Supreme Privy Council of Commerce Collegium. The Supreme Privy Council was established. Changing the form of government

After his fall (1727) - princes Dolgorukov and Golitsyn.

However, after the accession of Peter II Alekseevich to the throne (May 1727), A.D. Menshikov fell from grace and A.G. and V.L. Dolgorukovs entered the Supreme Privy Council, and in 1730, with the accession of Anna Ioannovna, M. M. Golitsyn and V.V. Dolgorukov.

"Plan of the Supreme Leaders" and "Conditions"

Having rejected the married eldest daughter of Tsar Ivan Alekseevich, Catherine, 8 members of the Council elected his youngest daughter Anna Ioannovna, who had already lived in Courland for 19 years and had no favorites or parties in Russia, to the throne by 8 o’clock in the morning on January 19 (), which means she arranged everyone. Anna seemed obedient and controllable to the nobles, not prone to despotism.

Taking advantage of the situation, the leaders decided to limit autocratic power by demanding that Anna sign certain conditions, the so-called “ Conditions" According to " Conditions“real power in Russia passed to the Supreme Privy Council, and the role of the monarch for the first time was reduced to representative functions.

On January 28 (February 8), 1730, Anna signed “ Conditions“, according to which, without the Supreme Privy Council, she could not declare war or make peace, introduce new taxes and taxes, spend the treasury at her own discretion, promote to ranks higher than colonel, grant estates, deprive a nobleman of life and property without trial, enter into marriage, appoint an heir to the throne.

Relying on the support of the guard, as well as the middle and minor nobility, Anna publicly tore apart " Conditions"and your letter of acceptance.

On March 1 () 1730, the people took the oath for the second time to Empress Anna Ioannovna on the terms of complete autocracy.

By the manifesto of March 4 (15), the Supreme Privy Council was abolished.

The fates of the members of the Supreme Privy Council developed differently: Mikhail Golitsyn was dismissed and died almost immediately, his brother and three of the four Dolgorukovs were executed during the reign of Anna Ioannovna. Only Vasily Vladimirovich Dolgorukov survived the repression, under Elizaveta Petrovna he was returned from exile and appointed head of the military board. Golovkin and Osterman occupied the most important government posts during the reign of Anna Ioannovna. Osterman briefly became the de facto ruler of the country in 1740-1741, but after another palace coup he was exiled to Berezov, where he died.

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- Why are you yawning?
- Good! That's how it flows from them! Don't wet our living room.
“You can’t dirty Marya Genrikhovna’s dress,” the voices answered.
Rostov and Ilyin hurried to find a corner where they could change their wet dress without disturbing Marya Genrikhovna’s modesty. They went behind the partition to change clothes; but in a small closet, filling it completely, with one candle on an empty box, three officers were sitting, playing cards, and did not want to give up their place for anything. Marya Genrikhovna gave up her skirt for a while to use it instead of a curtain, and behind this curtain Rostov and Ilyin, with the help of Lavrushka, who brought packs, took off the wet dress and put on a dry dress.
A fire was lit in the broken stove. They took out a board and, having supported it on two saddles, covered it with a blanket, took out a samovar, a cellar and half a bottle of rum, and, asking Marya Genrikhovna to be the hostess, everyone crowded around her. Some offered her a clean handkerchief to wipe her lovely hands, some put a Hungarian coat under her feet so that it would not be damp, some curtained the window with a cloak so that it wouldn’t blow, some brushed the flies off her husband’s face so that he would not wake up.
“Leave him alone,” said Marya Genrikhovna, smiling timidly and happily, “he’s already sleeping well after a sleepless night.”
“You can’t, Marya Genrikhovna,” the officer answered, “you have to serve the doctor.” That’s it, maybe he’ll feel sorry for me when he starts cutting my leg or arm.
There were only three glasses; the water was so dirty that it was impossible to decide whether the tea was strong or weak, and there was only enough water in the samovar for six glasses, but it was all the more pleasant, in turn and by seniority, to receive your glass from Marya Genrikhovna’s plump hands with short, not entirely clean, nails . All the officers seemed to really be in love with Marya Genrikhovna that evening. Even those officers who were playing cards behind the partition soon abandoned the game and moved on to the samovar, obeying the general mood of courting Marya Genrikhovna. Marya Genrikhovna, seeing herself surrounded by such brilliant and courteous youth, beamed with happiness, no matter how hard she tried to hide it and no matter how obviously shy she was at every sleepy movement of her husband, who was sleeping behind her.
There was only one spoon, there was most of the sugar, but there was no time to stir it, and therefore it was decided that she would stir the sugar for everyone in turn. Rostov, having received his glass and poured rum into it, asked Marya Genrikhovna to stir it.
- But you don’t have sugar? - she said, all smiling, as if everything that she said, and everything that others said, was very funny and had another meaning.
- Yes, I don’t need sugar, I just want you to stir it with your pen.
Marya Genrikhovna agreed and began to look for the spoon, which someone had already grabbed.
“You finger, Marya Genrikhovna,” said Rostov, “it will be even more pleasant.”
- It's hot! - said Marya Genrikhovna, blushing with pleasure.
Ilyin took a bucket of water and, dripping some rum into it, came to Marya Genrikhovna, asking him to stir it with his finger.
“This is my cup,” he said. - Just put your finger in, I’ll drink it all.
When the samovar was all drunk, Rostov took the cards and offered to play kings with Marya Genrikhovna. They cast lots to decide who would be Marya Genrikhovna's party. The rules of the game, according to Rostov’s proposal, were that the one who would be king would have the right to kiss Marya Genrikhovna’s hand, and that the one who would remain a scoundrel would go and put a new samovar for the doctor when he woke up.
- Well, what if Marya Genrikhovna becomes king? – Ilyin asked.
- She’s already a queen! And her orders are law.
The game had just begun when the doctor’s confused head suddenly rose from behind Marya Genrikhovna. He had not slept for a long time and listened to what was said, and, apparently, did not find anything cheerful, funny or amusing in everything that was said and done. His face was sad and despondent. He did not greet the officers, scratched himself and asked permission to leave, as his way was blocked. As soon as he came out, all the officers burst into loud laughter, and Marya Genrikhovna blushed to tears and thereby became even more attractive in the eyes of all the officers. Returning from the yard, the doctor told his wife (who had stopped smiling so happily and was looking at him, fearfully awaiting the verdict) that the rain had passed and that she had to go spend the night in the tent, otherwise everything would be stolen.
- Yes, I’ll send a messenger... two! - said Rostov. - Come on, doctor.
– I’ll watch the clock myself! - said Ilyin.
“No, gentlemen, you slept well, but I didn’t sleep for two nights,” said the doctor and gloomily sat down next to his wife, waiting for the end of the game.
Looking at the gloomy face of the doctor, looking askance at his wife, the officers became even more cheerful, and many could not help laughing, for which they hastily tried to find plausible excuses. When the doctor left, taking his wife away, and settled into the tent with her, the officers lay down in the tavern, covered with wet overcoats; but they didn’t sleep for a long time, either talking, remembering the doctor’s fright and the doctor’s amusement, or running out onto the porch and reporting what was happening in the tent. Several times Rostov, turning over his head, wanted to fall asleep; but again someone’s remark entertained him, a conversation began again, and again causeless, cheerful, childish laughter was heard.

At three o'clock no one had yet fallen asleep when the sergeant appeared with the order to march to the town of Ostrovne.
With the same chatter and laughter, the officers hastily began to get ready; again they put the samovar on dirty water. But Rostov, without waiting for tea, went to the squadron. It was already dawn; the rain stopped, the clouds dispersed. It was damp and cold, especially in a wet dress. Coming out of the tavern, Rostov and Ilyin, both in the twilight of dawn, looked into the doctor’s leather tent, shiny from the rain, from under the apron of which the doctor’s legs stuck out and in the middle of which the doctor’s cap was visible on the pillow and sleepy breathing could be heard.
- Really, she’s very nice! - Rostov said to Ilyin, who was leaving with him.
- What a beauty this woman is! – Ilyin answered with sixteen-year-old seriousness.
Half an hour later the lined up squadron stood on the road. The command was heard: “Sit down! – the soldiers crossed themselves and began to sit down. Rostov, riding forward, commanded: “March! - and, stretching out into four people, the hussars, sounding the slap of hooves on the wet road, the clanking of sabers and quiet talking, set off along the large road lined with birches, following the infantry and battery walking ahead.
Torn blue-purple clouds, turning red at sunrise, were quickly driven by the wind. It became lighter and lighter. The curly grass that always grows along country roads was clearly visible, still wet from yesterday’s rain; The hanging branches of the birches, also wet, swayed in the wind and dropped light drops to their sides. The faces of the soldiers became clearer and clearer. Rostov rode with Ilyin, who did not lag behind him, on the side of the road, between a double row of birch trees.
During the campaign, Rostov took the liberty of riding not on a front-line horse, but on a Cossack horse. Both an expert and a hunter, he recently got himself a dashing Don, a large and kind game horse, on which no one had jumped him. Riding this horse was a pleasure for Rostov. He thought about the horse, about the morning, about the doctor, and never thought about the upcoming danger.
Previously, Rostov, going into business, was afraid; Now he did not feel the slightest sense of fear. It was not because he was not afraid that he was accustomed to fire (you cannot get used to danger), but because he had learned to control his soul in the face of danger. He was accustomed, when going into business, to think about everything, except for what seemed to be more interesting than anything else - about the upcoming danger. No matter how hard he tried or reproached himself for cowardice during the first period of his service, he could not achieve this; but over the years it has now become natural. He now rode next to Ilyin between the birches, occasionally tearing leaves from branches that came to hand, sometimes touching the horse’s groin with his foot, sometimes, without turning around, giving his finished pipe to the hussar riding behind, with such a calm and carefree look, as if he was riding ride. He felt sorry to look at Ilyin’s agitated face, who spoke a lot and restlessly; he knew from experience the painful state of waiting for fear and death in which the cornet was, and knew that nothing except time would help him.
The sun had just appeared on a clear streak from under the clouds when the wind died down, as if it did not dare spoil this lovely summer morning after the thunderstorm; the drops were still falling, but vertically, and everything became quiet. The sun came out completely, appeared on the horizon and disappeared into a narrow and long cloud standing above it. A few minutes later the sun appeared even brighter on the upper edge of the cloud, breaking its edges. Everything lit up and sparkled. And along with this light, as if answering it, gun shots were heard ahead.
Before Rostov had time to think about and determine how far these shots were, the adjutant of Count Osterman Tolstoy galloped up from Vitebsk with orders to trot along the road.
The squadron drove around the infantry and battery, who were also in a hurry to go faster, went down the mountain and, passing through some empty village without inhabitants, climbed the mountain again. The horses began to lather, the people became flushed.
- Stop, be equal! – the division commander’s command was heard ahead.
- Left shoulder forward, step forward! - they commanded from the front.
And the hussars along the line of troops went to the left flank of the position and stood behind our lancers who were in the first line. On the right stood our infantry in a thick column - these were reserves; above it on the mountain, our guns were visible in the clear, clean air, in the morning, oblique and bright light, on the very horizon. Ahead, behind the ravine, enemy columns and cannons were visible. In the ravine we could hear our chain, already engaged and cheerfully clicking with the enemy.
Rostov, as if hearing the sounds of the most cheerful music, felt joy in his soul from these sounds, which had not been heard for a long time. Tap ta ta tap! – several shots clapped suddenly, then quickly one after another. Again everything fell silent, and again it was as if firecrackers were cracking as someone walked on them.
The hussars stood in one place for about an hour. The cannonade began. Count Osterman and his retinue rode behind the squadron, stopped, talked with the regiment commander and rode off to the guns on the mountain.
Following Osterman’s departure, the lancers heard a command:
- Form a column, line up for the attack! “The infantry ahead of them doubled their platoons to let the cavalry through. The lancers set off, their pike weather vanes swaying, and at a trot they went downhill towards the French cavalry, which appeared under the mountain to the left.
As soon as the lancers went down the mountain, the hussars were ordered to move up the mountain, to cover the battery. While the hussars were taking the place of the lancers, distant, missing bullets flew from the chain, squealing and whistling.
This sound, not heard for a long time, had an even more joyful and exciting effect on Rostov than the previous sounds of shooting. He, straightening up, looked at the battlefield opening from the mountain, and with all his soul participated in the movement of the lancers. The lancers came close to the French dragoons, something was tangled there in the smoke, and five minutes later the lancers rushed back not to the place where they stood, but to the left. Between the orange lancers on red horses and behind them, in a large heap, were visible blue French dragoons on gray horses.

Having ascended the throne, Catherine continued to shower the guards with “favors.” Behind Catherine stood the nobles, who at first actually ruled for her, and then legally secured power in the country.

There was no unity among the main nobles. Everyone wanted power, everyone strived for enrichment, fame, honor. Everyone feared the “blessed” 11 Gordin Y. Between slavery and freedom. P.142.. They were afraid that this “all-powerful Goliath,” as Menshikov was called, using his influence on the empress, would become the helm of government, and would relegate other nobles, more knowledgeable and nobler than him, to the background. Not only nobles, but also the nobility and gentry feared the “almighty Goliath”. The coffin of Peter was still standing in the Peter and Paul Cathedral, and Yaguzhinsky already addressed the ashes of the emperor, loudly so that they could hear, complaining about “insults” on the part of Menshikov. The influential Golitsyns rallied, one of whom, Mikhail Mikhailovich, who commanded the troops located in Ukraine, seemed especially dangerous to Catherine and Menshikov. Menshikov openly bullied the Senate, and the senators responded by refusing to meet. In such an environment, the intelligent and energetic Pyotr Andreevich Tolstoy acted, obtaining the consent of Menshikov, Apraksin, Golovkin, Golitsyn and Catherine (whose role in this matter was practically reduced to zero) to establish the Supreme Privy Council. On February 8, 1726, Catherine signed a decree establishing it. The decree stated that “for the sake of good, we have decided and commanded from now on at our court, both for external and internal important state affairs, to establish a Privy Council...”. Alexander Danilovich Menshikov, Fyodor Matveevich Apraksin, Gavrila Ivanovich Golovkin, Pyotr Andreevich Tolstoy, Dmitry Mikhailovich Golitsyn and Andrey were introduced into the Supreme Privy Council by decree of February 8

Ivanovich Osterman 22 Ibid., p. 43..

