Lesson stage

Teacher activity

Student activities

Formed UUD

The result of interaction (cooperation)

Organizational stage

Greeting the teacher and identifying the absent, checking the readiness for the lesson.

Reply greeting

Readiness and lesson

The readiness of the class for the perception of knowledge, the establishment of a friendly lesson environment

Motivational target stage

Create conditions for

the appearance of an internal student

needs for inclusion in the educational process.

The teacher raises a problematic question: The controversy is still ongoing: why did I.V. Stalin?

Slide 1.

Announces the lesson plan:

1. Lenin's death
2. Communist Party in the 1920s
3. Internal party power struggle.

Asks to write down in a notebook.

Write down the date, lesson plan in a notebook.

Ability to express your thoughts and arguments orally, to the question posed

The desire to know the version of the victory of Stalin I.V. in the struggle for power, and the formation of a personal attitude to these events.

Knowledge update

M.P. Tomsky in March 1922 declared: “We are being reproached abroad for having a regime of one party ... we have many parties. But unlike abroad, we have one party in power, and the rest are in prison. " Why did this fact please the party member? What was going on in the ranks of the party at that time? In the political development of the country? We will discuss these issues in the lesson.

Conversation, express their opinions.

Be able to express your thoughts verbally, listen and hear each other

Define concepts.

The level of preparation of students for the lesson.

Goal-setting (setting a learning task)

Leading students to the formulation of the goal and objectives of the lesson.

In December 1922, the leader of the Bolshevik Party V.I. Lenin fell seriously ill. Until March 1923, he dictated a number of articles: "On cooperation", "On our revolution", "Better less, but better", "How to transform RABKRIN", in which he tried to show his vision of the future socialist society. The attitude towards these works is ambiguous. What did the party leader suggest?

Examine and comment on the diagram.

Study and comment on the diagram.

Ability to conduct dialogue on the basis of equal relations and mutual respect and acceptance;

Goal-setting, including setting new goals, transforming a practical task into a cognitive one;

Defining the goals and objectives of the lesson

Practical activities for the study of new material

1. The death of Lenin ... In January 1924 V.I. Lenin died. His death and illness gave rise to a power struggle in the party leadership. Being seriously ill V.I. Lenin wrote in 1922."Letter to the Congress" , in it he gave an assessment to his closest associates.

Slide 3.

2. Communist Party in the 1920s.

The international situation in 1922 changed after the defeat of the communist uprising in Germany and the coming to power of the fascists in Italy. It became clear that the USSR was left alone, surrounded by hostile countries. The question arose before the party: is it possible to build socialism in one country and what will it be? Further strategy and the choice of the path of development depends on the situation in the party.

Imagine what the consequences for the country could have had such a phenomenon in the party?

Slide 4.

3. Internal party power struggle... You are convinced that the changes that have taken place in the party presupposed the search for a single leader who could concentrate power in his hands. After Lenin's death, an internal party war begins.

Checking the completion of the task and drawing up a diagram. Slide 5.

Acquaintance with the document, answers to the question: "Who and why could become a leader in the country?", Comprehension of the information received, answers to the question posed, formulation of conclusions.

They work with the text of the paragraph, give a description of the Communist Party. (checking the completed assignment and drawing up a diagram).

Answers to the question.

Work with paragraph materials and writing

Answers the questions:

1. The reasons for the internal party struggle.
2. The course and results of the internal party struggle.

Make up a diagram.

Ability to conduct dialogue on the basis of equal relations and mutual respect and acceptance;

Define concepts;

Establish causal relationships;

Mastering new material, expanding vocabulary,

acquisition of networking skills.

Knowledge inclusion and repetition

Test organization .

Test execution.

Mutual verification.

Willingness to gain new experience;

Planning your work,

Controlling your process of activity,

Determination of the level of assimilation of new material.

Getting the first results of studying the topic.

Reflection, summing up

Why do you think I.V. Stalin?

Rate statement by G. Zinoviev at the XIII Congress of the RCP (b) in 1924

The teacher sums up the results.

Students speak up. Analysis of the work done in the lesson.

Independently assess the correctness of the action and make the necessary adjustments to the performance both at the end of the action and in the course of its implementation.

Summing up the results of the lesson, determining the level of success of the student in the lesson.

Homework

Abstract in a notebook.

Prepare a report on political figures of the 1920s.

Perceive the teacher's homework information.

They ask clarifying questions.

Willingness and ability to fulfill the norms and requirements of school life, the rights and obligations of the student;

The struggle for power in the Bolshevik party (diagrams for the lesson) L.A. Solomatina MBOU Anopinskaya secondary school

The controversy continues to this day: why did I.V. Stalin? Lesson Plan: The Death of Lenin The Communist Party in the 1920s. Internal party power struggle.

The death of V.I. Lenin In his last letters and articles, V.I. Lenin puts his hopes on administrative methods of combating bureaucracy and corruption (improving the work of the workers 'and peasants' inspection, increasing the number of workers in the Central Committee.) Indicates the main directions of the country's development, expressed in the growth of civilization and culture; increasing various forms of cooperation on a voluntary basis. Writes about the danger of a split in the party. Its unity and the preservation of the monopoly on power are the main conditions for the movement towards socialism.

Communist Party in the 1920s Militarized organization Growth of the party apparatus Tightening of party discipline Fight against the manifestation of dissent Privileges for party members become a system The well-being of employees of the apparatus depends on: Position held Willingness to unswervingly fulfill directives of higher bodies Suspicion of persons of noble origin, intelligentsia, clergy, "petty bourgeoisie" personal loyalty to a particular party leader. "Purge" of the party (1921) - 25% of the party was excluded from the party. "Leninsky Call" (1924), 240 thousand people joined the party. Those who hoped to get a good job and make a career also joined the party. Decisions are made by a narrow circle of the political elite. Appointments to positions are approved by the party body

Internal party struggle for power Causes of internal party struggle Struggle between political leaders - The personal rivalry of political leaders for power in the party and in the country. - Differences in views on the path of development of the USSR. - Lack of legal opposition. Phases of the internal party struggle. Stalin, Kamenev, Zinoviev against Trotsky (1923-1925) Stalin, Bukharin and Rykov against Kamenev and Zinoviev (1925-1927). Exclusion of Kamenev and Zinoviev from the party Stalin against Bukharin and Rykov (1927-1930). Removal of Bukharin and Rykov from leading posts. Organization against Kamenev, Zinoviev, Bukharin, Rykov in 1935-1938. public political processes. Convicted and executed. The result of the internal party struggle - I.V. Stalin won a decisive victory.

Loss of L.D. Trotsky's former political weight was due to his underestimation of his opponents. He did not expect that they would prefer low intrigues to open discussion. It got to the point that even like-minded G.E. Zinovieva, L.B. Kamenev and I.V. Stalin N.K. Krupskaya in October 1923 at the plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and the Central Control Commission of the RCP (b) was forced to state that the behavior of the "troika" went beyond the framework of party comradeship.

In the fall of 1924, the "troika" expanded to the "seven": now, along with G.E. Zinoviev, L.B. Kamenev and I.V. Stalin, it included the rest of the Politburo members - A.I. Rykov, Tomsky, Bukharin and the secretary of the Central Committee, chairman of the Central Control Commission V.V. Kuibyshev. This group had a special document regulating its activities, special codes for communication. The "Seven" regularly met in Stalin's office and decided in advance all the questions brought up to the Politburo.

The January 1925 plenum condemned "the totality of Trotsky's actions against the party." Although he was still left in the Politburo, his political career in the USSR was over.

But peace and harmony in the Politburo did not come, since already in the second half

1925 between L.B. Kamenev and G.E. Zinoviev, on the one hand, and I.V. Stalin - on the other hand, the struggle for the place of the sole leader began.

G.E. Zinoviev, L.B. Kamenev and I.V. Stalin were people with long-established views. Like V.I. Lenin, they all believed that it was impossible to build socialism in the USSR outside the world proletarian revolution. In January 1924, one of the prominent Bolsheviks K.B. Radek expressed doubt about the possibility of a world proletarian revolution. For such seditious thoughts he was almost expelled from the party. However, soon K.B. Radek's ally appeared, N.I. Bukharin.

Since, reasoned N.I. Bukharin, a world revolution is not foreseen in the near future, a fundamental change in the internal policy of the party is required: from the actual war with the peasants (by suppressing the growth of their economic opportunities with high taxes and restricting their political rights), it is required to move on to the further development of the NEP.

As dogmatic Marxists, G.E. Zinoviev and L.B. Kamenev could not accept such a change in policy and assessed it as a betrayal of the October cause. Actions I.V. Stalin in the 30s. will show that he fully shared the views of his personal enemies. The essence of N.I. Bukharina I.V. Stalin did not understand and did not accept his position. But then G.E. Zinoviev and L.B. Kamenev stood in his way, therefore I.V. Stalin supported N.I. Bukharin.

G.E.'s objections Zinoviev and L.B. Kamenev were in the spirit of Marxism and relied on Lenin's works. They argued that socialism was impossible in backward Russia, therefore they reduced domestic politics to the need to hold out until the victory of the world revolution. And since the bulk of the country's population was made up of peasants hostile to the cause of socialism, the process of waiting, according to Zinoviev and Kamenev, was reduced to accelerated industrialization at the expense of new taxes on peasants. In practice, this would inevitably turn into a state of undeclared war of the party against the bulk of the people. Ordinary members of the party were already tired of this state, so they supported N.I. Bukharin and I.V. Stalin.

Bring serious arguments against the proposals of N.I. Bukharin, G.E. Zinoviev and L.B. Kamenev could not. Then they attacked I.V. Stalin, who was responsible for the work of the party apparatus. At the 14th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks held in 1925 G.E. Zinoviev and L.B. Kamenev were defeated. They were personally elected to the Central Committee, but immediately after the congress I.V. Stalin removed their supporters from the party leadership.

In 1926 G.E. Zinoviev and L.B. Kamenev united with their former enemy - L.D. Trotsky. Soon they were joined by party members with pre-October experience. They have developed two opposition programs - "Platform 15", "Platform 13". They continued to criticize I.V. Stalin and the unreality of building socialism in one country. However, they were wrong about the main thing: not I.V. Stalin created such a situation in the party, and the logic of the struggle for power of the extremist party required the promotion of people like I.V. Stalin. And the party masses understood this intuitively.

Equally the only correct in that situation were the proposals of N.I. Bukharin on changing attitudes towards the peasantry and the beginning of the construction of socialism alone. This course was not the result of theoretical reasoning, but was dictated by the real domestic and international situation. And he was correct. It was planned to build socialism in a class world, no repressions were supposed then.

At the July 1926 plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, supporters of L.B. Kamenev and G.E. Zinoviev were removed from the Politburo. The leadership of the party went to I.V. Stalin.

From the very beginning, already in life IN AND. Lenin (contrary to the assertions of those communists who later, like NS Khrushchev and MS Gorbachev, tried to shift the responsibility for the “distortion of the idea of ​​socialism” onto I.V. Stalin alone), the contradiction between the relatively liberal NEP in the economy and the strengthening of the totalitarian regime in politics . Indicators this fortification steel:

1. The dissolution of the last remaining opposition parties of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks that took place in 1923 (after the trial of the Socialist-Revolutionaries in 1922, falsified by Lenin's instructions, which laid the foundation series of trumped-up legal killings against political opponents). The result was the final approval of the one-party system in a "pure" form.

2. Adopted in 1921 at the same party congress as the NEP, on the initiative of Lenin, the resolution "On Party Unity", which prohibited intra-party factions and strengthened the centralization of power in the party.

3. When formal the abolition of the Red Terror at the end of the Civil War in 1922, the penetration of the state security bodies (renamed from the Cheka to the GPU) increased into all spheres of society, up to the culture and private life of citizens.

4. Intensification of censorship and persecution of dissent, a striking example of which even during Lenin's life was the "philosophical steamer" in 1922 - the first expulsion abroad of a group of scientists and professors for "seditious" lectures and works.

5. The de facto subordination of the trade unions to it, approved in 1921 at the same X Congress of the Party.

All these measures, which laid the foundation for the totalitarian regime, were carried out on the initiative and under the personal leadership of V.I. Lenin.

At the turn of 1922/23. the recognized leader of the party and founder of the Soviet state V.I. After suffering a stroke, Lenin became disabled and died in January 1924. Since, in essence, all power in the state was concentrated in the hands of the party elite, even on the eve of his death, in the fall of 1923 a struggle for power unfolded in the party, in which certain ideological differences between the leading leaders of the party and the desire of each of them for personal power were intertwined. Briefly, the chronicle of the struggle looked like this:

1923-1924 - left opposition protest Trotskyists under the leadership of L.D. Trotsky; their slogans are the curtailment of the NEP, the world revolution, the bureaucratization of the economy, industrialization at the expense of the peasantry. The Trotskyists were supported by the most radical circles of the party, student youth, and part of the workers. In the struggle against the extremely ambitious Trotsky, who displayed obvious dictatorial habits, other rival leaders of the party (G.E. Zinoviev, LB Kamenev, I.V. Stalin) united and defeated him, relying on the party apparatus.

1925 - the appearance of the "new opposition" G.Ye. Zinoviev (among other things, who headed the Comintern) and L.B. Kamenev under the Trotskyist slogans. The victory was won by I.V. Stalin in alliance with N.I. Bukharin. In 1926, the pragmatist Stalin officially dropped the slogan of world revolution as untenable.

1926-1927 - the belated unification of the defeated and deprived posts in the government of Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev, their final defeat and expulsion from the party. Later, almost all of them hastened to officially "repent", with the exception of Trotsky, who soon left abroad, formed the international Trotskyist 4th International there and was killed in Mexico in 1940 on Stalin's personal assignment.

1928-1929 - speech of the upper right opposition headed by N.I. Bukharin and A.I. Rykov; slogans - the continuation and development of the NEP. The opposition did not have serious support in the party, due to the unpopularity of the NEP among the Bolsheviks. Having been defeated and deprived of high positions, members of the opposition also publicly "repented".

As a result the struggle for power, backed up by humiliating public confessions of opposition leaders, was the approval in 1929 of a one-man dictatorship I.V. Stalin who used tactical miscalculations of his rivals and smashed them one by one.

9.3. Collectivization and industrialization. Building a unified system of the state planned economy (1929-1937).

1929 year, dubbed by the communists themselves "the year of the great turning point", marked a turn towards the liquidation of the NEP and the final destruction of private property, the simultaneous implementation of the forced industrialization of the country (completed in 1937) and the collectivization of agriculture (basically completed by 1933, finally – by 1936).

Prerequisites such a turn were :

1. The ultimate goals of the communists, for whom the NEP was a temporary maneuver and, from this point of view, fulfilled its task as soon as the post-war economic recovery was completed.

2. Low marketability of small-peasant agriculture, since before the revolution the main supplier of marketable grain was landlord latifundia destroyed by the revolution, combined with the low purchase prices of the communist state for bread, as mentioned above . Consequence This was the food crisis of 1928 and the introduction of bread cards in cities that existed until 1935.

3. Lack of foreign investment in the economy and loans ( Consequently refusal of the communists to pay tsarist debts) and, on the other hand, colonial income (as a consequence of their international policy). In these conditions, the robbery of the village became the main real source of the industrial leap. for the purpose of pumping funds into the industry.

Why did the communists need this leap, which required an incredible exertion of the country's forces and massive violence against the peasantry? The answer is as follows:

4. International isolation of the communist regime and hostility towards it on the part of practically all countries of the world, despite the formal restoration of diplomatic and trade relations in the 1920s. Such a situation appeared consequence the entire policy of the communists, and above all the work of the agents of the Comintern in all countries to promote communist ideas. In combination with the collapse of hopes for a world revolution, this factor forced the communists to rush to arm themselves, which was impossible without fast build-up the potential of heavy industry. That's why the interests of the latter were put in first place, to the detriment of the production of consumer goods.

Thus, the vehicle for the industrial leap in this environment was collectivization agriculture, forcefully deployed in the fall of 1929. Peasant farms formally voluntarily, but in fact forcibly merged into collective farms(collective farms) . At the same time, the "kulaks" (to which many "middle peasants" were also counted, that is, those wealthy peasants who did not even use hired labor) were moved with their families to remote regions of Siberia and the Far North. Collectivization was carried out at a rapid pace with the support of the poorest strata of the peasantry, who had nothing to lose; oblasts and districts competed to see who would achieve results faster.

Mass resistance of the middle peasantry and "kulaks" (uprisings, slaughter of livestock, burning of collective farm property and murder of collective farm activists), in which 700 thousand peasants took part, was suppressed by the terror of the GPU. At the time of the greatest aggravation of the situation in the spring of 1930, Stalin ordered to reduce the rate of collectivization for the purpose of political maneuver and temporarily allowed those wishing to leave the collective farms, placing in his article "Dizziness with Success" all the blame for "excesses" on local workers. However, after a short respite, the forced corral into collective farms was resumed.

