The history of Lend-Lease has been mythologized by both supporters of the Soviet regime and its opponents. Read about the real volumes of Lend-Lease and its contribution to the Victory in this article.
From the editor's website:
The history of Lend-Lease has been mythologized by both opponents of Soviet power and its supporters. The former believe that without military supplies from the USA and England the USSR could not have won the war, the latter believe that the role of these supplies is completely insignificant. We bring to your attention a balanced view of this issue by historian Pavel Sutulin, originally published in his LiveJournal.
History of Lend-Lease
Lend-Lease (from the English “lend” - to lend and “lease” - to rent) is a unique program for lending to allies by the United States of America through the supply of equipment, food, equipment, raw materials and materials. The first step towards Lend-Lease was taken by the United States on September 3, 1940, when the Americans transferred 50 old destroyers to Britain in exchange for British military bases. On January 2, 1941, Oscar Cox, an employee of the Ministry of Finance, prepared the first draft of the Lend-Lease law. On January 10th, this bill was transmitted to the Senate and House of Representatives. On March 11, the Law received approval from both chambers and was signed by the President, and three hours later the President signed the first two directives to this law. The first of them ordered the transfer of 28 torpedo boats to Britain, and the second ordered the transfer of 50 75-mm cannons and several hundred thousand shells to Greece. This is how the history of Lend-Lease began.The essence of Lend-Lease was, in general, quite simple. According to the Lend-Lease law, the United States could supply equipment, ammunition, equipment, etc. countries whose defense was vital for the States themselves. All deliveries were free of charge. All machinery, equipment and materials spent, used up or destroyed during the war were not subject to payment. Property left over after the end of the war that was suitable for civilian purposes had to be paid for.
As for the USSR, Roosevelt and Churchill made a promise to supply it with the materials necessary for war immediately after Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union, that is, on June 22, 1941. On October 1, 1941, the First Moscow Protocol on Supply to the USSR was signed in Moscow, the expiration of which was set on June 30. The Lend-Lease Act was extended to the USSR on October 28, 1941, as a result of which the Union was granted a loan of $1 billion. During the war, three more protocols were signed: Washington, London and Ottawa, through which supplies were extended until the end of the war. Lend-Lease deliveries to the USSR officially ceased on May 12, 1945. However, until August 1945, deliveries continued according to the “Molotov-Mikoyan list.”
Lend-Lease deliveries to the USSR and their contribution to victory
During the war, hundreds of thousands of tons of cargo were delivered to the USSR under Lend-Lease. Military historians (and, perhaps, everyone else) are of greatest interest, of course, in allied military equipment - we’ll start with that. Under Lend-Lease, the following were supplied to the USSR from the USA: light M3A1 “Stuart” - 1676 pcs., light M5 - 5 pcs., light M24 - 2 pcs., medium M3 “Grant” - 1386 pcs., medium M4A2 “Sherman” (with a 75-mm cannon) - 2007 pcs., medium M4A2 (with a 76-mm cannon) - 2095 pcs., heavy M26 - 1 pc. From England: infantry "Valentine" - 2394 units, infantry "Matilda" MkII - 918 units, light "Tetrarch" - 20 units, heavy "Churchill" - 301 units, cruising "Cromwell" - 6 units. From Canada: Valentine - 1388. Total: 12199 tanks. In total, during the war years, 86.1 thousand tanks were delivered to the Soviet-German front.
"Valentine" "Stalin" is coming to the USSR under the Lend-Lease program.
Thus, Lend-Lease tanks accounted for 12.3% of the total number of tanks produced/delivered to the USSR in 1941-1945.
In addition to tanks, self-propelled guns/self-propelled guns were also supplied to the USSR. ZSU: M15A1 - 100 pcs., M17 - 1000 pcs.; Self-propelled guns: T48 - 650 pcs., M18 - 5 pcs., M10 - 52 pcs. A total of 1,807 units were delivered. In total, 23.1 thousand self-propelled guns were produced and received in the USSR during the war. Thus, the share of self-propelled guns received by the USSR under Lend-Lease is equal to 7.8% of the total number of equipment of this type received during the war. In addition to tanks and self-propelled guns, armored personnel carriers were also supplied to the USSR: English “Universal Carrier” - 2560 units. (including from Canada - 1348 pcs.) and American M2 - 342 pcs., M3 - 2 pcs., M5 - 421 pcs., M9 - 419 pcs., T16 - 96 pcs., M3A1 “Scout” - 3340 pcs. ., LVT - 5 pcs. Total: 7185 units. Since armored personnel carriers were not produced in the USSR, Lend-Lease vehicles made up 100% of the Soviet fleet of this equipment. Criticism of Lend-Lease very often draws attention to the low quality of armored vehicles supplied by the Allies. This criticism actually has some basis, since American and British tanks were often inferior in terms of performance characteristics to both their Soviet and German counterparts. Especially considering that the Allies usually supplied the USSR with not the best examples of their equipment. For example, the most advanced modifications of the Sherman (M4A3E8 and Sherman Firefly) were not supplied to Russia. The situation with supplies under Lend-Lease to aviation is much better.
Under Lend-Lease, 8 thousand anti-aircraft and 5 thousand anti-tank guns were supplied. In total, the USSR received 38 thousand units of anti-aircraft and 54 thousand anti-tank artillery. That is, the share of Lend-Lease in these types of weapons was 21% and 9%, respectively. However, if we take all Soviet guns and mortars as a whole (receipts during the war - 526.2 thousand), then the share of foreign guns in it will be only 2.7%.
During the war, 202 torpedo boats, 28 patrol ships, 55 minesweepers, 138 submarine hunters, 49 landing ships, 3 icebreakers, about 80 transport ships, about 30 tugs were transferred to the USSR under Lend-Lease. There are about 580 ships in total. In total, the USSR received 2,588 ships during the war years. That is, the share of Lend-Lease equipment is 22.4%.
The most noticeable were the Lend-Lease deliveries of cars. In total, 480 thousand cars were delivered under Lend-Lease (85% of them from the USA). Including about 430 thousand trucks (mainly US 6 companies Studebaker and REO) and 50 thousand jeeps (Willys MB and Ford GPW). Despite the fact that the total receipt of vehicles on the Soviet-German front amounted to 744 thousand units, the share of Lend-Lease vehicles in the Soviet vehicle fleet was 64%. In addition, 35,000 motorcycles were supplied from the United States.
But the supply of small arms under Lend-Lease was very modest: only about 150,000 thousand units. Considering that the total supply of small arms to the Red Army during the war amounted to 19.85 million units, the share of Lend-Lease weapons is approximately 0.75%.
During the war years, 242.3 thousand tons of motor gasoline were supplied to the USSR under Lend-Lease (2.7% of the total production and receipt of motor gasoline in the USSR).
The situation with aviation gasoline is as follows: 570 thousand tons of gasoline were supplied from the USA, and 533.5 thousand tons from Britain and Canada. In addition, 1,483 thousand tons of light gasoline fractions were supplied from the USA, Britain and Canada. From light gasoline fractions, gasoline is produced as a result of reforming, the yield of which is approximately 80%. Thus, from 1,483 thousand tons of fractions, 1,186 thousand tons of gasoline can be obtained. That is, the total supply of gasoline under Lend-Lease can be estimated at 2,230 thousand tons. During the war, the USSR produced about 4,750 thousand tons of aviation gasoline. This number probably includes gasoline produced from fractions supplied by the Allies. That is, the USSR's production of gasoline from its own resources can be estimated at approximately 3,350 thousand tons. Consequently, the share of Lend-Lease aviation fuel in the total amount of gasoline supplied and produced in the USSR is 40%.