After some time, members of the Supreme Privy Council submitted to Catherine “an opinion not on the decree on the new established Privy Council,” which established the rights and functions of this new highest government body. “Opinion not in the decree” assumed that all the most important decisions are made only by the Supreme Privy Council, any imperial decree ends with the expressive phrase “given in the Privy Council”, papers going to the name of the Empress are also provided with the expressive inscription “for filing in the Privy Council”, foreign policy, the army and navy are under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Privy Council, as well as the collegiums that head them. The Senate, naturally, loses not only its former significance as the highest body in the complex and cumbersome bureaucratic machine of the Russian Empire, but also the title of “governor”. “Opinion is not included in the decree” 11 “Opinion is not included in the decree on the newly established Supreme Privy Council” P.14. became a decree for Catherine: she agreed with everything, only stipulating something. Created “at the side of the empress,” the Supreme Privy Council only mercifully considered her. So, in fact, all power was concentrated in the hands of the “supreme leaders,” and the governing Senate, the stronghold of senatorial opposition to Menshikov and his entourage, having become simply “high,” lost its importance for a long time, without ceasing to be the focus of opposition to the “supreme leaders” 22 Vyazemsky L.B. Supreme Privy Council. P.245..

The composition of the Supreme Privy Council is noteworthy; it fully reflects the balance of power that has developed in government circles. Most of the members of the Supreme Privy Council, namely four out of six (Menshikov, Apraksin, Golovkin and Tolstoy), belonged to that unborn nobility or adjoined it, like Golovkin, who came to the fore under Peter and thanks to him took leading positions in government , became rich, noble, influential. The noble nobility was represented by one Dmitry Mikhailovich Golitsyn. And, finally, standing apart is Heinrich Ioganovich Osterman, a German from Westphalia, who became Andrei Ivanovich in Russia, an intriguer, an unprincipled careerist, ready to serve anyone and in any way. an energetic and active bureaucrat, a submissive executor of the royal commands under Peter and the ruler of the Russian Empire under Anna Ivanovna, a “crafty courtier” who successfully survived more than one palace coup. His appearance as a member of the Supreme Privy Council foreshadows the time when, after the death of Peter, whom “. overseas "adventurers, who looked at Russia as a feeding trough, although they were not invited to distant Muscovy by him, were afraid and did not dare to act openly; his incompetent successors ended up on the Russian throne, and the "German attack" unfolded in full, penetrating all the pores of the Russian state. Thus, the composition of the Supreme Privy Council under Catherine I in February 1726 reflected the victory of Peter’s pets and their support in January 1725 (the guards. But they were going to rule Russia in a completely different way from Peter. The Supreme Privy Council was a bunch of aristocrats (and the supreme leaders were indeed a feudal aristocracy, all without exception, regardless of who their fathers and grandfathers were in the Muscovite state), striving together, as a small but powerful and influential group, to rule the Russian Empire in their personal interests.

Of course, the inclusion of Dmitry Mikhailovich Golitsyn in the Supreme Privy Council did not at all mean his reconciliation with the idea that he, Gediminovich, has the same right and grounds to rule the country as the tsar’s orderly Menshikov, the “artistic” Apraksin, and others. The time will come, and contradictions between the “higher-ups”, i.e. the same contradictions between the noble and unborn nobility that resulted in the events at the tomb of Peter will be reflected in the activities of the Supreme Privy Council itself 11 I. I. Ivanov Mysteries of Russian history of the 18th century. M 2000 s. 590.

Even in a report dated October 30, 1725, the French envoy F. Campredon reported on a “secret meeting with the queen,” in connection with which he mentioned the names of A. D. Menshikov, P. I. Yaguzhinsky and Karl Friedrich. A week later, he reports on “two important meetings” held with Menshikov. 1 One of his reports also mentions the name of Count P. A. Tolstoy.

Almost at the same time, the Danish envoy G. Mardefeld reports in reports about the persons included in the councils “assembled on internal and external affairs”: these are A. D. Menshikov, G. I. Golovkin, P. A, Tolstoy and A . I. Osterman.

When analyzing this news, the following circumstances should be noted. Firstly, we are talking about the most important and “secret” state affairs. Secondly, the circle of advisers is narrow, more or less constant and includes people holding key government positions and relatives of the tsar (Karl Friedrich - Anna Petrovna’s husband). Further: meetings can take place with Catherine I and with her participation. Finally, most of the persons named by Campridon and Mardefeld then became members of the Supreme Privy Council. Tolstoy came up with a plan to curb Menshikov's willfulness: he convinced the empress to create a new institution - the Supreme Privy Council. The empress was to preside over its meetings, and its members were given equal votes. If not with her mind, then with a heightened sense of self-preservation, Catherine understood that the unbridled temper of his Serene Highness, his disdainful attitude towards other nobles sitting in the Senate, his desire to command everyone and everything, could cause strife and an explosion of discontent not only among the noble nobility, but also among those who placed her on the throne. 22 Collection of the Russian Historical Society. P. 46. Intrigues and rivalries, of course, did not strengthen the empress’s position. But on the other hand, Catherine’s consent to the creation of the Supreme Privy Council was an indirect recognition of her inability to rule the country herself, like her husband.

Was the emergence of the Supreme Privy Council a break with Peter's principles of governance? To resolve this issue, we need to turn to the last years of Peter and the practice of the Senate deciding the most important issues. Here the following is striking. The Senate may not meet in full; At meetings that discussed important issues, the emperor himself was often present. Particularly significant was the meeting on August 12, 1724, which discussed the progress of construction of the Ladoga Canal and the main items of state revenue. It was attended by: Peter I, Apraksin, Golovkin, Golitsyn. It is noteworthy that all of Peter's advisers are future members of the Supreme Privy Council. This suggests that Peter I, and then Catherine, were inclined to think about reorganizing the top administration by forming a body narrower than the Senate. Apparently, it is no coincidence that Lefort’s report dated May 1, 1725 reports plans being developed at the Russian court “to establish a secret council,” including the Empress, Duke Karl Friedrich, Menshikov, Shafirov, Makarov. 11 there. P. 409.

So, the origins of the emergence of the Supreme Privy Council should be sought not only in the “helplessness” of Catherine I. The message about the meeting on August 12, 1724 also casts doubt on the common thesis about the emergence of the Council as some kind of compromise with the “patrimonial nobility” personified by Golitsyn.

The decree of February 8, 1726, which officially formalized the Supreme Privy Council under the person of the empress, is interesting precisely not because of the traces of the struggle of individuals and groups (they can be discerned there only with great difficulty): this state act is nothing more than a legislative establishment, in in principle, which boils down to the legalization of an existing council.

Let us turn to the text of the decree: “We have already seen that secret councilors, in addition to senate government, have a lot of work in the following matters: 1) that they often have, by virtue of their position, like first ministers, secret councils on political and other state affairs, 2) Some of them also sit in the first collegiums, which is why in the first and very necessary matter, in the Privy Council, and also in the Senate, business stops and continues because they, being busy, cannot soon carry out resolutions and the aforementioned state affairs. For his benefit, we judged and commanded from now on at our court to establish a Supreme Privy Council for both external and internal important state affairs, in which we ourselves will sit.”

The decree of February 8, 1726 is difficult to suspect of some kind of “understatement” masking some kind of struggle between parties, groupings, etc.: the fact is so clearly visible that the center of gravity of the legislative decree lies in a completely different plane, namely in the area of ​​​​functioning tasks state machine.

Not long ago, the opinion was clearly formulated that over the course of a number of years, since the time of Peter I, “the lack of efficiency of the Senate began to be felt more strongly, and this could not but lead to the creation of a more flexible permanent body. This became the Supreme Privy Council, which arose on the basis of meetings of advisers systematically assembled by Catherine I.” The above thesis most adequately reflects the reasons for changes in top management in 1726 and is confirmed in specific material.

Already on March 16, 1726, the French envoy Campredon relied on assessments that came from among the Council itself. In the so-called “Opinion not in the decree” 1 we find, in particular, the following commentary of the decree of February 8, 1726: “and as now Her Imperial Majesty ... for the best success in disposing of the state, the board deigned to divide into two, and of which in one important, in other matters of state, then, as everyone apparently knows, with God’s help things have become much better than before...” The Supreme Privy Council, like the secret councils of the times of Peter I, is a purely absolutist body. Indeed, there is no document regulating the activities of the Council. “Opinion is not a decree” rather formulates the general principles of independence and sovereignty, rather than somehow limiting them. In charge of foreign and domestic policy, the Council is imperial, since the Empress “rules the first presidency” in it, “this council is only the least respected for a special collegium or otherwise, perhaps, since it only serves Her Majesty to relieve Her Majesty of the heavy burden of Her government.”

So, the first link: the Supreme Privy Council is the direct heir to the secret councils of Peter I in the 20s of the 18th century, bodies with a more or less permanent composition, information about which was quite clearly reflected in the diplomatic correspondence of that time.

The fall of the Supreme Privy Council in 1730 could be seen as proof that the emergence of bodies like it was something of a ghost of the past, standing in the way of the newly born Russian absolutism. This is how many historians of the 18th - 19th centuries perceived this organ, starting with V.N. Tatishchev and ending with N.P. Pavlov-Selvansky, and echoes of such an understanding appeared in Soviet historiography. Meanwhile, neither the events of 1730 themselves nor their consequences provide grounds for such a conclusion. It must be taken into account that by this time the Council had largely lost the quality of the unofficial real government of the country: if in 1726 there were 125 meetings of the Council, and in 1727 - 165, then, for example, from October 1729 after the death of Peter II in January 1730, the Council was not going at all and things were largely neglected. 11 Vyazemsky B. L. Supreme Privy Council. pp. 399-413.

In addition, the documents published in 1730, and documents of programmatic, without exaggeration, significance, cannot be reduced to the famous “Conditions”. The so-called “Oath Promise of the Members of the Supreme Privy Council” deserves no less attention. It is considered as a document drawn up by members of the Council after familiarizing themselves with the position of the capital's nobility in relation to the supreme power. It says: “The integrity and well-being of each state depends on good advice... The Supreme Privy Council does not consist of any of its own assemblies of power, but for the best purposes of state creep and administration, to help their imperial majesties.” It is apparently impossible to perceive this declaration, given the official nature of the document, as a demegogic device: its orientation is diametrically opposed to the provisions of the “Conditions”. Most likely, this is evidence of a change in the initial position of the Supreme Privy Council, taking into account the wishes expressed in the noble projects and the sentiments of the nobility itself. It is no coincidence that the programmatic requirement of the “Oath Promise”: “See that in such a first meeting of one surname more than two persons are not multiplied, so that no one can take the power from above for the village.” This is quite visible confirmation that, with on the one hand, the traditions of “monarchy with a boyar duma and boyar aristocracy” were still in memory, and on the other hand, that the political thinking of the top of the ruling class during this period directly abandoned them.

This adjustment in the position of the Supreme Privy Council was the reason that it did not experience any severe repressions in March 1730. The decree of March 4, 1730, which abolished the Council, was carried out in a very calm form. Moreover, a significant part of the Council members were included in the restored Senate and only then, under various pretexts, were removed from government affairs. Members of the Supreme Privy Council A.I. Osterman and G.I. Golovkin on November 18, 1731 were introduced into the newly established Cabinet of Ministers. Such trust on the part of the new empress in people who were, without a doubt, aware of the well-known “venture” with limiting the powers of the empress, deserves to be noted. There is still a lot that is unclear in the history of the events of 1730. Even Gradovsky A.D. drew attention to an interesting detail of the first steps of Anna Ioannovna’s policy: when restoring the Senate, the empress did not restore the position of prosecutor general. As one of the options for explaining this phenomenon, the historian did not exclude the fact that “her advisers had in mind to place some new institution between the Senate and the supreme power...” 11 Gradovsky A.D. The Supreme Administration of Russia of the 18th Century and the General prosecutors. P. 146.

Period 20-60's. XVIII century - is by no means a return or an attempt to return to the old days. This is the period of “youthful maximalism”, which the strengthening Russian absolutism was experiencing at that time, interfering in everything and everyone and at the same time, apparently, having no real support in the Senate of that time in the central institutions that were “harmonious” system” is often only on paper.

In contrast to the opinion rooted among many bourgeois researchers, which has not been completely eradicated in the works of Soviet historians, it was the “supra-Senate” imperial councils that were the conductors of the new, absolutist line in governance.

Let's turn to specific material. Here are just a few fairly striking and typical examples. The emergence of the Supreme Privy Council caused a rather characteristic reaction on the part of the Senate, which we can judge from the personal order of Catherine I: “Announce in the Senate. So that now the decrees sent from the Supreme Privy Council are carried out as determined, and places are not protected . For they have not yet entered into business, but have begun to defend their positions” 11 Mavrodin V.V. The birth of a new Russia.P.247..

It was the Supreme Privy Council that formed a special Commission on Taxes, headed by D. M. Golitsyn, which was supposed to solve one of the most painful issues - the state of the state’s finances and.” at the same time - the disastrous state of the tax-paying population of Russia 2. But the Commission did not even manage to break through the “information barrier” - due to the negative attitude of lower authorities. In his report to the Council on September 17, 1727, D. M. Golitsyn reported that the commission sent a decree to the Senate and the Military College “and, moreover, the points on which it was required to send the relevant statements to this commission, and then a statement was sent from the High Senate about one Kyiv province, and that not for all points. And about the Smolensk province it was announced that reports had been submitted to the Senate, but about other provinces no reports had been sent. But the statements from the Military Collegium have been sent, although not to all points...”, etc. 22 Ibid. P.287. The Council was forced, by its protocol of September 20, 1727, to threaten the collegiums and chancelleries with a fine if the statements continued to be delayed, but as far as one can assume, this had no effect. The Council was able to return to the work of the mission only on January 22, 1730, when its report was again heard, but it was not possible to complete the work of the Commission.

Many similar incidents, apparently, led members of the Supreme Council to conclusions about the need to reduce the staff of various authorities. Thus, G.I. Golovkin categorically stated: “The staff will look into it very much necessary, since not only people are superfluous, the demons of whom can be spent, but entire offices are newly made, for which there is no need.” 11 Klyuchevsky V. O. Course of Russian History . P.191.

The position of the Senate regarding a number of requests from the Supreme Council was more than evasive. Thus, in response to a corresponding request about fiscals, the following report was received: “What number and where and whether everything against the indicated number has fiscals, or where they do not, and for what, there is no news about that in the Senate” 3 . Sometimes the Senate proposed too slow and archaic solutions to pressing issues. These include the proposal of the Senate at the height of the peasant uprisings of the 20s. “Restore special orders for the investigation of robbery and murder cases.” In contrast to this, the Council took up peasant protests itself. When a fairly large movement broke out in the Penza province in 1728, the Council, by a special decree, ordered military units to “ruin to the ground” “thieves’ and robbers’ camps,” and the progress of the punitive expedition was to be reported by the commanders appointed by M. M. Golitsyn report directly to the Council 22 Troitsky S.M. Russian absolutism and the nobility in the 18th century. P.224.

