St. Petersburg State

University of Film and Television

Essay

Polish-Swedish intervention

1609-1912

Performed: 1st year student

Faculty of SO

Semenova Daria

St. Petersburg 2010

Plan

I. Introduction ___________________________________________________ pages 2-5

II. Main part: Polish-Swedish intervention 1609-1612. _____ pp. 6-17

§ 1 The beginning of open intervention and the first people's militia __p. 6-11

§ 3 The second people's militia and the liberation of Moscow __________ pp. 12-15

III. Conclusion ___________________________________________________ pp. 16-17

IV. Bibliography ________________________________________________ page 18

Introduction

In the history of our state there were periods in which its independence and the identity of the people, if you like, were threatened. One such example is the hard times of the late 16th and early 17th centuries. Historians call this period in Russian history (from the death of Ivan the Terrible (1584) to the accession of Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov (1613) the Time of Troubles. The Troubles were the product of a severe internal and external crisis, which was structural in nature, i.e. all areas of life.

So, economic crisis, which is associated with the consequences of the Livonian War, the oprichnina, the growth of feudal exploitation, served as the basis for a social crisis. Social tension was observed in the lower classes due to the difficult economic situation, but the nobility also experienced social dissatisfaction. His increased role was little suited to his position. The ruling class claimed more, both in terms of material rewards for sovereign service and in career advancement.

Political crisis manifested itself in the fact that the monarchical tyrannical model of the relationship between government and society, imposed, as is known, by Ivan the Terrible, showed its inconsistency, because the social structure has undergone major changes. Thus, the main political question was on the agenda: who and how, with what rights and responsibilities will belong to the ruling stratum in the state, which has already ceased to be a collection of scattered lands and principalities, but has not yet completely turned into a single organic whole.

The political crisis gave rise to dynastic crisis, which did not end at all with the accession of B. Godunov, but, on the contrary, only flared up with renewed vigor.

I would also include within the framework of the structural crisis weakening of the moral and religious foundations of society, for during the reign of Ivan the Terrible, the moral prohibition on murder was essentially lifted, blood flowed like a river, and qualities such as servility, unscrupulousness and dexterity began to be valued.

Since the object of my essay is the Polish-Swedish intervention of 1609-1912, to begin with I decided on one of the central concepts of the essay - “intervention”. Intervention refers to the violent intervention of one or more states in the internal affairs of other countries and peoples. This intervention can be military (aggression), economic, diplomatic, ideological. In our case, the Polish-Swedish intervention can be defined as the military aggression of Poland and Sweden against Russia, which pursued both political and economic goals. The author of the abstract believes that two clearly visible periods can be distinguished in the Polish intervention. I would characterize the first as hidden, “anonymous” and its beginning was attributed to the accession of False Dmitry the First, i.e. by 1605. The second is in the nature of open intervention and begins with the Poles’ siege of Smolensk in 1609. During the essay I will try to prove this.

I classified all the literature used according to the following principle.

TO first group works I included the works of Russian historians: V.D. Sipovsky, G. Vernadsky and A.O. Ishimova.

All of them, considering the Polish-Swedish intervention, will pay attention to the personalities of False Dmitry I, Vasily Shuisky, False Dmitry II, and the role of Kuzma Minin and Dmitry Pozharsky in the fight against the interventionists. But if none of the presented authors doubts the enormous role of the latter in the victory of the Russian people, then, for example, there is a difference of opinion regarding False Dmitry the first. So V.D. Sipovsky calls him a talented and zealous politician, “who, without difficulty, without much difficulty, explained and solved problems that arose...”. The author believes that this tsar did a lot for the Russian state. And A.O. Ishimova calls him “a pretend tsar, because he never loved Russians and, in any case, preferred them to the Poles...”. From this he concludes that False Dmitry did more harm than good. But neither A.O. Ishimova nor V.D. Sipovsky say that already the period of his reign can be considered the beginning of the intervention. Historians noted the aggressive nature of the intervention, largely linking it with the internal political struggle and the personal qualities of Vasily Shuisky. Both authors agree that foreign intervention contributed to the civil and spiritual unification of the Russian people.

And G. Vernadsky, considering the basis of victory over the interventionists, uses the term “vertical solidarity”. By it, the author understands the spiritual rapprochement of all segments of the population, regardless of their social status and financial situation. The historian believes that vertical solidarity is characteristic of periods associated with external danger, i.e. the threat of losing the independence of their Fatherland. The author of the abstract agrees with this position.

Co. second group works I included the works of Russian and Soviet historians: A.N. Sakharov and V.I. Buganov, S.G. Pushkarev, N.I. Pavlenko and I.L. Andreev, A.V. Shishov. These authors consistently outline the history of the intervention, identify the reasons for the conspiracies against Boris Godunov and Vasily Shuisky, and talk about the activities of the leaders of the people's militia, Minin and Pozharsky. All these historians point out that the Russian Orthodox Church played a huge role in the process of national survival, which, coupled with the national awareness of the universal misfortune, helped the people unite, defining the primary tasks for that day, leading certain segments of the population away from solving their purely economic and political problems .

The literature studied allows me to put forward hypothesis: Polish-Swedish intervention 1609-1612. which almost led to the loss of Russia's independence, itself was a catalyst that accelerated the process of Russian society emerging from the deepest political crisis. I also believe that the Cossacks, as a special social stratum of Russian society, speaking under the banners of False Dmitry I and False Dmitry II, intensified the struggle between representatives of the upper class for a more privileged position in society, thereby accelerating the start of the open intervention of Poland and Sweden.

In connection with the above, the author puts the following purpose of the essay: show the Polish-Swedish intervention as the fundamental basis for the manifestation of vertical solidarity of the Russian people during the fight against the invaders, as well as the role of K. Minin and D. Pozharsky in the liberation of the country from the invaders.

Tasks the abstract are:

1. Study of literature on this issue;

2. Comparison of the points of view of different historians;

3. Presenting your own opinion.

Main part: Polish-Swedish intervention 1609-1612.

§ 1. The beginning of open intervention and the first people's militia.

At the beginning of the paragraph, I consider it possible to present my own opinion that in the Polish intervention of the Time of Troubles I trace two periods: the period of hidden, “anonymous” intervention and open intervention. The first, in my opinion, began with the arrival of False Dmitry I in Moscow, that is, in 1605. As an argument, I will cite the point of view of historians A.N. Sakharov and V.I. Buganov, which I do not dare doubt. Behind the name of False Dmitry the first “...as many then believed, was hiding a small nobleman from Galich, who after his wanderings became a monk, a novice with Patriarch Job in Moscow - Grigory Otrepiev. Having fled to Poland, he took the name of the late prince and claimed the right to the throne of the Moscow sovereigns. He was supported by the Polish king Sigismund, magnates, gentry and Catholic clergy, who dreamed of Russian lands and other riches. The papal ambassador Rangoni blessed the “prince” who secretly converted to Catholicism. Papal Rome hoped to bring the union of Catholicism and Orthodoxy to Russia and subordinate it to its influence.”

Thus, the authors clearly name the motives for the increased interest in Russia on the part of Poland and the Catholic Church already at the very beginning of the dynastic crisis. These are the territorial claims of the Polish gentry and the spiritual power of the Catholic Church. There is a hidden economic and ideological intervention.

In addition, historians pay special attention to the character traits of Grigory Otrepiev himself, which greatly satisfied both the Poles and the Pope. “A restless and gifted man by nature, the “prince” was obsessed with dreams of power, fame, and wealth.” Everything was going as well as possible. I also believe that Grigory Otrepiev’s aspirations were fueled by Polish adventurers, in particular, Marina Mniszek, the daughter of the Sandomirov governor Yuri Mniszek (a native of the Czech Republic), with whom he fell in love. The “Tsarevich” became engaged to her, promising her father, his father-in-law, Russian lands, money and privileges. Well, what about intervention, even if it’s not open? During this period, the Poles, with the support of the Catholic Church, used Grigory Otrepyev as a tool to interfere in the internal affairs of Russia.