Under Lend-Lease, the Soviet Union received 328 thousand tons of aluminum. If we believe B. Sokolov (“The Role of Lend-Lease in the Soviet War Efforts”), who estimated Soviet aluminum production during the war at 263 thousand tons, then the share of Lend-Lease aluminum in the total amount of aluminum produced and received by the USSR will be 55%. 387 thousand tons of copper were supplied to the USSR - 45% of the total production and supply of this metal to the USSR. Under Lend-Lease, the Union received 3,606 thousand tons of tires - 30% of the total number of tires produced and supplied to the USSR. 610 thousand tons of sugar were supplied - 29.5%. Cotton: 108 million tons – 6%. During the war, 38.1 thousand metal-cutting machines were supplied from the USA to the USSR, and 6.5 thousand machines and 104 presses were supplied from Great Britain. During the war, the USSR produced 141 thousand machine tools and forging presses. Thus, the share of foreign machines in the domestic economy was 24%. The USSR also received 956.7 thousand miles of field telephone cable, 2.1 thousand miles of sea cable and 1.1 thousand miles of submarine cable. In addition, 35,800 radio stations, 5,899 receivers and 348 locators, 15.5 million pairs of army boots, 5 million tons of food, etc. were supplied to the USSR under Lend-Lease.
According to the data summarized in diagram No. 2, it is clear that even for the main types of supplies, the share of Lend-Lease products in the total volume of production and supplies to the USSR does not exceed 28%. In general, the share of Lend-Lease products in the total volume of materials, equipment, food, machinery, raw materials, etc. produced and supplied to the USSR. Typically estimated at 4%. In my opinion, this figure, in general, reflects the real state of affairs. Thus, we can say with a certain degree of confidence that Lend-Lease did not have any decisive impact on the USSR’s ability to wage war. Yes, under Lend-Lease such types of equipment and materials were supplied that made up the majority of the total production of such in the USSR. But would the lack of supply of these materials become critical? In my opinion, no. The USSR could well have redistributed its production efforts so as to provide itself with everything it needed, including aluminum, copper, and locomotives. Could the USSR do without Lend-Lease at all? Yes, I could. But the question is, what would it cost him? Without Lend-Lease, the USSR could have taken two ways to solve the problem of the shortage of those goods that were supplied under Lend-Lease. The first way is to simply turn a blind eye to this deficiency. As a result, the army would experience a shortage of cars, aircraft and a number of other types of equipment and equipment. Thus, the army would certainly be weakened. The second option is to increase our own production of products supplied under Lend-Lease by attracting excess labor to the production process. This force, accordingly, could only be taken at the front, and thereby again weaken the army. Thus, when choosing any of these paths, the Red Army found itself a loser. The result is a prolongation of the war and unnecessary casualties on our part. In other words, Lend-Lease, although it did not have a decisive influence on the outcome of the war on the Eastern Front, nevertheless saved hundreds of thousands of lives of Soviet citizens. And for this alone Russia should be grateful to its allies.
Speaking about the role of Lend-Lease in the victory of the USSR, we should not forget about two more points. Firstly, the vast majority of equipment, equipment and materials were supplied to the USSR in 1943-1945. That is, after the turning point during the war. For example, in 1941, goods worth approximately $100 million were supplied under Lend-Lease, which amounted to less than 1% of the total supply. In 1942, this percentage was 27.6. Thus, more than 70% of deliveries under Lend-Lease occurred in 1943-1945, and during the most terrible period of the war for the USSR, allied assistance was not very noticeable. As an example, in diagram No. 3 you can see how the number of aircraft supplied from the USA changed in 1941-1945. An even more telling example is cars: as of April 30, 1944, only 215 thousand of them were delivered. That is, more than half of the Lend-Lease vehicles were delivered to the USSR in the last year of the war. Secondly, not all of the equipment supplied under Lend-Lease was used by the army and navy. For example, out of 202 torpedo boats delivered to the USSR, 118 never had to take part in the hostilities of the Great Patriotic War, since they were put into operation after its end. All 26 frigates received by the USSR also entered service only in the summer of 1945. A similar situation was observed with other types of equipment.
And finally, to conclude this part of the article, a small stone in the garden of Lend-Lease critics. Many of these critics do not focus on the insufficient supplies of the allies, reinforcing this by the fact that, they say, the United States, given its level of production, could supply more. Indeed, the USA and Britain produced 22 million small arms, but delivered only 150,000 thousand (0.68%). Of the tanks produced, the Allies supplied the USSR with 14%. The situation with cars was even worse: in total, about 5 million cars were produced in the USA during the war years, and about 450 thousand were delivered to the USSR - less than 10%. And so on. However, this approach is certainly wrong. The fact is that supplies to the USSR were limited not by the production capabilities of the allies, but by the tonnage of available transport ships. And it was with him that the British and Americans had serious problems. The Allies simply did not physically have the number of transport ships necessary to transport more cargo to the USSR.
Delivery routes
Lend-Lease cargo reached the USSR via five routes: through Arctic convoys to Murmansk, along the Black Sea, through Iran, through the Far East and through the Soviet Arctic. The most famous of these routes, of course, is Murmansk. The heroism of the sailors of the Arctic convoys is glorified in many books and films. It is probably for this reason that many of our fellow citizens had the false impression that the main deliveries under Lend-Lease went to the USSR precisely by Arctic convoys. Such an opinion is pure delusion. In diagram No. 4 you can see the ratio of cargo transportation volumes along various routes in long tons. As we see, not only did most of the Lend-Lease cargo not pass through the Russian North, but this route was not even the main one, giving way to the Far East and Iran. One of the main reasons for this state of affairs was the danger of the northern route due to the activity of the Germans. In diagram No. 5 you can see how effectively the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine operated in Arctic convoys.
The use of the trans-Iranian route became possible after Soviet and British troops (from the north and south, respectively) entered the territory of Iran, and already on September 8, a peace agreement was signed between the USSR, England and Iran, according to which British and Soviet troops were stationed on the territory of Persia troops. From that moment on, Iran began to be used for supplies to the USSR. Lend-Lease cargo went to the ports of the northern tip of the Persian Gulf: Basra, Khorramshahr, Abadan and Bandar Shahpur. Aircraft and automobile assembly plants were established in these ports. From these ports to the USSR, cargo traveled in two ways: by land through the Caucasus and by water through the Caspian Sea. However, the Trans-Iranian route, like the Arctic convoys, had its drawbacks: firstly, it was too long (the convoy route from New York to the coast of Iran around the South African Cape of Good Hope took approximately 75 days, and then the passage of cargo took time across Iran and the Caucasus or the Caspian Sea). Secondly, navigation in the Caspian Sea was hampered by German aviation, which sank and damaged 32 ships with cargo in October and November alone, and the Caucasus was not the calmest place: in 1941-1943 alone, 963 bandit groups with a total number of 17,513 were liquidated in the North Caucasus Human. In 1945, instead of the Iranian route, the Black Sea route began to be used for supplies.
However, the safest and most convenient route was the Pacific route from Alaska to the Far East (46% of total supplies) or through the Arctic Ocean to Arctic ports (3%). Basically, Lend-Lease cargo was delivered to the USSR from the USA, of course, by sea. However, most of the aviation moved from Alaska to the USSR under its own power (the same AlSib). However, this path also had its difficulties, this time associated with Japan. In 1941 - 1944, the Japanese detained 178 Soviet ships, some of them - the transports "Kamenets-Podolsky", "Ingul" and "Nogin" - for 2 months or more. 8 ships - the transports "Krechet", "Svirstroy", "Maikop", "Perekop", "Angarstroy", "Pavlin Vinogradov", "Lazo", "Simferopol" - were sunk by the Japanese. The transports “Ashgabat”, “Kolkhoznik”, “Kyiv” were sunk by unidentified submarines, and about 10 more ships were lost under unclear circumstances.