Formally the land became the property of the collective farms, but in fact the state withdrew all the "surplus" from the collective farms. In essence, it was a repetition of the surplus appropriation system in a more convenient, centralized form for the communists.

The results of collectivization become:

1. Receipt by the state of huge funds from the sale of agricultural products for export to invest them in forced industrialization. Perhaps this result was the only positive.

2. Robbery and destruction of the peasantry as a landlord class, the actual concentration of all agriculture in the hands of the state (vegetable gardens were left to feed the peasants) and the ruthless suppression of resistance (3.5 million dispossessed and exiled).

3. Consequently- mass famine in 1933 in the countryside, especially in Ukraine (up to 2 million dead), and brutal repression for the attempts of starving peasants to steal from collective farm fields (the so-called "law on 5 ears of corn").

4. The actual attachment of peasants to the land, when the flight from poverty from collective farms to cities began, by introducing a passport system in 1934 with prohibition issuing passports to villagers.

5. Consequently of the above - a sharp drop in labor productivity in agriculture, despite on its mechanization with tractors and combines (carried out centrally by the state).

Combined with the general centralization of the economy and the introduction of a planning principle in it through 5-year plans, collectivization made it possible to carry out in 1928-1937. accelerated industrialization country (one of the side sources of funds was the widespread use of the free labor of millions of concentration camp prisoners). It was carried out through the widespread construction of new factories with the introduction of new technologies. The enthusiasm of the workers, who were promised a speedy paradise on earth and one of the manifestations of which was Stakhanov movement"Shock workers" for overfulfillment of plans, combined with a sharp tightening of labor discipline. Every industrial accident was declared "sabotage" and entailed severe repression. This was symbolized by the sacramental phrase of the People's Commissar of Railways L. Kaganovich: "Each accident has its own name, patronymic and surname."

The main results of industrialization become:

1. A powerful industrial leap, the growth of industrial production in less than 10 years by 2.5 times, including in heavy industry - by 5 times, and the transformation of the USSR from agro-industrial countries in industrial-agrarian... From the 5th place in the world, which was occupied by pre-revolutionary Russia in terms of industrial production (after the USA, England, France and Germany), the USSR moved to the 2nd (after the USA).

2. The final destruction of private property in industry (the "Nepman" businessmen were simply crushed by taxes) and its concentration entirely in the hands of the state, with the transition to a super-centralized system of state planning through the State Planning Committee by drawing up 5-year plans ( five-year plans) and with the replacement of local economic management bodies (economic councils) with central state bodies (economic people's commissariats, and later ministries). At the same time, the sphere of directive planning included not only the volume and range of products in all sectors of the economy, but also the prices of goods. With the destruction of free trade, the ruble ceased to be freely convertible, its rate was set by the state.

It should be recognized that industrialization and collectivization were accompanied by major social achievements communists during the same period, the most important of which were:

1) the elimination of unemployment by 1930 due to the transition to a planned system of the national economy;

2) the elimination of mass illiteracy through the introduction of compulsory free education (at first, as before the revolution from 1913 - primary, then - 7-year and later - secondary);

3) free education at all levels;

4) free healthcare at all levels.

The totality of the communists 'measures to eradicate illiteracy, free education, expand the network of universities and schools, and place culture and the humanities under strict ideological control of the party (in particular, cultural figures were united in the Writers' Union, the Composers 'Union, the Artists' Union, etc. discipline modeled on the party) was named "Cultural revolution".

Exercise 1

Analyze the materials in the paragraph and the documents below and write down the answer to the question.

From a speech at the XI Congress of the RCP (b) by a member of the Politburo MP Tomsky. March 1922

We are reproached abroad that we have a one-party regime. This is not true. We have many parties. But unlike abroad, we have one party in power, and the rest are in prison.

From the speech of V.I. Lenin at the X Congress of the RCP (b). 1921 g.

Our party is a government party, and the resolution passed by the party congress will be binding on the entire Republic.

The Politburo does not object to further negotiations on the sale of Sakhalin Island, and considers the amount of a billion (dollars) to be minimal.

What features of the political system formed during the NEP years do the presented documents testify?

One-party system. At the same time, the party regulated all spheres of society and the activities of the state.

Assignment 2

Analyze the text of the paragraph and write down the answers to the questions.

1. An illustration of what party decision can serve as the following quatrain of D. Bedny?

An evil seed is sown by an evil discussion.

There is nowhere else to spread such debauchery.

Will - the party that way to break and pump!

It's time to end this ugliness!

Adoption of the resolution "On the unity of the party", according to which it was forbidden to create factions or groups within the RCP (b) that had views different from the party.

2. What were the consequences of this decision?

The persecution of members of other parties and the purge of the ranks of the RCP (b).

Assignment 3

Assignment 4

Use the text in the tutorial to select the correct answers.

1. When the trial of the SRs took place:

a) in December 1921;

b) in June - August 1922;

c) in June 1923?

2. What verdict was passed to 12 defendants at the SR trial:

a) the postponement of the death penalty and its dependence on the behavior of party members who remained at large;

b) immediate execution;

c) expulsion abroad?

Assignment 5

Using the text of the paragraph, choose the correct answers.

1. What was the main political contradiction of NEP:

a) lack of support for NEP among the members of the CPSU (b);

b) the lack of mass support for NEP among the peasants;

c) lack of political pluralism?

2. Speaking in 1927 at the plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), L. D. Trotsky quoted the words of V. I. Lenin about one of the Bolshevik leaders: "This chef will cook only spicy dishes." Who was it about:

and they. Bukharin; b) about I.V. Stalin; c) about F.E. Dzerzhinsky?

a) move I.V. Stalin from the post of General Secretary;

b) to appoint L.D. Trotsky;

c) withdraw I.V. Stalin and L.D. Trotsky from the Politburo?

Assignment 6

Give the correct answer.

Why did any opposition to the emerging Stalinist regime endure in the 1920s? defeat (several answers are possible):

a) the opposition did not have broad social support;

b) the struggle was waged only in the upper echelons of power, and its meaning was incomprehensible to ordinary party members;

c) I.V. Stalin enjoyed considerable popularity in the country;

d) I.V. Was Stalin a more sophisticated tactician than his rivals?

Assignment 7

"11 s. o -a s: o t \ t \ s s -OSUDARSTVENNY.rEP & and FYAr of the Russian Federation -SUBARAL. ".:.

- [Page 3] -

Public organizations. Church. Mass public organizations, above all trade unions, were not ignored by the authorities. At the beginning of 1921, in the ranks of the RCP (b), the discussion about trade unions was rejected two extreme positions: L.D. ... The point of view of V. I. Lenin was adopted, who regarded the trade unions as a “school of communism), in other words, as independent organizations working under the leadership of the Communist Party. In practice, by the end of 1919. almost nothing was left of the "self-activity" of the trade unions, and they turned into a kind of government department for workers' affairs. Institutions of supplying, industrial and other cooperation were rapidly moving towards the de facto nationalization of institutions.

From October 1917 onwards, the new government also sought to subordinate the Russian Orthodox Church, which is authoritative in the people, (as well as other religious confessions) and consistently moved towards this goal. At the same time, the policy of not only the "whip" was widely used (in particular, the confiscation in 1 9 2 2 under the pretext of fighting hunger of the values ​​of the Russian Orthodox Church and the subsequent terror against its ministers), but also “carrot a” - in the form of material and moral support for the so-called “renovationism” and similar schismatic movements that undermine intra-church unity.

Under powerful pressure from the authorities, Orthodox hierarchs were forced to give up their positions step by step. Having languished under house arrest since 1992, Patriarch Tikhon published an appeal to the episcopate, clergy and laity in July 1923, where he called on the flock "to show examples of obedience to the existing civil authority, in accordance with the commandments of God." After Tycho's death in 1 9 2 5, the Bolsheviks did not allow the election of a new patriarch.

In July 1 9 2 7, the locum tenens of the patriarchal throne, Metropolitan Sergius, signed a special ecclesiastical "Declaration," where he demanded that the clergy who did not accept the new way of life immediately withdraw from church affairs. As expected more wikis, these forced decisions of the Orthodox hierarchs caused a new wave of turmoil among believers, which increasingly weakened the position of the church as an independent social and spiritual force.

Internal party struggle. In 1 9 20s. important changes are also taking place within the ruling party itself. The size of the Russian Communist Party, renamed in 1925 into the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (Bolsheviks), rapidly increased from 732 thousand people in 1921 to 1.3 million in 1927 ...

In the party itself, as it grew, the split between the rank and file members and the upper ranks deepened. The leading levers of control of the Communist Party (and, consequently, the state) were still held by the so-called Bolshevik Guard, about 8 thousand party members with pre-revolutionary experience.

The Bolshevik Guard included many professional revolutionaries. They had rich experience in political struggle, the ability to independently analyze events. Naturally, at sharp turns of the revolution in this environment, proposals for resolving problems that arose that did not coincide with the central line were often formulated, and factional groups arose. With the weakness of the democratic mechanism for making decisions and taking into account the rights of the minority, only the presence of a generally recognized leader softened the internal party contradictions, allowed the old guard to maintain the unity of its own ranks and pursue a consistent political course.

After the death of V.I.Lenin (January 1924), the party center, the Politburo, split, and the struggle for personal leadership, which began in the Bolshevik elite in the fall of 1923, flared up in full force.

The first stage of the battle for power over the party and country falls on 1 9 2 3 - 1 9 24, when against the leading group of the Central Committee (I.V. Stalin - from April 1 9 2 2, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) , G.E. Zinoviev, L. B. Kamenev, N. I. Bukharin) spoke together with his associates L. D. Trotsky. The second stage is a discussion of 1 9 2 5 with the "new opposition", already headed by Zinoviev and Kamenev. The third - with the "united opposition", which gathered in 1 9 2 6 - 1 9 2 7 years. in their ranks Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev and others.

The oppositionists did not agree with JV Stalin's thesis about "the possibility of building socialism in one country." They continued to assert: the socialist system in backward peasant Russia can be established only after the victory of the proletarian revolution in the industrial West. Opposition forces sharply criticized the economic policy of the Central Committee, demanding to curtail market principles in the economy.

They also came out amicably against the "clamping down on democracy", which divided the Communist Party, as they put it, into "two floors - the upper one, where they decide, and the lower one, where they learn about the decision." Opponents of the secretary general urged ordinary party members to take control of the party apparatus that had ascended to unattainable heights - right up to the Central Committee and the Politburo, demanded the restoration of freedom of factions, etc.

The outcome of the internal party drama, which played out both on the stage of the Kremlin Palace and in the provincial clubs where rural communists gathered to discuss issues, ultimately depended then on the position of the most influential and authoritative group in the party - the Bolshevik Guard.

Having settled on the "top floor" of the CPSU (b), the Bolshevik Guard did not at all want to sacrifice rights and benefits in favor of ordinary communists. Therefore, she looked with obvious displeasure at the opposition slogan of a broad internal party democracy, capable of shaking the established distribution of roles (regardless of how sincerely JV Stalin's opponents were here). The opposition's leftist attacks on the NEP, which concealed the danger of a new aggravation of relations with the peasantry, caused no less wariness among the Whist Guards.

Finally, Stalin's thesis about "building socialism in one country" looked much more advantageous than the opposition. Firstly, he took into account the psychology of both the top and the party masses, who were equally tired of passively waiting for the arrival of the world revolution and full of excitement to implement their main program directive as soon as possible. Secondly, it was optimally adapted to play the role of a nationwide unifying idea, a political base for effective propaganda and propaganda work to mobilize the labor efforts of the people.

Taking into account the above, it is not difficult to understand why at each new round of the struggle against successive oppositions I. V. Stalin and his associates (N. I. Bukharin, K. E. Voroshilov, L. M. Kaganovich, S. M. Kirov, VM Molotov and others) invariably received the support of the overwhelming part of the old Bolshevik guard. It was this circumstance that predetermined the small number and weakness of the opposition groups themselves, the failure of their attempts to lead the party masses. At the end of 1 9 2 7, L. D. Trotsky, G. E. Zinoviev, L. V. Kamenev, and other leaders of the opposition, together with their convinced supporters, were expelled from the ranks of the CPSU (b).

So, JV Stalin achieved his immediate goal, having managed to remove from the political arena the main rivals in the struggle for Lenin's legacy. But the internal party battles of the NEP years brought another unexpected result for many of their participants. By the end of 1 9 20s. the positions of solidarity as a whole with the "general line" of the Central Committee of the old Bolshevik guard were also seriously undermined: its representatives were gradually and in increasing numbers replaced in leading party and state posts by the nomination of the general secretary.

In this way, the second (after the election to the post of General Sec) was made on the road to the establishment of the regime of personal power of I.V. Stalin in the party and country.

A new stage of the "cultural revolution". In the cultural arena, more wikis have kept the old intelligentsia in the spotlight.

- & nbsp– & nbsp–

nym, etc.). The essence of the ideological and political The cover of the publication of the platform "change of milestones a) reflected two mo" Change of milestones).

cop: not a struggle, but cooperation with the Soviet 1921

power in the economic and cultural revival of Ross and and; deep and sincere confidence that the Bolshevik system will “under the pressure of the elements of life) get rid of extremism in the economy and politics, evolving towards the bourgeois democratic order.

The authorities, seeking to involve the old intelligentsia in active labor activity, in the first postwar years supported such sentiments. Specialists in various fields of knowledge were provided with more bearable conditions of life and work in comparison with the bulk of the population. This was especially true of those who, in one way or another, were associated with strengthening the scientific, economic and defense potential of the state.

Among them were N.E. Zhukovsky, the founder of modern aircraft construction, V.I. Vernadsky, the founder of geochemistry and biochemistry, chemists N.D. Zelinsky and N.S. A. N. Bach and other prominent scientists. Under the leadership of academician I.M. Academician AE Fersman headed geological surveys in the Urals, the Far East, and the Kola Peninsula. Research in genetics (N.I. Vavilov), physics (P.L. Kapitsa, A.F. Ioffe, L.I. A. Zander) and others.

At the same time, the possibilities of the intelligentsia to participate in political life and to influence the mass public consciousness were limited in every possible way. In 1 9 2 1, the autonomy of higher educational institutions was abolished. They were placed under the watchful eye of party and state bodies. Professors and lecturers who did not share communist beliefs were fired. In 1 9 2 2, a special censorship committee was created - Glavlit, which was obliged to exercise preventive and repressive control over "hostile attacks" in the press against Marxism and the politics of the ruling party, for the propaganda of religious ideas, etc.

Soon the Chief Repertoire Committee was added to it - to control the repertoire of theaters. In August 1992, about 160 opposition-minded prominent scientists and cultural figures were expelled from the country (N.A. Berdyaev, S.N. Bulgakov, N.O. Lossky, S.N. Prokopovich, P. A. Sorokin, S. L. Frank and others). The following year, there was a massive purge of libraries from "anti-Soviet and anti-fiction books", which included many outstanding works of Russian and foreign writers, philosophers, historians, economists. By the middle of 1 9 20-ies. the activity of almost all private publishing houses that arose during the transition to the NEP ceased, independent scientific and literary-artistic journals were closed.

Having barely consolidated its position in power, the Bolshevik Party embarked on the formation of its own, socialist intelligentsia, loyal to the regime and loyally serving it. “We need the cadres of the intelligentsia to be ideologically trained,” NI Bukharin declared in those years. “And we will churn out intellectuals, develop it, like in a factory.” New institutes and universities were opened in the country (in 1 9 2 7 there were already 1 4 8, much more than in pre-revolutionary times). Back in the years of the Civil War, the first workers 'faculties (workers' faculties) were created at higher educational institutions, which, according to the figurative expression of the People's Commissar of Education A. V. Lunacharsky, became "a fire escape to higher educational institutions for workers." By 1 9 2 5, the graduates of workers 'faculties, where workers and peasants' youth were sent on party and Komsomol vouchers, accounted for half of the students admitted to universities.

The school system has undergone a radical reform.

The new, Soviet school in accordance with the special Regulations on it (October 1 9 18) was created as a single, public, teaching in the native language. It included two stages (1st stage - five years , 2nd - four years) and ensured the continuity of education, starting with preschool institutions and ending with universities. School curricula were revised and focused on the education of students in a purely "class approach" to assessing the past and the present. In particular, the systematic course of history was replaced by social science, where historical facts were used as an illustration of Marxist sociological schemes, proving the inevitability of the socialist reorganization of the world. By the middle of 1 9 2 0's. the number of students has exceeded the pre-war level. But still many children, especially in rural areas, remained outside the school threshold. And in my school itself, no more than 10% of those who entered the first grade graduated from the second grade.

Since 1919, when the decree on the elimination of illiteracy was adopted, an offensive against this age-old evil begins. In 1 9 2 3 the voluntary society “Down with illiteracy! ". His activists opened thousands of points, circles, reading rooms, where adults and children studied. By the end of the 1920s. about 50% of the population could read and write (against 30% in 1917).

