Home Diseases and pests NATO in the modern world (what is the new concept of the bloc). Coursework - NATO: creation and activities of NATO practical activities and achievements in brief

Diseases and pests

NATO in the modern world (what is the new concept of the bloc). Coursework - NATO: creation and activities of NATO practical activities and achievements in brief

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) - a military-political union of European states, the United States and Canada, created on April 4, 1949 by the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington.

Founders and original members NATO There were 12 states: Belgium, Great Britain, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Canada, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United States of America and France.

Between 1949 and the early 1980s, the Alliance four countries joined(Turkey and Greece - in 1952, Germany - in 1955, Spain - in 1982).

Currently, 28 states are members of NATO.

The main goal of NATO- guarantee the freedom and security of all its members in Europe and North America in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. To achieve this goal, NATO uses its political influence and military capabilities in accordance with the nature of the security challenges faced by its member states.

- act as a basis for stability in the Euro-Atlantic region;
- serve as a forum for consultations on security issues;
- exercise deterrence and protection against any threat of aggression against any of the NATO member states;
- promote effective conflict prevention and actively participate in crisis management;
- to promote the development of all-round partnership, cooperation and dialogue with other countries of the Euro-Atlantic region.

Structure:

NATO's key decisions are being prepared and adopted in committees which are made up of members of national delegations. Quantity national delegations corresponds to the number of member states of the alliance. This is the core of the Alliance as an international club. The work of the inter-national committees is supported by a civilian staff (international officials) who report to the Secretary General and an integrated command structure which is managed by the NATO Military Committee.

North Atlantic Council (NAC) has real political power and decision-making rights. It consists of the Permanent Representatives of all Member States, who meet at least once a week. Sessions of the NATO Council are also held at higher levels - foreign ministers, defense ministers or heads of government, but its powers and decision-making rights remain the same, and decisions have the same status and legal force regardless of the level of representation.

Military Planning Committee (KVP) usually works as a permanent representative, but meets at least twice a year at the level of defense ministers. It deals with most military issues and tasks related to collective defense planning. All member states of the Alliance are represented on this committee, with the exception of France. The Defense Planning Committee guides the activities of NATO's governing military bodies.

NATO Defense Ministers Members of the Defense Planning Committee hold regular meetings within the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) where they discuss specific policy issues related to nuclear forces.

NATO Secretary General is a prominent international statesman who has been entrusted by the governments of NATO member states to chair the North Atlantic Council, the Defense Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group, as well as the nominal chairman of other major NATO committees. He is the Secretary General and Chief Executive Officer of NATO. In addition, the Secretary General is Chairman of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Mediterranean Cooperation Group, co-chairman (together with the representative of Russia and the representative of the NATO country, acting honorary chairman) of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. He also co-chairs, with Ukraine's representative, the NATO-Ukraine Commission.

International Secretariat. The work of the North Atlantic Council and its subordinate committees is carried out with the help of the International Secretariat. It is composed of staff from various member states, recruited directly by NATO or seconded by the respective governments. Members of the International Secretariat report to the Secretary General of NATO and remain loyal to the organization throughout their tenure.

Military Committee (VC) is responsible for the planning and conduct of collective military operations and holds regular meetings at the level of the Chiefs of General Staff (CHOS). Iceland, which has no armed forces, is represented at such meetings by a civilian official. France has a special representative. The Committee is NATO's highest military body, operating under the overall political direction of the North Atlantic Council, the STOC and the NSG.

International Military Headquarters (IMS)) is headed by a general or admiral, who is selected by the Military Committee from among the candidates nominated by NATO member states for the post of Chief of the International Military Staff (IMS). Under his leadership, the IMS is responsible for planning and evaluating policy on military issues and making appropriate recommendations for consideration by the Military Committee. It also oversees the proper implementation of the policies and decisions of the Military Committee.

Introduction

1. Essence and structure of NATO. Development of NATO after the fall of the Warsaw Pact

1.1. Concept, main purpose and structure of NATO

1.2. Development of NATO after the end of the Cold War

2. Features and Prospects of Russia-NATO Relations

2.1. General issues of development of relations

2.2. NATO expansion to the east is a threat to Russia

Conclusion

Bibliography

Introduction

The theme of this work is the activities of NATO and its impact on the modern system of international relations.

The relevance of the topic is due to the need for Russia to respond to NATO expansion to the east, which is impossible without understanding the processes taking place in NATO policy after the fall of the Warsaw Pact.

The North Atlantic Alliance remains the main means of maintaining the involvement of the United States of America in European security affairs. As a result of its expansion, it plays a decisive role in unifying a continent that has been divided for almost 50 years.

Today NATO is an international organization that already includes 19 states, and in the near future there will be 26 countries - this is a reality, its impact is felt not only in the Euro-Atlantic region, but in other parts of the world. The members of this organization include all the most politically influential, economically powerful and militarily strong Western states, including three nuclear powers (USA, Great Britain, France) - permanent members of the UN Security Council.

The profound changes that have taken place in the political situation in Europe and in the world as a whole have led NATO countries to the conclusion that it is necessary to transform the North Atlantic Alliance, shifting its focus from the military component to the political one, updating its goals, functions, strategic concept and political face.

The political and scientific relevance of a comprehensive study of NATO's activities both in the past and in the present is growing. It is necessary to create an effective mechanism for interaction with this large and complex international organization, which has become an integral part of the European security system.

Russia has to coexist with NATO and build normal relations with it, which determines the relevance of the topic.

Objective: to study the key features of NATO's influence on modern international relations.

Work tasks:

Determine the features of NATO development after the fall of the Warsaw Pact.

To study the structure of NATO at the present stage of development.

To study the issues of NATO expansion to the East.

Consider the problems and prospects of relations between Russia and NATO.

Object of study is the evolution of NATO's foreign policy strategy in the context of the end of the Cold War and the new parameters of the diplomatic process due to these changes.

Subject of research are the process of the alliance's search for its role in the new political realities and the functioning of the diplomatic mechanism of the alliance, both within the union itself and outside it, in particular, in relations with the Russian Federation.

1.1. Concept, main purpose and structure of NATO

To begin with, it is necessary to determine the essence and goals of NATO development, for this purpose, you can turn to network resources. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) North Atlantic treaty Organization, NATO; fr. Organization du traité de l"Atlantique Nord , OTAN) appeared on April 4, 1949 in the United States. Then the United States, Canada, Iceland, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, Italy and Portugal became NATO member states. It is a "transatlantic forum" for Allied countries to consult on any matter affecting the vital interests of its members, including events that could endanger their security, and provides for deterring or defending against any form of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state. .

In 1954 the Soviet Union offered to join NATO. The offer was rejected. As a result, in opposition to NATO, the Warsaw Pact was signed on the initiative of the USSR. . Later, the USSR repeated the proposal to join NATO in 1983, after 1991, Russia also repeatedly made a similar proposal.

