After the failure of Operation Valkyrie and attempts to conclude a separate peace with Reichsfuehrer Himmler, Winston Churchill gives a secret order to prepare a plan for an attack on the USSR.
After the capture of Berlin in 1945, when it became clear that the war was over, the planet, it turns out, was hanging by a thread from the Third World War.
Its instigator (as in the case of the Second World War) was Great Britain. This is the opinion of Igor Panarin, professor of the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Foreign Ministry, academician of the Academy of Military Sciences.
As a scientist, I am not used to being unfounded, - Igor Nikolaevich argues. - Let me remind you that in October 1998, first in the British and then in the world press, the first reports about Churchill's military plans for the Soviet Union, developed in the spring of 1945, were published. The basis for these messages was the documents of the State Archives of Great Britain.
Recently, the Institute of General History of the Russian Academy of Sciences received photocopies of these documents, which makes it possible to get acquainted with them in more detail. The key in them is the plan of Operation Unthinkable dated May 22, 1945, prepared by the Joint Planning Headquarters of the War Cabinet.
The plan provides an assessment of the situation, formulates the objectives of the operation, defines the forces involved, the directions of strikes by the Western allies and their likely results. The appendices to the plan contain information about the deployment of the Soviet Army (in English documents, as a rule, the term "Russian army" is used) and Western allies, as well as cartographic material. Given the complexity of the preparation, the nature and volume of the documents themselves, there is every reason to assume that the prime minister gave the task to the planners in April 1945.
After the failure of Operation Valkyrie and attempts to conclude a separate peace with Reichsfuehrer Himmler, Winston Churchill gives a secret order to prepare a plan for an attack on the USSR. Already on May 22, such a plan was ready.
But after all, less than two weeks after Germany's surrender, World War II continued, militaristic Japan had not yet been defeated. It is hard to believe that someone could make plans for the Third World War.
Unfortunately, not everything lends itself to logic, not only to the philistine, but even to politicians and historians. And yet. The blow was to be delivered by a half-million group of Anglo-American troops through Northern Germany. Together with them, a 100,000-strong German army was to act, formed from the remnants of the Hitlerite Wehrmacht on the orders of Churchill. In Hitler's military uniform, with Hitler's weapons, under the command of the same officers.
The third world war was supposed to begin on July 1, 1945, with the transition to a decisive offensive of 47 western divisions. And what prevented this?
That Stalin learned in advance from the Soviet intelligence about the insidious plan of the former allies. On June 29, 1945, Soviet troops in Germany unexpectedly redeployed to more advantageous positions. And the Soviet leader simultaneously organized a special information and propaganda operation, during which the whole world learned about Churchill's German army. He was forced to disband her. The plan of military aggression against the USSR failed. But the intention itself is indicative.
It has been heard that even before the end of the war, when its outcome became obvious, England had developed a secret propaganda plan, according to which it was she who should be named the winner.
Yes, this was the most important goal of the information war. Let us turn to the top-secret "Rankin" plan, approved in Quebec and carefully concealed from the USSR. It turns out that the famous Operation Overlord - the landing of allied troops in northern France on June 6, 1944 - was coordinated by the British MI6 and the US Strategic Forces Office with the German generals as part of Operation Valkyrie.
The basis was a conspiracy against Hitler, which was organized by the head of the OSS Donovan and the head of MI6 Menzies, using contacts in German army circles through the agent of influence, Admiral Canaris. According to the centers of control of the British Empire (Committee of 300, Round Table, etc.), Hitler had already fulfilled all the tasks assigned to him and interfered with the implementation of plans to establish a post-war world order and to weaken the USSR as much as possible.
Canaris, being a supporter of the ideas of the British Empire, ensured contacts of the German generals with MI6. The key figure promoted by British intelligence within the Wehrmacht was Rommel, who was supposed to replace Hitler and continue the war in the east in alliance with the armed formations of the Polish émigré government in London.
If we talk about the Allied landing in Normandy, then pay attention to who commanded the German troops in the landing zone - Field Marshal Rommel, the most active participant in the conspiracy against Hitler, the future German Napoleon (according to MI-6). Based on the above facts, we can hypothesize that D-Day is one of the largest disinformation operations of the 20th century.
"D-Day" is another Munich conspiracy (let me remind you that among other conspiracies - the rescue of British troops near Dunkirn and the promise given to Hitler on May 10, 1941, not to open the Second Front in the event of his attack on the USSR on June 22, 1941).
That is disinformation. Who was it aimed at? The main target was, of course, the USSR. But it concerned the whole world. Most likely, the Allied landing in Normandy on June 6, 1944 was a carefully prepared covert operation to simulate an invasion (a conspiracy between director Churchill and Field Marshal Rommel through intelligence channels).
Recently, you expressed the idea that Great Britain and the United States also instigated Germany by the beginning of World War II, which is absolutely seditious for ordinary people.
What is her sedition? I can confirm my words with facts. By 1933, the key branches of German industry and large banks were under the control of American-British finance capital. At the same time, there was funding for the Nazi party and Hitler personally, who was being prepared for an attack on the USSR.
In the fall of 1929, after the collapse of the American Stock Exchange, provoked by the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve System (FRS), the third stage of the strategy of the financial circles of the British Empire began to be implemented. The Fed and Morgan's banking house decide to end lending to Germany, triggering a banking crisis and economic depression in Europe.
In September 1931, the British Empire abandoned the gold standard, deliberately destroying the international payment system and completely cutting off the financial oxygen of the Weimar Republic. The NSDAP, on the other hand, ranks second in the Reichstag, after which its funding from abroad is intensified. Schacht, President of the Reichsbank, becomes the main link between the largest German industrialists and foreign financiers.
On January 4, 1932, the head of the Bank of England, Norman, met with Hitler, at which a secret agreement was concluded on financing the NSDAP. The Dulles brothers, American politicians, were also present at this meeting.
Thus, back in 1932, the Dulles brothers were actively involved in the implementation of the global plans of the British Empire. A few months later, the political elite of Germany finally decided on the transfer of power to the Nazis, and on January 30, 1933, Hitler became Reich Chancellor. The implementation of the fourth stage of the strategy begins.
The attitude of the Anglo-American ruling circles towards the new government became extremely sympathetic. When Hitler refused to pay reparations, which naturally called into question the payment of war debts, neither the British Empire nor France presented him with claims for payments. Moreover, after Schacht's trip to the United States in May 1933 and his meeting with the president and major Wall Street bankers, America provided Germany with new loans totaling $ 1 billion.
And in June, during a trip to London and a meeting with Norman, Schacht is seeking a British loan of $ 2 billion, as well as a reduction and then termination of payments on old loans. Thus, the Nazis got what the previous governments could not achieve.
In the summer of 1934, the British Empire entered into an Anglo-German transfer agreement, which became one of the foundations of British policy towards the Third Reich. By the end of the 30s, Germany became England's main trading partner. Schroeder Bank becomes Germany's main agent in the UK, and in 1936 its New York branch merges with the Rockefeller House to create an investment bank.
From the point of view of information warfare, the Great Depression represented, in my opinion, a strategic information operation to preserve the world domination of the British Empire by organizing the world economic crisis and World War II. In this case, one can only be glad that Britain did not achieve these goals.
- Tags:,
Operation "Unthinkable", developed at the direction of British Prime Minister W. Churchill by the British Defense Planning Headquarters, in the deepest secrecy even from other headquarters, envisaged a military campaign against the USSR immediately after the end of World War II. The plans for the operation included the defeat of Soviet troops on the territory of the former Nazi Reich and a new invasion of the Soviet Union, as well as the total destruction of Soviet cities from the air using nuclear weapons. The forces intended for a blitzkrieg modeled on the German one would include both Anglo-American troops and German, Polish and Hungarian divisions.
The events and facts outlined in this article may seem incredible. In fact, it is difficult to believe in them, how difficult it is for a sane person to believe in the possibility of a vile betrayal of the one whom he considered an ally and friend. And, nevertheless, the treacherous betrayal was conceived and in fact was committed. For almost seven decades, information about him was kept in the strictest confidence and only recently became public. And it happened unintentionally. It all started with the fact that British journalist T. Mayer published his book "When the lions roar: Churchill and the Kennedy clan." The book, in particular, dealt with the FBI document declassified in the USA, in which the British ex-Prime Minister Winston Churchill in 1947 asks the American Senator Samuel Bridges to convince the President of the United States Harry Truman to drop an atomic bomb on Moscow, and at the same time subject four more to nuclear bombing. ten largest industrial centers of the USSR.
In this "radical" way, Churchill hoped to stop the "communist conquest" of the West. Documents confirming these truly cannibalistic plans are kept in the National Archives of Great Britain.
First, we need to remember how the situation developed on the fronts in the victorious spring of 1945.
By April 1945, the Red Army liberated the territory of Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and partly Czechoslovakia. Both Soviet and Anglo-American forces advanced rapidly through the moribund Nazi Reich. At the same time, there was an unspoken competition: who would approach Berlin faster and take it. In this regard, the Soviet troops had an undeniable advantage: on April 13, they occupied the capital of Austria, Vienna, and on April 16, they began an operation to capture Berlin. On April 25, a historic meeting of American and Soviet troops took place on the Elbe near the city of Torgau.
In the Pacific, Japanese troops were driven out of almost all the territories they had captured, and the Japanese navy was defeated. However, the Japanese ground forces were still a powerful force, the fight against which in China and on the Japanese islands themselves could, according to the calculations of the American command, drag on until 1947 and require great sacrifices. This made the United States vitally interested in helping the Soviet Union, which at the Yalta Conference in 1945 made a commitment to oppose Japan after the victory over Germany.
The secret development of a plan for a war against the USSR - in fact, the outbreak of the Third World War - began in early April 1945, even before the signing of the Act of surrender of Nazi Germany.
Sir Winston personally invented the code word for its designation - Unthinkable, which means "Unthinkable" in Russian. What did Churchill want to say by this name? That we are talking only about the hypothetical possibility of a military clash with the Soviets in the event of an extraordinary aggravation of the situation? Or maybe (which is most likely), he simply understood that the allies were committing an unthinkable meanness against the Soviet Union, which bore the brunt of the fight against the fascist beast and saved the world, including, of course, Western democracies, from the brown plague? In addition, being a sober realist, Sir Winston, perhaps, was aware that it was impossible to crush the USSR and its Armed Forces in 1945, that this was an unthinkable and deliberately doomed to fail, therefore he assigned such an exotic name to the plan for unleashing the Third World War. fundamentally contradicting the spirit and military traditions of the British army, accustomed to fighting only with the enemy over whom it was possible to win. Of course, after the prime minister's order, top secret work on the concept and details of a sudden super-powerful strike against Soviet troops in Berlin and East Germany began to boil in London.
But the Soviet leadership learned about the planning of Operation Unthinkable, its far-reaching goals, the forces involved, the immediate, subsequent and final tasks only a few days after the start of this work.
As it is clear from recently declassified documents of the Main Intelligence Directorate, already on May 18, 1945, the military attaché in London, Major General I.A. Sklyarov sent a telegram to Moscow, to the Center (GRU General Staff of the Red Army), on which, in addition to the "Top Secret" stamp, there was also another stamp - "Superlightning". This designation, which was not accepted in the daily practice of the attaché, indicated that the extraordinary telegram from London should have been deciphered in the first place and immediately reported to the top leadership of the country, namely I.V. Stalin and his closest associates in the State Defense Committee and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.
The military attaché in England, Major General Sklyarov, reported to the Center absolutely reliable information received by his subordinate Lieutenant Colonel I.M. Kozlov from a secret agent, encrypted with the letter "X". According to the agent, on May 15, 1945, the Joint Planning Headquarters of the British War Cabinet began to develop a plan for the war against the USSR - the "Unthinkable" plan.
"X" (his real name is still strictly classified, and perhaps the GRU will never open it at all!) Informed Moscow that the development of the "Unthinkable" plan is being carried out under the cover of the strictest secrecy, and several high-ranking specialists in military planning are taking part in it , including Generals Peak and Thompson, deputy. the head of the planning department, Colonel Barry, Colonel Tandji, and several other distinguished officers.
Agent "X" was constantly in touch with the officer of the USSR military attache, Lieutenant Colonel Kozlov, and during the war he transmitted a large amount of important information to Moscow.
This information revealed the plans of both the command of the Wehrmacht and the rulers of Nazi Germany, and the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition. Thus, "X" reported on secret negotiations conducted in Switzerland by the representative of the US Office of Strategic Services (military and political intelligence) Allen Dulles with SS General Karl Wolf. On May 18, 1945, "X" informed the Center that on May 15, in the strictest secrecy, the first meeting on the development of Operation Unthinkable was held. The meeting was chaired by General Thompson, who was responsible for the development of the plan. He began his speech by warning the members of the working group that "all preparatory measures must be carried out under conditions of special secrecy" and that Winston Churchill wants to "teach a good lesson to Stalin, to impose an Anglo-American war on the Soviet Union, to strike a sudden and terrible blow on the Soviets. ".
The initial postulates for the developers of the Unthinkable plan, according to Agent X, were Churchill's intentions to "drive the Russians to the line east of the Curzon Line and then make peace."
Agent X also reported that the Joint Chiefs of Staff immediately stated: "It is impossible to draw up a plan based on such a limited operation, and he will have to draw up a plan for an all-out war against the Soviet Union."
By special instructions from Churchill, the Anglo-American troops on the European continent were brought to full combat readiness and were to begin military operations against Soviet military units on July 1, 1945.
Literally until today, few people knew how Stalin managed to thwart the plans of the insidious "allies", why we were forced to hastily take Berlin, against whom the British instructors in April 1945 were training the undisbanded German divisions that surrendered to them, why he was with inhuman cruelty Dresden was destroyed in February 1945, and who exactly did the Anglo-Saxons want to intimidate.
The legend of "honest allies - the United States and Great Britain" was welcomed in every possible way, both in the USSR and during perestroika times. And then few documents were published - this period was hidden for many reasons. True, in recent years, the British and Americans themselves began to partially open the archives of that period, because now there is no one to fear - the USSR is no longer there.
