On the birthday of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, the leadership of the US National Security Archive prepared a rather original gift for the former Secretary General of the Central Committee of the CPSU: they posted 14 secret documents relating to the activities of the Soviet politician in the period from 1984-1991 to the public. A congratulatory signature is attached to the secret papers.
It is worth noting that the National Security Archive is not like Wikileaks, but an official body that monitors the period of secrecy of documents. As soon as the term ends, the documents are made public. So what was the activity of Mikhail Sergeevich concealing?
Correspondence with Reagan, data from Reagan with Thatcher and Bush with Kohl, as well as an analysis of Gorbachev's activities as a politician who took office as General Secretary.
The areas painted in white are the CIA seal, no one will know the hidden information. Even for people close to the American intelligence services, this was inaccessible.
The documents indicate that Gorbachev's work is assessed as risky, but, nevertheless, effective. Mostly praise for "fighting inefficiency and corruption". It is noted that the Secretary General is rapidly promoting his familiar supporters to high positions, who will later have to be isolated. The Americans also complain that Gorbachev's actions do not go at the same pace as his promises: "The ambitious agenda puts Gorbachev in the crosshairs ... It will be necessary to constantly prove his case ... Any mistake he makes will lead to the consolidation of the opposition and hit him himself."
Judging by the documents from the time when Mikhail Gorbachev was already president of the USSR, the United States began to understand that their plan was gradually beginning to work. With such “successes”, Gorbachev will soon be overthrown, and this will be followed by an arbitrary anarchy.
And then there are several ways according to the plan: either conservatives from the KGB come to power, who will destroy their own economy and eventually give their place to the democrats, or reformers who will make a confederation out of the Soviet Union. Analysts are well aware that Gorbachev destroyed the Leninist regime and left absolutely nothing in return, except for an anti-crisis program that does not work.
Ultimately, Gorbachev made attempts to break between conservatives and reformers, but neither of them trusted him. The United States concludes that even if either side comes to power, it will be impossible to pull the country out of the crisis: “Gorbachev will most likely be forced to resign.”
These, of course, are not the only documents that Mikhail Sergeyevich received on his 85th birthday. Not all of them are made public. There are rumors that the remnants are in Moscow at 39 Leningradsky Prospekt. Of course, Gorbachev will not say anything about them, wanting to remain in the guise of a real reformer.
Gorbachev's policy led the USSR to disaster, according to American intelligence, and now this fact can no longer be hidden.
The secrecy stamp was removed from 14 documents relating to Gorbi's activities in 1984-1991, - a well-known historian of special services, writer Gennady SOKOLOV told Komsomolskaya Pravda. - On March 2, the leadership of the US National Security Archive posted them on their website with a congratulation in red font "Happy Birthday, Mikhail Sergeevich!" And on the same day sent from Washington to Moscow a package with secret papers made public. Personally to the hero of the day, who turned 85.
Gennady Evgenievich, what is this US National Security Archive and does it congratulate all world leaders in such an original way?
This is a public organization created in the US capital in 1985 by journalists and historians at the George Washington University. Its goal is to encourage intelligence agencies to declassify archival materials of interest to the world community. A lot of interesting material pulled out from under the bushel regularly appears on their site. Unfortunately, we do not have such an analogue in Russia. Although the need is great. Too many secrets of interest to the people have been gathering dust for 50 or more years on the shelves of the archives of domestic special services. I have not heard of such gifts from the US National Security Archive to other world leaders. It seems that Gorbachev was the first to receive such an honor. Still, in the West it is treated differently than in our homeland. With great reverence. He delivered many pleasant super surprises to them during his short career as the last leader of the USSR.
- What exactly is in the “Gorbi Dossier” exposed by the special services?
Records of his talks with Reagan in Reykjavik, Geneva and Malta, personal correspondence with Reagan, as well as assessments given to Mikhail Sergeevich in the correspondence between Reagan and Thatcher, Bush with Kohl.
Of greatest interest in this "Dossier" are, in my opinion, two declassified CIA documents. Analysis of the beginning of the General Secretary and his decline.
NEW BROOM
The first document on 13 pages evaluates the new leader of the USSR based on the results of the first 100 days of his stay in power, says Gennady Sokolov. - It is titled eloquently: "Gorbachev, a new broom."
SECRET
CIA intelligence agency. June 1985
(document С05332240)
“In the first 100 days of his reign, Gorbachev proved himself to be the most aggressive and determined Soviet leader since Khrushchev. He has shown a willingness to take controversial and even unpopular measures, such as an anti-alcohol campaign or abandoning the old practice of not criticizing the actions of his colleagues at Politburo meetings.”
Further in the text, a gap is CIA censorship. To paint over with white the fragments of text in declassified papers that remain secret behind seven seals is an American practice for the last 20 years, if I'm not mistaken. Prior to this, super-secrets were blacked out throughout the text. It happened that the whole page of the cereushka was smeared with black, only at the top the title of the document remained untouched.
- And what can be now secret in the analytical report of 30 years ago about Gorbachev? The USSR is long gone!
Obviously, in this place specific examples are given from the meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU with criticism of Mikhail Sergeevich addressed to his comrades. This is secret information that was never published in the USSR, possibly obtained by the CIA from undercover sources of its Moscow residency. It is likely that the CIA cites the pseudonyms of these sources in the document. They are not subject to declassification and therefore are hidden by Langley's censorship. There are a lot of similar exclusions in the New Broom. But let's keep reading. Abstract.
« He launched an attack on the most sensitive areas, such as re-prioritising investments in the country's economy, methods of managing it, and corruption. The offensive nature of his rhetoric leaves no room for compromise and retreat.».
« Gorbachev believes that an attack on inefficiency and corruption, rather than radical reforms, can radically change the situation in the country for the better. This is a risky course, but Gorbachev’s chances of success should not be underestimated… In the short term, his chances look good… He has begun to form his own support group in the Politburo and the Party Secretariat… he can also count on the support of the middle class, disappointed by the stagnation of the Brezhnev era… The country’s public, judging by on initial reaction, also responded positively to Gorbachev's style of work and point of view»
« A sharp contrast with the style of his predecessors... Gorbachev made it clear that he intended to seriously tackle the existing problems. Populist style…, direct contact with people…, carefully thought-out PR campaigns…, getting his wife Raisa involved in media and TV work ».
« Emphasis in speeches on the crisis in the country…, a turning point in history…, the need to accelerate the development of the economy…, the goal is to meet the growing needs of the population».
« Gorbachev uses the time-tested method of consolidating his power, putting forward his supporters to leadership positions.
Having promoted three of his like-minded people to the Politburo at the Plenum in April, he actually secured a majority for himself in decision-making. One of the three new members of the Politburo appointed at the suggestion of Gorbachev at the April plenum was Yegor Ligachev, unofficially the "second secretary" in the party. This appointee isolated Gorbachev's rival, Central Committee Secretary Grigory Romanov. Gorbachev put this protégé (Ligachev) “on the cadres” - at the head of the department responsible for the selection and placement of leading cadres in the party, thereby creating the basis for personnel renewal and nomination of his supporters for the next party congress in February 1986. The second appointee, KGB Chairman Viktor Chebrikov, another close ally of Gorbachev, gave the General Secretary the important advantage of exerting political pressure on his potential opponents in the Politburo, many of whom were involved in corruption.”
Gorbachev's third nominee, as is known, was Nikolai Ryzhkov (he replaced Tikhonov as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR).
- Later, Mikhail Sergeevich "isolates" his faithful nominees.
- "Gorbachev's public statements and his pronounced commitment to reforms clearly outweigh concrete actions to change the economic system."
"Gorbachev has already shown significant activity in the field of foreign policy ... A significant increase in his personal role in the diplomatic efforts of the USSR should be expected in the near future."
“The opposition to Gorbachev (after the April Plenum) is disorganized. The old guard - Prime Minister Tikhonov, Moscow party boss Grishin, Republican party leaders Shcherbitsky (Ukraine) and Kunaev (Kazakhstan) have apparently gone on the defensive amid accusations of mismanagement and corruption in the organizations they control. Secretary of the Central Committee Romanov, as a potential leader of the opposition, was out of work due to personnel changes organized by Gorbachev, and, apparently, has no more political future ... Gorbachev's opponents in the Central Committee lack a leader. Gorbachev's proposals are met with some opposition... But his opponents will have to wait until the new leader makes a mistake before counterattacking."
“Gorbachev's efforts to make the country's existing system more efficient remain a risky venture. A new investment strategy could make him many enemies. Efforts to accelerate the country's economic development could ricochet back at Gorbachev himself."
“The ambitious agenda puts Gorbachev in the crosshairs… It will be necessary to constantly prove his case… Any mistake he makes will lead to the consolidation of the opposition and will hit him.”
WHO WILL TAKE POWER FROM GORBACHEV
This is the title of the second secret document, number 50USC4039. It was prepared on April 29, 1991 for US President Bush Sr. on behalf of CIA Deputy Director John Helgerson.
Here are the main theses and quotes.
“The era of Gorbachev is almost over. Even if in a year he remains in his Kremlin office, he will not have real power. If Gorbachev is overthrown in the near future, then the hardliners will do it ... However, over time, the influence of the reformers will grow, and the Democrats will come to power. The transition of power will probably not be smooth, a transitional period with an intense struggle for power and, as a result, anarchy is inevitable.
First page of document number 50USC4039. It was prepared on April 29, 1991 for US President Bush Sr. on behalf of CIA Deputy Director John Helgerson.
The loss of power by Gorbachev will inevitably be connected with the fate of the country's political system. If the conservatives seize power, they will look for ways to preserve the empire and authoritarian rule with harsh methods. The opposition will be crushed without delay, its leaders, in particular Yeltsin, will be arrested or liquidated, and the newly won rights and freedoms will be put to an end. They will take a hardline stance against the United States and look for opportunities to expand their influence abroad. But even if the conservatives use force and mass repression, it will be difficult for them to retain power due to the lack of an effective program to overcome the growing problems and because of the internal disengagement in the country. With such power, the economic situation will worsen, social exclusion will grow sharply, which will inevitably lead to the victory of democratic and nationalist forces.