Lend-Lease payment
This is perhaps the main topic of speculation among people trying to somehow denigrate the Lend-Lease program. Most of them consider it their indispensable duty to declare that the USSR allegedly paid for all cargo supplied under Lend-Lease. Of course, this is nothing more than a delusion (or a deliberate lie). Neither the USSR nor any other countries that received assistance under the Lend-Lease program, in accordance with the Lend-Lease law, paid, so to speak, a single cent for this assistance during the war. Moreover, as was already written at the beginning of the article, they were not obliged to pay after the war for those materials, equipment, weapons and ammunition that were used up during the war. It was necessary to pay only for what remained intact after the war and could be used by the recipient countries. Thus, there were no Lend-Lease payments during the war. Another thing is that the USSR actually sent various goods to the USA (including 320 thousand tons of chrome ore, 32 thousand tons of manganese ore, as well as gold, platinum, wood). This was done as part of the reverse Lend-Lease program. In addition, the same program included free repairs of American ships in Russian ports and other services. Unfortunately, I was unable to find the total amount of goods and services provided to the Allies under reverse Lend-Lease. The only source I found claims that this same amount was 2.2 million dollars. However, I personally am not sure of the authenticity of this data. However, they may well be considered as a lower limit. The upper limit in this case will be an amount of several hundred million dollars. Be that as it may, the share of reverse Lend-Lease in the total Lend-Lease trade turnover between the USSR and the allies will not exceed 3-4%. For comparison, the amount of reverse Lend-Lease from the UK to the USA is equal to 6.8 billion dollars, which is 18.3% of the total exchange of goods and services between these countries.So, no payment for Lend-Lease occurred during the war. The Americans provided the bill to the recipient countries only after the war.
The USSR's debt was determined in 1947 in the amount of 2.6 billion dollars, but already in 1948 this amount was reduced to 1.3 billion. However, the USSR refused to pay. The refusal also followed new concessions from the United States: in 1951, the amount of the debt was again revised and this time amounted to 800 million. An agreement on the procedure for repaying the debt to pay for Lend-Lease between the USSR and the USA was signed only on October 18, 1972 (debt amount was again reduced, this time to $722 million; the repayment period was 2001), and the USSR agreed to this agreement only on the condition that it was provided with a loan from the Export-Import Bank. In 1973, the USSR made two payments totaling $48 million, but then stopped payments due to the implementation of the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the 1972 Soviet-American trade agreement in 1974. In June 1990, during negotiations between the presidents of the USA and the USSR, the parties returned to discussing debt. A new deadline for the final repayment of the debt was set - 2030, and the amount - 674 million dollars. Currently, Russia owes the United States $100 million for supplies under Lend-Lease.
Other types of supplies
Lend-Lease was the only significant type of allied supplies to the USSR. However, not the only one in principle. Before the adoption of the Lend-Lease program, the United States and Britain supplied the USSR with equipment and materials in cash. However, the size of these deliveries was quite small. For example, from July to October 1941, the United States supplied the USSR with cargo worth only $29 million. In addition, Britain provided for the supply of goods to the USSR on account of long-term loans. Moreover, these deliveries continued even after the adoption of the Lend-Lease program.
We should not forget about the many charitable foundations created to raise funds for the benefit of the USSR around the world. The USSR and private individuals also provided assistance. Moreover, such help came even from Africa and the Middle East. For example, the “Russian Patriotic Group” was created in Beirut, and the Russian Medical Aid Society was created in the Congo. The Iranian merchant Rahimyan Ghulam Hussein sent 3 tons of dried grapes to Stalingrad. And merchants Yusuf Gafuriki and Mamed Zhdalidi transferred 285 heads of cattle to the USSR.
Literature
1. Ivanyan E. A. History of the USA. M.: Bustard, 2006.
2. /Brief History of the USA / Under. ed. I. A. Alyabyev, E. V. Vysotskaya, T. R. Dzhum, S. M. Zaitsev, N. P. Zotnikov, V. N. Tsvetkov. Minsk: Harvest, 2003.
3. Shirokorad A. B. Far Eastern Final. M.: AST: Transizdatkniga, 2005.
4. Schofield B. Arctic convoys. Northern naval battles in World War II. M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2003.
5. Temirov Yu. T., Donets A. S. War. M.: Eksmo, 2005.
6. Stettinius E. Lend-Lease - a weapon of victory (http://militera.lib.ru/memo/usa/stettinius/index.html).
7. Morozov A. Anti-Hitler coalition during the Second World War. The role of Lend-Lease in the victory over the common enemy (http://militera.lib.ru/pub/morozov/index.html).
8. Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century. Losses of the armed forces / Under the general. ed. G. F. Krivosheeva. (http://www.rus-sky.org/history/library/w/)
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14. What we know and what we don’t know about the Great Patriotic War (http://mrk-kprf-spb.narod.ru/skorohod.htm#11)
LEND-LEASE(English lend-lease, from lend - to lend and lease - to rent), a system for the United States of America to loan or lease military equipment and other material assets to allied countries during the Second World War.
The Lend-Lease Act was adopted in the USA in March 1941 and the American government immediately extended its effect to Great Britain. In October 1941, in Moscow, representatives of the USSR, USA and Great Britain signed a protocol on mutual supplies. The USSR expressed its readiness to pay for supplies to its allies using funds from its gold reserves. In November 1941, the United States extended the Lend-Lease law to the USSR.
In total, during the Second World War, US supplies under Lend-Lease to the allies amounted to approx. 50 billion dollars, of which the share of Sov. The Union accounted for 22%. At the end of 1945, deliveries to the USSR under Lend-Lease amounted to 11.1 billion dollars. Of these, the USSR accounted for (in million dollars): aircraft - 1189, tanks and self-propelled guns - 618, cars - 1151, ships - 689, artillery - 302, ammunition - 482, machine tools and vehicles - 1577, metals - 879, food – 1726, etc.
Return deliveries from the USSR to the USA amounted to $2.2 million. Sov. The Union supplied the United States with 300 thousand tons of chrome ore, 32 thousand tons of manganese ore, a significant amount of platinum, gold, and timber.
In addition to Amer. Lend-Lease assistance to the USSR was also provided by Great Britain and (since 1943) Canada; the volume of this assistance is estimated at $1.7 billion, respectively. and 200 million dollars.
The first allied convoy with cargo arrived in Arkhangelsk on August 31, 1941. (cm. Allied convoys in the USSR 1941–45). Initially, USSR assistance was provided in a relatively small volume and lagged behind planned supplies. At the same time, it partially compensated for the sharp decline in owls. military production in connection with the seizure by the Nazis of a significant part of the territory of the USSR.
From summer to October 1942, deliveries along the northern route were suspended due to the defeat of the PQ-17 caravan by the Nazis and the Allies’ preparations for landing in North Africa. The main flow of supplies occurred in 1943–44, when a radical turning point in the war had already been reached. Nevertheless, the Allied supplies provided not only material assistance, but also political and moral support for the Owls.
people in the war with Nazi Germany.
According to American official data, at the end of September 1945, 14,795 aircraft, 7,056 tanks, 8,218 anti-aircraft guns, 131 thousand machine guns, 140 submarine hunters, 46 minesweepers, 202 torpedo boats, 30 thousand radio stations, etc. were sent from the USA to the USSR. More than 7 thousand aircraft were received from Great Britain, St. 4 thousand tanks, 385 anti-aircraft guns, 12 minesweepers, etc.; 1188 tanks were delivered from Canada.