So, on July 1, 1945, 47 British and American divisions, without any declaration of war, were to deal a crushing blow to the naive Russians who did not expect such boundless meanness from their allies.
The strike was supposed to be supported by 10-12 German divisions, which the "allies" kept undisturbed in Schleswig-Holstein and in southern Denmark, they were trained daily by British instructors: they were preparing for war against the USSR. In theory, a war of the united forces of the entire Western civilization was to begin against Russia - later other countries were to participate in the "crusade" against the "communist infection" - Poland, then Hungary ... The war was supposed to lead to a complete defeat and unconditional surrender of the USSR. The ultimate goal was to end the war at about the same line where Hitler planned to end it according to the Barbarossa plan: Arkhangelsk - Stalingrad.
The Anglo-Saxons intended to crush us with a total bombing terror - the savage destruction of the largest Soviet cities: Moscow, Leningrad, Vladivostok, Murmansk, etc. Devastating strikes were supposed to be inflicted by armada of "flying fortresses" - the notorious American B-29 bombers. How many millions of Soviet people had to perish in the cruellest "fiery whirlwinds" that wiped out Hamburg and Dresden from the face of the earth, destroyed Tokyo ... Now they were going to do this with us, loyal allies.
Subsequently, in his memoirs, Churchill described the situation that had developed in the spring of 1945 as follows: “The destruction of Germany's military power entailed a radical change in relations between communist Russia and Western democracies. They lost their common enemy, the war against which was almost the only link that tied their alliance. From now on, Russian imperialism and the communist doctrine did not see and did not set a limit to their advancement and striving for final domination. " From this, according to Churchill, concrete practical conclusions for Western strategy and politics inexorably flowed.
Soviet Russia, only strengthened during the Second World War, grew into a mortal threat to the entire "free" world; it was necessary to create a new front against its rapid advance.
This front in Europe was to extend as far east as possible; the main target of the Anglo-American armies is Berlin; the capture of Czechoslovakia and the entry of American troops into Prague is of the utmost importance; Vienna, or better all of Austria, should be ruled by Western powers ...
Subsequently, Agent "X" provided details of the plan of the operation. According to the information he obtained, Churchill based it on the following most important considerations: the Anglo-Saxons strike the Soviet troops on approximately July 1, 1945, without warning, with maximum surprise; British and American military morale and public opinion are bound to be "100 percent reliable"; the German army and the capabilities of the defeated Third Reich and its allies "will be used against the Soviets with maximum force" ...
According to the agent, the chief of British military intelligence, General Sinclair, and his trusted employee, Lieutenant Colonel Stockdale, were involved in the development of the "Unthinkable" plan, according to the agent.
X also conveyed that the Unthinkable plan broadly “requires two army groups to perform an unexpected tick movement. One group is moving from the north of Germany, the other from the Leipzig area as quickly as possible to the center of Poland. This will be accompanied by powerful air raids on the most important communication centers and key railway bridges on the main river barriers (Oder, Spree, Vistula). An additional offensive is to begin in Austria along the Linz-Vienna line. Special forces on aircrafts should be transferred to the Black Sea in order to bomb the Caucasian and Baku oil refineries and oil fields (this was planned by the British back in 1940, and the developers of Operation Unthinkable simply removed an old skeleton from the closet waiting in the wings). Also considered, and very seriously, "the likelihood of an air and naval operation against St. Petersburg."
The plan for the land campaign involved the delivery of two main attacks in North-Eastern Europe in the direction of Poland.
In general, according to Churchill's instructions, the total Allied forces involved in the operation were to be: 50 infantry, 20 armored, 5 airborne divisions, as well as the troops of the Wehrmacht and Poland. By the start of hostilities, the Allies planned to fully arm and reorganize at least 10 German divisions. In total, at least 83 divisions with a total number of well over one million people were to take part in the implementation of the Unthinkable plan ...
The occupation of a vast Soviet territory was also planned, in order to reduce the material and human potential of the USSR to a level at which "further resistance of the Soviets would be impossible." In political terms, the concept of the entire operation was an example of Anglo-Saxon goal-setting: the imposition of the political will of the British Empire and the United States on the Russians.
The news from London turned out to be a complete and obviously discouraging surprise for our leadership.
To be convinced of this, it is enough to recall that in the first days of May 1945, Stalin and Churchill repeatedly exchanged personal, and sometimes secret and very confidential messages. Churchill, as is evident from the published correspondence, sent eight lengthy letters to Stalin and received the same number in return. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the British Prime Minister thoroughly discussed the most serious problems of the post-war structure of Europe and made attempts to coordinate the positions of their governments. In particular, the issue of union control over the situation in the Italian province of Giulia was discussed, preparations for a meeting on the zones of responsibility of allies in Europe and the activities of the European Consultative Commission were also discussed. In addition, the leaders of the victorious powers agreed on the time and procedure for announcing Victory Day.
Comparing the facts, one is involuntarily amazed at the truly boundless hypocrisy with which Sir Winston conducted an "interested" dialogue with the Soviet leader, while nurturing plans for his physical destruction.
In a message dated May 9, Churchill, on behalf of the entire British nation, expressed to Stalin "cordial greetings on the occasion of the brilliant victory" that the Red Army and the peoples of the USSR won by "driving the invaders from their land and defeating Nazi tyranny," and also declared his confidence that " the future of mankind depends on friendship and mutual understanding between the British and Russian peoples. " Further, the British Prime Minister, as it has now become clear, with feigned kindness, wrote: “Here, in our island homeland, today we very often think of you, and we send you from the depths of our hearts wishes for happiness and prosperity. We want that after all the sacrifices and suffering in that gloomy valley through which we have passed together, we now, bound by faithful friendship and mutual sympathy, could go further under the shining sun of a victorious world. " Churchill concluded this message with very eloquent words: "I ask my wife to convey to you all these words of friendship and admiration."
Stalin, already informed of the plans of the Allies, responded to Churchill less emotionally, in a more constructive and businesslike manner, shifting the discussion from enthusiastic outbursts to specific problems of the post-war structure of Europe, in particular, the need to endow Poland, which suffered so much from German Nazism, with a significant share of land in German Silesia. But he conducted the conversation, we emphasize, in an equally friendly, affable tone.
In history, alas, there is no documentary evidence of how the Soviet leader reacted to the report of the military attaché from London that Winston Churchill, vowing to him of eternal friendship, gave the order to develop a plan of attack on Soviet troops and the USSR. One can only assume that the document handed to him by the head of the GRU Kuznetsov caused Stalin's reaction of bewilderment and many questions ...
By the way, during this period, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was in lively correspondence with US President Harry Truman. From Moscow to Washington, 8 personal messages were sent to Truman and 5 were received from him.
It should be noted right away that Churchill's idea of launching a surprise strike on Soviet troops was met with great disapproval in the circles of the British ruling elite. First of all, this idea was criticized at a secret meeting of the British War Cabinet. For example, the chief of British military intelligence, General Sinclair, bluntly called it "sheer nonsense that cannot be taken seriously at all." Sinclair immediately stressed that "the situation of Germany itself with its problem of communications, millions of refugees, the problem of food and the state of industry makes it impossible to wage a big war through Germany and Poland."
Agent X has also brought Moscow to the attention of the final results of the first meeting on the Unthinkable plan. “I think,” he concluded, “that the most responsible of his advisers will now view the idea of war on Russia as an adventure, but there are also many of his instigators who, like Thornton, say:“ Now or never ”.
The military attaché in London Sklyarov concluded the urgent report to Moscow with the words: "In words, the source said that the final decision on this issue is not yet known."
The next report from London was precisely reported by the head of the GRU Kuznetsov to Stalin, so that he had the opportunity to get acquainted with both objective information and with the reasoning and assessments of agent "X".
In the second or third decade of May - June 1945, the GRU's London residency continued to receive more and more reports on the development of Operation Unthinkable.
So, on May 19, Agent X reported: "The Allies actually betrayed the USSR by separate secret negotiations in Bern with the German commander-in-chief in Italy and secured their advance in Yugoslavia with a political trick, forcing Tito to wage a hard battle."
May 28 - another message from “X”: “There are no new facts about the plan. Rumors are not sedative. Beware of provocations for obvious political reasons. " This was a very significant warning.
In fact, the knowledgeable agent recalled the provocation of the SS thugs led by Otto Skorzeny in the German town of Gleiwitz, bordering Poland on August 31, 1939, when, while staging an attack on German territory, the SS man read into the microphone a statement broadcast to the whole world that “ the time has come for the war of Poland against Germany. " "X", one must think not without reason, suspected that Operation Unthinkable - an attack on Soviet troops in Germany - could begin with a similar provocation in West Berlin.
Fortunately, there were still sober heads in the British Military Planning Headquarters.
Despite the involvement of German, Polish, Hungarian troops, they came to the conclusion that Operation Unthinkable, due to the apparent superiority of the Soviet forces, was deliberately doomed to failure.
And no matter how many resources the Anglo-Americans use, they will still not achieve success - so strong was the grouping of Soviet troops in Germany and Poland.
On May 22, 1945, the Military Planning Headquarters completed its calculations for the planned operation-adventure and reported its findings to Churchill. In general, Sir Winston agreed with them, but ordered to immediately begin work on a new plan of the same operation "Unthinkable", this time in a defensive version. And on June 9, Churchill received a draft of the new plan from General Ismay for approval. The next day, the prime minister wrote to Ismay: “I have studied the draft Unthinkable plan, developed on June 8, 1945, which reflects Russian superiority in ground forces as 2 to 1. If the Americans withdraw their troops to their zones and transfer the main forces to the territory The United States and the Pacific, the Russians have sufficient strength to advance to the North Sea and Atlantic coastlines. It is necessary to think over a clear plan of how we can defend our Island, taking into account that France and the Netherlands will not be able to resist Russian supremacy. "
Concluding his message to the general, Churchill drew the following conclusion, indicating that he had not yet completely lost his mind: “Keeping the codename of Operation Unthinkable, the command realizes that this is only a preliminary sketch of what I hope is still a hypothetical probability ... ".
Nevertheless, on the same June 10, Churchill gave General Ismay new instructions and demanded that the plan of the operation be finalized, which was executed soon.
The new draft defensive plan stated that “the Russians will be able to attack the British Isles using the following forms of war: by blocking all sea communications; by invasion; with the help of an air strike by air forces; in the event of a missile strike on the British Isles or the use of other new weapons (that is, it was understood that the USSR could well acquire its own nuclear weapons). "
As a result, General Ismay summed up: “Only in the case of the use of missiles and other new weapons that the Russians may have will there be a serious threat to the security of our country. An invasion or serious blows to our sea communications can be carried out only after a lengthy preparation, which will take several years. "
On this in the "Unthinkable" plan, thank God, an end was put. It was hidden in an archive, where it safely gathered dust for several decades, until researchers engaged by the ruling elite reached it.
However, the unresolved questions, nevertheless, remain.
For example, what dividends did Churchill expect to derive from the Unthinkable plan?
First of all, it should be noted that the British Prime Minister hoped to involve the United States in the global war against the USSR, which by the summer of 1945 already possessed nuclear weapons. It becomes obvious that Sir Winston wanted to take advantage of the favorable moment and "saddle" H. Truman, who, after the death of F. Roosevelt, became the sovereign American president. But despite the Masonic solidarity, in the process of a preliminary secret discussion with the Americans about his plans for a war against the USSR, Churchill was unable to convince Truman of the advisability of attacking Soviet troops in Germany in 1945. Since the United States was in the decisive phase of the war with Japan and was counting on Soviet help, the notorious Atlantic solidarity could cost them too much. In any case, if Truman Churchill had supported then, we could talk about the lives of hundreds of thousands of Yankees, and an American voter would not forgive his president for this.
Further, the American military intelligence could not help but pay attention to the fact that on June 29, 1945, literally one day before the planned start of the war, the opposing Red Army unexpectedly changed its deployment. Marshal G.K. Zhukov brought the troops of the Group of Occupation Forces in Germany to full combat readiness, and the vanguards of the military units even moved into combat positions. Soviet soldiers, selflessly obeying the marshal (whom Stalin undoubtedly dedicated to Churchill's plans), were ready to repel any provocation of the volatile allies with great damage to the enemy. It seems that this was also a weighty circumstance that outweighed the scales of history - the order to attack the Anglo-Saxon troops was never given. Prior to this, the capture of Berlin, which was considered impregnable, showed the power of the Red Army and the military experts of the former ally came to the conclusion that the inevitable cancellation of the attack on the Red Army units.
But this happened in conditions when the allied coalition had a global superiority in forces and means. Doesn't this remind you of the modern picture of the confrontation between NATO forces and Russian military groups?
Suffice it to recall that the naval forces of Great Britain and the United States in 1945 had absolute superiority over the Soviet Navy: 19 times over destroyers, 9 times over battleships and large cruisers, and 2 times over submarines. More than 100 aircraft-carrying ships and several thousand units of carrier-based aircraft - against complete zero on the part of the USSR. Yesterday's allies had 4 air armies of heavy bombers that could deliver devastating blows. Soviet long-range bomber aviation was incomparably weaker ...
By the way, in April 1945, the Allies presented our troops exhausted and exhausted, and military equipment - worn out to the limit. Their military experts were greatly surprised by the power of the Soviet Army, which it demonstrated during the capture of Berlin, which was considered impregnable throughout the world. There is no doubt that the decision of I.V. Stalin on the storming of Berlin in early May 1945 prevented the Third World War. This is confirmed by declassified documents. From them it is clear that Berlin would have been surrendered by the Wehrmacht to the "allies" without a fight, and the combined forces of all of Europe and North America would have attacked the USSR.
Stalin certainly did not have the opportunity to prevent the Second World War, but he managed to prevent the Third. The situation was extremely serious, but the USSR won again without flinching.
Now noisy politicians and venal scribblers in the West are trying to present Churchill's plan as a "response" to the "Soviet threat", to Stalin's attempt to conquer all of Europe.
