Until the end of 1922, Germany paid, according to the reparation commission, 1.7 billion marks in gold and about 3.7 billion in kind. Of this amount, England received 1.1 billion, and France - 1.7 billion. The size of the actual payments was far behind the reparation obligations. Germany constantly demanded a moratorium and, deliberately creating inflation, avoided its obligations in every possible way. The Poincaré government saw the only way out of the situation in putting forceful pressure on Germany through the occupation of the Ruhr region. England opposed these intentions and thereby actively encouraged the Germans to resist. While Poincaré demanded effective guarantees for the payment of reparations, England insisted on a moratorium for Germany. The British representative on the reparations commission made a special trip to Berlin in November 1922 and persistently advised the German government to stand firmly for the provision of a moratorium. Many British leaders deliberately provoked the Germans to oppose the payment of reparations, hoping to cause a crisis in which France would be defeated and lose its importance in European politics. This made the occupation of the Ruhr inevitable.

On the other hand, British politicians were inclined to welcome the Ruhr crisis, hoping that it would eliminate the tendency in Germany towards a separate agreement with France and make England ready to act as an arbiter. An important place in Lloyd George's plans was to involve the United States in European affairs, in particular, in financing Germany to pay payments and linking its own debt with them. British diplomacy provoked the Ruhr conflict without fully understanding the French diplomatic game.

France sought not only the payment of payments by Germany, but above all the establishment of the hegemony of French industry in Europe. The talk was about combining the coal and metallurgical industries of France and Germany. France needed coal; Germany had a shortage of iron ore. Even before 1914, some Ruhr companies bought iron ore enterprises in France, and French metallurgical companies bought Ruhr coal mines. The largest German industrialist Hugo Stinnes in 1922 intensively sought the possibility of creating a Franco-German cartel of coal and steel.24 The Ruhr occupation, with the participation of 5 French divisions and one Belgian, had as its main goal the integration of these two key industries under French control. The statements of French diplomats about security and reparations were only an additional argument to justify this act. In addition, the French ruling circles planned the dismemberment of Germany. The occupation was supposed to end with the annexation of the left bank of the Rhine and the Ruhr region to France, the separation of southern Germany from the northern, and the inclusion of the dismembered Reich in the sphere of French hegemony on the European continent.

The area of ​​French occupation covered an area 96 km deep and 45 km wide. But 80-85% of Germany's entire coal production, 80% of iron and steel production, and 10% of the country's population were concentrated in this small area. Shortly before the French intervention in Germany, a center-right government came to power, consisting of the German People's Party led by Stresemann, representatives of the Catholic Center, etc. The government was headed by a representative of German big capital, Wilhelm Cuno (1876-1933), who had extensive business connections in the USA and England.

Cuno's government, counting on the support of the United States and England, called on all employees, workers and entrepreneurs to renounce all cooperation with the occupying forces and stopped paying reparations altogether. It was a policy of passive resistance. All political parties supported her. The French occupation authorities began to evict from the Rhineland all government officials who took part in acts of sabotage. A total of 100 thousand workers and employees were evicted. The French began sending their own transport engineers and miners. The burden of intervention quickly grew on the French budget. At the same time, the occupation of the Ruhr and passive resistance led to the collapse of the German mark and the German economy was on the verge of complete collapse. The time came when the Berlin government could not find money to ensure passive resistance of the Ruhr population.

There was growing alarm in England about the French occupation of the Ruhr. English diplomats feared that if France succeeded, it would occupy a position similar to the one it occupied after the Peace of Tilsit. The support provided by England to Germany became more active. British diplomats encouraged the Germans to continue their resistance, advising them to hold out until the financial pressure on France from England and the United States took its toll. At the same time, England did not undertake anything real to materially support the German resistance. The leader of the German People's Party, Gustav Stresemann (1878-1929), wrote in his memoirs: “We were warned from confidential sources in this country (i.e. England) that the conflict could last for months and that we must hold out. The latest news from America allows to assume that America is inclined to participate in actions against France, at least in financial measures calculated to lower the franc"25. British diplomats deceived the Germans. They did not care about German destinies; it was important that France suffer economic damage and suffer political defeat. Exhausted Germans, half-starved urban residents of the Ruhr were to play the role of the vanguard in the English anti-French struggle. The Germans once again fell for the bait of the British and, there is no doubt that without the inspiring promises of England, the “passive resistance” of the Germans would not have lasted long and would not have brought any effect.

Whenever it seemed that the policy of passive resistance was beginning to weaken, and the shadow of a political and economic crisis hung over Germany, British diplomacy began to act especially actively. On August 11, 1923, Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Minister, in a note published in the press, sharply condemned France's Ruhr policy and threatened separate action if France did not agree to an agreement with Germany. The note stated that England “cannot advise Germany to cease passive resistance.” This was an attempt by England to directly intervene in the conflict and, at the same time, to encourage those circles of the German bourgeoisie who not only did not suffer from “passive resistance,” but also received substantial compensation from the government in the form of subsidies for business downtime.

But Poincare did not pay attention to Curzon’s note and demanded unconditional surrender from the German government. Germany had no choice. In August 1923, the Reichsbank did not even have depreciated marks to pay for passive resistance. The crisis in the country deepened every day. The political situation has become extremely tense. On August 12, 1923, the Cuno government fell and on August 13, Gustav Stresemann formed a “grand coalition” government, which included the Social Democrats, the Center Party, and others. The new government headed for an agreement with the French. This decision was accelerated by the announcement of a general strike in Germany. A separatist movement began in the country. In the western lands, the creation of the Rhine Republic was announced, which was announced in Cologne by the mayor of the city, Konrad von Adenauer. The collapse of the state was brewing. On September 27, the government announced an end to passive resistance. Stresemann explained this act of the German government, first of all, by fear of social upheaval. He wrote on October 10: “We stopped passive resistance because it completely exploded on its own and would only plunge us into Bolshevism if we continued to finance it.”26

The political situation was tense to the limit. Separatist uprisings occurred in Koblenz, Wiesbaden, Trier, Mainz, and a republic with its own armed forces was proclaimed in northern Bavaria. The French occupation authorities recognized the "de facto" governments of these "republics". In Saxony and Thuringia, as a result of local elections, coalition governments consisting of communists and socialists came to power. In Hamburg, on October 22-24, a popular uprising took place led by the city's communist leader, Ernst Thälmann, the future chairman of the German Communist Party. In Saxony and Thuringia, the “Red Hundreds” were created, which were armed revolutionary detachments. A fascist putsch began in Munich and a fascist organization led by Adolf Hitler began a march on Berlin on November 8, 1923. A civil war actually began in the country on the principle of “a war of all against all.” It was urgent to take measures to save the German state. On September 27, Stresemann announced the end of passive resistance. This was a tactical ploy by German politicians, who hoped that such a move would lead to negotiations with the French government and reparations and the withdrawal of troops from the Ruhr.

But the French government, taught by the bitter experience of the Germans’ attitude to the problem of reparations, refused to even talk about the Rhineland, the Ruhr and reparations. It stated that France needed certain guarantees, which could only be provided by the obligations of the Ruhr industrialists. The Ruhr magnates were forced to reach an agreement with the French military authorities. They feared that the French occupation of the Ruhr could result in permanent French control in western Germany, over the industry of the Ruhr and the Rhineland. Stresemann's government allowed Ruhr industrialists to begin negotiations with the French authorities on the issue of industrial production and payment of reparations. It promised to reimburse them later, when the opportunity to obtain foreign loans presented itself. On November 23, a comprehensive agreement was concluded with the occupation authorities, according to which German industrialists guaranteed reparations supplies and timely payment of monetary contributions. Poincaré won, the German government abandoned passive resistance and accepted the conditions of France. But much more important was England’s refusal to jointly oppose France with Germany. On September 20, 1923, after a meeting between the British Prime Minister S. Baldwin and Poincaré, a communiqué was adopted, which stated that both sides “were happy to establish a general agreement in views and to discover that on no issue there is such a disagreement about goals and principles that would hinder cooperation between both countries, cooperation on which so much depends on peace and harmony throughout the world."27

Germany once again received an object lesson from the diplomats of the “island of the Pharisees,” as the great English writer Galsworthy called England. England provoked the Ruhr crisis, brought Germany to economic collapse and betrayed it as soon as it became clear that France intended to carry through its Ruhr policy. France won economically and politically. She showed that she was a force to be reckoned with, whether England liked it or not. It has enough power resources to force Germany to fulfill its obligations under the Treaty of Versailles. Germany capitulated and had to change tactics. The main hopes were placed on the United States and the development of a new Eastern policy, the basis of which was relations with the Soviet Union. England had the opportunity to isolate France through an agreement with the USA and Germany.

Chapter Nine. Ruhr conflict (1922-1923) (Prof. Pankratova A. M.)

The end of "execution policy"

Along with the Middle East complications, the reparations problem still remained unresolved for the diplomacy of the victorious countries. From the end of 1922, a new and most acute phase began in the development of the reparation issue.

The speech of the German Foreign Minister Rathenau in Genoa was the last demonstration of German diplomacy in favor of agreement and cooperation with the victorious powers of Versailles. It caused, however, an explosion of indignation on the part of reactionary nationalist circles in Germany.

A noisy campaign began in the press against Rathenau and Reich Chancellor Wirth, who were accused of “an insane desire to pursue a policy of execution.” Nationalists demanded no reparations; Moreover, they raised the question of annulment of the Treaty of Versailles. The campaign against reparations was directed, as before, by the German coal king Hugo Stinnes, together with the German “People's Party,” representing the interests of heavy industry.

The next deadline for reparation payments was approaching, May 31, 1922. Chancellor Wirth rushed between Paris and London, hoping, if not for a loan, then for a long moratorium. The German Minister of Finance was also sent to Paris with an extensive program of economic and financial reforms in Germany. All these negotiations turned out to be fruitless.

Wirth’s efforts about an international loan also did not yield results. A meeting of bankers in Paris, reflecting the irreconcilable position of the French imperialists, spoke out against the loan.

The French imperialists were hungry for conflict. They wanted to implement their long-standing plans to capture the Ruhr. They openly threatened occupation, preparing public opinion for this step, which could lead to serious international complications.

At the same time, German industrialists, led by Stinnes, continued to sabotage all government measures aimed at paying reparations. At a meeting of entrepreneurs in North-West Germany on June 6, 1922, Stinnes openly called for resistance and failure of reparation obligations. He declared the threat of occupation of the Ruhr frivolous. Expanding the occupation, he said, would only prove to the French that they could not achieve anything this way.