In addition to weapons, the USSR received from the United States under Lend-Lease cars (more than 480 thousand trucks and cars), tractors, motorcycles, ships, locomotives, wagons, food and other goods. Aviation squadron, regiment, division, which were successively commanded by A.I. Pokryshkin, from 1943 until the end of the war, flew American P-39 Airacobra fighters. American Studebaker trucks were used as a chassis for rocket artillery combat vehicles (Katyusha).
Unfortunately, some of the Allied supplies did not reach the USSR, because they were destroyed by the Nazi Navy and the Luftwaffe during transport sea crossings.
To assemble and prepare aircraft for flight from Iran to the USSR, intermediate air bases were used, where British, American and Soviet aircraft operated. specialists. Along the Pacific route, ships from the USA to the Far Eastern ports of the USSR sailed under the owl. flags and owls captains (since the US was at war with Japan). Cargoes arrived in Vladivostok, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, Nikolaevsk-on-Amur, Komsomolsk-on-Amur, Nakhodka, Khabarovsk. The Pacific route was the most efficient by volume at 47.1%.
Another route was the air route from Alaska to Eastern Siberia, along which the American and Sov. pilots delivered 7.9 thousand aircraft to the USSR. The length of the air route reached 14 thousand km.
Since 1945, the route through the Black Sea has also been used.
In total from June 1941 to September. 1945 17.5 million tons of various cargoes were sent to the USSR, 16.6 million tons were delivered to their destination (the rest were losses due to the sinking of ships). After the surrender of Germany, the United States stopped deliveries under Lend-Lease to the European part of the USSR, but continued them for some time in the Soviet Union. Far East in connection with the war against Japan.
A government program under which the United States of America supplied its allies in World War II with military supplies, equipment, food and strategic raw materials, including petroleum products.
For the USSR (from the English lend - to lend, lease - to rent out). The Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941 authorized the President of the United States, when deemed necessary, to lend or lease defense articles "to the Government of any country the defense of which the President recognizes as vital to the security of the United States." On the same day, the law was extended to the UK, which became the main recipient of American aid, and to Greece. The United States made the decision to extend the Lend-Lease law to the USSR on November 7, 1941. But on October 30, F. Roosevelt, in a message to J.V. Stalin, announced his order to begin supplies to the USSR on the basis of the law of March 11, 1941 and provide for their payment is a loan of $1 billion. The volume and types of weapons, raw materials and food for the period from October 1, 1941 to June 30, 1942 were determined by the First Protocol, signed on October 1, 1941 by representatives of the USSR, USA and Great Britain at the Moscow Conference on the issue of mutual military supplies. Subsequently, three more protocols were developed. During the period of the First Protocol, assistance to the USSR was provided in a relatively small volume and lagged behind the planned norms. Lend-Lease did not provide serious material assistance to the Battle of Moscow and the defenders of the capital, although some types of supplies (copper, aluminum, etc.) were compensated in the end. 1941 a rare decline in domestic industrial production. The main thing is that Lend-Lease had great moral and psychological significance for the Soviet people at the front and in the rear. The shipment of goods to the USSR under the First Protocol was provided mainly by Great Britain and was carried out mainly through Iceland, the Norwegian, Barents and White Seas. The weapons were delivered to Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Molotovsk (Severodvinsk). The North Atlantic route was the most dangerous. In the harsh conditions of the Arctic, with constant enemy attacks at sea and from the air, escorting caravans with cargo was associated with great casualties. Under the Second Protocol (July 1, 1942-June 30, 1943), supplies from Great Britain and the United States were distributed approximately equally; Their obligations were also not fully fulfilled. But even in 1942, the urgent needs of the USSR for trucks, fighters and transport aircraft were met to a large extent from Western sources of supply. The PQ-17 convoy heading to the USSR suffered heavy losses from enemy bombing and submarines in July 1942 (see Arctic convoys). During one of the most difficult periods of the war for the USSR, cargo shipments were suspended. Incomplete fulfillment of the conditions of the Second and subsequent supply protocols was also caused by a number of other circumstances: the priority requirements of the Anglo-American Mediterranean strategy over the requests of the Soviet Union, delays in deliveries due to the fault of some government structures of the Western powers, and their distrust of the USSR. President Roosevelt repeatedly intervened in the procedure for providing assistance to the Soviet Union when, for one reason or another, the fulfillment of obligations was slowed down or disrupted. Presidential Advisor G. Hopkins, who headed the Soviet Protocol Committee, acted energetically in the same spirit. Due to large losses on the northern route, other, less dangerous, but longer supply routes to the USSR were developed: the Pacific (to Vladivostok, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and other cities) and trans-African (America - West Indies - Africa - Iraq - Iran - Baku). Since the summer of 1942, the main flow of cargo for the USSR was sent to the Far East and Iran. It was supplied through the Pacific Ocean to the USSR in 1943-1945. in increasing quantities of weapons and food. To receive the American Liberty ships and other large-capacity dry cargo ships, the port in Vladivostok was reconstructed and new ports were built. Approx. arrived in Vladivostok, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, Khabarovsk and other cities. 2 thousand cargoes. Tanks, planes, cars, aviation gasoline and other important materials were sent to the USSR along the trans-African route. For their delivery, a through route was organized by rail and highway from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea. Western specialists reconstructed Iraqi and Iranian ports, and together with their Soviet allies, the Americans developed and exploited supply routes through Iran. The air base in Abadan, created for the reception, assembly of aircraft and their delivery by air to the USSR, became important. Beginning with the Third Protocol (July 1, 1943–June 30, 1944), supplies were provided primarily by the United States; the main part of deliveries occurred in the 2nd half. 1943 and 1944. According to the Fourth Protocol, it was planned to provide assistance in the period from July 1, 1944 to June 30, 1945. But on May 12, 1945, the Americans suspended supplies without warning. After the protest declared by the Soviet side, they resumed, but in limited quantities, and were intended only for the purpose of preparing the USSR for an attack against Japan. The last batch of cargo arrived in the USSR on September 20, 1945. According to official American data, from the Western Hemisphere along all routes to the USSR since June 1941. By September 20, 1945, 17.6 million long tons of cargo were shipped (1 long ton = 1.016 metric tons). Of these, 47.1% went to the Soviet Far East, 23.8% through the Persian Gulf, 22.7% to northern Russia, 3.9% to the Black Sea region and 2.5% to the Soviet Arctic. The victory over Germany was achieved by the Soviet armed forces mainly with the help of weapons and ammunition produced at domestic enterprises. Supplies to the Soviet Union under Lend-Lease, according to initial government estimates, amounted to 4% of the total production of the USSR. Recently it has been clarified that in relation to the production of military aircraft (bombers and fighters), this figure has reached 16-23%. Lend-Lease was not, of course, an act of charity. The United States pursued its own interests, primarily strategic (support for the Soviet-German front as the main front of World War 2). In the spring of 1945, influential pressure groups in the United States increased demands for a reduction in aid to the Soviet Union and other countries. An amendment to the lend-lease law was passed through Congress, according to which aid funds could not be used for the purposes of reconstruction and economic recovery of recipient countries. At the same time, it would be wrong to underestimate the importance of weapons, raw materials and food received from the USA, Great Britain and Canada (Canada became involved in direct assistance to the USSR from the Third Protocol). On all routes in 1941-1945. The USSR received from these three countries 18,300 aircraft of various types, 11,900 tanks, 13,000 anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, 427,000 vehicles, as well as a significant amount of industrial equipment, raw materials and food. The volume of cargo provided by the United States amounted to 4.8 million long tons in 1943, 6.2 million in 1944, and 3.7 million tons in 1945 (through September 20). Of the 14,126 American aircraft (including 76% of Aircobra fighters), more than half were transported along the Fairbanks (Alaska) - Krasnoyarsk route, which operated for almost 3 years, including during the war between the USSR and Japan. Significant assistance was also provided by locomotives, tractors, sea vessels and road transport (jeeps and Studebakers) received from overseas. Supplies under Lend-Lease contributed to the creation of the material foundations for the victory of the USSR and other states, the development of a new mechanism of economic and international cooperation, which previously had no analogues in world practice.
