The end of the policy of détente. The period of “détente” in the foreign policy of the USSR. What is the “Brezhnev Doctrine” and how did it manifest itself?

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Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Tyva

FSBEI HPE `"Tuva State University""

Faculty of Philology

Essay

On the topic: “The policy of “détente””

Completed by: 1st year student, 2nd group

Tumat Ai-Kys Syldysoolovna

Checked by: senior teacher

Ondar Evgenia Mikhailovna

Kyzyl 2016

Introduction

1. The policy of “détente” of the 60s and early 70s

2. The policy of “détente” from the early 70s to the 80s

Conclusion

Bibliography

Introduction

In the second half of the 60s, the USSR and the USA needed some respite and regrouping of forces. Both superpowers sought to maintain their dominance in the bipolar system of international relations. At the same time, they tried to develop some “rules of the game”, to prevent being drawn into a new serious international crisis like the Caribbean, and to avoid the threat of a nuclear war. The existing balance of forces made it impossible for one superpower to win an armed conflict. Each side sought to “outplay” the other and gain political advantages in the process of détente. It was desirable to limit the ruinous strategic arms race. At the same time, the Soviet leadership sought to establish genuine strategic parity and its recognition by Washington, and the American leadership sought to maintain its technological gap from the USSR.

The purpose of this work is to examine the policy of `"DETENTE"" of international tension:

1. Study the policy of “détente” since the early 70s

2. Explore the policy of “détente” from the early 70s to the 80s

International détente problem security

1. Politics"discharge"60s early 70s

At the turn of the 50-60s and especially the 60s, positive changes began to be seen in negotiations between the USSR and the USA. And there were certain changes in the American position, and the Soviet government began to show greater flexibility.

US President John Kennedy, under whom the rearmament program began, managed to rise above global American ambitions, which, in particular, was demonstrated by the Caribbean crisis. It was under him that diplomatic methods in the foreign policy program began to be used much more than before. Even Kennedy's short stay in the White House suggests that he understood the need to find ways to establish contacts with disarmament partners.

The most important problem of international relations of the 1960s-1980s. was to ensure security in the world, primarily in Europe, where, as is known, both the First and Second World Wars began. Sensible people in the East and West began to realize, especially after the Cuban missile crisis, that it was impossible to ensure international and, first of all, European security through an arms race, confrontation, and bloc confrontation. The accumulated mountains of weapons, including nuclear missiles, the quantity of which was constantly increasing, showed politicians that there would be no winner in the next war. With the weapons that we already had, it was possible to destroy all life on Earth 15 times. This spoke of the senselessness and danger of confrontation between East and West, forced us to look for solutions to the most important issues through negotiations and conclusion of agreements, and to expand cooperation between East and West, including in ensuring security in the world.

For several years, the prevailing feeling in the system of international relations was that the superpowers, having created the conditions for coexistence-competition, wanted to develop rules of cooperation or even rules for the general “management” of the system of international relations.

Thus, the 1960s (although some foreshadowing signs had already been observed in previous years) began a period of almost twenty years of dualism in which global power politics competed peacefully and the United States showed a willingness to recognize the Soviet Union as an equal entity.

In general, the transition from the coexistence of rivalry to new forms of international relations forced the parties to balance risks and led to such significant results as the signing on August 5, 1963 of a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in space and under water (without the participation of the French and Chinese). January 27, 1967 United States. The Soviet Union and Great Britain signed a treaty prohibiting the deployment of nuclear weapons in space, on the Moon and other celestial bodies. The treaty was symbolic, given that satellites could be tested without a nuclear charge and equipped with one in the event of a crisis.

The most politically and militarily significant result achieved before the end of Johnson's presidency was the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The treaty was the result of a long process of negotiations initiated by the United Nations, which the two major nuclear powers took advantage of because they understood the usefulness of an agreement of such a role in solving the objective internal problems of their respective alliances.

Indeed, in 1961, the UN General Assembly created a committee of 18 participating countries. In order to study a proposal regarding a treaty and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The committee worked without concrete results until 1965, when the Americans and Russians, for obvious reasons, began to show real interest in its activities, while the French refrained from participating in the work of the committee. In 1964, the first Chinese nuclear test took place, and this was enough to shake up Soviet diplomacy. At the same time, the Americans had to face a number of problems within NATO related to their strategic planning, precisely at the moment when they developed maximum activity in Vietnam. Intense work was underway within NATO on a serious revision of the strategy, which should ultimately lead to the abandonment of plans to create a multilateral nuclear force (MNF). They could also include, in a completely unclear form, both the French nuclear program (to which de Gaulle gave a further impetus) and the persistent desire of Federal Germany to possess such weapons. The multilateral force, according to American projects, was to be replaced by an advisory body designed to become, as McNamara said in June 1965, a place for consultation among allies on issues of nuclear weapons planning.