If the reformers win, then the transfer of power to the republics and the creation of a confederation will follow. Even if the union is re-established, the republics will have more independence and the right to go their own way. Many republics will immediately embark on the path of democratic and market reforms, but some of them will retain certain features of authoritarian rule ... Each republic will begin to pursue its own foreign policy and build its own internal security system independently of the KGB.
Summarizing, we can say that the Soviet Union is currently going through a revolutionary situation, and the current centralized system of government in it is doomed to failure. As has already happened over the past two years in other countries of Eastern Europe, in the USSR there are now all signs that in the near future there will not only be a change of power, but also the rapid liquidation of the existing political system.
“Since the beginning of 1991, Gorbachev has been under increasing political pressure from two opposing sides - conservatives and reformers. His situation is aggravated by the fact that he has practically lost support in the country. The center of power he heads is increasingly blurred. If before the leaders of the opposition were concerned about the political future of Gorbachev, now they are only thinking about how to get rid of him as soon as possible.
The conservatives, represented by the leadership of the KGB, the armed forces and the CPSU, who used to be politically dependent on Gorbachev, are now distancing themselves from him. The nature of the statements about Gorbachev's policy made by KGB Chairman Kryuchkov and Defense Minister Yazov during their meetings with former US President Richard Nixon during his recent visit to Moscow shows distrust of Gorbachev on the part of security officials.
A large number of mid-level conservatives are uniting in anti-Gorbachev positions. Parliamentarians and members of the Soyuz deputy group collect signatures to convene an extraordinary congress of the CPSU in order to remove Gorbachev from power posts. Since the end of last year, their most prominent representatives have been putting pressure on Gorbachev, calling for him to leave and advocating the re-election of the party leadership. The positions of the general secretary in the party are weakening. At the April plenum, Gorbachev was able to defend his position as leader of the party thanks to the support of the majority of the members of the party's central committee, but he still has to deal with the ever-increasing threat of a coup in the party.
Attempts by reformers to remove Gorbachev intensified after Yeltsin's televised call in February for Gorbachev to be fired. The same call was made by strikers in the country miners and representatives of other industrial sectors. Most of these groups are calling for the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Congress of People's Deputies."
LEAD THE COUNTRY TO A DISASTER
The reason for the situation around Gorbachev is that his policy has led the country to a catastrophe, and he is not able to bring it out of the crisis - give a ruthless fair assessment of the activities of the last Soviet leader of the CIA analysts. - He destroyed the old Leninist political system in the country, but did not create anything in return. His new anti-crisis program is a stillborn project of using outdated methods of centralized leadership to stabilize the country's economy.
According to official statistics, the economy continues to decline and in the first quarter of the year, GNP (gross national product) fell by 8 percent. Inventories of consumer goods are shrinking markedly, prices are rising at an accelerated pace, spinning an inflationary spiral.
Last week, Gorbachev got some breathing room, managing to rebuff attempts by the conservatives at the party plenum to dismiss him and getting agreement with the leaders of the republics, including Yeltsin. This happened against the backdrop of a sharp deterioration in the situation in the country, and none of the key players dared to escalate the struggle for power.
Yeltsin and the leaders of the republics are apparently wary of putting undue pressure on Gorbachev, believing that this could lead to his removal by hardliners in the party. Therefore, at one of his last meetings with deputies, Yeltsin called this approach a tactical ploy, emphasizing that the time had not yet come for a full-scale confrontation.
The attempt to remove Gorbachev at the Party Plenum was initiated by middle-level representatives, and not by conservative leaders, who, apparently, will resort to a coup d'etat to seize power if they decide to do so. All this became possible due to the ongoing economic disintegration in the country. Soon, political pressure on Gorbachev will increase again. The leaders of the republics, including Yeltsin, are waiting for a decisive turn in their direction from the President of the USSR, but the conservatives will not tolerate such a shift.
In order to reach stable agreements with the republics, Gorbachev will have to cede a significant part of his power to them and weaken control from the center. In fact, we can only talk about creating a fairly fragmented confederation. If this does not happen, the confrontation will continue. Gorbachev cannot count on the fact that the fear of a coup on the part of the conservatives will be a deterrent for the republics.
Any attempts by Gorbachev to reach an agreement with the republics will cause concern on the part of the conservatives, who seek to maintain centralized control over the Union. This is their top priority. The fear that Gorbachev might actually agree on the division of powers with the republics¸ is likely to become a catalyst for the actions of the conservatives to seize power.
The working people of the country no longer trust Gorbachev's government. Unrest in the country will inevitably grow due to a sharp rise in prices and an acute shortage of consumer goods.
Gorbachev's attempts to preserve the central government and the union state at any cost may exacerbate the conflict between the republics and the center. The growing influence and popularity of the elected leadership in the republics is also capable of undermining the already weakened authority of Gorbachev. If Yeltsin succeeds in creating and strengthening the presidential structures of power in the Russian Federation - elections are scheduled for June - he will significantly strengthen his position in opposition to the center and the struggle to remove Gorbachev.
Gorbachev's political position is getting worse and worse. He entered into an alliance with the top of the KGB, the armed forces and the CPSU and fully supports the policy of the conservatives. He has found himself in a politically dependent position on them, and it will become increasingly difficult for him to try to ignore their demands. Realizing this, most reformers no longer trust him. Last week, Yeltsin and the leaders of the eight republics agreed with Gorbachev on a new basis for cooperation between the center and the republics, but this agreement may not work unless Gorbachev gives up some of his powers in favor of the republics. Gorbachev has lost political initiative and is now only trying to react to events without any long-term plan of action.
The essence of the current crisis is that none of the warring parties is able to resolve it. The Soviet Union is in a revolutionary situation.
Although the country's security forces have sufficient capabilities for a coup d'état, it will be difficult to introduce a state of emergency in the country. Moreover, if the opposition succeeds ... in neutralizing the putschists' readiness to use force, then the conservatives' stake on it will be beaten.
The main conclusion of the CIA report is "Gorbachev will most likely be forced to resign." Recall that the CIA handed over this analytical report to US President Bush on April 29, 1991.
In August, indeed, the conservatives will try to seize power in the country. But the GKChP will fail, the putschists will be arrested. On December 25, the first and last president of the USSR will resign. The mighty and indestructible union of the free republics will fall apart. Everything as the CIA predicted!
AFTERWORD
Control over the destruction of the "red empire"
I was especially interested in translating declassified CIA documents concerning the beginning and end of the fleeting but dramatic era of Gorbachev, Gennady Sokolov admits. - The archives and secrets of the special services have generally occupied me, as a writer and historian, since the mid-80s. The secrets of the "five-year period of Gorbachev's rule" are the most incomprehensible and fascinating. After all, behind them are hidden still unsolved mechanisms for breaking the greatest empire of the twentieth century - the Soviet Union.
This topic, I think, will haunt our minds for many years to come. For a quarter of a century of the existence of the new Russia, many bold, albeit quite plausible, versions of a conspiracy against the USSR, plans to overthrow the Soviet regime, secret operations to recruit the Kremlin leadership and Gorbachev himself have already been issued “on the mountain”.
If these versions did take place, we are unlikely to learn about them from archival documents in our lifetime. Not a single intelligence service in the world will rush to reveal secrets of this kind. Therefore, any declassified materials related to the last years of the great Soviet Union are so interesting.
The CIA document of June 1985 is interesting, first of all, for the forecast and analysis of possible changes in the USSR under the “new broom” - Gorbachev. The anticipation of these changes in the text is obvious. As was the expectation that Gorbachev's reforms would fail, according to the CIA analyst team who wrote this report.
The conclusions from the analysis given in the document and the action plans of the American intelligence and the US administration are recorded in other documents unknown to us that are not subject to declassification. But one can easily assume that they formulated a strategy for “supporting Gorbachev” and his reforms.
In April 1991, according to CIA analysts, Gorbachev "successfully" failed the course of perestroika, effectively destroying the Soviet empire. The authors of the Bush report are only wondering who will replace the loser and whose chances of success are preferable. The choice is made in favor of Yeltsin.
The task of destroying the USSR and the Soviet system seems to them to a large extent already accomplished. We can only speculate what conclusions and specific proposals the US presidential administration made from this document of CIA Sovietologists. But they apparently dealt with work with Gorbachev's successor, Yeltsin. Work on the final destruction of the "red empire".
TO THE POINT
The Iron Lady bared her knees for the Secretary General
Back in 2013, about 400 documents from the archive of the British Foreign Office (the country's Foreign Office) concerning Gorbachev's contacts with the British leadership were sent to the public in London in 2013, the writer Gennady Sokolov continues the story. - From them, in particular, it follows that in the fall of 1984, the British elite set the task of choosing one of the young and promising members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee in order to invite him on a visit to London to meet and establish business contacts at the highest level.
Initially, there were two members of the Politburo on the list - Aliyev and Gorbachev. After studying and analyzing the situation in London, they staked on Gorbachev as a more promising leader. Perhaps because of the "fifth point" (nationality). After all, the leader of the USSR should be a representative of the titular nation - a Slav. The British guessed right with the candidacy.
From the declassified documents, it follows that Margaret Thatcher, a professor at Oxford University and a Sovietologist, Archie Brown, recommended placing Gorbachev on British Prime Minister. Paying attention to him back in 1978, when he became secretary of the Central Committee. Since then, Brown has closely followed Gorbachev's rise up the Soviet political ladder. His analytical materials on this subject were also recently declassified at the request of the Foreign Office. One of Brown's sources of information was Gorbachev's old friend from Moscow State University, the Czech Zdenek Mlynarzh, who fled from Prague to the West in 1968. He claimed that Gorbachev was open to new ideas, intelligent and committed to anti-Stalinist views. According to Brown, this was a very unusual set of qualities for a member of the Brezhnev team.