Thus, I consider the above to be an argument in favor of the point of view that the intervention on the part of Poland began long before 1609, but was only of a hidden, “anonymous” nature. Although historians N.I. Pavlenko and I.L. Andreev do not call the reign of False Dmitry I an intervention, they use the term “adventure” for this period.

It can be considered that open intervention began in the fall of 1609, when the army of Sigismund III appeared near Smolensk, although the Polish king still remained loyal to Vasily Shuisky. The question arises: what was the reason for the Poles to openly oppose Russia?

We probably need to start with the defeat of I. Bolotnikov in the civil war of 1606-1607. (until 1608 the performance continued in the Urals). Because the defeat did not become a triumph for Shuisky, for soon a new center of attraction for opposition forces appeared in the person of False Dmitry II. It should be noted that False Dmitry II appeared in the city of Starodub, which was located on the border of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Russia. This is an important fact. Extremely diverse forces united around the new impostor, among which a special role was played by the so-called “Rokoshans” - participants in the action against the Polish king. For them, this was a new adventure, during which they hoped for a rich reward from False Dmitry II. He was also joined by the Polish detachments of Lisovsky, Hetman Ruzhinsky and later Hetman Sapieha. Russian forces also came here: the defeated detachments of Bolotnikov, the “free Cossacks” led by Ivan Zarutsky, all dissatisfied with Vasily Shuisky. Soon their camp appeared in the village of Tushino. The power of False Dmitry II soon spread over a significant territory. In fact, a kind of dual power was established in the country: two capitals - Moscow and Tushino, two sovereigns - Vasily Ivanovich and Dmitry Ivanovich, two patriarchs - Hermogenes and Filaret, who was brought by force to Tushino and “named” patriarch. In my opinion, during this period the moral impoverishment of society was manifested, when the nobles moved several times from one camp to another in order to receive rewards and retain what they had acquired in any case.

The outbreak of hostilities led to devastation and losses. In 1609, Hetman Sapieha besieged the Trinity-Sergius Monastery. Its defense contributed to the strengthening of national feeling and greatly damaged the impostor, the patron saint of the Poles, the destroyers of Orthodox shrines.

In this situation, Tsar Vasily Shuisky relied more not on patriotic feelings, but on real force. So in 1609 he concluded an agreement with Sweden, according to which, in exchange for the ceded Korelia volost, the Swedes provided military assistance to the Moscow sovereign.

In my opinion, this practice brought Vasily Shuisky more disadvantages than advantages. Firstly, this agreement violated the previous agreement with the Poles and gave Sigismund III a reason for open interference in Moscow affairs and overcoming the internal opposition that was preventing the war in the East. By the way, Sigismund took advantage of the situation of “general instability”, declaring that he came to Smolensk “for the sake of ending civil strife and unrest.” Secondly, under these conditions, the Poles no longer needed False Dmitry II, with whom they ceased to reckon, and the ranks of the rebels began to go over to the side of the Polish king. Which also did not improve the position of the Moscow Tsar. Despite the heroic defense of Smolensk from the Poles, led by the governor boyar M.B. Shein and lasting for 21 months, the Poles did not abandon their plans. Thus began the Polish Open Intervention.

And in February 1610, the Russian Tushins led by M.G. Saltykov concluded an agreement with Sigismund near Smolensk to call his son, Prince Vladislav, to the Moscow throne. The authors of the agreement sought to preserve the foundations of the Russian system of life: Vladislav had to maintain Orthodoxy, the previous administrative order and class structure. The power of the prince was limited to the Boyar Duma and even the Zemsky Sobor. A number of articles were supposed to protect the interests of the Russian nobility and boyars from the penetration of the “gentry”. It is noteworthy that the Tushins stipulated the right to travel for science to Christian lands. The treaty was a step in constituting the rights of the ruling classes according to the Polish model. I am sure that the main issue for the Russian Tushino residents was the religious issue. They insisted on Vladislav’s adoption of Orthodoxy, but Sigismund was categorically against it, because dreamed of a dynastic union of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Russia.

In April 1610, Prince M. Skopin-Shuisky died suddenly. There were rumors that he was poisoned by the brother of the childless king, D. Shuisky. This death had a detrimental effect on the Shuiskys in general, because they lost the only personality close to them that could unite all layers of Russian society.

In June 1610, Hetman Zholkiewski defeated the tsarist troops under the command, as N.I. Pavlenko and I.L. Andreev believe, of the “mediocre D. Shuisky...” near the village of Klushino near Mozhaisk. The battle was not distinguished by tenacity: the foreigners changed, the Russians were not going to fight to the death for Vasily Shuisky. In this situation, Zholkiewski moved towards Moscow. At the same time, False Dmitry II was moving from Kaluga to Moscow. As is known, he appealed to the residents to open the gates to the “natural sovereign.”

On July 17, 1610, the boyars and nobles, led by Zakhary Lyapunov, overthrew Vasily Shuisky from the throne. And on July 19, in order to avoid the restoration of Shuisky’s power, he was forcibly tonsured a monk. It is noteworthy that the conspirators explained the overthrow of Shuisky this way: “... they don’t like the Moscow State... and they don’t want to serve him, and internecine blood has been flowing for a long time...”. They, the conspirators, promised to elect a sovereign “with all the land, exiling all the cities...”. I dare say that the conspirators learned a good lesson from the period of Shuisky’s reign. After all, as you know, the king did not have the support of many cities and lands, and therefore they promised to elect a new king who would satisfy everyone. And before the elections, power passed to a government of seven boyars, the so-called “Seven Boyars”.

Attention should be paid to the fact that the conspirators, speaking out against Shuisky, hoped that the entourage of False Dmitry II would do the same to him. The Russians and Poles agreed that by removing these two odious figures, it would be possible to overcome discord. However, the impostor's supporters did not fulfill their promise. False Dmitry II continued to threaten the capture of Moscow, anarchy and changes in the composition of ruling individuals and social groups. In these conditions, having no real power, the “Seven Boyars” sought stability. And she found her by concluding an agreement to call Prince Vladislav to the Russian throne. The agreement largely repeated the agreement previously concluded by the Russian Tushins. But if the religious question remained open there, then Moscow now swore allegiance to the new sovereign with the obligatory condition that “... he, the sovereign, should be in our Orthodox faith of the Greek law...”. The treaty allowed the boyars to bring Polish troops into Moscow, and False Dmitry II, together with Zarutsky’s “free Cossacks,” retreated to Kaluga.

All the historians I presented agree on how the Poles behaved in Moscow. They behaved like conquerors, arrogantly, boorishly, and did not hesitate to openly declare their intentions. Prince Vladislav did not appear. The governor, Alexander Gonsevsky, ruled on his behalf, relying on a narrow circle of Russian boyars. The articles of the August Treaty were violated, and the siege of Smolensk continued. To resolve the situation, a grand embassy was sent to the royal camp for negotiations, which, as we know, reached a dead end. Sigismund refused to lift the siege of Smolensk and release 15-year-old Vladislav to Moscow. His position regarding Vladislav’s adoption of Orthodoxy remained unchanged. Moreover, it soon became known about the king’s secret intention to ascend to the Russian throne himself. The situation was not resolved, but only worsened with the arrest of Russian ambassadors on the orders of Sigismund.

The country was on the brink of destruction. Firstly, society was split into hostile camps. Secondly, discord and class egoism prevailed. Thirdly, there was a Polish garrison in Moscow, and the country was ruled by a puppet government. And, fourthly, the overthrow of Vasily Shuisky freed the hands of Charles IX, Sigismund's enemy, and the Swedes occupied a significant part of northwestern Russia.