Did the Soviet leadership have plans of an offensive to the shores of the Atlantic and the capture of the British Isles at that time? Only a negative answer is obvious to this question. This is confirmed by the law on the demobilization of the army and navy, adopted in the USSR on June 23, 1945, and their consecutive transfer to the states of peacetime. Demobilization began on July 5, 1945 and ended in 1948. The army and navy were reduced from 11 million to less than 3 million people, the State Defense Committee and the Supreme Command Headquarters were disbanded. The number of military districts in 1945-1946 decreased from 33 to 21. The number of troops in East Germany, Poland and Romania was significantly reduced. In September 1945, Soviet troops were withdrawn from northern Norway, in November from Czechoslovakia, in April 1946 from the island of Bornholm (Denmark), in December 1947 from Bulgaria ...
According to the largest expert on post-war foreign policy, Doctor of Historical Sciences Valentin Falin, “it is difficult to find in the past century a politician equal to Churchill in his ability to confuse strangers and friends. But the future Sir Winston was especially successful in terms of pharisaism and intrigue in relation to the Soviet Union.
In his letters to Stalin, he "prayed that the Anglo-Soviet Union would be a source of many benefits for both countries, for the United Nations and for the whole world," and wished "complete success for this noble enterprise." This meant a broad offensive by the Red Army along the entire eastern front in January 1945, which was hastily preparing in response to the plea of Washington and London to provide assistance to the allies who were in crisis in the Ardennes and Alsace. But this is in words. But in fact, Churchill considered himself free from any obligations to the Soviet Union ... ”.
It was then that Churchill gave orders to store captured German weapons with an eye to its possible use against the USSR, placing the surrendering soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht in divisional divisions in Schleswig-Holstein and in southern Denmark. Then the general meaning of the insidious undertaking started by the British leader will become clear. The British took under their protection the German units, which surrendered without resistance, sent them to the indicated lands. In total, about 15 German divisions were stationed there. The weapons were stored, and the personnel were trained for future battles ...
According to Churchill's will, literally everything was clearly spelled out in the "Unthinkable" plan: the Soviet troops at that moment would be exhausted, the equipment that took part in the hostilities in Europe was worn out, food supplies and medicines would come to an end. Therefore, it will not be difficult to push them back to the pre-war borders and force Stalin to resign. “A change of state system and a split in the USSR awaited us. - writes V. Falin. - As a measure of intimidation - the bombing of cities, in particular, Moscow. She, according to the plans of the British, was waiting for the fate of Dresden, which the allied aviation, as you know, razed to the ground ... ".
The American General Patton, the commander of the tank armies, bluntly stated that he did not plan to stop at the demarcation line along the Elbe agreed in Yalta, but to go further, to Poland, from there to Ukraine and Belarus - and so on to Stalingrad. And to end the war where Hitler did not have time and could not end it. “He called us nothing more than“ the heirs of Genghis Khan, who need to be expelled from Europe, ”notes V. Falin. “After the end of the war, Patton was appointed governor of Bavaria, and soon removed from his post for sympathizing with the Nazis ...”.
London has long denied the existence of the Unthinkable plan, but a few years ago the British declassified part of their archives, and among the documents were papers relating to Operation Unthinkable. At this point, there was nowhere to dissociate ourselves further ...
Eisenhower in his memoirs admits that the Second Front practically did not exist at the end of February 1945: the Germans were retreating to the east without resistance.
The tactics of the Germans were as follows: to hold, as far as possible, positions along the entire line of the Soviet-German confrontation until the virtual Western and real Eastern fronts closed, and the American and British troops would, as it were, take over from the Wehrmacht formations in repelling the “Soviet threat ", Which supposedly inevitably hangs over Central and Western Europe.
At this time, Churchill, in correspondence, telephone conversations with Roosevelt, was trying to convince at all costs to stop the Russians, not to let them into Central Europe. This explains the importance that the capture of Berlin had acquired by that time.
It should be recalled that the Western allies could advance eastward a little faster than they could, if the headquarters of Montgomery, Eisenhower and Alexander (the Italian theater of operations) better planned their actions, better coordinated forces and means, spent less time on internal squabbles and searches common denominator. Washington, while Roosevelt was alive, for various reasons was in no hurry to put an end to cooperation with Moscow, and Truman at first, at least until the Potsdam conference in July 1945, was in no hurry to break or even spoil relations with the USSR. And for Churchill, "the Soviet Moor did his job, and he should have been removed."
Let's remember that Yalta ended on February 11. In the first half of February 12, the guests flew home. In the Crimea, by the way, it was agreed that the aviation of the three powers would adhere to certain lines of demarcation in their operations. And on the night of February 12-13, bombers of the Western Allies wiped out Dresden from the face of the earth, then struck a terrible blow at the main enterprises in Slovakia, in the future Soviet zone of occupation of Germany, so that the factories would not get to us intact. In 1941, Stalin suggested that the British and Americans bomb the oil fields in Ploiesti using the Crimean airfields. But then they did not touch them. They were raided in 1944, when Soviet troops approached the main center of oil production, which supplied Germany with fuel throughout the war.
One of the main targets of the raids on Dresden was the bridges over the Elbe. The Churchill's directive, which was shared by the Americans, was in effect - to detain the Red Army as far as possible in the East.
In the briefing before the departure of the British crews it was said: it is necessary to "clearly demonstrate to the Soviets the capabilities of the Allied bomber aviation." So they demonstrated it. Moreover, more than once. In April 1945, Potsdam was bombed. Oranienburg was destroyed. We were notified - it turns out that the American pilots were simply “mistaken”. They, de, aimed at Zossen, where the headquarters of Marshal Goering and the German Air Force was located. The classic "distraction" statement that is innumerable. Oranienburg was bombed on the orders of Marshall and Lehi, because there were laboratories working with uranium materials. So that neither laboratories, nor personnel, nor equipment, nor the nuclear materials themselves fall into our hands, they have turned everything to dust and dust.
Obviously, during Operation Unthinkable, Churchill hoped to expel Soviet troops from Germany and the Eastern European states, beyond the Curzon Line (which is now actually restored due to the admission of Poland and the Baltic states to NATO, the fascist coup in Ukraine). The British prime minister believed that the allied forces should occupy almost the entire European part of the Soviet Union. Thus, Sir Winston mentally saw himself as the liberator of Europe from both the Nazis and the Bolsheviks. By the way, Churchill claimed the role of the savior of European civilization, the entire "free world" from the "communist infection" back in 1918, having acted as the organizer of the Anglo-French-American-Japanese intervention in the young Soviet Republic.
And the last circumstance following from the previous ones. Churchill, persuading fellow Freemason Truman to carry out a "preemptive" strike on the Soviets, meant air (and most likely nuclear) strikes against the most important targets on the territory of the USSR. In particular, he called for an air and sea operation against Leningrad and inflict as much damage as possible on the Caucasian oil fields and refineries. But at the same time, the British Prime Minister intended to destroy the spiritual power of Russia (which is worth the idea of razing the treasury of Russian national culture - St. Petersburg - Leningrad!).
Fortunately, Churchill's attempts to drag the United States into a war against the USSR did not meet with approval in Washington at the time. Anxiously awaiting the results of the test of the atomic bomb, which imparted unprecedented power to the American armed forces, US President H. the continent of the Japanese Kwantung Army.
In July 1945, Churchill, as if nothing had happened, headed the British delegation to a conference of the heads of the Allied Powers in Potsdam. However, after the victory of the Laborites in the parliamentary elections, the British delegation in Potsdam was already headed instead of Churchill by Laborist K. Attlee ...
The plan for Operation Unthinkable was only declassified by the British government in 1999. But the Soviet military intelligence learned its content in advance, as the most important provisions were developed, and promptly informed the Soviet leadership.
The finale of the Great Patriotic War, by the will of the insidious British prime minister, could well have turned into the first action of a new world war. Fortunately, this did not happen. The plan for Operation Unthinkable was archived. Its implementation, in all fairness, was thwarted by the military attaché in London, Major General Sklyarov, his subordinate Lieutenant Colonel Kozlov, and most importantly, an arch-valued agent under the pseudonym "X".
The story of the development and cancellation of Operation Unthinkable, which became public after the release of the recording of the conversation of the former British Prime Minister with the American Senator S. Bridges, which was kept in the special archives of the US FBI, is another confirmation of the fact that during the Cold War world peace was constantly exposed to dangerous threats from calculating political schemers such as Sir Winston Churchill.
Especially for the Centenary
The article was published as part of a socially significant project carried out with state support funds allocated as a grant in accordance with the order of the President of the Russian Federation No. 11-rp dated January 17, 2014 and on the basis of a competition held by the All-Russian public organization Knowledge Society of Russia.
"With such allies and enemies are not necessary ..."
Many well-known historical facts testify to the insidiousness of our allies in World War II. First of all, these are repeated violations in relation to the USSR of its obligations to open a "second front"; the constant refusal to develop a coalition strategy, which undermined the unity of action of the allies; repeated attempts to conduct separate negotiations with the Nazis; bombardment of the most important economic objects of Eastern and Central Europe as Soviet troops approach them, etc.
By the way, at the end of March 1945, as a result of regular separate negotiations, 35 "second-rate" German divisions on the 800-kilometer Western Front actually ceased their armed struggle and ensured the unhindered advance of Anglo-American troops into the interior of the country. At the same time, 147 first-class divisions fought fiercely against the Red Army, seeking to delay the inevitable retribution for the atrocities on the territory of the USSR.
It could not be otherwise. After all, possessing genetic Russophobia and bestial hatred of communism, Western leaders viewed an alliance with Soviet Russia as a "sad necessity", consistently carrying out their treacherous strategic plans typical of the Anglo-Saxons: to achieve the maximum weakening of enemy number one - Nazi Germany and the exhaustion of their wartime ally - The USSR, so that after the victory it can dictate its will to both.
Randolph Churchill In support of this, we cite the statement of the son of a convinced Russophobe W. Churchill-Randolph. Despite the fact that the official position of the parent obliged Randolph to be more restrained, he, expressing the convictions of his father, did not restrain himself: "The ideal outcome of the war in the East would be when the last German would kill the last Russian and lay dead next to him." In the United States, a similar statement was made on the second day after the German attack on the USSR and belonged to the senator
G. Truman (fig. 2), later to the president of the country: “If we see that Germany is winning, then we should help Russia, and if Russia is winning, then we should help Germany, and thus let them kill each other as much as possible, although I do not want under no circumstances to see Hitler in the victors ”.
In the spring of 1945, the military-strategic situation in Europe became intolerable for the Western allies. At the rate
W. Churchill, for Western strategy and politics, the following conclusions followed from it:
- Soviet Russia has become a mortal threat to the "free world";
- it is necessary to immediately create a new front against its rapid advance;
- this front in Europe should go as far east as possible;
- the main and real goal of the Anglo-American armies is Berlin;
- liberation of Czechoslovakia and the entry of American
troops to Prague are of the utmost importance; - Vienna, essentially all of Austria, should be governed by the Western powers, at least on an equal footing with the Russian Soviets;
- it is necessary to curb the aggressive claims of Marshal Tito towards Italy.
Given these circumstances, as well as the extreme degree of economic and military exhaustion of the USSR during the war and the US monopoly on nuclear weapons, the West needed an urgent transition from a policy of cooperation to a policy of force, dictate, constant pressure, and even direct military confrontation. In the interests of this, and was developed by Operation Unthinkable.
Operation Unthinkable ( English... Operation Unthinkable) - the codename of first offensive and then defensive plans of military action in the event of a military conflict between the British Empire and the United States - on the one hand, and the USSR -
on the other, created in the spring and summer of 1945. Both plans were developed on the instructions of Prime Minister W. Churchill by the Joint Planning Headquarters of the British War Cabinet in the deepest secrecy from other headquarters. The British government categorically denied the existence of such plans until 1998. Currently, after declassification, documents related to these plans are stored in the National Archives of Great Britain.
The plan of the operation was ready on May 22, 1945. It provided an assessment of the situation, formulated the objectives of the operation, determined the forces and means involved, the directions of the strikes of the Western Allies' troops and their probable results. The appendices to the plan contained information about the deployment of the Red Army troops (in English documents, as a rule, the term "Russian army" is used) and Western allies, as well as cartographic material. The time for the development of the operation plan is not indicated, but, given the complexity of its preparation, the nature and volume of the documents themselves, there is every reason to assume that the planners received the task of the Prime Minister no later than March 1945.
It was clearly stated in the plan: the Soviet troops at that moment would be exhausted, the equipment that took part in the hostilities in Europe would be worn out, ammunition would be used up, food supplies and medicines would come to an end. Therefore, it will not be difficult to throw them back to the pre-war borders and force I.V. Stalin to resign. As a measure of intimidation, a massive bombing of a number of large cities in the country, in particular Moscow, was envisaged. She, according to the plans of the British, was waiting for the fate of Dresden, which, as you know, allied aviation razed to the ground.
The implementation of the offensive plan was to begin on July 1, 1945 with a surprise attack by 47 divisions of the armies of Great Britain, the USA, France, Canada and two Polish corps (including 15 armored divisions), as well as 10-15 German divisions (which, after surrendering, our the allies so carefully "cherished" along with their weapons in their zone of occupation). The purpose of the operation was to drive out Soviet troops from Central Europe.
The northern army group was to deliver the main blow to Stettin and further to Bydgoszcz, part of the Danzig force. South - in the direction of Leipzig, Cottbus, Breslau, part of the Poznan force. The immediate task was to defeat the Soviet troops and drive them beyond the line of the Neisse and Oder rivers. The further goal was to complete the defeat of the Soviet troops and the reserves that had approached and to reach the Breslau-Bydgoszcz-Danzig line.
This plan was enthusiastically accepted by the reactionary generals of the Allied armies. So, the commander of the armored forces of the US Army, General D. Patton, known for his bragging, allegedly stated that he and his troops would reach the Volga and Stalingrad and beyond, where the Germans did not reach. Obviously in the footsteps of Paulus.