The general tone of Stinnes's speeches and his press became increasingly defiant. Stinnes's newspaper "Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" published in its issue of June 7, 1922, on the first page, printed in bold type, the conditions under which Germany could allegedly agree to pay reparations; these were: the clearing of allied troops from all territories occupied by them, including the Saar basin; abandonment of the 26 percent levy on foreign trade established in 1921 by the London Memorandum; granting Germany the right to trade freely with Danzig and through the Polish Corridor; correction of the borders of Upper Silesia in the interests of Germany; refusal to grant “most favored nation rights” to all allies.

This program, under the guise of patriotic slogans, clearly led to conflict with France.

With the help of his press and wide agents, Stinnes incited a thirst for revenge and revenge among the masses. He was the first to refer to the fact that Germany was insolvent. Among German industrialists, Stinnes propagated the idea that the occupation of the Ruhr might even be beneficial for them. It will worsen relations between England and France, ensure Anglo-German rapprochement, lead to the abolition of reparations and enable German industrialists to increase pressure on the working class.

This plan was the basis of the “policy of catastrophe”, on the path of which Stinnes had been pushing German diplomacy since the time of the Spa conference in 1920. However, the obstacle to this policy was such a consistent supporter of the “policy of implementation” as Walter Rathenau. That is why it was precisely against him that the fire of Stinnes and his like-minded Helferich, who led the “national opposition” in the Reichstag, was directed.

Immediately after the Genoa Conference, Helferich published a demagogic pamphlet with sharp attacks against the government's economic measures. There he also ridiculed Rathenau’s behavior in Genoa. Helferich launched an even more furious attack against Rathenau in the Reichstag on June 23, 1922.

Speaking on the Saar issue, Helferich portrayed the German Foreign Minister as a malicious ally of the French invaders. As a result of this policy, Helferich said, the Saarland population feels “in the true sense of the word betrayed and sold out.”

Accusing Rathenau, Helferich demanded that the government refuse to fulfill reparation obligations.

“The path to salvation will open before us only then,” he said at a meeting of the Reichstag on June 23, 1922, “when it turns out that there is a German government that will turn its back when impossible demands are presented to it. Salvation will be possible when the world understands that in Germany again - let me express my thought in one word - can deal with men."

The day after this provocative speech, June 24, 1922, when Rathenau was driving from his villa in Gruiwald to the ministry, he was overtaken by a fast-moving car. Two German officers were sitting in it. The car was driven by a student. Having reached Rathenau's car, they fired several shots from revolvers and threw a hand bomb at Rathenau. Rathenau was killed on the spot. The killers turned out to be three members of the reactionary-monarchist "Organization S" ("Consul"), active participants in the Kapp putsch. Behind the murderers' backs was their true inspirer, Stinnes.

"Course for the Ruhr"

“The murder of Rathenau, an active supporter of the policy of implementing the Treaty of Versailles, was in the interests of not only Stinnes, but also of Poincaré, who had long been heading for the Ruhr.”

This course of Poincaré's policy was dictated by two main motives. One was the desire to establish the hegemony of French heavy industry in Europe, to achieve the economic dominance of France as a condition for its political dominance. Another motive was the fear of military revenge on the part of defeated Germany.

The motives of Poincaré's diplomacy were reflected in a secret report drawn up on his behalf by the chairman of the financial commission of the French Parliament, Dariak.

The report began by expressing regret that the "economic sanctions" consisting of control over the Rhine customs and the establishment of a customs barrier along the Rhine coinciding with the line of French occupation had been lifted (October 1, 1921). The author of the report strongly emphasized the exceptional importance of the Ruhr for the economic life of Germany.

“The heavy industry of the Ruhr region,” wrote Dariak, “which is entirely in the hands of a few people, will play a decisive role in the events that should take place in Germany in the future. In this regard, the economic role of Stinnes, Thyssen, Krupp, Hannel, Klöckner, Funke, Mannesman and three or four other individuals are similar to the role of Carnegie, Rockefeller, Harriman, Vanderbilt and Gold in America. In addition, they develop political activities unfamiliar to American billionaires."

Dariak raised the question of the possibility and ways of using the wealth of the Ruhr by France. Should we go for a direct seizure of these areas with the elimination of German industrialists, or should we first try to reach an agreement with them?

“We can offer the German government,” reasoned Dariak, “one quarter or one third of the shares of the concerns and the use of profits under the control of the Allied Commission. Can’t France offer French ore in exchange for German coke for the purpose of peaceful exploitation, subject to real mutual industrial cooperation? "

Dariak recalled the Wiesbaden Agreement of October 6, 1921 between Luscher and Rathenau on the supply of goods, which to a certain extent replaced cash payments. Should we repeat this experience?

In Germany, as in France, representatives of heavy industry are vitally interested in such cooperation.

“German industrialists,” Dariak developed his proposal, “openly declare that the unification of German coke and French ore will have major consequences, and if a reparation agreement is directly concluded between both peoples, the prelude to which was the agreement in Wiesbaden, all problems will very quickly be simplified ".

Outlining a plan for the economic use of the Ruhr basin, Dariak also raised the question of extending the occupation of the Rhine zone.

“We must delay the occupation army,” he wrote, “for longer than 15 years and give the French troops the opportunity to save the Rhineland population from the danger of the return of the Prussian stick: this will ensure its future.”

Dariac insisted that French diplomacy develop and implement a carefully thought-out program of action in relation to the Rhineland with the aim of creating a Rhineland state as a buffer between Germany and France.

In accordance with the conclusions of Dariak's report, Poincaré put forward a new program in mid-1922 - “productive pledges”. Instead of financial payments, French diplomacy on the reparations issue now demanded payment of reparations in kind. The most concrete expression of the program of “productive pledges” was found in the following seven points of demands put forward by French diplomacy at the London Conference on the reparation issue (August 7-14, 1922):

1. Control over import and export licenses carried out by the Inter-Union Commission for Import and Export in Ems.

2. Establishment of a customs border on the Rhine with the inclusion of the Ruhr region.

3. Introduction of special duties on exports from the Ruhr region.

4. Control over state mines and forests in occupied areas.

5. Granting the winners 60% participation in the chemical industry of the occupied areas.

6. 26 percent export duty for reparations.

7. Transfer of German customs duties to the winners.

This program of Poincaré aroused strong objections from the majority of delegates at the London Conference. The British delegation spoke out especially sharply against it.

The diplomatic controversy between England and France over the occupation of the Ruhr was essentially a struggle for influence in post-war Europe. British diplomacy took all measures to prevent France from further strengthening and gaining hegemony on the continent. She sought to preserve the “European balance” and secure for England the role of arbiter in international disputes.

If France tried to implement its policy towards Germany using military pressure, then England acted in a different way. She sought an agreement with Germany, trying to find a common language with her. British diplomacy directed its efforts towards rapprochement with Germany as opposed to France and Soviet Russia. In the face of public opinion, this policy was justified by the need to prevent the German-Soviet agreement.

One of the main proponents of the course towards Anglo-German rapprochement was the British ambassador in Berlin, Lord d'Abernon. He stood at the center of the entire diplomatic game. Widely using pacifist techniques, he acted as an “ambassador of peace.”

England’s attitude towards the occupation of the Ruhr is expressed in d’Abernon’s memoirs in the following words: “Was the occupation of the Ruhr, which precipitated the final crisis of German finances and temporarily disrupted the life of the most active part of German industry, really such a great misfortune as everyone in that time believed? Germany? If France's action accelerated and intensified the catastrophe, did it not thereby bring the moment of salvation closer? Wasn't the aggravation of the crisis a necessary step towards restoration? Would not the struggle over reparations have lasted for many years if this violent disruption of the entire industrial life of Germany had not been followed by a complete collapse? The devastation wrought by the occupation of the Ruhr, and the resulting crisis of the entire financial organization of Germany, were perhaps necessary to sober up the whole world."

1 (D "Aberon, Ambassador of Peace, vol. I, p. 39.)

At the London Conference, the British delegation did not try to reach an agreement with France. She countered Poincaré's proposals with her own program, consisting of 10 points. The main ones were: the autonomy of the German state bank, limiting Germany's current debt and providing it with a moratorium.

The conference ended with the complete divergence of the former allies. Lloyd George stated this fact, not without humor, when closing the conference. “Let us at least agree,” he said, “that we cannot come to an agreement.”

British diplomacy, while outwardly remaining a passive observer of the developing conflict, in fact did not waste any time. She was preparing a decisive rebuff to France and, for this purpose, was drawing closer to the United States.

American capital also feared French hegemony in Europe. A French victory would close the way for this capital to penetrate the national economies of European countries and, above all, Germany. In relation to the latter, the policies of England and the United States largely coincided.

Increasing differences between allies

The London Conference in August 1922 was the last attempt to resolve the reparations issue through the collective efforts of Allied diplomacy. After this, Poincaré began to act independently. His policy was directed by those extreme groups from the Comité des Forges who persistently sought the occupation of the Ruhr.

Preparations for this capture were in full swing. Comité de Forges played a leading role in it. A special fund was created to bribe the political figures he needed. Bribes were generously distributed to deputies, officials, and journalists. With funds from the Comité des Forges, the Poincaré press and the Havas telegraph agency launched a campaign in favor of “productive pledges.”

French diplomacy worked hard to prepare an international environment favorable to Poincaré's plans. After the Kemalist victory over the Greeks in September 1922, she kept the Turks from attacking Constantinople. In return for this service, Poincaré sought from England freedom of action for the French in the Ruhr. The resignation of Lloyd Deyurge as a result of the Middle East crisis freed Poincaré's hands. The new Prime Minister Bonar Law took a less steadfast position on the Ruhr issue.

The situation in Germany was also favorable to Poincaré's plans. Stinnes continued his policy of disaster. On November 9, he made a sharp speech against Germany's fulfillment of its reparation obligations. The Wirth government, on the advice of the British, addressed the reparations commission with a note dated November 14, 1922, asking for a moratorium for 3-4 years.

The German note was not even considered by the commission. Through the efforts of Stinnes, Wirth's cabinet was overthrown. The new Cuno cabinet, formed on November 16, 1922, tried to fight Poincaré, playing on Anglo-French differences. The German press began to intimidate the British with the competition of French heavy industry. Then, on November 27, 1922, the French Council of Ministers issued a resolution to register all German industrial enterprises as collateral.

Things were taking a terrible turn. Cuno's government was forced to moderate its tone. It again made proposals on the question of reparations, basically repeating the note of November 14. The Conference of Allied Prime Ministers, which opened in London on December 10, rejected the German proposals. The next day, December 11, on the first page. The Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung published a defiant statement from Stinnes.