In my opinion, the church and church leaders played a huge role in this tragic time. In particular, Patriarch Hermogenes, and later the abbot of the Trinity-Sergius Monastery Dionysius. It was Hermogenes who led the religious-national forces and freed his subjects from the oath to Vladislav and called for resistance. It was the church that gave the national liberation movement a national idea - the defense of Orthodoxy and the restoration of the Orthodox kingdom. The healthy forces of society are consolidating around this idea. The idea of ​​convening a national militia arises. Detachments of free Cossacks I. Zarutsky and Prince D. Trubetskoy joined the noble detachments of P. Lyapunov and formed the First Militia.

In the spring of 1611, the militia besieged Moscow, occupying part of the city. And the day before, an uprising broke out here, in which Dmitry Pozharsky was an active participant. There he was wounded, and he was taken to his Nizhny Novgorod estate. Having no strength, the Poles completely burned out the settlement.

The militia created the highest temporary authority of the country - the Council of the Whole Land. But he acted, according to G. Vernadsky, indecisively, and was constrained by internal disagreements and mutual suspicions. The Cossacks did not get along well with the nobles; the latter were afraid of the Cossacks, seeing in the Cossack villages shelters for fugitives, and in the Cossacks themselves - rivals in the service.

In this situation, Lyapunov wanted to restore order by force and dealt with several Cossacks. On July 22, 1611, Lyapunov was summoned to the Cossack circle and killed. With the death of Lyapunov, the first militia disintegrated. The nobles left the camp near Moscow. The Cossacks continued the siege, but their forces were too small to cope with the Polish garrison. These events coincided with the fall of Smolensk in early June 1611. Sigismund openly declared his intention to sit on the Moscow throne. The Swedes also became more active. On July 16, they captured Novgorod, whose authorities agreed to an agreement with Charles IX, which provided for the election of his son Charles Philip as king. Russia again found itself on the brink of destruction. Proof of this can be the fact that the most popular journalistic genre of that time was “lamentations” about the destruction of the Russian land.

At the end of the first paragraph, I dare to summarize first results:

1. In my opinion, the concept of “hidden intervention” rather than “adventure” is still more suitable for the period of the reign of False Dmitry I;
2. The non-recognition of the power of Vasily Shuisky by many cities and lands intensified the political crisis within the state, increasingly splitting Russian society. He failed to become a force capable of consolidating it. And the conciliatory policy with the Poles and Swedes led to its logical conclusion - open intervention;
3. Representatives of the upper class - boyars and nobles - during this period were most interested not in the fate of the Fatherland, but in their own social position and material well-being;
4. In the national unification of the Russian people, the Russian Orthodox Church and its leaders played a huge role - Patriarch Hermogenes and Abbot Dionysius;
5. The Cossacks are beginning to be a significant social force;
6. The behavior of the Poles, Swedes and Russian boyars and nobles in our country contributed to the creation of the first people's militia, in which various strata of Russian society were represented, but a special role in it was played by the “Zemstvo people” and the Cossacks. A patriotic upsurge begins.

§ 2. The second people's militia and the liberation of Moscow

After the collapse of the first militia, the zemshchina again showed the ability to revive. In provincial cities, a movement begins to organize a second militia. In the fall of 1611, the head of the Nizhny Novgorod settlement, Kuzma Minin, made an appeal to “...sacrifice everything for the liberation of Russia...”. Under his leadership, the city council began to raise funds to recruit military men. There were all sorts of things in the history of the creation of the second militia. But the most striking thing, in my opinion, is the patriotic impulse, the readiness for self-sacrifice that swept the masses. A governor was also elected, distinguished by his “strength and inner honesty” - Dmitry Pozharsky. The latter, together with the “elected person” Kuzma Minin, headed the new Council of the Whole Land.

The second militia did not immediately advance to Moscow. Having risen up the Volga, it stood in Yaroslavl for more than four months, completing the organization of the government and the main orders. This was necessary in order, firstly, to gather strength and resources, relying on the less devastated northern cities, and, secondly, to come to an agreement with the “free Cossacks”. Lyapunov's fate was still too memorable to ignore the importance of such an action. This fact eloquently confirms my opinion that the Cossacks are becoming a real force in the state.

Meanwhile, a split occurred in the troops near Moscow. The ambitious I. Zarutsky, who dreamed of an independent role, went with his supporters to Kolomna, where Marina Mnishek and her son from False Dmitry II, Ivan the Little Raven, as defined by his contemporaries, were located. The name of Ivan Dmitrievich, the “legitimate” heir to the throne, gave Zarutsky the desired freedom of action and independence.

The remaining part of the free Cossacks at one time swore allegiance to the next False Dmitry III, who showed up in Pskov. However, the impostor idea greatly compromised itself, and the Cossacks soon retreated from the “Pskov thief.”

In August 1612, the second militia arrived near Moscow. Already in September, the governors near Moscow agreed to “access” Moscow together and “to want the best of the Russian state in everything without any cunning.” A single government was formed, which henceforth acted on behalf of both governors, princes Trubetskoy and Pozharsky.

Even before this, in the 20th of August, the militia repelled an attempt by Hetman Khotkevich to liberate the besieged Polish garrison. However, the Poles persisted. Each time they were thrown back by Pozharsky-Minin’s militia and Trubetskoy’s detachments, either west of the Borovitsky Gate, or at the Donskoy Monastery. Having not achieved success, having lost many people and carts of food, the hetman left from near Moscow. They felt sorry to part with the rich booty looted in Moscow. They strongly hoped for the king's help. But at this time, Sigismund faced a number of difficulties: the gentry, in particular, feared the autocratic aspirations of the king, strengthened by the resources of Moscow, and limited his strength. Sigismund was forced to retreat. The Polish and Lithuanian people were exhausted. But the siege and fighting continued. On October 22, Kitay-Gorod was captured. Famine began in the Kremlin, and the besieged capitulated on October 26, 1612. The militia solemnly entered Moscow - the heart of all of Russia, which was liberated by the efforts of the people, who showed endurance, fortitude, and courage in a difficult hour for Russia, and saved their country from a national catastrophe.

The “Council of the Whole Earth” convened representatives of different classes of the population at the Zemsky Sobor (A.N. Sakharov and B.I. Buganov call the clergy, boyars, nobility, townspeople, Cossacks, black-growing peasants). In January 1613, he elected as king the young Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov, the son of the Tushino patriarch Filaret, in the world - boyar Fyodor Nikitich Romanov, a female relative of the kings Ivan the Terrible and Fyodor Ivanovich. The election of the king meant the revival of the country, the protection of its sovereignty, independence and identity.

At the end of this paragraph, I dare to make the following conclusions:

1. Vertical solidarity manifested itself most strongly during the creation and activity of the second people's militia. It was expressed in the fact that representatives of all segments of the population, as if in a single impulse, united to fight the interventionists. This fight, as is known, was led by representatives of the nobility - princes D. Pozharsky, D. Trubetskoy and the “elected person” Kuzma Minin. Both princes enjoyed enormous prestige for their personal qualities and were trusted. The Cossacks also took an active part in the fight against the invaders. Let me give you an example. The Polish king tried to take Volok (modern Volokolamsk). He stormed it three times, but all the assaults were successfully repulsed by the Cossack garrison and local residents, commanded by the Cossack atamans Nelyub Markov and Ivan Epanchin. The peasants also did not stand aside. They created partisan detachments, which by their actions kept the Poles in constant tension. And the common population of Russian cities offered heroic resistance. An illustrative example is the resilience of the residents of the small town of Pogoreloye Gorodishche, who successfully withstood the onslaught of the interventionists and did not surrender their village.

2. A few words about the Cossacks. Whatever you say, the Cossacks were already a privileged military class. Self-government, the right not to extradite fugitives and not to pay taxes to the state treasury - all these were privileges in exchange for border protection and military service. In conditions of general turmoil, the Cossacks also made attempts to move up the social ladder and achieve new privileges. Therefore, we see their active participation both on the side of the impostors and in the fight against the invaders. Thus, during the Time of Troubles, the Cossacks showed themselves to be a real force to be reckoned with.