To summarize, we note that the analysis of the activities of higher government institutions in Russia in the 20s-60s. XVIII century clearly illustrates their one-dimensionality as necessary elements of the political system of an absolute monarchy. Their continuity is clearly visible not only in the general direction of policy, but also in their very competence, positions, principles of formation, style of current work and other aspects up to the preparation of documentation, etc.

In my opinion, all this allows us to supplement, to some extent, the general idea that exists in Soviet historiography regarding the political system of Russia in the 18th century. Apparently, it is necessary to more clearly understand the depth and versatility of V.I. Lenin’s well-known characterization of the “old serf society”, in which revolutions were “ridiculously easy”, while it was a question of transferring power from one group of feudal dals - another. Sometimes this characteristic receives a simplified interpretation, and the emphasis continues to be placed only on the fact that all those who succeeded each other in the 18th century. governments pursued a serfdom policy.

History of higher institutions of the 20-60s. XVIII century It also clearly shows that absolutism as a system in these years was steadily strengthening and acquiring greater maturity compared to the previous period. Meanwhile, discussions about the “insignificance” of the successors of Peter I as opposed to the significance and scale of the political transformations of Peter himself are still very common. It seems that such a shift of the center of gravity from a really important factor - the functioning of the top of absolutist governments - to the personal qualities of a particular monarch at this stage of development of historiography is simply archaic. 11 Kostomarov N.I. Russian history in the biographies of its main figures. P.147. It is especially important to realize this when writing textbooks and teaching aids, as well as publications designed for a wide readership.

Obviously, a certain adjustment of established terms is required for a more correct definition of the key problems in the history of Russia in the 18th century, as well as the most promising ways to solve them. The more facts accumulate about the highest state bodies, the functioning of which actually reflected the state of absolutism - the political superstructure at the stage of late feudalism 1, the clearer it becomes: the term “era of palace coups”, invariably used since the time of Klyuchevsky, is by no means reflects the basic essence of the period 20-60's. XVIII century. Given the controversial nature of the provisions expressed in this article, it is hardly worth proposing a specific, precise formulation for defining this period: this would be premature given the current state of development of the problem. However, now we can say unequivocally: such a formulation and a specific term should reflect the main trends in the socio-economic and political development of the country, and therefore include a definition of what this time was like for the evolution of absolutism and the degree of it maturity.

Turning to the question of further ways of developing the problem, we emphasize: the thesis expressed long ago by S.M. remains relevant to this day. Troitsky about the need to “monographically develop the history of the ruling class of feudal lords.” At the same time, the famous Soviet researcher believed that “special attention should be paid to the study of specific contradictions within the ruling class of feudal lords and the forms that the struggle between individual layers of feudal lords took in a given period” 2. Appeal to the history of the highest state institutions of Russia in the 18th century. allows us to supplement and concretize the general thesis of S. M. Troitsky. Apparently, no less important are the problems of “social stratification” among the state class, factors that influenced the formation of the administrative elite, which had real influence on the country’s domestic and foreign policy. A special issue, undoubtedly worthy of attention, is the question of the political thinking of this period, the study of the socio-political views of statesmen of the 20-60s, and the clarification of how the “programmatic” political guidelines of this time were formed.

Chapter 2. Policy of the Supreme Privy Council.

2.1. Adjustment of Peter's reforms.

The Supreme Privy Council was created by a personal decree of February 8, 1726, consisting of A.D. Menshikova, F.M. Apraksina, G.I. Golovkina, A.I. Osterman, P.A. Tolstoy and D.M. Golitsyn." The fact that it included the presidents of the Military, Admiralty and Foreign Collegiums meant that they were removed from the subordination of the Senate and their leadership was accountable directly to the Empress. Thus, the country's top leadership clearly gave understand which policy areas it perceives as priority, and ensure adoption on them

operational decisions, eliminating the very possibility of paralysis of the executive power due to conflicts, such as the one that took place at the end of 1725. The minutes of the council meetings indicate that it initially discussed the issue of division into departments, i.e. . on the distribution of areas of competence between its members, but this idea was not implemented. Meanwhile, in fact, such a division took place due to the official responsibilities of the supreme leaders, as presidents of the collegiums. But decision-making in the council was carried out collectively, and therefore, responsibility for them was collective.

The very first decisions of the council indicate that their members were clearly aware that its creation meant a radical restructuring of the entire system of central government bodies, and they sought, if possible, to give its existence a legitimate character. It is no coincidence that their first meeting was devoted to resolving issues about the functions, competence and powers of the council, and its relationships with other institutions. As a result, the well-known “opinion not in decree” appeared, in which the position of the Senate, subordinate to the council, was determined, and the three most important collegiums were actually equalized with it. since they were ordered to communicate with each other through promemories Kamensky A.B. Russian Empire in the 18th century. P. 144.. Throughout February and the first half of March 1726, the supreme leaders (soon in this work they were joined by Duke Karl Friedrich, who was included in the council at the insistence of the Empress Holstein) again and again returned to regulating the activities of the new body. The fruit of their efforts was a personal decree of March 7 “on the position of the Senate”, a week later a decree renaming the Senate from “government” to “high” (on June 14 of the same year from “government” to “holiness” was re- renamed the Synod), and on March 28 another decree on the form of relations with the Senate).

In the historical literature, the question of whether the leaders initially had oligarchic intentions and whether the establishment of the Supreme Privy Council actually meant a limitation of autocracy was actively discussed. In this case, Anisimov’s point of view seems most convincing to me. “In terms of its place in the system of power and competence,” he writes, “the Supreme Privy Council has become the highest government authority in the form of a narrow, controlled by the autocrat body consisting of trusted representatives. Its range of affairs was not limited - it was the highest legislative, and the highest judicial, and the highest administrative authority." But the council "did not replace the Senate", it "had jurisdiction primarily over matters that did not fall under existing legislative norms ". “It was extremely important,” notes Anisimov, “that the most pressing state problems were discussed in the Council in a narrow circle, without becoming the subject of attention of the general public and without thereby damaging the prestige of the autocratic government" 1 .

As for the Empress, later, in a decree of January 1, 1727, she quite clearly explained: “We have established this Council as supreme and at our side for no other reason, so that in this heavy burden of the government in all state deeds by their faithful advice and impartial announcements of their opinions help and relieve us committed" 1 1 Right there. With. 150. Anisimov quite convincingly shows that with a whole series of orders that outlined the range of issues that were to be reported to her personally, bypassing the council, Catherine ensured her independence from it. This is also indicated by many other examples, such as the history of the inclusion of the Duke of Holstein in the council, the empress’s editing of some council decisions, etc. But how should the establishment of the Supreme Privy Council be interpreted (and its appearance, undoubtedly, was an important pre- management education) from the point of view of the history of reforms in Russia in the 18th century?

As will be seen from the following review of the activities of the council, its creation really contributed to an increase in the level of management efficiency and essentially meant an improvement in the system of government bodies created by Peter I. The close attention of the top leaders from the first days of the council’s existence to the regulation of its activities indicates the fact that they acted strictly within the framework of the bureaucratic rules set by Peter and, albeit unconsciously, did not strive to destroy, but rather to complement his system. It is also worth noting that the council was created as a collegial body that acted in accordance with the General Regulations. In other words, the very creation of the council, in my opinion, meant the continuation of Peter’s reform. Let us now consider the specific activities of the Supreme Privy Council in the most important issues of domestic policy.

Already by decree of February 17, the first measure was implemented aimed at streamlining the collection of provisions for the army: the General Provision Master was subordinate to the Military Collegium with the right to report to the Supreme Privy Council about the incorrect actions of the college. On February 28, the Senate ordered the purchase of fodder and provisions from the population at the seller’s price, without causing any oppression to them.

A month later, on March 18, on behalf of the Military Collegium, instructions were issued to officers and soldiers sent to collect the soul tax, which, apparently, according to the legislators, should have helped reduce abuses in this very sick for the state issue. In May, the Senate implemented last year's proposal of its Attorney General and sent Senator A.A. Matveev with an audit to the Moscow province. Meanwhile, the Supreme Privy Council was concerned primarily with financial issues. The leaders tried to solve it in two directions: on the one hand, by streamlining the accounting system and control over the collection and expenditure of funds, and on the other, by saving money.

The first result of the work of the supreme leaders to streamline the financial sphere was the subordination of the State Office to the Chamber Collegium and the simultaneous abolition of the position of county rentmasters, announced by decree of July 15. The decree noted that with the introduction of the poll tax, the functions of rentmasters and chamberlains in the localities began to be duplicated, and ordered that only chamberlains be left. It was also considered advisable to concentrate the accounting of the income and expenditure of all financial resources in one place. On the same day, another decree prohibited the State Office from independently issuing funds for any emergency expenses without the permission of the Empress or the Supreme Privy Council.

July 15 became a turning point in the fate of not only the States Office. On the same day, on the grounds that Moscow has its own magistrate, the office of the Chief Magistrate was abolished there, which was the first step in transforming city government, and this measure itself was one of the ways, as the leaders believed, saving money 1. The first step was taken on the path to judicial reform: a personal decree was issued on the appointment of city governors to correct judicial and investigative matters. Moreover, the argument was that district residents endure great inconvenience from having to travel to provincial cities for legal matters. At the same time, court courts find themselves overloaded with cases, which entails increased judicial red tape. However, complaints against the governor were allowed to the same court courts.

It is clear, however, that the restoration of the position of district voivodes was related not only to legal proceedings, but also to the local government system in general. “And before that,” the supreme leaders believed, “before this, there were only governors in all cities and all sorts of affairs, both sovereign and petitioners, also, according to the decree sent from all the orders, they were carried out alone and were without pay, and then the best rule came from one, and the people were happy" 11 Ibid. This was a principled position, a very definite attitude towards the system of local government created by Peter. However, it is hardly fair to see in it nostalgia for the old times. Neither Menshikov, nor Osterman, nor even more so the Duke of Holstein could experience such nostalgia simply due to their origin and life experience. Rather, behind this reasoning there was a sober calculation, a real assessment of the current situation.

As further showed, the decrees of July 15 became only a prelude to the adoption of much more drastic decisions. The top officials understood perfectly well that the liquidation of the Moscow office of the Chief Magistrate alone could not solve the financial problem. They saw the main evil in an excessively large number of institutions at different levels and overly inflated staff. At the same time, as is clear from the above statement, they recalled that in pre-Petrine times, a significant part of the administrative apparatus did not receive a salary at all, but was fed “from business.” Back in April, Duke Karl Friedrich submitted an “opinion” in which he asserted that “the civil staff is not burdened with anything so much as with a multitude of ministers, of which, according to reasoning, a great part can be dismissed.” And further, the Duke of Holstein noted that “there are many servants who, as before, here in the empire, according to the former custom, from ordered income, without burdening the staff, could live contentedly.” The Duke was supported by Menshikov, who proposed refusing to pay salaries to small employees of the Patrimony and Justice Collegium, as well as local institutions. Such a measure, His Serene Highness believed, would not only save state funds, but also “cases can be resolved more efficiently and without continuation, since everyone will have to work tirelessly for any accident.” 11 Decree on the creation of the Supreme Privy Council. not to give, but to give them enough from their affairs, according to the previous custom, from petitioners, who will give what of their own free will" 22 Ibid.. It should be borne in mind that clerks were understood as minor employees who did not have class ranks.

However, it is significant that in the matter of staff reductions, the leaders first of all paid attention to the boards, i.e.

central rather than local institutions. Already in June 1726, they noted that from their bloated staff “there is a needless loss in salaries, and there is no success in business” 33 Kamensky A. B. Decree. Op. With. 169.. On July 13, the members of the council submitted a report to the empress, in which, in particular, they wrote: “In such a plurality in government, there cannot be better success, for they are all read with one ear in hearing cases, and It’s not just that there is a better way, but because of many disagreements in business, things stop and continue, and there is a needless loss in salary” 44 Ibid. P. 215..

Apparently, the ground for the report was prepared in advance, because already on July 16, on its basis, a personal decree appeared, almost verbatim repeating the arguments of the supreme leaders: “With such a large number of members in the management of affairs, there is no better success, but even more so in disagreements there is a stoppage and insanity in business." The decree ordered that in each board there should be only a president, a vice-president, two advisers and two assessors, and even those were ordered to be present in the board not all at the same time, but only half of them, changing annually. Accordingly, salaries were supposed to be paid only to those currently in service. Thus, in relation to officials, a measure previously proposed for the army was implemented.

In connection with this reform, A.N. Filippov wrote that “the Council stood very close to the conditions of the then reality and was keenly interested in all aspects of management... in this case, he noted... what he had to constantly come across in the activities of the boards.” However, the historian considered the decision to be a half-measure that “could not have a future.” The leaders, he believed, did not bother to study the causes of the vice they observed, and reduced the number of collegiate members, “not daring either to directly abandon collegiality or to defend Peter’s reform as a whole.” Filippov is certainly right that the excessive number of collegiate members was not an invention of the leaders and that it actually had a negative impact on the efficiency of decision-making, but his assessment of the reform seems too harsh. Firstly, the fact that the leaders did not encroach on the principle of collegiality indicates, on the one hand, that they did not aim at Peter’s reform of central government as such, and on the other hand, It is quite clear that abandoning this principle would mean a much more radical break, which, in the specific historical conditions of that time, could have unpredictable consequences. Secondly, I note that the actual argumentation related to the ineffectiveness of the work of the boards both in the report of the council and then in the decree was essentially just a cover, while the goal was purely financial in nature. And finally, we must not forget that, at the very least, the boards existed in Russia for many more decades after that, generally coping with their functions.

At the end of 1726, the supreme leaders got rid of another, in their opinion, unnecessary structure: by decree of December 30, the Waldmeister offices and the positions of the Waldmeisters themselves were destroyed, and the supervision of the forests was entrusted to the governor. The decree noted that “the people have a great burden from the Waldmeisters and forest wardens,” and explained that the Waldmeisters live off the fines levied on the population, which naturally entails significant abuses. It is clear that the decision made was supposed to help ease social tension and, apparently, as the leaders believed, increase the solvency of the population. Meanwhile, the discussion was about softening Peter’s legislation on protected forests, in turn related to issues of maintaining and building the fleet. This was another acute problem where Peter’s legacy directly collided with real life. The construction of the fleet required large financial investments and the attraction of significant human resources. Both of these were extremely difficult in the conditions of post-Petrine Russia. It was already said above that in the first year after Peter’s death, the construction of the fleet, despite everything, continued. In February 1726, a personal decree was issued to continue the construction of ships in Bryansk 11 Decree on the construction of ships. However, subsequently, already in 1728, the council, after much debate, was forced to come to a decision not to build new ships, but just keep the existing ones in good working order. This happened already under Peter II, which is often associated with the young emperor’s lack of interest in maritime affairs. Accordingly, the leaders are accused of neglecting the beloved brainchild of Peter the Great. However, documents indicate that this measure, like other similar ones, was forced and dictated by the real economic conditions of the time, when, by the way, Russia did not wage any wars.