“After the rejection of the German proposals in London,” it read, “it remains to state the following: German industry was not asked about anything when preparing the proposals that were then submitted to the London Conference. It was not even informed about them. We consider the proposals sent to London to be inexpedient and economically unfeasible. Even if they were accepted by the other side, the economic and industrial circles of Germany would still try to find means and ways to achieve an appropriate and final solution during further negotiations.”

Stinnes' statement meant that German heavy industry, even under the threat of occupation of the Ruhr, refused to pay reparations.

Events took on a rapid pace. The December debate in the French Chamber on the issue of debts and reparations took place in a tense atmosphere. Poincaré's supporters strongly demanded the occupation of the Ruhr as a guarantee of reparation payments, as well as the consolidation of France on the left bank of the Rhine as a natural barrier against possible German aggression.

On the issue of inter-allied debts, Poincaré firmly stated that France could pay the debts of its allies only if Germany carefully fulfilled its reparation obligations.

On December 26, at the request of Poincaré, the reparations commission raised the issue of Germany's failure to fulfill forest deliveries for 1922. Poincaré insisted on recognizing “deliberate non-fulfillment” and applying the corresponding one to Germany; articles of the Treaty of Versailles. The British delegation objected. From her point of view, it was impossible to talk about Germany’s failure to fulfill contractual obligations, because she made cash payments. The representative of England on the reparations commission, Bradbury, described the failure to fulfill timber deliveries as “microscopic.” In his opinion, the whole issue of non-compliance was just a “military stratagem” of French diplomacy in order to have a pretext for occupying the Ruhr.

The British's arguments proved powerless against Poincaré's stubbornness. To dissuade the French from occupying the Ruhr, English Prime Minister Bonar Law went to Paris on December 28, 1922. British Foreign Minister Curzon arrived there from Lausanne. At a preliminary meeting of British ministers, it was decided to give Germany a “breathing space” and create a situation for it in which it would be able to pay reparations.

Position of Fascist Italy

Italian diplomacy tried to take advantage of the differences between the allies on the reparations issue.

By this time, the long civil war in Italy ended in victory for the Nazis. Having become the head of the government on October 30, 1922, Mussolini sought to strengthen his dictatorship, which relied on the support of the magnates of Italian industry, banking and agriculture. One of the means of this policy of the fascist dictator was to provide the Italian steel industry with French iron ore. Mussolini decided to support Poincaré's position on the Ruhr issue. Passing through Paris on December 8, 1922, on his way to a conference in London, he stated in one of his interviews with journalists: “Italy’s point of view on the reparations issue is the same as France’s. Italy can no longer show generosity. It agrees with the allies is that Germany should be forced to bow its head" 1 .

1 (Silvio Trentin, Le fascisme a Geneve, Paris 1932, p. 41.)

At the London Conference in December 1922, the Italian delegation joined the French government's reparations program. Poincare was jubilant. Expressing his satisfaction with Italy’s new position on the reparation issue, he stated, not without gloating, that “he is very happy to see in the person of Mr. Mussolini a supporter of that method of effective guarantees that was always rejected by his predecessors” 1 .

1 (Silvio Trentin, Le fascisme a Geneve, p. 42.)

Poincaré was not averse to using Mussolini to put pressure on England and Germany. However, Italy was too weak to have any significant influence on the course of the struggle for the Ruhr.

Paris Conference (January 2-4, 1923)

At the very first meeting of the Paris Conference, January 2, 1923, the British delegation made a proposal to provide Germany with a moratorium without collateral or guarantees for 4 years. After this period, Germany must pay 2 billion gold marks annually, and after another 4 years - 2.5 billion. The total amount of German debt should be capitalized, according to the British proposal, in the amount of 50 billion gold marks. The English project linked the settlement of inter-allied debts and European debt to America with such a solution to the reparation problem.

Poincaré criticized Bonar Law's project at the conference. He stated that France would never agree to such a method of resolving the reparations issue, which would give Germany the opportunity to restore its economic life “at the expense of the countries it has ruined.”

“If we accept the English plan,” said Poincaré, “then the entire German debt will become one third less than the debt of France. In a few years, Germany will be the only country in Europe free from all external debts. Since the population of Germany is constantly increasing, and industry remains almost untouched, then in the very near future Germany will become the complete master of the situation in Europe. After all, the population of France is half that of Germany, and France will also be forced to bear the entire burden of restoring the devastated areas."

The French government published an official statement that the English project not only did not provide France with any guarantees, but violated the basic provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. In an interview with representatives of the press, Poincaré indicated that if the Allies do not want to put pressure on Germany to fulfill French demands, this will automatically entail the following measures on the part of the French government: 1) occupation of the Essen and Bochum regions and the entire Ruhr basin according to program developed by Marshal Foch; 2) sequestration of customs duties in the occupied regions.

At the final meeting of the Paris Conference, Bonar Law made a statement that the British government, having familiarized itself with the French proposals, finds them unacceptable. They “would entail serious and even irreparable consequences for the economic situation of Europe,” the British delegate warned.

In their final declarations, both delegations expressed regret over the “irreconcilable differences that have emerged on such a serious issue.” However, they expressed the hope that, despite this, both sides would maintain mutual friendly relations.

Commenting on these declarations, the French press noted that as a result of the Paris Conference, “cordial agreement (entente cordiale) gave way to heartbreak (rupture cordiale).”

The Paris Conference actually gave Poincaré free rein regarding the Ruhr. Formal recognition of this freedom occurred at a meeting of the reparations commission on January 9, 1923, which discussed the issue of coal supplies to Germany.

The German government asked to hear two of its experts first. The chairman of the commission, Bartu, warned them to keep it short. It was clear to everyone that the outcome of the discussion was predetermined. After a three-hour meeting, the commission, by a majority of three votes to one (English), decided to consider that Germany had established a deliberate failure to fulfill its obligations on coal supplies. Such failure gave the allies the right to apply sanctions.

On January 10, 1923, a Franco-Belgian note was sent to Berlin. She notified the German government that, due to Germany’s violation of paragraphs 17 and 18 of the eighth section of the Treaty of Versailles, the governments of France and Belgium were sending a commission consisting of engineers to the Ruhr region to monitor the activities of the coal syndicate in terms of fulfilling reparation obligations - “Micum” (La Mission Internationale de controle des usines et mines).

The note emphasized that the French government “does not intend to resort to military operations or occupation of a political nature.” Troops are sent only in such numbers as are necessary “to protect the commission of engineers and to guarantee its orders.”

Occupation of the Ruhr

The true content of this diplomatic document became clear the very next day. cheers On January 11, 1923, detachments of Franco-Belgian troops of several thousand people occupied Essen and its environs. A state of siege was declared in the city. The German government responded to these events by recalling by telegraph its ambassador Mayer from Paris, and envoy Landsberg from Brussels. All German diplomatic representatives abroad were instructed to present in detail to the respective governments all the circumstances of the case and to protest against the “violent policy of France and Belgium, which is contrary to international law.” President Ebert's appeal "To the German People" of January 11 also announced the need to protest "against violence against law and the peace treaty."

Germany's formal protest was stated on January 12, 1923, in the German government's response to the Belgian and French note. “The French government,” the German note read, “is trying in vain to disguise a serious violation of the treaty by giving a peaceful explanation for its actions. The fact that the army crosses the border of unoccupied German territory in wartime composition and weapons characterizes France’s actions as a military action.”

“This is not about reparations,” Chancellor Cuno said in his speech in the Reichstag on January 13. “This is about an old goal that has been set by French policy for more than 400 years... This policy was most successfully pursued by Louis XIV and Napoleon I; but it was no less clearly adhered to by other rulers of France to this day."

British diplomacy continued to remain an outwardly indifferent witness to developing events. She assured France of her loyalty.

But behind the diplomatic scenes, England was preparing the defeat of France. D'Abernon conducted continuous negotiations with the German government on methods of fighting against the occupation.

The German government was advised to respond to the French policy of occupying the Ruhr with “passive resistance.” The latter was to be expressed in the organization of the struggle against France’s use of the economic wealth of the Ruhr, as well as in the sabotage of the activities of the occupation authorities.

The initiative to pursue this policy came from Anglo-American circles. D'Abernon himself strongly attributes it to American influence. “In the post-war development of Germany, American influence was decisive,” he states. “Remove actions taken on American advice, or in supposed agreement with American opinion, or in anticipation of American approval, and the whole course of German policy would be completely different.”

1 (D "Abernon, Ambassador of Peace, vol. I, p. 29.)

As for British diplomacy, as facts show, it not only had no real intention of keeping Poincaré from the Ruhr adventure, but secretly sought to incite a Franco-German conflict. Curzon made his demarches against the occupation of the Ruhr only for appearances; in reality, he did nothing to prevent its implementation. Moreover, both Curzon and his agent, the English ambassador in Berlin, Lord d'Abernon, believed that the Ruhr conflict could mutually weaken both France and Germany. And this would lead to British dominance in the arena of European politics.

The Soviet government took a completely independent position on the issue of occupation of the Ruhr.

Openly condemning the capture of the Ruhr, the Soviet government warned that this act not only could not lead to the stabilization of the international situation, but clearly threatened a new European war. The Soviet government understood that the Ruhr occupation was as much the result of Poincaré’s aggressive policy as the fruit of the provocative actions of the German imperialist bourgeoisie led by the German “People’s Party” of Stinnes. Warning the peoples of the whole world that this dangerous game could end in a new military fire, the Soviet government, in an appeal to the Central Executive Committee on January 13, 1923, expressed its sympathy for the German proletariat, which was becoming the first victim of the provocative policy of disasters pursued by the German imperialists.

The policy of "passive resistance"

Already on the eve of the occupation, on January 9, 1923, the entire senior administration of the Rhine-Westphalian Coal Syndicate left Essen for Hamburg. Other enterprises followed this example. The coal syndicate stopped reparation supplies of coal to the Allies. The Cuno government, for its part, announced that it would not conduct any negotiations with the reparations commission until the Ruhr was liberated from the occupying forces.

The policy of passive resistance, proclaimed by Cuno on January 13 in the Reichstag, was approved by a majority of 283 votes to 28. This policy was most actively supported by the Ruhr coal miners, led by Stinnes.

However, German politicians and industrialists did not imagine the real consequences of passive resistance.

Poincaré strengthened the occupying army; he expanded the area of ​​occupation, occupying Düsseldorf, Bochum, Dortmund and other rich industrial centers of the Ruhr region. The Ruhr gradually isolated itself from Germany and from the entire outside world - Holland, Switzerland, Italy. General Degoutte, who commanded the occupying armies, banned the export of coal from the Ruhr region to Germany. With the occupation of the Ruhr, Germany lost 88% of coal, 48% of iron, 70% of cast iron. The entire region was under the authority of the customs committee, which created a customs wall between the occupied Rhine-Westphalia region and Germany. The fall of the German mark became catastrophic.