3. The creation and activity of the second people's militia is a vivid example for considering the question of the role of the masses and individuals in history. The liberation of Moscow is associated with the names of great Russian people - Kuzma Minin and Dmitry Pozharsky. They were comrades-in-arms in serving the Fatherland and will forever remain in the people's memory. Their names are inseparable in the history of our country. I can’t help but give an example related to Peter the Great. In the spring of 1695, Peter arrived in Nizhny Novgorod to build a fleet and, first of all, asked: “Where is Kuzma Minin buried?” With great difficulty, local authorities found the grave of the national hero. Peter immediately ordered the ashes of the Russian patriot to be transferred to the Nizhny Novgorod Kremlin and buried in the tomb of the Transfiguration Cathedral. When this was done, he knelt before the tomb, saying: “Here lies the savior of Russia.” Peter ordered these words to be written on the tomb of “the chosen person by the whole earth” Kuzma Minin. But the most famous monument to the great Russian patriots was erected in Moscow, on Red Square. It was built according to the design of the architect I.P. Martos using money raised by the people. On the pedestal of the monument there is an inscription: “To Citizen Minin and Prince Pozharsky, grateful Russia. Summer of 1818." This monument perpetuates the memory of thousands of other heroes who died during the Troubles. And this memory is sacred.

Conclusion

With the liberation of Moscow, the turmoil did not end yet. Finally, in my opinion, it is important to consider the difficulties that the new government had to face.

First: gangs of robbers and interventionists roamed the cities and villages. I will give just one example, but it is very illustrative. One such Polish detachment operated in Kostroma and neighboring counties. The ancestral lands of the mother of the newly elected king were located here. It was winter. The Poles appeared in one of the Romanov villages, seized the headman Ivan Susanin and demanded that he show them the way to where his young master was. Susanin led them into the wilds and, having died himself under the sabers of the enemies, destroyed the detachment. The feat of the Kostroma peasant played a role not only in the salvation of Mikhail Fedorovich, but also in preventing a new unrest in the country in the event of the death of young Romanov. In connection with these events, the Moscow authorities are sending military detachments everywhere, and they are gradually liberating the country from bandit gangs.

Second: In the fall of 1618, the grown-up prince Vladislav undertook a campaign in Russia, which ended unsuccessfully. On December 1, 1618, in the village of Deulino, near the Trinity-Sergius Monastery, a truce was concluded with the Poles for 14.5 years. Military operations ceased. But Poland retained Smolensk and some cities along the southwestern border.

Third: Peace was established in relations with Sweden on February 27, 1617 (Treaty of Stolbov). According to it, lands were transferred to Sweden along the southern and eastern shores of the Gulf of Finland with the cities of Yam, Koporye, Ivan-gorod, and Oreshok. Russia has again lost access to the Baltic Sea.

Despite the territorial losses, the task of “pacification” with neighboring countries was solved. But internal matters remained.

First of all, these were the ongoing unrest and uprisings of the offended people. During these years, the rebels captured Cheboksary, Tsivilsk, Sanchursk and other cities in the Volga region, Vyatka district and others. Nizhny Novgorod and Kazan were besieged. In Pskov and Astrakhan, for a long time, local “better” and “lesser” people waged a fierce struggle among themselves. In Pskov, for example, the rebels installed smerds in power, removing governors, boyars and nobles from affairs. Impostors operated in both Pskov and Astrakhan.

Under these conditions, the Romanov government organizes a fight against the rebels. The civil war is coming to an end. But its echoes will be heard for several more years, until 1618.

The Troubles, also called by contemporaries the “Moscow or Lithuanian ruin,” ended. It left serious consequences. Many cities and villages lay in ruins. Russia has lost many of its sons and daughters. Agriculture and crafts were ruined, and commercial life faded away. The Russian people returned to the ashes, began, as had been the custom from time immemorial, to a sacred task - they revived their homes and arable lands, workshops and trade caravans.

The Time of Troubles greatly weakened Russia and its people, but also showed its strength.

Thus, the Polish-Swedish intervention of 1609-1612. was a catalyst for Russia's recovery from the political crisis. The author of the abstract considers his hypothesis proven and his goal achieved.

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A.N.Sakharov, V.I.Buganov “History of Russia from ancient times to the end of the 17th century”, M., “Enlightenment”, 1997, sir 245

Beginning of the 17th century. was marked by a general political crisis, and social contradictions intensified. All layers of society were dissatisfied with the rule of Boris Godunov. Taking advantage of the weakening of statehood, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Sweden attempted to seize Russian lands and include it in the sphere of influence of the Catholic Church.

In 1601, a man appeared who pretended to be Tsarevich Dmitry, who had miraculously escaped. He turned out to be a runaway monk, deacon of the Chudov Monastery, Grigory Otrepiev. The appearance of False Dmitry 1st in 1601-1602. in the Polish possessions in Ukraine, where he declared his claims to the royal throne in Rus', served as a pretext for the start of intervention. In Poland, False Dmitry turned for help to the Polish gentry and King Sigismund 3rd. To get closer to the Polish elite, False Dmitry converted to Catholicism and promised, if successful, to make this religion the state religion in Rus', and also to give Western Russian lands to Poland.

In October 1604, False Dmitry I invaded Russia. The army, joined by runaway peasants, Cossacks, and servicemen, quickly advanced towards Moscow. In April 1605, Boris Godunov died, his warriors went over to the side of the pretender. Fedor, Godunov's 16-year-old son, was unable to retain power. Moscow went over to the side of False Dmitry 1st. The young tsar and his mother were killed, and on June 20 a new “autocrat” entered the capital.

In 1617, the Peace of Stolbov was concluded between Russia and Sweden. Russia returned Novgorod, but lost the coast of the Gulf of Finland. In 1618, the Deulin truce was concluded with Poland, which received Smolensk, Chernigov and Novgorod-Seversk lands. Despite the dire consequences of the Swedish-Polish intervention, Russia retained the most important thing - its statehood.

The Polish intervention is closely connected with the events of the Russian Time of Troubles, in which Poland took a very active part. In an effort to strengthen his position in the fight against False Dmitry II, Tsar Vasily IV Shuisky entered into an alliance with Sweden in February 1609, which provided for Sweden to provide Russia with a significant army of mercenaries in exchange for the Korelu fortress with the district.

The alliance of Russia and Sweden, which occurred during the Polish-Swedish war, gave the Polish king Sigismund III a reason to openly oppose Russia. The events of the Polish intervention are intertwined with the events of the subsequent Swedish intervention of 1611-1617.

Smolensk defense. In the fall of 1609, a 12,000-strong Polish army, supported by 10,000 Ukrainian Cossacks (Polish subjects), besieged Smolensk. At that time, Smolensk was the most powerful Russian fortress. In 1586-1602. The fortress walls and towers of Smolensk were rebuilt by the famous architect Fyodor Kon. The total length of the fortress walls was 6.5 km, height 13-19 m with a thickness of 5-6 m. 170 cannons were installed on them.

An attempt at a surprise night assault on September 24, 1609 ended in failure. At the beginning of 1610, the Poles tried to make tunnels, but they were discovered in a timely manner and blown up by Smolensk miners. In the spring of 1610, Russian troops with Swedish mercenaries marched towards Smolensk against the army of King Sigismund, but were defeated at the village of Klushino (north of Gzhatsk - 06/24/1610). It seemed that nothing could prevent the capture of the fortress. However, the garrison and residents of Smolensk on July 19 and 24, and August 11 successfully repelled the attack attempts. In September 1610 and March 1611, King Sigismund negotiated with the goal of persuading the besieged to capitulate, but did not achieve the goal. However, the position of the fortress after almost two years of siege was critical. Of the 80 thousand townspeople, only a tenth survived. On the night of June 3, 1611, the Poles from four sides launched the fifth, which turned out to be the last, attack. The city was taken.