The literary and artistic life of Soviet Russia in the first post-revolutionary years was distinguished by its many colors, an abundance of various creative groups and trends. In Moscow alone, there were over 30 of them. Writers and poets of the Silver Age of Russian literature continued to publish their works (A. A. Akhmatova, A. Bely, V. Ya. Bryusov, and others). The thunderstorm that swept over Russia gave a new impetus to the work of V.V. Mayakovsky and S.A.Esenin. They staged performances by the classics of theatrical direction KS Stanislavsky and VI Nemirovich-Danchenko. Art exhibitions were organized by followers of the World of Art, Jack of Diamonds, Blue Rose and other pre-revolutionary associations of artists (P. P. Konchalovsky, A. V. Lentulov, R. R. Falk, etc.). Representatives of the futurism left-modernist currents of ma, imagism, suprematism, cubism, and the flame of revolution were very active.

constructivism - in poetry, painting, theater Sculptor re, architecture (V.E. Meyerhold, K. S. Mel, V. I. Mukhina.

1 92 2 - 1 923 g

Nikov, V.E. Tatlin, and others).

But in this area, too, the ruling party gradually established "revolutionary order", using both state structures and literary and artistic associations of a communist orientation: Proletkult (the ideologists of this organization, formed in 1917, dreamed of creating a kind of "proletarian culture ", Which has nothing to do with the past achievements of Russian and world culture), the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers (RAPP), the Left Front of the Arts (LEF), etc.

They zealously tried to introduce the "class struggle) into artistic creativity, poisoned in the press both" internal emigrants) M. A. Bulgakov, E. I. Zamyatin, and other non-party writers and cultural figures who avoided glorifying the "heroic of revolutionary accomplishments ). The so-called fellow travelers - writers who sympathized with the Bolshevik plans to reorganize Russia, but who, in the opinion of their strict judges, “deviated from the proletarian ideology), were under fire of criticism. Among the fellow travelers were M.M. Zoshchenko, V.A.Kaverin, K.A.Fedin, E.G. Bagritsky, A. Vesyoly, M.M. others. The unbridled criticism of many talented cultural workers awakened the Central Committee of the RCP (b) to somewhat moderate the revolutionary fervor of its fighters on the art front. In a decree on literature adopted in 1925, they were slightly reprimanded for “communist arrogance). True, it was immediately emphasized that the main concern of the party remains “the formation of the ideological unity of all creative forces on the basis of proletarian ideology).

Despite the growing ideological pressure, 1 9 20-ies. have rightfully gone down in history as the time of the creation of outstanding works in various fields of culture. Their creators were both masters recognized before the revolution, and young people who had talented themselves in literature, painting, theater, cinema, and architecture.

Among the latter are MA Sholokhov with his first part of the epic The Quiet Don "(1 9 28) and SM Eisenstein, whose film Battleship Potemkin) (1 9 2 5) triumphantly bypassed the screens of the world.

- & nbsp– & nbsp–

1. How relations between the state and the church developed in the 1920s. ?

Why did the atheist Bolsheviks support Renovationism? 2. Explain why leadership in the Communist Party meant power over the state. 3.

Start filling in the table "Struggle for power in the RCP (b) VKP (b)": horizontal columns - a) political opponents; b) specific disagreements; c) the results of the struggle; columns on the vertical year s:

1) 1 9 2 3 - 1 9 24; 2) 1 9 2 5; 3) 1 9 2 6 - 1 9 2 7; 4) 1 9 2 8 - 1 9 2 9. 4. What was the manifestation of ideological pressure on workers of literature and art in the 1920s? ? * Express your opinion: why, in spite of this, 1920s.

were the time of the creation of outstanding works in different fields of culture? 5. How did the relationship between the authorities and various groups of the intelligentsia evolve in the 1920s? ? 6 *. Drawing on knowledge from literature courses and MHC, tell us about a work of literature or art that was popular in 191920s. Express your opinion about this work and.

7 *. Using additional sources and materials on the Internet, prepare a message on the topic “The fate of the Russian emigration”.

- & nbsp– & nbsp–

The principles of the national policy of the Bolsheviks. In a country where 57% of the population were non-Russian nations and nationalities, the national policy of the Bolshevik Party was of great importance.

Outlining its contours in the pre-October period, the leaders

The RSDLP (b) proceeded from two Marxist postulates:

On the fundamental impossibility of solving the national question under capitalism. Only the revolutionary transformation of bourgeois society into a socialist one could ensure the overcoming of class antagonisms, and then national contradictions - right up to the merger of nations;

On the subordination of the policy of Marxists in the field of interethnic relations to the key task - the struggle of the proletariat for state power.

This view of the relationship between national and political factors has formulated an outwardly contradictory, but with a "class"

the point of view is the logically harmonious position of the Bolsheviks on the national-state question. On the one hand, at the Second Congress of the RSDLP (1,903), they willingly adopted the Marxist thesis about the right of nations to self-determination, later strengthening its explosive nature in relation to the foundations of imperial power with another right - to secession and the formation of independent states.

On the other hand, the future proletarian state was seen by V.I. political conditions for building socialism and the merging of nations into one supranational community. In other words, the Russian revolutionary Marxists were then talking about a single unitary state, subdivided only into administrative-territorial units (uyezds, provinces, etc.).

However, in this, too, the Bolsheviks were far from dogmatic stiffness. In 1913, they, without abandoning the idea of ​​a unitary state, allowed the possibility of carrying out “broad regional autonomy” within its framework in order to ensure “equality of all nations and languages”. Shortly before October 1917, "in the situation of a rapid rise in the national consciousness of the peoples inhabiting the country, Lenin formulated the principle of a" union of free republics ", that is, their federation. Therefore, Lenin continued to view the federation only as a form of transition to a "completely unified state" dictated by the conditions of multinational Russia.

The federal principle, like the right of peoples to freely decide the question of joining the Soviet federation, was legally enshrined in the Constitution of the RSFSR.

Think about the questions: how, in the following years, did the whist leadership more realize the aspiration of different nations and peoples to create their own statehood? What are the far-reaching consequences of this?

National politics in action. On December 31, 1 9 1 7, the Soviet government recognized the state independence of Finland.

In August 1 9 18, V.I. The Bolsheviks could not ignore the firm will of the Finnish and Polish peoples to restore their statehood.

As for the rest of the nations and nationalities of Russia, in the interpretation of their "right to self-determination up to secession," the principle of political expediency, clearly outlined by the Bolsheviks in the pre-October period, prevailed. And he imperiously demanded to keep the former Russian Empire as strong and united as possible. Moreover, two more were added to the traditional Marxist arguments in favor of this: fragmented and decentralized Russia was certainly incapable of playing the role of the "engine" of the world revolution assigned to it by the new rulers, and after the revolutionary wave in Europe clearly subsided - to survive in the "capitalist encirclement".

The Bolshevik Party consistently moved towards its goal, relying, first, on strictly centralized party-communist, and then on military structures created in the territories of the former empire; secondly, on their historically established economic connection. From the very beginning, in the process of restoring a unified state, two complementary directions emerged.

In 1 9 1 8 - 1 922 peoples, mainly small and compactly living surrounded by the Great Russian lands, received autonomy of two levels within the RSFSR: republican (Bashkir ASSR, Tatar ASSR, Dagestan ASSR, etc.) and regional (Buryat-Mongolian AO, Votsk AO, Kalmyk AO , Mariyskaya AO, Chuvash AO, etc.).

On the economically and culturally developed outskirts of the collapsed empire, local communists, led by the Central Committee of the RCP (b), formed sovereign Soviet republics that were formally outside Moscow's control: the Ukrainian SSR (December 1 9 17), the Byelorussian SSR (January 1 9 1 9), the Azerbaijan SSR (April 1 9 20), the Armenian SSR (November 1 9 20), the Georgian SSR (February 1 9 2 1).

The last three entered the Transcaucasian Federation in March 1 9 2 2.

It is appropriate to recall that the Soviet power, which was established in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, did not stay there.

From the moment the republics emerged, they practically immediately found themselves within the framework of a general political union due to the uniformity of the Soviet state system and the concentration of power in the hands of a single Bolshevik party (the republican communist parties were initially part of the RCP (b) as provincial organizations).

In June 1919, the military-economic union of the Soviet republics was formed (the unification of their armed forces, economic councils, railroad transport, labor and finance commissariats), and in February 1929, in connection with the preparation of an international conference in Ge nue is their diplomatic alliance.

Formation of the USSR. In September 1992, a commission of the Central Committee of the RCP (Bolsheviks), with the participation of J.V. Stalin, prepared the so-called plan of autonomy: the entry of the Soviet republics into the RSFSR under the rights of autonomies. Justifying it, Stalin, not without reason, pointed to the ostentatious, formal nature of the independence of the national republics, proclaimed at a time when, in the fire of the Civil War, "it was necessary to demonstrate Moscow's liberalism in the national question." Now, he believed, the need for this political camouflage was no longer needed.

The idea of ​​autonomization was supported by the leaders of the communist parties of Azerbaijan and Armenia. The leaders of Belarus and Ukraine took a wait and see attitude. Only the members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia unequivocally rejected the autonomization plan, stating: "We consider it necessary to combine economic efforts and common policy, but with the preservation of all the attributes of independence."

This thesis was warmly supported by V.I.Lenin, who regarded the idea of ​​autonomization as politically and erroneous, in no way suitable for peacetime. It would inevitably aggravate Moscow's relations with the population of the outlying lands and local political elites. Therefore, the party leader proposed a different legal basis for the formation of a unified state with the retention of the necessary "attributes of independence": to proclaim it as a voluntary union of sovereign and equal republics.

The Central Committee of the RCP (b) spoke in favor of this proposal.

On December 30, 1 9 2 2, the congress of plenipotentiaries of the RSFSR, Ukraine, Belarus and the Transcaucasian Federation (I Congress of Soviets of the USSR) adopted the Declaration and Treaty on the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, elected the Central Executive Committee (CEC). The following year, a union government was formed - the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. It was headed by V. I. Lenin, and after his death - A. I. Rykov.

In January 1 9 24 11 All-Union Congress of Soviets approved the Constitution of the USSR. The supreme body of power, she announced the All-Union Congress of Soviets, and between the congresses - the Central Executive Committee, which consisted of two equal chambers: the Union Council and the Council of Nationalities (the first was elected by the congress from representatives of the union republics in proportion to their population, the second consisted of five representatives from each union and autonomous republics and one each from the autonomous regions). The highest executive body was proclaimed the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. He was in charge of foreign affairs, the country's defense, foreign trade, communications, finances, etc. The Union republics were in charge of internal affairs, agriculture, education, justice, social security and health care. The old system of elections to the Soviets was retained.

A crack in the foundation of the union state. According to the Constitution, the USSR was a federation of equal sovereign republics that had the right to freely secede from the Union. But in a situation where the key article of the Constitution on the sovereignty of the Soviets was a fiction and in fact, state power was concentrated in the structures of the Communist Party and, tightly controlled from a single center (Moscow), the USSR actually acquired the character of a unitary state. Despite the fact that the republics had their own constitutions, bodies of state power and administration (congresses of Soviets, councils of people's commissars, people's commissariats, etc.), in fact, their rights did not go beyond the framework of cultural and national autonomy - the subjects of the Soviet federation enjoyed a certain freedom of self-government. only in the field of culture, schools, language and everyday life. As a result, a huge communist empire emerged on the political map of the world, the core of which was the RSFSR.

Do not think, however, that the Bolshevik theoreticians and practitioners themselves did not see the contradiction between the officially proclaimed form of the union (federation) and its essentially unitary content.

The ruling party went for such a peculiar national-state structure, sincerely believing that:

Real unitarianism, as already noted, will provide optimal conditions for the socialist reorganization of the country, during which the rapprochement of nations will take place with their subsequent merging into a new historical community of people and thus eliminating the very ground for interethnic conflicts;

The federalist shell, creating the appearance of state self-determination of the peoples of the USSR, is capable of restraining nationalist passions in this transitional period, especially since the overwhelming majority of nations and nationalities living compactly in a certain territory gradually acquired the attributes of their statehood at different levels. In 1924, new union republics were created (with the abolition of the Khorezm and Bukhara People's Soviet Republics) - the Uzbek SSR and the Turkmen SSR, in 1929 - the Tajik SSR, in 1936 - the Kazakh SSR and the Kirghiz SSR , and Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia after the dissolution in 1936.

The Transcaucasian Federation was directly incorporated into the USSR. In parallel, new autonomous formations were established in the Soviet republics themselves.

But, as has happened more than once with the Bolshevik strategists, their theoretical predictions diverged from reality.

The purposefully pursued policy of rapprochement of nations has borne fruit in leveling the level of socio-economic and cultural development of the Soviet republics by pumping material resources from the RSFSR. The internationalization of various aspects of the life of Soviet society was also observed, up to an increase in the number of mixed marriages.

And yet, the nations as a whole stubbornly did not want to “merge”, to lose their independence, the traditions and customs that came from the ancestors. On the contrary, the economic and cultural upsurge of the republics was accompanied by a further growth in the national consciousness of the indigenous peoples who inhabited them, the desire for the real establishment of their own national statehood and sovereignty. And this could not but enter into an ever-increasing contradiction with formal federalism.

As a result, the crack in the foundation of the USSR, which arose during its creation, not only did not heal over the years, but expanded.

Explain the meaning of concepts and expressions: ostulat, rights of nations to self-determination, unitary state, cultural - national autonomy.

1. Using the information in the paragraph, fill out the table "National-state policy of the Bolsheviks: principles and reality."

* Explain what contradictions are manifested in the implementation of the party's course to create a unified state. 2. Trace the development of the unifying process in 1919-1922. What factors contributed to the creation of the USSR? 3. Draw a diagram or create a computer presentation "The highest bodies of state power and administration of the USSR according to the Constitution of 1924". 4*. Write an essay on one of the topics: "The importance of the formation of the USSR for the ruling party", "The importance of the formation of the USSR for Soviet citizens)," The importance of the formation of the USSR for the world historical process). When completing the assignment, use information from courses in social studies and general history. 5*. Lead a discussion on the topic “SS SR: federal or unitary state?). Formulate your conclusion using information from courses in social studies and law. 6 *. Find the text of the Constitution of the USSR in 1924 in the library or on the Internet. Analyze the articles of the Constitution on the status of the union republics.

Share the findings with your classmates.

- & nbsp– & nbsp–

The goals of the USSR in the field of interstate relations. The contradictory economic and political interests of the Western powers hindered the formation of a new anti-Soviet coalition.

Nevertheless, a wary, partly hostile attitude towards Red Russia continued to persist. It was nourished both by the socialist transformations taking place in Russia and by the ambivalence of its foreign policy.

On the one hand, Moscow was interested in establishing mutually beneficial foreign policy and business cooperation with the capitalist countries (the principle of peaceful coexistence); on the other, it openly proclaimed its adherence to the principle of proletarian internationalism and, in accordance with it, supported the communist movement through the structures of the Comintern, secretly provided great assistance (in gold, currency, weapons, etc.) to the forces seeking to destabilize the political situation and for seizing power in their countries.

Under such conditions, relations between the USSR and foreign states developed unevenly. And yet, the main vector of this development was the gradual strengthening of the positions of the Soviet Union in the world arena. There were two main reasons for this. First, the objective needs of the world economy. It was negatively affected by the prolonged exclusion from the system of international economic relations of Russia, which possessed inexhaustible natural resources and a capacious internal market. Second, the weakening (with the loss of hopes for a world revolution) the class ideological component of the USSR's foreign policy, which over the years gave way to the pragmatic component, the orientation toward peaceful coexistence with capitalist states.

I am the official diplomat. With the signing of peace treaties with Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland in 1 9 2 0 - early 1 9 2 1, the Soviet state emerged from international isolation. Even earlier, in 1919, relations with Afghanistan were normalized, and in 1921 - with other southern neighbors - Turkey and Iran, a treaty of friendship was signed with Mongolia.

The major powers refrained from establishing diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia, demanding, in accordance with the norms of international law, the payment of pre-revolutionary debts and compensation for losses from the nationalization of foreign property.

In the spring of 1 9 2 2, an international conference with the participation of Russia was convened in Genoa to discuss these issues. The parties failed to reach an agreement there, but during the conference in the vicinity of Genoa Rapallo, a Soviet-German treaty was signed to renounce mutual claims and establish diplomatic relations.

In 1924 the period of diplomatic recognition of the USSR began.

In the middle of 1 9 20-ies. he maintained official relations with more than 20 countries of the world, including England, France, Italy, Japan, and China. An agreement with the latter made possible the joint operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER), and under an agreement with Tokyo, the USSR transferred the northern part of Sakhalin, which had been under Japanese occupation since the time of the intervention. Of the great powers, only the United States delayed the recognition of the USSR until 1 9 3 3.