NATO Purpose: NATO members agree that an armed attack on one or more members of the alliance in Europe or North America will be perceived as an attack on the entire alliance. In this regard, they agree that in the event of such an attack, they, as an exercise of the right to individual or collective self-defense, will help the attacked member or members, independently and jointly with other members, acting as necessary, including with the use of armed forces to restore and maintain security in the North Atlantic" acting as necessary, including with the use of armed forces" means that other members of the union are not obliged to enter into an armed conflict with the aggressor. They remain under an obligation to respond, but they can choose how they respond.

This distinguishes the treaty from Article 4 of the Brussels Treaty, which founded the Western European Union, which explicitly states that the response must be of a military nature. However, it is often assumed that NATO members will provide military assistance to the attacked. In addition, the article limits the scope of the alliance to Europe and North America (until 1963 Algeria), which explains why NATO did not intervene in the conflict in the Falklands.

The highest political body of NATO is the North Atlantic Council (NATO Council), which consists of representatives of all member states in the rank of ambassadors and meets twice a year under the chairmanship of the NATO Secretary General. The North Atlantic Council also holds its meetings at the level of foreign ministers and heads of state and government, but formally these meetings have the same status as sessions at the level of foreign ministers. Council decisions are taken unanimously. Between sessions, the functions of the NATO Council are performed by the Permanent Council of NATO, which includes representatives of all member countries of the bloc in the rank of ambassadors.

Since December 1966, the Military Planning Committee has become the highest military-political body of the organization, which meets twice a year at its sessions at the level of defense ministers, although it formally consists of permanent representatives. Between sessions, the functions of the Defense Planning Committee are performed by the Standing Committee of Defense Planning, which includes representatives of all member countries of the bloc in the rank of ambassadors.

The supreme military body of NATO is the Military Committee, consisting of the Chiefs of General Staff of the NATO member countries and the civilian representative of Iceland, which does not have armed forces, and meeting at least twice a year for its meetings. The Military Committee has under its command the command of two zones: Europe and the Atlantic. The Supreme High Command in Europe is headed by the Supreme Commander (always an American general). Under his command are the main commands in the three European theaters of operations: North European, Central European and South European. Between meetings, the functions of the Military Committee are performed by the Standing Military Committee.

The main bodies of NATO also include the Nuclear Planning Group, which usually meets twice a year at the level of defense ministers, usually before meetings of the NATO Council. Iceland is represented in the Nuclear Planning Group by a civilian observer.

1.2. Development of NATO after the end of the Cold War

The collapse of the socialist bloc in the late 1990s raised doubts about the need to preserve the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which had fulfilled its mission. Based on the historical experience of the second half of the 20th century, the logic of a realistic approach to military alliances led to the assumption that practically no defense alliance could survive its own victory over the enemy. Politicians and experts in the US and Western Europe, who accepted this logic, were of the opinion that, in order not to contradict the forces of history, NATO should be dissolved, or at least limited in its claims. For example, Germany, represented by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, supported by Czechoslovakia, during the second half of 1990 (until the CSCE Paris Summit in November 1990) pursued an active line towards a “deeper institutionalization” of the CSCE, intending to transform this forum into cornerstone of the new European security system. In Moscow in the early 1990s, the idea of a "European Security Council" from the major powers of Europe was more popular.

The functions and goals of NATO after the Second World War were focused on containing the Soviet bloc, however, after its collapse, the need arose to revise the classical doctrines.

It should be noted that at the turn of the 1980s-1990s, NATO, which during the post-war period performed more of a deterrent than a military-offensive function, faced the need for external adaptation to new international conditions and closely related internal structural restructuring. During the Cold War, NATO, in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and Article 5 of its own Charter, was a regional pact whose purpose was to ensure the "collective defense" of its members. However, after the collapse of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact, the need to preserve NATO in the form in which it had existed for all the post-war years was "... called into question ...". Thus, in the early 1990s, NATO faced an inevitable crisis of its own institutional identity.

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NATO expansion.

NATO(North Atlantic Treaty Organization - English The North Atlantic Trade Organization is a military-political bloc of states created in 1949 on the initiative of the United States. Currently, 19 states are members of NATO. The question of expanding this bloc to the east after the collapse of the USSR became a serious problem in Russia's relations with the West.

The North Atlantic Alliance was conceived as a military-political alliance, constituting the military-strength pillar of one of the two poles of the bipolar world. It was preceded, in particular, Truman Doctrine- the foreign policy program of the US government, set out on March 12, 1947 by President G. Truman in a speech in Congress. Referring to the "communist danger" looming over Greece and Turkey, H. Truman called on the Congress in the "security interests of the United States" to provide assistance to these states. The axis of the North Atlantic alliance was not only strength, but also ideology. In this sense, the NATO bloc covered the entire so-called free world.

At the same time, it must be taken into account that the rapprochement of Western Europe and North America occurred not only because of the threat of a Soviet invasion, but also because of a wider range of problems. At the end of World War II, the governments of European countries found themselves in a situation characterized by the collapse of empires and international trade, the threat of economic and social chaos, the collapse of the monetary system, the rise of the influence of radical ideologies, food shortages, inefficient transport systems, people's disappointment in their leaders, etc. d.

In response, many mutually intertwining, contradictory, duplicating institutions were created, which together constituted something like an institutional version of “flexible response” to complex and diverse problems at the levels of individual, state, subregional, regional and international interaction.

With the end of the Cold War, the North Atlantic Alliance found itself in a completely different strategic situation. The main reasons for the creation of the NATO bloc disappeared, and because of this, it simply could not avoid a systemic crisis. This was essentially acknowledged by the participants in the Rome summit meeting of the leaders of the alliance member countries in November 1991, at which NATO's "new strategic concept" was promulgated.

It is appropriate to recall in this connection that the main goal of NATO, formulated in the fifth article of the treaty, is to provide mutual assistance to member countries in the event of a hypothetical attack and the collective defense of their territories. After the end of the Cold War and the virtual cessation of the main external threat from the East, the leaders of the alliance were faced with the problem of its radical transformation or dissolution. In the current situation, any other threats and arguments would not be sufficient to fully replace the original main goal.

However, there are a number of reasons why NATO will remain a real factor in world politics for the foreseeable future. There are powerful forces that are very interested in the Alliance and will take all measures to prevent its dissolution. Different participants in this process pursue different interests. For the United States, NATO remains a proof and a tool for realizing their supposedly leading role in the world in the coming century.

A number of European countries see the alliance as a tool to deter the nationalization of Germany's foreign policy and possible hegemonic encroachments on its part. The fact is that the unification of Germany has changed the geopolitical balance of power in the world. It no longer “fits” into the narrow framework assigned to it by the US geostrategic course.