However, in 1726, as in the previous year, a number of laws were adopted aimed at maintaining Peter’s rule.

heritage. Of greatest importance, in particular, was the act of April 21, which confirmed Peter the Great's decree of 1722 on the order of succession to the throne and gave the force of the law to the "Truth of the Will of the Monarchs." On May 31, a personal decree confirmed the obligation to wear German dress and shave beards for retirees, and on August 4 - for the “philistines” of St. Petersburg.

Meanwhile, the discussion in the Supreme Privy Council on the question of how to reconcile the interests of the army and the people continued. The search for palliative solutions for a year and a half did not lead to any serious results: the treasury was practically not replenished, arrears were growing, social tension was expressed primarily in peasant escapes, which threatened not only the well-being of the state, but also the well-being of the nobility , did not subside. It became clear to the leaders that it was necessary to take more radical comprehensive measures. A reflection of these sentiments was a note by Menshikov, Makarov and Osterman, submitted in November 1726. It was on its basis that a draft decree was prepared and presented to the Supreme Privy Council on January 9, 1727, which, after discussion in the council, was already in February implemented by several issued decrees.

The decree of January 9 openly stated the critical state of government affairs. “Based on the current state of our empire,” it said, “it shows that almost all those matters, both spiritual and secular, are in poor order and require speedy correction... not only the peasantry, for which the maintenance of the army is established in great poverty, and from great taxes and incessant executions and other disorders comes to extreme and complete ruin, but other matters, such as commerce, justice and mints, are in a very ruined state.” Meanwhile, “the army is so necessary that without it it is impossible for the state to stand... for this reason, it is necessary to take care of the peasants, for the soldier is connected with the peasant like the soul with the body, and when the peasant is not there, then there will be no and a soldier." The decree ordered the leaders to “have diligent consideration of both the land army and the navy, so that they are maintained without great burden to the people,” for which it was proposed to create special commissions on taxes and the army. It was also proposed, before the final decision on the size of the capitation, to defer its payment for 1727 until September, to pay part of the tax in kind, to shift the collection of taxes and recruits to the civil authorities, to transfer the regiments

from rural areas to cities, send some of the officers and soldiers from the nobility on long-term vacations to save money, reduce the number of institutions, streamline the conduct of affairs in the Patrimonial Board, establish the Milking Office and the Revision Board, consider the issue of correcting the coinage, to increase the amount of duties for the sale of villages, to liquidate the Manufacturer Board, and for manufacturers to meet once a year in Moscow to discuss minor issues, while more important ones will be resolved in the Commerce Board 11 Mavrodin V.V. The Birth of a New Russia. P. 290..

As we see, the leaders (based on their own opinion) were offered a whole program of anti-crisis actions, which soon began to be implemented. Already on February 9, a decree was issued to defer payment for the May third of 1727 and return the officers sent to collect the poll tax to the regiments. At the same time, it was reported about the establishment of a commission on the army and navy, “so that they would be maintained without great burden to the people” 22 Ibid. P. 293.. On February 24, Yaguzhinsky’s long-standing proposal, repeated in a note by Menshikov, Makarov and Osterman, was implemented: “two parts of officers, and constables, and privates, who are from the nobility, should be released into their homes so that they can inspect their villages and they could put it in proper order." At the same time, it was stipulated that this norm did not apply to officers from the non-ranking nobles.

On the same day, February 24, a comprehensive decree appeared, containing a number of important measures and almost verbatim repeating the decree of January 9: “Everyone knows with what vigilant diligence the blessed and eternally worthy of memory of His Imperial Majesty, our the kind husband and sovereign worked in establishing good order in all matters, both spiritual and secular, and in composing decent regulations in the hope that a very proper order for the benefit of the people would follow in all this, based on the current situation; - the history of Our Empire shows that not only the peasants, on whom the maintenance of the army is entrusted, are in great poverty and from great taxes and incessant executions and other disorders come to extreme ruin, but also other matters, such as commerce, justice and mints is in a very weak state and all this requires speedy correction.” The decree ordered the collection of the poll tax not directly from the peasants, but from landowners, elders and managers, thus establishing for the serf village the same order that had previously been

established for palace villages. Responsibility for collecting the poll tax and its implementation was to be entrusted to the voivode, who was given one staff officer to help. And so that there would be no disagreements between them due to seniority in ranks, it was decided to give the voivodes the rank of colonel for the duration of their duties.

The decree of February 24 again repeated the norm about sending part of the military on leave, and also ordered the transfer of regiments to cities. Moreover, the arguments that were heard even during the discussion of this issue in 1725 were repeated almost verbatim: in urban conditions it is easier for officers to monitor their subordinates, keep them from escapes and other crimes, and can be collected much faster if necessary; when the regiment sets out on a campaign, it will be possible to concentrate the remaining patients and property in one place, which will not require unnecessary costs for numerous guards; the placement of regiments in cities will lead to a revival of trade, and the state will also be able to receive a duty on goods brought here, but “most of all, the peasantry will experience great relief, and there will be no burden for citizenship 11 Kurukin I.V. Shadow of Peter the Great / / On the Russian throne P.68. .

The same decree carried out a number of measures to reorganize both central and local government bodies. “The multiplication of rulers and offices throughout the state,” noted the leaders, “not only serves to greatly burden the state, but also to the great burden of the people, and instead of previously addressing one ruler in all matters, we - not to ten and, perhaps, more. And all those different stewards have their own special offices and office servants and their own special court, and each of them drags the poor people along with their own affairs. they want their own, keeping silent about other disorders that occur every day from unscrupulous people to the greater burden of the people" 11 Andreev E.V. Representatives of the authorities after Peter. P.47. The decree of February 24 subordinated city magistrates to governors and destroyed the offices and offices of zemstvo commissars, which became unnecessary when the duties of collecting taxes were assigned to the governor. At the same time, judicial reform was carried out: court courts were liquidated, whose functions were transferred to the governors. The supreme leaders realized that the reform entailed strengthening the role of the College of Justice, and took measures to strengthen it. Under the Supreme Privy Council itself, a Milking Office was established, which had a collegiate structure structurally and organizationally. The same decree created the Revision Collegium, and the Patrimonial Collegium was transferred to Moscow, which was supposed to make it more accessible to landowners. The decree stated about the Manufacture Collegium that “since it cannot pass any important resolution without the Senate and our Cabinet, it is for this reason that it receives its salary in vain.” The Collegium was liquidated, and its affairs were transferred to the Commerce Collegium. However, a month later, on March 28, it was recognized that it was “indecent” for the affairs of the Manufacturer Collegium to be in the Commerce Collegium, and therefore the Manufacture Office was established under the Senate. The decree of February 24 also contained measures to streamline the collection of fees for issuing documents from various institutions.

The reorganization of management continued in the next month: on March 7, the Racket Master's Office was liquidated, and its functions were assigned to the Chief Prosecutor of the Senate, “so that salaries would not be wasted.” In a personal decree dated March 20, the “multiplying staff” and the associated increase in salary costs were again criticized. The decree ordered the restoration of the pre-Petrine system of payment of salaries - “as it was before 1700”: to pay only those who were paid then, and “where they were content with business”, to also be satisfied with this. Where previously in the cities the governors did not have clerks, secretaries cannot be appointed there now. It was this decree (then repeated on July 22 of the same year) that was a kind of apotheosis of the leaders’ criticism of Peter’s reforms. It is significant that he differed from others in the harshness of his tone and the absence of the usual detailed argumentation. The decree seemed to indicate the fatigue and irritation that had accumulated among the leaders, and their feeling of powerlessness to change anything radically.

In parallel with the work on reorganizing management and taxation, the leaders paid a lot of attention to trade issues, rightly believing that its activation could quickly bring income to the state. Back in the fall of 1726, the Russian ambassador to Holland B.I. Kurakin proposed opening the Arkhangelsk port for trade and the Empress ordered the Supreme Secret Council to make inquiries about this and report its opinion. In December, the council heard a report from the Senate on free trade and decided to create a Commission on Commerce, headed by Osterman, which began its activities by calling on merchants to submit proposals for “correction of commerce.” The issue of Arkhangelsk was resolved at the beginning of the next year, when by decree of January 9 the port was opened and it was ordered that “everyone should be allowed to trade without restrictions.” Later, the Commerce Commission transferred to free trade a number of goods that had previously been farmed out, abolished a number of restrictive duties and contributed to the creation of favorable conditions for foreign merchants. But its most important task was the revision of Peter’s protectionist tariff of 1724, which, as Anisimov put it, was speculative, divorced from Russian reality, and brought more harm than good.

In accordance with the February decree and the opinion of the supreme leaders, expressed by them in numerous notes, the government decided to take urgent measures in the sphere of monetary circulation. The nature of the planned measures was similar to those taken under Peter: to mint a lightweight copper coin worth 2 million rubles. As A.I. Yukht noted, the government was “aware that this measure would have a negative impact on the general economic situation of the country,” but “it did not see any other way out of the financial crisis.” Sent to Moscow to organize what A.Ya. Volkov discovered that the mints looked “as if after an enemy or fire devastation,” but he energetically set to work and over the next few years, about 3 million rubles lightweight pentagons.

The council's consideration of the issue of the poll tax and the maintenance of the army did not proceed smoothly. So, back in November 1726 P.A. Tolstoy proposed, instead of auditing arrears, which Menshikov, loyal to the interests of his department, insisted on, to audit funds in the Military, Admiralty and Kamerkollegii. Tolstoy was surprised that in peacetime, when many officers are on leave, the army lacks men, horses and funds, and, apparently, rightly suspected possible abuses. Back in June of the same year, a decree was issued according to which the army regiments were ordered to submit receipts and expenditure books and account statements in good condition to the Revision Board, which was again strictly confirmed at the end of December. The military board proposed collecting taxes in kind from the population, but on Tolstoy’s initiative it was decided to give payers the opportunity to choose the form of payment themselves.

It is significant that despite all the difficulties and insoluble problems that the Supreme Privy Council faced, its activities were highly appreciated by foreign observers. 11 Eroshkin. History of state institutions of pre-revolutionary Russia. P.247. Now the finances of this state are no longer undermined by unnecessary constructions of harbors and houses, poorly developed manufactories and factories, too extensive and inconvenient undertakings or feasts and pomp, and they are no longer forced by force, the Russians, to such luxury and festivities, to building houses and moving their serfs here, wrote the Prussian envoy A. Mardefeld. - In the Supreme Privy Council, affairs are executed and sent quickly and after mature discussion, instead of, as before, while the late sovereign was engaged in the construction of his ships and followed his other inclinations, they lay dormant for a whole half a year, not to mention already about countless other laudable changes" 11 Notes of Mardefeld A.S.24..

In May 1727, the active work of the Supreme Secret Council was interrupted by the death of Catherine I and the accession to the throne of Peter II. Menshikov's subsequent disgrace in September, as many researchers believe, changed her character and led to the triumph of the counter-reformist spirit, symbolized primarily by the move of the court, Senate and collegiums to Moscow. To verify these statements, let us again turn to the legislation.

Already on June 19, 1727, the order to transfer the Patrimonial Collegium to Moscow was confirmed, and in August the Chief Magistrate was liquidated, which became unnecessary after the liquidation of the city magistrates. At the same time, a burgomaster and two burgomasters were appointed to the St. Petersburg Town Hall for the merchant court. A year later, instead of city magistrates, cities were ordered to have town halls. At the beginning of autumn, the council considered the feasibility of maintaining trade consulates in foreign countries, in particular in France and Spain. The Senate, in turn, relying on the opinion of the Commerce Collegium, believed that in this “there is no state benefit and it is hopeless to keep them profitable in the future, because the government and merchant goods sent there were sold, many at a premium.” As a result, it was decided to liquidate the consulate. It is unlikely that Anisimov was right in seeing here yet another evidence of the top leaders’ rejection of Peter’s policies, who cared about the penetration of Russian goods into remote corners of the planet, including America, even if it was unprofitable. About three years have already passed since the death of the great reformer - a period sufficient to convince himself of the hopelessness of this undertaking. The measure adopted by the leaders was purely pragmatic in nature. They looked at things soberly and considered it necessary to encourage Russian trade where there were opportunities and prospects for development, for which they took quite serious measures. Thus, in May 1728, a decree was issued on the establishment of special capital in Holland for external expenses, in order to thus support the exchange rate and increase the volume of Russian exports abroad).

By the fall of 1727, it became clear that the removal of the army from collecting the poll tax jeopardizes the treasury receiving any money at all, and in September 1727, the military was again sent to the districts, although now subordinate to governors and voivodes; in January 1728 this measure was confirmed by a new decree. In the same January, a stone building was allowed in Moscow, and in April it was clarified that it required obtaining some kind of special police permission. On February 3 of the following year, 1729, stone construction was allowed in other cities. On February 24, on the occasion of the coronation celebrations, the emperor announced a request for fines and easing of punishments, as well as forgiveness of the poll tax for the May third of the current year. Close attention was still paid to control over income and expenses: the decree of April 11, 1728 required the immediate submission of accounts by the colleges to the Revision Board, and on December 9 it was announced that the salaries of officials guilty of this kind would be withheld delays On May 1, the Senate recalled the need to regularly send statements from central government institutions to the Academy of Sciences for their publication. In July, the Milking Office was removed from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Privy Council and reassigned to the Senate with the proviso that it was still obliged to submit monthly information about its activities to the council. However, relieving itself of some responsibilities, the council accepted others: “in April 1729, the Preobrazhenskaya Chancellery was abolished and cases “on the first two points” were ordered to be considered in the Supreme Privy Council. 11 Kurukin I.V. Shadow of Peter the Great // On the Russian throne P.52.

The Order to governors and governors, issued on September 12, 1728, which regulated their activities in some detail, was important for streamlining management. Some researchers drew attention to the fact that the Order reproduced certain procedures of pre-Petrine times, in particular, passing the year

kind of "according to a list". However, the document itself was written in the tradition of Peter’s regulations and contained a direct reference to the General Regulations of 1720. There were many such references to the authority of the grandfather in other legislative acts of the time of Peter II.

