CORRESPONDENT THEORY OF TRUTH- a set of methodological directions that determine the truth of a certain piece of knowledge (statement, theory) through correspondence (Latin correspondentia) to the object of this knowledge; The main version of the correspondence theory of truth is the "classical" concept of truth (Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas), according to which truth is the correspondence of thoughts to reality. All three terms included in this definition are problematic. Variants of the correspondence theory of truth differ in the nature of the formulation and solutions of these problems. The first group of problems is related to the formulation of restrictions that indicate which thoughts can be characterized as true. For example, statements that describe a certain state of affairs (“The cat is sitting on the carpet”) can be considered true, but statements expressing an order (“Hands up!”) Or having no specific meaning ( "X–at=z"), have no truth value; statements that claim to be true must satisfy the syntactic and semantic rules of the language (for example, the statement "This square is round" is neither true nor false, but meaningless). The second group of problems is related to what exactly can be relied upon as reality, to which thoughts correspond. According to logical atomism (Russell, Wittgenstein,), statements are true if they correspond to "facts"; however, "facts" are certain cognitive constructs dependent on sensory perceptions and conceptual interpretations, therefore, by comparing statements with facts, we are comparing one thought with another. The main difficulty, especially emphasized by Kant, is that thought cannot be directly compared with its object (“thing in itself”), therefore knowledge has its own reality, within which only the question of the objectivity of this knowledge can be raised. The third group of problems is related to the interpretation of "correspondence": from the naive concept of "copying" reality to the pragmatic concept, the correspondence between knowledge and its object is established by checking all the practical consequences of this knowledge (Pearce's principle), such interpretations also include the "reflection theory" (Lenin ).
The correspondence theory of truth was clarified by Tarski, who showed that semantic paradoxes known since antiquity such as the "paradox of Eubulides" (let A \u003d "A is false", then A is true, if A is false, and vice versa) can be eliminated in languages that allow formalization , building a hierarchy of semantic levels: an object language for which syntax rules are specified, and a metalanguage with designation rules for each element of the object language. The semantic definition of "truth" is introduced by the concept of "feasibility", which has a precise meaning in metamathematics. A language free from semantic antinomies can be constructed only if all its initial expressions and construction rules are exactly listed, i.e. formalization conditions are met. Since this requirement is not fulfilled for natural languages, they inevitably contain the indicated antinomy. The correspondence theory of truth is one of the premises of realistic theories of knowledge (critical realism, scientific realism, etc.). In a number of methodological concepts, various interpretations of the “correspondence” between knowledge and its object are proposed: as a degree of confirmation (neopositivism), as “plausibility, verissimilitude” (Popper) (a hypothesis is considered “corresponding” to reality as long as it successfully resists refutation) and others. At the same time, instrumentalist, conventionalist and constructivist models of knowledge and its development are considered incompatible with the correspondence theory of truth. See also Art. True , Instrumentalism , Coherent theory of truth , Reflection.
Literature:
1. Russell b. Human knowledge. Its scope and boundaries. K., 1997;
2. Sandküler H.-J. The reality of knowledge. M., 1997;
3. Chudinov E.M. The nature of scientific truth. M., 1977;
4. Tarsky A. The semantic concept of truth and the foundation of semantics. - In the book: Analytical Philosophy: Formation and Development. M., 1998;
5. Popper K. Logic and the growth of scientific knowledge. M., 1983;
6. O'Connor D. The Correspondence Theory of Truth. L., 1975.
One of the most common in philosophy and science - correspondent(from the English word correspondence - correspondence) the concept of truth, the origins of which we find already in Aristotle. Sometimes this concept is also called classical. The first attempts to study it were made by Plato and Aristotle. The classical understanding of truth was shared by Thomas Aquinas, P. Holbach, Hegel, L. Feuerbach, Marx; it is shared by many philosophers of the 20th century.
This concept is shared by materialists, idealists, and theologians; the agnostics do not reject it either; among the adherents of the classical conception of truth there are both metaphysics and dialectics.
The classical concept of truth is characterized by the following principles: reality does not depend on the world of knowledge; a one-to-one correspondence can be established between our thoughts and reality; the correspondence theory itself is logically consistent.
As the name of the concept implies, the main concept for it is the concept of correspondence. True is corresponding. Moreover, the concept under consideration is initially dual. Indeed, on the one hand, one can speak of true knowledge, implying knowledge that corresponds to a thing. On the other hand, one can speak of a true thing, meaning its correspondence to its idea (concept, essence). In both cases, this concept seems very clear and natural. However, a closer examination of it shows that it contains many ambiguities. The main one is the ambiguity of the content of the very concept of correspondence. Indeed, what does, for example, mean the correspondence between a statement about a thing and this thing itself? After all, the fundamental difference between a statement and a thing is obvious. The statement does not have a spatial form, does not contain the substance from which the thing is composed. It does not have the properties that a thing has, and so on. What then is the correspondence between the statement and the thing?
An equally serious problem for the concept of truth under discussion is the problem of establishing the correspondence or inconsistency of a statement and a thing (the problem of the criterion of the truth of a statement). Indeed, some method is needed to establish the correspondence between a statement and a thing. However, this method of recognizing true (or not true) statements itself must be checked for truth, which requires the involvement of another criterion of truth, and so on. The correspondent conception of truth has other problems as well. Nevertheless, this concept remains in service with philosophy throughout almost its entire history.
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