Yes, Zdenek Mlynarzh, one of the architects of the Prague Spring of 1968, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, studied in the same group with Gorbachev at the law faculty of Moscow State University, they lived in the same dorm room. In 1967, Zdenek even visited him in Stavropol. Mlynarazh, after returning to Prague after the Velvet Revolution, told me in an interview for Komsomolskaya Pravda about their strong friendship.
Correspondence and analytical materials from the archives of the British Foreign Office contain many complementary statements about Gorbachev and his wife. Not a single critical remark can be found in his address. Moreover, one declassified document speaks of the Iron Lady's personal sympathies for Gorbachev. And even about attempts at flirting at the residence of the British prime ministers in Checkers, where Thatcher deliberately sat down with Mikhail Sergeevich on the sofa, drawing her knees up and baring her legs.
Compromise in a long box
It was not for nothing that the Americans presented declassified documents to Gorbachev on his 85th birthday, writer Gennady SOKOLOV believes. - After his resignation in December 1991, the former secretary general took with him the entire archive accumulated over 6 years of work in the Kremlin. Now it is stored in Moscow, in the building of the Gorbachev Foundation at 39 Leningradsky Prospekt. This priceless archival collection includes more than 10,000 materials. Many of them are closed to the general public. According to the German magazine Der Spiegel, "these documents contain much of what Gorbachev would have preferred to keep silent about." "Spiegel" believes that "Gorbachev followed the path of many retired politicians, deciding to significantly embellish his image as a reformer." Documents unfavorable for this purpose are shelved. a source
- 26.03.2016Photo: RIA Novosti
His policies led the USSR to disaster, US intelligence claimed
The secrecy stamp was removed from 14 documents relating to Gorbi's activities in 1984-1991, a well-known journalist told Komsomolskaya Pravda special services historian, writer Gennady SOKOLOV. - On March 2, the leadership of the US National Security Archive posted them on their website with a congratulation in red font "Happy Birthday, Mikhail Sergeevich!" And on the same day sent from Washington to Moscow a package with secret papers made public. Personally to the hero of the day, who turned 85.
Gennady Evgenievich, what is this US National Security Archive and does it congratulate all world leaders in such an original way?
This is a public organization created in the US capital in 1985 by journalists and historians at the George Washington University. Its goal is to encourage intelligence agencies to declassify archival materials of interest to the world community. A lot of interesting material pulled out from under the bushel regularly appears on their site. Unfortunately, we do not have such an analogue in Russia. Although the need is great. Too many secrets of interest to the people have been gathering dust for 50 or more years on the shelves of the archives of domestic special services. I have not heard of such gifts from the US National Security Archive to other world leaders. It seems that Gorbachev was the first to receive such an honor. Still, in the West it is treated differently than in our homeland. With great reverence. He delivered them many pleasant super surprises during his short career as the last leader of the USSR.
- What exactly is in the “Gorbi Dossier” exposed by the special services?
Records of his talks with Reagan in Reykjavik, Geneva and Malta, personal correspondence with Reagan, as well as assessments given to Mikhail Sergeevich in Reagan's correspondence with Thatcher, Bush with Kohl.
Of greatest interest in this "Dossier" are, in my opinion, two declassified CIA documents. Analysis of the beginning of the General Secretary and his decline.
NEW BROOM
The first document on 13 pages evaluates the new leader of the USSR based on the results of the first 100 days of his stay in power, says Gennady Sokolov. - It is titled eloquently: "Gorbachev, a new broom."
SECRET
CIA intelligence agency. June 1985
(document С05332240)
“In the first 100 days of his reign, Gorbachev proved himself to be the most aggressive and determined Soviet leader since Khrushchev. He has shown a willingness to take controversial and even unpopular measures, such as an anti-alcohol campaign or abandoning the old practice of not criticizing the actions of his colleagues at Politburo meetings.”
Further in the text, a gap is CIA censorship. To paint over with white the fragments of text in declassified papers that remain secret behind seven seals is an American practice for the last 20 years, if I'm not mistaken. Prior to this, super-secrets were blacked out throughout the text. It happened that the whole page of the cereushka was smeared with black, only at the top the title of the document remained untouched.
- And what can be now secret in the analytical report of 30 years ago about Gorbachev? The USSR is long gone!
Obviously, in this place specific examples are given from the meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU with criticism of Mikhail Sergeevich addressed to his comrades. This is secret information that was never published in the USSR, possibly obtained by the CIA from undercover sources of its Moscow residency. It is likely that the CIA cites the pseudonyms of these sources in the document. They are not subject to declassification and therefore are hidden by Langley's censorship. There are a lot of similar exclusions in the New Broom. But let's keep reading. Abstract.
“He launched an attack on the most sensitive areas, such as re-prioritising investments in the country's economy, methods of managing it, and corruption. The offensive nature of his rhetoric leaves no room for compromise and retreat.
“Gorbachev believes that an attack on inefficiency and corruption, rather than radical reforms, can radically change the situation in the country for the better. This is a risky course, but Gorbachev’s chances of success should not be underestimated… In the short term, his chances look good… He has begun to form his own support group in the Politburo and the Party Secretariat… he can also count on the support of the middle class, disappointed by the stagnation of the Brezhnev era… The country’s public, judging by initial reaction, also reacted positively to Gorbachev's style of work and point of view"
“A sharp contrast with the style of his predecessors ... Gorbachev made it clear that he intends to take seriously the solution of existing problems. Populist style…, direct communication with people…, carefully thought-out PR campaigns…, getting his wife Raisa involved in media and TV work.”
"Emphasis in speeches on the crisis in the country ..., a turning point in history ..., the need to accelerate the development of the economy ..., the goal is to meet the growing needs of the population."
“Gorbachev uses the time-tested method of consolidating his power, putting forward his supporters to leadership positions.
Having promoted three of his like-minded people to the Politburo at the Plenum in April, he actually secured a majority for himself in decision-making. One of the three new members of the Politburo appointed at the suggestion of Gorbachev at the April plenum was Yegor Ligachev, unofficially the "second secretary" in the party. This appointee isolated Gorbachev's rival, Central Committee Secretary Grigory Romanov. Gorbachev put this protégé (Ligachev) “on the cadres” - at the head of the department responsible for the selection and placement of leading cadres in the party, thereby creating the basis for personnel renewal and nomination of his supporters for the next party congress in February 1986. The second appointee, KGB Chairman Viktor Chebrikov, another close ally of Gorbachev, provided the General Secretary with the important advantage of exerting political pressure on his potential opponents in the Politburo, many of whom were involved in corruption.
Gorbachev's third nominee, as is known, was Nikolai Ryzhkov (he replaced Tikhonov as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR).
- Later, Mikhail Sergeevich "isolates" his faithful nominees.
- "Gorbachev's public statements and his pronounced commitment to reforms clearly outweigh concrete actions to change the economic system."
"Gorbachev has already shown significant activity in the field of foreign policy ... A significant increase in his personal role in the diplomatic efforts of the USSR should be expected in the near future."
“The opposition to Gorbachev (after the April Plenum) is disorganized. The Old Guard - Prime Minister Tikhonov, Moscow party boss Grishin, Republican party leaders Shcherbitsky (Ukraine) and Kunaev (Kazakhstan) have apparently gone on the defensive amid accusations of mismanagement and corruption in the organizations they control. Secretary of the Central Committee Romanov, as a potential leader of the opposition, was out of work due to personnel changes organized by Gorbachev, and, apparently, has no more political future ... Gorbachev's opponents in the Central Committee lack a leader. Gorbachev's proposals are met with some opposition... But his opponents will have to wait until the new leader makes a mistake before counterattacking."
“Gorbachev's efforts to make the country's existing system more efficient remain a risky venture. A new investment strategy could make him many enemies. Efforts to accelerate the country's economic development could ricochet back at Gorbachev himself."
“The ambitious agenda puts Gorbachev in the crosshairs… It will be necessary to constantly prove his case… Any mistake he makes will lead to the consolidation of the opposition and will hit him.”
WHO WILL TAKE POWER FROM GORBACHEV
This is the title of the second secret document, number 50USC4039. It was prepared on April 29, 1991 for US President Bush Sr. on behalf of CIA Deputy Director John Helgerson.
Here are the main theses and quotes.
“The era of Gorbachev is almost over. Even if in a year he remains in his Kremlin office, he will not have real power. If Gorbachev is overthrown in the near future, then the hardliners will do it ... However, over time, the influence of the reformers will grow, and the Democrats will come to power. The transition of power will probably not be smooth, a transitional period with an intense struggle for power and, as a result, anarchy is inevitable.
The loss of power by Gorbachev will inevitably be connected with the fate of the country's political system. If the conservatives seize power, they will look for ways to preserve the empire and authoritarian rule with harsh methods. The opposition will be crushed without delay, its leaders, in particular Yeltsin, will be arrested or liquidated, and the newly won rights and freedoms will be put to an end. They will take a hardline stance against the United States and look for opportunities to expand their influence abroad. But even if the conservatives use force and mass repression, it will be difficult for them to retain power due to the lack of an effective program to overcome the growing problems and because of the internal disengagement in the country. With such power, the economic situation will worsen, social exclusion will grow sharply, which will inevitably lead to the victory of democratic and nationalist forces.
If the reformers win, then the transfer of power to the republics and the creation of a confederation will follow. Even if the union is re-established, the republics will have more independence and the right to go their own way. Many republics will immediately embark on the path of democratic and market reforms, but some of them will retain certain features of authoritarian rule ... Each republic will begin to pursue its own foreign policy and build its own internal security system independently of the KGB.