First militia (1611). The defeat of Russian troops at the village of Klushino (06/24/1610) accelerated the overthrow of Vasily IV Shuisky (July 1610) and the establishment of the power of the boyar government ("Seven Boyars"). Meanwhile, two troops approached Moscow: Zholkievsky and False Dmitry II from Kaluga. The Poles proposed to elevate Sigismund's son, Vladislav, to the Moscow throne. Fearing False Dmitry, the Moscow nobility decided to agree with Vladislav’s candidacy, because they were afraid of reprisals from the Tushins. In addition, at the request of the Moscow boyars, who feared an attack by the troops of False Dmitry II, a Polish garrison under the command of Alexander Gonsevsky (5-7 thousand people) entered Moscow in the fall of 1610.

It soon became clear that Sigismund was in no hurry to send his son to the Moscow throne, but wanted to manage Russia himself as a conquered country. This is what, for example, residents of the Smolensk region wrote to their compatriots, having already experienced the power of Sigismund, who, by the way, first promised them various liberties. “We did not resist - and we all died, we went into eternal work towards Latinism. If you are not now in union, in common with the whole earth, then you will cry bitterly and sob with inconsolable eternal crying: the Christian faith in Latinism will change, and the Divine churches will be ruined with your Christian race will be killed with all cruelty, and your Christian race will be enslaved and desecrated, and your mothers, wives and children will be taken away." The authors of the letter warned about the real intentions of the invaders: “To bring out the best people, to devastate all the lands, to take possession of all the land of Moscow.”

In December 1610, False Dmitry II died in a quarrel with his servants. Thus, the opponents of Vladislav and the “Tushinsky Thief” were left with one enemy - the foreign prince, against whom they opposed. The inspiration for the campaign was the Orthodox Church. At the end of 1610, Patriarch Hermogenes sent letters throughout the country with a call to go against the Gentiles. For this, the Poles arrested the patriarch. But the call was received, and militia detachments moved towards Moscow from everywhere. By Easter 1611, some of them reached the capital, where the uprising of the townspeople began. On March 19, a detachment of Prince Dmitry Pozharsky arrived to help them. But the Poles took refuge behind the fortress walls of the center of Moscow. On the advice of the boyars who remained with them, they set fire to the rest of the city, driving out the attackers from there with fire.

With the arrival of the main forces of the militia (up to 100 thousand people) in early April, the fighting resumed. The militia occupied the main part of the White City, pushing the Poles towards Kitay-Gorod and the Kremlin. On the night of May 21-22, a decisive assault on Kitai-Gorod followed, but the besieged managed to repel it. Despite their large numbers, the militia was unable to achieve its goals. It did not have a unified structure, discipline, or general leadership. The social composition of the militia was also heterogeneous, among whom were nobles and their former serfs and Cossacks. The interests of both regarding the future social structure of Russia were directly opposite.

The noble militia was led by Prokopiy Lyapunov, the Cossacks and former Tushins - Ataman Ivan Zarutsky and Prince Dmitry Trubetskoy. However, intense rivalry began among the main leaders of the movement. On July 22, 1611, Lyapunov was killed on false accusations of intentions against the Cossacks. The Cossacks began beating his supporters, forcing them to leave the camp and go home. Mostly only the detachments of Trubetskoy and Zarutsky remained near Moscow.

Meanwhile, in August, a detachment of Hetman Sapieha managed to break through to Moscow and delivered food to the besieged. At the end of September, the Polish detachment of Hetman Chodkiewicz (2 thousand people) also approached the capital. During several skirmishes he was repulsed and retreated. The last major attempt by the First Militia to liberate Moscow was made in December 1611. The Cossacks, led by Ataman Prosovetsky, blew up the gates of Kitay-Gorod and broke into the fortress. But the Poles repelled the assault with fire from 30 guns. After this failure, the First Militia virtually disintegrated.

Second militia (1612). The condition of the Russian state only worsened in 1611. Sigismund's army finally captured Smolensk. There was a Polish garrison in Moscow. The Swedes took Novgorod. Foreign and local gangs roamed freely throughout the country, robbing the population. The top leadership ended up in captivity or on the side of the invaders. The state was left without any real central authority. “A little more - and Russia would have become a province of some Western European state, as was the case with India,” wrote the German researcher Schulze-Gevernitz.

True, the Poles, weakened by a long and unsuccessful war with the Swedes and the siege of Smolensk, could not seriously begin to conquer Russian lands. In the conditions of intervention, the collapse of the central government and the army, the last line of defense for Russia became popular resistance, illuminated by the idea of ​​public unity in the name of defending the Motherland. The class contradictions characteristic of the first stages of the Time of Troubles give way to a national-religious movement for the territorial and spiritual integrity of the country. The Russian Orthodox Church acted as a force that united all social groups and stood up in defense of national dignity. Patriarch Hermogenes, imprisoned in the Kremlin, continued to distribute appeals through his associates - letters, calling on his compatriots to fight infidels and troublemakers. The Trinity-Sergius Monastery also became the center of patriotic propaganda, where appeals were written by Archimandrite Dionysius and cellarer Abraham Palitsyn.

One of the letters went to the Nizhny Novgorod zemstvo elder, meat merchant Kuzma Minin. In the fall of 1611, he spoke in Nizhny Novgorod before his fellow citizens, calling on them to give up their strength and property to defend the Fatherland. He himself made the first contribution, allocating a third of his funds (100 rubles) to create a militia. The majority of Nizhny Novgorod residents decided to do so. Those who refused were forced. Prince Dmitry Pozharsky was invited to lead the militia.

In January 1612 The militia moved to Yaroslavl, establishing its power in the northeastern regions. The second militia was more homogeneous than the first. It consisted mainly of servicemen, zemstvo people of North-Eastern Rus'. The militia did not immediately go to Moscow, but stopped in Yaroslavl to strengthen their rear and expand the base of their movement. But they soon learned that a large detachment of Hetman Chodkiewicz was coming to the capital to help the Polish garrison. Then Pozharsky hurried to Moscow.

Approaching the capital, the Second Militia (approximately 10 thousand people) took up positions near the Novodevichy Convent, on the left bank of the Moscow River. On the right bank, in Zamoskvorechye, there were Cossack detachments of Prince Trubetskoy (2.5 thousand people), who had been stationed near Moscow since the time of the First Militia. Soon Khodkevich’s detachment (up to 12 thousand people) approached the capital, with whom the militia entered into battle at the Novodevichy Convent on August 22. Gradually, the Poles pushed the militias back to the Chertolsky Gate (area of ​​Prechistenka and Ostozhenka streets). At this critical moment of the battle, part of the Cossacks from Trubetskoy’s camp crossed the river and attacked Khodkevich’s detachment, which could not withstand the onslaught of fresh forces and retreated to the Novodevichy Convent.

However, on the night of August 23, a small part of Khodkevich’s detachment (600 people) still managed to penetrate into the Kremlin among the besieged (3 thousand people) and in the morning they made a successful foray, capturing a bridgehead on the banks of the Moscow River. On August 23, Khodkevich’s detachment crossed to Zamoskvorechye and occupied the Donskoy Monastery. The Poles decided to break through to the besieged through Trubetskoy’s positions, hoping for the instability of his troops and the disagreements of the Russian military leaders. In addition, Zamoskvorechye, which was burned by fires, was poorly fortified. But Pozharsky, having learned about the hetman’s plans, managed to transport part of his forces there to help Trubetskoy.

On August 24, a decisive battle broke out. The most brutal battle ensued for the Klimentovsky prison (Pyatnitskaya Street), which changed hands more than once. In this battle, cellarer Abraham Palitsyn distinguished himself, who at a critical moment persuaded the Cossacks not to retreat. Inspired by the priest's speech and the promised reward, they launched a counterattack and recaptured the fort in a fierce battle. By evening he remained with the Russians, but there was no decisive victory. Then a detachment led by Minin (300 people) crossed to Zamoskvorechye from the left bank of the river. With an unexpected blow to the flank, he attacked the Poles, causing confusion in their ranks. At this time, the Russian infantry, entrenched in the ruins of Zamoskvorechye, also launched an attack. This double blow decided the outcome of the battle. Khodkevich, having lost half of his detachment in three-day battles, retreated from Moscow to the west.