For NATO itself, expansion is a matter of survival. The effect of the law of self-preservation and self-reproduction, which determines the essence and activities of any organization. One of the ways in which this law manifests itself is expansion. In this sense, the NATO bloc is no exception, which preferred the palliative path of quantitative expansion to qualitative restructuring on the basis of existing realities.

A favorable circumstance for this was that the Eastern European countries, which gained de facto national independence with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc, entered the European forefront as independent and active subjects of international relations. For them, the desire to join NATO is largely driven by psychological considerations, a desire to free themselves from excessive military spending and create a favorable climate of trust in which they can implement difficult economic and political reforms.

One of the most important reasons pushing the Eastern European countries into the "embrace" of NATO is not only the ghost of the Soviet Union, but also the ghosts of the empires of the past (Ottoman, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia), for which these countries served as an arena of rivalry or a bargaining chip. coins in the big geopolitical game. There are no more empires, including the Soviet one, but the ghosts remain. Of course, in history they often played a fatal role, but still, it seems that the task is to identify the real guidelines for world development and find their place in the real world.

In the eyes of the Eastern European countries, joining NATO is, in essence, a question of asserting, first of all, in their own eyes, their European identity, as well as a question of integration into the economic and political structures of the EU. Joining NATO is seen by them as the shortest way to solving their social, economic and defense problems on the basis of speedy integration into European structures. In their eyes, joining the alliance is a kind of guarantee of security in the face of risk and instability allegedly coming from Russia.

At the same time, many Europeans see the North Atlantic Alliance as a means of preventing the renationalization of security policy in Europe. This problem has become especially urgent in the light of the tragic events in the former Yugoslavia. NATO is seen as a guarantor of European, and not only European, security, the preservation of the American political and military presence in Europe.

Today, the United States remains a necessary component of the European balance of power, and the North Atlantic Alliance is the basis of the military-strategic partnership between the United States and Europe. The United States is one of the two main pillars of NATO, and it is obvious that if they leave Europe, the NATO bloc will collapse.

There are a number of other reasons and arguments in favor of maintaining and strengthening NATO. In particular, one cannot ignore the desire of certain circles in the West to take advantage of the weakening of Russia's position, to prevent its revival and restoration of its weight and influence in world affairs. One of the reasons is the interest of significant political and bureaucratic circles in maintaining this organization as an employer and source of profitable orders. In this context, one should also consider the disputes and discussions that have unfolded recently regarding the expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance by including new members from among the Eastern European countries that were previously members of the Warsaw Pact.

Of course, from the point of view of supporters of maintaining and expanding NATO, their arguments are not without foundation and have the right to exist. Perhaps these arguments would be acceptable to the rest of the world community if the realities on the basis of which the alliance was created were preserved in some form.

The confrontation between East and West ceased, in 1990 there was German unification- The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic into a single state, the Berlin Wall disappeared, dividing Europe into two parts, an end to the military presence of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. As they say, organizations are created, in essence, not by the states-participants of these organizations, but by their enemies. There is a certain amount of truth in this statement in the sense that alliances, blocs, organizations are formed due to the presence of a certain threat or challenge to their participants. History provides us with many examples when coalitions that have won a war break up almost the next day after the victory. Why should NATO avoid this fate?

Of no small importance in this context is the fact that European security is becoming less of a military issue. It is turning into a problem to be solved on a broader scale of foreign policy that goes beyond the competence of NATO. Even before the end of the Cold War, a number of leaders of the member countries of the alliance were aware of the need for a certain modification of its structure, role and functions. The more she needs it now. Without it, the expansion generally loses all meaning. As shown by a number of events of the post-bipolar era, for example, in Rwanda, Somalia, Yugoslavia, the NATO bloc in its current form is not yet ready to stop wars, aggressions, and bloody conflicts that arise both in Europe and abroad.

In the first period after the end of the Cold War, some of the top Soviet leadership and Russian politicians got the impression that the confrontational nature of Russia's relations with the West had become history and that from now on the times of democracy, peace and friendship are coming, which can only darken a few irresponsible troublemakers like S. Hussein or M. Gaddafi. It was assumed that with the fall of the Iron Curtain and the Berlin Wall, the USSR (Russia) would join the common family of European peoples, a single space of European security would be created, of which Russia with all its Asian parts would become an integral part.

In addition, at the beginning of 1990 there were tendencies towards bringing the political and political-military aspects of NATO to the fore. The desire of the leaders of the alliance to soften and even revise many doctrines directed against the USSR and the countries of the former Warsaw bloc was traced. In principle, this attitude was reflected in the Charter of Paris, adopted at the CSCE summit meeting in November 1990. It, in particular, stated that these states “are no longer adversaries, will build new partnership relations and extend the hand of friendship to each other ". In pursuance of this directive, the leadership of the alliance also took a number of measures aimed at reducing the military confrontation in Europe. Thus, along with a reduction in the size of its armed forces in Central Europe, it went to the redeployment of armed forces in the central zone from the front lines to more distant ones. NATO's readiness for further changes in military, especially nuclear, strategy was also declared.

Only this can explain the incredible fact that the leaders of the USSR took the word of the Western governments, who assured them that if they agreed to the unification of Germany, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Germany and non-interference in the process of liberation of the Eastern European countries, the NATO bloc would not expand to the east. However, the position has again been confirmed, according to which declarations always remain declarations, which, if necessary, can be waived and, as a rule, are waived. What are, for example, the assurances of Western leaders given during the period of German reunification and the development of agreements on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, including from the GDR. Then they assured M. Gorbachev that the question of admitting the member countries of the Warsaw bloc to NATO would never be raised. However, after the completion of the withdrawal of its troops by Russia, the position of Western countries on this issue changed to the exact opposite. By deploying efforts to absorb the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the West, in fact, treacherously renounced its obligations and thereby deceived the USSR and Russia.

The very attitude of the West to the expansion of NATO in its current form without a proper reassessment and revision of strategic goals and guidelines does not seem to be entirely verified. It is no coincidence that those authors who see with their own eyes the possible negative consequences of the expansion of the alliance insistently call for the process of expansion not to be mechanical, but to be determined by specific strategic circumstances. In their view, only if Russia poses a military threat to Central and Eastern Europe should NATO offer membership and security guarantees to the Visegrad Four and possibly other countries in the region.

One gets the impression that with the end of the Cold War and the bipolar bloc and systemic confrontation, the West in general, and the United States in particular, failed to fully realize the critical nature of the era we are living through, did not show foresight and genuine political will to ensure that start a new chapter in relations with Russia from a clean page. Here, apparently, the syndrome of Western unity plays an important role. The so-called second world represented by the countries of the socialist community has disappeared from the political map of the planet. The ideological infrastructure, as well as the economic basis for the singling out of the third world, was finally "washed out". As a result, it seems that the pillars of the unity of the developed world are being shaken.

The leaders of the Western countries do not cease to assure the world community, and above all Russia, of their good intentions, of their peacefulness and concern for the security problems not only of their own members, but also of Russia. Perhaps there is a great deal of truth in these arguments.