What prevented the implementation of this insidious plan? First of all, the American military planners, accustomed to calculating everything to the smallest detail, who were not attracted by the prospect of "dealing" alone with the well-equipped, equipped and trained Japanese Kwantung Army of one million, were opposed. President Truman reluctantly had to agree with the arguments of his military experts: "Well, if you think so that they should help us with Japan, let them help us, but we will end our friendship with them here."
The second reason was the Berlin Strategic Offensive Operation, brilliantly conceived and with great skill in a short time by the Red Army, which made a stunning, indelible and sobering impression on the British and American military leaders. That, it turns out, is why the far-sighted I.V. Stalin demanded to take Berlin as soon as possible.
The third reason is that Churchill lost the election and was left without power. And, finally, the fourth reason - the top British military leaders themselves were against the implementation of this plan, because the Soviet Union, as they were convinced, was too strong. The conclusion of the chiefs of staff of the British troops was unequivocal: a blitzkrieg against the Russians would not work, and it would be more expensive to get involved in a protracted war. In other words, rabid reactionary politicians "stumbled" over the common sense of military professionals.
In addition, Soviet intelligence was not asleep - the plan for Operation Unthinkable thanks to the Cambridge Five became known to our leadership. On June 29, 1945, the day before the planned start of the war, the occupation group of the Red Army in Germany, just in case, suddenly for the allies, totally changed its deployment system in the interests of giving it a defensive configuration. Perhaps this was the weight that shifted the scales of history - the order was not given to the Anglo-Saxon troops, since now there could be no question of any surprise.
And a number of other facts testifying to the treachery of our allies. At the dawn of the atomic era, on April 25, 1945, US President H. Truman, having received information about the development of the atomic bomb, literally "made a slip of the tongue according to Freud," exclaiming: "I will have something to hit the Russians with." Immediately after the war, the well-known General L. Grose, who was also the administrative head of the work on the creation of atomic weapons, stated bluntly that the atomic bomb was intended specifically for the Soviet Union. And in early June 1945, the US Secretary of War G. Stimpson urged the American president to publicly demonstrate this weapon by "imposing it on Japan" in order to "thus influence Stalin."
On the second day after the official end of World War II, the memorandum of the US Joint Intelligence Committee No. 329 dated September 4, 1945, proposed: "Select approximately 20 of the most important targets suitable for strategic atomic bombing in the USSR and on the territory controlled by it." According to calculations, the result of this action should have been the death of 13 million people (recent allies who had just saved the world from fascism). And what were the plans of nuclear strikes against the USSR, which did not have or had a limited arsenal of nuclear weapons and did not possess effective carriers in 1946-1954!
There is no doubt that these weapons could have been used. For Western leaders of that time, the lives of tens of millions of people meant absolutely nothing. After all, they, without hesitation, destroyed the defenseless population of two Japanese cities, when there was no strategic need for this.
A. KALISTRATOV
LITERATURE:
Volkov F. Behind the scenes of the Second World War. - M .: Mysl, 1985.S. 304.
Kraminov D. Truth about the second front. - Petrozavodsk: State Publishing House of the Karelian ASSR, 1960, p. 30.
New York Times, 26.06.1941.
W. Churchill. World War II. Abbr. per. from English Book. the third, v. 5-6. - M .: Military Publishing, 1991.S. 574.
Operation "Unthinkable". [Weblog] URL: http://www.coldwar.ru/bases/operation-unthinkable.php. (date of access 12.02.2018).
The Memories by Harry S. Truman... - Vol. 1.- N.Y., 1955, - pp. 68, 72.
Belous V. Birthday of the bomb. // Independent Military Review. 2010. No. 25, p. 15.
Sekistov V.A. Who whipped up the war danger. // Military History Journal. 1989. No. 10, p. 23.
1. We have analyzed (the possibility of carrying out) Operation Unthinkable. In accordance with the guidelines, the analysis was based on the following premises:a) The action receives the full support of public opinion from both the British Empire and the United States, respectively, the morale of the British and American troops remains high.
b) Great Britain and the United States have full support from the Polish troops and can count on the use of German labor and the remaining German industrial potential.
c) We cannot rely on any assistance from the armies of other Western powers, although we have bases and equipment at their disposal on their territory, which we may have to resort to.
d) Russians enter into an alliance with Japan.
e) Date of declaration of hostilities - July 1, 1945.
f) The plans for the redeployment and demobilization of troops continue until July 1, and then it ceases.
In order to comply with the high secrecy regime, no consultations were held with the headquarters of the ministries in charge of the branches of the armed forces.
Target
2. The general political goal (of the operation) is to impose the will of the United States and the British Empire on the Russians.
Although the "will" of the two countries can be viewed as a matter that directly concerns only Poland, it does not at all follow that the degree of our involvement (in the conflict) will certainly be limited. A quick (military) success may induce the Russians, at least temporarily, to submit to our will, but it may not. If they want total war, they will get it.
3. The only way for us to achieve our goal in a definite and long-term plan is to win a total war, but taking into account what was said above, in paragraph 2, regarding the possibility of an early (military) success, it seems to us correct to approach the problem with two premises:
a) total war is inevitable, and we have considered the chances of success taking into account this attitude;
b) the political setting is such that quick (military) success will allow us to achieve our political goals, and subsequent participation (in the conflict) should not worry us.
TOTAL WAR
4. Since the possibility of a revolution in the USSR and the political collapse of the current regime is not considered by us and we are not competent to give judgments on this issue, the Russians can be taken out of the game only as a result:
a) the occupation of such a (vast) territory of Russia proper in order to reduce the country's military potential to a level at which further resistance (by the Russians) becomes impossible;
b) inflicting a defeat on the Russian troops on the battlefield that would make it impossible for the Soviet Union to continue the war.
Occupation of the living space of Russia
5. It is possible that the situation will develop in which the Russians will be able to withdraw the troops and thereby avoid a decisive defeat. In this case, they can adopt the tactics they have used so successfully against the Germans, as well as in previous wars, and which consists in using the enormous distances that the territory has endowed them with. In 1942, the Germans reached the borders of Moscow, the Volga and the Caucasus, but the methods of evacuating the factories, combined with the deployment of new resources and the help of the allies, allowed the USSR to continue fighting.
6. In fact, it is impossible to talk about the limit of the Allies' advance into the depths of Russia, at which further resistance (of the Russians) will become impossible. It is difficult to imagine the very possibility of an allied penetration as deep and quick as the Germans did in 1942, despite the fact that their advance did not lead to a decisive outcome.
Decisive defeat of the Russian troops
7. Details of the available forces and the deployment of Russian and Allied troops are given in Appendices II and III and illustrated on Maps A and B. The current balance of power in Central Europe, where the Russians have an advantage of about three to one, makes it unlikely in the current situation a complete and decisive victory for the Allies in this territory. Although the Allies are doing better with organization and slightly better with equipment (troops), the Russians in the war with the Germans proved to be formidable opponents. They have competent command, appropriate equipment and organization (troops) that may not meet our standards, but have stood the test (war). On the other hand, only about a third of their divisions correspond to a high level (requirements), others lag significantly behind them, and in terms of mobility, all of them, without exception, are significantly inferior to the corresponding formations of the allies.
8. To inflict a decisive defeat on Russia in a total war will require, in particular, the mobilization of human resources (allies) in order to withstand the current colossal human resources (Russians). This extremely long-term project includes:
a) the large-scale deployment of colossal American resources (manpower) in Europe;
b) the re-equipment and reorganization of the human resources of Germany and all Western European allies.
Conclusion
9. Our findings:
a) if the political goal is to achieve a definite and final result, it is necessary to achieve the defeat of Russia in a total war;
b) the result of a total war with Russia is unpredictable, one thing can be said with all certainty: victory in such a war is a task for a very long time.
QUICK SUCCESS
10. Nevertheless, on the basis of a political assessment (of the situation), it can be concluded that a quick and limited victory will force Russia to accept our terms.
11. Before deciding to start hostilities, the following should be considered:
a) If the assessment is wrong and the achievement of any of the limited goals set by us does not force Russia to submit to our conditions, we will in fact be drawn into an all-out war.
b) It is impossible to limit military operations to any one region, and therefore, as they unfold, we will have to reckon with the reality of a global battle.
c) Even if everything goes according to plan, we will not achieve the final result from a military point of view. The military power of Russia will remain unbroken, and the Russians will always be able to resume the conflict at any moment that suits them.
12. Nevertheless, in the case of a readiness, taking into account all the above dangers, to take the risk of a limited military action, we analyzed possible steps to inflict a strike on the Russians that would force them to accept our terms even in a situation where they could avoid a decisive defeat and militarily, they will still be able to keep fighting.
General strategic situation
13. Of the Russian forces opposing us, the Red Army is undoubtedly the most formidable. There is no threat to our bases and ships comparable to the German threat from Russian strategic bombers or submarines, and therefore the main attention should be paid to the strength and deployment of the (units) of the Red Army.
14. Europe. The main forces of the Red Army are concentrated in Central Europe. Despite the fact that the Russians can occupy Norway up to Trondheim in the south and Greece, this circumstance will not have a significant impact on the overall strategic situation. In Europe, the Russians can also occupy Turkey and, using their current dominance in Southeast Europe, are able to blockade the Straits, preventing any possible Allied naval action in the Black Sea. This in itself does not pose an additional threat to us, but Southeast Europe, including Greece, will immediately be closed to our influence and trade.
15. Middle East. An extremely dangerous situation may arise in Persia and Iraq. It seems quite likely that the Russians will attack in this region in order to seize valuable oil fields and because of the exceptional importance of this region to us. According to our estimates, about 11 Russian divisions can be used against the Allied forces as part of three Indian brigade groups. In view of the foregoing, it is difficult to imagine how we will be able to defend the named territories, given that the loss of this source of oil supplies can have extremely serious (consequences).
Due to transport difficulties and due to involvement in (the campaign in) Central Europe, it seems unlikely at the initial stage of (hostilities) a Russian offensive in the direction of Egypt.
But they will certainly try to provoke unrest in all states of the Middle East.
16. India. Despite the fact that the Russians will undoubtedly try to provoke unrest in India, the possibility of them conducting military action in the region seems doubtful.
17. Far East. In the Far East, any agreement between the Russians and the Japanese will allow the latter to free up forces to strengthen the metropolis or to resume the offensive in China. They are unlikely to be able to undertake large-scale operations to return the territories they have lost. Since, however, the decisive operations against Japan, apparently, will have to be postponed, a stalemate may arise in the war with Japan. Russian offensive actions against the allies in the Far East seem unlikely.
18. The above arguments and the current disposition of the main forces lead us to the conclusion that Central Europe will inevitably become the main theater (of military operations) - with auxiliary (in nature), but extremely important (in terms of consequences) operations in the Persian-Iraqi region.
19. In Appendix 1 we analyze (the possibility of a military) campaign in Europe. The key points of our analysis are summarized below.
Factors influencing our strategy in Eastern Europe
20. First of all, we will have superiority over the Russians in the air and at sea. The latter will allow us to control the Baltic, but in itself it will not play a significant role in achieving rapid success.
21. In the air, our advantage will, to a certain extent, be complicated by the fact that the forces of our strategic bombers will first have to be based in England - even in the case of using intermediate airfields on the continent. The grueling workload of the Air Force and the long distances that they will have to travel will hardly allow them to be used with the same efficiency as during the war with Germany.
22. Russian industry is so dispersed that it can hardly be considered a winning target for air strikes. At the same time, the significant length of Russian communications, apparently, can offer us much more preferable targets (for bombing), especially on. important crossings over water obstacles. However, to achieve any effective results, such attacks on communications must be coordinated with an offensive on land.
So, the only way we can achieve rapid (military) success is a land campaign, which allows us to take full advantage of our air advantage - both tactically and in strikes against Russian communications.
2H. The study of the topographic (map) and general direction of communications indicates that the main efforts of the land offensive should be concentrated in the North (Europe). This provides us with additional advantages, since it allows us to use our naval advantage in the Baltic to cover our left flank and actions against the enemy's right flank.
24. So, the campaign should be carried out in the North-East of Europe, primarily by ground forces.
Land Campaign in Northeastern Europe
25. The possibility of engaging allied forces in offensive operations will largely depend on how much of them will be associated with the need to restore and protect communications in the destroyed regions of Germany.
26. Taking this unit into account, as well as the forces required to secure the front north to the Dresden Chemnitz line, we estimate that we have about 47 divisions, including 14 armored divisions, that can be used in offensive operations.
27. The Russians, in response, according to our estimates, will be able to deploy forces equivalent to 170 Allied divisions, of which 30 are armored. Thus, we will be faced with a power inequality of about two to one in the armored forces and four to one in the ground forces.
28. It is difficult to assess the extent to which our advantage in tactical aviation and command and control would help restore the balance (of forces), but given the above inequality, launching an offensive would definitely be a risky undertaking.
If, in spite of everything, this option is chosen, it can be realized through two main strikes: - northern, along the Stettin - Schneidemühl - Bydgoszcz axis; - southern, along the axis Leipzig - Cottbus - Poznan and Breslau.
29. The main tank battles are likely to unfold east of the Oder-Neisse line, and the outcome of the campaign may depend on their outcome. If the outcome is favorable, we will probably be able to reach the general Danzig-Breslau line. Any subsequent offensive, however, would mean a stretching of the front line, which must be held during the winter, and an increase in the threat emanating from a bulge that has taken shape in the region of Bohemia and Moravia, from which the Russians will not necessarily have to retreat. Consequently, if we fail to win the victory we need to the west of the Danzig-Breslau line, then, by doing so, it is quite possible that we will in fact be drawn into an all-out war. Z0. So, the success of the land campaign will depend on the outcome of the battles west of the aforementioned line before the onset of the winter cold. Our strategic position is not strong in itself, and in fact we will have to bet on one major battle with an extremely unfavorable balance of forces for us.
CONCLUSIONS
H1. According to our conclusion:
a) starting a war with the Russians, we must be ready for an all-out war, long and costly at the same time;
b) the numerical superiority of the Russians on land makes it extremely doubtful the possibility of achieving limited and rapid (military) success, even if, according to political views, this will correspond to the achievement of our political goals.