In the legislation of this period one can also find provisions that directly continue the policies of Peter the Great. Thus, on January 8, 1728, a decree was issued confirming that the main trading port of the country was still St. Petersburg, and on February 7, a decree was issued to complete the construction of the Peter and Paul Fortress there. In June, the tradesman Protopopov was sent to the Kursk province “to find ores,” and in August the Senate distributed surveyors among the provinces, entrusting them with drawing up land maps. On June 14, it was ordered from each province to send five people from officers and nobles to participate in the work of the Legislative Commission, but since the prospect of legislative activity apparently did not arouse enthusiasm, this order had to be repeated in November under threat of confiscation of estates. However, six months later, in June 1729, the assembled nobles were sent home and new ones were ordered to be recruited in their place. In January 1729, a decree was issued ordering the continuation of the construction of the Ladoga Canal to Shlisselburg, and a year later they remembered the fine for not going to confession and communion canceled by Catherine and decided to replenish the state treasury in this way.

The statement often found in literature about the complete oblivion of the army and navy during the reign of Peter II is also not entirely true. Thus, on June 3, 1728, on the recommendation of the Military Collegium, the Engineering Corps and the mining company were established, and their staffs were approved. In December 1729, the office of the Life Guards of the Semenovsky and Preobrazhensky regiments was created, and the decree on the annual dismissal of one third of the officers and privates from the nobility was confirmed. Measures were taken to strengthen the cities and forts of the Ufa and Solikamsk provinces as a “precaution against the Bashkirs.”

changes in the management and judicial system, financial and tax spheres, trade. It is equally obvious that the council did not have any specific political program, a plan for transformation, much less one that would have any ideological basis. All the activities of the leaders were a reaction to specific social, political and economic circumstances that developed in the country as a result of the radical reforms of Peter the Great. But this does not mean that the decisions of the new rulers of the country were made rashly and were unsystematic. Even though the situation was truly critical, all the measures implemented by the leaders went through a long stage of comprehensive discussion and the first serious steps were taken almost a year and a half after the death of Peter and six months after the establishment of the Supreme Privy Council. Moreover, in accordance with the bureaucratic procedure already established at the previous stage, almost every decision made by the council went through the stage of expert assessment in the relevant department. It should also be taken into account that the people who found themselves in power were not random people. These were experienced, well-informed administrators who had gone through Peter's school. But unlike their teacher, who, for all his strict rationalism, was also partly a romantic, who had certain ideals and dreamed of achieving them at least in the distant future, the leaders showed themselves to be outspoken pragmatists. However, as the events of 1730 showed, at least some of them were not devoid of the ability to think big and look far ahead. 11 Ivanov I.I. Mysteries of Russian history. P.57.

However, several questions arise. Firstly, what was the real situation in the country and weren’t the leaders, as Anisimov believes, trying to exaggerate things? Secondly, were the transformations carried out by the leaders really of a counter-reformist nature and, thus, were aimed at destroying what Peter had created? And even if so, does this mean a reversal of the modernization process?

As for the situation in the country, to characterize it it is worth turning to the monograph by P.N. Milyukov "State economy of Russia in the first quarter of the 18th century and the reform of Peter the Great." Even though many of his data were subsequently disputed by later researchers, in general the picture of the economic crisis he painted, I think, is correct. Meanwhile, such a detailed, numerically based

in Miliukov’s book, the picture was not known to the leaders, who based their judgments mainly on reports from the field and information about the amount of arrears. Therefore, for example, it is advisable to refer to a document such as the reports of A.A. Matveev about his revision of the Moscow province, where, as one might assume, the situation was not the worst. “In the Alexandrova Sloboda,” wrote Matveev, “of all the villages and hamlets, the peasants of all the villages and villages were taxed and burdened with palace taxes beyond their measure, much imprudently from the main rulers of that settlement; many fugitives and emptiness have already appeared; and in the settlement, not only in the villages and hamlets not peasants, but straight beggars have their own yards; moreover, not without offensive burdens for their own, and not for the palace’s profit.” From Pereslavl-Zalessky, the senator reported: “Incomprehensible thefts and abductions of not only government, but also capitation money from the chamberlain, commissars and clerks here I found, in which, according to the decrees of decent income and expenditure books, they have there was nothing at all, except for their rotten and dishonest notes lying around in scraps; after searching for them, more than 4,000 of the stolen money have already been found from me.” In Suzdal, Matveev executed the copyist of the Cameroon office for the theft of more than 1000 rubles and, having punished many other officials, reported to St. Petersburg: “In this city there is a great increase in poverty from day to day among the peasants, 200 people or more, and from everywhere they, peasants , numerous people are fleeing to the lower towns due to their extreme poverty, there is nothing to pay per capita. The peasants of the synodal team submit petitions for grievances and excessive fees in excess of the capitation allotted to them 11 Miliukov P. N. State economy of Russia in the first quarter 18. centuries and the reform of Peter the Great." “Facilitation in the payment of capitation money, the withdrawal of military commands,” wrote S.M. Solovyov, commenting on these documents, “that’s all that the government could do for the peasants at the time described. But to eradicate the main evil - the desire of every superior to feed on at the expense of the lower and at the expense of the treasury - it could not; for this it was necessary to improve society, and this still had to wait" 1 ^.

In the activities of the governments of Catherine I and Peter II, the main goal of which, as already mentioned, was the search for funds to maintain the viability of the state, the following interrelated areas can be identified: 1) improving taxation, 2) transforming the administrative system, 3) measures in the field of trade and industry. Let's consider each of them separately.

As is clear from the materials of the discussion of issues related to the poll tax in the Senate and the Supreme Privy Council, members of the first post-Petrine governments saw the main flaw of Peter’s tax reform not in the very principle of the poll tax, but in the imperfect mechanism for collecting taxes, firstly, it did not make it possible to quickly take into account changes in the composition of payers, which led to impoverishment of the population and an increase in arrears, and secondly, in the use of military commands, which caused protest from the population and reduced the combat effectiveness of the army. The placement of regiments in rural areas with the obligation of local residents to build regimental yards was also criticized, which also made their duties unbearable. The constant growth of arrears raised serious doubts about the ability of the population to pay taxes in the amount established by Peter in principle, although this point of view was not shared by all the leaders. So, Menshikov, as N.I. writes. Pavlenko, believed that the amount of the tax was not burdensome and “this idea was firmly entrenched in the prince’s head six years ago, when the government of Peter I discussed the amount of the tax.” Menshikov “remained true to the conviction that it is enough to reduce the number of clerks and messengers of all kinds,..., to eliminate the regimental yards in the districts that collected a capitation tax, and to place soldiers in the barracks of the cities, and prosperity will come among the villagers.” Since Menshikov was the most authoritative of the council members, his opinion ultimately prevailed.

At the same time, it is worth noting that since the first experience of collecting the poll tax was carried out only in 1724 and its results could not be known to the main inspirer of the date reform, the leaders had every reason to judge it based on the first results. And as people who took responsibility for governing the country, they, moreover, were obliged to take decisive measures to correct the situation. Anisimov believes that in reality the ruin of the country was not caused by the excessive amount of the poll tax, but was a consequence of the overstrain of economic forces during the many years of the Northern War, the increase in the number and size of indirect taxes and duties. In this he is undoubtedly right. However, the introduction of a per capita tax, at first glance, a very moderate size, in such conditions could turn out to be the straw after which the development of the situation crossed a critical line, and the measures that the leaders began to take were really the only

but possible to save the situation. Moreover, I note that they never agreed to a radical reduction in the size of the per capita tax, rightly believing that it would jeopardize the existence of the army. In general, the measures taken by the leaders should be considered quite reasonable: the withdrawal of military units from rural areas, the release of residents from the obligation to build regimental yards, a reduction in the size of the poll tax, forgiveness of arrears, variation in the collection of taxes in money and food with the introduction of actual free prices, shifting the collection of taxes from peasants to landowners and managers, concentrating the collection in one hand - all this was supposed to help reduce social tension and give hope for replenishing the treasury. And the Tax Commission, which, by the way, was headed by D.M. Golitsyn, that is, a representative of the old aristocracy, which, according to some authors, was in opposition to Peter’s reforms, after working for several years, was unable to offer anything in return for the poll tax. Thus, no matter how one evaluates the leaders’ criticism of the tax reform, their real actions were aimed only at its improvement, adjustment, and adaptation to real life conditions.

The transformations were much more radical,

carried out by the leaders in the system of government of the country, and some of them can indeed be considered as counter-reform in relation to Petrine institutions. First of all, this relates to the liquidation of court courts, the creation of which was, as it were, the first step towards the implementation of the principle of separation of powers. However, this kind of theoretical reasoning was, of course, alien and unfamiliar to the leaders. For them, the court was just one of the many institutions that appeared locally during Peter’s reforms. Moreover, in the absence of professional legal education in the country, and, consequently, of professional lawyers, given that the law itself has not yet emerged as a sphere of independent social activity, the existence of court courts in no way ensures a valid division There was no way for the authorities to change their minds. Looking ahead, I will note that subsequently, when judicial institutions were made independent during the provincial reform of 1775, a true separation of powers still did not work out, because the country and society were simply not ready for it. 11 Ibid. P. 234.

As for the organization of local government, when assessing the activities of the leaders, we must remember that the system of institutions that existed locally at that time was created by Peter over a long time, and if its core was created in parallel with the collegiate reform , then at the same time there remained many different institutions that arose earlier, often spontaneously and unsystematically! The completion of the tax reform and the beginning of the functioning of the new taxation system was inevitable, even if the economic situation in the country were more favorable, should have led to changes in the structure of local authorities, and these changes, of course, should have been aimed at simplifying system as a whole and increasing its efficiency. This is exactly what was accomplished in 1726-1729. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the meaning of the measures taken was to further centralize management, to create a clear vertical of executive power and, therefore, did not in any way contradict the spirit of Peter’s reform.

One cannot but recognize as reasonable the desire of the top leaders to reduce the cost of the apparatus by reducing it. Another thing is that the voivodeship administration created, or rather recreated locally, was more archaic in form compared to Peter’s institutions, but it now functioned differently than in pre-Petrine Russia, if only because the voivode was not subject to orders in Moscow, and the governor, who, in turn, was accountable to the central authorities, whose organization was fundamentally different. One should not neglect the reasoning of the leaders that it was easier for the population to deal with one boss than with many. Of course, the new governors, like their predecessors of the 17th century, did not disdain anything in order to line their pockets, but to correct this evil, indeed, as Solovyov wrote, it was necessary, first of all, to correct morals, which was beyond the power of the leaders.

As for central institutions, as we have seen, all the efforts of the top leaders were aimed at reducing their cost, on the one hand, and increasing their efficiency by eliminating duplication of functions, on the other. And even if we agree with those historians who see in the reasoning of the supreme leaders their rejection of the very principle of collegiality, they did not take any real actions to destroy it. Supremes

destroyed a number of previously existing institutions and created others, and new institutions were created on the same principles of collegiality, and their functioning was based on Peter the Great’s General Regulations and the Table of Ranks. The collegial body, as already mentioned, was the Supreme Privy Council itself. All of the above does not contradict the reduction in the number of collegiate members, which did not fundamentally change the order of decision-making in institutions. The decision of the top leaders to refuse to pay part of the officials’ salaries and to transfer them to feeding “out of business” looks somewhat different. Here one can indeed discern a significant deviation from Peter’s principles of organizing the administrative apparatus, which laid the foundations of the Russian bureaucracy. Of course, those who accuse the leaders of not understanding the essence of Peter’s reform are right, but they acted not on the basis of any ideological principles, but in subordination to circumstances. In their justification, however, it must be said that in reality, officials both at that time and later received their salaries extremely irregularly, with great delays and not always in full; payment of wages in food was practiced. So, to a certain extent, the leaders gave the force of law to what existed de facto. The vast state needed a ramified and well-functioning administrative apparatus, but did not have the resources to maintain it.

The very fact of not only the liquidation by the leaders of some of Peter’s institutions, but also the creation of new ones by them testifies, in my opinion, to the fact that these actions of theirs were of a completely meaningful nature. Moreover, their reaction to the changing situation was quite quick. Thus, according to the decree of February 24, 1727, all responsibilities related to the collection of taxes in cities were assigned to city magistrates, with their members personally liable for arrears. As a result, new abuses appeared and a stream of complaints from townspeople against them 11 Ibid. P. 69., which became one of the factors that predetermined their liquidation. Essentially, this was a resolution of the contradiction between the form of Peter’s city institutions, which goes back to foreign models, and the actually enslaved state of the population of Russian cities,

in which even insignificant elements of self-government turned out to be incompetent.

In my opinion, the trade and industrial policy of the Supreme Privy Council can be characterized as quite reasonable and justified. The vzrkhovniki generally proceeded from the economically correct idea that trade could most likely bring much needed funds to the state. The protectionist tariff of 1724 caused significant damage to trade and caused many protests from both Russian and foreign merchants. The consequences of the closure of the Arkhangelsk port even earlier were also negative, which led to the destruction of the trade infrastructure that had developed over centuries and the ruin of many merchants. Therefore, the measures taken by the leaders were reasonable and timely. It is significant that in these matters they were in no hurry, and the Commission on Commerce they created completed work on the new tariff only by 1731. It was based, on the one hand, on the Dutch tariff (which once again proves that the clergy were the true “chicks of Petrov’s nest”), and on the other hand, the opinions of merchants and trade management authorities, the new bill of exchange charter, the abolition of a number of trade monopolies, permission to export goods from the ports of Narva and Revel, the elimination of restrictions, played a positive role. associated with the construction of merchant ships, the introduction of deferments for arrears of customs duties. Experiencing an acute shortage of funds, the leaders, however, considered it possible to provide targeted support to individual industrial enterprises by providing tax breaks and government subsidies in general. trade and industrial policy was relatively more liberal and was in line with modernization processes.

So, in the first five years after the death of Peter the Great, the process of transformation in the country did not stop and was not reversed, although its pace, of course, slowed down sharply. The content of the new transformations was associated primarily with the correction of those Peter's reforms that did not withstand the collision with real life. However, in general, the policy of the new rulers of the country was characterized by continuity. Everything fundamental in Peter’s reforms is the social structure of society, the principles of organizing public service and power, the regular army and navy, the tax system, the administrative-territorial division of the country, established property relations, the secular nature of government and society, the country’s focus on active foreign policy remained unchanged. It is, apparently, right to draw another conclusion: the first years of the history of post-Petrine Russia proved that Peter’s reforms were basically irreversible, and irreversible precisely because they generally corresponded to the natural direction of the country’s development.