The proposal, studied by a special committee of ministers since 1965, with the aim of preventing unilateral action by the French, led to the creation in 1967 of the “Nuclear Planning Group” (to which Federal Germany was also admitted), which was tasked with formulating NATO’s nuclear strategy. This, however, it was in conflict with projects to equip France with autonomous nuclear forces and therefore was of no small importance for accelerating Gaulle’s decision to withdraw from the NATO military organization; in addition, the abandonment of nuclear weapons also meant the end of Germany’s expectations, no matter how indirect they may have been. , based on different but similar considerations, the United States and the USSR began to view the non-proliferation treaty no longer as an insignificant discussion at the UN, but as an important potential agreement.In 1967, Johnson continued dialogue with the Russians on strategic arms limitation projects.Meanwhile, from the middle 1967 to mid-1968 Almost simultaneously with the escalation and then easing of tensions in Vietnam, the US and USSR presented sufficient justification to lead the United Nations to sign on July 1, 1968. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (after the UN General Assembly approved its text on June 12 with 95 votes in favor, 4 against, with 21 abstentions). In general, the treaty obliged nuclear powers not to transfer nuclear weapons to those who do not possess them, and the latter not to seek to acquire them.

Obviously, this was an unequal treaty, since it asserted the permanent hegemony of the powers. Its political significance was obvious: the Americans forever renounced Germany's atomic rearmament in exchange for the Soviet Union's condemnation of Chinese nuclear rearmament (the French case stood apart and was, in general, marginal in relation to the dominant theme). The Soviet Union's concerns about the situation in Central Europe were so great that, in order to avoid nuclear rearmament of Germany, the Moscow government finally refused to help China become a nuclear power, which, accordingly, aggravated tensions between the two communist states. For the Federal Republic of Germany, the last possibility of possessing nuclear weapons independent of NATO has thus disappeared.

On the contrary, both De Gaulle and Mao Zeedong felt encouraged to continue with their independent projects, despite tensions with the allies, which in the French case led in 1966 to a rather formal and psychological withdrawal from the military organization from NATO than the actual one. In the Chinese version, the results were armed clashes on the Ussuri River in 1969 and a complete diplomatic departure from what remained of socialist internationalism.

Only with the election of American President R. Nixon in November 1968 was it possible to overcome the sharp turn of 1967-1968. in order to give a truly full-scale character to détente, understood as the use in diplomacy to limit the economic costs of nuclear and space competition.

R. Nixon came to power on a wave of anti-war sentiment, taking into account which he promised voters to withdraw American troops from Southeast Asia and end the war. Washington believed that a settlement in Vietnam was impossible without simultaneous improvements in US relations with Moscow and Beijing. But if cooperation was established in the first case, then in the second case there was uncertainty - there were not even diplomatic relations between the PRC and the USA. A non-standard solution was required from the American president. Moreover, he had to exercise extreme caution: take into account the possible reaction from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, China and the USSR, and also monitor the reaction of public opinion - both within the country and in the allied states of the United States.

The policies of the American president were closely watched in Beijing. The PRC was afraid of the Soviet Union and distrustful of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which was leaning towards an alliance with Moscow and moving away from China. Improving relations with Washington was beneficial to China, as it could strengthen its position in the confrontation with Moscow. Therefore, back in November 1968, immediately after R. Nixon’s victory in the presidential election, the Chinese Foreign Ministry made a proposal to negotiate a Sino-American agreement and normalize relations on the principles of peaceful coexistence. It was a signal addressed to the new American leader, who, since 1967, had been known for his views on the need to restructure American policy in Asia to take into account “the realities in China.”

Since May 1969, intensive consultations between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam regarding the withdrawal of American troops began in Paris. The fundamental decision about its necessity was ripe in Washington, but its political and ideological justification was required. On June 25, 1969, President R. Nixon, speaking to military personnel of the American military base on the island of Guam, announced a new doctrine of US policy in Asia, which was based on the principle of “Vietnamization” of the war, which implied the transfer of the main burden of combat operations from American expeditionary forces troops on part of the army of the government of South Vietnam.

R. Nixon’s “Guam Doctrine” meant that the United States would no longer defend its allied regimes in Asia with the help of the American army. The Asian allies now had to defend themselves primarily on their own. Washington guaranteed them a “nuclear umbrella”—that is, protection from interference by hostile great powers—and was willing to provide air and naval support. But from now on, overcome the resistance of local communists and resolve border disputes with neighbors with the help of your own soldiers. international relations détente politics

The “Guam Doctrine” (or “Doctrine of Vietnamization of the War”) was positively received in most countries of the world, since it indicated the seriousness of Washington’s intentions to curtail US participation in the war. The situation in the Asia-Pacific region remained alarming.