Historical sources:
Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with US Presidents and British Prime Ministers during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Ed. 2nd. T 2. M., 1976.
The author is Mark Semyonovich Solonin (b. May 29, 1958, Kuibyshev) - Russian publicist, author of books and articles in the genre of historical revisionism dedicated to the Great Patriotic War, primarily its initial period. By education, he is an aviation design engineer.
Guns, oil, gold
The article was published (with minor, purely technical abbreviations) on September 28, 2010 in the weekly Military-Industrial Courier. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to all participants in the discussion of the note “Beyond Limits,” whose interesting and informative messages largely determined the content and themes of this article
On September 29, 1941, a conference of representatives of the USSR, USA and Great Britain began in Moscow, during which fundamental decisions were made on large-scale supplies of weapons and military equipment to the Soviet Union. On October 1, the first (there will be four in total) protocol on supplies worth $1 billion over 9 months was signed. Thus began the history of American Lend-Lease for the USSR. Deliveries of various materials for military and civilian purposes continued until September 1945. In total, 17.3 million tons of property with a total value of 9.48 billion dollars were delivered to the Soviet Union (mainly from the USA). Taking into account the work and services performed, the total cost of Lend-Lease in the USSR amounted to 11 billion dollars. Dollars of the early 40s, when for one thousand “green” you could buy a weighty ingot of 850 grams of gold.
FOUR PERCENT
Is this a lot - 17 million tons of goods with a total value of 7 thousand tons of pure gold? What is the real contribution of Lend-Lease supplies to equipping the Red Army and to the work of the national economy of the USSR? The best Soviet economists deeply and comprehensively studied this question and gave an exhaustive, short and accurate answer to it. The answer was published in 1947 in the book “The Military Economy of the USSR during the Second World War,” published under the signature of a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, deputy head of the government of the USSR (i.e., Stalin’s deputy), permanent (since 1938). ) Head of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, Doctor of Economic Sciences, Academician N.A. Voznesensky. Four percent. Only four percent of the volume of Soviet industry's own production came from these pitiful American handouts. There would be something to argue about - the amount of economic assistance from the allies turned out to be within the error limits of economic statistics.
Two years later, in October 1949, N.A. Voznesensky was arrested. Investigation according to the so-called The “Leningrad affair” lasted for almost a year. The best security officers, highly experienced Soviet investigators, revealed the insidious plans of seasoned enemies of the people. The Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, having comprehensively studied the materials of the case, having become familiar with the irrefutable evidence of the guilt of the conspirators, sentenced N.A. Voznesensky, A.A. Kuznetsov, P.S. Popkov, M.I. Rodionov and others to death. On April 30, 1954, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR rehabilitated Voznesensky, Kuznetsov, Popkov, Rodionov and others. It turned out that the “Leningrad case” was fabricated from beginning to end, the “evidence” of guilt was grossly falsified, a lawless reprisal took place under the guise of a “trial,” the charges were dictated by the political assignment of the warring clans surrounded by Stalin. The execution sentence was considered a mistake. Unfortunately, no one bothered to officially recognize as a “mistake” the crazy four percent that appeared in Voznesensky’s book in accordance with the instructions of the political leadership of the USSR, which at that time was preoccupied with fanning the flames of the Cold War.
There was no economic calculation behind these notorious “four percent” initially, and how could it be possible to express the ratio of the volumes of a huge range of goods in one single number? Of course, money and prices were invented precisely for this purpose, but in the conditions of the Soviet economy, prices were set prescriptively, without any connection with a completely absent market, and were calculated in non-convertible rubles. Finally, war and war economics have their own laws - is it possible to estimate the cost of flour delivered to besieged Leningrad by simply multiplying the weight in tons by pre-war prices? At what cost should hundreds of thousands of human lives saved be measured? How much do a barrel of water and an iron bucket cost in a fire? The Soviet Union received about 3 thousand km of fire hose under Lend-Lease. How much does it cost in war? Even in cases where Lend-Lease deliveries amounted to tiny fractions of a percent of the mass-dimensional volumes of Soviet production, their real significance in war conditions could be enormous. "Small spool but precious". 903 thousand detonators, 150 thousand insulators, 15 thousand binoculars and 6199 sets of semi-automatic anti-aircraft sights - is this a lot or a little?
The Americans supplied the USSR with 9.1 thousand tons of molybdenum concentrate for the “pathetic” amount of 10 million dollars (one thousandth of the total cost of Lend-Lease goods). On the scale of Soviet metallurgy, where the count was in the millions of tons, 9.1 thousand tons is an insignificant detail, but without this “trifle” it is impossible to smelt high-strength structural steel. And in the endless lists of Lend-Lease supplies there is not only molybdenum concentrate - there are also 34.5 thousand tons of zinc metal, 7.3 thousand tons of ferro-silicon, 3.3 thousand tons of ferro-chrome, 460 tons of ferro-vanadium , 370 tons of cobalt metal. And also nickel, tungsten, zirconium, cadmium, beryllium, 12 tons of precious cesium... 9570 tons of graphite electrodes and 673 tons (i.e. thousands of kilometers!) of nichrome wire, without which the production of electric heating devices and furnaces will stop. And another 48.5 thousand tons of electrodes for galvanic baths. Statistical data on the production of non-ferrous metals in the USSR remained strictly classified for half a century. This circumstance does not allow us to give a correct assessment of the value of those hundreds of thousands of tons of aluminum and copper that were supplied under Lend-Lease. However, even the most “patriotic” authors agree that Lend-Lease covered up to half the needs of Soviet industry - and this does not take into account the colossal amount of American electrical wires and cables supplied ready-made.
There are endless rows of figures for the supply of a wide variety of chemicals. Some of them were not supplied in “spool” volumes: 1.2 thousand tons of ethyl alcohol, 1.5 thousand tons of acetone, 16.5 thousand tons of phenol, 25 thousand tons of methyl alcohol, 1 million liters of hydraulic mixture. .. It is especially worth paying attention to 12 thousand tons of ethylene glycol - with this amount of antifreeze it was possible to fill about 250 thousand powerful aircraft engines. But, of course, the main component of the Lend-Lease “chemistry” was explosives: 46 thousand tons of dynamite, 140 thousand tons of smokeless gunpowder, 146 thousand tons of TNT. According to the most conservative estimates, Lend-Lease supplies covered one third of the Red Army's needs (and this estimate does not yet take into account the share of imported components used for the production of explosives in Soviet factories). In addition, 603 million rifle-caliber cartridges, 522 million large-caliber cartridges, 3 million shells for 20-mm air cannons, 18 million shells for 37-mm and 40-mm anti-aircraft guns were received from America in “ready form”.
Anti-aircraft guns, by the way, were also supplied from the USA - about 8 thousand small-caliber anti-aircraft guns (a significant part of which were installed on the chassis of a light armored personnel carrier), which amounted to 35% of the total MZA resource received by the Red Army during the war years. The share of imports of automobile tires and chemical raw materials (natural and synthetic rubber) for their production is estimated within the same limits (at least one third of the total resource).