“The Poles suffered such a significant loss,” wrote the 17th-century Polish historian Kobierzycki, that nothing could be compensated for it. The wheel of fortune turned, and the hope of taking possession of the entire Moscow state collapsed irrevocably.” On October 26, 1612, the remnants of the Polish garrison in the Kremlin, driven to despair by hunger, capitulated. The liberation of the Russian capital from the interventionists created the conditions for the restoration of state power in the country.

Defense of Volokolamsk (1612). After the liberation of Moscow by the forces of the Second Militia, the Polish king Sigismund began to gather forces with the goal of recapturing the Russian capital. But the Polish nobility was tired of the war and for the most part did not want to participate in the dangerous winter campaign. As a result, the king managed to recruit only 5 thousand people for such a serious operation. Despite the obvious lack of strength, Sigismund still did not retreat from his plan and in December 1612 set out on a campaign against Moscow. On the way, his army besieged Volokolamsk, where there was a garrison under the command of governors Karamyshev and Chemesov. The city's defenders rejected the offer to surrender and valiantly repelled three attacks, inflicting serious damage on Sigismund's army. The Cossack atamans Markov and Epanchin especially distinguished themselves in battle, who, according to the chronicle, actually led the defense of the city.

While Sigismund was besieging Volokolamsk, one of his detachments under the command of Zholkovsky went for reconnaissance to Moscow, but was defeated in a battle near the city. This defeat, as well as the failure of the main forces near Volokolamsk, did not allow Sigismund to continue his attack on the Russian capital. The king lifted the siege and retreated to Poland. This made it possible to unhinderedly hold the Zemsky Sobor in Moscow, which chose a new tsar - Mikhail Romanov.

Lisovsky's raid (1614). In the summer of 1614, a Polish-Lithuanian cavalry detachment under the command of Colonel Lisovsky (3 thousand people) made a deep raid across Russian lands. The raid began from the Bryansk region. Then Lisovsky approached Orel, where he fought with the army of Prince Pozharsky. The Poles overthrew the Russian vanguard of governor Islenyev, but the resilience of the soldiers remaining with Pozharsky (600 people) did not allow Lisovsky to build on his success. By evening, Islenyev’s fleeing units returned to the battlefield, and Lisovsky’s detachment retreated to Kromy. Then he moved to Vyazma and Mozhaisk. Soon Pozharsky fell ill and went to Kaluga for treatment. After this, his detachment disintegrated due to the military men leaving for their homes, and Lisovsky was able to continue his campaign unhindered.

His path ran through the Kostroma, Yaroslavl, Murom and Kaluga regions. Lisovsky went around large cities, devastating their surroundings. Several commanders were sent in pursuit of the elusive detachment, but they were unable to block his path anywhere. Near Aleksin, Lisovsky had a clash with the army of Prince Kurakin, and then left Russian borders. The successes of the "lisovchiki" testified not only to the talents of their leader, but also to the difficult state of Russia, which was not yet able to effectively protect itself from raids. Lisovsky's raid did not have much impact on the course of the Russian-Polish war, but left a long memory in the Moscow state.

Astrakhan campaign (1614). If Lisovsky managed to avoid retribution, then another major “hero” of the Time of Troubles was captured that year. We are talking about Ivan Zarutsky. Back in 1612, he tried to destroy Pozharsky with the help of hired killers, and then left Moscow to the south with the radical part of the Cossacks. Along the way, the ataman captured the wife of two False Dmitrys - Marina Mnishek, who lived with her son in Kaluga after the murder of False Dmitry II. In 1613, with a detachment of Cossacks (2-3 thousand people), Zarutsky tried to again raise the southern regions of Russia against Moscow. But the population, convinced over the last terrible years of the destructiveness of civil strife, did not support the ataman. In May 1613, in the battle of Voronezh, Zarutsky was defeated by the army of governor Odoevsky and retreated even further to the south. Ataman captured Astrakhan and decided to create an independent state there under the auspices of the Iranian Shah.

But the Cossacks, tired of the turmoil and attracted by the promises of the new Moscow government to accept them into service, did not support the ataman. Residents of Astrakhan treated Zarutsky with open hostility. The Shah of Iran also refused help, not wanting to quarrel with Moscow. Without any serious support, Zarutsky and Marina Mnishek fled from Astrakhan at the news of government troops approaching the city. The formidable ataman in the past was soon defeated by a small detachment (700 people) of the tsarist governor Vasily Khokhlov. Zarutsky tried to hide on the Yaik River, but local Cossacks handed him over to the authorities. Ataman and Marina's son Mnishek were executed, and Marina herself was imprisoned, where she died. With the liberation of Astrakhan, the most dangerous source of internal unrest was eliminated.

Moscow campaign of Vladislav (1618). The last major event of the Russian-Polish war was the march to Moscow of troops led by the prince Vladislav (10 thousand Poles, 20 thousand Ukrainian Cossacks) in the fall of 1618. The Polish prince tried to take possession of Moscow in the hope of restoring his rights to the Russian throne. On September 20, the Polish army approached the Russian capital and set up a camp in the famous Tushino. At this time, detachments of Ukrainian Cossacks (subjects of Poland) led by Hetman Sagaidachny approached the Donskoy Monastery from the south. The Muscovites tried to prevent his connection with Vladislav, but, according to the chronicle, they were attacked by such fear that they let the hetman’s army through to Tushino without a fight. The horror of the townspeople was increased by the comet that stood over the city in those days.

Nevertheless, when the Poles attacked Moscow on the night of October 1, they met a worthy rebuff. The hottest battle broke out at the Arbat Gate, where a detachment of archers led by steward Nikita Godunov (487 people) distinguished himself. After a fierce battle, he managed to repel the breakthrough of Polish units under the command of Cavalier Novodvorsky. Having lost 130 people in this case, the Poles retreated. Their attack on the Tverskaya Gate also did not bring success.

Truce of Deulino (1618). After an unsuccessful assault, negotiations began, and soon the opponents, tired of the struggle (the Poles were then at war with Turkey and were already beginning a new clash with Sweden), concluded the Deulino truce for fourteen and a half years. Under its terms, Poland retained a number of Russian territories it had captured: Smolensk, Novgorod-Severskie and Chernigov lands.

1. Polish-Swedish intervention. general characteristics

The Polish-Swedish intervention was an attempt by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to establish its dominance over Russia during the Time of Troubles.

At the beginning of the 17th century. Polish and Swedish feudal lords, taking advantage of the weakening of the Russian state caused by the unfolding struggle within the ruling class, began intervention. They wanted the dismemberment of the Russian state and the enslavement of its peoples. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth resorted to a disguised intervention, supporting False Dmitry I. In return, False Dmitry I promised to transfer the western regions of the Russian state to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (and partly to his father-in-law J. Mniszek), support it in the fight against Sweden, introduce Catholicism in Russia and take part in the anti-Turkish coalition. However, after his accession, False Dmitry I, for various reasons, refused to make territorial concessions to Poland and conclude a military alliance against Sweden. The murder of the impostor in May 1606 during the anti-Polish uprising in Moscow meant the collapse of the first attempt at aggression by the Polish feudal lords against Russia.

The beginning of the 17th century was marked by a general political crisis, and social contradictions intensified. All layers of society were dissatisfied with the rule of Boris Godunov. Taking advantage of the weakening of statehood, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Sweden attempted to seize Russian lands and include it in the sphere of influence of the Catholic Church.