Having spared the United States the demoralizing bloodshed of Vietnam and turned its attention to the nation and broader international issues, the Nixon administration focused on what it sometimes pompously called a “peacekeeping structure.” The triangle of relations between the United States, the USSR and China formed the basis for a number of major breakthroughs: an agreement on guaranteed access to divided Berlin; and the dramatic reduction of Soviet influence in the Middle East and the beginning of the Arab-Israeli peace process; and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (aborted during the Ford administration). Each of these events had an impact on all the others. The principle of linkage was in full force.

Détente gave new life to European diplomacy, a theater of foreign policy that literally found itself at a freezing point after the final consolidation of spheres of influence in the East and West in 1961. Until Willy Brandt was elected chancellor in September 1969, all West German governments had consistently insisted that the only legitimate German government was in Bonn. The Federal Republic refused to recognize the East German regime and broke off diplomatic relations with all governments (with the exception of Russia) that agreed to such recognition - due to the so-called “Halyntein Doctrine”.

After the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, the issue of German unification began to disappear from the agenda in negotiations between East and West, and the German desire for unity was temporarily shelved. During these years, de Gaulle decided to explore the possibility of negotiating with Moscow independently of the United States by declaring a policy of “détente, concord and cooperation” with Eastern Europe. The hope was that if Moscow perceived Europe as an independent party rather than an American satellite, Kremlin leaders, given their problems with China, might loosen the stranglehold they had on Eastern Europe. De Gaulle wanted West Germany to move somewhat away from Washington and follow France in turning to the Soviets.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia ended de Gaulle's initiative, but ironically opened the way for Brandt when it was his turn to lead West Germany in 1969.

Brandt then put forward a thesis, paradoxical for that time, that since hope in the West had led the country to a dead end, the unification of Germany could be achieved through German application to the communist world.

He insisted that his country recognize the East German satellite state, agree to the Polish border (along the Oder-Neisse line) and improve its relationship with the Soviet Union. And when tensions between East and West ease, it is possible that the Soviet Union will turn out to be much less rigid in matters of unification. At the very least, the living conditions of the East German population could be significantly improved.

In August 1970, Chancellor W. Brandt arrived on an official visit to Moscow, where on August 12 a Soviet-West German treaty was signed, in which West Germany officially recognized the Oder-Neisse line as the eastern border of Germany, thus renouncing former German territories , passed after the Second World War to the USSR and Poland.

As a result of complex negotiations in the summer of 1971, a new agreement was signed between the new powers, the freedom of West Berlin and Western access to the city.

Since then, Berlin has disappeared from the list of international crisis points. The next time it appears on the world agenda will be when the wall comes down and the German Democratic Republic collapses.

In addition to the Berlin agreement, Brandt's Ostpolitik brought with it friendship treaties between West Germany and Poland, and between West and East Germany and the Soviet Union.

2. Politics« détente» from the early 70s to the 80syears

February 1971 In a radio address to the nation, R. Nixon for the first time stated that neither of the two most powerful powers had a clear advantage in the nuclear field. In essence, this was the first time that a senior US leader openly acknowledged what came to be called “strategic parity.”

Strategic parity did not mean equality of quantitative indicators of the military potential of the superpowers. His concept was directly related to and derived from the doctrine of “mutually assured destruction.”

In the last days of March 1971, the 14th Congress of the ruling Communist Party met in Moscow. Brezhnev gave a lengthy report. The cornerstone of the foreign policy section of the report was the Peace Program, which was a specific list of income for the development of foreign relations of the USSR and the priority tasks of the Soviet Union in international politics. This was the most comprehensive presentation of the policy of peaceful coexistence ever given by the Soviet top leadership. Peaceful coexistence “according to Brezhnev” differed little from peaceful coexistence “according to Khrushchev.” It was also considered a “specific peaceful form of class struggle” and also did not cancel the ideological struggle against “imperialism” while developing mutually beneficial economic ties and political dialogue with it.

But the meaning of the peace program was in theoretical nations. Just as the 20th Congress of 1956 was supposed to “sanctify” the de-stalenization of Soviet society begun by Khrushchev, the 14th Congress was called upon to legalize the policy of détente, to justify it in the eyes of the party masses, to create a canon of ideologically correct reading and interpretation of the pragmatism of the USSR’s foreign policy, which is increasingly moved away from the utopias of the “world revolution” and more and more resembled - conceptually, substantively and terminologically - the policy of an ordinary great power, at the level of practical actions little distinguishable from the policy of the United States, although very different from it at the level of official ideological motivation and information and propaganda support .