CRUCIAL CONTRIBUTION
It is not at all difficult to find positions for which Lend-Lease supplies turned out to be larger than Soviet own production. And these are not only all-terrain passenger cars (the famous Jeeps, 50 thousand delivered), all-wheel drive trucks (the equally famous Studebakers, 104 thousand delivered), motorcycles (35 thousand), armored personnel carriers (7.2 thousand), amphibious vehicles (3.5 thousand). No matter how great the role of American automotive technology was (in total, more than 375 thousand trucks alone were delivered) - incredibly reliable in comparison with domestic "GAZ" and "ZIS" - the supply of railway rolling stock was much more important.
The technology of war in the mid-20th century was based on the use of enormous quantities of ammunition. The theory and practice of the “artillery offensive” (which remains a source of legitimate pride for Soviet military science) involved the expenditure of many thousands of tons of ammunition per day. In that era, such volumes could only be transported by rail, and the steam locomotive became a weapon no less important (albeit unfairly forgotten by the public and journalists) than a tank. Under Lend-Lease, the USSR received 1911 steam locomotives and 70 diesel locomotives, 11.2 thousand carriages of various types, 94 thousand tons of wheels, axles and wheel pairs.
American supplies were so huge that they made it possible to practically curtail our own production of rolling stock - in four years (1942-1945) only 92 steam locomotives and a little more than 1 thousand cars were produced; the released production capacity was loaded with the production of military equipment (in particular, the Ural Carriage Works in Nizhny Tagil became one of the main producers of the T-34 tank). To complete the picture, it remains only to recall the 620 thousand tons of railway rails supplied under Lend-Lease.
It is difficult to overestimate the role of Lend-Lease in the re-equipment (quantitative and qualitative) of the Soviet Armed Forces with radio communications. 2,379 complete on-board radio stations, 6,900 radio transmitters, 1 thousand radio compasses, 12.4 thousand headphones and laryngophones - and this is only for aviation. 15.8 thousand tank radio stations. More than 29 thousand various radio stations for the ground forces, including 2092 high-power (400 W) radio stations SCR-399 installed on the Studebaker chassis, with the help of which communications were provided at the corps-army-front link, and another 400 of the same radio stations, but without a car. To ensure radio communications at the tactical level (regiment-division), 11.5 thousand SCR-284 portable radio stations and 12.6 thousand V-100 Pilot walkie-talkies were supplied (the latter were already supplied with inscriptions and scales in Russian at the manufacturing plant).
Simple, reliable and noise-proof wired communications were not forgotten - 619 thousand telephone sets, 200 thousand headphones, 619 telegraph stations, 569 teletypes and an absolutely astronomical amount of telephone wire (1.9 million km) were supplied to the USSR. As well as 4.6 million dry batteries, 314 diesel generators, 21 thousand battery charging stations, tens of thousands of various control and measuring instruments, including 1340 oscilloscopes. And another 10 million radio tubes, 170 ground and 370 airborne (!!!) radars. American radio stations served regularly in the national economy of the USSR, in the river and navy until the 60s, and the Soviet radio industry was provided with samples for study, development and unlicensed copying for at least 10 years in advance.
Such lists can be listed for a long time, but still, in first place in importance, I would put the provision of aviation gasoline to the Soviet Air Force (however, even in terms of tonnage, this category was in first place).
On the eve of the war, the situation with the provision of aviation fuel moved from the stage of a “gasoline crisis” to a “gasoline catastrophe.” New aircraft engines, increased in compression and supercharging, required gasoline with a higher octane number than the B-70, which was produced in significant quantities. The planned (and actually not achieved in 1941) production volume of high-octane gasoline B-74 and B-78* (450 thousand tons) was only 12% of the mobilization request of the NPO (for B-78 it was 7.5%). The country, which at that time had the largest oil production in the entire Old World, kept its aviation on a strict starvation ration. The outbreak of war did not improve the situation at all - a large amount of gasoline was lost in blown-up warehouses in the western military districts, and after German troops reached the foothills of the Caucasus in the summer of 1942, the evacuation of Baku oil refineries further aggravated the crisis.
* Contrary to a widespread misconception, the numbers in the designation of the brand of aviation gasoline are not equal to its octane number. B-74 gasoline had an octane number, determined by the “motor method,” of 91, B-78 gasoline had an octane number of 93. For comparison, it is worth noting that the best Russian motor gasoline, AI-98, has an octane number of 89.
Soviet aviation, nevertheless, flew and fought. In total, during the war, 3 million tons of high-octane aviation gasoline were consumed (for all needs and by all departments) (2.998 thousand tons - to be precise) Where did it come from? 720 thousand tons are direct import supplies. Another 1,117 thousand tons of aviation gasoline were obtained by mixing imported high-octane (with an octane number from 95 to 100) components with Soviet-made low-octane gasoline. The remaining 1.161 thousand tons of aviation gasoline (slightly more than one third of the total resource) were produced by Baku factories. True, they produced this gasoline using Lend-Lease tetraethyl lead, which was obtained in the amount of 6.3 thousand tons. It would not be much of an exaggeration to say that without the help of the allies, the red star planes would have had to remain on the ground throughout the war.
LEND-LEASE IN THE HUMAN DIMENSION
People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry Shakhurin talks about such an episode of the war in his memoirs. At one of the three main aircraft engine plants, the implementation of the plan was systematically disrupted. Arriving at the plant, Shakhurin found out that production was limited to the work of two highly qualified turners, who could be entrusted with boring engine crankshafts; These workers could barely stand on their feet from hunger. A high-ranking Moscow boss successfully solved the problem, and from a certain “special base of the regional executive committee” an enhanced special ration was allocated for two people. Lend-Lease solved the same problem, but on a different scale.
238 million kg of frozen beef and pork, 218 million kg of canned meat (including 75 million kg designated as “tushenka”), 33 million kg of sausages and bacon, 1.089 million kg of chicken meat, 110 million kg of eggs powder, 359 million kg of vegetable oil and margarine, 99 million kg of butter, 36 million kg of cheese, 72 million kg of milk powder... It is no coincidence that I cited the volumes of Lend-Lease food supplies in precisely such strange units of measurement ( "millions of kilograms") It’s easier to divide by the number of possible consumers. For example, during the entire war, 22 million wounded were admitted to hospitals. This means that it was theoretically possible to consume 4.5 kg of butter, 1.6 kg of cheese, 3.3 kg of dry milk, 60 kg of meat to feed each of them (of course, this list does not include stewed meat - this is for a sick person not food). I trust our respected veterans to compare these lists with the actual diet of military hospitals...
Adequate and plentiful nutrition is, of course, an important condition for the recovery of the wounded, but first of all, the hospital needs medicines, surgical instruments, syringes, needles and suture thread, chloroform for anesthesia, and various medical devices. With all this we were not bad, but very bad.
On the eve of the war, huge volumes of military medical equipment were concentrated in the border districts (there were more than 40 million individual dressing packages there alone). Most of it remained there. The loss and/or evacuation of most of the pharmaceutical industry led to production volumes falling to 8.5% of pre-war levels by the end of 1941, despite the fact that the situation required a manifold increase in the production of medicines. Hospitals washed used bandages; doctors had to work without such vital drugs as ether and morphine for anesthesia, streptocide, novocaine, glucose, pyramidon and aspirin.
The lives and health of millions of wounded were saved by medical Lend-Lease - another carefully forgotten page in the history of the war. In general, allied supplies provided up to 80% of the needs of the Soviet military medical service. In 1944 alone, 40 million grams of streptocide alone were obtained. American antibiotics and sulfonamides became an invaluable treasure. And at what price can one measure one million kg of vitamins supplied to the USSR? Lend-Lease surgical instruments, X-ray machines, and laboratory microscopes served well for many years during and after the war. And 13.5 million pairs of leather army boots, 2 million sets of underwear, 2.8 million leather belts, 1.5 million wool blankets to supply the Red Army were not superfluous...