J. Grantham,
J.S. Thompson,
W. A. Aawson
Attached:
Appendix I - Campaign Assessment in Europe
Appendix II - Russian forces and their disposition
Appendix III - Allied Forces and Their Disposition
Appendix IV - German reaction
Appendix I
EVALUATION OF THE CAMPAIGN IN EUROPE
GOAL
1. The goal of this campaign is to achieve rapid, albeit limited, success (in the war) with the Russians.
FACTORS INFLUENCING ALLIES 'STRATEGY
Air Force use
2. In the air, our advantage will be to a certain extent complicated by the fact that the forces of our strategic bombers will first have to be based in England - even if intermediate airfields are used on the continent. The grueling workload of the Air Force and the long distances that they will have to travel will hardly allow them to be used with the same efficiency as during the war with Germany.
Z. Russian industry is so dispersed that it can hardly be regarded as a winning target for air strikes. At the same time, the significant length of Russian communications, apparently, can offer us much more preferable targets (for bombing), especially important crossings over water obstacles. However, to achieve any effective results, such attacks on communications must be coordinated with an offensive on land in order to hinder the supply of the Russians (units).
4. An analysis of vulnerable positions in Russian lines of communication is given in Appendix 1. These positions, however, are located largely outside the reach of heavy bombers based in the United Kingdom. Consequently, if it is necessary to attack these targets, bomber aviation must be deployed at airfields in North-Western Europe, or it will have to use temporary airfields.
5. The complex system of ground organization of bomber aviation makes, however, practically unfeasible for several months the transfer of the latter from the United Kingdom to northeastern Europe, and during this time the possibility of delivering a quick and decisive strike may well be lost.
The use of temporary airfields (and, as a consequence,) limiting the force of strikes, perhaps / will allow us to increase the power of strikes against important targets behind the line of defense of the Russians (troops).
6. When considering the question of our use of bombers, one should, however, take into account the significant numerical superiority of the Russian armies and the tactical aviation that they will deploy against us. The superiority is such that we will mainly have to use heavy bombers for tactical purposes in order to provide direct support to the ground forces.
7. Bomber aircraft in the Mediterranean will have to be used in the same capacity.
Topography
8. The study of topographic (maps) and communications in Eastern Europe leads to the unequivocal conclusion that the main efforts on land should be undertaken by us in the north. South of the conventional line Zwickau - Chemnitz - Dresden - Görlitz, excluding the Danube Valley, there are not enough convenient routes of advance from west to east, and the predominantly mountainous nature of the terrain limits the possibility of conducting mobile warfare.
Left flank security
9. It is important to prevent the retaliatory movement of the Russians from the ports of Northern Germany or Bornholm to Sweden and Denmark. Our naval advantage in the Baltic will prevent it, but it would still be wise to achieve a quick surrender of Stettin. The foregoing testifies in favor of delivering one of the main attacks along the coast of Northern Germany with the support of massive flank attacks, which would make it possible to use our superiority in the conduct of large-scale military operations.
In addition to this, our naval forces in the Baltic will cut off the enemy's sea communications and destroy any naval grouping that goes to sea. (However) all this will not materially affect the ability or will of the Russians to resist.
Logistics support
10. In the German territory occupied by the Allied troops, the communication system is almost completely destroyed, while in the part of Germany occupied by the Russians, the destruction is much less extensive, and the railways are functioning. As a result, in the rear of the allies, there will be difficulties in transport communications.
11. It is likely that it will take a lot of troops and resources to prevent Germany from becoming a hindrance (to our actions). It is impossible to predict how serious they will be. Nevertheless, from a logistic point of view, if an offensive is undertaken at all, organizational considerations are unlikely to hinder our advance until we reach the (transition line) from the narrow to the wide (railway) track. Now broad-gauge routes on the main directions, perhaps, reach the line of the river. Oder. The use of vehicles will allow us to provide a range of operations (troops) of about 150 miles outside this line.
Summary
12. Based on the above, we come to the conclusion that:
a) the (military) campaign (against the Russians) should initially have a land character and unfold in North-Eastern Europe;
b) the best zone for an offensive is the area north of the Zwickau-Chemnitz-Görlitz line.
FORCES THAT ALLIES CAN INVOLVE FOR THE OFFENSIVE
Ground troops
13. Appendix III shows that the total Allied forces in Northern Europe on 1 July should be:
- 20 armored divisions;
- 50 infantry divisions;
- 5 airborne divisions;
- armored and infantry brigades equivalent to 8 divisions.
The situation in occupied Germany
14. Occupied Germany is the base for any offensive we are planning. Therefore, it is necessary to take adequate measures to ensure the security of this territory. The possible development of the situation there is considered in Appendix IV, from which it follows that we will need parts to maintain internal order.
15. A more serious impact on the ability to attract and the mobility of our troops will probably have the consequences of the chaos into which Germany will be plunged as a result of allied operations. to ensure the functioning of the allied lines of communication, it may be necessary to divert significant engineering, transport and management resources. At the present time it is impossible to give any reliable estimate of the degree of distraction.
16. Nevertheless, it is likely that maximum pressure will have to be exerted on our Western European allies so that they assume ever-increasing responsibility (for the state of affairs) in Germany. Comparing the above with the above distractions, we consider ourselves entitled to put forward an assumption about the possibility of reducing the occupying forces of Britain and the United States to:
- 10 infantry divisions;
- 1 armored division.
Even larger reductions are possible as the nature and extent of cooperation with the Germans becomes clearer. Since, however, preparatory steps in this direction are unlikely, if at all, the above figures can be considered minimal at the initial stage of action.
Defense requirements
17. Problems can be expected from Yugoslavia and no doubt the presence of (Russian) forces (capable of undertaking) an offensive in Austria. Since, however, the terrain right up to the northern borders of Austria is mountainous and difficult to pass, the Allied High Command, the Mediterranean (grouping), in our opinion, can organize the defense of this sector to the region north of Salzburg with available forces. For these purposes, 3 armored and 12 infantry divisions from the existing ones will be fully involved.
18. North of Salzburg we have strong defensive positions along the line from the Bohemian Mountains to Zwickau. Nevertheless, due to their length (250 miles) and taking into account the numerical superiority of the Russians, to ensure the security of this sector of the front, in our opinion, forces of about 5 armored and 20 infantry divisions will be required.
Assistance from the Germans
19. The possibility of German assistance is discussed in Appendix IV; according to calculations, in the early stages (of the military campaign) 10 German divisions can be reformed and re-equipped. However, they should not be counted on by July 1st. Consequently, although they may be re-formed by the time of participation in hostilities by the fall, we did not include them in our calculations.
20. Re-forming the larger German forces would be a much more time-consuming undertaking, as it involves large-scale re-equipment (of German units with equipment) from Allied sources.
Conclusion on the available forces (allies)
21. Thus, according to our calculations, the available forces of the Allies for offensive operations in the North are:
| Armored divisions | Infantry divisions | Airborne divisions | Equivalent to divisions | Total | |
| Total cash as of July 1 | 20 | 50 | 5 | 8 | 83 |
| Internal security | 1 | 5 | - | 5 | 11 |
| Defense | 5 | 20 | - | - | 25 |
| Cash for the offensive | 14 | 25 | 5 | 3 | 47 |
Air Force
22. Assuming no reductions in forward-based forces are foreseen, the Allied tactical air force in Northwest Europe and the Mediterranean will be 6,714 frontline aircraft. The bomber capacity is 2,464 aircraft, of which 1,840 are based in the United Kingdom and 624 in the Mediterranean.
23. There is no information about the redeployment of the US Air Force after June 1, 1945. Consequently, the given layout may undergo changes in the direction of reduction due to the ongoing redeployment (of American aviation) during June, if any.
24. Despite the restrictions on ice operations during the winter months, the following forces will be required in the Baltic: - 2 or 3 cruisers;
- 2 flotilla of destroyers (including 1 flotilla of the fleet (metropolis));
- submarine flotilla (small class);
- several fleets of motorized batteries / armored boats;
- 1 assault unit.
25. These forces will apparently have to be based in Brunsbüttelkog with forward bases on the North German coast just behind the ground forces, as well as in Sweden, where Karlskrona (the main naval base of the Swedes) and Lide Fjord are suitable for this role.
26. Part of the aforementioned forces can be brought up from the home fleet, since the threat in the North Sea from the Russians is extremely weak, but the rest of them will have to be provided at the cost of building up our forces in the Far East.
27. Small-tonnage warships will be required only in the waters of the metropolis and in the Mediterranean Sea to destroy any enemy ships that ventured out of the northern Russian ports or through the Dardanelles into the Mediterranean Sea.
CASH FORCE RUSSIANS
Ground forces
28. Russian forces in Europe are discussed in Appendix II.
In general, the troops at their disposal are: - 169 shock divisions;
- Z47 conventional divisions;
- 112 shock tank brigades;
- 141 conventional tank brigade.
29. It is impossible to foresee changes in the deployment of the Russians by 1 July. Nevertheless, it should be assumed that in connection with the need to prepare public opinion of the allies for a future war with Russia, any attack (on it) will not be (for the Russians) a complete surprise. They will probably conclude that an offensive from our side is likely to be launched in the North.
Z0. The Russians may have to deal with significant internal security problems in Poland. The vast majority of Poles are most likely anti-Russian; the Russians do not have to rely on the support or simply neutrality of even Beurling's army, which today numbers 10 divisions in its ranks.
31. But even with this assumption, we must take into account that our offensive will have to face the forces of the following Russian army groups:
- 2nd Baltic (front);
- 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian (fronts);
- 2nd Belorussian (front);
- 1st Belorussian (front);
- 1st Ukrainian (front).
32. In general, these fronts will be: - 100 shock divisions;
- 220 conventional divisions;
- 88 shock tank brigades;
- 71 conventional tank brigade.
33. By rough estimates, this corresponds to the following equivalent of allied formations: - 140 infantry divisions;
- 30 armored divisions;
- 24 tank brigades.
34. The Russian Air Force in the West has at its disposal approximately 14,600 aircraft, of which 9,380 are fighters and attack aircraft and 3,380 are bombers of an unknown type, and about 1,000 of them are heavy bomber aircraft.
35. Thus, there are about 2 thousand aircraft of a heterogeneous or unknown type, 800 of which are in service with the Russian naval aviation.
POSSIBLE RUSSIAN STRATEGY
36. During the opening phase of hostilities, the Russian strategy is likely to be defensive in nature. If the Russians are properly warned, they will be able to fortify forward positions to keep us on the line of contact. Due to their significant numerical superiority, the Russians may well be able to prevent any advance of our troops. They will most likely keep the bulk of the armored units quietly in the rear as a strategic reserve in combat readiness to carry out a counterattack in case we succeed in organizing a breakthrough. If the latter happens, the strategy of the Russians will probably consist of (organizing) a "sticky" defense up to the Oder-Neisse line in the hope that the main tank battle will be fought in the territory east of these rivers.
They will not necessarily need to withdraw their troops from Bohemia and Moravia in parallel (fighting on the front line), and if they decide to maintain control over these areas, perhaps with the support of the Czechs, then as we move forward this ledge in our line (defense) will become more and more inconvenient for us.
37. During the opening phase of the land campaign, the Russians are likely to use their air force primarily to provide direct support to the ground forces. Perhaps, the long-range bomber aviation of the Russians will be involved in the same role as it has proven its complete ineffectiveness in the role of strategic aviation.
38. The Russians may try to organize massive sabotage on the allied lines of communication, especially in France, Belgium, Holland and to a lesser extent in Germany. The usual method here could be the use (for this purpose) of local communists, to whom Russians, specially selected from among the repatriates who had been there for some time as prisoners or in forced labor, would be infiltrated to reinforce them.
Brief outline of the campaign.
39. In view of the superiority of the Russians in the ground forces, any offensive operation (against them) is definitely risky. If the decision to conduct a ground offensive operation is nevertheless made, in order to achieve the effect of maximum surprise in order to knock the Russians off balance, taking into account the above, it is possible to draw a conclusion about the advisability of delivering two main attacks by the following two army groups:
- in the north along the Stettin - Schneidemühl - Bydgoszcz axis;
- in the south along the axis Leipzig - Cottbus - Poznan and Breslau.
40. The primary goal here would be (access to) the Oder - Neisse line. Further, an offensive along the general Danzig-Breslau line is possible. However, the degree of advance to the east from the Oder - Neisse line depends on the result of the main tank battle, which, as shown above, can take place in this zone, that is, on the Schneidemühl - Bydgoszcz - Breslau - Glogau section.
41. It should be borne in mind that if the Russians do not withdraw from Bohemia and Moravia, then as our offensive unfolds, our southern flank will also be extended, which we will have to closely monitor. Due to the length of the mountains, starting from Gorlitz, from south to east, the length of the front will increase as we move forward.
42. Consequently, if by autumn we reach the Danzig-Breslau line and the hostilities continue, we may find ourselves in a difficult situation, with a choice: either we move forward, stretching our communications in difficult weather conditions, or for a (long) of the Eastern European winter, we hold a front that is too long for the available forces. If progress beyond this line is inevitable, we may well find ourselves drawn into an actual all-out war, and therefore, following the premise on which the analysis is based, we need to win sufficient to force the Russians to submit to our conditions, west of the general Danzig line - Breslau.
CONCLUSIONS
43. So, we come to the following conclusions.
a) The campaign in its initial form will have the character of a land operation in North-Eastern Europe.
b) Air operations will be carried out in the form of direct support for ground operations. We need to be prepared to inflict a brutal defeat on the Russian air force and create serious problems on the railroad communications behind the Russian lines.
c) We will have to actually strengthen our naval advantage in the Baltic and be ready to prevent any movement of the Russians towards Sweden or Denmark.
d) The main ground operations will have the character of an allied offensive north of the Zwickau-Chemnitz-Dresden-Görlitz line, while the rest of the front will hold the defense.
e) What forces we will have for the offensive largely depends on the inevitable distractions associated with ensuring the functioning of allied communications in the destroyed German territories.