From the point of view of the foreign policy program, the congress played a progressive role. Brezhnev's pragmatic position did not allow orthodox anti-Western groups in the top leadership of the CPSU to block the rapprochement of the USSR with the West on the basis of the global status quo and the policy of détente. It became clear that although the foreign policy of the Soviet Union would remain conservative, a return to confrontation was not expected and Moscow did not intend to risk a war with the United States. The congress gave detente the green light. It was no longer dangerous to openly advocate peaceful cooperation with the West, observing certain rules and permitted “figures of speech.” It was still dangerous to question the ideological basis of Soviet foreign policy and the leading role of the CPSU in its implementation. At the same time, cautious liberalization in the sphere of foreign policy was accompanied by the persecution of political dissent and repression against dissidents within the USSR.

In the scientific community, the bearers of political realism were grouped around the director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences; they were formed primarily in this layer.

American diplomacy paid a lot of attention to improving relations with Moscow, finding complete understanding in this on the Soviet side. Soviet-American cooperation in the political and diplomatic field developed unusually fruitfully in the early 70s. Since 1969, Soviet-American negotiations on arms control were held in Helsinki, the task of which was to develop a compromise in the field of limiting strategic offensive weapons. Along the way, preparations were underway for a whole series of bilateral agreements aimed at stabilizing Soviet-American relations and excluding an accidental military conflict between the USSR and the USA. These negotiations began to bear fruit.

September 30, 1971. An indefinite Soviet-American Agreement on measures to reduce the risk of a nuclear war between the USSR and the USA was signed in Washington. In accordance with it, the parties pledged to inform each other of all cases of “unauthorized, accidental or other unexplained incident involving a possible explosion of a nuclear weapon,” as well as to take measures to prevent the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under the control of each party. The agreement regulated a number of important technical organizational aspects of interaction between the USSR and the USA in the event of dangerous situations arising in order to avoid conflict between them. This was the first document after the Caribbean crisis of 1962, which set out the rules of conduct for the parties in the event of a “nuclear alarm”.

In May 1972, US President Nixon made an official visit to Moscow. This was the first-ever visit by a senior American leader to the Soviet Union, if you do not count the stay of President F.D. Roosevelt in Yalta in 1945. As a result of the negotiations, it was possible to conclude a number of important agreements of a military-strategic and general political nature.

First of all, the first documents were signed, which were the result of compromises reached within the framework of negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms. In Russian, this process was abbreviated by the first letters of this phrase - OSV, in English - SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks). In the 60-70s, two rounds of such negotiations took place. The first of them was named “OSV-1”, the second “OSV-2”. Nixon's visit to Moscow included the SALT I series of agreements - the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Systems (ABM) and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures for the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of 1972.

The USSR and the USA agreed that each side would be allowed to create two “anti-missile” complexes and place under their protection, respectively, two areas (four in total) of their choice - around the capitals and in the area where silo launchers are located, that is, bases ICBM. At the same time, both sides pledged not to create a nationwide, that is, covering the entire territory of the country, missile defense systems and the basis for their creation. The treaty also prohibited the creation, testing and deployment of sea-, air-, space- or mobile-ground-based missile defense systems or components. The agreement was indefinite, but it was possible to withdraw from it by notifying 6 months before the day of the expected withdrawal (which the American side took advantage of in 2002).

During President Nixon's second visit to Moscow in June 1974, the Special Soviet-American Protocol reduced the number of areas allowed for the deployment of missile defense systems from four to two - one for each side. The Soviet Union placed its missile defense system in the Moscow area, and the United States in Grand Forks, the area of ​​the main ICBM launcher base.

The agreements of the SALT-1 series did not concern such important types of offensive weapons as long-range bombers, in terms of the number of which the United States had a threefold advantage over the USSR. In addition, the agreement did not regulate the number of multiple warheads (MIRVs), which made it possible to increase the destructive power of missiles in service by placing multiple warheads on them instead of conventional ones, formally remaining within the limits of the 1972 agreements.

During Nixon's visit to Moscow on May 29, 1972, an important document was also signed, called “Fundamentals of Relations between the USSR and the USA.” It formulated 12 principles that both states intended to guide their relations. They formed a kind of code of their mutual behavior - at least under conditions of détente. The principles of peaceful coexistence were recognized as the basis of Soviet-American relations, and the differences in ideology and social systems between the two countries were not considered as obstacles to the development of normal relations on the principles of equality, non-interference in internal affairs, sovereignty and mutual benefit. Even more significant was the commitment of the parties in their relations to avoid confrontation, strive to prevent nuclear war and try, directly or indirectly, to gain unilateral advantages at the expense of the other side. In the field of security, the United States and the USSR agreed to proceed from the principles of recognition of interests, as well as renunciation of the use of force and the threat of its use.