The repressions of the occupation authorities also intensified. A number of coal miners, including Fritz Thyssen, were arrested. Degutte threatened Krupp with sequestration of his enterprises. Arrests of German government officials in the Ruhr and Rhine regions began.

The Cuno government's attempt to influence the French government through diplomatic means led nowhere. Poincaré returned one of the German government's protests with the following transmittal note: "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the honor to send back to the German Embassy the attitude received today. It is impossible to accept a paper drawn up in such terms."

Poincaré responded to the protest about the arrests in the Ruhr region with a note dated January 22, 1923. It stated that the French government confirmed receipt of a letter in which the German government protested against the arrest of certain persons in the Ruhr region. The French government rejects this protest. "All measures taken by the occupation authorities are completely legal. They are a consequence of the violation of the Treaty of Versailles by the German government."

German diplomacy again tried to achieve British intervention in the Ruhr conflict. Member of the Reichstag Breitscheid, who was considered among the German Social Democrats an outstanding expert on international issues and a born diplomat, went on an unofficial visit to England. Breitscheid’s impressions were far from rosy: they did not go further than sympathy for Germany and condemnation of France in England. There was a prevailing reluctance to get drawn into the conflict. “The overwhelming majority of the English people want to avoid war at all costs, since nowhere is the disgust for a new war as strong as in England,” was the main conclusion from Breitscheid’s visit to England.

This was also proven by the so-called Cologne incident. After the start of the Ruhr occupation, persistent rumors spread about the withdrawal of British troops from the Cologne zone. German newspapers picked up this rumor with glee, hoping that the Allied differences would lead to Poincaré abandoning the Ruhr occupation. But these hopes were not justified. On February 14, 1923, British Foreign Secretary Curzon explained the reasons why the British government decided to leave its troops in the Rhineland. “Their presence will have a moderating and pacifying effect,” the minister said. The withdrawal of British troops would, in Curzon's opinion, mean the end of the Entente.

As his English friends explained to Breitscheid, the British at first really wanted to leave their zone of occupation; however, they did not want to quarrel with the French, especially after the breakdown of negotiations with the Turks in Lausanne (4 February 1923).

British diplomacy also refused mediation. “As for mediation,” Curzon said, “there can be no question of it unless both sides make a corresponding request.”

Thus, Germany's hope for help from British diplomacy collapsed. Meanwhile, French pressure was intensifying. Poincare's diplomacy relied on the support of Belgium and Italy. Italian diplomacy resurrected the old Napoleonic project of a continental bloc against England. Even during the Paris Conference, she began secret negotiations with France and Belgium on the organization of such a bloc. The Italian official agency even published a message on January 11, 1923, which stated that “the Italian government drew the attention of the governments of France and Belgium to the timeliness of the formation of a kind of continental syndicate, from which Germany would not be excluded a priori” 1 .

1 (Silvio Trentin, Le fascisme a Geneve, p. 44.)

The initiative of fascist Italy was picked up by the reactionary nationalist press in France. She trumpeted that the Franco-Italian union was “the first article of the new constitution of Europe.” On February 21, 1923, the French senator and publisher of the Matin newspaper, Henri de Jouvenel, wrote that it was impossible to make the future of Europe dependent on Great Britain. “The continent has its own interests,” de Jouvenel declared. “Island brains can hardly comprehend them, and if they do, they will not want to serve them. Great Britain is seeking political balance in Europe. Even the tunnel under the canal arouses its suspicion. However, the Alps They don’t separate countries from each other like a canal.”

Jouvenel supported the idea of ​​a Franco-Italian alliance. He argued that French iron would find profitable sales in Italy. In addition, France and Italy should jointly engage in oil fields in Romania, Turkey and Russia. In this regard, they can combine their merchant fleet to transport oil.

New German offers

The economic consequences of the Ruhr occupation affected not only Germany. The decline in the purchasing power of the German population entailed a fall in English exports and an increase in unemployment in England.

The City of London hoped that the occupation of the Ruhr would cause the franc to depreciate, which would benefit the English pound. The exchange rate of the franc was indeed falling rapidly. But the fall of the franc, along with the economic collapse of Germany, completely disorganized the European market.

In Germany, nationalist and revanchist sentiments sharply intensified. In all regions of Germany, especially in Bavaria, secret and overt fascist-type organizations were formed. They came out with slogans of mobilizing forces to restore the “Great German Army”, rearmament it and prepare for a new war. The Reichswehr gained increasing influence in the country. The entire leftist press in Germany alarmingly noted the closeness of the Reichswehr with fascist organizations.

This situation in Germany caused alarm in France. The issue of security guarantees did not leave the pages of the French press.

Poincare used this position to justify his Ruhr policy. Speaking in Dunkirk on April 15, 1923, he again argued not only the economic, but also the political necessity of the occupation of the Ruhr.

According to Poincaré, after four invasions in one century, France has the right to ensure its security. It must “protect its borders from further violations and prevent a nation whose imperialism is apparently incurable from hypocritically beginning preparations for invasion in the shadows.”

The next day, April 16, the Chairman of the Belgian Council of Ministers, Tunis, spoke in the same spirit. He stated that the occupation of the Ruhr should paralyze Germany's aggressive intentions. “Occupation is a means, not an end,” the prime minister said. “We want Germany, having admitted that it lost a dangerous bet on financial currency bankruptcy... to finally decide on compensation and make offers to us.”

The tense situation in Europe and the pressure of public opinion finally forced British diplomacy to lift its visor. On April 21, 1923, Lord Curzon made a speech in the House of Lords in which he advised Germany to submit new proposals on the reparation issue through the English Ambassador d'Abernon. “I can only repeat my advice,” said Curzon, “which I once already gave to the German government. Let it itself come up with a proposal that would show the Entente that Germany is ready to fulfill its obligations as far as possible. I know that the French and Belgian Governments are ready, if such a proposal is made to these two parties or to the Entente as a whole, to begin negotiations for a serious discussion of the issue. Germany, in my opinion, can only take the first step so that this is followed by the resolution of the Ruhr conflict" 1 .

1 (Gustav Stresemann, Vermachtnis, V. I, S. 55.)

Stresemann responded to Curzon’s proposal in a public speech in Berlin on April 22, 1923. He stated that, with certain reservations and amendments, “Curzon’s conclusions on the reparation problem can serve as the basis for further international discussion. However,” Stresemann continued, “we must express our some remarks to Lord Curzon. The English minister only touches on the reparations issue. If we are not mistaken, Curzon would like the League of Nations to have an influence on the administration of the Rhineland. On the issue of reparations it is possible to agree with Germany. Our life and death do not depend on this. whether we pay one billion more or less. But the Rhine and the Ruhr are questions of life and death for us... If Curzon wants to be an honest mediator between Germany and France, then let him proceed from this premise - German sovereignty over the Rhineland" 2 .

2 (Ibid., S. 56.)

But the French government did not want English mediation. On April 26, Poincaré announced that no German proposal would be considered unless it was addressed to France itself.

In the end, counting on the support of England, the German government on May 2, 1923, transmitted a note with proposals on the issue of reparations to Belgium, France, England, Italy, the USA and Japan. Noting that “the economic recovery of Europe and peaceful cooperation can only be resolved by mutual agreement,” the German note warned that German passive resistance would continue until the occupied areas were evacuated. The German government agreed to set the total amount of Germany's obligations at 30 billion marks in gold, and this entire amount should be covered with the help of foreign loans.

The German note proposed to transfer the entire reparations problem to an international commission for decision. At the same time, the note referred to the speech of the American Secretary of State Hughes, delivered at the American Historical Association in December 1922. To resolve the reparation problem, Hughes proposed turning to experts - “persons who enjoy high authority in the financial spheres of their country, people of such personal authority and experience and honesty, so that their decision on the amount of the amounts to be paid and on the financial plan for making payments will be recognized throughout the world as the only correct solution to the matter."

At the same time, the German government asked to submit to arbitration all those controversial issues that could not be resolved diplomatically.

The German note sparked a new diplomatic battle. The response note of the French and Belgian governments dated May 6, 1923 was drawn up in a sharply polemical tone. Strongly objecting to the idea that the occupation of the Ruhr constituted a violation of the Treaty of Versailles, the note warned that “negotiations are unthinkable until the end of passive resistance.”

Rejecting German proposals regarding the creation of an international commission, the French and Belgian governments stated that they did not intend to change anything in their previous decisions. They cannot help but note that “the German note gives from beginning to end the impression of only a thinly veiled but systematic rebellion against the Treaty of Versailles.” The acceptance of the German proposals “would inevitably lead to the complete and final liquidation of this treaty and the need to draw up another, as well as to moral, economic, political and military revenge by Germany.”

The British government's response to the German note was formulated more restrainedly. In the English note of May 13, 1923, there was a clear intention to show that English diplomacy did not influence the German position and its proposals of May 2, 1923.

Curzon noted in his note that the German proposals were a “great disappointment” for him. In form and in essence they are far from what the British government could expect, Curzon stated, in response to “the advice with which on many occasions I allowed myself to turn to the German government.” Curzon invited Germany to “present more serious and clear evidence of its willingness to pay than has been the case so far.”

The Italian government responded to the Germans with a very evasive note dated May 13, 1923. It emphasized that Italy was placed at a disadvantage in the distribution of reparation payments. The note also recommended that Germany come up with a new proposal that "could be accepted by both the Italian and other Allied governments."

Japan responded later than others. In a short note dated May 15, she reported that “for the Japanese government this issue is not of such great and vital importance as for other allies.” Nevertheless, Japan proposed to the German government to take measures for “a speedy, peaceful resolution of the entire reparation problem as a whole.”

The reception given to the German note of May 2 forced the Cuno government to reconsider its proposals.

Three weeks later, on June 7, 1923, Cuno sent a new memorandum to the Entente governments. In it, the German government proposed to determine Germany's solvency at an "impartial international conference."

As a guarantee for the payment of reparations, Cuno offered bonds worth 20 billion gold marks, secured by state railways and other property.

But Poincaré was in no hurry to answer this time either. He continued to set the cessation of passive resistance as a precondition for negotiations with Germany.

In May 1923, a change of cabinet took place in England. The resignation of Vonar Law and the appointment of Baldwin as Prime Minister did not mean a radical change in the general direction of English politics and the course of its diplomacy. But the new prime minister, a former Chancellor of the Exchequer, who relied on influential commercial and industrial circles in England, belonged to those politicians who persistently sought to eliminate the Ruhr conflict. He was prompted to this not only by the interests of these circles, but also by the fear of the English bourgeoisie of the danger of a revolutionary crisis in Germany.