Summarizing, we can say that the Soviet Union is currently going through a revolutionary situation, and the current centralized system of government in it is doomed to failure. As has already happened over the past two years in other countries of Eastern Europe, in the USSR there are now all signs that in the near future there will not only be a change of power, but also the rapid liquidation of the existing political system.
“Since the beginning of 1991, Gorbachev has been under increasing political pressure from two opposing sides - conservatives and reformers. His situation is aggravated by the fact that he has practically lost support in the country. The center of power he heads is increasingly blurred. If before the leaders of the opposition were concerned about the political future of Gorbachev, now they are only thinking about how to get rid of him as soon as possible.
The conservatives, represented by the leadership of the KGB, the armed forces and the CPSU, who used to be politically dependent on Gorbachev, are now distancing themselves from him. The nature of the statements about Gorbachev's policy made by KGB Chairman Kryuchkov and Defense Minister Yazov during their meetings with former US President Richard Nixon during his recent visit to Moscow shows distrust of Gorbachev on the part of security officials.
There is an amalgamation of a large number of mid-level conservatives in anti-Gorbachev positions. Parliamentarians and members of the Soyuz deputy group collect signatures to convene an extraordinary congress of the CPSU in order to remove Gorbachev from power posts. Since the end of last year, their most prominent representatives have been putting pressure on Gorbachev, calling for him to leave and advocating the re-election of the party leadership. The positions of the general secretary in the party are weakening. At the April plenum, Gorbachev was able to defend his position as leader of the party thanks to the support of the majority of the members of the party's central committee, but he still has to deal with the ever-increasing threat of a coup in the party.
Attempts by reformers to remove Gorbachev intensified after Yeltsin's televised call in February for Gorbachev to be fired. The same call was made by strikers in the country miners and representatives of other industrial sectors. Most of these groups are calling for the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Congress of People's Deputies."
LEAD THE COUNTRY TO A DISASTER
The reason for the situation around Gorbachev is that his policy has led the country to a catastrophe, and he is not able to bring it out of the crisis - give a ruthless fair assessment of the activities of the last Soviet leader of the CIA analysts. - He destroyed the old Leninist political system in the country, but did not create anything in return. His new anti-crisis program is a stillborn project of using outdated methods of centralized leadership to stabilize the country's economy.
According to official statistics, the economy continues to decline and in the first quarter of the year, GNP (gross national product) fell by 8 percent. Inventories of consumer goods are shrinking markedly, prices are rising at an accelerated pace, spinning an inflationary spiral.
Last week, Gorbachev got some breathing room, managing to rebuff attempts by the conservatives at the party plenum to dismiss him and getting agreement with the leaders of the republics, including Yeltsin. This happened against the backdrop of a sharp deterioration in the situation in the country, and none of the key players dared to escalate the struggle for power.
Yeltsin and the leaders of the republics are apparently wary of putting undue pressure on Gorbachev, believing that this could lead to his removal by hardliners in the party. Therefore, at one of his last meetings with deputies, Yeltsin called this approach a tactical ploy, emphasizing that the time had not yet come for a full-scale confrontation.
The attempt to remove Gorbachev at the Party Plenum was initiated by middle-level representatives, and not by conservative leaders, who, apparently, will resort to a coup d'etat to seize power if they decide to do so. All this became possible due to the ongoing economic disintegration in the country. Soon, political pressure on Gorbachev will increase again. The leaders of the republics, including Yeltsin, are waiting for a decisive turn in their direction from the President of the USSR, but the conservatives will not tolerate such a shift.
In order to reach stable agreements with the republics, Gorbachev will have to cede a significant part of his power to them and weaken control from the center. In fact, we can only talk about creating a fairly fragmented confederation. If this does not happen, the confrontation will continue. Gorbachev cannot count on the fact that the fear of a coup on the part of the conservatives will be a deterrent for the republics.
Any attempts by Gorbachev to reach an agreement with the republics will cause concern on the part of the conservatives, who seek to maintain centralized control over the Union. This is their top priority. The fear that Gorbachev might actually agree on the division of powers with the republics¸ is likely to become a catalyst for the actions of the conservatives to seize power.
The working people of the country no longer trust Gorbachev's government. Unrest in the country will inevitably grow due to a sharp rise in prices and an acute shortage of consumer goods.
Gorbachev's attempts to preserve the central government and the union state at any cost may exacerbate the conflict between the republics and the center. The growing influence and popularity of the elected leadership in the republics is also capable of undermining the already weakened authority of Gorbachev. If Yeltsin succeeds in creating and strengthening the presidential structures of power in the Russian Federation - elections are scheduled for June - he will significantly strengthen his position in opposition to the center and the struggle to remove Gorbachev.
Gorbachev's political position is getting worse and worse. He entered into an alliance with the top of the KGB, the armed forces and the CPSU and fully supports the policy of the conservatives. He has found himself in a politically dependent position on them, and it will become increasingly difficult for him to try to ignore their demands. Realizing this, most reformers no longer trust him. Last week, Yeltsin and the leaders of the eight republics agreed with Gorbachev on a new basis for cooperation between the center and the republics, but this agreement may not work unless Gorbachev gives up some of his powers in favor of the republics. Gorbachev has lost political initiative and is now only trying to react to events without any long-term plan of action.
The essence of the current crisis is that none of the warring parties is able to resolve it. The Soviet Union is in a revolutionary situation.
Although the country's security forces have sufficient capabilities for a coup d'état, it will be difficult to introduce a state of emergency in the country. Moreover, if the opposition succeeds ... in neutralizing the putschists' readiness to use force, then the conservatives' stake on it will be beaten.
The main conclusion of the CIA report is "Gorbachev will most likely be forced to resign." Recall that the CIA handed over this analytical report to US President Bush on April 29, 1991.
In August, indeed, the conservatives will try to seize power in the country. But the GKChP will fail, the putschists will be arrested. On December 25, the first and last president of the USSR will resign. The mighty and indestructible union of the free republics will fall apart. Everything as the CIA predicted!
AFTERWORD
Control over the destruction of the "red empire"
I was especially interested in translating declassified CIA documents concerning the beginning and end of the fleeting but dramatic era of Gorbachev, Gennady Sokolov admits. - The archives and secrets of the special services have generally occupied me, as a writer and historian, since the mid-80s. The secrets of the "five-year period of Gorbachev's rule" are the most incomprehensible and fascinating. After all, behind them are hidden still unsolved mechanisms for breaking the greatest empire of the twentieth century - the Soviet Union.
This topic, I think, will haunt our minds for many years to come. For a quarter of a century of the existence of the new Russia, many bold, albeit quite plausible, versions of a conspiracy against the USSR, plans to overthrow the Soviet regime, secret operations to recruit the Kremlin leadership and Gorbachev himself have already been issued “on the mountain”.
If these versions did take place, we are unlikely to learn about them from archival documents in our lifetime. Not a single intelligence service in the world will rush to reveal secrets of this kind. Therefore, any declassified materials related to the last years of the great Soviet Union are so interesting.
The CIA document of June 1985 is interesting, first of all, for the forecast and analysis of possible changes in the USSR under the “new broom” - Gorbachev. The anticipation of these changes in the text is obvious. As was the expectation that Gorbachev's reforms would fail, according to the CIA analyst team who wrote this report.
The conclusions from the analysis given in the document and the action plans of the American intelligence and the US administration are recorded in other documents unknown to us that are not subject to declassification. But one can easily assume that they formulated a strategy for “supporting Gorbachev” and his reforms.
In April 1991, according to CIA analysts, Gorbachev "successfully" failed the course of perestroika, effectively destroying the Soviet empire. The authors of the Bush report are only wondering who will replace the loser and whose chances of success are preferable. The choice is made in favor of Yeltsin.
The task of destroying the USSR and the Soviet system seems to them to a large extent already accomplished. We can only speculate what conclusions and specific proposals the US presidential administration made from this document of CIA Sovietologists. But they apparently dealt with work with Gorbachev's successor, Yeltsin. Work on the final destruction of the "red empire".
TO THE POINT
The Iron Lady bared her knees for the Secretary General
In London, back in 2013, about 400 documents from the archive of the British Foreign Office (the country's Foreign Office) concerning Gorbachev's contacts with the British leadership were sent to the public for open access, - continues the story of the writer Gennady Sokolov. - From them, in particular, it follows that in the fall of 1984, the British elite set the task of choosing one of the young and promising members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee in order to invite him on a visit to London to meet and establish business contacts at the highest level.
Initially, there were two members of the Politburo on the list - Aliyev and Gorbachev. After studying and analyzing the situation in London, they staked on Gorbachev as a more promising leader. Perhaps because of the "fifth point" (nationality). After all, the leader of the USSR should be a representative of the titular nation - a Slav. The British guessed right with the candidacy.
From the declassified documents it follows that the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was recommended to put on Gorbachev by a professor at Oxford University, Sovietologist Archie Brown. Paying attention to him back in 1978, when he became secretary of the Central Committee. Since then, Brown has closely followed Gorbachev's rise up the Soviet political ladder. His analytical materials on this subject were also recently declassified at the request of the Foreign Office. One of Brown's sources of information was Gorbachev's old friend from Moscow State University, the Czech Zdenek Mlynarzh, who fled from Prague to the West in 1968. He claimed that Gorbachev was open to new ideas, intelligent and committed to anti-Stalinist views. According to Brown, this was a very unusual set of qualities for a member of the Brezhnev team.
Yes, Zdenek Mlynarzh, one of the architects of the Prague Spring of 1968, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, studied in the same group with Gorbachev at the law faculty of Moscow State University, they lived in the same dorm room. In 1967, Zdenek even visited him in Stavropol. Mlynarazh, after returning to Prague after the Velvet Revolution, told me in an interview for Komsomolskaya Pravda about their strong friendship.