The result of pressure from hardliners was Ford's decision in 1975 to replace the term "détente" in his rhetoric with the slogan "peace from a position of strength." Further negotiations on the development of the SALT II treaty were actually interrupted. As the United States began preparing for the 1976 presidential elections, détente came under increasing attack. Thus, J. Wallace, who was seeking nomination from the Democratic Party, said at one of his election rallies: “When I was a boxer, I firmly learned: as soon as you give yourself a release, you immediately find yourself knocked out. While we are “discharging ourselves” here with the Russians, they are taking over the whole world.” By the end of 1975, there were more and more signs that detente in relations between the USSR and the USA, in the form in which it was carried out, had exhausted itself.

The biggest foreign policy mistake of the Soviet leadership was interference in the internal political struggle in Afghanistan and the occupation of the country in December 1979. The imposition of social and political development schemes was doomed to failure; protracted military operations bled the already ineffective Soviet economy dry. Most countries of the world condemned the short-sighted, incompetent foreign policy of the USSR.

In the late 70s - early 8s. The prevailing nuclear age required new approaches in international relations both from the Soviet Union, socialist countries, and from the United States of America, capitalist countries. However, the development of countries has followed the path of fear, the destruction of trust, and a half-break of detente. The deterioration of relations was accompanied by a dangerous and costly rise in the arms race.

Conclusion

From the 60s to the early 70s, the period was generally characterized by a weakening of international tensions at the global level and in the European direction of world politics. In fact, for the first time in international relations of the 20th century, the principle of the status quo acquired universal recognition, DESPITE IDEOLOGICAL differences between East and West. Based on the recognition of the current state of affairs, there was a rapprochement between the USSR and Western European countries and the United States, which resulted in a reduction in the danger of global conflict and a turn towards resolving controversial issues through dialogue and peaceful cooperation. This new trend is called détente or simply détente.

Although détente has not eliminated wars, conflicts, contradictions and crises from international practice, it has increasingly eliminated brinkmanship, counter-escalating confrontations, and mutual threats to use nuclear weapons. “Confrontations according to the rules,” “soft” forms of confrontation that do not really threaten the outbreak of a nuclear conflict, have become more typical.

Despite isolated outbreaks of acute disagreements, in the 11 years after the Caribbean crisis there was not a single case of dangerous confrontation between the USSR and the USA. A unique form of “confrontational stability” was being consolidated in the world, combining the features of “orderly confrontation” and cooperation.

Listusedliterature

1. Kissinger G. Diplomacy - M. Ladomir, 1977 Protopov A.S. history of international relations and foreign policy of Russia 1648-2000

2. Naprinsky M.M. history of international relations. 1945-1975: Textbook “Russian Political Encyclopedia”, 2004

3. Systemic history of international relations, 1918-2003: Events of 1945-2003 / ed. Bagaturova: scientific education. Forumpo intl. Relations: scientifically will form a forum on relations: Institute of World Economy and International. Relations RAS; state univ. Humanities 2003

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Relief of international tension

But the advent of atomic weapons almost eliminated the danger of large-scale war. And immediately after Stalin's death, the danger of invasion began to rapidly decrease. Until the 1960s, some international provocations still continued: explosions at the headquarters of White Guard organizations, threatening rhetoric, attempts to support “our own”... But the scale was not at all the same.

The last large-scale episode that made the West shudder was the Cuban Missile Crisis... In October 1962, the USSR stationed itself in Cuba. That's why in Cuba they call it the "October Crisis" (Crisis de Octubre), and in the USA - “Cuban Missile Crisis” (Cuban missile crisis).

October 14, 1962, when a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft of the US Air Force, during one of its regular flights over Cuba, discovered Soviet medium-range P-12 and P-14 in the vicinity of the village of San Cristobal. US President John Kennedy created a special Executive Committee, which discussed possible ways to solve the problem. On October 22, Kennedy addressed the people, announcing the presence of Soviet “offensive weapons” in Cuba, which immediately caused panic in the United States. America began a “quarantine” (blockade) of Cuba.

The USSR first denied that there were these missiles in Cuba... then it argued that it was defending itself from the USA in this way. And the real threat of nuclear war looms over the world. All the more real because Kennedy was already ready to launch a massive bombing of Cuba. However, another U-2 flyby showed that several missiles had already been installed and were ready for launch. It became clear that the bombing would lead to one thing: missiles would be launched at America.

Then John Kennedy suggested that the Soviet Union dismantle the installed missiles and turn around the ships still heading to Cuba. In return: US guarantees not to attack Cuba and not overthrow the regime of Fidel Castro.

The Khrushchev government agreed. On October 28, 1962, the dismantling of the missiles began. The last Soviet missile left Cuba a few weeks later, and the blockade of Cuba was lifted on November 20.

For 38 days the world teetered on the brink of war, and this became the turning point of the entire Cold War. And after that, Khrushchev pounded his boot on the UN podium, shouting that he would show the West “Kuzka’s mother” and that the whole question was who would bury whom faster: the USSR or the West.

But the worst was over, and international détente began.