In the above-mentioned (see point "d") region, we will most likely face the enemy's superiority in tanks - twice and in infantry - four times.
f) In view of this superiority (of the Russians), any offensive operation becomes risky.
g) If, having achieved the effect of surprise and knocking the Russians out of balance, (we) recognize the possibility of further advance to the east, the result will depend on the outcome of the main tank battle, which may take place east of the Oder-Neisse line. Superiority in command and control of troops and aviation may allow us to win this battle, but our strategic position cannot be called fundamentally strong, and in fact we will have to bet on the tactical outcome of a single big battle.
h) In the conditions of continuing hostilities, any advance beyond the Danzig-Breslau line is fraught with dangerous complications. Failing to win the necessary victory to the west of the named line, we will in fact find ourselves involved in an all-out war.
Appendix II
THE FORCES OF THE RUSSIANS AND THEIR DISLOCATION
ECONOMY
1. Russia is currently producing an enormous mass of war materials for its ground and air forces. The lion's share of them is transported to army units along long and thin lines of communication, which are especially vulnerable to air strikes.
2. Its (Russia's) military potential will significantly increase in the first half of 1945 due to the industrial resources and raw materials of the territories it occupied, especially due to Upper Silesia. These territories are now being reorganized by the Russians. and most of the industrial equipment is reportedly in the process of being dismantled and transported to Russia. Consequently, the Russians will not receive an immediate benefit from the acquisition of these resources and will not be able to make up for the loss of the Allied supplies accordingly. On the other hand, the Russian military would have some immediate benefit from the capture of German equipment - especially vehicles and anti-tank weapons.
H. In the war that ended, from the products on the allied supplies of which Russia relied on the largest scale, let us name motor vehicles and high-octane aviation gasoline, the import of which accounted for about half of all supplies. To maintain the mass production of military products at the current level, Russia now needs to a large extent allied supplies, especially explosive materials, rubber, copper, magnesium oxide and some ferroalloys. Nevertheless, even if it loses these supplies, it cannot be said with certainty that it will not be able, if so decided, to continue the war with war booty with non-diminishing and all-encompassing effectiveness over a period of several months. Its losses will be most tangible in such areas as aircraft technical equipment, military transport and explosive materials.
4. Russia will probably be able to maintain its current level of rationing in the absence of food supplies from its allies, even if this may require collecting heavy indemnities from all the territories it occupies in Europe.
5. Russia will face the extremely serious task of completely restoring communications by July 1. The overwhelming majority of the bridges will continue to be temporary wooden structures, and the railway network east of the Vistula will not be able to be rebuilt and the track gauge will not be able to change, with the possible exception of the main highways leading from East to West. The latter will be vulnerable to air strikes.
She (Russia) will suffer from a growing shortage of locomotives and vehicles caused by wear and tear and aviation strikes. This shortage will intensify due to the forcedly long run from the main industrial regions (located) in the Urals and to the east of Moscow.
The Russians will not face the problem of reducing manpower for work inside Russia thanks to the return of prisoners of war and displaced persons and the large-scale conscription of manpower in the occupied territories.
RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES
Army
6. If we assume that in the current war the Russians have lost approximately 10-11 million people, then the total number of mobilized ground forces of the Russians on July 1 may amount to just over 7 million people. More than 6 million of them, according to our estimates, are involved in the European theater of operations. In addition, about 600 thousand people (personnel) of special security units (NKVD) will operate in their composition. A capable and experienced Supreme High Command was formed in the Russian army. It is an extremely tough (combat) army, costing less to maintain and redeploy than any Western army, and uses daring tactics largely based on neglect of casualties to achieve its goals. The (system of) protection and camouflage (of Russians) at all levels is of a high level. The equipment (of the Russian army) improved rapidly throughout the war and is now good. Quite a lot is known about how it developed, and it can be argued that it is definitely not worse than that of other great powers. The Russian demonstrated ability to improve existing weapons and equipment and deploy them in mass production is extremely impressive. There are known examples of how the Germans copied the main characteristics of Russian weapons. During the war, noticeable progress was noted (by the Russians) in the field of radio communications and technical means of forcing rivers, repairing armored vehicles and restoring railways. The training of engineering personnel is at a high level.
7. On the other hand, today the Russian army suffers from heavy losses and fatigue caused by the war. The tactical and educational level (of Russian soldiers) is generally lower than that of the German army. Due to the relatively low general level of education, the Russians are forced to reserve the best human material for special branches of the armed forces: the Air Force, armored units, artillery and engineering troops. Because of this, from the point of view of the level of training of a soldier, the infantry was not at the height of the situation in comparison with Western standards. There is a noticeable shortage of highly educated and trained staff officers and middle-level officers, which inevitably turns into over-centralization (in management). There is ample evidence that the Russian command abroad faces significant discipline problems. Looting and drunkenness are widespread, and this is a symptom of the fact that the army is tired of war, (which is especially clearly manifested) in contact with a higher level of material wealth than that achieved at home. Any renewed war in Europe will cause serious tension in the Red Army. Its units will have to fight outside of Russia, and the Supreme High Command may find it difficult to maintain morale among the rank and file, especially lower-level infantry units. This factor can be strengthened through the effective use of allied propaganda.
8. The morale of the Russian Air Force is commendable. Russian pilots are intelligent and operate with unfailing competence, sometimes with brilliance, and have extensive experience in short-range tactical operations in support of army forces. It should, (however,) take into account that they have long been operating in conditions of numerical superiority over the Germans. their training and discipline are practically at the level of the Allied Air Force.
9. In general, the forward line of the Russian Air Force has 16,500 operational aircraft, united in four armies:
The Army Air Force, numbering over 14,000 aircraft, is equipped to provide direct support to Army ground operations.
Naval Aviation. These forces, consisting of over 1,100 aircraft, are closer to (our forces) the coastal command and the command of the mine-setting forces of bomber aviation by the nature of their subordination to the Russian fleet than to our air force of the fleet. (The main efforts) of these (Russian) forces are primarily focused on anti-submarine operations.
Long-range bomber aviation consists of approximately 1,000 aircraft. So far, it has shown itself to be ineffective as a strategic destination.
Fighter Aviation Forces (Air Defense). These units, numbering about 300 aircraft, are designed to defend important targets in areas in the rear. In addition, additional defensive fighter aircraft are part of the Air Force's fighter units. These aircraft are designed to defend important targets and are likely to have insufficient experience in their defense.
10. Russian aircraft have a modern design and meet the tasks they are called upon to solve. In general, however, they are inferior to the samples of the Allied aircraft. The Russian Air Force is not organized or equipped to withstand modern day or night long-range bombers, fight daytime forces, or act as strategic (bombers). In particular, Russian radar technology, as far as can be judged, is at a level significantly inferior to Western standards.
11. The production of aircraft (among the Russians during the war years) has grown. The production of 3 thousand aircraft a month has been reached. These production volumes are sufficient to compensate for the losses incurred by the Germans. However, if the allies refuse (to Russia) the supply of aluminum and inflict heavy losses on them, according to our confidential plans, these production volumes will be completely inadequate in the light of the new requirements.
12. (The aviation industry) of Russia is approximately 50 percent dependent on the Union supplies of aviation fuel. For the next six months, it will hardly be able to receive significant volumes of it from the former German (oil refineries) factories.
13. The small size of the Russian naval forces cannot be called a modern and effective weapon of warfare, and in the current state of affairs, none of their numerous fleets is able to take the initiative in the war at sea. The equipment (of the ships) is largely outdated, and the level of education and training of personnel is low. Officers and sailors are not familiar with the latest advances in naval warfare, especially in terms of interaction (the fleet) with aviation. Shipbuilding yards in Leningrad were damaged, similar shipyards on the Black Sea were completely destroyed.
Appendix 1 to Annex II
Red Army forces (excluding satellite armies)
| Armies | Divisions | Tank brigades | ||||
| Fronts or territories | drums | ordinary | drums | ordinary | drums | ordinary |
| Finland and Norway | - | 3 | - | 9 | - | 1 |
| Leningrad and 3rd Baltic fronts | - | 3 | 1 | 15 | 1 | 12 |
| 2nd Baltic Front | 3 | 4 | 19 | 40 | 7 | 17 |
| 1st Baltic, 3rd Belorussian fronts | 3 | 8 | 25 | 54 | 9 | 19 |
| 2nd Belorussian Front | 2 | 5 | 16 | 40 | 20 | 12 |
| 1st Belarusian Front | 5 | 5 | 16 | 50 | 31 | 13 |
| 1st Ukrainian Front | 4 | 4 | 24 | 36 | 21 | 10 |
| 4th Ukrainian Front | 1 | 3 | 12 | 32 | 3 | 2 |
| 2nd Ukrainian Front | 3 | 4 | 32 | 28 | 7 | 21 |
| 3rd Ukrainian Front | 1 | 4 | 19 | 36 | 7 | 6 |
| Caucasus and Iran | - | 1 | - | 11 | - | 1 |
| Total in the West | 22 | 45 | 169 | 366 | 112 | 143 |
| Far East | 7 | - | 36 | - | 13 | - |
| TOTAL | 29 | 45 | 205 | 366 | 125 | 143 |
| 74 armies | 571 division | 268 tank brigades | ||||
Equivalent in allied divisions
Appendix III
ALLIANCE FORCES AND THEIR DISLOCATION
In general, the general-purpose forces of the British Navy - even in the absence of support from the United States, are completely sufficient to deal with the Russian naval forces, and their disposition on July 1 should provide them with the necessary advantage in Europe.
Army
2. The distribution of Allied forces that we estimate at our disposal is shown in Appendix 1.
<...>
4. The above calculations are made on the following basis: - American redeployment plans allow for the withdrawal (from Europe) of four divisions by July 1. (Consequently) one armored and three infantry divisions should be deducted temporarily from the American forces stationed in northeastern Europe. Note the significant scale of the redeployment (of American forces) planned after July 1: 10 divisions can be withdrawn in July alone.
- The beginning of the withdrawal of the Canadian (units) and the movement of Indian units from the Mediterranean are taken into account.
- The (impending) demobilization (of the British Armed Forces) was not taken into account, since, according to our estimates, even having begun to one degree or another, it will not pick up such proportions by July 1 as to significantly affect the combat capability of our troops.
Moral attitude
5. In the event of the implementation of the premise formulated in paragraph 1 (a) of the accompanying note, we should not expect, according to our estimates, a noticeable drop in the combat qualities of our troops.
Equipment and resources
6. Subject to the reservations below, the equipment (troops) situation should be satisfactory. With regard to British troops, however, immediate action must be taken to ensure that:
a) the production of artillery ammunition remained at the current level;
b) the supply of Sherman tanks from American sources continued;
c) Canadian (military) production remained at the current level.
Accommodations that can be attracted for operations
7. It should be borne in mind that in North-Eastern Europe - regardless of the position taken (in relation to the conflict) by the Germans - significant forces and resources, especially engineering (troops), will be tied (by problems that we will have to solve) in occupied areas of Germany.
8. The morale of the Allied Air Force is high. The level of (combat readiness) of the crews is good in all respects, they are well trained, disciplined, and have the (necessary) experience. The training of new crews will continue.
9. The Strategic Air Force is united into subunits and units, numbering 2,464 long-range bombers, capable of accurately dropping a significant load of bombs on both strategic and tactical targets in the daytime and at night. one can expect them to act both on the Russian lines (defense) and outside them with a minimum of losses. However, the effectiveness of the actions of these forces is associated with a complex system of ground organization, which is why they cannot be quickly moved from one theater of operations to another. This lack of mobility gives rise to the need to (build) temporary airfields in case it becomes necessary to strike targets outside the range of the aircraft currently in use.
10. The Tactical Air Force, composed of 6,714 forward line aircraft, is capable of providing powerful and continuous support to our ground forces. Tactical aviation is also capable of defending important targets from enemy air strikes.
12. The equipment of the Allied Air Force is universally superior to that of the Russian Air Force. With regard to the available number of Allied forward line aircraft, it should be noted that the number of American aircraft listed in Appendix II could be significantly reduced due to the redeployment that the Americans intend to carry out during June. information about which we do not have,
13. The (volume) of aircraft and equipment production by the United States after July 1, 1945 is unknown to us, but we can expect it to decline. The production of aircraft and equipment in the United Kingdom will decrease. There is no shortage of aviation fuel supplies.
14. Appendix II shows the forces and dispositions of the RAF, Dominion Air Force and Allied Air Force in the European and Mediterranean theaters of operations as of July 1, 1945. US Air Force figures are as of June 1, 1945. Since we do not have data on the redeployment of US forces after June 1, the figures for the American (Air Force) should be treated with reservations,
<...>
Appendix IV
ASSESSMENT OF GERMAN RESPONSE TO CONFLICT BETWEEN WESTERN ALLIES AND RUSSIA
Position of the German General Staff and Officer Corps
The German General Staff and Officer Corps will likely conclude that (the decision) to side with the Western Allies will best serve their interests, but their readiness for effective and active interaction may be limited, primarily due to the fact that the German army and civilians were tired of the war.
Position of the civilian population in Germany
2. War weariness will become the dominant factor (influencing) the attitude of the German civilian population. The reluctance to cooperate with the Western allies can be intensified (under the influence of) Russian propaganda (conducted) from the Russian occupation zone. Nonetheless, the deep-seated fear of the Bolshevik threat and Russian repression is likely to force the German civilian population to opt for the Anglo-American rather than Russian occupation and thus side with the Western allies.
Potential Allied Problems with Internal Security in Germany
H. In general, the position of the civilian population in Germany is unlikely to take the form of active and organized hostility towards the Anglo-American forces, nevertheless, the following factors are potential sources of unrest and sabotage:
a) Unbearable living conditions. Such a situation may arise if the vehicles that (we) currently have in Germany are sufficient either to maintain a tolerable standard of living for the civilian population, or to support the operational actions of the Allied forces, but not to solve both of these tasks at the same time.
b) German youth, who inherited all their current ideas about Western democracy from Nazi propaganda.
c) Unemployed in devastated areas such as ports and industrial centers, especially (if events take place) against the backdrop of worsening difficult living conditions. The discontent of this class can manifest itself not only in hostility towards the Anglo-American troops, but also potentially in pro-Russian sentiments.
d) A significant mass of German prisoners of war or potential prisoners of war (found themselves) in the hands of the Anglo-American allies, who must either be kept under guard or released so that they can take care of themselves. Once freed, they can constitute an extremely serious source of potential unrest.