Correspondence and analytical materials from the archives of the British Foreign Office contain many complementary statements about Gorbachev and his wife. Not a single critical remark can be found in his address. Moreover, one declassified document speaks of the Iron Lady's personal sympathies for Gorbachev. And even about attempts to flirt at the residence of the British prime ministers at Chekkers, where Thatcher deliberately sat down with Mikhail Sergeyevich on the couch in a homely manner, her knees drawn up and her legs bared.
BY THE WAY
Compromise in a long box
It was not for nothing that the Americans presented declassified documents to Gorbachev on his 85th birthday, writer Gennady SOKOLOV believes. - After his resignation in December 1991, the former secretary general took with him the entire archive accumulated over 6 years of work in the Kremlin. Now it is stored in Moscow, in the building of the Gorbachev Foundation at 39 Leningradsky Prospekt. This priceless archival collection includes more than 10,000 materials. Many of them are closed to the general public. According to the German magazine Der Spiegel, "these documents contain much of what Gorbachev would have preferred to keep silent about." "Spiegel" believes that "Gorbachev followed the path of many retired politicians, deciding to significantly embellish his image as a reformer." Documents unfavorable for this purpose are shelved.
Mikhail Sergeevich did not at all resemble the leaders of the Brezhnev team. Photo: RIA Novosti
His policies led the USSR to disaster, US intelligence claimed
- The secrecy stamp was removed from 14 documents relating to the activities of Gorbi in 1984-1991, - a well-known historian of special services, writer Gennady SOKOLOV told Komsomolskaya Pravda. - On March 2, the leadership of the US National Security Archive posted them on their website with a congratulation in red font "Happy Birthday, Mikhail Sergeevich!" And on the same day sent from Washington to Moscow a package with secret papers made public. Personally to the hero of the day, who turned 85.
- Gennady Evgenievich, what is this US National Security Archive and does it congratulate all world leaders in such an original way?
- This is a public organization created in the US capital in 1985 by journalists and historians at the George Washington University. Its goal is to encourage intelligence agencies to declassify archival materials of interest to the world community. A lot of interesting material pulled out from under the bushel regularly appears on their site. Unfortunately, we do not have such an analogue in Russia. Although the need is great. Too many secrets of interest to the people have been gathering dust for 50 or more years on the shelves of the archives of domestic special services. I have not heard of such gifts from the US National Security Archive to other world leaders. It seems that Gorbachev was the first to receive such an honor. Still, in the West it is treated differently than in our homeland. With great reverence. He delivered many pleasant super surprises to them during his short career as the last leader of the USSR.
- What exactly is in the "Dossier of Gorby" exposed by the special services?
- Recordings of his talks with Reagan in Reykjavik, Geneva and Malta, personal correspondence with Reagan, as well as assessments given to Mikhail Sergeyevich in the correspondence of Reagan with Thatcher, Bush with Kohl.
Of greatest interest in this "Dossier" are, in my opinion, two declassified CIA documents. Analysis of the beginning of the General Secretary and his decline.
George Bush, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1988. Photo: Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
NEW BROOM
- The first document on 13 pages gives an assessment of the new leader of the USSR based on the results of the first 100 days of his stay in power, - says Gennady Sokolov. - It is eloquently titled: "Gorbachev, a new broom."
SECRET
CIA intelligence agency. June 1985
(document С05332240)
“In the first 100 days of his reign, Gorbachev proved himself to be the most aggressive and determined Soviet leader since Khrushchev. He has shown a willingness to take controversial and even unpopular measures, such as an anti-alcohol campaign or abandoning the old practice of not criticizing the actions of his colleagues at Politburo meetings.”
Further in the text, a gap is CIA censorship. Painting over in white the fragments of text that remain secret behind seven seals in declassified papers has been an American practice for the last 20 years, if I'm not mistaken. Prior to this, super-secrets were blacked out throughout the text. It happened that the whole page of the cereushka was smeared with black, only at the top the title of the document remained untouched.
- And what can be secret in the analytical report of 30 years ago about Gorbachev? The USSR is long gone!
- Obviously, in this place specific examples are given from the meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU with Mikhail Sergeyevich's criticism of his comrades. This is secret information that was never published in the USSR, possibly obtained by the CIA from undercover sources of its Moscow residency. It is likely that the CIA cites the pseudonyms of these sources in the document. They are not subject to declassification and therefore are hidden by Langley's censorship. There are a lot of similar exclusions in the New Broom. But let's keep reading. Abstract.
“He launched an attack on the most sensitive areas, such as re-prioritising investments in the country's economy, methods of managing it, and corruption. The offensive nature of his rhetoric leaves no room for compromise and retreat.
“Gorbachev believes that an attack on inefficiency and corruption, rather than radical reforms, can radically change the situation in the country for the better. This is a risky course, but Gorbachev’s chances of success should not be underestimated… In the short term, his chances look good… He has begun to form his own support group in the Politburo and the Party Secretariat… he can also count on the support of the middle class, disappointed by the stagnation of the Brezhnev era… The country’s public, judging by initial reaction, also reacted positively to Gorbachev's style of work and point of view"
“A sharp contrast with the style of his predecessors ... Gorbachev made it clear that he intends to take seriously the solution of existing problems. Populist style…, direct communication with people…, carefully thought-out PR campaigns…, getting his wife Raisa involved in media and TV work.”
"Emphasis in speeches on the crisis in the country ..., a turning point in history ..., the need to accelerate the development of the economy ..., the goal is to meet the growing needs of the population."
“Gorbachev uses the time-tested method of consolidating his power, putting forward his supporters to leadership positions.
Having promoted three of his like-minded people to the Politburo at the Plenum in April, he actually secured a majority for himself in decision-making. One of the three new members of the Politburo appointed at the suggestion of Gorbachev at the April plenum was Yegor Ligachev, unofficially the "second secretary" in the party. This appointee isolated Gorbachev's rival, Central Committee Secretary Grigory Romanov. Gorbachev put this protégé (Ligachev) "on the cadre" - at the head of the department responsible for the selection and placement of leading cadres in the party, thereby creating the basis for personnel renewal and nomination of his supporters for the next party congress in February 1986. The second appointee, KGB Chairman Viktor Chebrikov, another close ally of Gorbachev, gave the General Secretary the important advantage of exerting political pressure on his potential opponents in the Politburo, many of whom were involved in corruption.
Gorbachev's third nominee, as is known, was Nikolai Ryzhkov (he replaced Tikhonov as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR).
- Later, Mikhail Sergeevich "isolates" his faithful nominees.
"Gorbachev's public statements and his pronounced commitment to reform clearly outweigh concrete actions to change the economic system."
"Gorbachev has already shown significant activity in the field of foreign policy ... A significant increase in his personal role in the diplomatic efforts of the USSR should be expected in the near future."
“The opposition to Gorbachev (after the April Plenum) is disorganized. The old guard - Prime Minister Tikhonov, Moscow party boss Grishin, Republican party leaders Shcherbitsky (Ukraine) and Kunaev (Kazakhstan) have apparently gone on the defensive amid accusations of mismanagement and corruption in the organizations they control. Secretary of the Central Committee Romanov, as a potential leader of the opposition, was out of work due to personnel changes organized by Gorbachev, and, apparently, has no more political future ... Gorbachev's opponents in the Central Committee lack a leader. Gorbachev's proposals are met with some opposition... But his opponents will have to wait until the new leader makes a mistake before counterattacking."
“Gorbachev's efforts to make the country's existing system more efficient remain a risky venture. A new investment strategy could make him many enemies. Efforts to accelerate the country's economic development could ricochet back at Gorbachev himself."
“The ambitious agenda puts Gorbachev in the crosshairs… It will be necessary to constantly prove his case… Any mistake he makes will lead to the consolidation of the opposition and will hit him.”
WHO WILL TAKE POWER FROM GORBACHEV
This is the title of the second secret document, number 50USC4039. It was prepared on April 29, 1991 for US President Bush Sr. on behalf of CIA Deputy Director John Helgerson.
Here are the main theses and quotes.
“The era of Gorbachev is almost over. Even if in a year he remains in his Kremlin office, he will not have real power. If Gorbachev is overthrown in the near future, then the hardliners will do it ... However, over time, the influence of the reformers will grow, and the Democrats will come to power. The transition of power will probably not be smooth, a transitional period with an intense struggle for power and, as a result, anarchy is inevitable.
First page of document number 50USC4039. It was prepared on April 29, 1991 for US President Bush Sr. on behalf of CIA Deputy Director John Helgerson.
The loss of power by Gorbachev will inevitably be connected with the fate of the country's political system. If the conservatives seize power, they will look for ways to preserve the empire and authoritarian rule with harsh methods. The opposition will be crushed without delay, its leaders, in particular Yeltsin, will be arrested or liquidated, and the newly won rights and freedoms will be put to an end. They will take a hardline stance against the United States and look for opportunities to expand their influence abroad. But even if the conservatives use force and mass repression, it will be difficult for them to retain power due to the lack of an effective program to overcome the growing problems and because of the internal disengagement in the country. With such power, the economic situation will worsen, social exclusion will grow sharply, which will inevitably lead to the victory of democratic and nationalist forces.
If the reformers win, then the transfer of power to the republics and the creation of a confederation will follow. Even if the union is re-established, the republics will have more independence and the right to go their own way. Many republics will immediately embark on the path of democratic and market reforms, but some of them will retain certain features of authoritarian rule ... Each republic will begin to pursue its own foreign policy and build its own internal security system independently of the KGB.
Summarizing, we can say that the Soviet Union is currently going through a revolutionary situation, and the current centralized system of government in it is doomed to failure. As has already happened over the past two years in other countries of Eastern Europe, in the USSR there are now all signs that in the near future there will not only be a change of power, but also the rapid liquidation of the existing political system.
“Since the beginning of 1991, Gorbachev has been under increasing political pressure from two opposing sides - conservatives and reformers. His situation is aggravated by the fact that he has practically lost support in the country. The center of power he heads is increasingly blurred. If before the leaders of the opposition were concerned about the political future of Gorbachev, now they are only thinking about how to get rid of him as soon as possible.