Speaking on July 12, 1923 in the House of Commons on the issue of Ruhr complications, Baldwin emphasized that “for England as a business nation it is clear that if excessive payments are demanded from Germany, then England itself and its allies will suffer the most.” “Germany,” said the prime minister, “is rapidly approaching financial chaos; it may be followed by industrial and social collapse.”

The English bourgeois press persistently argued that the unresolved problem of reparations was “an obstacle to restoring the economic balance of Europe, and consequently of England.”

The occupation of the Ruhr accelerates the catastrophe; it can only be prevented by the rapid elimination of the Ruhr conflict - this general conclusion of the business and government circles of England determined the direction of the activities of English diplomacy.

On July 20, 1923, the British cabinet sent a note to the French government. In it, Lord Curzon expressed England's readiness to join other allies in putting pressure on the German government to abandon passive resistance in the Ruhr. However, as a condition for this collective influence, Curzon set a new serious attempt to determine Germany’s solvency and to establish a more realistic amount of reparations by a committee of impartial experts.

The French note rejected the British government's assumptions about the destructive results of the occupation of the Ruhr: the ruin of Germany was the work of Germany itself and its government, and not a consequence of the occupation of the Ruhr. German passive resistance must end without any conditions. A new determination of Germany's solvency and the total amount of reparations is both useless and dangerous.

“In 1871,” the French note concluded its objections, “no one in the world was interested in whether France considered the Frankfurt Treaty fair and feasible. No one then prevented Germany from occupying a significant part of French territory until the full payment of the five billion compensation that the country demanded - a victor who was not invaded, who did not experience any destruction from the war and, however, took two provinces from the vanquished."

The Anglo-French contradictions in the Ruhr issue were increasingly intensified. The world press was already talking about serious cracks in the Versailles system and even about the collapse of the Entente. The issue of Anglo-French differences was discussed in both English houses. Giving a review of diplomatic correspondence on the reparation issue at a meeting of the House of Commons on August 2, 1923, Baldwin emphasized that he was seeking to eliminate the Ruhr conflict as an ardent friend of France. “Since I want this friendship to continue,” the prime minister said, “I wish for a speedy end to the troubles that are currently causing suffering in Europe.”

The parliamentary opposition, led by Lloyd George, was not slow to reproach the government for disloyalty to France; after all, the British government first encouraged, and now condemns, the Ruhr adventure. This is inconsistent and illogical.

“What kind of chaos is this?” asked Lloyd George on August 6, 1923 in the article “Following the Example of Napoleon.” “France and Germany: both are striving for an agreement in the Ruhr. But both are too proud to admit it. Therefore the struggle continues and will continue to the detriment of both sides. England sends grumbling notes in turn to France and Germany... Germany must present its calculations under machine guns and present its arguments before the muzzle of French guns... The whole world has gone crazy."

1 (Lloyd George, Is This the World? 1924, pp. 104-105.)

In a new lengthy note to England dated August 20, 1923, Poincaré listed Germany's systematic violations of the Versailles obligations. “The Reparation Commission,” the note read, “dedicated twenty-three meetings to the conscientious hearing of thirty-two experts appointed by Germany 2 . Only after this long work, on April 27, 1921, did it determine Germany’s reparation debt. By May 1, 1921, it was calculated at amounting to 132 billion gold marks." Citing the collapse of its finances and the fall of its currency, Germany stubbornly avoided paying reparations. At the same time, she "rebuilt a huge merchant fleet, which at the moment competes in American waters with the fleet of England and with our fleet; she dug canals, developed a telephone network; in short, she undertook all kinds of work that France must now postpone" 3 .

2 ("German reparations and the report of the committee of experts." Collection of documents, Guise, 1925, p. 17.)

3 (Right there.)

According to the calculations of the economist Moulton 4, Germany contributed only 25-26 billion gold marks by the beginning of 1923. Of these, 16 billion was the value of German property abroad and only 9.5 billion were withdrawn from the country's national wealth. This amount also included natural supplies worth 1.6 billion marks. Germany contributed only 1.8 billion in cash. Deliberate disruption of the budget, exclusion of large industry from taxation, malicious evasion of payments - all this characterized violations of reparation obligations by Germany. At the same time, as Lloyd George noted in his book “Is This Peace?”, Germany deliberately sought to cause material damage to the Allies and, in particular, to prevent the restoration of French and Belgian industry after the war. By maneuvering, disguising itself and deceiving the public opinion of Europe, imperialist Germany accumulated strength in order to once again become a threat to the world.

4 (Moulton T. T., Solvency of Germany, M, -L. 1925.)

The imperialist claims of fascist Italy

A threat to the world also arose from fascist Italy. Taking advantage of the Ruhr conflict, she was in a hurry to arrange her affairs in the Mediterranean basin. Mussolini's government laid claim to the entire eastern Adriatic coast. Italian fascism put forward the slogan of turning the Adriatic Sea into the Italian sea (Mare nostro - Our sea).

In April 1923, the fascist General Vecchi made a speech in Turin directed against Yugoslavia. He demanded the inclusion of a significant part of it into the Italian Empire.

“The outlines of imperial Italy,” said Vecchi, “inscribed on the coat of arms of fascist corporations, cover Yugoslavia with their borders. After all, Yugoslavia is for us holy Dalmatia, sacrificed on the altar of the fatherland.”

Relations between Italy and Yugoslavia became even more strained when on September 16, 1923, the Italians carried out a political coup in Fiume. Italian troops sent to Fiume established fascist power there. Without receiving the support of France, which was busy with the Ruhr conflict, Yugoslavia was forced to abandon its claims to Fiume in favor of Italy.

Almost at the same time, fascist Italy began the struggle for Albania and Corfu. On August 27, 1923, near the Albanian border on Greek territory, an attack by unknown persons occurred on the Italian members of the commission for establishing the borders of Albania. Italy blamed the Greek government for the murder of its representatives. An ultimatum was sent to Athens, and on August 31, Italian troops occupied the island of Corfu. Greece appealed to the Council of the League of Nations. She asked the League to appoint a commission to oversee the judicial investigation and determine the amount of compensation for the families of those killed. However, Mussolini, in an official note dated September 5, rejected in advance any intervention by the League of Nations.

The Council of the League of Nations invited the Greek government to apologize to the envoys of the three powers represented in the border commission. Italy agreed that Greece should apologize not to Italy, but to the conference of ambassadors, since the dead delegates were its representatives. The Italian government, satisfied with receiving 50 million lire in favor of the families of those killed, evacuated Corfu. Meanwhile, a military demonstration on Greek territory cost Italy 288 million lire.

Italy's aggressive methods of international policy aroused the indignation of European powers. In addition, England could not allow the capture of the island of Corfu, which is the key to the Adriatic Sea. The day after the occupation of the island, England issued an ultimatum to the Italians to clear it. The danger of isolation forced Italian diplomacy to retreat. Italy hastened to assure an alarmed Europe of its peaceful intentions and resume negotiations with Yugoslavia.

Germany's refusal of passive resistance

Meanwhile, the revolutionary crisis was growing in Germany. In August 1923, a huge strike began in the Ruhr resistance region;

400 thousand strike workers demanded the departure of the occupiers. The struggle in the Ruhr was supported by workers throughout Germany. On August 12, a strike led to the fall of the Cuno government. However, the German Social Democrats, frightened by the scale of the revolutionary struggle, hastened to strangle the revolution with the help of the bourgeoisie and the Reichswehr. As a result, the Stresemann-Hilferding coalition government was created.

The son of a small Berlin merchant, Gustav Stresemann, received, not without difficulties, a university education. Later, he proved himself to be a major organizer as the head of a chocolate trust and little by little became his own man in various capitalist organizations. Having taken the post of secretary of the Saxon Manufacturing Industry Society, Stresemann entered Parliament, where he became the leader of the National Liberal Party. In 1914-1918 Stresemann was one of the most determined supporters of the war to the end. By the way, he was one of the ardent defenders of the submarine war against England. Defending the idea of ​​​​creating a “great Germany” in speeches and articles, Stresemann defended plans to seize France to the Somme River, Belgium, Poland and Russian lands, including Ukraine. Stresemann was also a supporter of the idea of ​​​​destroying the British Empire.

After the war, as the leader of the German “People's Party”, Stresemann became the head of its parliamentary faction. With her, he voted against signing the Treaty of Versailles. However, all this did not prevent the flexible businessman from soon becoming a supporter of England and a defender of the idea of ​​“reconciliation” with the Western powers. However, in this too Stresemann was two-faced. In a letter to the German crown prince (written later, already in 1925), he openly stated: “The question of choosing between East and West is not put on the agenda. You can choose, however, only when you have military power behind you. That’s what we have.” “Unfortunately, no. We cannot become the continental sword of England, and in the same way we cannot afford a German-Russian alliance.” The English ambassador in Berlin, Lord d'Abernon, played a significant role in nominating Stresemann for Reich Chancellor. With Stresemann's help, this diplomat hoped to find a compromise desirable for England that could put an end to the protracted Ruhr conflict.

However, relying on England, Stresemann played a double game. He hoped to reach an agreement with France.

In his keynote speech in Stuttgart on September 2, 1923, Stresemann stated that Germany was ready to enter into an economic agreement with France. However, it will resolutely fight against any attempts to dismember Germany. The next day, immediately after Stresemann returned from Stuttgart, the French ambassador came to see him; he informed the Chancellor that France was ready to discuss the issue he had raised. Nevertheless, the ambassador considers it necessary to draw the chancellor’s attention to the fact that the French government sets as a precondition the refusal of the population of the Ruhr from passive resistance.

“I pointed out to him,” Stresemann writes in his diary, “that the German government cannot achieve an end to passive resistance until the Ruhr conflict is resolved. In France, they must understand that the German government, not being able to ensure the peace of the German population, cannot take no measures to eliminate this resistance. Moreover, the German government is being attacked precisely because it does not show sufficient energy in strengthening this resistance" 1 .

1 (Gustav Stresemann. Vermiichtnis, V. I, S. 102-103.)

In conclusion, the Reich Chancellor posed several specific questions to the French ambassador. Firstly, will France agree to the organization of an international railway society in the Rhineland? Secondly, how does she imagine normal German supplies of coke and coal? Thirdly, can we count on closer economic cooperation between Germany and France?

Without instructions from his government, the French ambassador was unable to answer these questions.

Stresemann continued his diplomatic game in order to negotiate the most favorable terms of surrender for Germany. He informed the English ambassador in Berlin, d'Abernon, that the German government agreed to an end to passive resistance, but demanded an amnesty for its participants.