4. It is too early to assess how the German administration, even with a willingness to cooperate, will be able to dispose of these potential sources of unrest and sabotage, but it seems clear that Anglo-American forces will need to (deploy) guard garrisons in German industrial areas and ports. In addition, the protection of our main communications may require significant (forces).
Potential military value of German troops
5. If Germany is required to fight on the side of the Western Allies, the German General Staff must be sufficiently reformed in order to be able to create, organize and control the army. Perhaps the General Staff will not cooperate with us until some kind of political agreement is concluded between Germany and the Western allies.
6. Although in the early stages the Germans may welcome an alliance with the Western allies in the name of a "crusade" against Bolshevism and their will to conduct hostilities will remain at least in the units that fought on the Eastern Front, the desire of the Germans to restore their military prestige may be limited by the following factors :
a) The attitude of veterans (especially German prisoners of war who have been in captivity for a long time) is that the war, however that may be, is over, even if Germany lost it.
b) Concealed anger for the defeat suffered, aggravated by the policy of non-entry (of the allies) into close friendly relations (with Germany).
c) Inevitable confusion (in mood) caused by a change of sides (in a conflict).
d) Difficult conditions of fighting on the Eastern Front, which (the Germans) are well aware of.
e) War weariness.
f) Russian propaganda.
g) Certain gloating at the sight of the Western allies getting involved in trouble with Russia.
7. Thus, German generals, even if they want to side with the Anglo-American troops, will have to face certain problems of introducing troops into battle at an early stage of the campaign against significant Russian (German) forces. Most likely, they will not be able to bring more than 10 divisions into battle at the very beginning (of the action). But even to gather this kind of forces will take considerable time, and the degree of delay will be determined by the scattering of German prisoners of war (who were) with the Anglo-Americans.
Limitations due to lack of equipment.
8. For the following reasons, the supply of equipment may be a limiting factor:
a) Much of the German equipment is most likely unusable due to lack of care and cover.
b) Before the end of hostilities (the Germans) there was a lack of equipment. The deficit cannot be eliminated immediately, although warehouses in remote areas such as Norway can be brought in for this purpose.
d) Armament from German reserves of significant German forces (say, up to 40 divisions) is virtually impracticable due to the lack of usable heavy weapons and vehicles.
e) Even if the Germans come to a decision that assistance to the Anglo-American troops is more in their interests, the production of military equipment will continue to be limited by: - war weariness;
- the state of enterprises;
- lack of transport and, accordingly, a shortage of raw materials.
9. Despite this, the Germans will most likely be able to properly equip and enter into battle the very same 1 O divisions, which in paragraph 7 were mentioned as a possible contribution from their side (in the allied campaign against the Russians).
In this form, the plan was submitted to the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff - the highest body of military leadership of the British armed forces. On June 8, 1945, their following opinion was sent to W. Churchill:
PRIME MINISTER
In accordance with your instructions, we have considered our potential opportunities to exert pressure on Russia through the threat or use of force. We limit ourselves to what concrete facts and figures show. We are ready to discuss them with you if you wish.
a) Ground Forces
The Russian division differs in its composition from the Allied division. Therefore, we converted the Russian divisions to their British equivalent. Our assessment of the overall balance of power in Europe as of July 1:
The superiority in the numerical strength of the Russian aviation will for a certain time be compensated for by the significant superiority of the allies in its control and efficiency, especially in strategic aviation. However, after a certain period of time of operations, our air force will be seriously weakened due to the lack of replacement aircraft and crews.
c) Naval forces
The allies can certainly ensure the dominant superiority of their forces at sea.
3. It is clear from the ratio of the land forces of the parties that we do not have the capabilities of an offensive with the aim of achieving quick success. Considering, however, that the Russian and allied ground forces are in contact from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, we must be ready for operations in the land theater ...
4. Therefore, we believe that if a war breaks out, it will be beyond our ability to achieve rapid, limited success and we will be drawn into a protracted war against overwhelming forces. Moreover, the superiority of these forces could grow immeasurably if the fatigue and indifference of the Americans grows and they are drawn to their side by the magnet of the war in the Pacific. "
The document was signed by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff Field Marshal A. Brook and the Chiefs of Staff of the Navy and Air Force.
W. CHURCHILL TO THE JOINT PLANNING HEADQUARTERS OF THE MILITARY OFFICE ABOUT THE PLAN "IMPOSSIBLE"
JOINT PLANNING HEADQUARTERS OF THE MILITARY CABINET
I read the commander's remarks on the "Unthinkable" on June 8th, which show a two-to-one Russian superiority on land.
2. If the Americans withdraw troops to their zone and transfer the bulk of the armed forces to the United States and the Pacific, the Russians will be able to advance to the North Sea and Atlantic. It is necessary to think over a clear plan of how we can defend our Island, taking into account that France and the Netherlands will be unable to withstand Russian supremacy at sea. What naval forces do we need and where should they be deployed? What size of the army do we need and how should it be dispersed? The location of airfields in Denmark could give us a huge advantage and would allow us to keep open the passage to the Baltic, where the main naval operations are to be carried out. The possibility of having footholds in the Netherlands and France should be considered.
3. Keeping the codename "Unthinkable", Command suggests that this is just a preliminary sketch of what, I hope, is still a purely hypothetical probability.
The victorious volleys of guns died down. The bloody war ended with the defeat of fascism. Judgment was imminent for those who unleashed this massacre, which claimed millions of human lives and threw the development of mankind back many years. However, not everyone dreamed of eternal peace and life without shots ...
For a long time this information was kept secret and only now it becomes available. Nowadays very few people know this, as well as how Stalin managed to thwart the plans of the "probable allies", why we were forced to hastily take Berlin, against whom the British instructors in April 1945 trained the undisbanded divisions of the Germans who surrendered to them, why Dresden was destroyed with inhuman cruelty in February 1945, and who exactly did the Anglo-Saxons want to intimidate. This period was hidden for many reasons. In recent years, the British began to partially open the archives of that period, there is no one to fear - the USSR is no longer there.
In April 1945, Churchill ordered the preparation of a war plan against the USSR. It was provided to him on May 22, 1945 in 29 pages. The assignment was preceded by the conclusions that Churchill presented in his memoirs:
- first, Soviet Russia became a mortal threat to the “free world”;
- second, to immediately create a new front against its rapid advance;
- thirdly, this front in Europe should go as far east as possible;
- fourthly, the main and real goal of the Anglo-American armies is Berlin;
- fifth, the liberation of Czechoslovakia and the entry of American troops into Prague is of the utmost importance;
- sixth, Vienna, essentially all of Austria, must be governed by the Western powers, at least on an equal footing with the Russian Soviets;
- seventh, it is necessary to curb the aggressive claims of Marshal Tito towards Italy ...
The plan provides an assessment of the situation, formulates the objectives of the operation, defines the forces involved, the directions of strikes by the Western allies and their likely results. The appendices to the plan contain information about the deployment of the Red Army troops (in English documents, as a rule, the term "Russian army" is used) and Western allies, as well as cartographic material. The time of the prime minister's order to develop the plan of operation is not specified, but, given the complexity of its preparation, the nature and volume of the documents themselves, there is every reason to assume that the prime minister's assignment was received by the planners in April 1945.
In 1999, the British government declassified the plan for Operation Unthinkable.developed on May 22, 1945 in case the USSR does not stop at the agreed borders of the zones of occupation, but continues its march westward to the Atlantic Ocean. This plan is currently on file with the National Archives of Great Britain. Churchill pointed out in the comments on the draft plan presented to him that the plan was a "preventive measure" for what he hoped was a "purely hypothetical case."
The plan for Operation Unthinkable was first presented at a meeting of the heads of the special services in London on May 22, 1945: it began to be developed in April by order of Prime Minister Churchill. These documents are no longer a secret, and the cynicism of the allies is striking: on July 1, 1945, 47 British divisions were to invade the Soviet zone of occupation of Germany, occupy Dresden, Berlin and Breslau with the support of tanks, and break into Poland.
The British were going to destroy the aircraft of the USSR, block the Baltic from the sea and organize sabotage in the Soviet rear. The British even planned to use captured Germans - to form 10-12 divisions from SS and Wehrmacht soldiers and transfer them to the front: "They will be happy to fight against the Bolsheviks"; as if the prisoners still wanted to fight - after the devastating defeat of Germany!
By January 1, 1946, the Allies hoped to "cleanse Europe" and dictate peace terms to Moscow. Reading all this, it is disgusting to realize that the British, shaking hands with their allies, congratulating them on the victory over Hitler, were preparing to stick a knife in the USSR's back - not disdaining the help of yesterday's enemies, the SS.
So why didn't Operation Unthinkable take place? The British Chiefs of Staff suggested that the blitzkrieg would not work - it would be a protracted war. "The Russians will occupy Norway, Greece and possibly Turkey and Iraq ... Holland and France will be defenseless before them."
The Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram published an article on the results of the Second World War. "What would Europe be like now if in the summer of 1945 Churchill put into effect a plan of attack on the USSR - Operation Unthinkable?" - writes "Al-Ah-ram". - After all, Hitler did not expect that four years after the invasion of the Soviet Union, the Russians would raise a red flag over the Reichstag. It is possible that Soviet troops would have occupied London, forcing the British to build socialism. "
The Americans were cool about the attack, but not because they were more diplomatic than the British. The USSR, as they believed, could conclude an alliance with Japan - in this case, a confrontation in the Pacific Ocean and the involvement of the United States in a protracted conflict are inevitable; not the sea will be spilled - an ocean of blood. And most importantly, the plan for Operation Unthinkable became known in Moscow, where it was transferred by the "Cambridge Five" of Soviet intelligence officers in Britain with Kim Philby. However, on June 29, 1945, the day before the planned start of the war, the Red Army suddenly changed its deployment for the insidious enemy. This was the decisive weight that shifted the scales of history - the order was not given to the Anglo-Saxon troops. Prior to this, the capture of Berlin, which was considered impregnable, showed the power of the Soviet Army and the enemy's military experts were inclined to cancel the attack on the USSR. Marshal Georgy Zhukov began the regrouping of Soviet troops in Germany, reinforcing it with military equipment and manpower - the soldiers of Victory, who were not yet soon to see their homeland and relatives. In London, they figured out that they would have to give up the blow ...
Meanwhile, only in May 1945, the Red Army and the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition twice stood on the brink of conflict. The first time was when, on May 6, 1945, the 16th Armored Division of the US Third Army (under the command of General George Patton), ignoring the agreements with the USSR, captured the city of Pilsen, located in the center of the Soviet occupation zone. The goal of the Americans was the Skoda plant complex, which contained the drawings of the bureau of Hans Kammler, SS Obergruppenfuehrer in charge of the Nazi miracle weapon program.
On May 12, the Red Army entered Pilsen, but Patton's officers refused to surrender control of the city. One of the commanders of the Soviet special forces, Captain Yevgeny Olesinsky, promised to "throw the Americans out with bayonets." The "war of nerves" lasted for 24 hours until the allies left.
The second time - when on May 2, 1945, detachments of Yugoslav partisans captured the city of Trieste in Italy. The allies demanded to transfer Trieste under their control, but the leader of the partisans and the future holder of the Soviet Order of Victory with diamonds, Josip Broz Tito, said - "this land belongs to Yugoslavia." The British dug in outside the city - skirmishes broke out between the partisans and the British at night. The allies brought up tanks and artillery to Trieste. British General William Morgan proposed dividing the disputed territory into two parts by the so-called "Blue Line", but Tito did not agree - he knew for certain that Stalin had declared that he would "render any support to Yugoslavia." On May 22, 1945 (when the Unthinkable plan was being discussed in London) soldiers of the British 13th Corps began to occupy the neighborhoods of Trieste. Not accepting the battle, the Yugoslavs retreated behind the Blue Line. It was on this day that the third world war could really begin ...
British commanders wrote on June 8, 1945, an opinion on the plan for Operation Unthinkable to his prime minister, in which he assessed the state of the troops of the opposing sides and made conclusions about the prospects of the planned war:
"A) Ground Forces
The Russian division differs in its composition from the division of the allies. Therefore, we converted the Russian divisions to their British equivalent. Our assessment of the general balance of power in Europe as of July 1:
|
Allies (number of aircraft) |
Russians (number of aircraft) |
|||
|
tactical aviation |
strategic aviation |
tactical aviation |
strategic aviation |
|
|
Britain and the dominions |
||||
|
Poland |
||||
|
Total |
||||
The superiority in the numerical strength of the Russian aviation will, for a certain period of time, be compensated for by the significant superiority of the allies in its control and efficiency, especially in strategic aviation. However, after a certain period of time of operations, our air force will be seriously weakened due to the lack of replenishment of airplanes and crews.
c) Naval forces
The allies can certainly ensure the dominant superiority of their forces at sea.
3. From the ratio of the ground forces of the parties, it is clear that we do not have the capabilities of an offensive in order to achieve a quick success. Considering, however, that the Russian and allied ground forces are in contact from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, we must be ready for operations in the land theater ...
4. Therefore, we believe that if a war breaks out, it will be beyond our ability to achieve rapid, limited success, and we will be drawn into a protracted war against overwhelming forces. Moreover, the superiority of these forces could increase immeasurably if the fatigue and indifference of the Americans grows and they are drawn to their side by the magnet of the war in the Pacific.
The document was signed by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff Field Marshal Alan Brook and the Chiefs of Staff of the Navy and Air Force.