In 1601, a man appeared who pretended to be the miraculously saved Tsarevich Dmitry, the son of Ivan the Terrible. The pretext for the start of the intervention was the appearance of False Dmitry in 1601-1602. in the Polish possessions in Ukraine, where he declared his claims to the royal throne in Rus'. In Poland, False Dmitry turned for help to the Polish gentry and King Sigismund III. To get closer to the Polish elite, False Dmitry converted to Catholicism and promised, if successful, to make this religion the state religion in Rus', and also to give Western Russian lands to Poland.

In October 1604, False Dmitry invaded Russia. The army, joined by runaway peasants, Cossacks, and servicemen, quickly advanced towards Moscow. In April 1605, Boris Godunov died, and his warriors went over to the side of the pretender. Fedor, Godunov's 16-year-old son, was unable to retain power. Moscow went over to the side of False Dmitry. However, he did not live up to expectations: he did not give the outskirts of Russia to the Poles and did not convert the Russians to Catholicism. In May 1606, an uprising broke out in Moscow, False Dmitry I was overthrown and killed. Boyar Vasily Shuisky was “shouted out” as king on Red Square. In 1607, a new impostor appeared in the city of Starodub, posing as Tsarevich Dmitry.

He gathered an army from representatives of the oppressed lower classes, Cossacks, service people and detachments of Polish adventurers. False Dmitry II approached Moscow and camped in Tushino (hence the nickname “Tushino Thief”). A large number of Moscow boyars and princes went over to his side.

In the spring of 1609 M.V. Skopin-Shuisky (the Tsar's nephew), having gathered detachments of people's militia from Smolensk, the Volga region, and the Moscow region, lifted the 16,000-strong siege of the Trinity Lavra of St. Sergius. The army of False Dmitry II was defeated, he himself fled to Kaluga, where he was killed.

In February 1609, Shuisky concluded an agreement with Sweden. This gave the Polish king, who was at war with Sweden, a reason to declare war on Russia. Open intervention began under the leadership of Sigismund III. The Polish army under the command of Hetman Zholkiewski moved towards Moscow, and near the village of Klushino it defeated the troops of Shuiski. The king finally lost the trust of his subjects and was overthrown from the throne in July 1610. After the overthrow of Shuisky, a provisional government of seven boyars was established in the country, and the period of the so-called “Seven Boyars” began. But, fearing the expansion of the newly flared peasant unrest, the Moscow boyars invited the son of Sigismund III, Vladislav, to the throne, and surrendered Moscow to Polish troops.

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The Poles at that time fought very often with Russia. They simply could not help but notice the weakness in which the latter was. In 1606, Bolotnikov’s uprising occurred, which was supported by the south of Russia. In 1607, the army of the allegedly newly saved Tsarevich Dmitry (False Dmitry II) moved to Rus' from Poland. With difficulty, in 1608, Shuisky’s troops defeated Bolotnikov, executing him. The situation was more complicated with False Dmitry II, who was nicknamed the Tushino thief. He stood at the head of a 30,000-strong Polish army, and he was joined by Cossacks and ordinary people who did not recognize Shuisky or who simply wanted to profit from robberies. They conquered many cities west of Moscow. Most of them surrendered without problems; they found serious problems during the storming of the Trinity-Sergei Lavra. The defenders of which stood to the death. Vasily Shuisky turned to the Swedes for help, they agreed to help the Russians for money. This probably provoked Poland to openly attack Rus', because Poland and Sweden were enemies then. In 1609, the troops of the Polish king Sigismund III began the assault on Smolensk. And yet, Russian troops led by the talented commander Skopin-Shuisky defeated the Tushinsky thief. But in May 1610 this wonderful commander died, probably poisoned by the boyars. The Poles gradually defeated the Russian troops, on top of everything else, the Swedes stopped helping us and even captured the Russian city of Novgorod. In June 1610, as a result of a conspiracy among the boyars, Vasily Shuisky was overthrown and tonsured a monk. Moscow began to be ruled by a council of boyars (Semiboyarshchina). They decided to invite the Polish prince Vladislav to the Russian throne and allowed the Poles into Moscow. Russia was in a very difficult situation, many Russian people simply organized themselves into gangs and engaged in robberies, this is how they behaved and southern Cossacks. It was the apogee of the Time of Troubles in Russia

No. 4. Militia

IN 1611 approached the walls of Moscow 1st Home GuardLyapunova, Prince Dmitry Trubetskoy and Ataman Zarutsky. Bely and Kitay-Gorod were liberated. At the “Council of the Whole Earth,” a government was elected, headed by Lyapunov, Trubetskoy and Zarutsky. The council collected taxes and sorted out disputes between nobles. However, as a result of infighting at the military council of the rebel Cossacks, Lyapunov was killed, and the remaining troops under the leadership of Dmitry Trubetskoy and Zarutsky held the siege of the Kremlin until the arrival of the second militia. In the same year, the Crimean Tatars, without meeting resistance, ravaged the Ryazan region. After a long siege, Smolensk was captured by the Poles, and the Swedes, emerging from the role of “allies,” ravaged the northern Russian cities.

Prince Dmitry Trubetskoy continuously sent letters to the Trinity Monastery to Archimandrite Dionysius with a request to quickly send letters to the cities and hasten the collection of the second militia. Finally, letters from Trinity (as the Trinity-Sergius Lavra was then called) reached Nizhny Novgorod. Second Home Guard1612 headed Nizhny Novgorod zemstvo elder Kuzma Minin, who invited the prince to lead military operations Pozharsky. In February 1612 the militia moved towards Yaroslavl, to occupy this important point, where many roads crossed. Yaroslavl was busy; The militia stood here for four months, because it was necessary to “build” not only the army, but also the “land.” That is, the taxes that were collected by the first militia began to be collected by the second militia, which caused discord between Prince Trubetskoy and Prince Pozharsky. The latter wanted to gather a “general zemstvo council” to discuss plans to combat the Polish-Lithuanian intervention and “how we can not be stateless in this evil time and choose a sovereign for us with the whole earth.” The candidacy of the Swedish prince was also proposed for discussion. Carla-Philippa who "wants to be baptized into our Orthodox faith of Greek law" . However, the zemstvo council did not take place. Archimandrite Dionysius and cellarer of the Trinity Monastery Abraham Palitsyn put a lot of effort into reconciling and uniting the two princes Dmitriev. Historian Kastomarov writes “Finally20 (30) August1612 The militia of Minin and Pozharsky arrived in Moscow. Trubetskoy rode out to meet them and offered to stand in the same camp with the Cossacks. But Pozharsky and Minin replied that they would not stand in the same camp with the Cossacks. The zemstvo militia stood at the Belogorodskaya wall to the Alekseevskaya tower on the Moscow River. His main core was at the Arbat Gate: Minin and Pozharsky stood there. Having established the camp, the military men began to dig themselves in a ditch. “September 22 is the day of the union of Trubetskoy and Pozharsky. The decisive role in this reconciliation was again played by Archimandrite of the Trinity Monastery Dionysius. An “Agreement on Union and Love” was signed between the two princes Dmitry. Thus, a new land-wide government was created from the Orders and Discharges created near Moscow in 1611 (the first militia) and in Yaroslavl in 1612 (the second militia). And they sent letters to the cities for new signatures: “The boyars and governors of the Moscow state Dmitry Trubetsky and Dmitry Pozharsky and their comrades are beating with their foreheads...”

The united second militia defeated the troops of Hetman Chodkiewicz, who tried to unite with the Polish garrison that controlled the Moscow Kremlin.

From the “Piskarevsky Chronicler” (PSRL, vol. 34, p. 218) about the capture of Kitay-Gorod: “And after that, in Moscow, in the city under siege, the famine began to be great, and people ate people, dogs and cats, and all sorts of filthy things, and the boyars and nobles, and Lithuania, began to gather, and at that time the Cossacks shouted to Prince Dmitreev’s regiment with their right hands to the city of China from Kulishki from All Saints from Yvanov Lushka. 22nd day, on Thursday before Dmitrevsky Saturday, both the Lithuanians and the Germans killed many, and captured the treasury"; the garrison of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth retreated to Kremlin. Prince Pozharsky entered Kitai-Gorod with Kazan Icon of the Mother of God and vowed to build a temple in memory of this victory. On October 26 (November 5, new style), the command of the Polish garrison signed a capitulation, releasing the Moscow boyars and other nobles from the Kremlin at the same time; the next day the garrison surrendered.