The term itself appeared in the early 70s of the 20th century. This is a tracing paper from the French detente (discharge). The essence of detente is that after the Cuban missile crisis, both sides finally realized that it would not be possible to destroy the enemy and remain unharmed. Doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (Mutual Assured Destruction) sounded like this: “it is impossible to destroy a strategic enemy without him delivering a blow, the consequences of which will be unacceptable to us.”

The USSR caught up with the USA in the power of nuclear forces.

The Vietnam War required enormous costs, gave rise to political opposition, and polarized society.

Social Democrat Willy Brandt came to power in Germany, fussily “repenting” for all the crimes of the Germans, committed and not committed. He also started the “new Eastern policy”. The Moscow Treaty between the USSR and Germany (1970) fixed the inviolability of the post-war borders, and the renunciation of the territorial claims of the Federal Republic of Germany to East Prussia and German lands, which were transferred to Lithuania, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

The cancellation of the draft deferment for students in the US Army sparked mass student protests. In 1970, police shot down a student demonstration at the University of Kent. 4 people, including 2 girls, were killed.

All these facts indicated that it was better to curtail the arms race and confrontation.

For the USSR, the Cuban Missile Crisis showed that it would not be possible to launch an attack on the United States through the territory of “friend Fidel.”

The implementation of the American Apollo program led to the American landing on the Moon in 1969. This means that it is not possible through space either.

And then there’s the break with China: the explosion of Mao’s aggressive demagoguery, the “cultural revolution,” calling them “revisionists,” territorial claims to the Far East and Siberia. In 1972, it came to a border conflict on Damansky Island, on the Amur. Having lost such an important strategic ally, the USSR became sad.

As a consequence of all these changes, on November 17, 1969, negotiations began between the USSR and the USA on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons in Helsinki.

Until 1979, there was a stream of agreements between the USSR and the USA, establishing increasingly closer relations between these countries, practically excluding the outbreak of hostilities.

On June 18, 1979, in Vienna, J. Carter and L. I. Brezhnev signed the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II).

Before Stalin's death and during the Cuban Missile Crisis, it was easy and simple to scare the allies with the Soviet threat. During the period of détente, it is much more difficult. It is no coincidence that it was at this time that Europe began to behave much more independently.

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INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………………….3

PREREQUISITES AND THE BEGINNING OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION DELAY……………………………………………………………………………….….6

1.1 Reasons for detente and goals of the parties………………….…………......6

1.2 Moscow Treaty 1963 and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968………………………………………………………………………………….….11

1.3 Treaty on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space of 1967………………………………………………………………………………......16

SOVIET-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS AND AGREEMENTS 1972-1979. AND CULTURAL-ECONOMIC COOPERATION….…18

2.1. SALT I Agreement and ABM Treaty……………………………………………………....…..18

2.2. SALT-2 Treaty……………………………………………………………………………….........23

2.3. Helsinki Accords 1975…………………………………….…….….....28

2.4. Cultural and economic cooperation between the USSR and the USA…………..…..…...34

COMPLETION OF DISCHARGE……………………………………………………………...….…38

3.1. Reasons for the fragility of discharge…………………………….……..……....38

3.2. From détente to confrontation……………………………………………..…......41

3.3. The influence of the détente process on the development of international relations.........45

CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………......48

LIST OF SOURCES USED…………………..………….....51

INTRODUCTION

Soviet-American relations are a complex and multifaceted phenomenon in world political history. Interest in the phenomenon of Soviet-American cooperation has not waned to this day. The reasons here are not only in the scientific interest of the relationship between the world's first country of the socialist system and the largest, richest and economically powerful country of capitalism, as is commonly believed in Soviet historiography. Interest in the problem of Soviet-American relations is manifested to the extent that the key to understanding modern Russian-American relations lies precisely in the Soviet period.

If you carefully trace the relationship between the USSR and the USA in retrospect, it becomes clear that the relationship between them appears to be a striking example of the struggle for leadership on the world stage. If we compare the USSR and the USA with each other according to a number of indicators (economic potential, resource, scientific and technical, territorial, etc.), then it becomes objective that both sides had sufficient potential for claims to world domination, and both Soviet Russia and the United States understood perfectly. The fear that one country would succeed in something or have more influence in the world than another constantly hovered in the ruling circles of both the USSR and the USA (for example, the desire of the Soviet Union to “catch up and overtake America”).