After the publication of materials about Operation Unthinkable, the famous military historian, professor at the University of Edinburgh, John Erickson expressed the opinion that “Churchill's plan” helps explain “why Marshal Zhukov unexpectedly decided in June 1945 to regroup his forces, received orders from Moscow to strengthen the defenses and study in detail the deployment of the Western Allies' troops. Now the reasons are clear: obviously, Churchill's plan became known in advance to Moscow and the Stalinist General Staff took appropriate countermeasures "...
There are two opinions among military experts about the outcome of a possible conflict in the summer of 1945 between the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and Britain and the United States, on the other. Some are convinced that "the Russians would have been unlucky" and that the USSR would have been left with horns and legs. "The United States then had only three atomic bombs in stock,- said the secretary of the union of former French special forces " The world is our fatherland "Jean-Pierre Kandani, who thinks differently. - And it would hardly have worked out to use them - after all, not a single plane would have reached the cities of the USSR through the Soviet occupation zone of Germany: they would have been shot down by anti-aircraft guns. The Red Army, which had a unique experience of storming European capitals, would have easily dealt with the allies - in two or three months the Russians would have occupied Italy, France and Britain. "
TOP SECRET
War Cabinet
Joint planning headquarters
OPERATION UNINSTANCED
Joint Planning Headquarters Report
1. We have analyzed the possibility of carrying out Operation Unthinkable. In accordance with the guidelines, the analysis was based on the following premises:
a) The action receives the full support of public opinion from both the British Empire and the United States, respectively, the morale of the British and American troops remains high.
b) Great Britain and the United States have full support from the Polish troops and can count on the use of German labor and the remaining German industrial potential.
c) We cannot rely on any assistance from the armies of other Western powers, although we have bases and equipment at their disposal on their territory, which we may have to resort to.
d) Russians enter into an alliance with Japan.
f) The plans for the redeployment and demobilization of troops continue until July 1, and then it ceases.
In order to comply with the high secrecy regime, no consultations were held with the headquarters of the ministries in charge of the branches of the armed forces.
Target:
2. The general political goal of the operation is to impose the will of the United States and the British Empire on the Russians. Although the “will” of the two countries can be viewed as a matter that directly concerns only Poland, it does not at all follow that the degree of our involvement in the conflict will certainly be limited. A quick military success may induce the Russians, at least temporarily, to submit to our will, but it may not. If they want total war, they will get it.
By the end of the war, the Soviet army, although it lost millions of its soldiers on the fronts, was able to pierce not only Berlin, but also take the whole of Europe under its protectorate, as some Soviet military historians say. However, in the spring of 1945, no one in Moscow even thought of violating the allied agreements, and even more so to contemplate how, after the storming of Berlin, to throw the allies into the Atlantic Ocean.
W. CHURCHILL TO THE JOINT PLANNING HEADQUARTERS OF THE MILITARY OFFICE ABOUT THE PLAN "IMPOSSIBLE"
JOINT PLANNING HEADQUARTERS OF THE MILITARY CABINET
I read the commander's remarks on the Nemys-limogo, dated June 8th, which show a two-to-one Russian superiority on land.
2. If the Americans withdraw troops to their zone and transfer the bulk of the armed forces to the United States and the Pacific Ocean region, the Russians will be able to advance to the North Sea and Atlantic. It is necessary to think over a clear plan of how we can defend our Island, taking into account that France and the Netherlands will not be able to withstand Russian superiority at sea. What naval forces do we need and where should they be deployed? What size of the army do we need and how should it be dispersed? The location of airfields in Denmark could give us a huge advantage and would allow us to keep open the passage to the Baltic, where the main naval operations are to be carried out. The possibility of having footholds in the Netherlands and France should be considered.
3. Keeping the codename "Unthinkable", Command suggests that this is just a preliminary sketch of what, I hope, is still a purely hypothetical probability.
In April 1945, the Allies presented our troops exhausted and exhausted, and our military equipment worn out to the limit. Their military experts were greatly surprised by the power of the Soviet Army, which it demonstrated in the capture of Berlin, which they considered impregnable. There is no doubt that the conclusion of the great historian V. Falin is correct - Stalin's decision to storm Berlin in early May 1945 prevented the third world war. This is confirmed by recently declassified documents. Otherwise, Berlin would have been surrendered to the "allies" without a fight, and the combined forces of all of Europe and North America would have attacked the USSR.
It was then that Churchill gave orders to store captured German weapons with an eye to its possible use against the USSR, placing the surrendering soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht as divisional divisions in Schleswig-Holstein and in southern Denmark. Then the general meaning of the insidious undertaking started by the British leader will become clear. The British took under their protection the German units, which surrendered without resistance, sent them to South Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein. In total, about 15 German divisions were stationed there. The weapons were stored and the personnel trained for future battles.
American General Patton, the commander of the tank armies, bluntly stated that he did not plan to stop at the demarcation line along the Elbe agreed in Yalta, but to move on. To Poland, from there to Ukraine and Belarus - and so on to Stalingrad. And to end the war where Hitler did not have time and could not end it. He called us nothing more than "the heirs of Genghis Khan, who need to be expelled from Europe." After the end of the war, Patton was appointed governor of Bavaria, and soon removed from his post for sympathizing with the Nazis.
London has long denied the existence of such a plan, but a few years ago the British declassified part of their archives, and among the documents were papers concerning the plan "Unthinkable".
Eisenhower in his memoirs admits that the Second Front practically did not exist at the end of February 1945: the Germans were retreating to the east without resistance. The tactics of the Germans were as follows: to hold, as far as possible, positions along the entire line of the Soviet-German confrontation until the virtual Western and real Eastern fronts closed up, and the American and British troops would, as it were, take over the baton from the Wehrmacht formations in repelling the "Soviet threat "hanging over Europe.
At this time, Churchill, in correspondence, telephone conversations with Roosevelt, was trying to convince at all costs to stop the Russians, not to let them into Central Europe. This explains the importance that the capture of Berlin had acquired by that time.
I must say that the Western allies could advance eastward a little faster than they could, if the headquarters of Montgomery, Eisenhower and Alexander (the Italian theater of operations) better planned their actions, better coordinated forces and means, spent less time on internal squabbles and finding a common denominator. Washington, while Roosevelt was alive, for various reasons was in no hurry to put an end to cooperation with Moscow. And for Churchill, "the Soviet Moor did his job, and he should have been removed."
Let's remember that Yalta ended on February 11. In the first half of February 12, the guests flew home. In the Crimea, by the way, it was agreed that the aviation of the three powers would adhere to certain lines of demarcation in their operations. And on the night of February 12-13, bombers of the Western Allies wiped out Dresden from the face of the earth, then walked through the main enterprises in Slovakia, in the future Soviet zone of occupation of Germany, so that the factories did not get to us intact. In 1941, Stalin suggested that the British and Americans bomb the oil fields in Ploiesti using the Crimean airfields. No, then they did not touch them. They were raided in 1944, when Soviet troops approached the main center of oil production, which supplied Germany with fuel throughout the war.
One of the main targets of the Dresden raids was the bridges over the Elbe. The Churchill's directive, which was shared by the Americans, was in effect, to detain the Red Army as far as possible in the East. In the briefing before the departure of the British crews, it was said: it is necessary to clearly demonstrate to the Soviets the capabilities of the allied bomber aviation. So they demonstrated it. Moreover, more than once. In April 1945, Potsdam was bombed. Oranienburg was destroyed. We were notified that the pilots were mistaken. They seemed to be aiming at Zossen, where the headquarters of the German Air Force was located. The classic "distraction" statement that was innumerable. Oranienburg was bombed on the orders of Marshall and Lega, because there were laboratories working with uranium. So that neither laboratories, nor personnel, nor equipment, nor materials fall into our hands - everything has been turned to dust.
Attempts were made to influence partners by a good example. From the words of Vladimir Semyonov, a Soviet diplomat, I know the following. Stalin invited Andrei Smirnov, who was then the head of the 3rd European Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and concurrently Minister of Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, to discuss, with the participation of Semyonov, options for action in the territories set aside for Soviet control.
Smirnov reported that our troops, pursuing the enemy, went beyond the demarcation lines in Austria, as agreed in Yalta, and suggested de facto stake out our new positions in anticipation of how the United States would behave in similar situations. Stalin interrupted him and said: "Wrong. Write a telegram to the Allied powers." And he dictated: "The Soviet troops, pursuing parts of the Wehrmacht, were forced to cross the line previously agreed upon between us. I hereby want to confirm that after the end of hostilities, the Soviet side will withdraw its troops into the established zones of occupation."
On April 12, the US Embassy, state and military institutions received Truman's instructions: all documents signed by Roosevelt are not subject to execution. This was followed by a command to toughen up the position in relation to the Soviet Union. On April 23, Truman holds a meeting at the White House, where he declares: “Enough, we are no longer interested in an alliance with the Russians, and therefore we may not fulfill the agreements with them. We will solve the problem of Japan without the help of the Russians. ” He set himself the goal of “making the Yalta agreements non-existent, as it were”.
Truman was close to not hesitating to announce the break of cooperation with Moscow publicly. The military literally rebelled against Truman, with the exception of General Patton, who commanded the US armored forces. By the way, the military also thwarted the Unthinkable plan. They were interested in the entry of the Soviet Union into the war with Japan. Their arguments to Truman: if the USSR does not take the side of the United States, then the Japanese will transfer a million-strong Kwantung army to the islands and will fight with the same fanaticism as it was in Okinawa. As a result, the Americans will only lose from one to two million people killed.
In addition, the Americans had not yet tested a nuclear bomb at that time. And public opinion in the States would not have understood such a betrayal then. American citizens were then mostly sympathetic to the Soviet Union. They saw what losses we are suffering for the sake of a common victory over Hitler. As a result, according to eyewitnesses, Truman broke down a little and agreed with the arguments of his military experts. “Well, if you think so that they should help us with Japan, let them help, but we will end our friendship with them,” concludes Truman. Hence such a tough conversation with Molotov, who wondered what had suddenly happened. Truman here already relied on the atomic bomb.
In addition, the American military, like, indeed, their British counterparts, believed that it was easier to start a war with the Soviet Union than to successfully end it. The risk seemed to them too great - the storming of Berlin made a sobering impression on the British. The conclusion of the chiefs of staff of British troops was unequivocal: a blitzkrieg against the Russians would not work, and they did not dare to get involved in a protracted war.
So, the position of the US military is the first reason. The second is the Berlin operation. Third, Churchill lost the election and was left without power. And finally, the fourth - the British military leaders themselves were against the implementation of this plan, because the Soviet Union, as they were convinced, was too strong.
The United States not only did not invite Britain to participate in this war, they squeezed her out of Asia. Under the agreement of 1942, the US line of responsibility was not limited to Singapore, but also concerned China, Australia, and New Zealand.
Stalin, and this was a major analyst, bringing everything together, said: "You are showing what your aviation can do, and I will show you what we can do on the ground." He demonstrated the striking firepower of our Armed Forces so that neither Churchill, nor Eisenhower, nor Marshall, nor Patton, or anyone else would have a desire to fight the USSR. Behind the determination of the Soviet side to take Berlin and reach the line of demarcation, as they were designated in Yalta, there was an overriding task - to prevent the British leader's adventure with the implementation of the Unthinkable plan, that is, the escalation of World War II into the Third. If this had happened, there would have been thousands and thousands of times more victims!
The political scenario of the Berlin operation belonged to Stalin. The general author of its military component was Georgy Zhukov. Stalin insisted on the Berlin operation. He wanted to show the initiators of the "Unthinkable" the fire and striking power of the Soviet armed forces. With a hint, the outcome of the war is decided not in the air and at sea, but on the ground. The battle for Berlin sobered many dashing heads and thus fulfilled its political, psychological and military purpose. And there were more than enough heads in the West, intoxicated by a relatively easy success in the spring of 1945.
The storming of Berlin, hoisting the banner of Victory over the Reichstag were, of course, not only a symbol or the final chord of the war. And least of all propaganda. It was a matter of principle for the army to enter the enemy's lair and thus mark the end of the most difficult war in Russian history. From here, from Berlin, the soldiers believed, a fascist beast crawled out, bringing immeasurable grief to the Soviet people, the peoples of Europe, and the whole world. The Red Army came there in order to start a new chapter in our history, and in the history of Germany itself, in the history of mankind ...
The Allies wanted to steal Victory Day from us by accepting the surrender of the Germans on May 7 in Reims. This essentially separate deal fit into the Unthinkable plan. It is necessary that the Germans capitulate only to the Western allies and be able to participate in the Third World War. Hitler's successor Dönitz said at this time: "We will end the war in front of Britain and the United States, which has lost its meaning, but we will continue the war with the Soviet Union." The surrender at Reims was in fact the brainchild of Churchill and Dönitz. The surrender agreement was signed on May 7 at 2:45 am.
It cost us tremendous efforts to force Truman to confirm the surrender in Berlin, more precisely, in Karlhorst on May 9 with the participation of the USSR and the allies, to agree on Victory Day on May 9, because Churchill insisted: consider May 7 as the end of the war. By the way, there was another forgery in Reims. The text of the agreement on Germany's unconditional surrender to the Allies was approved by the Yalta Conference; Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin signed it. But the Americans pretended to have forgotten about the existence of the document, which, by the way, lay in the safe of Chief of Staff Eisenhower Smith. Eisenhower's entourage, under the leadership of Smith, drew up a new document, "cleared" of the Yalta provisions undesirable for the allies. At the same time, the document was signed by General Smith on behalf of the Allies, and the Soviet Union was not even mentioned, as if it did not participate in the war. This is the kind of performance that took place in Reims. The document of surrender in Reims was handed over to the Germans before it was sent to Moscow.
Eisenhower and Montgomery refused to participate in the joint Victory Parade in the former capital of the Reich. Together with Zhukov, they were supposed to receive this parade. The conceived Victory Parade in Berlin nevertheless took place, but it was received by one Marshal Zhukov. This was in July 1945. And in Moscow, the Victory Parade took place, as you know, on June 24.
Fortunately, the military in the West turned out to be smarter than their politicians. They calculated that if Churchill's Operation Unthinkable began, its ending would be obvious: a victorious red flag would be hoisted over Big Ben. With a hammer and sickle - the same as over the Reichstag.