“I made it clear to him,” Stresemann wrote in his diary, “that if an agreement is not reached, then we will no longer be able to tolerate the occupation regime. Then responsibility for order in these areas will fall on Belgium and France” 1 . As a result of these negotiations, the German government published a declaration on September 26, 1923, in which it invited the population of the occupied regions to stop passive resistance.

1 (Gustav Stresemann, Vermachtnis, V. I, S. 127.)

Germany surrendered for a number of reasons. She was forced to do this primarily by the general economic crisis and the growing revolutionary movement in the country.

By capitalizing on this danger, Stresemann hoped to make the bourgeois governments of Germany's recent enemies more accommodating. Stresemann warned them that his government could be "the last bourgeois government in Germany."

In the autumn of 1923, Germany was truly facing a revolutionary explosion. In Saxony, a workers' government was created from left-wing Social Democrats and Communists. Soon the same government was formed in Thuringia. Immediately, Stresemann's government sent troops to Saxony and Thuringia. The workers were crushed. Having learned about the events in Saxony, the proletariat of Hamburg began a general strike on October 22, 1923; it turned into an armed uprising. After a three-day struggle with the troops, this uprising was suppressed. As a result of the betrayal of the Social Democratic leaders who supported the bourgeoisie, the revolutionary struggle of the German proletariat ended in defeat. The German bourgeois government celebrated victory. It demonstrated to the capitalist powers that pressure on Germany threatened to unleash a socialist revolution. On the other hand, by crushing the labor movement, it made it easier for itself to place the full burden of retribution for the imperialist war on the working masses of Germany.

Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation

Elabuga Institute of Kazan (Volga Region) Federal University

Department of General and National History, History of State and Law

Ruhr conflict 1923

I've done the work

Khamidullin N.R.

Elabuga – 2016

Plan

Introduction………………………………………………………………………………

International position of Germany after the World War: reparation payments……………….…………………….….

Occupation of the Ruhr: completion of the “policy of implementation”…………………………………………………….

Consequences and overcoming the Ruhr conflict………………………………………………………..…

Conclusion………………………………………………………

List of sources and literature used……………….

Introduction

The relevance of the topic of our work is more than obvious. At the present stage of development of international relations, we are seeing more frequent use of the words: “conflict”, “conflict resolution”, “conflict resolution”. Conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Nagorno-Karabakh, the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict are just a small list of conflicts where unresolved contradictions between subjects of international law have led to armed clashes and numerous casualties. The evolution of the conflicts themselves does not stand still: modern conflicts are continuously developing new forms of conflict interaction, more socially dangerous, but at the same time more manageable. Therefore, the study and analysis of the stages of resolving and overcoming international conflicts, and in our case the Ruhr conflict, is especially important and is not questioned. The study of conflicts that occurred earlier will allow us to understand the reasons for their occurrence, the process of formation, structure, ways of development and regulation of international conflicts.

When writing the work, we used the following literature and articles. ArticleArshintseva O.A. "Reparations in British European Policy during the Ruhr Crisis of 1923" We used to reveal the problem of German reparations, as one of the central ones in European politics from 1919 to 1923, which subsequently became the cause of the crisis as a result of the French occupation of the Ruhr. The author comes to the conclusion that Great Britain had a decisive influence on the course of events and the results of the crisis, the main one of which was the revision of the reparation payment scheme in Germany. Emelyanova E.N. in his article “The Failed Revolution of 1923 in Germany” helped us reveal the first paragraph of our work. We have gathered information aboutthe international position of Germany after the World War, and the consequences of the war for Germany.Kotelnikov K.D. in the article “German-Soviet secret military negotiations in connection with the Ruhr conflict (1923)” describes the process of negotiations that resulted in secret military cooperation between Germany and the Soviet Union in the development of types of weapons expressly prohibited for Germany by the Treaty of Versailles. In addition, from the article we learned about the decisive stage of rapprochement between Germany and Russia: after the negotiations in 1923. We used material for the second and partially for the third paragraph from the bookBonvechB. « StoryGermany" , in particular about the consequences of the Ruhr conflict, as well as overcoming the conflict.

Target study this workRuhr conflict 1923To achieve this goal, it is necessary to solve the following tasks: consider the international position of Germany after the World War; describe the occupation of the Ruhr; analyze the consequences and overcoming the Ruhr conflict.

The structure of the work is determined by the content of the topic of the test and consists of an introduction, three paragraphs, a conclusion and a list of sources and literature used.

§ 1. International position of Germany after the World War: reparation payments

The Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919 stated that it was Germany that should bear full responsibility for the outbreak of the First World War. The treaty ordered Germany to return Alsace and Lorraine to France, the left bank of the Rhine with the cities of Koblenz, Mainz and Cologne to be transferred to the Entente (France and Great Britain) for 15 years, for the same period the management of the Saar Basin region was transferred to the League of Nations, part of the German territories was given to Belgium, Poland, Denmark and Czechoslovakia. Germany lost the large Baltic ports of Memel (Klaipeda) and Danzig (Gdansk). The victorious powers divided the German colonial lands among themselves. In total, the German Empire lost 70 thousand km², or an eighth of its territory, and human resources were reduced by 1/12 due to these losses.

The Treaty of Versailles established the complete demilitarization of Germany as a prerequisite for a general and widespread limitation of armaments. Under the terms of the agreement, the General Staff was dissolved, a significant part of the fortifications was destroyed, the relevant articles of the agreement abolished universal conscription in Germany, limited the size of the ground armies to 100 thousand volunteers and the officer contingent to 4 thousand people. The navy could have no more than 6 battleships, 6 light cruisers, 12 counter-destroyers, the same number of destroyers and 15 thousand sailors. But it was forbidden to have a submarine fleet, aviation and airships. The “extra” warships were dismantled by the allies.

The economic requirements of the treaty were also not lenient. Germany's foreign assets and patents were seized and sequestered. During the post-war decade, Germany was obliged to supply millions of tons of coal to France, Italy and Belgium, and to transfer half of its supply of chemical products and dyes to the victorious powers.

The defeat of Germany and the most difficult conditions of the Treaty of Versailles, which placed responsibility, moral and material, on the German Empire for the outbreak of the world war, could not but cause the deepest shock among the Germans. Society did not stop talking about the “invincibility on the battlefields” of German soldiers, who, however, were dealt a “treacherous stab in the back” by the revolutionaries, who took advantage of the opportune moment to proclaim the Weimar Republic.

Of particular importance was the size of reparations, to determine which a special commission was formed from representatives of the Entente countries. The calculations were based on the amounts of all military debt obligations, including rent payments from allies to each other. The commission determined that the amount of reparations over 30 years should be 132 billion gold marks. Payment terms or struggle to ease the financial burden, and became for the Weimar Republic, formed in August 1919 ( named after the constitution adopted in the city of the same name. In government land of Germany divided into 15 lands and 3 independent cities), the key theme of all foreign policy events and negotiations, significantly influencing and generally complicating the domestic political situation. The birth of the republic in an atmosphere of hopelessness about the military future of Germany became a unique reaction of society to the inability of the government to end the war with dignity.

All German parliamentary parties insisted that there was no legal basis for the decision of the Entente countries. However, vae victis: the reality of the threat of French occupation of the territory of the German state remained real and quite feasible, therefore supporters of the “policy of fulfillment” of the terms of the peace treaty inevitably had to prevail in the Weimar parliament, which is what actually happened. This development of events was also prompted by the hope for a likely revision of post-war agreements in the future and, by signing the Treaty of Versailles in May 1919, the German delegation expected to use every opportunity for further negotiations, changes and clarifications. Over the next two years, German politicians at conferences in Paris and London insist on reducing the size of reparation payments. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Weimar Republic, W. Rathenau, is trying to convince the victorious powers that their demands are unrealistic and impracticable. He managed to get Soviet Russia to abandon claims for reparations, but the government failed to achieve any noticeable and positive changes for the republic in this “reparations confrontation.”

Continuously growing public debts and reparation payments undermine the stability of the German currency. Rapid inflation - in the fall of 1923 the gold mark was worth almost forty million paper marks - dealt a severe blow to the well-being of the population. Under these conditions, a government crisis was inevitable, which is what happened: the cabinet of J. Wirth, a supporter and one might even say the founder of the “policy of implementation”, came to power: it was the position of Wirth and Rathenau that received this name.

The speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Weimar Republic in Genoa was an obvious demonstration of German diplomacy's commitment to the terms of the Versailles agreements and readiness to cooperate with the victorious powers. However, this demonstration aroused the indignation of reactionary-nationalist German politicians.

The foreign policy activities of the government of the Weimar Republic noticeably intensified towards the next deadline for reparation payments in 1922: J. Wirth tried to negotiate with London and Paris an additional loan or a long-term moratorium. An extensive program of financial and economic reforms in Germany was proposed to the French authorities by the Minister of Finance of the Republic, which should create a reliable foundation for the “policy of implementation”. However, a meeting of bankers in the French capital opposed the loan, and all negotiations between German diplomats ended in vain.

The foreign policy activities of J. Wirth's cabinet were also hampered by the position of German industrialists, who did not stop sabotaging government measures to pay reparations. At a meeting of businessmen in the German North-West in June 1922, Stinnes openly called for thwarting all attempts by Germany to fulfill its reparation obligations, declaring the threat of the French occupation of the Ruhr mythical and untenable. Subsequently, the tone of the speeches of the leader of big capital and the printed publications belonging to him became openly defiant: “Deutsche Allgemeina Zeitung” published on the front page of the issue dated June 7, 1922 in large print the conditions and principles on which the Germans could agree to pay reparations: the Allies were withdrawing their troops from all occupied territories, including the Saar Basin; refuse the 26% tax on foreign trade turnover, grant Germany the right to free trade with Danzig, change the Upper Silesian borders in favor of Germany and abandon the “most favored nation right” assigned by the allies.

Thus, the dire economic problems caused by Germany's defeat in the war, the preceding Allied blockade and the subsequent huge reparations inevitably pushed the Weimar government to implement a "policy of implementation." Its main supporters and organizers, Reich Chancellor Wirth and Foreign Minister of the Republic Rathenau, saw the prospect of such a direction in the hope of a possible revision of post-war agreements in the future and easing the financial burden. However, attempts by German diplomacy to change the situation for the better were unsuccessful. The pressure from the victorious powers only intensified, which in turn contributed to the activation of the nationalist opposition and supporters of the “politics of disasters”, who did not even stop at the physical elimination of their political opponents.

Inevitable under such conditions, the collapse of the national currency in the winter of 1923 became the most spectacular economic disaster of the twentieth century. Rampant hyperinflation gave the first period of the Weimar Republic a chaotic character. The political significance of the seemingly purely economic factor, inflation, was enormous, since it was this factor that contributed to the promotion of the German Nazis to the forefront of the international political context. This episode in the economic history of the Weimar Republic clearly and convincingly confirmed that financial difficulties influence and even determine the direction of political development.