The conservatives, represented by the leadership of the KGB, the armed forces and the CPSU, who used to be politically dependent on Gorbachev, are now distancing themselves from him. The nature of the statements about Gorbachev's policy made by KGB Chairman Kryuchkov and Defense Minister Yazov during their meetings with former US President Richard Nixon during his recent visit to Moscow shows distrust of Gorbachev on the part of security officials.
A large number of mid-level conservatives are uniting in anti-Gorbachev positions. Parliamentarians and members of the Soyuz deputy group collect signatures to convene an extraordinary congress of the CPSU in order to remove Gorbachev from power posts. Since the end of last year, their most prominent representatives have been putting pressure on Gorbachev, calling for him to leave and advocating the re-election of the party leadership. The positions of the general secretary in the party are weakening. At the April plenum, Gorbachev was able to defend his position as leader of the party thanks to the support of the majority of the members of the party's central committee, but he still has to deal with the ever-increasing threat of a coup in the party.
Attempts by reformers to remove Gorbachev intensified after Yeltsin's televised call in February for Gorbachev to be fired. The same call was made by strikers in the country miners and representatives of other industrial sectors. Most of these groups are calling for the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Congress of People's Deputies."
LEAD THE COUNTRY TO A DISASTER
“The reason for the situation around Gorbachev is that his policy led the country to a catastrophe, and he is not able to bring it out of the crisis,” CIA analysts give a ruthlessly fair assessment of the activities of the last Soviet leader. - He destroyed the old Leninist political system in the country, but did not create anything in return. His new anti-crisis program is a stillborn project of using outdated methods of centralized leadership to stabilize the country's economy.
According to official statistics, the economy continues to decline and in the first quarter of the year, GNP (gross national product) fell by 8 percent. Inventories of consumer goods are shrinking markedly, prices are rising at an accelerated pace, spinning an inflationary spiral.
Last week, Gorbachev got some breathing room, managing to rebuff attempts by the conservatives at the party plenum to dismiss him and getting agreement with the leaders of the republics, including Yeltsin. This happened against the backdrop of a sharp deterioration in the situation in the country, and none of the key players dared to escalate the struggle for power.
Yeltsin and the leaders of the republics are apparently wary of putting undue pressure on Gorbachev, believing that this could lead to his removal by hardliners in the party. Therefore, at one of his last meetings with deputies, Yeltsin called this approach a tactical ploy, emphasizing that the time had not yet come for a full-scale confrontation.
The attempt to remove Gorbachev at the Party Plenum was initiated by middle-level representatives, and not by conservative leaders, who, apparently, will resort to a coup d'etat to seize power if they decide to do so. All this became possible due to the ongoing economic disintegration in the country. Soon, political pressure on Gorbachev will increase again. The leaders of the republics, including Yeltsin, are waiting for a decisive turn in their direction from the President of the USSR, but the conservatives will not tolerate such a shift.
In order to reach stable agreements with the republics, Gorbachev will have to cede a significant part of his power to them and weaken control from the center. In fact, we can only talk about creating a fairly fragmented confederation. If this does not happen, the confrontation will continue. Gorbachev cannot count on the fact that the fear of a coup on the part of the conservatives will be a deterrent for the republics.
Any attempts by Gorbachev to reach an agreement with the republics will cause concern on the part of the conservatives, who seek to maintain centralized control over the Union. This is their top priority. The fear that Gorbachev might actually agree on the division of powers with the republics¸ is likely to become a catalyst for the actions of the conservatives to seize power.
The working people of the country no longer trust Gorbachev's government. Unrest in the country will inevitably grow due to a sharp rise in prices and an acute shortage of consumer goods.
Gorbachev's attempts to preserve the central government and the union state at any cost may exacerbate the conflict between the republics and the center. The growing influence and popularity of the elected leadership in the republics is also capable of undermining the already weakened authority of Gorbachev. If Yeltsin succeeds in creating and strengthening presidential structures of power in the Russian Federation—elections are scheduled for June—he will significantly strengthen his position in opposing the center and fighting to remove Gorbachev.
Gorbachev's political position is getting worse and worse. He entered into an alliance with the top of the KGB, the armed forces and the CPSU and fully supports the policy of the conservatives. He has found himself in a politically dependent position on them, and it will become increasingly difficult for him to try to ignore their demands. Realizing this, most reformers no longer trust him. Last week, Yeltsin and the leaders of the eight republics agreed with Gorbachev on a new basis for cooperation between the center and the republics, but this agreement may not work unless Gorbachev gives up some of his powers in favor of the republics. Gorbachev has lost political initiative and is now only trying to react to events without any long-term plan of action.
The essence of the current crisis is that none of the warring parties is able to resolve it. The Soviet Union is in a revolutionary situation.
Although the country's security forces have sufficient capabilities for a coup d'état, it will be difficult to introduce a state of emergency in the country. Moreover, if the opposition succeeds ... in neutralizing the putschists' readiness to use force, then the conservatives' stake on it will be beaten.
The main conclusion of the CIA report is “Gorbachev will most likely be forced to resign.” Recall that the CIA handed over this analytical report to US President Bush on April 29, 1991.
In August, indeed, the conservatives will try to seize power in the country. But the GKChP will fail, the putschists will be arrested. On December 25, the first and last president of the USSR will resign. The mighty and indestructible union of the free republics will fall apart. Everything as the CIA predicted!
AFTERWORD
Control over the destruction of the "red empire"
“I was especially interested in translating declassified CIA documents concerning the beginning and end of the fleeting but dramatic era of Gorbachev,” Gennady Sokolov admits. - The archives and secrets of the special services have generally occupied me, as a writer and historian, since the mid-80s. The secrets of the "five-year period of Gorbachev's rule" are the most incomprehensible and fascinating. After all, behind them are hidden still unsolved mechanisms for breaking the greatest empire of the twentieth century - the Soviet Union.
This topic, I think, will haunt our minds for many years to come. For a quarter of a century of the existence of the new Russia, many bold, albeit quite plausible, versions of a conspiracy against the USSR, plans to overthrow the Soviet regime, secret operations to recruit the Kremlin leadership and Gorbachev himself have already been issued “on the mountain”.
If these versions did take place, we are unlikely to learn about them from archival documents in our lifetime. Not a single intelligence service in the world will rush to reveal secrets of this kind. Therefore, any declassified materials related to the last years of the great Soviet Union are so interesting.
The CIA document of June 1985 is interesting, first of all, for the forecast and analysis of possible changes in the USSR under the “new broom” - Gorbachev. The anticipation of these changes in the text is obvious. As was the expectation that Gorbachev's reforms would fail, according to the CIA analyst team who wrote this report.
The conclusions from the analysis given in the document and the action plans of the American intelligence and the US administration are recorded in other documents unknown to us that are not subject to declassification. But one can easily assume that they formulated a strategy for “supporting Gorbachev” and his reforms.
In April 1991, according to CIA analysts, Gorbachev "successfully" failed the course of perestroika, effectively destroying the Soviet empire. The authors of the Bush report are only wondering who will replace the loser and whose chances of success are preferable. The choice is made in favor of Yeltsin.
The task of destroying the USSR and the Soviet system seems to them to a large extent already accomplished. We can only speculate what conclusions and specific proposals the US presidential administration made from this document of CIA Sovietologists. But they apparently already dealt with work with Gorbachev's successor, Yeltsin. Work on the final destruction of the "red empire".
TO THE POINT
The Iron Lady bared her knees for the Secretary General
- In London, back in 2013, about 400 documents from the archive of the British Foreign Office (the country's Foreign Office) concerning Gorbachev's contacts with the British leadership were sent to the public, - the writer Gennady Sokolov continues the story. - From them, in particular, it follows that in the fall of 1984, the British elite set the task of choosing one of the young and promising members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee in order to invite him on a visit to London to meet and establish business contacts at the highest level.
Initially, there were two members of the Politburo on the list - Aliyev and Gorbachev. After studying and analyzing the situation in London, they staked on Gorbachev as a more promising leader. Perhaps because of the "fifth point" (nationality). After all, the leader of the USSR should be a representative of the titular nation - a Slav. The British guessed right with the candidacy.
From the declassified documents, it follows that Margaret Thatcher, a professor at Oxford University and a Sovietologist, Archie Brown, recommended placing Gorbachev on British Prime Minister. Paying attention to him back in 1978, when he became secretary of the Central Committee. Since then, Brown has closely followed Gorbachev's rise up the Soviet political ladder. His analytical materials on this subject were also recently declassified at the request of the Foreign Office. One of Brown's sources of information was Gorbachev's old friend from Moscow State University, the Czech Zdenek Mlynarzh, who fled from Prague to the West in 1968. He claimed that Gorbachev was open to new ideas, intelligent and committed to anti-Stalinist views. According to Brown, this was a very unusual set of qualities for a member of the Brezhnev team.
- Yes, Zdenek Mlynarzh, one of the architects of the Prague Spring of 1968, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, studied in the same group with Gorbachev at the law faculty of Moscow State University, they lived in the same dorm room. In 1967, Zdenek even visited him in Stavropol. Mlynarazh, after returning to Prague after the Velvet Revolution, told me in an interview for Komsomolskaya Pravda about their strong friendship.
- There are many complementary statements about Gorbachev and his wife in the correspondence and analytical materials from the archives of the British Foreign Office. Not a single critical remark can be found in his address. Moreover, one declassified document speaks of the Iron Lady's personal sympathies for Gorbachev. And even about attempts at flirting at the residence of the British prime ministers in Checkers, where Thatcher deliberately sat down with Mikhail Sergeevich on the sofa, drawing her knees up and baring her legs.