Determining its diplomatic strategy, the Soviet leadership proceeded in 191920s. from the fact that the main threat to the security of the USSR is represented by the countries of the former Entente, primarily England, France and the United States. Therefore, Moscow closely followed the foreign policy actions of the Western capitals, and in those cases when it saw an anti-Soviet background in them, it tried to find effective countermeasures.

In the middle of 1 9 20-ies. The USA, Britain and France have taken a number of steps to strengthen their influence on Germany, the leading partner of the USSR in Europe. According to a plan prepared in 1924 by a group of Western experts headed by Charles Dawes, Berlin received many billions of dollars in loans for the restoration and development of the economy.

In October 1925, an international conference was held in Locarno (Switzerland), where the USSR was not invited. England, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Poland concluded a series of agreements there. They guaranteed the inviolability of the borders of Germany's western neighbors and at the same time did not say anything about the eastern ones.

Moscow regarded the "Dawes Plan" and the Locarno Agreements as "a system of economic and political blocs directed against the USSR with their spearheads," and insisted on the signing of a treaty of neutrality and non-aggression with Germany in 1926, as well as new economic agreements. ... At the end of 1 9 20-ies. this country accounted for almost a third of the USSR's foreign trade turnover.

In 1 9 2 5 - 1 9 2 7 years. agreements on neutrality and non-aggression were concluded with Turkey, Lithuania, Iran and Afghanistan, which, according to the Bolsheviks, weakened the likelihood of their involvement in "anti-Soviet combinations."

In February 1928, on the initiative of French Foreign Minister A. Briand and US Secretary of State F. Kellogg, discussion of an international pact began in Western capitals, proclaiming "the rejection of war as an instrument of national policy" and the settlement of all disagreements and conflicts only by peaceful means.

The USSR was again ignored, prompting its official pro test. “The elimination of the Soviet Union from the number of participants in the negotiations, it was emphasized in the statement of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs GV Chicherin,“ suggests that the real goals of the initiators of this pact, obviously, included and still include the desire to make it an instrument of isolation and struggle against the USSR. ". The public demarche carts had little effect, and Soviet representatives received an invitation to write this important diplomatic document.

At the end of the 1920s. the Soviet government twice came up with drafts of a convention on immediate, complete and general disarmament, and then a convention on the reduction of armaments. Deliberately doomed to failure, they nevertheless contributed to the strengthening of the foreign policy positions of the USSR as a peacekeeping force. According to one American newspaper, Moscow's proposals "were shared by the common people everywhere."

The policy of the Comintern. Events developed differently along the second, unofficial line of USSR foreign policy. Attempts to interfere - mainly through the Comintern - in the internal affairs of foreign states did not yield results, and sometimes led to serious international complications.

The Fourth Congress of the Comintern, which met in Moscow in December 1922, decided: "... in those countries where the position of bourgeois society is especially precarious," the communists must strive to form "workers' governments."

When the next year the internal political situation in Germany, Poland and Bulgaria escalated, the Comintern considered the moment appropriate to implement its directive. The local communist parties received a directive to lead matters to general political strikes with a smooth transition into an armed uprising.

Although national strikes broke down, the communists succeeded in raising uprisings in a number of places (in September 1923 - in some regions of Bulgaria, in October - in Hamburg, in November - in Krakow). But in a matter of days they were drowned in blood by the government troops. The results of the Comin Ternovo offensive on the "bastions of world capital a" inspired by the Central Committee of the RCP (b)

turned out to be very deplorable and. In the European countries scorched by the hot breath of Bolshevik maximalism, political forces grew stronger, calling for restraint in relations with Moscow and close rapprochement with the West.

By the middle of 1 9 20-ies. the revolutionary wave in Europe finally receded, and politicians in Moscow spoke with regret about "stabilizing capitalism." However, even under these conditions, the Comintern tried to use in the interests of the world revolution any surge of public discontent in the Western countries.

In May 1926, a serious conflict arose in England between miners and entrepreneurs supported by the government. A nationwide strike of the proletariat soon began. The British Communist Party, prompted by the Comintern, from the moment the crisis broke out called on the workers to broaden the struggle and warned against attempts to limit the strike to "purely defensive tasks". In many countries, including the USSR, a public campaign has begun to raise funds for the strikers. Through the legal professors of the USSR, the shock allied channels from Moscow promptly sent the brigade to the expense of the Federation of Miners a solid riat of the whole world.

the amount of money, significantly exceeding ext OfficialG. Klutsis. 1 9 3 1 y.

London responded by accusing the Soviet side of interfering in the internal affairs of the United Kingdom and in May 1 9 2 7.

severed diplomatic relations with the USSR.

Another center of gravity for the Comintern's efforts was far from Europe in China. This huge country experienced in the 1919s. Hard times. It was actually cut into several parts, between which military clashes did not stop. The weak central government in Beijing was easily subject to pressure from foreign powers. Moscow hastened not to miss its chance and staked on the government in Nanjing, which controlled South China. It was headed by Sun Yat-sen, the leader of the Kuomintang nationalist party.

The first contacts to Sun Yatsen were made by the Comintern, and in 1 9 2 2 BC.

they were secured by the Soviet diplomatic mission. Sun Yat-sen agreed to the entry of the Chinese Communists into the Kuomintang. The Soviet side pledged to provide financial and military assistance to this party in its struggle for power in China. In fact, the greatest support of the USSR was received by the communists, who gradually increased their influence in the Kuomintang. According to I.V. Steel's plan, it was necessary to “use the Kuomintangists” to the end, and then, having seized the moment, get rid of them.

After the death of Sun Yat-sen, the commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang army, Chiang Kai-shek, decided to forestall such a turn of events and struck an unexpected blow: in April 1927, he ordered the arrest and execution of thousands of communists. Then the troops of Chiang Kai-shek, relying on the support of the Western powers, moved to the northern regions of China and in 1928 captured Peking. There the Kuomintang established a new national government, whose foreign policy was marked by sharp anti-Sovietism. After an unsuccessful attempt by China in 1929 to establish complete control over the Chinese Eastern Railway with the help of military force, the severance of diplomatic relations with the USSR followed.

- & nbsp– & nbsp–

1. What is the significance of the Genoa Conference in the formation of the foreign policy course of our country? 2 *. What agreements between the USSR and foreign countries, signed in 191920s, do you consider the most significant for Soviet foreign policy? Argument your point of view based on the knowledge gained in the course of general history. 3. Which countries were considered as the main political opponents of the USSR in 1919 20s. ? Why exactly are they? How did this position manifest itself in the activities of the USSR in the international arena? 4*. What was the duality of the USSR's foreign policy? Using sources, prove its existence. 5. Work in pairs. Give an assessment of the achievements and accounts of the foreign policy of the USSR in 1 9 2 0 - ies. Formulate your conclusions.

6 *. Prepare a computer presentation on one of the topics: “The Comintern and its activities in the 1920s. "," Foreign policy of the USSR in 1 9 2 0 - ies. :

strengthening or weakening of international positions? ". 7 *. Using knowledge of general history and additional material, analyze how things were going in 1919 20s. relations between Soviet Russia and the USSR with one of the Western European states or the United States and one of the Asian states. Prepare a presentation of the results of your mini-research.

- & nbsp– & nbsp–

Country and world at the turn of the decade. 1 9 20s were a time of revival of the market economy around the world. State intervention in the economy caused by the dashing war years was curtailed. In Western countries, economic recovery was observed everywhere. But by the end of the decade, the global commodity market was oversaturated. As a result, the largest economic crisis in the history of the West broke out in 1929-1933.

The global crisis has had twofold consequences. On the one hand, he clearly showed the leaders of Western countries that the liberal, spontaneous market economy had reached a dead end. It is necessary, while maintaining basic democratic values, to reuse state regulation of economic life and social relations. First of all, the USA, England and France followed this path.

On the other hand, in countries that did not have colonies and rich resources, political forces that expressed the interests of the most aggressive circles revived noticeably. They suggested looking for a way out of the crisis by introducing dictatorial forms of government with a complete curtailment of democratic freedoms, strict control of the state over the economy and, most importantly, the resumption of the power struggle for a new territorial redistribution of the world. These right-wing extremist forces have been around since the beginning of 1919. began to be defined by the concept of "fascism"

(from Italian fascio - bunch). The fascists acquired the most noticeable influence in Italy, Germany, and Spain.

The crisis also struck the Soviet Union, which was weakly connected with the world economy. And although in the USSR it had other reasons, its consequences developed in line with global trends.

The crisis of the late 1920s. in USSR. In December 1925, “when the country's economy had barely recovered from the devastation, the Communist Party embarked on a course of forced industrialization. And the issue of grain procurement became aggravated almost immediately. After all, all material means and resources were pumped into the construction of industrial giants, and not factories and factories producing consumer goods.

At the turn of 1 9 2 7 - 1 9 28 years. an acute grain procurement crisis broke out. State bins after purchases of peasant products remained half empty. Cities and the army were threatened with starvation.

The Bolsheviks, as in the years of "war communism", resorted to violent methods of seizing grain. On April 19, 28, the Central Committee of the Communist Party, JV Stalin called for a "blow to the kulaks and speculative buyers." In fact, he attacked all those who had marketable grain, including the middle peasants. Once again, detachments of “bread-makers” appeared on the rural roads, in whose hands were not bags of money, but screws. And again the village began to seethe. The murders of party and Soviet activists began.

The next year, the crisis situation repeated itself. About 3 thousand terrorist acts were registered in the village.

Their victims were 1,0 thousand local government officials. Peasant riots and uprisings broke out in a number of areas. Military units of the OGPU, and in some places even artillery and aircraft, were sent to suppress them.

Search for anti-crisis measures. “Bourgeois specialists” (as the old specialists who collaborated with the Soviet regime were called in those years) suggested looking for ways to overcome the crisis by removing “class restrictions” and expanding the freedom of action of the private sector in the city and countryside.

This, in their opinion, could help in solving the problem of accumulating funds for a moderately developed state industry, including its industrial sectors. Professor-economist ND Kondratyev, for example, stated that only the “getting rich man” and the NEPman are “creative figures” in the matter of accumulation, and the class of the population that “does not make ends meet in its budget is fit only to fight on the barricades. "

The plans of the Bolsheviks did not at all include strengthening the positions of their competitors in the economy, and then inevitably in politics. The Communist Party leadership, united in its rejection of the initiatives of the "bourgeois specialists", disagreed on the question: what to do next?

Some members of the Politburo, headed by NI Bukharin, considered it necessary to fine-tune the mechanism of the market link between town and country. They proposed to support the "Individual economy of the poor and middle peasants" with the help of flexible purchase prices and the use of state reserves, and to create them to buy grain abroad, to actively develop light industry. And only when there is a general recovery of the economy, it is possible to raise the question of the rapid pace of industrialization.

JV Stalin's position was fundamentally different. He advocated the preservation of the most important priority in the economic policy of the party - accelerated industrialization, which paved the way for the development of the modern military-industrial complex and the technical re-equipment of the entire national economy. If this goal cannot be achieved on the basis of NEP, then the shattered mechanism of the market economy must be replaced without hesitation by another, administrative and managerial one that meets the socialist ideal. And we must start with the village, without waiting for it to rise up against the communists.

Here JV Stalin strove to solve two interrelated tasks - political and socio-economic: firstly, once and for all, remove from the agenda the peasant question that constantly worried the authorities, for which N.I. class "

and thus get rid of the strata of the population capable of organized resistance; secondly, to form large collective farms (collective farms). The experience of the few collective farms available at that time showed that in terms of marketability they were two to three times more productive than individuals, and it was much easier to control x than 2.5 million individual farms. Thus, the collective farms turned into a reliable channel for pumping the resources of the agrarian sector into industry, not subject to market conditions.

In the clash of two points of view on the way out of the crisis, Bukharin's and Stalin's, the latter won. The position of NI Bukharin and his associates was condemned as a "right deviation", and they themselves lost their high party and state positions.

Many communists, like J.V. Stalin, advocated accelerated industrialization (albeit poorly imagining the enormous social costs of this process) and deeply doubted the possibility of its implementation without a radical reconstruction of the national economy, which would allow the country's resources to be directed to the main direction is the development of heavy industry. After all, it was no secret that the developed capitalist countries took several decades to create their own industrial base. And this is under favorable internal and external conditions, with the widespread use of sources of accumulation that are absent in the USSR: foreign loans, large investments of domestic private capital, and finally, outright robbery of the colonies.

Assessing the discussions of those distant years now, some historians support the position of N.I. Bukharin. In their opinion, “the problem of forced industrialization was artificially forced ...

In the end, the USSR repulsed the aggression of Nazi Germany, having an economic potential (as a result of huge losses), about one and a half times less than that which, at the cost of colossal efforts and sacrifices, was created by 1941. , could have been created within the framework of unforced development, within the framework of NEP). Other historians share the doubts of the secretary general's supporters. They believe that Bukharin's model “from a scientific point of view was difficult to implement in those conditions), because the resources available in the country were clearly not enough for the balanced and dynamic development of all sectors of the national economy within the framework of a market economy. According to their calculations, with the preservation of the NEP, the economy of the USSR was expected to grow by 1–2% annually, while the population increased by 2% per year. In such a situation, the share of the country's national income by the mid-1930s. could be only 1 5% of the US level, while in 1 9 1 3, it was equal to 30%. “Even worse,” these scientists emphasize, “the situation was developing in the newest branches of industry. Here the lag has already been measured dozens of times, and even its reduction turned out to be impossible. Before the USSR at the end of 1919.

the prospect of economic stagnation and military impotence emerged).

Think about the question: how grounded was the decision of the Stalinist leadership to take a course towards forced industrialization? Return to this question after reading the material § 2 4.

Industrialization during the first five-year plans. The leadership of the Communist Party approved a five-year plan for 1 928 / 29-1 9 3 2/3 3 years. "There are no such fortresses that the Bolsheviks could not take," - JV Stalin immediately declared, and under the hypnosis of these words, the planned targets were raised more than once.

Sources of funds for industrialization were sought exclusively within the country. They were mainly formed by the incomes of light industry and especially agriculture, income from the monopoly of foreign trade in grain, gold, timber, furs and other goods (the newest technological equipment for factories under construction was imported into the country with the proceeds: the share of imported machines installed on them and other technology reached 80-85% in the first five-year plan); taxes on the population as a whole increased significantly, and above all the progressive tax on the Nepmen.

A direct consequence of the last tax, in fact, confiscatory and supplemented by direct administrative pressure, was a complete curtailment by 1 9 3 3.

private sector in industry and trade.

Considerable resources for industrialization were drawn from another, surprising and almost incomprehensible for us non-material source - the spiritual energy of the working people. Five-year plan and But the fact remains: the Bolsheviks managed capitalism. The poster evokes and over the years to support the artist KA Su a wave of labor enthusiasm. A vivid expression of a vanto. 1 9 3 2 y.

this was found in the truly massive socialist competition that unfolded since 1929. “As you can see from the memories of those years,” wrote one Western historian, “a powerful stimulus for many people was the idea that in a short time, at the cost of exhausting hard efforts you can create a better, that is, socialist, society. "

Worn out from the frequent use of the words that in the years of the first and second (1 9 3 3 - 1 93 7) five-year plans, the country turned into a grandiose construction site, nevertheless quite accurately reflected the reality.

During this time, the following are created:

The second (after the Krivoy Rog-Donbass) coal and metallurgical base in the east. It was based on the blast furnaces of the Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk plants, the mines of the Kuznetsk and Karaganda coal basins;

The second oil base in Bashkiria with a simultaneous radical reconstruction of the first - Baku;

Powerful electric power facilities to and: Dneproges and a number of other hydro and thermal power plants;

Industries absent in pre-revolutionary Russia: high-quality and non-ferrous metallurgy, bearing, pipe-rolling, heavy machine building, tractor building and production of agricultural machinery, aviation and automobile, chemical, tire, etc.;

New railway lines (Turksib, Novosibirsk - Leninsk, Karaganda - Balkhash, Kurgan - Sverdlovsk, etc.).

Many large projects were built in the backward national republics of the USSR. The specificity of their industrialization was that they received the lion's share of material resources at the expense of generous contributions from Russia and partly from Ukraine. As a result, the rates of industrial development of the former backward outskirts of the Russian Empire were higher than the all Union rates (approximately one and a half to two times).

There were also important shifts in the management of the entire industrial complex of the USSR. The plans that were arbitrarily changed in the direction of increasing did not correspond to the real possibilities. Hundreds of new plants and factories were laid annually, but their construction was not completed due to a lack of raw materials, fuel, and equipment. By 1 9 3 1, almost half of the capital investment was frozen in unfinished projects. The desire to overcome the shortage and the scattering of resources quickly led to the formation of a centralized system of their distribution and strict regulation of the activities of enterprises from above.

By the end of the first five-year plan, another problem emerged — an acute shortage of trained personnel. According to the alarming reports that then flocked to the center, about a third of the installed equipment was idle, more than half was working at partial capacity.

During the second five-year plan, the Bolsheviks put forward the slogan "The cadres who have mastered the new technology decide everything." A mandatory minimum of technical knowledge for workers was introduced. The factories created vocational training courses. Along with state support for socialist emulation, this made it possible to significantly increase production efficiency.