Of course, Russia is interested in stability along the entire perimeter of its borders. But the West's policy in this area cannot but arouse Russia's suspicions about its desire to undermine its status as a great power and turn it into a raw materials appendage of developed countries. Therefore, it will be perceived in Russia unequivocally - as a hostile and destabilizing action.

NATO expansion at the expense of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics will inevitably upset the balance of armed forces, which, in turn, will lead to the undermining of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Even without taking into account the forces of the new members, NATO surpasses Russia by 5 times in population, more than 10 times in military spending, 3 times in the size of the armed forces and the number of conventional weapons. At present, according to existing data, with a comprehensive accounting of personnel, aviation, armored vehicles, artillery and warships, the ratio of the combat potentials of the general forces of Russia and NATO is estimated at one to four.

It is obvious that America and Europe (even each separately) has a significant superiority over Russia both in material (including military-economic) and human resources, as well as in moral, political and ideological aspects. The question arises: why, in this case, move close to the borders of Russia? After all, in the extreme case, in a purely geostrategic plan, Russia will not care whether it strikes with its nuclear weapons the North Atlantic region with the states of Eastern Europe from the Baltic to the Black Sea or without them.

An increase in the power of NATO’s conventional forces while simultaneously approaching Russia’s borders could have a destabilizing effect on the balance of strategic nuclear forces, since the Alliance gains almost direct access to the central (previously rear) areas of key military and economic importance.

NATO tactical aviation will be able to strike at strategically important targets deep in Russia, both on the northern and southern flanks, respectively, from Norway and Turkey, and in the central direction from Central and Eastern Europe. Conventional weapons of the NATO countries also get the opportunity to solve strategic tasks on the territory of Russia, since the danger of destroying objects of strategic nuclear forces by conventional means increases. As a result, Russia will find itself in a situation of a certain depreciation of its nuclear arsenal.

How, then, do the supporters of the concept of NATO expansion see Russia's position in the event of the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of new members of the alliance? The explicit declaration of the Russian government to deploy SS-20 medium-range missiles in its western regions can be seen as a response to this development. Of course, objections may follow: Russia is now weak and lacks both will and economic resources. This is partly true now, but tomorrow the situation may be different. After all, Russia has repeatedly demonstrated the ability to find adequate solutions to the challenges of history. Here we should not forget the experience of other European countries.

A more or less acceptable answer in this direction, according to experts, could be a greater emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons. Russia can make the fulfillment of its treaty obligations dependent on specific political steps and measures taken by its Western partners, as well as by third countries whose actions are capable of influencing the balances of interests of their participants established by treaties.

We can also talk about a critical approach to determining acceptable terms for Russia to fulfill disarmament obligations. In the event of an unfavorable development of events, one cannot exclude the possibility of raising the question of actually revising the already implemented Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Short-Range Missiles and returning the SS-20 and SS-23 nuclear missiles or their analogues to service. In the end, it may well turn out that NATO will receive less benefits from expansion than the damage from the deterioration of relations with Russia and the unpredictability of these relations. It is possible that Western leaders, insisting on NATO expansion at any cost, are making a mistake of world-historic proportions. However, forecasts are always a thankless task. How events will develop, the future will show.

At present, in the West, many influential statesmen, military officials and researchers are expressing doubts about the correctness of the chosen course. However, the mechanism has been launched, and in the current situation, the West simply cannot retreat and abandon plans for NATO expansion to the east. Therefore, the Russian leadership cannot stop the already launched mechanism. But based on the well-known principle “politics is the art of the possible,” in the current difficult situation, it should strive to make a decision that would be associated with the least damage to our country. So far, Russia's relations with NATO are being built on the basis of a unique document, which was the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation of May 27, 1997.

It should be noted that the question of the deployment and non-deployment of nuclear weapons or large military contingents on the territory of the future members of the alliance has not only and not so much purely military, as political, psychological, and moral significance. It is no less a question of how much Russia can trust the West. Moreover, he clearly demonstrated a certain treachery by starting the process of expanding the alliance.

It should also be taken into account that NATO enlargement is a long process that by no means ended with the adoption of decisions in Madrid in July 1997 to invite Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic to the union. They officially joined NATO in March 1999. It should be emphasized here that no matter how Western strategists assess the current situation and historical prospects for Russia, ultimately European security will be determined by the balance of power between NATO and Russia. And in the strategic plan, ie. from the point of view of the possibilities of mutually assured destruction of each other, both sides have and in the foreseeable future will have nuclear-strategic parity. In this situation, in the event of an aggravation for one reason or another of the international situation in Europe and in the world as a whole, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe can become nuclear hostages of NATO and the United States.

Therefore, arguments about a certain isolation of Russia on the European continent are devoid of any real grounds. Both a stable and a weakened Russia cannot but influence the state of affairs in Europe in the most direct way, if only because it is a nuclear superpower.

Introduction.

The theme of this work is the creation and activities of NATO.

Today NATO - an international organization that already includes 19 states, and in the near future there will be 26 countries - is a reality, its impact is felt not only in the Euro-Atlantic region, but in other parts of the world. The members of this organization include all the most politically influential, economically powerful and militarily strong Western states, including three nuclear powers (USA, Great Britain, France) - permanent members of the UN Security Council.

The relevance of this topiclies in the fact that the question of the prospects for the further development of relations between Russia and NATO is currently of great interest. There is also some concern about the expansion of NATO to the east.

Objective study the structure and development of NATO.

Work tasks:

To study the development of NATO after the Cold War.

To study the structure of NATO at the present stage of development.

To study the issues of NATO expansion to the East.

Consider the problem of relations between Russia and NATO.

It is also necessary to consider the structure of the organization and the evolution of NATO's foreign policy strategy in the conditions of the end of the Cold War and the new parameters of the diplomatic process caused by these changes.

The history of NATO, the characteristic features and characteristics of its activities, the problems of its military and political doctrines have been studied in detail by Soviet and Russian specialists in the field of international relations. The issues of formation and development of NATO at the initial stage of the existence of the alliance were studied in the works of Cheprakov V.A., B.M. Haloshi and Ya.G. Istyagin.

The concept of the “Atlantic community” and its role in NATO policy were studied in detail in the works of I.M. Rivanova, A.I. Utkin.

Assessments of US political doctrines, foreign policy theories developed by American international scientists, and their influence on the policy of the North Atlantic Alliance are given in the works of G.A. Arbatov, K.S. Gadzhieva, I.P. Dementieva, L. A. Modzhoryan, E.I. Popova.

Relations between the United States and Western European allies are studied in the works of Yu.P. Davydova, V.G. Baranovsky, I.B. Ponomareva, PA. Smirnova, G.A. Vorontsova, B.C. Sheina, S.A. Karaganova, V.P. Lukina, S.I. Alpatova, V.I. Batyuka, V.A. Mazinga.