"FREEDOM" CARAVANS
The Soviet Union and the United States were not close neighbors. Accordingly, all these millions of tons of goods, including many hundreds of thousands of tons of explosives that fly into the air from the very first fragment of an aerial bomb (and no less flammable and explosive aviation gasoline), still had to be delivered to the ports of the USSR across the vast expanses of the world's oceans. The Soviet navy was able to transport only 19.4% of this gigantic tonnage; the allies supplied everything else themselves.
To solve this problem, unprecedented in scale and complexity, an equally unprecedented means was found - the Americans were able to organize high-speed mass production of ocean-going ships of the Liberty series. The figures characterizing the Liberty construction program cannot but shake the imagination. Huge ocean-going ships with a displacement of 14.5 thousand tons (length 135 m, carrying capacity 9.14 thousand tons) were built in the amount of 2,750 units. The average duration of construction of one vessel was increased to 44 days. And this is on average - in November 1942, the ship of this series, Robert Peary, was launched 4 days, 15 hours and 29 minutes after the moment of laying.
The main feature of the Liberty series ships (it was this that made it possible to achieve phenomenal production rates) was the replacement of riveting with welding. It was believed that the service life of such ships would be very low, but in war conditions it was decided to neglect this. However, "Freedom" turned out to be surprisingly tenacious - the "welded ships" sailed the seas for decades; Thus, the above-mentioned Robert Peary was in operation until 1963, and even at the beginning of the 21st century at least three Liberty were still in service!
The task was by no means exhausted by the ultra-high-speed construction of a huge number of ships. Berlin also understood the military significance of these endless caravans of ships with aviation gasoline, weapons and ammunition, and tried to take their own countermeasures. Guiding ships through the waters of the North Atlantic (about a third of all cargo was delivered along this “Murmansk” route), infested with German submarines, under the gun of German bombers, who received all the airfields of Norway for their base, became, in fact, a naval campaign of strategic scale. And the Allies won this campaign brilliantly - even in the “Murmansk direction” only 7% of the tonnage was lost; caravans heading to the ports of Iran or the Soviet Far East lost no more than 1%.
Everything is relative. How can we compare the naval miracle performed by the Allies? It is possible with the history of the “siege” of Leningrad, when the delivery of several barges with food per day across Lake Ladoga - and this over a distance of 50-80 km, and not 5 thousand nautical miles - turned into an almost insoluble problem. It is possible with the history of the ill-fated “Tallinn passage”, when the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, on a 400 km journey from Tallinn to Leningrad, without encountering a single German submarine at sea, or a single enemy vessel of the destroyer class or higher, lost 57% of the civilian ships being escorted. It is possible (although it is better not to do so) to recall the history of the many-month defense of Sevastopol, when the Black Sea Fleet - again, having practically no enemy worth mentioning at sea - was unable to either ensure uninterrupted supply of the ground forces fighting for the city, nor the evacuation of the last surviving defenders of Sevastopol ( from 15 to 20 thousand people, including at least 5 thousand wounded, were simply abandoned to the mercy of the enemy)
“Completely shameless and cynical...”
And after all this, on September 1, 2010, on the next anniversary of the start of World War II, on the state (which in this case is very important) TV channel “Culture”, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAN) gives a big lecture. , director of the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, comrade A.N. Sakharov, and he says the following words: “It was agreed that the United States and other allied countries would provide great assistance to the Soviet Union under the so-called Lend-Lease system... America demanded payment in gold and not just someday, but already during military operations, during the war itself. In this sense, the Americans knew how to count money and in this sense were completely shameless and cynical. Everything that was demanded was paid for, including in gold..."
Even if this shameless and cynical lie were true, we should thank the Americans for their invaluable help. This is a huge success - during a devastating war, when the fate of the country hung by a thin thread, to find a supplier who, in exchange for stupid soft metal (you can’t make a simple one out of gold and a bayonet), will sell millions of tons of military goods at normal (and not “blockade”) prices property, food, gasoline and medicine. Moreover, he himself will bring three-quarters of this cargo from the other side of the globe.
However, a lie remains a lie - in accordance with the terms of Lend-Lease, not a ruble, not a dollar, not a cent was paid during the war. After the end of hostilities, most of the supplies were simply written off as property spent during the war. At negotiations in 1948-1951 Americans billed $0.8 billion - less than one tenth of the total cost of the goods supplied. The Soviet side agreed to recognize only 0.3 billion. However, recognizing the debt and returning it are two very different things. A long, multi-decade history of disputes and squabbles has ended with the fact that to date no more than one percent of Lend-Lease supplies have been paid (taking into account dollar inflation).
Supply value
Your decision, Mr. President, to provide the Soviet Union with an interest-free loan in the amount of $ 1,000,000,000 to ensure the supply of military equipment and raw materials to the Soviet Union was accepted by the Soviet Government with heartfelt gratitude, as urgent assistance to the Soviet Union in its huge and difficult struggle against a common enemy - bloody Hitlerism.
Original text(English)
Your decision, Mr. President, to grant the Soviet Union an interest-free loan to the value of $1,000,000,000 to meet deliveries of munitions and raw materials to the Soviet Union is accepted by the Soviet Government with heartfelt gratitude as vital aid to the Soviet Union in its tremendous and onerous struggle against our common enemy-bloody Hitlerism.
The first official historical assessment of the role of Lend Lease was given by the Chairman of the State Planning Committee Nikolai Voznesensky in his book “The Military Economy of the USSR during the Patriotic War,” published in 1948:
...if we compare the size of the allies' supplies of industrial goods to the USSR with the size of industrial production at socialist enterprises of the USSR for the same period, it turns out that the share of these supplies in relation to domestic production during the war economy period will be only about 4%.
The 4% figure was published without further comment and raised many questions. In particular, it was unclear how Voznesensky and his collaborators calculated these percentages. It was difficult to estimate Soviet GDP in monetary terms due to the lack of convertibility of the ruble. If the count was based on units of production, then it is not clear how tanks were compared with airplanes, and food with aluminum.
Voznesensky himself was soon arrested in connection with the Leningrad case and executed in 1950, so he could not give any comments. Nevertheless, the figure of 4% was subsequently widely cited in the USSR as reflecting the official point of view on the significance of Lend-Lease.
The role of Lend-Lease was also highly appreciated by A. I. Mikoyan, who during the war was responsible for the work of the seven allied People's Commissariats (trade, procurement, food, fish and meat and dairy industries, maritime transport and river fleet) and, as the People's Commissar of the country's foreign trade, with 1942, in charge of receiving allied supplies under Lend-Lease:
- ... when American stew, shortening, egg powder, flour, and other products began to arrive to us, what significant additional calories our soldiers immediately received! And not only the soldiers: something also fell to the rear.
Or let's take the supply of cars. After all, we received, as far as I remember, taking into account losses along the way, about 400 thousand first-class cars for that time such as Studebaker, Ford, Willys cars and amphibians. Our entire army actually found itself on wheels, and what wheels! As a result, its maneuverability increased and the pace of the offensive increased noticeably.
Yes... - Mikoyan said thoughtfully. - Without Lend-Lease, we would probably have fought for another year and a half.