The planned targets for the first five year plan assumed an almost threefold increase in industrial production in comparison with 1928, and for the second five years (193 3 - 1 9 3 7) - two times from that achieved in 19 3 2. Official propaganda announced them before urgent implementation.

Now historians dispute the official figures. They found that for most of the most important indicators, the first five-year plans were not implemented at all. Moreover, some researchers question the main Stalinist conclusion about the transformation of the USSR from an agrarian country into an industrial one. According to their calculations, at the end of 1 9 30-ies. agriculture contributed more to the national income than industry.

But one thing is indisputable: for 1 9 2 9 - 1 9 3 7 years. the country has made a greasy industrial leap forward. The growth rates of heavy industry were two to three times higher than in the 1–3 years of Russia's development at the beginning of the century. As a result, the country acquired a potential, which, in terms of the sectoral structure and technical equipment, was mainly at the level of the advanced capitalist states. In terms of absolute volumes of industrial production, the USSR in 1939 took second place after the USA (in 1913 it was fifth). The share of imports fell to 1%.

The policy of industrialization affected other sectors of the economy incomparably less. As before, manual labor prevailed in construction and in the agricultural sector. Light industry lagged chronically.

Forced industrialization in a short time ensured full employment of the able-bodied population. On the eve of the first five-year plan, the unemployed accounted for 12% of those employed in the national economy, and by 1931 the last labor exchange was closed in the USSR.

Collectivization of the peasantry. Voluntary production cooperation of small and medium-sized peasant farms, received a neck in the 1920s. The name collectivization was considered as the main of the two methods of socialist reorganization of the countryside (the second method: the creation of state farms - state farms, directly subsidized from the treasury). Collective farms (collective farms) began to emerge at the turn of 1 9 1 7 - 1 9 1 8 years. But even ten years later there were few of them: collective farms then united about 1% of all peasant households, almost exclusively poor.

The 10th Party Congress (1 92 7) determined that collectivization should become the main task of the party in the countryside. In 1 9 2 8, the collective farms were provided with benefits for obtaining land for use, lending and taxation. The lease of land by the fists was limited.

Starting from November 1-9 28, state machinery and tractor stations (MTS) were created.

By June 1929, collective farms on a voluntary basis united 4% of peasant households, and four months later - already 8%. As we can see, in the summer and autumn of the same year, there was a certain leap, but rather quantitative than qualitative, because the poor people were still mainly drawn to collective farms. This skinny "socialist sector" could in no way help the authorities solve the grain procurement problem. And from the fall of 1929, the Communist Party passes over to a policy of coercive - in relation to the majority of peasants - collectivization.

The beginning "continuous collectivization" was carried out under the smoke: the howling veil of the conclusion drawn by JV Stalin in his article "The Year of the Great Turning Point" (November 1 9 2 9). In it, he stated that the party allegedly managed to achieve a turning point in the mood of the village and that the middle peasant voluntarily "went to the collective farms." In January-February 1 930

decisions were made on the forced deployment of the "farm construction collective". The most important of them proclaimed "the policy of liquidating the kulaks as a class) with the confiscation of the dispossessed property and its subsequent transfer to collective farms.

The authorities, with the help of the OGPU troops, within a short time (one and a half to two years) removed from the village really and potentially dangerous layers of the population. Among them were, first of all, the kulaks and the well-to-do middle peasants, that is, those peasants who had something to lose from collectivization and who therefore opposed (in various forms, up to the fight with sawn-off saws in their hands, but spontaneously but also separately) the Bolshevik offensive. to the village.

Peasant resistance peaked in the first months of 1930 (more than 8,000 mass demonstrations, including about 2,000 armed protests), which prompted the Bolshevik leaders to somewhat slow down the pace of collectivization. In March 1 930 g.

JV Stalin published an article "Dizziness with Success," in which he condemned the excesses of the local leadership and pharisaically emphasized the necessity of observing the principle of voluntary entry of peasants into collective farms. After waiting for a tactical pause, the authorities continued "collective farm construction" in the autumn of 1930.

According to various sources, the number of dispossessed people ranged from 3.5 to 9 million people. Some of them were thrown into prisons, and the bulk, including women, old people and children, were moved to remote areas of the provinces or sent under escort as special migrants to labor camps in the North and Siberia.

FROM ARCHIVE Secret report of the government commission for the investigation of the camp of special settlers (1931).

Up to 50 thousand kulak families numbering up to 200 thousand people have been settled in the Narym Territory ... The number of disabled people, including children, averages 50% of the total population of kulak villages. In most districts of the region, the special settlers are poorly organized economically ... Housing construction was not started in time. As a result, by the beginning of winter, the settlers ended up in huts and dugouts, which did not protect them from cold and rain. This situation was aggravated by the lack of warm clothing and footwear for most of the settlers. Almost all of the villages located at great distances from waterways were not provided with food by the end of the navigation ... As a result, the mortality rate of the elderly and children, especially the latter, is high. So, according to the Sredne Vasyugovskaya commandant's office, from the moment of the resettlement of the special settlers to September 1, the following died: 2 1 58 people, or 1 0, 1 3% of the total number. Of these, adult men 2 7 5, women 3 2 4 and children 1 5 59 ...

Surveys of special settlements in the Kazakh and Bashkir ASSR paint the same picture.

Determine the demographic composition of the special settlers. Why was the mortality rate among them so high? How did the fate of the special settlers differ from the fate of other categories of dispossessed people?

The peasants who remained in their native places, fearing for their fate, were enrolled in collective farms. Soon the government approved the Model Charter of Agricultural Artels (Collective Farms). He kept household lands, small implements, livestock, and poultry for the sole use of collective farmers. The artel, first of all, was required to fulfill numerous obligations to the state (in kind deliveries, government purchases, payment for MTS work, income tax, etc.), and only after that the balances of cash and agricultural products could be distributed among its members according to workdays - the rate of accounting for individual labor.

On the whole, the tragic epic of the collectivization of the peasantry ended in the mid-1930s. Collective farms united up to 93% of peasant farms that remained after dispossession. The consequences of the defeat of the age-old economic structure in the countryside were extremely grave. The productive forces of agriculture turned out to be undermined for many years: for 1 92 9 - 1 9 3 2 years. the number of cattle and horses decreased by one third, pigs and sheep by more than half a. Millions of dispossessed peasants, along with their families, found themselves behind barbed wire in labor camps scattered across the far outskirts of the country. Other villagers moved from the devastated ancestral nests to the city to work.

Agriculture of the USSR, weakened by forced collectivization, in 1993 2 - 1 9 3 3 years. a huge disaster struck: hunger.

There was a drought and, as a result, a crop failure. But the government steadily continued to pump through the collective farms from the main grain regions of the country their main wealth - bread (grain of different cultures), leaving nothing to the collective farmers for their own food.

Bread went to the foreign market and was converted into currency necessary for the purchase of modern equipment for industrial giants under construction. As a result, from 7, 5 to 1 0 million people died from hunger: Russians, Ukrainians, Kazakhs.

And yet the Bolshevik leaders, who professed the old old principle “the end justifies the means,” celebrated another victory. Despite the fact that the number of peasants decreased by one third, and the gross production of grain practically did not increase, its state procurements in 19397 in comparison with 1928 increased. 7 - Levandovsky, 1 1 class.

almost three times. With the increase in the number of tractors in the MTS, the level of mechanization of rural labor also increased. From now on, three-quarters of the harvest was carried out by tractors, and half of the grain harvesting was done by combine harvesters. In a short time, the agrarian sector, dominated by a poorly controlled small-scale commodity element, found itself under strict state control.

- & nbsp– & nbsp–

1. Compare the sales crisis and the grain procurement crisis. Determine the similarities and differences in the causes, manifestations and ways out of the crisis, proposed by the ruling party. 2. Finish filling out the table "Struggle for power in the RCP (b) - VKP (b). Analyze the methods used by I. V. Stalin on the way to power. 3. Determine the directions of forced modernization. 4. Prove that in the early years The USSR made a colossal industrial leap. What role did the labor enthusiasm and dedication of workers play in this? 5. What is the essence, reasons, main measures and results of collectivization? 6 * Using additional material, answer the questions: what other forms of collective farms, besides the artel, existed in 191920? 7. Why was collectivization called the tragedy of the Russian peasantry? Use the source in your answer. eight*. Express your point of view: what is the cost of forced modernization? Using the resources of the Internet, confirm your opinion with the statements of historians on this matter. Is it fair to say in this case that “the end justifies the means?

- & nbsp– & nbsp–

A blow to the "specialists". By the end of the 1920s. the old intelligentsia has almost completely abandoned its former illusions about the possibility of a democratic evolution of the Soviet regime. Skepticism and indifference now prevailed in this environment, a complete lack of enthusiasm for the curtailment of the NEP principles.

The Bolsheviks, seized by the "fever of everyday life, responded by direct intimidation of the old intelligentsia. They strove to eradicate dissent among specialists, to finally subordinate them to their will. At the turn of 1 9 2 0 - 1 930s. a wave of open trials of prominent economists, engineers and managers swept across the country (the Shakhty case in 1928, the trial of the Industrial Party in 1930, etc.). The defendants were accused of sabotage, that is, of the deliberate collapse of the Soviet economy and preparation for the overthrow of Soviet power.

FROM THE ARCHIVE The leader of the Menshevik émigrés F.I.Dan, who was well informed about domestic Russian affairs, rightly noted in January 1930: Pursued by the dizzying pace of overindustrialization and collectivization, this line too sharply contradicted scientific convictions and the general political and psychological attitude of the intelligentsia to be able to voluntarily pursue it. By way of order, she could only pursue this line with the greatest internal resistance. The latter, Dan concluded, is the famous sabotage work.

Explain the irony in the last words of the document.

Demonstration trials of “specialists” were supported by widespread repressions against the intelligentsia, primarily technical and scientific. Tens of thousands were dismissed, and some, in addition, were arrested for “anti-Soviet activities.

In addition to intimidating the intelligentsia, the organizers of judicial speculations on sabotage cases pursued a more ambitious goal: to thicken the atmosphere of general mistrust and suspicion in the country, instill in the minds of ordinary communists and the country's population the idea of ​​the need to further tighten the political regime in the face of the “threat of a class enemy. As soon as the trial of the Shakhty case was over, JV Stalin formulated his well-known thesis that "as we move forward, the resistance of the capitalist elements will increase, the class struggle will intensify."

A new round of internal party struggle. In the party, however, the Stalinist thesis did not find the support that the secretary general was counting on. The excessively high social cost of forced industrialization and collectivization, the rapid collapse of the remnants of internal party democracy, the dominance of Stalinist nominees in the upper echelons of power generated discontent among the old Bolshevik guard, which still held its ground. From it emerged people who made a number of attempts to stop the further escalation of violence in society and the concentration of power in the hands of JV Stalin.

In the early 1930s. a number of anti-Stalinist groups emerged, headed by the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR S.I. Syrtsov (1,930), a prominent party figure M.N. ...

FROM ARCHIVE

From the manifesto of M. N. Ryutin "To all members of the CPSU (b)" (1 932):

The party and the proletarian dictatorship were led by Stalin and his retinue into an unprecedented impasse and are going through a mortally dangerous crisis.

With the help of deception and slander, with the help of incredible violence and terror, under the banner of the struggle for the purity of the principles of Bolshevism and the unity of the party, relying on a centralized powerful apparatus, Stalin over the past five years cut off and removed from the leadership all the best, truly Bolshevik cadres, established in the CPSU (b) and the whole country, his personal dictatorship, took the path of the most unbridled adventurism and savage personal arbitrariness ... Stalin and his clique are destroying the cause of communism, and the leadership of Stalin must be over as soon as possible.

Confirm or refute with facts the assessments of M. N. Ryutin.

The Ryutin Manifesto found a response among the delegates to the 17th Congress of the CPSU (Bolsheviks), which met in January 1993. About a fifth of its delegates actually supported the final conclusion of the manifesto, voting against JV Stalin's entry into the new composition of the Central Committee.

As you can see, the anti-Stalinist opposition in the ranks of the CPSU (b) did not encroach on the fundamental principles of the party's policy, criticizing only the tactics of its implementation, and under the banner of protecting the "dictatorship of the proletariat" (which in reality never existed) demanded only one thing: the displacement of I. V. Stalin and the return to power "under the Linno Bolshevik cadres", that is, the old party guard. But even these demands posed a danger to the leading group of the Central Committee, for they could rally disgruntled party members, and most importantly, anti-Bolshevik forces in society. Therefore, Stalin's retaliatory actions were decisive.

From 1929 to 1936, a series of general purges took place in the CPSU (b).

As a result, all those who raised doubts about their reliability among the leadership (about 40% of all communists) were removed from the party ranks.

"Great terror". On December 1, 1993, one of the prominent leaders of the Communist Party, S. M. Kirov, was killed. The mystery of this political crime has not yet been solved. But the fact that it untied JV Stalin's hands for the physical removal of people who hindered him, primarily from the ranks of the Bolshevik Guard, is an indisputable historical fact. The investigating authorities were immediately ordered to conduct cases accused of preparing "terrorist acts" in an expedited manner (through military tribunals) and carry out sentences immediately.

The arrests of "enemies of the people" began to grow rapidly from 1 9 3 5, reaching a climax in 1 9 3 7, and gradually subsided (not stopping, however, at all) in 19 93 9. two million people.

To carry out such unprecedented repressions, the first impulse for mass arrests - the murder of S.M. Kirov - was clearly not enough. Hence - the staging of a number of new judicial political performances, this time over prominent party and state leaders (the trials of G.E. Zinoviev, L.B. Kamenev, etc.

in August 1936; over G. L. Pyatakov, K. B. Radek and others in January 1 9 3 7; over Marshal MN Tukhachevsky and others in June 1 9 3 7; over N.I.Bukharin, A.I. Rykov and others in March 1 9 3 8). These show trials were designed to "ideologically and politically" shape the growing repressive wave, to arm the organizers of the terror with proper slogans and thereby ensure the necessary scale and direction of arrests in the party, army and society.

Now the main goal of the mass repressions of those years is quite clear. They had to strike a blow at those communists who refused to recognize the correctness of Stalin's methods of building socialism or simply doubted them - there were especially many such people among the old Bolshevik guard, and they were almost completely burned out in the fire of state terror. By means of terror, the best, free-thinking part of the nation was removed from the social-political and cultural life of the country, capable of critically assessing reality and the processes taking place in it, and therefore, by the mere fact of its existence, represented an obstacle to the final assertion of the personal power of J.V. Stalin (It is indicative that among the repressed the share of persons with a higher education was almost three times higher than the all-Union level).

The slogan on the wall of the ba Along the way, other problems were solved. The ruling clique of the builders willingly made the arrested Belomorsko-Ball leaders of various levels into a kind of tiysk channel.

Scapegoats. Permanent difficulties in 1932

in production and in everyday life, all troubles and failures were attributed to them as enemies of the people, traitors who betrayed the ideals of socialism. The separatist sentiments in the union republics, which were carried by the national intelligentsia, formed already during the years of Soviet power, also seriously weakened.

In the course of the purges ”it suffered significant damage, especially in its scientific and creative part.

Think about the reasons for the psychological phenomenon of 1936, when in the fire of great terror any executioner easily turned into a victim, his own became a stranger, the country met with thunderous applause the sentences of the recent heroes and Bolshevik-Leninists.

Persecution of religion and the church. At the same time, the authorities made an attempt to completely destroy religion. At the beginning of 1929, a special instruction was sent to the site. According to him, all religious organizations were declared the only legally operating counterrevolutionary force with influence on the masses.

The widespread closure of Orthodox churches, Catholic churches, Muslim mosques, and Jewish synagogues began. If in 1 9 28 the Russian Orthodox Church had over 30 thousand church parishes, then by 1 9 3 9 there were about 1 00 functioning churches in the whole country. Church buildings were either destroyed or used for factory workshops, warehouses, clubs, and monasteries - for prisons and colonies. Thousands of icons and ancient liturgical books were burned; precious church utensils were melted down for scrap. The priests were arrested, imprisoned in a clerk, and shot.

Yet the authorities' intention to eradicate religion has failed.

The census of 1 9 3 7 showed that two thirds of the rural and one third of the urban population continued to consider themselves believers.

Completion (With the Cultural Revolution. In the sphere of culture, from the beginning of the 1930s, the authorities pursued a policy of strict regulation and strengthening of state supervision. By the resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (April 1932) associations of masters of literature and art, and their place was soon taken by the creative unions of the intelligentsia controlled by the government: the Union of Composers, the Union of Architects, the Union of Writers and the Union of Artists.

The dominant creative direction was proclaimed socialist realism, which demanded from the authors of works of literature and art not only a description of objective reality, but also its depiction in revolutionary development, serving the tasks

Ideological alteration and education of working people in the spirit of socialism.