The most striking manifestation of the struggle for world domination is the so-called Cold War period. It is here that the aspirations of both sides to dominate the global space are clearly visible. And after the Cuban missile crisis, the world entered a new stage of the Cold War. Both sides were quite clearly aware of the mutual vulnerability of the blocs. Gradually, the understanding came of the impossibility of using nuclear weapons in a world war, that in it “there cannot be a winner.” Therefore, the main content of the stage that began was the consistent leveling of the level of nuclear potentials between NATO and the Warsaw Warfare Division, the formation of strategic equality - parity - between the USSR and the USA. It is generally accepted that achieving parity was the essence of the process of “détente of international tension.” Détente of international tension is a policy aimed at reducing the aggressiveness of the confrontation between the countries of the socialist and capitalist camps. The term is used in relation to political processes in relations between the USSR and the USA from the late 50s to the end of the 70s. At the same time, it is important to evaluate this phenomenon in its entire historical context. “Détente” is a much more multifaceted phenomenon, covering not only the military-strategic area, but also the entire complex of East-West relations from environmental protection and cultural ties to foreign trade, which gave rise to a new climate in international relations and certain hopes in Soviet society. The core of “détente” was more favorable Soviet-American relations than ever before, which for the first time since the war went beyond purely diplomatic contacts.

The purpose of this course work is to examine the process of Soviet-American cooperation during the détente of international tension.

In accordance with the set goal, the following tasks will be solved:

1. Consider the prerequisites for the beginning of detente in international tension;

2. Study Soviet-American agreements and treaties concluded during the period of detente;

3. Analyze the reasons for the fragility of détente and its impact on the development of international relations.

The subject of the study is Soviet-American relations during the years of détente.

To achieve this goal, the following methods were used in the work: statistical, empirical research methods (observation, comparison), theoretical research methods (abstraction, analysis).

The course work consists of an introduction, three chapters, a conclusion, a list of references (19 titles), the total volume of work is 52 pages.

To write the work, various sources were used: teaching aids and monographs, collections of documents.

GLAVA 1

PREREQUISITES AND THE BEGINNING OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION DELAY

1.1 Reasons for detente and goals of the parties

In the second half of the 60s, both superpowers needed some respite and regrouping of forces. The USSR and the USA sought to maintain their dominance in the bipolar system of international relations. At the same time, they tried to develop some “rules of the game”: after the Cuban Missile Crisis, which almost led to the outbreak of World War III, East and West realized the need to gradually ease tensions in bilateral relations. The year 1962 made us realize how terrible the consequences of a nuclear war would be.

In addition, it was at the beginning of the “Brezhnev era” that the USSR achieved military parity with the United States and could now talk with the Americans on equal terms. This was the reason that the entire second half of the 60s and the entire 70s went down in the history of Soviet-American relations as a time of “détente,” a certain warming of relations. At the same time, the Soviet leadership sought to establish genuine strategic parity and its recognition by Washington, and the American leadership sought to maintain its technological gap from the USSR.

American historical and political literature very actively uses the thesis that detente in Soviet-American relations in the first half of the 70s became possible, first of all, as a result of “changes” in the Soviet approach to relations with the United States. However, such statements do not correspond to reality.

The Soviet Union did not need to make any adjustments to its policies, since it constantly made concerted efforts to improve Soviet-American relations and the international situation as a whole. From the rostrum of the XXIV Congress of the CPSU it was clearly stated that the USSR was ready to maintain normal relations with the United States. “We proceed from the fact,” said the Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the Congress, “that improvement of relations between the USSR and the USA is possible. Our principled line in relation to capitalist countries, including the United States, is to consistently and fully implement in practice the principles of peaceful coexistence, develop mutually beneficial ties, and cooperate with those states that are ready for this in the field of strengthening peace, giving maximum sustainable nature of relationships with them. But we have to consider whether we are dealing with a genuine desire to resolve issues at the negotiating table or with attempts to pursue policies from a “position of strength.” Those. At the same time, peaceful coexistence was still interpreted as a form of class struggle.

At the turn of the 60s and 70s, the United States really had to undergo a significant reassessment of the foreign policy guidelines of the Cold War period. For the United States, the interventionist course resulted in a further weakening of its international positions and the collapse of attempts to stop the objective processes of historical development unfolding in the world. Under these conditions, the United States in the early 70s was forced to take the path of a certain improvement in relations with the USSR, developing peaceful cooperation with it in a number of areas, and above all in the area of ​​strategic arms limitation.

Among the objective reasons why the United States agreed to a certain normalization of relations with the USSR are the following:

a change in the balance of forces in the world in favor of socialism, and above all the establishment of military-strategic parity between the USSR and the USA, between the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO; the growth of the military-economic and political power of all socialist countries, their influence on the course of world events;

the deepening of the general crisis of capitalism, the exacerbation of inter-imperialist contradictions, the increased desire of a number of large Western states to pursue a more independent foreign policy course;

the disappearance of the strategic “invulnerability” of the United States as a result of the emergence in the Soviet arsenal of effective means of delivering nuclear weapons over intercontinental distances;

the general crisis of the conceptual guidelines of the post-war US foreign policy towards “containment”, “pushing back” socialism, which was most clearly expressed in the failure of US aggression in Southeast Asia, which not only seriously undermined the international prestige of the United States, narrowed its possibilities for foreign policy maneuvering, but and created a deep division in the country.