BY THE WAY
Compromise in a long box
“It was not for nothing that the Americans presented declassified documents to Gorbachev on his 85th birthday,” says writer Gennady SOKOLOV. - After his resignation in December 1991, the entire archive accumulated over 6 years of work in the Kremlin, the former Secretary General took with him. Now it is stored in Moscow, in the building of the Gorbachev Foundation at 39 Leningradsky Prospekt. This priceless archival collection includes more than 10,000 materials. Many of them are closed to the general public. According to the German magazine Der Spiegel, "these documents contain much of what Gorbachev would have preferred to keep silent about." "Spiegel" believes that "Gorbachev followed the path of many retired politicians, deciding to significantly embellish his image as a reformer." Documents unfavorable for this purpose are shelved.
Gorbachev's policy led the USSR to disaster, according to American intelligence, and now this fact can no longer be hidden.
- The secrecy stamp was removed from 14 documents relating to the activities of Gorbi in 1984-1991, - a well-known historian of special services, writer Gennady SOKOLOV told Komsomolskaya Pravda. - On March 2, the leadership of the US National Security Archive posted them on their website with a congratulation in red font "Happy Birthday, Mikhail Sergeevich!"
And on the same day sent from Washington to Moscow a package with secret papers made public. Personally to the hero of the day, who turned 85.
Gennady Evgenievich, what is this US National Security Archive and does it congratulate all world leaders in such an original way?
This is a public organization created in the US capital in 1985 by journalists and historians at the George Washington University. Its goal is to encourage intelligence agencies to declassify archival materials of interest to the world community. A lot of interesting material pulled out from under the bushel regularly appears on their site. Unfortunately, we do not have such an analogue in Russia. Although the need is great. Too many secrets of interest to the people have been gathering dust for 50 or more years on the shelves of the archives of domestic special services. I have not heard of such gifts from the US National Security Archive to other world leaders. It seems that Gorbachev was the first to receive such an honor. Still, in the West it is treated differently than in our homeland. With great reverence. He delivered many pleasant super surprises to them during his short career as the last leader of the USSR.
What exactly is in the “Gorbi Dossier” exposed by the special services?
Records of his talks with Reagan in Reykjavik, Geneva and Malta, personal correspondence with Reagan, as well as assessments given to Mikhail Sergeevich in the correspondence between Reagan and Thatcher, Bush with Kohl.
Of greatest interest in this "Dossier" are, in my opinion, two declassified CIA documents. Analysis of the beginning of the General Secretary and his decline.
NEW BROOM
The first document on 13 pages evaluates the new leader of the USSR based on the results of the first 100 days of his stay in power, says Gennady Sokolov. - It is titled eloquently: "Gorbachev, a new broom."
SECRET
CIA intelligence agency. June 1985
(document С05332240)
“In the first 100 days of his reign, Gorbachev proved himself to be the most aggressive and determined Soviet leader since Khrushchev. He has shown a willingness to take controversial and even unpopular measures, such as an anti-alcohol campaign or abandoning the old practice of not criticizing the actions of his colleagues at Politburo meetings.”
Further in the text, a gap is CIA censorship. To paint over with white the fragments of text in declassified papers that remain secret behind seven seals is an American practice for the last 20 years, if I'm not mistaken. Prior to this, super-secrets were blacked out throughout the text. It happened that the whole page of the cereushka was smeared with black, only at the top the title of the document remained untouched.
And what can be now secret in the analytical report of 30 years ago about Gorbachev? The USSR is long gone!
Obviously, in this place specific examples are given from the meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU with criticism of Mikhail Sergeevich addressed to his comrades. This is secret information that was never published in the USSR, possibly obtained by the CIA from undercover sources of its Moscow residency. It is likely that the CIA cites the pseudonyms of these sources in the document. They are not subject to declassification and therefore are hidden by Langley's censorship. There are a lot of similar exclusions in the New Broom. But let's keep reading. Abstract.
“He launched an attack on the most sensitive areas, such as re-prioritising investments in the country's economy, methods of managing it, and corruption. The offensive nature of his rhetoric leaves no room for compromise and retreat.
“Gorbachev believes that an attack on inefficiency and corruption, rather than radical reforms, can radically change the situation in the country for the better. This is a risky course, but Gorbachev’s chances of success should not be underestimated… In the short term, his chances look good… He has begun to form his own support group in the Politburo and the Party Secretariat… he can also count on the support of the middle class, disappointed by the stagnation of the Brezhnev era… The country’s public, judging by initial reaction, also reacted positively to Gorbachev's style of work and point of view"
“A sharp contrast with the style of his predecessors ... Gorbachev made it clear that he intends to take seriously the solution of existing problems. Populist style…, direct communication with people…, carefully thought-out PR campaigns…, getting his wife Raisa involved in media and TV work.”
"Emphasis in speeches on the crisis in the country ..., a turning point in history ..., the need to accelerate the development of the economy ..., the goal is to meet the growing needs of the population."
“Gorbachev uses the time-tested method of consolidating his power, putting forward his supporters to leadership positions.
Having promoted three of his like-minded people to the Politburo at the Plenum in April, he actually secured a majority for himself in decision-making. One of the three new members of the Politburo appointed at the suggestion of Gorbachev at the April plenum was Yegor Ligachev, unofficially the "second secretary" in the party. This appointee isolated Gorbachev's rival, Central Committee Secretary Grigory Romanov. Gorbachev put this protégé (Ligachev) “on the cadres” - at the head of the department responsible for the selection and placement of leading cadres in the party, thereby creating the basis for personnel renewal and nomination of his supporters for the next party congress in February 1986. The second appointee, KGB Chairman Viktor Chebrikov, another close ally of Gorbachev, gave the General Secretary the important advantage of exerting political pressure on his potential opponents in the Politburo, many of whom were involved in corruption.
Gorbachev's third nominee, as is known, was Nikolai Ryzhkov (he replaced Tikhonov as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR).
Later, Mikhail Sergeevich "isolates" his faithful nominees.
- "Gorbachev's public statements and his pronounced commitment to reforms clearly outweigh concrete actions to change the economic system."
"Gorbachev has already shown significant activity in the field of foreign policy ... A significant increase in his personal role in the diplomatic efforts of the USSR should be expected in the near future."
“The opposition to Gorbachev (after the April Plenum) is disorganized. The old guard - Prime Minister Tikhonov, Moscow party boss Grishin, Republican party leaders Shcherbitsky (Ukraine) and Kunaev (Kazakhstan) have apparently gone on the defensive amid accusations of mismanagement and corruption in the organizations they control. Secretary of the Central Committee Romanov, as a potential leader of the opposition, was out of work due to personnel changes organized by Gorbachev, and, apparently, has no more political future ... Gorbachev's opponents in the Central Committee lack a leader. Gorbachev's proposals are met with some opposition... But his opponents will have to wait until the new leader makes a mistake before counterattacking."
“Gorbachev's efforts to make the country's existing system more efficient remain a risky venture. A new investment strategy could make him many enemies. Efforts to accelerate the country's economic development could ricochet back at Gorbachev himself."
“The ambitious agenda puts Gorbachev in the crosshairs… It will be necessary to constantly prove his case… Any mistake he makes will lead to the consolidation of the opposition and will hit him.”
WHO WILL TAKE POWER FROM GORBACHEV
This is the title of the second secret document, number 50USC4039. It was prepared on April 29, 1991 for US President Bush Sr. on behalf of CIA Deputy Director John Helgerson.
Here are the main theses and quotes.
“The era of Gorbachev is almost over. Even if in a year he remains in his Kremlin office, he will not have real power. If Gorbachev is overthrown in the near future, then the hardliners will do it ... However, over time, the influence of the reformers will grow, and the Democrats will come to power. The transition of power will probably not be smooth, a transitional period with an intense struggle for power and, as a result, anarchy is inevitable.
First page of document number 50USC4039. It was prepared on April 29, 1991 for US President Bush Sr. on behalf of CIA Deputy Director John Helgerson.
The loss of power by Gorbachev will inevitably be connected with the fate of the country's political system. If the conservatives seize power, they will look for ways to preserve the empire and authoritarian rule with harsh methods. The opposition will be crushed without delay, its leaders, in particular Yeltsin, will be arrested or liquidated, and the newly won rights and freedoms will be put to an end. They will take a hardline stance against the United States and look for opportunities to expand their influence abroad. But even if the conservatives use force and mass repression, it will be difficult for them to retain power due to the lack of an effective program to overcome the growing problems and because of the internal disengagement in the country. With such power, the economic situation will worsen, social exclusion will grow sharply, which will inevitably lead to the victory of democratic and nationalist forces.
If the reformers win, then the transfer of power to the republics and the creation of a confederation will follow. Even if the union is re-established, the republics will have more independence and the right to go their own way. Many republics will immediately embark on the path of democratic and market reforms, but some of them will retain certain features of authoritarian rule ... Each republic will begin to pursue its own foreign policy and build its own internal security system independently of the KGB.
Summarizing, we can say that the Soviet Union is currently going through a revolutionary situation, and the current centralized system of government in it is doomed to failure. As has already happened over the past two years in other countries of Eastern Europe, in the USSR there are now all signs that in the near future there will not only be a change of power, but also the rapid liquidation of the existing political system.
“Since the beginning of 1991, Gorbachev has been under increasing political pressure from two opposing sides - conservatives and reformers. His situation is aggravated by the fact that he has practically lost support in the country. The center of power he heads is increasingly blurred. If before the leaders of the opposition were concerned about the political future of Gorbachev, now they are only thinking about how to get rid of him as soon as possible.
The conservatives, represented by the leadership of the KGB, the armed forces and the CPSU, who used to be politically dependent on Gorbachev, are now distancing themselves from him. The nature of the statements about Gorbachev's policy made by KGB Chairman Kryuchkov and Defense Minister Yazov during their meetings with former US President Richard Nixon during his recent visit to Moscow shows distrust of Gorbachev on the part of security officials.