The Supreme Privy Council was established - the highest advisory body under the Empress, which was in charge of the main state internal and external affairs of Russia.

After the death of Emperor Peter I in 1725, his wife Ekaterina Alekseevna ascended the throne, creating from among the associates of the late emperor the Supreme Privy Council, which was supposed to advise the empress on what to do when making government decisions. Collegiums were subordinated to the Council, and the role of the Senate was reduced, which was reflected, in particular, in its renaming from the “Governing Senate” to the “High Senate”.

The first composition of the Privy Council included seven people: A. D. Menshikov, F. M. Apraksin, G. I. Golovkin, P. A. Tolstoy, A. I. Osterman, D. M. Golitsyn and the Empress’s son-in-law Duke Karl of Holstein .

Members of the Supreme Privy Council developed for Catherine I “an opinion not in the decree on the new established Privy Council,” which established the rights and functions of this body. It was assumed that all major decisions were to be made only by the Supreme Privy Council, and any imperial decree was to end with the phrase “given in the Privy Council.” Issues of foreign policy, the army and navy, the appointment of senior officials (including senators), control over the activities of the collegiums, financial management, control, investigative and supervisory functions were transferred to the jurisdiction of the Council.

The “top leaders” tried to resolve financial issues that were at the center of the council’s activities in two directions: by streamlining the system of accounting and control over government revenues and expenses and by saving money. The collection of poll taxes and recruits was transferred from the army to the civil authorities, military units were withdrawn from rural areas to cities, and some noble officers were sent on long vacations without payment of salary. In order to save money, the members of the Council decided to liquidate a number of local institutions (court courts, offices of zemstvo commissars, Waldmaster offices) and reduce the number of local employees. Some minor officials who did not have a class rank were deprived of their salaries.

The Supreme Privy Council lifted restrictions on trade in certain goods, abolished many restrictive duties and created favorable conditions for foreign merchants, in particular, previously prohibited trade through the Arkhangelsk port was allowed. In 1726, an alliance treaty was concluded with Austria, which for several decades determined the nature of Russia's policy in the international arena.

If under Catherine I the Council was an advisory body with broad powers, then under Peter II it concentrated all power in its hands. At first, Menshikov was in charge of the Council, but in September 1727 he was arrested and exiled to Siberia. After the death of Peter II in January 1730, the Supreme Privy Council invited Anna Ioannovna, the Dowager Duchess of Courland, to the throne. At the same time, on Golitsyn’s initiative, it was decided to carry out a reform of the political system of Russia through the actual elimination of the autocracy and the introduction of a limited monarchy. To this end, members of the Council invited the future empress to sign special conditions - “Conditions”, according to which she was deprived of the opportunity to make political decisions on her own: make peace and declare war, appoint to government posts, change the taxation system.

The lack of unity among supporters of the Supreme Privy Council, who were trying to limit the power of the Empress, allowed Anna Ioannovna, who arrived in Moscow, to publicly tear apart the “Conditions,” relying on the support of the middle and petty nobility and the guard.

By the Manifesto of March 4 (15), 1730, the Supreme Privy Council was abolished, and most of its members were sent into exile.

Lit.: Anisimov E.V. Russia without Peter: 1725-1740. St. Petersburg, 1994; Vyazemsky B. L. Supreme Privy Council. St. Petersburg, 1909; Ostrovsky V. Power in secret. How Russia was left without the House of Lords // St. Petersburg Diary. 2006. July 31 (No. 29 (88));Minutes of the Supreme Privy Council, 1726-1730. M., 1858;Filippov A. N. History of the Senate during the reign of the Supreme Privy Council and the Cabinet. Yuriev, 1895; Filippov A. N. The Cabinet of Ministers and its comparison with the Supreme Privy Council: Speech delivered at the ceremonial meeting of the Imperial Yuryev University, December 12, 1897 Yuryev, 1898.

The idea of ​​​​creating an institution higher than the Senate was in the air even under Peter the Great. However, it was brought to life not by him, but by his wife Catherine I. At the same time, the idea itself changed dramatically. Peter, as you know, ruled the country himself, delving into all the details of the government mechanism in both domestic and foreign policy. Catherine was deprived of the virtues that nature generously rewarded her husband with.

Contemporaries and historians assessed the empress's modest abilities differently. Field Marshal of the Russian Army Burchard Christopher Minich did not spare words of praise addressed to Catherine: “This empress was loved and adored by the entire nation, thanks to her innate kindness, which manifested itself whenever she could take part in persons who had fallen into disgrace and had earned the disfavor of the emperor. .. She was truly a mediator between the sovereign and his subjects.”

Minikh’s enthusiastic review was not shared by the historian of the second half of the 18th century, Prince M. M. Shcherbatov: “She was weak, luxurious in the entire space of this name, the nobles were ambitious and greedy, and from this it happened: practicing everyday feasts and luxuries, she left all power government to the nobles, of whom Prince Menshikov soon gained the upper hand.”

The famous historian of the 19th century S. M. Solovyov, who studied the time of Catherine I from unpublished sources, gave Catherine a slightly different assessment: “Catherine retained knowledge of persons and the relationships between them, retained the habit of making her way between these relationships, but she did not have the proper attention to affairs, especially internal ones, and their details, nor the ability to initiate and direct.”

Three dissimilar opinions indicate that their authors were guided by different criteria in assessing the empress: Minich - the presence of personal virtues; Shcherbatov - such moral qualities that should be inherent, first of all, to a statesman, a monarch; Soloviev - ability to manage the state, business qualities. But the advantages listed by Minich are clearly not enough to manage a vast empire, and the craving for luxury and feasts, as well as the lack of proper attention to business and the inability to assess the situation and determine ways to overcome the difficulties that have arisen, generally deprive Catherine of her reputation as a statesman.

Having neither knowledge nor experience, Catherine, of course, was interested in creating an institution capable of helping her, especially since she was oppressed by her dependence on Menshikov. The nobles were also interested in the existence of an institution capable of withstanding the onslaught of Menshikov and his limitless influence on the empress, among whom the most active and influential was Count P. A. Tolstoy, who competed with the prince in the struggle for power.

Menshikov's arrogance and disdainful attitude towards other nobles who sat in the Senate crossed all boundaries. An indicative episode occurred in the Senate at the end of 1725, when Minikh, who led the construction of the Ladoga Canal, asked the Senate to allocate 15 thousand soldiers to complete the work. Minikh's request was supported by P. A. Tolstoy and F. M. Apraksin. Their arguments about the advisability of finishing the enterprise begun by Peter the Great did not at all convince the prince, who passionately declared that it was not the job of soldiers to dig the ground. Menshikov defiantly left the Senate, thereby offending the senators. However, Menshikov himself did not object to the establishment of the Privy Council, believing that he would easily tame his rivals and, under the guise of the Privy Council, would continue to lead the government.

The idea of ​​​​creating a new institution was proposed by Tolstoy. The Empress was supposed to preside at meetings of the Supreme Privy Council, and members of the Council were given equal votes. Catherine immediately seized on this idea. If not with her mind, then with a heightened sense of self-preservation, she understood that Menshikov’s unbridled temper, his desire to command everyone and everything could cause strife and an explosion of discontent not only among the family nobility, but also among those who elevated her to the throne.

Campredon cites a statement by the empress dating back to the formation of the Supreme Privy Council. She declared “that she would show the whole world that she knew how to compel obedience and maintain the glory of her reign.” The establishment of the Supreme Privy Council really allowed Catherine to strengthen her power, to force everyone to “obey herself,” but under certain conditions: if she knew how to deftly weave intrigues, if she knew how to push opposing forces together and act as a mediator between them, if she had a clear idea of ​​where and by what means should the highest government institution lead the country, if it finally knew how to create coalitions that were useful to it at the right time, temporarily uniting rivals. Catherine did not possess any of the listed qualities, so her statement, if it was accurately reproduced by Campredon, hung in the air, turned out to be pure bravado. On the other hand, Catherine’s consent to the creation of the Supreme Council indirectly indicated her recognition of her inability, like her husband, to rule the country. The paradox of the establishment of the Supreme Privy Council was that it combined the contradictory aspirations of those involved in its creation. Tolstoy, as stated above, saw the Supreme Privy Council as a means of taming Menshikov. These expectations were shared by Apraksin and Golovkin. Menshikov, having supported the idea of ​​​​creating the Supreme Privy Council, was apparently guided by three considerations. Firstly, he simply missed the steps taken by Tolstoy, and having discovered them, he considered that it was useless to oppose them. Secondly, he also intended to benefit from the new institution - he believed that it would be easier to subjugate the five members of the Supreme Privy Council than the numerous members of the Senate. And finally, thirdly, Alexander Danilovich associated with the Supreme Council the fulfillment of his long-standing dream - to deprive his worst enemy, Prosecutor General of the Senate P. I. Yaguzhinsky, of the former influence.

The Supreme Privy Council was created on February 8, 1726 by personal decree of the Empress. However, rumors about the possibility of the emergence of a new institution penetrated the diplomatic environment as early as May 1725, when the Saxon envoy Lefort reported that they were talking about the establishment of a “Privy Council”. Similar information was sent by the French envoy Campredon, who even named the names of the members of the future institution.

Although the legislator had sufficient time to draw up a fundamental normative act, the decree read by G.I. Golovkin to members of the Supreme Privy Council on February 10 was distinguished by its superficial content, creating the impression that it was composed hastily. The creation of a new institution was justified by the need to provide members of the Supreme Privy Council with the opportunity to concentrate their efforts on solving the most important matters, freeing them from petty concerns that burdened them as senators. However, the decree does not define the place of the new institution in the current government mechanism, and the rights and responsibilities of the new institution are not clearly defined. The decree named the names of the persons obliged to be present in it: Field Marshal General Prince A. D. Menshikov, Admiral General Count F. M. Apraksin, Chancellor Count G. I. Golovkin, Count P. A. Tolstoy, Prince D. M. Golitsyn and Baron A.I. Osterman.

The composition of the Supreme Privy Council reflected the balance of power of the “parties” that competed during the elevation of Catherine to the throne: five of the six members of the Supreme Council belonged to the new nobility, and the family aristocracy was represented by Golitsyn alone. It is noteworthy, however, that it did not include the favorite of Peter the Great, the person who was number one in the bureaucratic world - Senate Prosecutor General P. I. Yaguzhinsky. Pavel Ivanovich was, as noted above, Menshikov’s worst enemy, and the latter did not object to the creation of the Supreme Privy Council, in particular, in the expectation that the post of Prosecutor General of the Senate would be eliminated and the mediating role between the Empress and the Senate would be played by the Supreme Privy Council.

Another ally of Peter, also an enemy of Menshikov, was left out of the Supreme Privy Council - cabinet secretary A.V. Makarov. There was no place in it for such experienced businessmen as P.P. Shafirov, I.A. Musin-Pushkin and others. All this gives reason to believe that when staffing the Supreme Privy Council, there was a bargaining between Catherine, Menshikov and Tolstoy.

On February 17, cabinet secretary Makarov announced in the Supreme Privy Council a decree of the empress, which extremely puzzled and alarmed Menshikov - another person was appointed to the institution - Catherine's son-in-law, Duke Karl Friedrich of Holstein. It did not take much difficulty for the prince to unravel the purpose of the appointment - he assessed it as a desire to weaken his influence, to create a counterweight to him and a more reliable support for the throne than he, Menshikov. Menshikov did not believe that Catherine could dare to do such a thing without his knowledge, and asked Makarov again: did he convey the Empress’s command correctly? Having received an affirmative answer, His Serene Highness immediately went to Catherine for clarification. The content of the conversation and its tone remained unknown, but the result is known - Catherine insisted on her own. The Duke, at the next meeting of the Supreme Privy Council, assured the listeners that he “will be nothing less than a member and to the other gentlemen ministers present as a colleague and comrade.” In other words, the husband of the daughter of Empress Anna Petrovna did not claim a leading role in the Supreme Privy Council, which somewhat reassured Menshikov. As for the other members of the Privy Council, they were quite happy with the appearance of such an influential figure who, relying on her relationship with the empress, could resist the dominance of Alexander Danilovich.

So, the composition of the new institution was approved. As for his competence, it was defined by a vague phrase: “We decided and commanded from now on at our court, both for external and internal state affairs, to establish a Supreme Privy Council, at which we ourselves will be present.”

Subsequent decrees, issued both on behalf of the Supreme Privy Council and on behalf of the Empress, clarified the range of issues to be resolved and its relationship to the Senate, Synod, collegiums and supreme power.

Already on February 10, the Supreme Privy Council ordered all central institutions to contact it with reports. However, one exception was made: the three “first”, in the terminology of Peter’s time, collegiums (Military, Admiralty and Foreign Affairs) were removed from the jurisdiction of the Senate, communicated with it as equals, by memorials, and became subject only to the Supreme Privy Council.

There was a reason for the appearance of this decree: the presidents of the three collegiums mentioned above were Menshikov, Apraksin and Golovkin; they also sat on the Supreme Privy Council, so it was not prestigious to subordinate these boards to the Senate, which itself was dependent on the Privy Council.

An important milestone in the history of the Supreme Privy Council is the so-called “Opinion not in the decree on the new established Privy Council”, submitted to the Empress by its members. There is no need to outline the contents of all thirteen points of the Opinion. Let us dwell on the most important of them, which are of fundamental importance, since in them, more clearly than in the founding decree, the purpose of creating a new institution and its main task were defined. The Supreme Privy Council, stated the Opinion, “serves only to relieve Her Majesty of the heavy burden of government.” Thus, formally, the Supreme Privy Council was an advisory body consisting of several persons, which made it possible to avoid hasty and erroneous decisions. However, the paragraph that followed this expanded the powers of the Supreme Privy Council by entrusting it with legislative functions: “No decrees should be issued before, until they have completely taken place in the Privy Council, the protocols are not fixed and will not be read to Her Majesty for the most gracious approbation, and then they can be fixed and sent out by the actual state councilor Stepanov (secretary of the council. - N.P.)".

“Opinion” established the work schedule of the Supreme Privy Council: on Wednesdays it should consider internal affairs, on Fridays - foreign ones; If the need arises, emergency meetings are convened. “Opinion is not a decree” expressed hope for active participation in the meetings of the Empress’s Council: “Since Her Majesty herself has the presidency in the Privy Council, there is reason to hope that she will be personally present often.”