“The need to change our policy,” noted in the foreign policy message to Congress of then US President R. Nixon dated May 3, 1973, “was dictated by the expediency of bringing it into line not only with new realities in the world, but also with new sentiments in America. Many Americans were no longer willing to unconditionally support all aspects of the post-war US activities in the world, which were draining our financial and especially psychological resources... Opinions began to be expressed in our country that the United States should moderate global appetites and turn its face to internal problems, searching for ways to solve them. solutions. Consequently, the very foundation on which our policies rested is in jeopardy; the bipartisan consensus of the past regarding an active American globalism has now disintegrated.”

The Republican Nixon-Kissinger administration, which came to power in the United States in 1969, was forced to take a course toward more active adaptation to the new balance of power in the world, to eliminate the gap between the global foreign policy ambitions of the United States and its real capabilities by slightly reducing American foreign policy obligations. The main direction of this adaptation was the normalization of relations with the Soviet Union. Statements by American politicians at the time that the United States was “forced to coexist” with the USSR, that they were “doomed” to such coexistence, for a long period of time reflected Washington’s understanding of the depth and scale of the changes that had taken place in the world.

After N. Khrushchev was removed from power in October 1964, the Kremlin began to pursue a more cautious and realistic course in the international arena. Détente was intended to help consolidate the existing territorial and political structure in Europe and the West's recognition of the dominance of the USSR in its sphere of influence. In the early 70s, an important stimulus for détente was the emerging rapprochement between the United States and China. In the current situation, Moscow was interested in establishing stable Soviet-American relations.

The shots of World War II ended, the military-nuclear potentials of NATO and the Department of Internal Affairs gradually equalized, the USSR achieved parity with the United States in armaments. The tension that arose between the socialist and capitalist camps increasingly pushed the world towards a new war...

Prerequisites and reasons for “detente”

Let us look at the question of what are the reasons for the transition to a policy of detente. The military buildup of the United States, the USSR and their protectorates or satellites created constant tension in foreign policy matters.

By the mid-60s, an economic crisis had set in in capitalist countries, which gave rise to financial interest in developing trade relations with the USSR, which had extensive oil and gas reserves. The United States moved on to a protracted war in Vietnam, and they needed help from the USSR in order to save face and leave with dignity. The Soviet Union was also interested in friendship with NATO countries, because to the south of Siberia China was rapidly developing, fraught with a threat.

All these prerequisites contributed to the transition of NATO and Warsaw countries to a “policy of détente” under the conditions of the Cold War.

Measures taken

The hopes and results of both sides from the measures taken are formulated in the table “The Policy of Détente in International Tension.”

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Hope	Actions	Result
Reducing military tension between the Warsaw Department and NATO	Conducting a pan-European Security Conference (1969)	Refusal of states from territorial claims
	Treaty on the final recognition of post-war borders in Europe (August 1970)
Recognition of the legitimacy of states	Negotiations between socialist and capitalist Germany	Mutual recognition of the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR (December 1972)
	Agreement between the USSR, USA, England and France on West Berlin (September 1971)	Refusal to use military force in West Berlin
Refusal of combat operations in space	Negotiations on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (1967)	Signing the contract
	Experimental flight of Soyuz and Apollo (1975)

Rice. 1. Soyuz-Apollo docking.

The main result of the Pan-European Conference on Security and Cooperation was the signing of the “Declaration of Principles”, according to which the 35 states participating in the conference pledged not to violate each other’s sovereignty, peacefully resolve disputes, respect human rights, equality of peoples and cooperate in many spheres of society.

By the end of the 70s, relations with the West began to deteriorate. A striking example was the refusal of the US Senate to ratify the treaty to continue reducing the arms race.

Rice. 2. President Nixon.

In addition to the measures indicated in the table, it should be noted that on May 22-30, 1972, US President Nixon visited the USSR. This was the first official visit of a US president in the entire history of relations.
During the meeting, R. Nixon and L. I. Brezhnev signed the following agreements:

• on cooperation in the field of science and technology;
• on the limitation of missile defense systems;
• a temporary agreement on certain measures in the field of strategic arms limitation;
• cooperation in the field of medicine;
• on preventing incidents at sea;
• trade agreement.

Rice. 3. L. I. Brezhnev.

On December 25, 1979, in connection with the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, the policy of “détente” began to gradually decline and another deterioration in Soviet-American relations occurred.

During the policy of détente, the Soviet Union actively purchased foreign cars, built joint livestock complexes in the Kuban, musical groups toured abroad, as well as other ways of cultural exchange between the two nations.

What have we learned?

The policy of "détente" was the first post-war attempt to improve relations between the socialist and capitalist worlds. And even though it turned out to be unsuccessful, it was the first step towards creation, not confrontation.

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