A large number of mid-level conservatives are uniting in anti-Gorbachev positions. Parliamentarians and members of the Soyuz deputy group collect signatures to convene an extraordinary congress of the CPSU in order to remove Gorbachev from power posts. Since the end of last year, their most prominent representatives have been putting pressure on Gorbachev, calling for him to leave and advocating the re-election of the party leadership. The positions of the general secretary in the party are weakening. At the April plenum, Gorbachev was able to defend his position as leader of the party thanks to the support of the majority of the members of the party's central committee, but he still has to deal with the ever-increasing threat of a coup in the party.
Attempts by reformers to remove Gorbachev intensified after Yeltsin's televised call in February for Gorbachev to be fired. The same call was made by strikers in the country miners and representatives of other industrial sectors. Most of these groups are calling for the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Congress of People's Deputies."
LEAD THE COUNTRY TO A DISASTER
The reason for the situation around Gorbachev is that his policy has led the country to a catastrophe, and he is not able to bring it out of the crisis - give a ruthless fair assessment of the activities of the last Soviet leader of the CIA analysts. - He destroyed the old Leninist political system in the country, but did not create anything in return. His new anti-crisis program is a stillborn project of using outdated methods of centralized leadership to stabilize the country's economy.
According to official statistics, the economy continues to decline and in the first quarter of the year, GNP (gross national product) fell by 8 percent. Inventories of consumer goods are shrinking markedly, prices are rising at an accelerated pace, spinning an inflationary spiral.
Last week, Gorbachev got some breathing room, managing to rebuff attempts by the conservatives at the party plenum to dismiss him and getting agreement with the leaders of the republics, including Yeltsin. This happened against the backdrop of a sharp deterioration in the situation in the country, and none of the key players dared to escalate the struggle for power.
Yeltsin and the leaders of the republics are apparently wary of putting undue pressure on Gorbachev, believing that this could lead to his removal by hardliners in the party. Therefore, at one of his last meetings with deputies, Yeltsin called this approach a tactical ploy, emphasizing that the time had not yet come for a full-scale confrontation.
The attempt to remove Gorbachev at the Party Plenum was initiated by middle-level representatives, and not by conservative leaders, who, apparently, will resort to a coup d'etat to seize power if they decide to do so. All this became possible due to the ongoing economic disintegration in the country. Soon, political pressure on Gorbachev will increase again. The leaders of the republics, including Yeltsin, are waiting for a decisive turn in their direction from the President of the USSR, but the conservatives will not tolerate such a shift.
In order to reach stable agreements with the republics, Gorbachev will have to cede a significant part of his power to them and weaken control from the center. In fact, we can only talk about creating a fairly fragmented confederation. If this does not happen, the confrontation will continue. Gorbachev cannot count on the fact that the fear of a coup on the part of the conservatives will be a deterrent for the republics.
Any attempts by Gorbachev to reach an agreement with the republics will cause concern on the part of the conservatives, who seek to maintain centralized control over the Union. This is their top priority. The fear that Gorbachev might actually agree on the division of powers with the republics¸ is likely to become a catalyst for the actions of the conservatives to seize power.
The working people of the country no longer trust Gorbachev's government. Unrest in the country will inevitably grow due to a sharp rise in prices and an acute shortage of consumer goods.
Gorbachev's attempts to preserve the central government and the union state at any cost may exacerbate the conflict between the republics and the center. The growing influence and popularity of the elected leadership in the republics is also capable of undermining the already weakened authority of Gorbachev. If Yeltsin succeeds in creating and strengthening the presidential structures of power in the Russian Federation - elections are scheduled for June - he will significantly strengthen his position in opposition to the center and the struggle to remove Gorbachev.
Gorbachev's political position is getting worse and worse. He entered into an alliance with the top of the KGB, the armed forces and the CPSU and fully supports the policy of the conservatives. He has found himself in a politically dependent position on them, and it will become increasingly difficult for him to try to ignore their demands. Realizing this, most reformers no longer trust him. Last week, Yeltsin and the leaders of the eight republics agreed with Gorbachev on a new basis for cooperation between the center and the republics, but this agreement may not work unless Gorbachev gives up some of his powers in favor of the republics. Gorbachev has lost political initiative and is now only trying to react to events without any long-term plan of action.
The essence of the current crisis is that none of the warring parties is able to resolve it. The Soviet Union is in a revolutionary situation.
Although the country's security forces have sufficient capabilities for a coup d'état, it will be difficult to introduce a state of emergency in the country. Moreover, if the opposition succeeds ... in neutralizing the putschists' readiness to use force, then the conservatives' stake on it will be beaten.
The main conclusion of the CIA report is "Gorbachev will most likely be forced to resign." Recall that the CIA handed over this analytical report to US President Bush on April 29, 1991.
In August, indeed, the conservatives will try to seize power in the country. But the GKChP will fail, the putschists will be arrested. On December 25, the first and last president of the USSR will resign. The mighty and indestructible union of the free republics will fall apart. Everything as the CIA predicted!
AFTERWORD
Control over the destruction of the "red empire"
I was especially interested in translating declassified CIA documents concerning the beginning and end of the fleeting but dramatic era of Gorbachev, Gennady Sokolov admits. - The archives and secrets of the special services have generally occupied me, as a writer and historian, since the mid-80s. The secrets of the "five-year period of Gorbachev's rule" are the most incomprehensible and fascinating. After all, behind them are hidden still unsolved mechanisms for breaking the greatest empire of the twentieth century - the Soviet Union.
This topic, I think, will haunt our minds for many years to come. For a quarter of a century of the existence of the new Russia, many bold, albeit quite plausible, versions of a conspiracy against the USSR, plans to overthrow the Soviet regime, secret operations to recruit the Kremlin leadership and Gorbachev himself have already been issued “on the mountain”.
If these versions did take place, we are unlikely to learn about them from archival documents in our lifetime. Not a single intelligence service in the world will rush to reveal secrets of this kind. Therefore, any declassified materials related to the last years of the great Soviet Union are so interesting.
The CIA document of June 1985 is interesting, first of all, for the forecast and analysis of possible changes in the USSR under the “new broom” - Gorbachev. The anticipation of these changes in the text is obvious. As was the expectation that Gorbachev's reforms would fail, according to the CIA analyst team who wrote this report.
The conclusions from the analysis given in the document and the action plans of the American intelligence and the US administration are recorded in other documents unknown to us that are not subject to declassification. But one can easily assume that they formulated a strategy for “supporting Gorbachev” and his reforms.
In April 1991, according to CIA analysts, Gorbachev "successfully" failed the course of perestroika, effectively destroying the Soviet empire. The authors of the Bush report are only wondering who will replace the loser and whose chances of success are preferable. The choice is made in favor of Yeltsin.
The task of destroying the USSR and the Soviet system seems to them to a large extent already accomplished. We can only speculate what conclusions and specific proposals the US presidential administration made from this document of CIA Sovietologists. But they apparently dealt with work with Gorbachev's successor, Yeltsin. Work on the final destruction of the "red empire".
The Iron Lady bared her knees for the Secretary General
Back in 2013, about 400 documents from the archive of the British Foreign Office (the country's Foreign Office) concerning Gorbachev's contacts with the British leadership were sent to the public in London in 2013, the writer Gennady Sokolov continues the story. - From them, in particular, it follows that in the fall of 1984, the British elite set the task of choosing one of the young and promising members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee in order to invite him on a visit to London to meet and establish business contacts at the highest level.
Initially, there were two members of the Politburo on the list - Aliyev and Gorbachev. After studying and analyzing the situation in London, they staked on Gorbachev as a more promising leader. Perhaps because of the "fifth point" (nationality). After all, the leader of the USSR should be a representative of the titular nation - a Slav. The British guessed right with the candidacy.
From the declassified documents, it follows that Margaret Thatcher, a professor at Oxford University and a Sovietologist, Archie Brown, recommended placing Gorbachev on British Prime Minister. Paying attention to him back in 1978, when he became secretary of the Central Committee. Since then, Brown has closely followed Gorbachev's rise up the Soviet political ladder. His analytical materials on this subject were also recently declassified at the request of the Foreign Office. One of Brown's sources of information was Gorbachev's old friend from Moscow State University, the Czech Zdenek Mlynarzh, who fled from Prague to the West in 1968. He claimed that Gorbachev was open to new ideas, intelligent and committed to anti-Stalinist views. According to Brown, this was a very unusual set of qualities for a member of the Brezhnev team.
Yes, Zdenek Mlynarzh, one of the architects of the Prague Spring of 1968, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, studied in the same group with Gorbachev at the law faculty of Moscow State University, they lived in the same dorm room. In 1967, Zdenek even visited him in Stavropol. Mlynarazh, after returning to Prague after the Velvet Revolution, told me in an interview for Komsomolskaya Pravda about their strong friendship.
Correspondence and analytical materials from the archives of the British Foreign Office contain many complementary statements about Gorbachev and his wife. Not a single critical remark can be found in his address. Moreover, one declassified document speaks of the Iron Lady's personal sympathies for Gorbachev. And even about attempts at flirting at the residence of the British prime ministers in Checkers, where Thatcher deliberately sat down with Mikhail Sergeevich on the sofa, drawing her knees up and baring her legs.
Compromise in a long box
It was not for nothing that the Americans presented declassified documents to Gorbachev on his 85th birthday, writer Gennady SOKOLOV believes. - After his resignation in December 1991, the former secretary general took with him the entire archive accumulated over 6 years of work in the Kremlin. Now it is stored in Moscow, in the building of the Gorbachev Foundation at 39 Leningradsky Prospekt. This priceless archival collection includes more than 10,000 materials. Many of them are closed to the general public. According to the German magazine Der Spiegel, "these documents contain much of what Gorbachev would have preferred to keep silent about." "Spiegel" believes that "Gorbachev followed the path of many retired politicians, deciding to significantly embellish his image as a reformer." Documents unfavorable for this purpose are shelved.