The military-strategic concepts of NATO and the United States in different periods of the existence of the alliance were studied by G.A. Trofimenko, V.I. Batyukom, A.A. Likhotal, M.A. Milstein.

The problems of NATO policy in the context of the formation of a European security system were considered by Yu.N. Rachmaninov.

After 1991, interest in NATO and more broadly - in the problems of the European and world security system, Russia's relations with NATO and the United States, trends in US foreign policy, allied relations and processes within NATO - remains high. Relations between the new Russia and the North Atlantic Alliance and other problems related to NATO are discussed in the publications of Russian scientists P. Ivanov, B.M. Haloshi, A. Grushko, N. Arbatova, P.E. Smirnova, G.B. Korsakov and others.

In foreign political science and historiography, an extensive bibliography is devoted to the problem of NATO and its political doctrinal principles. Among the authors whose works are used in the dissertation, we will name W. Lafeber and J. Spanier, who study the issue in the context of American foreign policy and the problems of Soviet/Russian-American relations. S. Gregory and F. Dyer consider the problem of NATO's nuclear policy.

J. Deutsch, A. Kanter, B. Scowcroft, J. Howorth, J. Keeler show the specifics of relations between NATO allies and, in this regard, draw conclusions about the prospects of the alliance. M. Mandelbaum and R. Asmus consider the process of NATO expansion after the end of the Cold War from different positions.

This work includes an introduction, the main part, consisting of three chapters, a conclusion and a bibliographic list.

Chapter 1. Creation and structure of NATO.

1.1. Creation, goals and objectives of NATO.

To begin with, it is necessary to determine the essence and goals of NATO development, for this purpose, you can turn to network resources. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATONorth Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO; fr. Organization du traité de l"Atlantique Nord, OTAN ) appeared on April 4, 1949 in the United States. Then the USA, Canada, Iceland, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, Italy and Portugal became NATO member states. This is a “transatlantic forum” for allied countries to consult on any issues affecting vital interests of its members, including events that could endanger their security, and provides deterrence or protection against any form of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state.

In 1954 the Soviet Union offered to join NATO. The offer was rejected. As a result, in opposition to NATO, the Warsaw Pact was signed on the initiative of the USSR. Later, the USSR repeated the proposal to join NATO in 1983, after 1991, Russia also repeatedly made a similar proposal.

NATO Purpose: NATO members agree that an armed attack on one or more members of the alliance in Europe or North America will be perceived as an attack on the entire alliance. In this regard, they agree that in the event of such an attack, they, as an exercise of the right to individual or collective self-defense, will help the attacked member or members, independently and jointly with other members, acting as necessary, including with the use of armed forces to restore and maintain security inNorth Atlantic « acting as necessary, including with the use of armed forces" means that other members of the union are not obliged to enter into an armed conflict with the aggressor. They remain under an obligation to respond, but they can choose how they respond.

This distinguishes the treaty from Article 4 of the "Brussels Treaty", which founded the Western European Union, which explicitly states that the response must be of a military nature. However, it is often assumed that NATO members will provide military assistance to the attacked. In addition, the article limits the scope of the alliance to Europe and North America (until 1963 Algeria), which explains why NATO did not intervene in the conflict in the Falklands.

The current Strategic Concept, published in 1999, defines NATO's primary objectives as follows:

– act as a basis for stability in the Euro-Atlantic region;

– serve as a forum for consultations on security issues;

- exercise deterrence and protection against any threat of aggression against any of the NATO member states;

– promote effective conflict prevention and actively participate in crisis management;

– to promote the development of a comprehensive partnership, cooperation and dialogue with other countries of the Euro-Atlantic region.

1.2. NATO structure.

NATO is an intergovernmental organization with no supranational functions. It can only do what none of its members object to. As an intergovernmental structure, it has at its disposal a very small number of military and civilian personnel - approximately 12,000 people. This is less than the total number of diplomatic workers in national missions to NATO. In terms of the level of administrative workload, that is, the ratio of the number of people working for NATO as an organization to the number of people that determine NATO's activities in national governments and diplomatic missions, NATO is a very efficient organization. For comparison: in the central bodies of the EU, only the number of translators is about 10 thousand people.

NATO's main decisions are prepared and adopted in committees, which are made up of members of national delegations. This is the core of the Alliance as an international club. The work of the inter-national committees is supported by a civilian staff (international officials) who report to the Secretary General and an integrated command structure which is managed by the NATO Military Committee. Rather accurate is the definition of NATO as an international club with military tools. At the same time, the proportion of military forces that, in the event of war, must be transferred under general command, is significantly inferior to the number of forces remaining under national control. In peacetime, the number of military forces subordinate to the central command is negligible - only a few thousand military. The same can be said about the overall budgets - they are meager compared to the total volume of military spending of the member countries.

Like any club, NATO has no politics, only membership rules. What is perceived as NATO policy is nothing more than the resultant policy of the member countries. It makes no practical sense to analyze and predict this conditional policy without analyzing and forecasting the policy of individual members of the Alliance.

Below is information about the main building blocks of NATO.

North Atlantic Council(SAS) has real political power and decision-making rights. It consists of the Permanent Representatives of all Member States, who meet at least once a week. Sessions of the NATO Council are also held at higher levels - foreign ministers, defense ministers or heads of government, but its powers and decision-making rights remain the same, and decisions have the same status and legal force regardless of the level of representation.

Each government is represented on the North Atlantic Council by a permanent representative with the rank of ambassador. All permanent representatives rely in their work on political and military personnel or staff of the mission to NATO, the number of which may vary from country to country.

The meeting of the NATO Council of Permanent Representatives is often referred to as the “Permanent Session of the North Atlantic Council”. Twice a year, and sometimes more frequently, there are meetings of the North Atlantic Council at ministerial level, with each NATO country represented by a Minister for Foreign Affairs.

High-level meetings with the participation of heads of state and government (summits) are held when it is necessary to resolve particularly important issues or at turning points in the development of NATO

Permanent Representatives act according to instructions from their capitals, communicating and explaining to their colleagues in the NATO Council the views and political decisions of their governments. In addition, they report to the leadership of their countries about the points of view and positions of other governments, report on new events, the process of building consensus on certain important issues or differences in the positions of individual countries in some areas.

Decisions on any actions are taken on the basis of unity of opinion and common consent. NATO does not have voting or majority voting procedures. Each country represented at meetings of the NATO Council or on any of its subordinate committees retains full independence and is fully responsible for its decisions.

The Council's work is prepared by subordinate committees responsible for specific policy areas.