Another milestone in the history of the Supreme Privy Council is associated with the decree of January 1, 1727. He, like the decree of February 17, 1726 on the inclusion of the Duke of Holstein in the Privy Council, dealt another blow to the omnipotence of Menshikov. In his statement to the members of the Council on February 23, 1726, the Duke, as we remember, promised to be an ordinary member of the new institution, like everyone else present, and called on everyone to “everyone declare his opinion freely and frankly.” Indeed, Menshikov retained his role as the leading member and continued to impose his will on the others. By decree of January 1, 1727, Catherine I decided to officially assign this role to the Duke. “We,” the decree said, “can completely rely on his faithful zeal for us and our interests; for this reason, His Royal Highness, as our most dear son-in-law and by virtue of his dignity, not only has primacy over other members in all matters that arise.” the first vote, but we also allow His Royal Highness to demand from all institutions the statements he needs.”

Fortunately for Menshikov, the Duke as a person was not able to resist him. Weak in soul and body, drunk even from a small amount of strong drinks, for which he had a tender love, the Duke could not compete with the prince also because he did not know the Russian language, was not aware of the state of affairs in Russia and did not have sufficient administrative experience . The Saxon ambassador Lefort gave him a derogatory description: “The Duke’s lifestyle deprived him of his good name”; according to the ambassador, the prince found “the only pleasure in a glass,” and immediately fell asleep “under the influence of wine fumes, since Bassevich inspired him that this was the only way to make himself fall in love in Russia.” Bassevich, the Duke's first minister, an experienced intriguer and braggart, who believed that Russia owed him everything that happened in it, easily controlled the Duke as a puppet and posed the main danger to Menshikov.

We find a similar judgment about the duke from the Danish ambassador Westphalen. True, Westphalen spoke less harshly about the empress’s son-in-law, finding some positive qualities in him: “The Duke does not speak Russian. But he speaks Swedish, German, French and Latin. He is well-read, especially in the field of history, loves to study, writes a lot, is prone to luxury, stubborn and proud. His marriage to Anna Petrovna is unhappy. The Duke is not attached to his wife and is prone to debauchery and drinking. He wants to be like Charles XII, between whom and the Duke there is no resemblance. He loves to talk, and reveals hypocrisy.”

Nevertheless, this generally insignificant person had a significant influence on the empress. In turn, in addition to Bassevich’s advice, the Duke, presumably, used the advice of his balanced and reasonable wife.

A description of Anna Petrovna's appearance and spiritual qualities was given by Count Bassevich. As already mentioned, Bassevich did not spare colors to portray her in the most attractive form: “Anna Petrovna resembled her august parent in face and character, but nature and upbringing softened everything in her. Her height of more than five feet was not too high with her unusually developed forms and proportionality in all parts of the body, reaching perfection.

Nothing could be more majestic than her posture and physiognomy; nothing could be more correct than the description of her face, and at the same time her gaze and smile were graceful and tender. She had black hair and eyebrows, a complexion of dazzling whiteness and a fresh and delicate blush, which no artificiality can ever achieve; her eyes were of an indeterminate color and were distinguished by an extraordinary brilliance. In a word, the strictest exactingness could not reveal any flaw in anything.

Added to all this was a penetrating mind, genuine simplicity and good nature, generosity, forbearance, excellent education and excellent knowledge of the Russian languages, French, German, Italian and Swedish.”

Campredon, who closely monitored the balance of power at court, noted in his dispatches the growing influence of the Duke of Holstein on the Empress already in the first half of 1725.

On March 3, he reported: “The Queen, seeing in the Duke the best support for herself, will warmly take his interests to heart and will be largely guided by his advice.” March 10: “The Duke’s influence is growing.” April 7: “The Duke of Holstein is the queen’s closest confidant.” April 14: “With envy and without fear, people here look at the growing confidence in the Duke of Holstein, especially those who treated him with disdain and even contempt during the Tsar’s lifetime. Only their intrigues are useless. The queen, who wants to elevate him to the throne of Sweden and hopes to receive military assistance from this power for him, sees in the duke her truest support. She is convinced that he can no longer have interests separate from her and her family, and that she can therefore only desire what is beneficial or honorable for her, as a result of which she, for her part, can fully rely on the integrity of his advice and on the honesty of his relationship with her.” April 24: “The Duke of Holstein, who had no voice during the time of the late Tsar, is now in charge of everything, since the Tsarina is guided only by the advice of him and Prince Menshikov, our inveterate enemy.”

The Duke expected to receive Livonia and Estland from Peter as a dowry for his daughter, but received neither one nor the other. But on May 6, 1725, Catherine gave the Duke the islands of Ezel and Dago, which aroused the hatred of Russian nobles.

The reader probably noticed that the book deals with the influence of the Duke of Holstein, Menshikov, and Tolstoy on the empress. At first glance, these judgments contradict one another. But, taking a closer look at the personality of the empress, a weak-willed woman who sought to avoid conflicts with nobles and at the same time easily succumbed to the suggestions of one or the other, we must recognize these contradictions as seeming. Catherine had the habit of agreeing with everyone, and this created the impression of the growing influence on her of either the Duke and his wife and minister standing behind him, or Menshikov, or Tolstoy. Sources are silent about Makarov’s influence, but not because this influence did not exist, but because this influence was shadow. In fact, the palm in influencing the Empress should be given to Menshikov, not only because he played a decisive role in placing her on the throne, but also because he had the power that, having easily given Catherine the crown, could just as easily give that crown take it away from her. The Empress was afraid of Menshikov and even in a critical situation for the prince, when he tried to take possession of the Duchy of Courland, she did not dare to remove him from power.

The expansion of her son-in-law's powers did not live up to Catherine's hopes - with this maneuver she ultimately failed to create a counterweight to Menshikov in the Supreme Privy Council. The failure was explained primarily by the fact that the weak-willed, narrow-minded duke, lacking the ability to make independent decisions, was opposed by the energetic, assertive, experienced not only in intrigue, but also in knowledge of the situation in the country of Menshikov.

The Duke's natural shortcomings were aggravated by the fact that he easily succumbed to outside influence. The man, without whose knowledge the Duke did not dare to take a step, was his minister Count Bassevich - a personality of an adventuristic character, an intriguer by nature, who more than once put his master in an awkward position.

The goal that Catherine strove for was simple - not only to keep the crown on her head until the end of her days, but also to place it on the head of one of her daughters. Acting in the interests of the Duke, the Empress relied on family ties and rejected the services and zeal of Menshikov, to whom she owed the throne. However, the Duke turned out to be so weak that he could not cope with restoring order not only in the country, but also in his own family. Here is the testimony of the French diplomat Magnan, who noted, “by the way, the coldness and disagreement that reigns between him and the duchess, his wife, and reaches the point that he has not been allowed into her bedroom for more than three months.”

As we remember, Catherine promised to preside over meetings of the Supreme Privy Council. However, she did not fulfill her promise: in the fifteen months that passed from the establishment of the Supreme Privy Council until her death, she attended meetings fifteen times. There were frequent cases when on the eve of the Council meeting she expressed a desire to attend it, but on the day when it was to take place, she ordered an announcement that she was postponing her presence to the next day, in the afternoon.

The sources do not name the reasons why this happened. But, knowing the daily routine of the Empress, one can safely say that she was unwell because she went to bed after seven in the morning and spent the night hours eating a rich feast.

As already mentioned, under Catherine I, the Supreme Privy Council was led by Menshikov - a man, although not of impeccable reputation, but with a fairly wide range of talents: he was a talented commander and a good administrator and, being the first governor of St. Petersburg, successfully supervised the development of the new capital.

The second person who influenced both the empress and the Supreme Privy Council was secret cabinet secretary Alexei Vasilyevich Makarov. There is a reason to get to know this person better.

Like Menshikov, Devier, Kurbatov and other lesser-known associates of Peter the Great, Makarov could not boast of his pedigree - he was the son of a clerk in the Vologda Voivodeship Office. An amateur historian of the second half of the 18th century, I. I. Golikov depicted Peter’s first meeting with Makarov like this: “The great sovereign, while in Vologda in 1693, saw in the Vologda office between the clerks a young scribe, precisely this Mr. Makarov, and from the first glance at him, penetrating his abilities, he took him in, appointed him as a scribe in his Cabinet and, little by little elevating him, promoted him to the aforementioned dignity (secret cabinet secretary. - N.P.), and from that time on he has not been separated from the monarch.”

There are at least three inaccuracies in Golikov’s report: no Cabinet existed for Peter the Great in 1693; Makarov served not in the Vologda, but in the Izhora office under Menshikov; finally, the starting date of his service in the Cabinet should be considered 1704, which is confirmed by a patent for the title of secret cabinet secretary.

Equally fantastic, but diametrically opposed information about Makarov’s abilities was expressed by the German Gelbig, the author of the famous essay “Random People in Russia.” About Makarov, Gelbig wrote that he was “the son of a commoner, an intelligent fellow, but so ignorant that he could not even read and write. It seems that this ignorance was his happiness. Peter took him as his secretary and entrusted him with copying secret papers, a tedious job for Makarov because he copied mechanically.”

Even a superficial acquaintance with the documents of that time, in the compilation of which Makarov was involved, is enough to be convinced of the absurdity of Gelbig’s testimony: Makarov not only knew how to read and write, but also had an excellent command of clerical language. It would be an exaggeration to consider Makarov’s pen brilliant, similar to the one owned by I. T. Pososhkov, P. P. Shafirov, F. Saltykov, but he knew how to compose letters, decrees, extracts and other business papers, understood Peter’s thoughts at a glance and gave them in a form acceptable for that time.

A huge mass of materials of national importance flocked to the Cabinet. All of them, before getting to the king, passed through the hands of the cabinet secretary.

Among the government elite, Makarov enjoyed enormous authority. Menshikov and Apraksin, Golovkin and Shafirov and other dignitaries sought his goodwill. The archives of the Cabinet of Peter the Great contain thousands of letters addressed to Makarov. Taken together, they provide abundant material for the study of the characters, morals and human destinies of that time. Some turned to the tsar for mercy, others begged for it from Makarov. Let us note that petitioners bothered the Tsar on rare occasions: their hand was restrained by several decrees of Peter, which strictly punished those who submitted petitions to him personally. The petitioners, however, learned to bypass the decrees: they made requests not to the tsar, but to Makarov, so that he would get the monarch to satisfy the request. The letters ended with a request to “represent” the king and report to him the essence of the request “in good time” or “in due course.” Prince Matvey Gagarin invented a slightly different formula: “Perhaps, dear sir, seeing an opportunity to convey it to the Tsar’s Majesty.” “In good times” or “over time” translated into modern language meant that the petitioner asked Makarov to report the request to the tsar at a time when he was in a good, complacent mood, that is, Makarov had to catch the moment when the request could not cause outbursts of anger in an irritable king.

Makarov was besieged with all sorts of requests! Marya Stroganova asked him to petition the Tsar for the release of her nephew Afanasy Tatishchev from service, since he “was needed” in the house. Princess Arina Trubetskaya was giving her daughter in marriage and, in connection with this, sought Makarov to ask Catherine for permission to borrow 5-6 thousand rubles from the treasury, “to send us this wedding.” Anna Sheremeteva, the widow of Field Marshal Boris Petrovich, asked to protect her “from petitioners among the runaway peasants, who are looking for great lawsuits for their elderly years.” The Countess asked the cabinet secretary to report to the Tsar and Tsarina “in good time” so that they would “defend” her from the plaintiffs.

Many requests to Makarov came from nobles. The President of the Admiralty Collegium and Senator Fyodor Matveyevich Apraksin ended his message to the Cabinet Secretary with the words: “You will be pleased to hand over a letter to His Tsar’s Majesty and how it will be received, perhaps, you will not deign to leave without news.” The son of the prince-pope of the all-drunken cathedral, Konon Zotov, who voluntarily volunteered to go abroad to study, complained to Makarov from Paris: “... I still don’t have a date (from the tsar. - N.P.) no praise, no anger.”

Even the almighty Menshikov resorted to Makarov’s mediation. Not wanting to bother the Tsar with unimportant matters, he wrote: “Otherwise, I didn’t want to bother your Majesty, I wrote at length to Secretary Makarov.” In a letter to Makarov, Alexander Danilovich, having outlined the essence of small matters, informed him: “And I didn’t want to bother His Majesty with these small matters, what will I expect.” Menshikov, as well as other correspondents who were in a confidential relationship with Makarov, often informed the cabinet secretary about facts and events that he considered necessary to hide from the tsar, because he knew that they would cause his anger. So, for example, in July 1716, Menshikov wrote to Makarov, who was abroad with the tsar: “Similarly, in Peterhof and Strelina, there are a lot of sick workers and they die constantly, of which more than a thousand people have died this summer. However, I am writing to you about this poor condition of the workers for your special knowledge, about which, unless some occasion calls, then you can convey, as quickly as possible, that the many non-corrections here are bothering His Royal Majesty no little.” In the report to the king, sent on the same day, there was not a single word about the mass death of builders. True, the prince said that he found work on Kotlin Island “in a weak state,” but he cited continuous rains as the reason for this.

Makarov dared to provide assistance even to people who were in tsarist disgrace. Among the nobles who were blessed by him, we meet the first “profit-maker” Alexei Kurbatov, who later became the Arkhangelsk vice-governor, the Moscow vice-governor Vasily Ershov, the Tsar’s favorite orderly, and then the admiralty Alexander Kikin. The latter was accused in 1713 of criminal fraud with contracts for the supply of bread to St. Petersburg. The threat of ending his life on the gallows seemed quite real, but the former favorite of the tsar was then rescued from trouble by Ekaterina Alekseevna and Makarov.

Makarov’s activities as a cabinet secretary deserves such detailed coverage primarily because he performed this position under Catherine I. Moreover, the cabinet secretary during her reign acquired immeasurably greater influence than in the previous one. Under the reformer tsar, who held in his hands all the threads of governing the country, Alexei Vasilyevich served as a rapporteur; under Catherine, who did not have management skills, he acted as an adviser to the empress and an intermediary between her and the Supreme Privy Council. Makarov was prepared for this task, having behind him more than twenty years of training in the administrator's craft, completed under the leadership of Peter. Knowing all the intricacies of the work of the government mechanism and being able to promptly prompt the Empress the need to promulgate the necessary decree, Makarov, along with Menshikov, became Catherine’s main assistant.

Several facts testify to the high prestige Makarov was able to give to the institution he led and to the cabinet secretary himself. Thus, by decree of September 7, 1726, it was ordered that important matters should be reported first to the Cabinet of Her Imperial Majesty, and then to the Supreme Privy Council. On December 9, 1726, Catherine, who highly valued Makarov’s services, granted him the rank of Privy Councilor.