Thus, defeat in the First World War and the most difficult conditions of the Versailles Peace Treaty, which placed on the German Empire the full measure of moral and material responsibility for the outbreak of a global military conflict, contributed to the intensification of the revolutionary movement in the country, the proclamation of the Weimar Republic, and largely determined the prospects and features existence of a new state. The social, economic and political state of the Weimar Republic, first of all and to a large extent, depended on the influence of foreign policy factors. Foreign policy dominated domestic policy throughout the existence of the Weimar state. The terms of payment of reparations and the struggle to alleviate the financial burden became the key theme of all foreign policy events and negotiations for the Weimar Republic, significantly determining, and generally complicating, the internal political situation.

§ 2. Occupation of the Ruhr: completion of the “policy of implementation”

By the spring of 1921, Germany was able to pay only 40% of the preliminary amount determined by the Treaty of Versailles. This meant that Germany had to pay out the remaining billions of dollars at an annual rate of 2.5 billion just to pay off interest and another 0.5 billion to reduce debt. Thus, the annual tranche amounted to 6% of German GDP, and it was absolutely unthinkable to replace all this with gold or currency.

Paris decides to improvise, although it has been announced more than once, but, nevertheless, unexpected for all political players in the international arena: on January 9, 1923, France accuses Germany of violating debt obligations, and two days later the Franco-Belgian military contingent takes over The Ruhr, Germany's main coal basin and its industrial heart, was home to 10% of the population, produced three-quarters of Germany's iron, coal and steel and had the world's densest railway network. The military accompanies a group of mining engineers who take control of the extraction and shipment of coal, by the way, in accordance with the letter of the corresponding article of the Treaty of Versailles. The Foreign Ministry of the Weimar Republic sent a note to the ambassadors of France and Belgium; Great Britain publicly condemned the French invasion, but did not take any practical action to counter it.

The policy of "fulfillment" did not survive its supporters - the death of Rathenau and the fall of the Wirth cabinet in November 1922 brought an end to this governmental period of the Weimar Republic, which was replaced by the first "unalloyed capitalist" government of Wilhelm Cuno, a German entrepreneur and non-partisan politician. After the French invasion of the Ruhr, Cuno formulated and proclaimed the principles of the new foreign policy of the Weimar Republic, called by the creator himself the “policy of passive resistance,” the essence of which was a call not to submit to illegal demands. The payment of reparation sums was suspended, the administrative apparatus, industry and transport were paralyzed by a general strike. Certain departments and enterprises refused to comply with the orders of the French. The government also announced its support for the strikers, although the only government action in this direction was the issue of special money.

The French in the occupied territory did not hesitate in choosing punitive means: provocations, threats and the use of military force became commonplace. Meanwhile, inflation rates continued to rise uncontrollably and unemployment tripled. Under these conditions, nationalists became more active again, calling for a boycott of the strikes, but for the first time since 1919, not they, but the republic received popular support. However, neither strikes nor sabotage caused serious damage to French requisitions. German business, fearing to lose control of the market, chose to resume coal supplies. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic warned the governments of France, Belgium, Great Britain, the USA, Italy and Japan about continuing the “policy of passive resistance” until the withdrawal of Entente troops from occupied German territories. German diplomacy agrees to set the amount of reparations at 30 billion gold marks, but requires foreign loans to cover the debt. The republic proposes to entrust the final solution to the reparation problem to a special international commission. However, these proposals do not find a response among the allies. The collapse of the Reichsmark at the end of 1923 led to the resignation of the Cuno cabinet and the disastrous end of the “policy of passive resistance.

Thus, the change of government cabinet and the change in the nature of foreign policy from “implementation” to “passive resistance” in the context of the ongoing economic crisis and occupation of the Ruhr did not lead to any fundamental changes or improvements in the international status of the Weimar Republic.

On January 11, 1923, detachments of Franco-Belgian troops of several thousand people occupied Essen and its surroundings. A state of siege was declared in the city. The German government responded to these events by recalling by telegraph its ambassador Mayer from Paris, and envoy Landsberg from Brussels. All German diplomatic representatives abroad were instructed to present in detail to the respective governments all the circumstances of the case and to protest against the “violent policy of France and Belgium, contrary to international law.” Germany's formal protest was stated on January 12, 1923, in the German government's response to the Belgian and French note. The fact that the army crosses the border of unoccupied German territory with wartime composition and weapons characterizes France’s actions as a military action.” British diplomacy continued to remain an outwardly indifferent witness to developing events. She assured France of her loyalty.

But behind the diplomatic scenes, England was preparing the defeat of France. D'Abernon conducted continuous negotiations with the German government on methods of fighting against the occupation. The German government received advice to respond to the French policy of occupation of the Ruhr with “passive resistance”. The latter was to be expressed in organizing the struggle against France’s use of the economic wealth of the Ruhr, as well as in sabotage of occupation activities authorities.

The initiative to pursue this policy came from Anglo-American circles. D'Abernon himself strongly attributes it to American influence. As for British diplomacy, as facts show, it not only had no real intention to keep Poincaré from the Ruhr adventure, but secretly sought to inflame the Franco-German conflict. Curzon made his demarches only for appearances against the occupation of the Ruhr; in fact, he did nothing to prevent its implementation. Moreover, both Curzon and his agent, the English ambassador in Berlin, Lord d'Abernon, believed that the Ruhr conflict could mutually weaken both France and Germany. And this would lead to British dominance in the arena of European politics.

The Soviet government took a completely independent position on the issue of occupation of the Ruhr. Openly condemning the capture of the Ruhr, the Soviet government warned that this act not only could not lead to the stabilization of the international situation, but clearly threatened a new European war. The Soviet government understood that the Ruhr occupation was as much the result of Poincaré’s aggressive policy as the fruit of the provocative actions of the German imperialist bourgeoisie, led by the German “people’s party” of Stinnes. Warning the peoples of the whole world that this dangerous game could end in a new military fire, the Soviet government, in an appeal to the Central Executive Committee on January 13, 1923, expressed its sympathy for the German proletariat, which was becoming the first victim of the provocative policy of disasters pursued by the German imperialists.

§ 3. Consequences and overcoming the Ruhr conflict

As a result, Germany lost 88% of coal, 48% of iron, 70% of cast iron. Germany was under threat of economic collapse. The fall of the German mark became catastrophic, and money depreciated at an unprecedented rate. In addition, the French began repression. Some coal miners, including Fritz Thyssen , were arrested. Krupp was warned about the sequestration of his enterprises. There was a wave of arrests of German government officials in Ruhr and Rhineland regions.

The crisis in Germany had a negative impact on England and throughout Europe. The decline in the purchasing power of the German population led to a fall in English exports and an increase in unemployment in England. At the same time, the French franc began to fall. All this caused disorganization of the European market. In Germany, there was a sharp increase in right-wing radical, nationalist and revanchist movements and organizations. Throughout Germany and especially in Bavaria , secret and overt organizations of a military and nationalist nature were formed.

Although the Ruhr conflict did not end, the policy of "passive resistance" did. But Germany’s relations with France finally lost perspective, and the Weimar Republic began to look for other guidelines in its foreign policy. Moreover, identifying them was not particularly difficult. In the summer of 1924, Great Britain and the United States initiated an international conference to overcome the Ruhr crisis on the basis of solving the reparation problem, the search for which had already been carried out by two expert committees that studied aspects of stabilizing the German mark and ways of “accounting for and returning capital to Germany.”

The German government realized that it would not be possible to overcome the severe crisis on its own, and it was necessary to seek help from an external force, which, as it became clear, only the Anglo-Saxons could provide. The Weimar Republic begins to persistently seek support from the United States and Great Britain. At the end of 1923, the Germans were able to obtain a large loan from them. Then the Weimar Republic signs a trade agreement with the United States, thus removing France from German affairs and solving the problem of reparation payments. In the spring of 1924, the recommendations of the reparation commission were developed, known as the “Daues Plan”, named after the head of the expert committee, who proposed to allocate a large international loan to Germany to stabilize the Reichsmark and inflation and correlate the payment of reparations with the restoration of the German economy. At the London Conference, where, after discussing all issues, representatives of Germany were invited, the delegation of the Weimar Republic pointed out the need to “resolve the issue of the military evacuation” of the Ruhr, occupied by Belgian and French troops. After the start of the Dawes Plan, a stream of overseas loans poured into the Weimar Republic. The export of capital from the United States to Germany, carried out in the form of Americans buying up shares of German companies, made it possible to overcome the crisis in the economy. During this period, the German government decided to admit the country to the League of Nations under certain conditions, providing for the provision of permanent membership to the Weimar Republic, participation in the work of the secretariat and the immediate cleansing of the Ruhr region.

Stresemann began intensive negotiations with France and Great Britain, steadily paving the Republic's “path to the West.” In June 1925, France accepted the German draft guarantees and, on the eve of the Locarno Conference, the French even left the Ruhr ahead of schedule. On October 5, 1925, the Locarno Conference began, where Stresemann demanded equal representation for his country in the Secretariat and Council of the League and colonial mandates. Germany was required to agree to participate in economic and military sanctions against the aggressor, which for all participants in the conference was the USSR. The German delegation did not give such consent, and as Stresemann explained, in “the event of a war between the West and Russia, Germany will not be able to help the latter even indirectly.” Meanwhile, in Moscow, Soviet and German representatives concluded a trade agreement demonstrating “special friendly relations” between Berlin and Moscow. The official document of the conference was a draft collective letter to Germany, containing an interpretation of the article that allowed Germany to participate in the activities of the League of Nations “to the extent possible, consistent with its military and geographical position.” A month before the end of 1925, the conference documents were signed in the British capital, and in the fall of the following year Germany was admitted to the League of Nations with a permanent seat on the Council.

In June 1929, at the Paris Conference, the directives of the “Dauwes Plan” were replaced by a new plan, developed by a group of financial specialists led by the American O. Jung, and reflecting the interests of private, mainly overseas, creditors of the Weimar Republic. The “Young Plan” provided for a certain reduction in annual payments to two billion marks, abolished the reparation tax on industry and reduced the taxation of transport, and provided for the elimination of foreign regulatory authorities. An important point of the plan and its consequence was the early withdrawal of the occupation military contingent from the Rhineland of Germany.

Thus, the industrial and financial crisis and the occupation of the Ruhr forced the government of the Weimar Republic to seek help from the United States and Great Britain. The support of these countries allowed Germany to cope with economic problems and gain the status of an active player in international politics. As a result of the Locarno Conference, the Weimar Republic was admitted to the League of Nations and was given a permanent seat on the Council. In many ways, this was facilitated by the personal and professional qualities of the head of the foreign policy department of the Weimar Republic, G. Stresemann, and the implementation of the directives of the “Dauwes Plan” and the “Jung Plan”.