Defense Planning Committee(KVP) usually works as a permanent representative, but at least twice a year it meets at the level of defense ministers. It deals with most military issues and tasks related to collective defense planning. All member states of the Alliance are represented on this committee, with the exception of France. The Defense Planning Committee guides the activities of NATO's governing military bodies. Within its area of responsibility, it performs the same functions and has the same rights and powers as the North Atlantic Council. The work of the Defense Planning Committee is prepared by a number of subordinate committees with specific areas of responsibility.

NATO Defense Ministers who participate in the Defense Planning Committee meet regularly as part of theNuclear planning groups(NSG), where they discuss specific policy issues related to nuclear forces. These meetings cover a wide range of nuclear weapons policy issues, including the safety, security and survivability of nuclear weapons, communications and information systems, deployment of nuclear forces, as well as broader issues of common concern such as nuclear weapons control. and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The work of the Nuclear Planning Group is supported by the NSG headquarters group.

Permanent Representatives and National Delegations.Each NATO country is represented on the North Atlantic Council by an ambassador or permanent representative who is supported by a national delegation of advisers and officials who represent their country on various NATO committees. These delegations are a lot like small embassies. The fact that they are located in the same Headquarters building allows them to communicate easily and quickly, formally and informally, with each other, as well as with members of NATO's international secretariats and representatives of partner countries.

NATO Secretary Generalis a prominent international statesman who has been entrusted by the governments of NATO member states to chair the North Atlantic Council, the Defense Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group, as well as the nominal chairman of other major NATO committees. He is the Secretary General and Chief Executive Officer of NATO. In addition, the Secretary General is Chairman of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Mediterranean Cooperation Group, co-chairman (together with the representative of Russia and the representative of the NATO country, acting honorary chairman) of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council.

International Secretariat.The work of the North Atlantic Council and its subordinate committees is carried out with the help of the International Secretariat. It is composed of staff from various member states, recruited directly by NATO or seconded by the respective governments. Members of the International Secretariat report to the Secretary General of NATO and remain loyal to the organization throughout their tenure.

Military Committee is responsible for the planning of collective military operations and holds regular meetings at the level of Chiefs of General Staffs (CHOS). Iceland, which has no armed forces, is represented at such meetings by a civilian official. France has a special representative. The Committee is NATO's highest military body, operating under the overall political direction of the North Atlantic Council, the STOC and the NSG.

The day-to-day work of the Military Committee is conducted by military representatives acting on behalf of their chiefs of general staff. The military representatives have sufficient authority to enable the Military Committee to carry out its collective tasks and make decisions promptly.

The military committee at the level of chiefs of general staffs (CHSH) usually meets three times a year. Two of these Military Committee meetings are held in Brussels and one is held on a rotating basis in other NATO countries.

International military headquarters(IMS) is headed by a general or admiral who is selected by the Military Committee from candidates nominated by NATO member states for the post of Chief of the International Military Staff (IMS). Under his leadership, the IMS is responsible for planning and evaluating policy on military issues and making appropriate recommendations for consideration by the Military Committee. It also oversees the proper implementation of the policies and decisions of the Military Committee.

command structure.The new command structure includes two strategic-level military commands. The first - the Joint Operational Command - Allied Command Operation (ACO), to which all operational commands are subordinate - is located at the headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe near the city of Mons and is responsible for operational activities. The Joint Operations Command is developing requirements for short-term operations. At the operational level, there are two permanent Joint Force Commands (JFCs) in Italy and the Netherlands, which form the ground headquarters of the Multinational Joint Task Force (JFC). There is also a smaller but highly effective permanent Joint Headquarters in Portugal (JHQ) which can serve as the basis for the establishment of MEP Naval Headquarters. On a tactical equal of thirteen, six headquarters are retained, designed to manage large mixed formations.

The second is the Allied Command for Transformation - the Combined Joint Task Force (ACT), created instead of the headquarters of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in the Atlantic, is responsible for the functional reorganization of the Alliance. It will focus on long-term force generation. The focus will be on enhancing the interoperability of NATO forces and gradually closing the transatlantic gap in capabilities through the exchange of the latest developments and research results in the field of new concepts of warfare. NATO Transformation Commands will develop concepts and doctrines, prepare and conduct experiments, determine the requirements for the armed forces in the future, oversee military education and combat training, and develop and evaluate requirements for the interaction of subsections and their reorganization. Transformation Commands will become a means of synchronizing national programs and development of the armed forces towards the creation of more effective joint combat structures and will promote increased interaction, which ultimately can ensure the reliable and flexible implementation of new tasks in conducting coalition actions to counter new threats.

Chapter 2. NATO activities.

2.1. Forms of participation of European countries in NATO.

The participation of European countries in NATO activities takes a number of forms: joint defense planning; participation in an integrated military command structure; placing armed forces under NATO command; infrastructure maintenance; co-ownership of defense systems; participation in NATO nuclear planning; military-industrial cooperation.

Joint Defense Planningis the backbone of NATO's activities and is the foundation for all other forms of defense integration. Joint defense planning is cyclical: plans are made for six, five and two years (the main planning cycle) with annual adjustments. The purpose of joint defense planning is to develop coordinated optimal plans for the development of national forces. The criterion of optimality is the effectiveness of collective defense. The plan drawn up for each country is then carried out by that country itself and does not involve any centralized management.

All NATO countries except France and Iceland take part in joint defense planning. The reason for their non-participation is that France withdrew from the military structure of NATO in 1966, remaining a party to the North Atlantic Treaty, and Iceland has no armed forces.

Joint defense planning is a separate process from operations planning. Planning for operations, such as peacekeeping operations, is carried out on a case-by-case basis and is provided by separate NATO structures. If collective defense planning is carried out mainly under the direction of the Military Planning Committee, which brings together the ministers of defense and representatives, then the planning of operations is the competence of the Military Committee, which brings together the chiefs of general staffs and their representatives. France, for example, does not participate in collective defense planning (although it coordinates its plans) and its defense minister does not participate in the work of the Defense Planning Committee. However, France participates in the planning of joint operations and, accordingly, is represented in the Military Committee.

On the basis of joint defense planning within NATO, member countries have created a number of integrated structures. The scale of individual countries' involvement in them correlates with the so-called "fair share" of participation. For the armed forces, it is determined by the share of the country's population in the total population of NATO countries.

AT integrated military command structure(multinational and national headquarters subordinate to the unified NATO command) all European members of NATO participate, except France and Iceland. However, the headquarters of the Eurocorps located in France is part of an integrated structure. Under existing rules, the commander-in-chief of NATO forces is a US representative, and his deputy is a European who is responsible for operations carried out with the help of NATO forces and means in the interests of the EU.

The main headquarters under the unified command are located in the following countries: Belgium (1 headquarters, NATO HQ), Great Britain (3 headquarters), Germany (7 headquarters), Greece (1 headquarters), Spain (1 headquarters), Italy (4 headquarters), Luxembourg (1 headquarters), the Netherlands (1 headquarters), Portugal (1 headquarters), Turkey (2 headquarters), France (1 headquarters).