Another evidence of Makarov’s high authority was the formula for registering his presence at meetings of the Supreme Privy Council. Even about senators, not to mention nobles of lower rank, in journal entries we read: “admitted,” “admitted,” or “summoned” to the presence of the Supreme Privy Council, while Makarov’s appearance was recorded with a more respectful formula: “Then the secret one came Cabinet Secretary Makarov”, “Then there was a secret Cabinet Secretary Makarov”, “Then the Cabinet Secretary Makarov announced.”

The importance of the Senate and senators during the reign of Catherine weakened significantly. This is evidenced, for example, by the journal entry of the Supreme Privy Council dated March 28, 1726, when senators Devier and Saltykov arrived at its meeting with a report: “Before the admission of those senators, His Royal Highness (Duke of Holstein. - N.P.) deigned to announce my opinion: that when senators come to the Supreme Privy Council with business, then do not read those cases in front of them or discuss them, so that they do not know ahead of time that the Supreme Privy Council will discuss.”

The foreign minister in the then bureaucratic pyramid also stood below Makarov: “At that meeting, His Royal Highness the Duke of Holstein’s Privy Councilor von Bassevich was admitted.” Let us remember that the Duke of Holstein was the son-in-law of the Empress.

Communication between the Empress and the Supreme Privy Council was carried out in various ways. The simplest one was that Makarov notified the council members of the cancellation of the empress’s intention to attend the meeting of the Supreme Privy Council.

Most often, Makarov played a mediating role between the Empress and the Supreme Privy Council, conveyed to him Catherine’s oral commands or carried out the instructions of the Supreme Privy Council to transmit prepared decrees to the Empress for approval. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that Alexei Vasilyevich was performing purely mechanical functions - in fact, during his reports, he gave advice to the empress, who was ignorant in management affairs and did not want to delve into the essence of the issue, with which she easily agreed. As a result, the empress’s orders actually belonged not to her, but to the cabinet secretary, who knew how to tactfully impose his will on her. Let's give a few examples, making a reservation that the sources did not preserve direct evidence that the empress was a puppet in the hands of Menshikov and Makarov; This is where logical considerations come into play.

On March 13, 1726, the Supreme Privy Council learned that the Senate would not accept promemories from the first three collegiums. Makarov reported this to the Empress. Having returned, he announced that the Senate from now on “will be written as the High Senate, and not the Governing Senate, because this word “Governing” is obscene.” It is unlikely that Catherine could have carried out such an action, which required appropriate legal preparation, on her own, without outside influence.

On August 8, 1726, Catherine, attending a meeting of the Supreme Privy Council, expressed a judgment that required her to know diplomatic etiquette and be aware of precedents. She “deigned to have the consideration” to send Prince Vasily Dolgoruky as ambassador to Poland instead of Count Bassevich, “reasoning that there it would be possible for him, without a public audience and other ceremonies, to manage the embassy business following the example of how the Swedish ambassador Cederhelm did it here.”

A special role fell to Makarov in appointments to positions. This is not surprising - no one in the country after the death of Peter I could compete with Alexei Vasilyevich in knowledge of the shortcomings and advantages of various nobles. Personal acquaintance with each of them allowed him to know their zeal for service, and the degree of selflessness, and such qualities of nature as a tendency to cruelty or mercy. Makarov's recommendations were of decisive importance for the empress.

Thus, on February 23, 1727, the Supreme Privy Council presented a list of candidates for governor, Princes Yuri Trubetskoy, Alexei Cherkassky, Alexei Dolgoruky, and the President of the Milking Chancellery, Alexei Pleshcheev. Catherine agreed to appoint only Major General Yu. Trubetskoy as governor; “About the others,” Makarov informed the Supreme Privy Council, “she deigned to say that they are needed here, and for this purpose “to select others and present them.” In order to “deign to say” something like this, it was necessary to have detailed information about each of the candidates and be sure “that they are needed here” - and this was hardly within the power of the Empress.

Makarov stood behind Catherine’s back during the appointment of Major General Vasily Zotov as governor of Kazan. The Supreme Privy Council considered it more expedient to appoint him president of the College of Justice, but the empress. Of course, at the suggestion of Makarov, she insisted on her own.

It is known that Alexei Bibikov, who had the rank of brigadier, was protected by Menshikov. It was he who was nominated by Alexander Danilovich to become the Novgorod vice-governor, believing that Kholopov, recommended by the Empress, “is not capable of any service due to his old age and decrepitude.” Catherine (read Makarov) rejected Bibikov’s candidacy, ordering “to elect another, older than him, Bibikov as vice-governor.”

Feedback from the Supreme Privy Council to the Empress was also carried out through Makarov. In the papers one can find different versions of wording, the meaning of which was that the Supreme Privy Council instructed Makarov to convey to the Empress the decrees he had adopted for their approval or for their signing.

Sometimes - although not often - Makarov's name was mentioned along with the members of the Supreme Privy Council present at its meetings. So, on May 16, 1726, “in the presence of four persons (Apraksin, Golovkin, Tolstoy and Golitsyn. - N.P.)... and the secret cabinet secretary Alexei Makarov, Alexey Bestuzhev’s secret report, No. 17, from Copenhagen was read.” On March 20, 1727, Alexey Vasilyevich even took the initiative to transfer the money remaining in the Rostov diocese after these expenses to the treasury. The Supreme Privy Council agreed: “To carry out this proposal.”

Of course, the ruling elite was aware of Makarov’s influence on the empress. Makarov also made mortal enemies, among whom the most sworn were A.I. Osterman and the vice-president of the Synod, Feofan Prokopovich. They caused him a lot of trouble during the reign of Anna Ioannovna, when Makarov was under investigation for many years and was kept under house arrest until his death.

However, the empress did not need hints in all cases. At the level of everyday issues, she made independent decisions, as happened, for example, with the decree of July 21, 1726 on the procedure for holding fist fights in the capital. Chief of Police of St. Petersburg Devier reported that on Aptekarsky Island there are crowded fist fights, during which “many, taking out knives, chase other fighters, and others, putting cannonballs, stones, and flails in their mittens, beat without mercy with mortal blows, from which there are fights and not without mortal killings, which murder is not charged as a sin, they also throw sand in the eyes.” The Empress did not prohibit fist fights, but demanded honest observance of their rules: “Whoever... from now on in such fist fights for fun will have the desire to choose sots, fiftieths and tens, register with the police office, and then monitor compliance with the rules of fist battle."

Another person whose influence on state affairs was undoubted, although not very noticeable, was A. I. Osterman. For the time being, he was behind the scenes of events, and came to the fore later, after the fall of Menshikov. The Spanish ambassador de Liria reported on January 10, 1728: “... after the fall of Menshikov, all the affairs of this monarchy passed to him (Osterman. - N.P.) hands... of a person known for his qualities and abilities.” In his assessment, Osterman was “a businessman behind whom everything is intrigue and intrigue.”

Most foreign observers are unanimous in their high assessment of Andrei Ivanovich’s abilities. This is how the Prussian ambassador Mardefeld spoke about him on July 6, 1727, when Osterman was still under the patronage of Menshikov: “Osterman’s credit stems not only from the power of the prince (Menshikov. - N.P.), but is based on the baron’s great abilities, honesty, selflessness and is supported by the boundless love of the young emperor for him (Peter II. - N.P.), who has enough foresight to recognize the mentioned qualities in him and understand that the baron is completely necessary for this state for its relations with foreign powers.”

We cannot agree with all of the assessments given. Mardefeld rightly noted the rare quality of a nobleman of that time - Osterman was not convicted of either bribery or embezzlement. The statement about his intelligence, efficiency and role in the government is also true. Indeed, Osterman had enough physical strength and talents to not only familiarize himself with the contents of numerous reports received by the Supreme Privy Council from collegiums, governors, and officials carrying out his special assignments, but also to single out the most important ones in order to formulate the agenda for the next meeting and prepare the relevant decree, for which, on his instructions, his assistants sought out previous decrees on a similar case. Domestic nobles of that time were not accustomed to such systematic work, and the hardworking Osterman was truly irreplaceable. According to Mardefeld, Osterman “bears the burden that they (Russian nobles. - N.P.), due to their natural laziness, they don’t want to wear it.”

Osterman’s indispensability in resolving issues of the everyday, routine life of the state was also noted by the observant French diplomat Magnan, who informed the Versailles court in June 1728: “Osterman’s credit is supported only by his necessity for the Russians, which is almost irreplaceable in terms of the smallest details in business, since not a single Russian feels hardworking enough to take on this burden.” Magnan is wrong in extending the lack of hard work to all “Russians.” It is enough to refer to the cabinet secretary Makarov, who was in no way inferior in hard work to Osterman. However, Alexey Vasilyevich lacked knowledge of foreign languages ​​and awareness in foreign policy affairs.

These were the people in whose hands real power lay and who had to look for ways to overcome the crisis that struck Russia at the beginning of the second quarter of the 18th century.

Domestic history contains many episodes in which the process of transfer of power from one leader to another took place. Sometimes these were bloody palace coups and revolutions. Sometimes the change of power occurred without bloodshed.

In the eighteenth century, in the Russian Empire, as in many other countries of the civilized world, the first preconditions for a crisis of autocratic power gradually began to appear.

In this article, the reader will be told one of such episodes of Russian history, where, albeit for a short time, but a group of high-ranking officials - the Supreme Privy Council - took into their hands the reins of government.

Peter the Great died. The first emperor of the Russian Empire left behind a great legacy that had to be managed competently. At the same time, Catherine the First, who ascended the imperial throne after the death of Peter, was quite far from state affairs.

Thus, the need arose for the formation of the Supreme Privy Council - a body that would exercise public administration on behalf of the autocrat. In addition, the influence of the nobility gradually increased, and it was no longer possible to ignore it. By creating a state governing body consisting of nobles, it was possible to control this influential part of the population.

So, in February 1726, the Supreme Privy Council was established by Empress Catherine the First.

Initially, the council was conceived as a small group of people competent in matters of government. The first composition of the Supreme Privy Council included the most influential associates of Peter the Great. This decision is due to the ability to coordinate all areas of government activity. Let us take a closer look at the personalities of all members of the Supreme Privy Council.

Alexander Danilovich Menshikov

The largest Russian military and political figure, the closest associate and one of the most trusted persons of Emperor Peter the Great. Menshikov was next to Peter both in the youth of the future emperor, when he was working out the system of the future army in the “amusing” regiments, and during the decisive moments of Peter’s military campaigns in the first quarter of the eighteenth century. Menshikov personally influenced the outcome of many of them.

Successful military service contributed to Menshikov’s dizzying military and government career. Resignedly carrying out the sovereign's decrees, Alexander Danilovich, a few days before the founding of St. Petersburg, was already listed as its governor-general, thus becoming the first person to hold this position.

For his zeal in serving the sovereign, Menshikov received the military rank of cavalry general, and for his participation in the Battle of Poltava, where the Swedish army was defeated and almost completely captured under the command of Alexander Danilovich, he was awarded the rank of field marshal general.

As a result of successful service, Menshikov's wealth and influence quickly increased. For example, for the defeat of Hetman Mazepa’s troops, the statesman was granted the village of Ivanovskoye and the villages nearby.

According to historians, it was Menshikov who actually determined the domestic and foreign policy of the Russian Empire after the death of Peter the Great. Enjoying significant influence in the council, Menshikov remained the “gray eminence” of the Russian court until his overthrow and exile.

Fedor Matveevich Apraksin

Also from the inner circle of Peter the Great. This man stood at the origins of the creation of the Russian Navy, heading the Admiralty Board for a long time.

Apraksin, like Menshikov, had a rapid military career. The naval commander gained a significant share of fame after a successful campaign against the Ottoman Empire and the capture of the city of Azov.

Fyodor Matveevich Apraksin occupied one of the leading positions in state and military affairs of the Russian Empire, second only to Menshikov in the Supreme Privy Council. The official retained his influence until his death in 1728.

Gabriel Ivanovich Golovkin

The “Grand Chancellor,” as he was called, was Peter the Great’s confidant as president of the College of Foreign Affairs. A born diplomat, Golovkin gained fame as a flexible politician and one of the wealthiest people of that era.

Contemporaries often noted that, despite all his prosperity, Gabriel Ivanovich always tried to dress poorly and denied himself many things. According to one version, the politician’s childhood, associated with constant need, had an effect.

Golovkin was the third most important member of the Supreme Privy Council, but was able to maintain his status and influence, despite the changeability of the era of “palace coups.”

Chancellor Golovkin also noted that he was at enmity with the Dolgoruky princes, who dominated the council after the change of the first composition.

Petr Andreevich Tolstoy

Count, founder of the famous Tolstoy dynasty, from which came future famous writers and artists, including the author of the famous novel “War and Peace.”

At the time of the formation of the Supreme Privy Council, Count Tolstoy held the position of head of the Secret Chancellery - a secret service created under Peter the Great. Also, Pyotr Andreevich Tolstoy oversaw the judiciary of the Russian Empire.

Dmitry Mikhailovich Golitsyn

Prince, one of the best business executives of Peter the Great's time. He had a lot of experience in modernizing fortifications and preparing them for the war with the Swedes.

At one time, Golitsyn was in charge of the Chamber Collegium, whose competence included the collection of taxes and distribution of the treasury, and various economic issues.

Looking ahead, it should be said that it was Golitsyn who was the author of the “Conditions” of the Supreme Privy Council, aimed at significantly limiting autocracy in the Russian Empire.

Heinrich Johann Friedrich Ostermann

Andrei Ivanovich (in the Russian version) Osterman is one of the most important figures in Russian foreign policy of the first half of the eighteenth century.

Coming from Germany, Andrei Ivanovich could easily navigate any difficult situation and enjoyed the trust of Peter the Great. For a long time he held the position of vice-chancellor.

If we analyze the first composition of this advisory body, we can conclude that Empress Catherine the First gathered around herself truly competent and knowledgeable people capable of resolving issues in any area of ​​management. The council included experienced military personnel, skilled diplomats, and managers.

As often happens, a struggle for power began in the highest deliberative state body of that time.

The first victim of this struggle was Count Tolstoy, whose presence in the council was constantly disputed by Menshikov.

After a short period of time, the unofficial leader of the council, Menshikov, finds himself exiled to Siberia on charges of embezzling state money.

The death of Apraksin in 1728 also made adjustments to the composition of the council.

The council governed all spheres of Russian society. Here the most important military decisions were made, the course of the country's foreign policy was laid, and internal issues of the state were discussed.

At its core, the council combined the best leaders of Peter’s time, called upon to help the monarch in state matters.

Through its activities, the Supreme Privy Council greatly undermined the position of the Senate, placing it below the Holy Synod - the highest body of church-state administration of the country.