The approval of rigid canons of artistic creativity and the authoritarian and commanding style of leadership deepened the internal contradictions in the development of culture, characteristic of the entire Soviet period.

Works by A. Pushkin, M. Yu. Lermontov, L. N. Tolstoy, I. V. Goethe, W. Shakespeare were published in huge numbers in the country, palaces of culture, clubs, libraries, museums and theaters were opened. The society striving for culture received new works by M. Gorky, M. A. Sholokhov, A. P. Gaidar, A. N. Tolstoy, B. L. Pasternak, other Soviet prose writers and others, performances by K. S. Stanislavsky, V. I. Nemirovich-Danchenko, V.E. Meyerhold, A. Ya. Ta: Irova, N.P. Akimova, the first sound films (A trip to the lives of N.V. Chapaev S.D. and G.N. Vasiliev, We are from Kronstadt E.A. Dzigan and others), music by S.S.Prokofiev and D.D.Shostakovich, paintings and sculptures by V.I. A. Plastova, I. D. Shadra, M. V. Grekova, architectural structures of V. and L. Vesnin, A. V. Shchusev.

But at the same time, entire historical and cultural layers were deleted that did not fit into the schemes of party ideologists. Russian art of the beginning of the century and the creativity of modernists in the 1920s became practically inaccessible. The books of Russian idealist philosophers, innocently repressed writers, and emigrant writers were withdrawn from libraries. The works of M.A.Bulgakov, S.A.Esenin, A.P. Platonov, O.E. Mandelshtam, paintings by P.D.Korin, K. S. Malevich, P.N. ... Monuments of church and secular architecture, created by the talent and labor of the people, were destroyed.

Among the humanities, history has received special attention from the authorities. It was radically revised and transformed, in the words of JV Stalin, into a "formidable weapon in the struggle for socialism."

In 1938, the "Short Course on the History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)" was published, which became a normative book for the network of political education, schools and universities. He gave the Stalinist version of the past, far from the truth, more than the whist party and. For the sake of the political conjuncture, the history of the Russian state was also rethought. If before the revolution it was considered by the Bolsheviks as a "prison of peoples", now, on the contrary, its power and progressiveness were emphasized in every possible way when various nations and nationalities were united to it.

Natural and technical sciences developed more freely. In those years, noticeable successes were achieved in the field of nuclear physics and electronics (N.N.Semenov, D.V.Skobel'tsyn, P.L. M. Vinogradov, M. V. Keldysh, M. A. Lavrent'e, S. L. Sobolev), physiology (school of academician I. P. Pavlov), biology (D. N. Pryanishnikov, N. I. Vavilov) , theory of space research and rocketry (K. E. Tsiolkovsky, Yu. V. Kondratyuk, F. A. Tsander). In 1933-1936 the first Soviet rockets were launched into the sky. The research of the drifting station "North Pole-1", headed by I.D.Papanin, non-stop record flights of V.A.Chkalov, V.K.Kokkindki, M.M. Gromov, V.S. ...

However, the priority for the Soviet leadership was not so much the accumulation of fundamental knowledge or the organization of research enterprises calculated for the external effect, but progress in applied sciences capable of ensuring the technical re-equipment of industry.

The indisputable achievement of Russian scientists was the design of powerful hydro turbines and coal combines, the discovery of industrial methods for the production of synthetic rubber, high octane fuel, and artificial fertilizers.

The state invested enormous funds in the creation of various design bureaus, where the development of new models of military equipment was carried out: tanks (Zh.Ya. Kotin, M.I.Koshkin, A.A. Morozov), airplanes (A.I. Tupolev, S. V. Ilyushi, N. N. Polikarpov, A. S. Yakovlev), artillery pieces and mortars (V. G. Grabin, I. I. Ivanov, F. F. Petrov), automatic weapons (V. A. Deg Tyarev, F.V. Tokarev).

It experienced a real boom in the 1930s. graduate School. The state, experiencing an acute need for qualified personnel, opened hundreds of new universities, mainly engineering and technical, where six times more students studied than in tsarist Russia.

In the composition of students, the share of workers who came from workers reached 5 2%, peasants - almost 1 7%. correspondence forms), poured into the ranks of the intelligentsia in a wide stream. By the end of the 1 930s. new recruits reached 90% of the total number of this social stratum.

Major changes were taking place in secondary school as well. In 1930

universal primary education is being introduced in the country, and seven-year education is compulsory in cities. In May 19394, the structure of the unified general education school was changed. Two levels are abolished and introduced: primary school - from 1 to IV grades, incomplete secondary - from 1 to VII grades, and middle - from 1 to X grades. The teaching of world and national history was restored, textbooks on all school subjects and a strict timetable for classes were introduced.

Finally, in 1 9 3 0s. In the main, illiteracy, which remained the lot of many millions of people, was largely overcome. An important role was played here by the all-union cultural campaign launched in 1928 on the initiative of the Komsomol under the motto “Literate, teach the illiterate! ". It was attended by hundreds of thousands of doctors, engineers, students, schoolchildren, housewives. Population census in 1 9 3 9

summed up the results: the number of literate people among the population over 9 years old reached 8 1, 2%.

At the same time, the creation of a written language for national minorities, who had never known it, was completed. For 1 9 20 - 1 930 it was acquired by about 40 nationalities of the North and other regions.

Explain the meaning of the concepts and expressions: "government", repression and, "great terror", socialist realities and zm.

1. Explain the political implications of the trials

Bourgeois specialists. 2. For what purpose did Soviet propaganda insistently instill in Soviet society the conviction that as the USSR progressed towards socialism, the class struggle would intensify? * What socio-economic, political, psychological consequences of this Stalinist idea could one count on? 3. Express your opinion: what is the significance of anti-Stalinist actions in the early 1930s. ? Compare them with the inner-party opposition in the 1920s. What is common and special about them? What are the reasons for Stalin's new victory over political opponents? 4. What goals did you set yourself to inspire the great terror? Determine its consequences for society.

5. Correlate the goals and objectives of the Cultural Revolution (see § 13) with the ways to achieve them and the results (see § 1 7, 2 1). 6 *. In which educational institution would you like to receive education in the 1930s? ? Why? Which path would you prefer - to get a higher education or to start a career? What objective conditions might influence your decision? 7 *. Using additional sources and materials on the Internet, write an essay on the Bolsheviks and the Russian Orthodox Church in the first decades of Soviet power.

- & nbsp– & nbsp–

Problem. What is the socio-political system formed in the USSR at the end of the 1930s? ?

Answer the questions. 1. What was the state symbol (coat of arms, flag, gimn) of the USSR in the 1 930s? 2. What was new in the political life of the Constitution of 1936?

New Constitution of the USSR. In December 1936, the new Constitution of the USSR was adopted, immediately declared the official propaganda of the Constitution of victorious socialism. "

The Soviets of Working People's Deputies were proclaimed the political basis of the USSR, and socialist ownership of the means of production as the economic basis. They declared freedom of conscience, speech, press, assembly and rallies, association in unions, as well as the right of citizens to work, rest, “compulsory incomplete secondary education. Some changes were made to the system of state power. Its supreme body was declared the Supreme Council, which consisted of two chambers: the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities, and in the period between its sessions - the Presidium of the Supreme Council.

The changes affected the electoral system: elections became universal, equal and direct with a secret ballot.

A common thread running through the entire text of the Constitution of the USSR was the following thesis: the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a socialist state of workers and peasants.

What, then, was “the country of victorious socialism” like?

Economy. The economy that took shape by that time is now defined as directive.

She was characterized by:

In fact, the complete nationalization of the means of production, although the existence of two forms of socialist property was established formally and legally: state and group (cooperative-collective farm);

The curtailment of commodity-money relations (but not their complete absence in accordance with the socialist ideal), the deformation of the objective law of value (prices were determined in the offices of officials, and not on the basis of market demand and supply);

Extremely tough centralism in management with minimal economic independence at the local level (in the republics and regions); administrative-command distribution of resources and finished products from centralized funds.

He correlated the total directive economy of the USSR with the original ideas of the Bolsheviks about the socialist economy (see § 1 3).

What's in common and special? Consider the question: why did the creators of the new economy fail to eradicate commodity-money relations in society? In what way did they show and smite?

The Soviet model of a directive economy was characterized by the existence of the so-called subsystem of fear - powerful roars of non-economic coercion. In August 1 9 3 2 the Central Executive Committee of the USSR approved the law “On the strengthening of socialist property.

According to him, citizens from 1 to 2 years of age, for example, picking spikelets on a collective farm field, were declared enemies of the people "and could receive a term of at least 1 0 years. At the turn of 1932. a passport regime was introduced, separating the village from the city by an administrative wall, because passports were issued only to townspeople. The peasants, thus, were deprived of the right to freely move around the country and were actually attached to the land, to their collective farms.

By the end of the 1 930s. As a result of mass repressions, the directive economy is acquiring a "camp" look more and more distinctly. In 1940

the centralized card index of the GULAG included data on almost 8 million persons of three categories: those who were in prison at that time;

those who served time and were released; dead in camps and prisons max. In other words, over the 10 years of the existence of the Gulag, more than 5% of the total population of the country have been behind barbed wire. The camps and colonies provided about half of the gold and chromium ore mined in the USSR, at least a third of platinum and timber. The inmates produced about a fifth of the total volume of hospital work. Through their efforts, entire cities were built (Magadan, Angarsk, No Rilsk, Taishet), kanals (Belomorsko-Baltic, Moscow-Volga), railways (Taishet-Lena, BAM-Tynda).

Social structure. The social-class structure of society, which by 1939 numbered about 1 70 million people, consisted of three main elements: the working class - its number increased in 1 9 2 9 - 1 9 3 7 years.

almost three times, mainly at the expense of people from the villages, and together with family members made up 3.37% of the total population (in the national regions, the growth of its ranks was even more significant:

in Kazakhstan - 18 times, in Kyrgyzstan - 2-7 times), the class of the collective farm peasantry and cooperative handicraftsmen (4 7, 2%), the social group of employees and the intelligentsia (1 6, 5%). There was also a small stratum of individual peasants and uncooperative workers (2, 6%).

Modern social scientists in the group of employees and the intelligentsia single out another social layer, the nomenclature. It included officials of the party and state apparatus of various levels and mass public organizations who performed all affairs in the USSR on behalf of the people, who were alienated in practice from power and property.

Based on information from the course of social studies, try to give the social stratification of Soviet society.

Standards of living. Since the end of 1 9 20-ies. the entire social policy of the Stalinist leadership was subordinated to one goal - to attract additional funds for forced industrialization.

Personal income tax is increasing. Introduced a forced subscription to bonds of "loans to industrialization", which took a large share of the salary. And from the end of 1928, city dwellers were transferred to the rationing system for distributing goods.

At fixed prices, they could buy, depending on the established categories, a limited amount of food and industrial goods.

In 1929 - 1930. Moscow workers, for example, received on average monthly ration cards: bread - 24 kg, meat - 6 kg, cereals - 2.5 kg, butter - 550 g, vegetable oil - 600 g, and sugar - kg. The employee ration cards were significantly lower. Only scientists were supplied comparatively well. Subsequently, the rationing rates for the ration cards decreased several times. The situation was somewhat improved by the persisting network of commercial trade (at free prices), the city collective farm markets opened throughout the country in 1933, and also ineradicable speculation - illegal private trade.

The situation in the village was especially difficult. The peasants received almost nothing from the collective farm cash registers and barns for their workdays and lived at the expense of their subsidiary plots.

In 1 9 3 5 the card system was abolished. Soon JV Stalin declared that in the Soviet country "Life has become better, life has become more fun." Indeed, the financial situation of urban and rural residents, although slowly, improved. In the countryside, for example, consumption of the most important foodstuffs (meat, fish, oil, sugar) increased by the end of the 1930s. in comparison with the hungry 1933, twice. And yet Stalin's rosy words were far from the harsh reality, except for the living standards of the elite, the nomenklatura, which was immeasurably higher than the national average.

Wages and salaries of workers and employees in the mid-1930s was about 85% of the level of 1 928. During the same time, state prices increased: for sugar - 6 times, bread - 1 0, eggs - 1 1, meat - 1 3, herring 1 5, vegetable oil - at 2 8.

Politic system. The essence of the political system in the USSR was determined by the regime of personal power of I. V. Stalin, which replaced the collective dictatorship of the old Bolshevik guard of the Leninist period.

Behind the facade of a purely decorative official power (Soviets at all levels - from the Supreme Soviet to the district and rural) hid the true supporting structure of the regime of personal dictatorship. It was formed by two systems that permeate the country: party organs and state security organs. The former recruited personnel for various administrative structures of the state and supervised their work. Even broader control functions, including supervision of the party itself, were carried out by the state security agencies, which operated under the direct leadership of I.V. Stalin.

The entire nomenklatura, including its core - the partocracy, lived in fear, fearing reprisals, its ranks periodically shake up the foxes, which excluded the very possibility of consolidating a new, dominated layer of managers on an anti-Stalinist basis and turned them into simple conductors of the will of the party-state elite into headed by I.V. Stalin.

Each member of Soviet society was involved in a hierarchical system of organizations: the elected, the most reliable, from the point of view of the authorities, - in the party (over 2 million people) and the Soviets (3.6 million democrat and activists), youth - in the Komsomol (9 million people), children - in pioneer squads, workers and employees - in trade unions (2 7 million people), literary and artistic intelligentsia in creative unions. All of them served as transmission belts "from the party-state leadership to the masses, condensed the socio-political energy of the people, which, in the absence of civil liberties, did not find any other legal way out, and directed it towards solving the immediate tasks of the Soviet government."

Society of State Socialism. Now many are asking the question: what social system ultimately formed in the USSR by the end of the 1930s? ? It seems that those historians and sociologists are right who define it as state socialism. Socialism - since the socialization of production took place, the elimination of private property and the social classes based on it. State - since socialization was not real, but illusory: the functions of disposing of property and political power were carried out by the party-state apparatus, the nomenklatura and, to a decisive extent, its leader.

In addition to the aforementioned complete (total) control of the state over the economy, there were other generic signs of totalitarianism: the nationalization of the political system, including public organizations, all-pervading ideological control under the monopoly of the authorities on the mass media, the actual elimination of constitutional rights and freedoms. , repression against the opposition and dissidents in general.

Explain the meaning of concepts and expressions: directive economy, card system, “loan and industry and aliza tion”, nomenclature, personal power regime , state socialism.

1. Fill in the table Country of victorious socialism: Constitution and realities. Lines of comparison: a) the political basis of the USSR, the essence of political power; b) economic basis; c) social class structure; d) participation of citizens in political life, rights and freedoms. 2. Compare the social policy of the mid-1920s. and the period of forced modernization. * What were the changes related to? 3. Work in groups. Calculate the daily ration of a Moscow worker according to the ration cards. Using sources, tell us about the life of representatives of one of the social groups of the peasantry:

dispossessed, individual farmers, collective farmers. Describe the situation of the GULAG prisoners. 4*. Discuss collectively: why there were no mass protests against the authorities in the USSR? 5*. Drawing on information from the course of social studies, give a description of the regime of personal power of I. V. Stalin. Compare his regime with the political regime of the Leninist period. 6. What are the achievements of our people in the 1 930s. can we be proud of? 7 *. Using additional sources and materials on the Internet, write a short history essay on one of the topics:

GULAG as a means of intimidating Soviet society, the GULAG and the socialist economy.

- & nbsp– & nbsp–

At the turn of 1920-1930. Soviet foreign policy was still characterized by ambivalence. Through official diplomacy, the USSR is achieving new successes. Thus, it was possible to restore diplomatic relations with England (1 929) and China (1 932), which had been demonstratively broken off earlier at the initiative of the leadership of these countries. In 1993, the USSR signed a new series of non-aggression treaties with France, Poland, Finland and Estonia.

As for the actions along the Cominternist line, failures here did not prevent JV Stalin from drawing the conclusion in 1928 that "Europe is clearly entering a period of a new revolutionary upsurge." And although this conclusion contradicted reality, the Comintern demanded that the Communist Parties, in preparation for the "decisive battles of the proletariat," strike the main blow at the Social Democratic parties accused of "assisting the fascists" in order to isolate them from the working masses and to establish the undivided influence of the Communists.

Behind all this was clearly seen the tragic underestimation of the threat posed by the rapidly growing shock forces of the world reaction of fascism.

Aggravation of the international situation. The German fascists, taking advantage of the deep division of the working class, the discontent of the masses during the world economic crisis of 1929-1993, and the help of influential anti-communist forces inside and outside the country, confidently moved to power.

In the elections to the Reichstag (parliament) in November 1932, 1.17 million voters voted for the Nazi party (the Social Democrats received 7.2 million votes, the Communists - 5.7 million). Two months later, in January 1 9 3 3, the President of Germany P. Hindenburg appointed the head of government (Reich Chancellor) of the Nazi Fuehrer A. Hitler.