The Lend-Lease program was mutually beneficial for both the USSR (and other recipient countries) and the USA. In particular, the United States gained the necessary time to mobilize its own military-industrial complex.
| Materials | Made in the USSR | Lend-Lease | Lend-Lease/Production USSR, % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Explosives, thousand tons | 558 | 295,6 | 53 % |
| Copper, thousand tons | 534 | 404 | 76 % |
| Aluminum, thousand tons | 283 | 301 | 106 % |
| Tin, thousand tons | 13 | 29 | 223 % |
| Cobalt, tons | 340 | 470 | 138 % |
| Aviation gasoline, thousand tons | 4700 (according to V.B. Sokolov - 5.5 million tons) | 1087 | 23 % |
| Car tires, million units | 3988 | 3659 | 92 % |
| Wool, thousand tons | 96 | 98 | 102 % |
| Sugar, thousand tons | 995 | 658 | 66 % |
| Canned meat, million cans | 432,5 | 2077 | 480 % |
| Animal fats, thousand tons | 565 | 602 | 107 % |
Lend-Lease debts and their payment
Immediately after the war, the United States sent countries that received Lend-Lease assistance an offer to return surviving military equipment and pay off the debt in order to obtain new loans. Since the Lend-Lease Act provided for the write-off of used military equipment and materials, the Americans insisted on paying only for civilian supplies: railways, power plants, ships, trucks and other equipment that were in the recipient countries as of September 2, 1945. The United States did not demand compensation for military equipment destroyed during the battles.
Great Britain
The volume of Great Britain's debts to the United States amounted to $4.33 billion, to Canada - $1.19 billion. The last payment in the amount of $83.25 million (to the United States) and $22.7 million (Canada) was made on December 29.
China
China's debt to the United States for supplies under Lend-Lease amounted to $187 million. Since 1979, the United States has recognized the People's Republic of China as the only legitimate government of China, and therefore the heir to all previous agreements (including supplies under Lend-Lease). However, in 1989, the United States demanded that Taiwan (not the People's Republic of China) repay the Lend-Lease debt. The further fate of the Chinese debt is unclear.
USSR (Russia)
The volume of American supplies under Lend-Lease amounted to about 11 billion US dollars. According to the Lend-Lease law, only equipment that survived the war was subject to payment; To agree on the final amount, Soviet-American negotiations began immediately after the end of the war. At the 1948 negotiations, Soviet representatives agreed to pay only a small amount and were met with a predictable refusal from the American side. The 1949 negotiations also came to nothing. In 1951, the Americans twice reduced the payment amount, which became equal to $800 million, but the Soviet side agreed to pay only $300 million. According to the Soviet government, the calculation should have been carried out not in accordance with the actual debt, but on the basis of precedent. This precedent should have been the proportions in determining the debt between the United States and Great Britain, which were fixed back in March 1946.
An agreement with the USSR on the procedure for repaying debts under Lend-Lease was concluded only in 1972. Under this agreement, the USSR agreed to pay $722 million, including interest, by 2001. By July 1973, three payments were made for a total of $48 million, after which payments were stopped due to the introduction of discriminatory measures by the American side in trade with the USSR (Jackson-Vanik Amendment). In June 1990, during negotiations between the presidents of the USA and the USSR, the parties returned to discussing debt. A new deadline for final debt repayment was set - 2030, and the amount - $674 million.
Thus, out of the total volume of American deliveries under Lend-Lease of $11 billion, the USSR and then Russia paid $722 million, or about 7%.
It should be noted, however, that taking into account the inflationary depreciation of the dollar, this figure will be significantly (several times) less. Thus, by 1972, when the amount of debt for Lend-Lease in the amount of $722 million was agreed upon with the United States, the dollar had depreciated 2.3 times since 1945. However, in 1972, only $48 million was paid to the USSR, and an agreement to pay the remaining $674 million was reached in June 1990, when the purchasing power of the dollar was already 7.7 times lower than at the end of 1945. Subject to the payment of $674 million in 1990, the total volume of Soviet payments in 1945 prices amounted to about 110 million US dollars, i.e. about 1% of the total cost of Lend-Lease supplies. But most of what was supplied was either destroyed by the war, or, like shells, was spent for the needs of the war, or, at the end of the war, in accordance with the Lend-Lease law, was returned to the United States.
France
On May 28, 1946, France signed a package of agreements with the United States (the so-called Blum-Byrnes accords) that settled the French debt for supplies under Lend-Lease in exchange for a number of trade concessions from France. In particular, France has significantly increased quotas for the screening of foreign (primarily American) films on the French film market.
Notes
- Using the example of the USSR, $11.3 billion worth of materials were received under Lend Lease, of which less than 1% was paid. The remaining 99% was received virtually free of charge - for more details, see the section Lend-Lease debts and their payment
- Mutual Aid Agreement Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: June 11, 1942
- For example, by refusing to supply the USSR with such acutely scarce raw materials as duralumin and tungsten, the United States supplied them to the Third Reich.
- The recalculation was based on official inflation data in the United States for 1913-2008 from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (USA)
- "The Big "L"--American Logistics in World War II", Alan Gropman, 1997, National Defense University Press, Washington, DC
- Leo T. Crowley, "Lend Lease" in Walter Yust, ed. 10 Eventful Years (1947) 2: 858-60; 1:520
- “The USSR has more than once recognized the enormous importance of the equipment and materials necessary for combat operations that came from the United States with the participation of England to the Soviet Union. But in 1942, the agreed plans for these deliveries were only 55 percent fulfilled. During the most difficult time of preparation for the Kursk operation (Washington and London knew about this work), supplies were interrupted for 9 months and resumed only in September 1943. Such a long break is not a technical issue, but a political one!” (O. B. Rakhmanin,). See also .
- Vishnevsky A. G. Sickle and ruble. Conservative modernization in the USSR. Moscow, 1998, ch. 10
- The First Lend-Lease Protocol was signed between the USSR and the USA, in the amount of $1 billion, valid until 06/30/1942.
- The Reichstag speech of December 11, 1941: Hitler’s declaration of war against the United States
- http://publ.lib.ru/ARCHIVES/K/KUMANEV_Georgiy_Aleksandrovich/Govoryat_stalinskie_narkomy.(2005).%5Bdoc%5D.zip
- Paperno A.L. Lend-Lease. Pacific Ocean. M., 1998. P. 10
- Zaostrovtsev G. A. “Northern Convoys: Research, memories, documents”, Arkhangelsk 1991. part 27
- V. Zimonin “Lend-Lease: how it was,” 10/26/2006, newspaper “Red Star”
- Leo T. Crowley, "Lend Lease" in Walter Yust, ed. 10 Eventful Years (1947) 2: 858-60; 1:520
- Correspondence of Roosevelt and Truman with Stalin on Lend Lease and Other Aid to the Soviet Union, 1941-1945
- Voznesensky N. Military economy of the USSR during the Patriotic War. - M.: Gospolitizdat, 1948
- Artem Krechetnikov, Franklin Roosevelt's "Garden Hose", June 29, 2007, BBCRussian.com
- From a report from KGB Chairman V. Semichastny to N. S. Khrushchev; classified “top secret” // Zenkovich N. Ya. Marshals and general secretaries. M., 1997. pp. 161-162
- G. Kumanev “Stalin’s People’s Commissars Speak”, p. 70 - Smolensk: Rusich, 2005
- http://militera.lib.ru/research/sokolov1/04.html
- http://militera.lib.ru/research/sokolov1/04.html
- http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/russia/newsid_6248000/6248720.stm
- http://militera.lib.ru/research/sokolov1/04.html
- Federal Agency for State Reserves, “Reserves during the Great Patriotic War”
- http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/russia/newsid_6248000/6248720.stm
- http://militera.lib.ru/research/sokolov1/04.html
- V. Gakov “The Green Price of Victory”, “Money” Magazine No. 23, 06/2002