Conclusion

The defeat in the First World War and the difficult conditions of the Versailles Peace Treaty, which placed on the German Empire the full measure of moral and material responsibility for the outbreak of a global military conflict, contributed to the intensification of the revolutionary movement in the country, the proclamation of the Weimar Republic, and largely determined the prospects and features of the existence of the new state . The social, economic and political state of the Weimar Republic, first of all and to a large extent, depended on the influence of foreign policy factors. Foreign policy dominated domestic policy throughout the existence of the Weimar state. The terms of payment of reparations and the struggle to alleviate the financial burden became the key theme of all foreign policy events and negotiations for the Weimar Republic, significantly determining, and generally complicating, the internal political situation.

The severe economic problems caused by Germany's defeat in the war, the preceding Allied blockade and the subsequent huge reparations inevitably pushed the Weimar government to implement a "policy of implementation". Its main supporters and organizers, Reich Chancellor Wirth and Foreign Minister of the Republic Rathenau, saw the prospect of such a direction in the hope of a possible revision of post-war agreements in the future and easing the financial burden. However, attempts by German diplomacy to change the situation for the better were unsuccessful. The pressure from the victorious powers only intensified, which in turn contributed to the activation of the nationalist opposition and supporters of the “politics of disasters”, who did not even stop at the physical elimination of their political opponents.

The change of government cabinet and the change in the nature of foreign policy from “implementation” to “passive resistance” in the context of the ongoing economic crisis and occupation of the Ruhr did not lead to any fundamental changes or improvements in the international status of the Weimar Republic.

The industrial and financial crisis and the occupation of the Ruhr forced the government of the Weimar Republic to seek help from the United States and Great Britain. The support of these countries allowed Germany to cope with economic problems and gain the status of an active player in international politics. As a result of the Locarno Conference, the Weimar Republic was admitted to the League of Nations and was given a permanent seat on the Council. In many ways, this was facilitated by the personal and professional qualities of the head of the foreign policy department of the Weimar Republic, G. Stresemann, and the implementation of the directives of the “Dauwes Plan” and the “Jung Plan”.

List of sources and literature used

Arshintseva O.A. Reparations in the European policy of Great Britain during the Ruhr crisis of 1923 // Izv. Altais. state un-ta. - 2006. - No. 4. - P. 47-50.

Kotelnikov K.D. German-Soviet secret military negotiations in connection with the Ruhr conflict (1923) // Tr. department history of modern and modern times. - 2015. - No. 14. - P. 147-155.

When, on January 9, 1923, the reparations commission declared that the Weimar Republic was deliberately delaying supplies, France used this as an excuse to send troops into the Ruhr Basin. Between January 11 and January 16, 1923, French and Belgian troops, initially numbering 60,000, occupied the entire Ruhr region, taking the coal and coke production facilities there as “production collateral” to ensure Germany fulfilled its reparations obligations. As a result of the occupation, about 7% of the post-war territory of Germany was occupied, where 72% of coal was mined and more than 50% of iron and steel were produced. However, the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, Raymond Poincaré, sought to achieve the assignment of the Rhineland and the Ruhr to a status similar to the status of the Saar region, where the ownership of the territory of Germany was only formal, and power was in the hands of the French. The entry of occupation troops caused a wave in the Weimar Republic popular anger. The government, led by Reich Chancellor Wilhelm Cuno, called on the population to “passive resistance.”

The occupation caused discontent on the part of Great Britain and the United States and aggravated problems in Europe. The occupation of the Ruhr region ended in July-August 1925 in accordance with the 1924 Dawes Plan.

Exacerbation of the German problem:

2 factions

1) “Proversals”: ​​exact fulfillment of obligations, cooperation to ease the sanctions regime

2) “Pro-Eastern” - connection with heavy industry, connection of “German intellect” with Russian labor resources and raw materials

Economic problems aggravated contradictions in Germany, a serious increase in anti-Semitic sentiments (the arrival of the wealthy Jewish population from Poland, jewelers, shop owners). The population blamed them for speculative operations

In November 1923: “Munich Putsch” under the slogans of fighting against foreigners, which was suppressed→ 5 years in prison by Hitler.

Dawes Plan of August 16, 1924 established a new procedure for reparation payments to Germany after the First World War, according to which their size was brought into line with the economic capabilities of the Weimar Republic. To start the mechanism of the German economy, according to the Dawes Plan, an international loan was simultaneously provided to Germany.

On November 30, 1923, the Reparations Commission decided to create an international committee of experts chaired by Charles Dawes. The treaty was signed on August 16, 1924 in London (London Conference 1924) and came into force on September 1, 1924. Its implementation became possible only after overcoming inflation in Germany and brought the Weimar Republic into its heyday - the “golden twenties”. Implemented primarily under US pressure and thanks to the policies of Gustav Stresemann, the Dawes Plan ensured the restoration of the German economy.

The Versailles agreements put Germany in an extremely difficult situation. The country's armed forces were sharply limited. The German colonies were divided among themselves by the victors, and the bloodless German economy could henceforth rely only on those raw materials that were available on its greatly reduced territory. The country had to pay large reparations.

On January 30, 1921, a conference of the Entente countries and Germany concluded in Paris, establishing the total amount of German reparations at 226 billion gold marks, which must be paid over 42 years. On March 3, the corresponding ultimatum was handed to the German Foreign Minister. It contained a requirement to fulfill its conditions within 4 days. On March 8, having received no response to the ultimatum, Entente troops occupied Duisburg, Ruhrort and Düsseldorf; At the same time, economic sanctions were introduced against Germany.

On May 5, the Entente countries presented Germany with a new ultimatum demanding that they accept all new proposals from the reparation commission within 6 days (to pay 132 billion marks over 66 years, including 1 billion immediately) and fulfill all the terms of the Versailles Treaty on disarmament and the extradition of the perpetrators of the world war. wars; otherwise, the Allied forces threatened to completely occupy the Ruhr area. On May 11, 1921, the office of Reich Chancellor Wirth, two hours before the expiration of the ultimatum, accepted the terms of the Allies. But only on September 30, French troops were withdrawn from the Ruhr. However, Paris never stopped thinking about this rich region.

The volume of reparations was beyond Germany's strength. Already in the fall of 1922, the German government turned to the Allies with a request for a moratorium on the payment of reparations. But the French government headed by Poincaré refused. In December, the head of the Rhine-Westphalian Coal Syndicate, Stinnes, refused to carry out reparations deliveries, even under the threat of Entente troops occupying the Ruhr. On January 11, 1923, a 100,000-strong Franco-Belgian contingent occupied the Ruhr Basin and the Rhineland.

The Ruhr (after Upper Silesia was taken away from Germany under the Treaty of Versailles) provided the country with about 80% of its coal, and more than half of German metallurgy was concentrated here. The struggle for the Ruhr region united the German nation. The government called for passive resistance, which, however, began without any calls. In the Ruhr, enterprises stopped working, transport and postal services did not work, and taxes were not paid. With the support of the army, guerrilla actions and sabotage began. The French responded with arrests, deportations and even death sentences. But this did not change the situation.

The loss of the Ruhr led to a worsening economic crisis throughout the country. Due to the lack of raw materials, thousands of enterprises stopped working, unemployment increased, wages fell, and inflation increased: by November 1923, 1 gold mark was worth 100 billion paper. The Weimar Republic was shaking. On September 26, Chancellor Stresemann announced the end of passive resistance in the Ruhr area and the resumption of German reparations payments. On the same day, a state of emergency was declared. The refusal to resist the French activated right- and left-wing extremists, as well as separatists, in many areas of Germany. The communists blamed the government for the occupation of the Ruhr and called for civil disobedience and a general strike. With the help of the Reichswehr, the uprisings were suppressed in the bud, although there was blood: in Hamburg it came to barricade battles. In November 1923, the Communist Party was officially banned. On November 8–9, 1923, a coup attempt took place in Munich, organized by a previously little-known right-wing organization, the NSDAP.

From September 26, 1923 to February 1924, the Minister of Defense Gessler and the head of the Reichswehr ground forces, General von Seeckt, were given exceptional powers in Germany in accordance with the state of emergency. These powers in practice made the general and the army dictators of the Reich.

Great Britain and the United States were dissatisfied with France's intransigent position and insisted on negotiating to establish a more realistic amount of reparations. On November 29 in London, the reparations commission created two expert committees to study the issue of stabilizing the German economy and ensuring that it pays reparations. On August 16, 1924, a conference of European countries, the USA and Japan concluded its work there and adopted a new reparation plan by the American banker Charles Dawes.

In accordance with the Dawes Plan, France and Belgium evacuated troops from the Ruhr area (they began to do this on August 18, 1924 and finished a year later). A sliding schedule of payments was established (which gradually increased from 1 billion marks in 1924 to 2.5 billion in 1928–1929). The main source of covering reparations was supposed to be state budget revenues through high indirect taxes on consumer goods, transport and customs duties. The plan made the German economy dependent on American capital. The country was provided with 800 million marks as a loan from the United States to stabilize the currency. The plan was designed for German industrialists and traders to transfer their foreign economic activities to Eastern Europe. The adoption of the plan indicated the strengthening of US influence in Europe and the failure of France’s attempt to establish its hegemony.

Payment of reparations was to be made both in goods and in cash in foreign currency. To ensure payments, it was planned to establish Allied control over the German state budget, money circulation and credit, and railways. Control was carried out by a special committee of experts, headed by the general agent for reparations. Charles Dawes was called the savior of Europe, and in 1925 he received the Nobel Peace Prize.

On October 16, 1925, an international conference concluded in the Swiss city of Locarno, in which representatives of Great Britain, France, Belgium, Italy, Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia participated. The conference adopted the Rhine Pact, which ensured the integrity of the borders between France, Belgium and Germany. The latter finally renounced its claims to Alsace and Lorraine, and France - its claims to the Ruhr region. The provision of the Treaty of Versailles on the demilitarization of the Rhineland was confirmed and the Dawes Plan was approved. By the way, the eastern German borders did not fall under the system of guarantees developed at Locarno, which was part of the anti-Soviet policy of the powers.

The settlement of the reparation issue and the liquidation of the Ruhr conflict created favorable conditions for the influx of foreign capital into Germany. By September 1930, the amount of foreign, mainly American, capital investment in Germany amounted to 26–27 billion marks, and the total amount of German reparation payments for the same period was slightly more than 10 billion marks. These capitals contributed to the restoration of industrial production in Germany, which already reached pre-war levels in 1927.