The fascists immediately set about implementing their programs of arming the country and eliminating bourgeois democratic freedoms. The foreign policy of the Hitlerite government was subordinated to one goal - preparation for unleashing aggressive wars in order to conquer domination over the whole world.

A hotbed of military tension has emerged in the heart of Europe. Another hotbed by that time was already smoldering in the Far East: from 1 9 3 1 Japan waged a war of conquest against China.

By the middle of the 1 930s. in the foreign policy of the USSR, the main place is occupied by the problem of relations with aggressive fascist states (Germany and Italy) and militaristic Japan.

Stalin's double diplomacy. The Soviet government in December 1933 proposed to create a system of collective security through the conclusion of a series of special interstate treaties. They were supposed to guarantee the inviolability of borders and contain obligations to jointly repulse the aggressor.

To promote the idea of ​​collective security, the tribune of the authoritative international organization of the League of Nations was actively used, where the USSR joined in 1934. The following year, the Soviet Union signed treaties with France and Czechoslovakia, providing for assistance, including limited military assistance, in the event of an attack. aggressor. Moscow condemned fascist Italy, which started the war of conquest in Abyssinia (modern Ethiopia) in 1935, provided massive support - with loans, military equipment, military advisers and volunteers - to China and the anti-fascist forces of Spain, which fought in 1936. 1 9 39 BC with the army of the rebellious general F. Franco.

These facts are well known. But until recently, we knew practically nothing about the second, behind-the-scenes side of Moscow's foreign policy. In contrast to the 1920s - early 1930s. this line was pursued not through the Comintern (having proclaimed himself in 1935 as a supporter of broad anti-fascist fronts with the participation of social democracy, he noticeably weakened revolutionary and subversive activities in European countries), but through I.V. Stalin's confidants - employees Soviet institutions abroad. The goal of Soviet foreign policy during this period was to achieve, in the event of insurmountable difficulties in creating a system of collective security, certain political agreements with Nazi Germany in order to localize its aggressive aspirations within the framework of the capitalist system, to divert the fire of the outbreak of war from the borders THE USSR.

Western democracies, above all England, used the means of secret diplomacy in relations with Germany even more energetically. Their goal was exactly the opposite - to send Hitler's military machine to the East. Soon the official diplomacy of England and France was also subject to this task. “We all know Germany’s desire to move to the East,” declared in 1936.

British Prime Minister S. Baldwin. "If it came to a fight in Europe, I would like it to be a fight between the Bolsheviks and the Nazis."

Western democracies openly embarked on the path of pacifying Nazi Germany, limiting themselves to only formal protests whenever the Third Reich took a new step to build up its military power and its aggressive aspirations (refusal to pay reparations under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, it also prohibited the production of aircraft, tanks and other military equipment, the Anschluss of Austria in March 1938).

The culmination of the disastrous policy of appeasement was the Munich conspiracy of England, France, Germany and Italy, aimed at the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. In September 1938 Germany received the Sudetenland, where half of the heavy industry of Czechoslovakia was located. In March 1939, this state ceased to exist altogether. The Czech Republic went entirely to Germany, and the Slovo cue, which retained the external attributes of sovereignty, was transformed into a disenfranchised puppet of Berlin.

1939 Non-Aggression Pact. At the turn of 1938-1939. Berlin determined the direction of further expansion. It was planned to seize Poland, and then, having accumulated the necessary forces and strengthening the rear, oppose France and England. With regard to the USSR, the Nazis took a course towards “staging a new Rapalle stage.

With these words, Hitler himself characterized this course, having in mind his intention to turn the USSR into a temporary ally striving for world domination of Germany and thereby neutralize it for the time being, to prevent Moscow from interfering in hostilities on the Anglo-French side.

The seeds of the “new Rapallo fell on the prepared soil. Despite the failure of the first attempt “to build bridges between Moscow and Berlin (confidential negotiations on this topic were interrupted in the middle of 1937 at the initiative of the German leadership), J.V. Stalin and his entourage still did not rule out the possibility of rapprochement with Germany as an alternative to another rapprochement - with Western democracies. Meanwhile, the latter became more and more problematic.

The Anglo-French Soviet negotiations that took place in Moscow in July-August 1939 (first general political, then military missions) revealed the tough, uncompromising positions of the parties, which almost did not hide their acute distrust of each other. And this was not accidental. JV Stalin had information about the simultaneous secret negotiations between London and Paris with Berlin, including the intention of England to take another step to pacify Germany: to renounce the obligation to defend Poland and to carry out at its expense a new version of Munich and already directly at the borders of the USSR ... In turn, the Western European capitals knew about the private contacts of German and Soviet diplomats of the highest rank (including V.M. Molotov, who headed in May 1939 BC).

People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs). In the course of these contacts, which were especially intense since July 1939, the representatives of the two countries quickly found a common language.

In the middle of August 1 9 3 9 JV Stalin made his choice.

2 August 3, the day after the end of the languid military negotiations with Britain and France, V.M. Molotov and German Foreign Minister I.R .: Ibbentrop signed a non-aggression pact in Moscow and a secret additional protocol to it division of spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. According to the latter, Berlin recognized Latvia, Estonia, Finland, the eastern part of Poland and Bessa as the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union. In September 1 9 3 9 this list was supplemented by Lithuania.

e Explain the meaning of concepts and expressions: a system of collective security, a secret diploma of atiya, double diplomacy, a policy of death, a Munich conspiracy.

1*. Give an assessment of the aggravation of the international situation in the 1930s.

from the standpoint of official diplomacy or from the standpoint of the Comintern. 2. Why in the 1 930s. the main direction of the diplomatic efforts of the USSR is the struggle to create a system of collective security? What successes have you achieved along this path? 3. Describe the policy of the USSR and Western democracies in relation to Nazi Germany. What would be the reasons for secret diplomacy in relations with this country? 4. Explain why the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations (July-August 1939) ended in failure. 5*. Work in pairs. On behalf of contemporaries of events, state the arguments for and against the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with Germany. Formulate your conclusion. Will you change your mind if you learn about the secret additional protocol? 6. Determine the reasons and consequences of the signing of the non-aggression pact on August 23, 1939 for the USSR, Germany and other countries. Use facts from the general history course in your answer. 7 *. Compare the consequences of the Munich Agreement of 1938 and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939.

8 On the eve of formidable trials Problem. How did the USSR prepare for war?

- & nbsp– & nbsp–

The beginning of World War II and Soviet foreign policy.

A week after the signing of the pact, Germany attacked Paul Shue. England and France, having suffered defeat in secret and overt attempts to come to terms with Hitler at the expense of the USSR, declared war on Germany. The Second World War began. The USSR officially defined its attitude to the belligerent states as neutral.

JV Stalin considered the strategic pause received by the USSR to be the main gain from the non-aggression pact. From his point of view, Moscow's departure from an active European policy lent a purely imperialist character to the world war. The class opponents of the Soviet state mutually depleted their forces, and it itself got the opportunity to move its own borders to the West (in accordance with a secret agreement with Germany on spheres of influence) and gain time to strengthen its military and economic potential.

In addition, with the conclusion of the pact, it became possible to influence the restless eastern neighbor through Berlin. In recent years, Japan's aggressive policy has already led to two major military conflicts with the USSR (near Lake Khasan in 1938 and near the Khalkh: I: n-Gol River in 1939) and threatened new, even larger-scale conflicts. innovations.

Japan responded to the event in Moscow even faster and sharper than the Soviet leadership expected. Molotov Pact-R: I: bbentrop clearly caught Tokyo by surprise and seriously undermined its hopes for the help of its strategic ally in hostile actions against the USSR, especially since the latter did not bring success. The Japanese General Staff began to revise the plans for upcoming military operations.

The central place in them now was occupied by the southern direction - us blunting into the colonial possessions of England and the United States (Malaya, Burma, the Philippines, etc.). Building on this success, the USSR in April 1941 signed a neutrality pact with Japan.

Under the direct influence of the Soviet-German agreements, the political geography of Eastern Europe was rapidly changing.

On September 1, September 1, 939, Soviet troops entered the eastern lands of Poland, which was completely defeated by Germany. Western Ukraine and Western Belarus were annexed to the USSR - territories that were previously part of the Russian Empire, but lost as a result of the Soviet-Polish war in 1920.

Then it was the turn of the Baltic states. In September-October 1939, the Stalinist leadership imposed on Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania "treaties of mutual assistance", under the terms of which they provided the USSR with their military bases. The following year, "elections" were held to the Seims of Lithuania and Latvia and to the State Council of Estonia.

They were attended by candidates nominated by the Communist Parties and verified by the Soviet special services and. The parliaments elected in this way applied for the admission of their countries to the USSR. In August 1940 this request was granted, and the USSR was replenished with three new "socialist republics".

At the same time, the USSR demanded from Romania the return of Bessarabia, which was part of Russia until January 1918, and Severnaya Bukov: Ina. In June 1940, Soviet troops immediately entered these lands. Soon they were annexed to the Ukrainian SSR and the Moldavian SSR (formed in August 1940).

A similar plan was hatched for Finland and.

in November 1939, the Soviet leadership provoked a war with it and immediately formed a puppet government of the "people's"

Finland, headed by the leader of the Comintern OV Kuusinenom. Combat operations were accompanied by heavy losses of the Red Army (almost 1 2 7 thousand killed and died from wounds against 48 thousand from the Finnish side). In addition, the war entailed serious foreign political complications for Moscow. In December 1 9 3 9 the USSR was expelled from the League of Nations as an aggressor state. England, France and the United States were preparing military assistance to Finland. Under these conditions, JV Stalin did not dare to go to Helsinki. The Sovietization of Finland failed. But nevertheless, in accordance with the peace treaty of March 1–2, 1940, the USSR ceded part of the territory: on the Karelian Isthmus, northwest of Lake Ladoga, on the northern peninsulas of Sredniy and Rybachiy. The Hanko Peninsula in the Baltic Sea was leased for 30 years.

On the newly acquired lands, "socialist transformations" began, similar to those that were carried out in the USSR at the turn of the 1920-1930s. They were accompanied by terror and deportation of large masses of people to Siberia. In addition, in the spring of 1940, almost 22 thousand prisoners and internees of officers, gendarmes, policemen, landowners and similar persons of the former bourgeoisie of Poland, imprisoned in Soviet concentration camps and prisons, were shot dead.

Some of them were subjected to extrajudicial reprisals in the Katyn forest near Smolensk.

Behind the worries and worries about expanding the borders, JV Stalin did not forget about the strategic task - to preserve the neutrality of the country for the longest possible period. To achieve this, in his opinion, it was possible only on one condition: if fascist Germany was confident that the non-aggression pact would provide her with a reliable rear in the east of Europe, excluding a war on two fronts in the foreseeable future. The main efforts of the Kremlin dictator were subordinated to the creation of such confidence among the Nazi elite.

In line with them were the treaty of friendship and the border between the USSR and Germany of September 28, 1939, a number of trade agreements that ensured huge supplies of Soviet strategic raw materials and food to Germany, assistance, under the guise of neutral theta, combat operations of the German fleet.

FROM ARCHIVE Memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany on Soviet-German economic relations of May 1 5, 1941

The situation with the supply of Soviet raw materials still presents a satisfactory picture ... The transit road through Siberia is still in operation. Supplies of raw materials from East Asia, in particular rubber transported to Germany along this road, continue to be carried out.

General (Soviet) supplies in the current year are calculated:

grain 632 000 tons; oil 232 000 tons; cotton 23 000 tons;

- & nbsp– & nbsp–

to show Moscow economic demands, even those that go beyond the scope of the treaty.

What new did you learn from the source about Soviet-German relations on the eve of the Great Patriotic War? How did fascist Germany use the economy of the USSR?

Preparing Germany for war with the USSR. However, the fate of the world was then decided not in Moscow, but in Berlin. Having occupied by the fall of 1940 most of Western Europe, including France, Germany found herself face to face with England. Berlin immediately launched a propaganda offensive, inviting London to make peace.

It was accompanied by German air raids on British cities. But England did not give up. The German General Staff began preparations for Operation Sea Lion "- the invasion of the German fascist troops into the British Isles through the La Mans.

Yet Nazi strategists were tormented by doubts about its effectiveness, since England, which possessed one of the most powerful navies in the world, was reliably protected from attack from the sea.

In the end, Hitler decided to postpone this operation and first unleash a blow on the USSR, which seemed to him an easier prey. The recent Soviet-Finnish war showed that the information flowing through various channels to Berlin about the extreme weakening of the Red Army's combat capability after the massive repressions of the 1930s. corresponds to reality. And this made the assurances of the generals of the Wehrmacht convincing about the possibility of defeating the colossus on feet of clay "in three or four months.

In July 1940, the German General Staff began to discuss the prospects for a war against the USSR, and by the beginning of 1941 there was already a detailed plan for this war (the Barbarbs plan). Soon the date of the attack was finally set - 22 June 1941 ...

In parallel, the concentration of fascist troops took place along the western borders of the USSR. This was done under the guise of resting the soldiers before the operation Sea Lion and the rush to the Middle East to seize British possessions.

So, in the tense diplomatic struggle of the pre-war period, Berlin, skillfully playing on the secret strings of the foreign policy of its potential victims, on their intention to negotiate with the aggressor behind each other's backs, managed to prevent the creation of a single anti-German bloc, and then, at the right moment for itself, withdraw one of these victims - the Soviet Union - from the game.

On the eve of the fascist aggression, the USSR found itself alone, without allies, and even with such leaders who firmly believed, not without the help of the same Nazi diplomacy that the non-aggression pact and the treaty of friendship with Germany reliably guarantee that the country will not be drawn into the fire of the world war.

Was the Soviet Union ready to repel aggression? The structural and material factors of the defense capability of any modern state can be represented in the form of a triangle, the base of which is the general economic potential (first of all, the basic industries), the middle part is the military-industrial complex, and the top is the armed forces proper.

As we know, as a result of forced industrialization and collectivization, the USSR acquired a powerful industry and a strictly centralized agriculture. The emphasis in industrial construction was placed on the eastern regions of the country. Even more serious shifts took place in the qualitative level of the Soviet economy.

New industries appeared in it (heavy engineering, automotive, aviation, chemical, etc.), without which it was unthinkable to equip the army with modern military equipment, and a significant increase in the educational, cultural and technical level of the population opened up opportunities for the effective mastery of it by millions. of people. Much attention was paid to the accumulation of state mobilization reserves. From 1 940 to June 1 94 1, their volumes almost doubled.

During the years of the first five-year plans, two military-industrial bases (Ural-Siberian and Far Eastern) appeared in the east, in addition to the only one that had been operating in the European part of the country since pre-revolutionary times. At the end of 1 9 30s. measures were taken to accelerate the development of the defense industries. In particular, the allocations for military needs increased by 2.5 times in comparison with 1938: by 1941 they reached one third of the state budget. New models of military equipment were developed and put on the conveyor, which were not inferior to the best foreign designs, and often even surpassed them. At the same time, the necessary scale for the production of modern weapons for various reasons, both objective and due to miscalculations, was not achieved. It was not completely possible to eliminate the imbalance in the geographical location of military factories: by the summer of 1941, less than 20% of defense products were produced in the east.

In the two pre-war years, the size of the Soviet Armed Forces tripled and reached 5.3 million people. In accordance with the law "0 universal conscription" adopted in September 1993, the transition to a unified personnel system for manning troops was completed short-term fees). However, their equipment was dominated by outdated military equipment.

Of the more than 20 thousand tanks in the army, modern combat vehicles were extremely small: 6 3 8 heavy KV and 1 2 2 5 medium T-3 4. less than two

- & nbsp– & nbsp–

The Stalinist purges inflicted enormous damage on the fighting efficiency of the army.

Only from May 1 9 3 7 to September 1 938 almost all division and brigade commanders, all corps commanders and commanders of military districts, most of the political workers of corps, divisions and brigades, and about half of the regimental commanders were subjected to repression.

Out of 733 people of the highest command and political staff of the Armed Forces (from brigade commander to marshal), 5 79 died. The army ended up in the hands of military leaders whose knowledge and strategic thinking corresponded to the level of the First World War and increase in the number of military units in the pre-war years).

By the beginning of 1941, only 7% of both had a higher military education.

A direct consequence of this were serious mistakes in the development of military doctrine, in assessing the nature of the initial stage of the war (it was supposed to be a zone of relatively long deployment of the sides' combat forces), in determining the direction of the enemy's main attack. JV Stalin was convinced that the Nazis in the war with the USSR would first of all strive to seize Ukraine in order to deprive our country of rich economic regions and seize Ukrainian grain, Donetsk coal, and then the Caucasian oil. The state supported the thesis that in the event of an attack on it, the USSR would conduct offensive hostilities on foreign territory with little blood and turn them into a civil war - the world flight with the world bourgeoisie. Therefore, more than half of the strategic stocks (weapons, ammunition, fuel) were stored near the border and in the first weeks of the war either fell into the hands of the Germans or were destroyed during the retreat.