№5. A time of troubles marked the frontier Kursk land numerous raids, devastation and bloodshed. Initially, the people of Kursk supported the impostor, who declared himself “the miraculously saved Tsarevich Dimitri,” and helped him take the Moscow throne. After the death of Dmitry at the hands of the conspirators and the accession of Vasily Shuisky to the throne, the Kursk region joined the rebels against the new “boyar” king. The following years, as elsewhere in Rus', became a period of anarchy and endless war. Russian cities and villages were subjected to devastating raids by “Lithuanian people” and “Cherkasy” - Ukrainian Cossacks who served the Polish king Sigismund. Kursk and Rylsk servicemen responded to them with equally devastating raids.

The year 1612 was catastrophic for the border region, when Prince Semyon Lyko, the constable of Lubny, ravaged the outskirts of Rylsk, and then stormed and burned Belgorod. After the death of Prince Semyon Ivanovich, the “glorious campaign of 1612” (along with his subsequent exploits) was even sung in verse.

Following this, Polish troops, consisting mainly of Cherkasy, approached the walls of Kursk, defeating the large fort and unsuccessfully besieging the small one for a month. It is unknown whether Semyon Lyko participated in the siege. Local church tradition attributes supremacy over enemy forces to a certain Hetman Zheltovsky, but documents report that detachments of colonels Rodkevich and Starinsky operated near Kursk in 1612.

The main source for describing the siege of Kursk is “The Tale of the City of Kursk and the Icon of the Sign of the Mother of God,” compiled at the end of the 17th century. The exact date of this event itself has not yet been established. In the surviving documents, it refers to the year 7120 from the creation of the world, which, in terms of modern chronology, falls on the period from September 1611 to August 1612, when the governor in Kursk was the steward Yuri Tatishchev.

"The Tale" reports that the attack of the enemies was God's punishment for the people of Kursk, since they were "in earthly affairs, abiding in joy, and engaged in fasting many times by failing to curse." The fast mentioned here had nothing to do with the regular church calendar. The fact is that in 1611, rumors spread throughout Russia about a vision that appeared in Nizhny Novgorod to “a certain man named Gregory.” According to this vision, the Russian kingdom and all Orthodox Christians could be saved only in the event of general repentance, when both old and young began to fast three days a week. The clergy supported these rumors in every possible way, and as a result, in the fall of 1611, the church authorities of the Volga cities, where the Second People's Militia gathered, “by the verdict of the entire Russian land” determined: to fast three days a week. On Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday, do not eat or drink anything, and on Thursday and Friday eat dry food. This ritual was supposed to unite the Russian people in the struggle for the restoration of the kingdom that collapsed during the Time of Troubles. The Kursk residents, like other residents of the Seversk land, did not consider it necessary to join this endeavor. The siege should therefore be dated to the early winter months of 1612.

Enemy troops, having set out from Putivl, moved to Rylsk, Orel and Kursk. The appearance of enemies came as a complete surprise to the residents of the county. Most of them did not have time to lock themselves within the walls of the fortress. The Polish-Cossack army approached the walls of Kursk in the evening on Wednesday, when evening services were going on in the churches. The enemies immediately rushed to attack, approaching the walls of Kursk from two sides - from the banks of the Kur River and through the Bozhedomnaya Slobodka in the area of ​​the Trinity Nunnery. The garrison did not have enough forces to provide defense along the entire perimeter of the fortifications of the large fort. Therefore, the governor decided to take his people to the confines of the dilapidated old fortress - the “small fortress”. The enemy, having burst into the burning city, quickly swept away the few barriers of its defenders and then carried out a real massacre: “And a great battle and shedding of blood here and there, and especially on Orthodox Christians and wives and children at that time, great blood was shed.” . After this, the besieged were offered to surrender, but they rejected this offer. Then, on the night from Friday to Saturday, an assault attempt was made. This time the blow was struck at the Pyatnitsky Gate. The besieged prudently covered them half with earth. By order of the governor, maintaining silence and complete silence, they awaited the enemy. When the attackers approached with a ram, they were met by a powerful volley. Having suffered heavy losses, the Cossacks retreated, then began regular shelling of the fortress from guns.

Expecting a new attack and seeing the impossibility of completely defending all the fortifications, Voivode Tatishchev ordered the burning of the area between the Kurova and Chalk towers. The besiegers, seeing the fire, mistakenly decided that the inhabitants had set the fortress on fire and were fleeing under the cover of fire and smoke. Immediately the city was surrounded by horse and foot soldiers. However, having realized his mistake, the enemy changed his plans and decided to take advantage of the fire and possible confusion of the defenders of the fortress to try to take it by surprise. However, this attack was successfully repelled - the defenders of Kursk took refuge behind an ancient earthen rampart, which was located inside the fortress.

Having failed, the besiegers blocked the city, depriving the townspeople of access to water. Only heavy snowfalls helped the besieged fight thirst. However, there was still not enough water. In addition, the supply of gunpowder began to dry up. The siege was already in its third week, and the people of Kursk were exhausted from the hardships they had suffered. Finally, at a general gathering, the besieged decided to leave the fortress, break through the siege ring and take refuge in the forests beyond Tuskar. A night was also appointed for the breakthrough.

But on the eve of the “Spassky priest, which is beyond the Kur River, the church, the priest, having heard this advice and wanting to receive honor from those who were opposed to it,” appeared in the enemy camp and revealed to the enemy the intentions of the Kursk people. The Cossack hetman decided to place a detachment of cavalry at the site of the supposed breakthrough, “prepared to cut down without any mercy” everyone who went beyond the fortress walls. At the same time, it was planned to launch a general assault on the fort, abandoned by the defenders. Victory itself went into the hands of the enemy. However, the besieged became aware of these plans, and when the enemy approached the walls of the fortress, “many nasty people were quickly killed by the citizens in that battle.” After this, the enemies increased their attacks, depriving the besieged of night sleep. But their efforts were in vain. On the fourth week of the siege, the enemies decided to retreat from the stubborn fortress. When they were already dismantling the camp and sounding the trumpet trumpet, another defector appeared - the priest of the Church of the Savior, which is beyond the Kur River, the husband of the priest who had previously betrayed him (in another version of the legend, a deacon - the son-in-law of the mentioned priest - is called a traitor). He told the hetman that the townspeople, fearing a repetition of night attacks, kept vigil on the walls from evening until dawn, “and on the day they always sleep without fear from labor.” Moreover, the traitor advised attacking the City from the Tolkochey Gate - the weakest part of the defense. Encouraged enemies repeated the assault, but it also ended in vain, although the city was on the verge of falling. After this, the enemies “became extremely furious and began to embitter this city with frequent, strong attacks... they were arranging all sorts of tricks to capture the city.”

However, the city was not surrendered, but the besiegers, after more than a month-long siege, still had to ingloriously retreat from the walls of the dilapidated, but so impregnable fortress. Kursk remained a strong stronghold of Russia on its southern borders.

According to the vow made by the people of Kursk during the siege, a church was built in the city, which laid the foundation for the Znamensky Monastery. In a petition addressed to the Tsar, the residents of the city wrote that “last year, in 120, Lithuanian people came to Kursk and took a large prison, but they, having gathered in a small prison, sat out from the Lithuanian people and promised to go to Kursk, in a small prison near the city , at the end of the auction against the city bridge, that a chapel was erected... to erect the Church of the Most Pure Mother of God of Kursk." The modern Znamensky Cathedral, which adorns the city center, thus serves as a reminder of the distant and glorious events of the Time of Troubles on Kursk land.