Contribution of forces to NATO commandhas three main forms. The first form covers a small number of forces that are transferred to NATO command on a permanent basis, both in wartime and in peacetime. These are naval units and air forces (AWACS), which are in constant readiness. Their total number is several thousand people, about 10 ships and up to 20 aircraft. The second form can be considered the main one for NATO. It consists in the fact that the armed forces remain under national administrative control, but undergo combat training according to the plans of the NATO integrated command structure and are transferred to NATO control in case of combat use. NATO encourages the creation of multinational formations by member countries, which are transferred to NATO management as a whole. In this case, administrative management is carried out collectively by several countries according to the procedures agreed between them. NATO's main multinational formations today are the Rapid Deployment Corps, the German-American and German-Danish Corps, as well as the Eurocorps. The third form is the "designation" of national forces without their transfer. Such forces can be used in the interests of NATO if necessary, but they are being trained within the framework of national programs.

All NATO countries except France and Iceland (for the reasons mentioned above) contribute military forces to NATO in one form or another. The degree of participation ranges from a company (for the Baltic countries) to several divisions (for Germany). In general, the number of forces allocated by a certain country to NATO correlates with the number of NATO headquarters located on the territory of this country.

Unified infrastructurecommand, control, control, computer processing, information and intelligence (C 5 I 2 ) NATO is funded from the general budget of the organization and includes the following subsystems: ACCIS (Integrated Command System), NADGE (Ground Command and Air Defense Information Infrastructure), RIS (Integrated Radar Infrastructure), NIS (Identification System), NICS (Integrated Communications System, including including satellite). Financing from NATO budgets implies common ownership and distribution of the financial burden in accordance with the "fair share" of the participation of countries. The creators of these systems are mainly US defense companies (Motorola, Boeing), Great Britain (BAE Systems), Germany (Siemens), Italy (Finmeccanica), the Netherlands (Philips). The participation of French companies and the European concern EADS is limited due to the position of France regarding the integrated structures of NATO. Recently, the situation is changing due to the deployment of a new generation of NATO satellite communications system and the unified theater surveillance system AGS.

The satellite communications system, called Satcom Post 2000, will be the fifth in NATO's history. Its operation began in 2005 and will last until 2019. Unlike previous systems, Satcom Post 2000 will be operated according to a new scheme, which will significantly reduce its cost.

Previously, NATO had two satellites deployed in the early 90's system called NATO IV. Its deployment by order of the Alliance was carried out by the United Kingdom. In fact, the satellites of the NATO IV system are identical to the British SKYNET 4. Since the UK does not have its own launch systems, the launch of these satellites is carried out by American and French launch vehicles. Even earlier, NATO owned a system called NATO III, which was built and deployed by the United States.

The Satcom Post 2000 system will cost NATO $457 million. Such a small price for a space constellation of modern military communications satellites was achieved by combining the deployment plans of Satcom Post 2000 with the national space programs of Great Britain, France and Italy. It is assumed that Satcom Post 2000 will consist of mutually compatible satellites of different manufacturers - French SYRACUSE, Italian SICRAL and British SKYNET. Moreover, all of them will be simultaneously used within the framework of the national programs of these countries.

In addition to these common structures, a number of countries allocate part of their national systems C 5 I 2 for joint work with NATO systems. This is, first of all, Germany, Great Britain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Iceland.

An important albeit very limited form of participation in NATO isco-ownership of common weapons systems. Such systems are purchased from NATO budgets and are managed centrally. To date, the only operational example of such a system is the AWACS airborne early warning system, consisting of 18 American-made AWACS E-3 aircraft. For legal reasons (in the modern international system, only national governments have the right to own the main types of weapons, except for small arms), these aircraft are assigned to the Luxembourg air force. 13 countries participate in the general purchase and, accordingly, collective operation: Belgium, Germany, Greece, Denmark, Spain, Italy, Canada, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the USA and Turkey. The UK and France have their own fleet of E-3 aircraft that can be used in a single system.

NATO has now begun the collective deployment of yet another system, the AGS. This theater surveillance system is also known as the Eye in the Sky. According to plans, AGS should be put into operation before 2010. To this end, on behalf of NATO, a contract worth close to 4 billion euros has been signed with a consortium of manufacturers.

Plans for creating a system that would allow NATO to have an integral information and target picture of the theater of operations have been developed since the early 90s. However, the complexity of the system and competition from European and American defense companies prevented implementation. These plans received a new impetus after the Alliance began creating a new rapid reaction force that will have global application. The AGS system, first of all, should ensure the conduct of operations of precisely these forces.

At the last stage, two transatlantic consortia took part in the tender for the development of the system - one led by the European company EADS and the American Northrop Grumman (so-called TIPS), the other - as part of the American Raytheon, German Siemens and British-Italian Alenia Marconi. The winner was the TIPS consortium, which proposed a combination of modernized European A320 aircraft and American Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles. If implemented, AGS will become the second system of its class in the world after the American JSTARS, which is in the exclusive possession of the United States.

Joint nuclear planninghas both a purely political aspect and a practical military aspect. Seven European states, under special agreements with the United States, provide infrastructure and forces for planning operations using American tactical nuclear weapons in Europe (B-61 bombs) in the interests of NATO. B61 bombs are designed for tactical aircraft A7, F15E, F16 and Tornado. According to most sources, they currently number no more than two hundred, although there are reports of five hundred bombs. The infrastructure for basing is available at 13 bases in seven European countries. Four bases are owned by the US Air Force (one each in the UK, Italy, Germany and Turkey), three are in Germany, two are in the UK (one on national territory and one in Germany), two are in Turkey, one each is in the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and Greece. In addition to Great Britain, the remaining six states - Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey - are non-nuclear. These countries, in accordance with special agreements with the United States, provide tactical aviation units from their armed forces, which are trained and certified for possible missions with American nuclear weapons. All French weapons are located on national territory and are not used in extended nuclear deterrence procedures.

The remaining member countries participate in nuclear planning at the political level through the Nuclear Planning Group.

An important aspect of NATO's activities (primarily, joint defense planning and a unified system for protecting classified information) isstimulation of military-industrial integration, although this process itself lies outside the competence of NATO. NATO's budgets are small (about $1.5 billion a year) and they are not intended for joint defense purchases, with the exceptions described earlier. At the same time, NATO promotes joint defense procurement by member countries where this is required by optimal joint defense planning. To do this, within the framework of NATO, special committees are being created that act on behalf of the collective customer. Such consolidation of orders contributes to the consolidation of production, since international consortiums of defense companies representing customer countries have the greatest chances to win tenders. Currently, the following committees play the main role: NAMEDSMA (USA, Germany, Italy) to coordinate the creation of an expanded missile defense system MEADS; NETMA (Great Britain, Germany, Spain, Italy) to coordinate the production of Eurofighter combat aircraft (previously this committee dealt with Tornado combat aircraft); NAHEMA (Germany, Italy, Netherlands, France) to coordinate the production of NH-90 helicopters; NHMO (Italy, France) to coordinate the operation of the HAWK air defense system. The customer for the new AGS theater surveillance system is the NC3A Agency, which represents NATO as an organization.