The political leadership of the USSR stubbornly ignored information about the preparation of German aggression. For fear of giving Berlin a reason to break the non-aggression pact, the Red Army was not put on alert in time.

And as a result: the blunt edge of the defense triangle turned out to be practically crumpled in the first tragic months of the war.

However, a nationwide catastrophe was avoided, since the industrial potential and the military-industrial complex remained.

The above facts give grounds for reflection on one more question: how convincing is the version of the USSR as the main culprit of the war, put forward in recent years by a number of domestic and foreign historians? They are trying to prove that Stalin appointed an attack on Germany on July 6, 1941, and Hitler, starting a preventive war against the USSR, only averted the threat of a massive blow from the Red Army from his country. For many researchers, the opposite is obvious: the real level of combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces did not allow them not only to attack, but also to skillfully repel fascist aggression.

Power and society. The alarming situation on the eve of the war affected the social policy of the Soviet leadership. In 1939, in order to strengthen labor discipline on collective farms, a mandatory minimum of workdays was established. Peasants who did not produce it were expelled from the collective farm and sent to forced labor. Similar measures were taken with regard to workers and employees. In June 1940, the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR increased the working day (from 7 to 8 hours) and prohibited unauthorized transfer from one enterprise to another. From now on, this was punishable by imprisonment. In July of the same year, a new decree followed.

He equated the release of low-quality products with "sabotage".

These steps to strengthen non-economic coercion in society were taken against the backdrop of an ever increasing orientation of the ideological work of the Communist Party to educating Soviet people in the spirit of patriotism and readiness for armed defense of the Motherland. Literature, cinema and official propaganda turned to the images of the heroes of the past: Dmitry Donskoy, Peter the Great, Alexander Suvorov, Mikhail Kutuzov, etc. Such attributes of the age-old Russian statehood as officer and general ranks were revived.

In the alarming pre-war decade, the authorities began to view the sports movement as an important element in strengthening the defense capability of the USSR. In 1 9 3 1 a sports complex was introduced

Ready for labor and defense of the USSR. The delivery of its standards has become a matter of honor for millions of schoolchildren and students in the country. Badge winning sports were very popular

Voroshilovsky shooter, Ready for air and chemical defense, Parachutist of the USSR, etc. The Voluntary Society for Assistance to Defense, Aviation and Chemical Construction was active among the youth. By 1 9 4 1 it consisted of about 14 million people. In the training sections of this society, young men and women studied shooting, air defense means, bayonet fighting techniques, the technique of driving cars and piloting airplanes.

- & nbsp– & nbsp–

1. Make a chronological table Expansion of the borders of the USSR in 1939-1941. ... Give an assessment of the actions of the USSR. 2. How are the relations between the USSR and Germany formed in 1939-1 9 4 1? ? * Which hopes of both sides regarding the non-aggression pact have been justified, which have not? Why?

Z *. Drawing on additional sources of information, please provide an assessment of Soviet-German relations in the late 1930s. What assessment do you support? Give reasons for your opinion. 4. Using the material in paragraph f, draw a diagram or prepare a computer presentation of the Factors of Defense of the USSR on the eve of the Great War.

5. Get involved in group work. Divide into three groups and, using the diagram (see task 4), analyze the degree of the USSR's readiness to repulse the enemy. * What factors, not included in the scheme, should be taken into account when assessing the defense capability of our country? After brainstorming, formulate your conclusion. 6 *. Prepare a speech on one of the topics: Social policy in the USSR in 1939-1 9 4 1. », What has changed in the party ideological work in 1939-1 9 4 1. ? , The readiness of the USSR for war with Germany.

- & nbsp– & nbsp–

Problem. Why is the Soviet - German front rightfully considered the main front of the Second World War?

Remember the meaning of the concepts: Headquarters of the Supreme Command, State Defense Committee, fundamental change, unconditional capitalization.

Answer the questions. 1. Did the events of the Second World War take place in 1939-1941? Which states were in a state of war with Germany by the year 1 94 1? 2. What was the Barbarossa plan? 3. What major battles of the Great Patriotic War do you know?

The fighting forces of the parties. At dawn on June 2, 1941, Germany attacked the USSR without declaring war. Together with the Wehrmacht, the armed forces of Hungary, Italy, Romania and Finland participated in combat operations. The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people began, which immediately became the most important component of the Second World War for the fate of the peoples of the Earth.

According to the Barbarossa plan, it was assumed that well-trained and technically equipped invasion armies would capture the vital centers of the country before the onset of winter 1941 and enter the Arkhangelsk-Volga-Astrakhan line. It was a strategic setting for a blitzkrieg - a blitzkrieg war. The fascist bloc threw 4, 4 million soldiers and officers, 4, 4 thousand.

combat aircraft, 4 thousand tanks and assault guns, 39 thousand cannons and mortars, concentrated in three directions:

Army Group North, deployed under the command of General Field Marshal V. Leeb in East Prussia, had the task of destroying Soviet troops in the Baltic, seizing ports on the Baltic Sea and Leningrad;

The most powerful army group "Center" (commanded by General Field Marshal F. Bock) was to attack Minsk and further to Smolensk and Moscow;

Army Group South (commanded by Field Marshal G. Rundstedt) pursued the goal of crushing the forces of the Red Army in Western Ukraine, reaching the Dnieper and developing an offensive to the southeast.

The invasion armies were directly opposed by the fighting forces of the western border districts. They included 3 million Soviet soldiers and officers, 3,9, 4,000 guns and mortars, 1,100 tanks and assault guns, 9,100 combat aircraft.

Yielding to the enemy in personnel, the Soviet troops had significantly more tanks and aircraft. However, the general qualitative superiority was on the side of the enemy, and at the beginning of the war it turned out to be decisive. The aggressor had a number of advantages, but the most important thing was that his troops were deployed, in full combat readiness. Another advantage was the quality of military equipment. For the most part, Soviet aircraft were inferior to German ones in terms of basic technical data, while taiki - in terms of deterioration and availability of repair facilities. Unlike the Soviet units, which were in a state of formation or reorganization and and, the German units were fully staffed according to wartime staff, coordinated and trained, had a well-trained command staff ... Despite the fact that the Germans were pedantry, favorable conditions for creative and proactive actions of commanders, which was not observed in the Red Army, where the fear of repression actually deprived the officers of any initiative. In the conditions of a rapidly changing, often unclear situation at the beginning of the war, in the absence of communication with a superior military leader, this played its tragic role. One of the most important advantages of the Wehrmacht was superiority in mobility. Before the attack on the USSR, Germany received road transport for almost all of Europe. The Soviet troops had only a third of the regular number of transport. To a much lesser extent than the enemy, they were equipped with rad io equipment.

In addition, the German command, striving to achieve success by deep cleaving strikes of tank wedges and their rapid advance, positioned the troops unevenly along the entire front.

Most of the forces were concentrated on the direction of the main strikes in order to create there a multiple (four to five times or more) superiority over the Soviet troops stretched along the line from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea.

Blitzkrieg failure. At noon on June 2, the first deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, VM Molotov, addressed the people by radio. Calling for a decisive rebuff to the treacherous aggressor, he ended his speech with the words that became the motto of all the war years: “Our cause is just! The enemy will be defeated! Victory will be ours! "

On June 22, a general mobilization of those liable for military service was announced. On the basis of the border military districts, the following fronts were formed: North-Western (commander - General F.I.Kuznetsov), Western (commander - General D.G. Pavlov) and South-West (commander - General M.P. Kirponos) ... On June 24, a new front was created - the Northern (commander - General M.M. Popov), a day later - the Southern (commander - General I.V. Tyulenev). On June 23, the Headquarters of the High Command was established (from August, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command), on June 30, the State Defense Committee (GKO), which officially concentrated the entirety of state and military power. JV Stalin was appointed Chairman of the State Defense Committee and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. In August 1994, General G.K. Zhukov became his deputy for the Supreme High Command.

The creation of these higher collegial bodies did not change the established situation: all the levers of control over the army and the country were solely in the hands of Stalin. It was difficult to make out where the State Defense Committee ends and where the Headquarters begins and vice versa, Zhukov later recalled. - In practice, it turned out like this: Stalin is Headquarters and the State Defense Committee is also Stalin. He commanded everything, he conducted, his word was final and not subject to appeal.

The first troops of the aggressor met the border outposts, which were in constant combat readiness. They all held out until the last cartridge. The heroic defense of the Brest Fortress, headed by Major P. M. Gavrilov, Captain I. N. Zubachev, and Regimental Commissar E. M. Fomin, went down in history forever.

For almost a month, the defenders of the border fortress, bleeding to death, fettered an entire fascist division.

However, most of the regular divisions of the border military districts were taken by surprise by the German attack. The defensive lines near the borders were not occupied by the troops that had been taken to summer camps near the training shooting ranges back in May. The artillery was located at training ranges away from their divisions. Aviation was not dispersed over hidden field sites, presenting an easily accessible target for destruction at base airfields. Only the ships and naval bases of the Northern, Baltic and Black Sea fleets, by order of the People's Commissar of the Navy N.F. Kuznetsov, were put on alert and met enemy aircraft with dense barrage of fire.

From the first hours of hostilities, the invading armies followed a well-thought-out plan. First of all, they achieved complete domination in the air, destroying thousands of defenseless Soviet aircraft at open airfields (only the Western Front then lost up to 40% of its aviation). The headquarters, command and control centers near the borders, railway communication centers, as well as remote cities: Murmansk, L: I: e paya, Riga, Kaunas, Minsk, Kiev, Smolensk were subjected to massive bombardment ... were completely violated. At the same time, powerful tank columns launched a ramming breakthrough of the loose defense line in three strategic directions: Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev.

On the evening of June 22, the political leadership of the USSR, in a temper, gave the Armed Forces an order to crush the enemy groupings that had wedged in and fight to break into the territories adjacent to the Soviet borders. But already at the end of June, given the unreality of this task, another directive was given to the troops - to switch to strategic defense. Its main borders were also designated, where, with the help of the civilian population, trenches, trenches and an inscription on the wall of the ditch were dug, anti-tank hedgehogs and barbed wire fences were installed in the Brest Fortress, long-term firing points and dugouts were set up. The command also tried to bring up the troop reinforcements there. Strategic defense pursued the goal of exhausting the enemy's striking forces, knocking out his trained personnel and military equipment, gaining time to create the necessary reserves and conditions in order to achieve a radical turn in the course of the war.

Immediately faced with fierce resistance from the Red Army, the Wehrmacht lost in the first five weeks of the war over 1 90 thousand soldiers and officers (twice as many as in two years of war in Europe), half of the tanks and almost a quarter of the aircraft. "Our troops," one of the fighting German generals stated with alarm, "very soon learned what it meant to fight against the Russians."

However, the situation on the Soviet-German front continued to aggravate every day.

Think about the questions: what was the reason for the tragic failures of the Red Army in the first months of the war? For an answer, refer to § 2 again. 4. What other factors played a negative role in the course of hostilities?

- & nbsp– & nbsp–

The most powerful Soviet front, the Southwestern Front, resisted with the last bit of strength. At the end of June, the largest tank battle in the initial period of the war took place in the Rovno-Dubno Brody area. More than 2 thousand tanks took part in it on both sides.

But it was lost, because the Soviet armored vehicles could not get fuel on time. A tragic situation developed near Kiev m. In September, the city was captured by the enemy. The Kiev group of Soviet troops was surrounded and destroyed. The commander of the Southwestern Front, MN Kirponos, was killed. Hundreds of thousands of Red Army soldiers were taken prisoner. Building on their success, the German fascist troops rushed to Odessa (after a heroic defense was taken in October), laid siege to Sevastopol, and in November reached Ros tov-on-Don.

The road of life

The most difficult situation arose on the central, Western front. At the beginning of July, tank groups of German troops in the Minsk region managed to encircle and defeat about 30 divisions of the Red Army, and then break through to Smolensk. Fierce battles for this key city on the way to Moscow continued for two months. During the Battle of Smolensk near Orsha, Soviet troops for the first time used rocket artillery, the legendary Katyushas, ​​which caused the enemy to panic. On August 30, the operation began near Yel'naya, led by General G.K. Zhukov. For the first time in the difficult months of the war, it was offensive in nature and ended in the complete defeat of 10 enemy tank and infantry divisions. In these battles, the Soviet guard was born. Four especially distinguished divisions were first awarded the rank of guards.

In mid-September, the Battle of Smolensk ended in defeat for the Red Army. Inspired by success, the Hitlerite command gathered about half of the personnel and aircraft, three quarters of the tanks on the Eastern Front, for the last rush to Moscow.

The general offensive of the German forces of the "Center" group on the capital of the USSR began on September 3 0 1 9 4 1 in accordance with the specially developed Operation Typhoon. The Nazis managed to break the defenses of the Soviet troops and by October 7, encircle seven armies in the area of ​​Vyazma and Bryansk. Kalinin (Tver), Mozhaisk, Maloyaroslavets were captured. The fighting was already 80-100 km from the capital.

However, the Red soldiers, loyal to the oath of allegiance to the Motherland, and surrounded by continued to fight to the death, chaining over 20 elite German divisions.

8 - Lewandowski, 11 cl.

The blood-conquered time, calculated literally in hours, allowed the Headquarters to pull fresh combat reserves to Moscow. On October 1 0, G.K. Zhukov was appointed commander of the main Western Front defending the capital; he was urgently recalled from Leningrad. The evacuation from Moscow of government institutions, foreign diplomats, industrial enterprises, and the population began. The hasty evacuation gave rise to rumors about the possible surrender of the city and panic among the residents. On October 20, a state of siege was introduced in the capital. People who sowed confusion and direct enemy agents were shot on the spot without trial or investigation. Regiments and divisions of the people's militia were urgently formed. Almost half a million of Muscovites went out to build fortifications and defensive crossings. The enemy was stopped by incredible efforts.

On November 7, 1 9 4 1, in Moscow on Red Square, despite the artillery cannonade from the nearby front, a parade of troops took place. He had a tremendous impact on raising the morale of the fighting Red Army, of the entire people. The participants of the parade walked from Red Square directly to the fighting positions, inspired by the words of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the great army of the unyielding people: Comrades, Red Army men and Red Navy men, commanders and political workers, workers and women workers, collective farmers and collective farmers, workers of intelligent labor, brothers and sisters! "The whole world looks at you as a force capable of destroying the plundering hordes of German invaders. The enslaved peoples of Europe, who fell under the yoke of the German invaders, look at you as their liberators. The great liberation mission fell to your lot. Be worthy of this mission! The war you are waging is a war of liberation, a just war. May the courageous image of our great ancestors - Alexander Nevsky, Dmitry Donskoy, Kuzma Minin, Dmitry Pozharsky, Alexander Suvorov, Mikhail Kutuzov inspire you in this war! the great Lenin! For the complete defeat of the German invaders! The second offensive of Army Group Center on Moscow began on November 1 5. The Moscow region again became an arena of bloody battles.

Its central and dominant component, which determines a relatively stable selective attitude with ... "Ilya Knabenhof 1 + 1 = 1 The tragedy of experiencing oneself as separate from all others is the delusion that becomes our prison! Albert Einstein Life has only one door. On the one hand, e is written "from oneself", on the other - "to oneself." Nisargadatta Maharaj From the very beginning, I want to draw your attention to two ... "

“ISSN 9125 0912. Bulletin of Dnipropetrovsk University. Series "IFNIT", 2013. Vipusk 21 28. 40 years in the ranks of the creators of rocket and space technologies: in 2 books. / Ed. V.V.Shelukhina. - Book. 1: Boldness, talent and feat of the team .... "

"The results of the annual spring OLYMPIAD for applicants to the master's program of ETU" LETI ", 2016 Electronics and nanoelectronics Winners: 1. Avdienko Pavel Sergeevich 2. Zemtsovskaya Vera Sergeevna 3. Nikolaychuk Vladimir Petrovich Prize-winners: Anikina ..."

redistribution of powers from the governor to subordinate institutions and officials. Both approaches mutually complemented each other, and each separately defended the interests of the absolute ... ”Head of the Center for Research on the Dynamics of Values ​​of the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The transformation of modern growth ... " [email protected] Tool CryptoPro CSP Cryptographic Version 3.6.1 Protection Administrator's Guide Security Information General part ... »www.rehes.org, extended theses of my report" Drinking ... "

«UDC 004.946: 316.752 DS Martyanov Virtual values: structure, dynamics, contradictions The article considers the concept of virtual value. The author's definition of virtual value is given, the main types of virtual values ​​are highlighted. Considered modern social theories about values. The author considers specific virtual values ​​... "

“Kim IZ. Postmodernity: Nottentialization of Simulacrum and Removal of the Principle of Reality The current state of society is difficult to characterize with old concepts, it is indefinable by means of modernist value attitudes. T..."

2017 www.site - "Free Electronic Library - Various Documents"

The materials on this site are posted for review, all rights belong to their authors.
If you do not agree that your material is posted on this site, please write to us, we will delete it within 1-2 business days.