2.2. The development of NATO after the end of the Cold War.

The functions and goals of NATO after the Second World War were focused on containing the Soviet bloc, however, after its collapse, the need arose to revise the classical doctrines.

Many of the underlying problems that divided Europe during the Cold War were compounded by the antagonism that existed between East and West in the ideological, political and military spheres. The changes that led to the end of the Cold War enabled NATO to launch a number of security and stability initiatives and create structures for dialogue, confidence-building and cooperation with former adversaries, as well as with other European states and neighboring countries throughout the Mediterranean region.

One of the first steps in this direction was the creation in 1991 of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. It was then renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and became the main forum for consultation and cooperation between NATO and non-NATO countries in the Euro-Atlantic region.

The most important factor in revising NATO's strategic priorities was the change in the nature of the main threats to international security.

The degree of conflict and political and military instability in Europe and the world has not so much decreased as it has acquired a qualitatively new content. The problems of regulating numerous centers of regional tension came to the fore, which not only turned into one of the key areas of world politics, but also acquired a sharply militarized character - the predominance of the so-called forceful appeasement over the "traditional peacekeeping" of the Cold War era became more and more obvious. However, the nature of these changes did not emerge immediately - NATO's strategic concept was formed under the influence of the external situation.

The first step towards solving the problem of transforming NATO from a defensive alliance into an organization aimed at ensuring the "collective security" of its members was to be approved in November 1991. The strategic concept of the alliance. It was also distinguished by “... optimism about the increased “opportunities for successfully resolving crises at an early stage ...” and the potential for developing pan-European dialogue and cooperation in this area, as well as recognition of the leading role of the CSCE in conflict management in Europe (with the possible participation of the EU, WEU and UN).

The events taking place in the world far outstripped the course of NATO's strategic thought: in parallel with theory, and often overtaking it, the practice of an increasingly active participation of the alliance in peacekeeping operations and forceful appeasement was developing. It was the direct experience of practical participation in the regulation of crises and conflicts in Europe during the 1990s, as well as the new operational-tactical concepts of the alliance in this area, that served as the basis for the formation of NATO's modern anti-crisis strategy.

The 1991 Strategic Concept emphasized the need for a global approach to security. The Alliance has taken a course towards establishing broad contacts and actively developing interaction with countries that are not members of NATO:

in 1991, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was created - a consultative forum, which, along with NATO states, included former socialist countries, and then states that emerged on the post-Soviet territory;

in 1994, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program was initiated, inviting all OSCE countries to cooperate with NATO on the basis of individual projects on issues such as ensuring transparency in military planning and military spending; imposing civilian control over the armed forces; implementation of joint planning, training and combat training of military units for peacekeeping, rescue and humanitarian operations; crisis management; Air defense, communications, logistics.

The initiative to develop the Partnership for Peace program belonged to the United States and was approved by the NATO countries. Its main direction is to strengthen the influence of the alliance countries in the post-socialist space and control the further "democratization" of the Eastern European states and the CIS countries.

In their 1991 Strategic Concept, NATO leaders recognized that “Allied security must take into account the global context” and that “Allied security interests can be affected by broader threats, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources, and acts terrorism and sabotage. NATO stated essentially the same thing in the 1999 Strategic Concept, this time putting "acts of terrorism" at the top of the list of "other threats".

Considering the process of restructuring NATO in the global space "after the Cold War" can be characterized as follows:

There is a certain decrease in military activity within NATO. Although the traditional task of organizing collective defense in the event of external aggression and providing appropriate military capabilities remains the main one, the scale of military preparations has been reduced since the end of the Cold War. The size of the armed forces has been reduced, some of them have been transferred to a reduced level of combat readiness, and the role of the nuclear component in military strategy has been reduced. As part of the ongoing restructuring of the military command, it is envisaged to reduce the total number of headquarters at various levels from 65 to 20.

Today, efforts are being made to strengthen the role of the alliance as a tool for the strategic involvement of the United States in Europe, while at the same time ensuring greater independence for the European members of the alliance. In 1994 officially approved the course towards the formation of a "European security and defense identity" (European Security and Defense Identity - ESDI) within NATO; it was decided that the military capabilities of the alliance could be used for the operations of the Western European Union (WEU). The concept of "combined joint task forces" (Combined Joint Task Force - CJTF) was adopted, which can be allocated from NATO as "separable, but not separate forces" for operations carried out by European members of the alliance without the participation of the United States.

A wider use of multinational formations formed by NATO members from among European countries is envisaged.

The alliance has taken a course towards establishing broad contacts and actively developing cooperative interaction with countries that are not members of NATO. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was created, a consultative forum that included, along with the NATO states, the former socialist countries, and then the states that emerged on the territory of the collapsed USSR.

Starting in 1993, the question of the possibility of expanding the alliance and joining it with the former socialist countries and the Baltic countries took center stage in discussions about NATO. In 1997 a formal decision was made on the forthcoming accession to the union of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, which became full members of NATO in 1999.

Subsequently, the main attention began to be given to the definition and justification of the new missions of the alliance, going beyond those functions that were outlined by the North Atlantic Treaty. At the same time, the need to reorient the alliance towards solving the problems of crisis management and peacekeeping is especially emphasized, with a corresponding change in ongoing military preparations and ensuring the flexibility and mobility of the armed forces.

For the first time, the NATO Strategic Concept included among the possible tasks “the conduct of crisis response operations not covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty” (that is, not related to collective defense against external aggression). The first practical experience of using NATO forces for these purposes was the bombing and missile strikes against Yugoslavia, which began in March 1999. The official goal of this operation was to end the humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo. NATO's military campaign against Yugoslavia showed that the alliance claims the right to use force outside the territory of member countries and without the sanction of the UN Security Council.

According to V.V. Shtol "... After the end of the Cold War, the winners faced the question of creating a new world order, the nature of which, perhaps for many decades, will predetermine the fate of mankind, all countries and peoples in the still emerging, largely unsettled geopolitical balance of interests and forces ...".

Thus, with the end of the Cold War, the most important factor in revising NATO's strategic priorities was the change in the nature of the main threats to international security. Despite the fact that the confrontation of the superpowers is a thing of the past, the degree of conflict and political and military instability in Europe and the world has not so much decreased as it has acquired a qualitatively new content. The problems of regulating numerous centers of regional tension came to the fore, which not only turned into one of the key areas of world politics, but also acquired a sharply militarized character - the predominance of the so-called forceful appeasement over the "traditional peacekeeping" of the Cold War era became more and more obvious. However, the nature of these changes was not immediately apparent.

The actions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization over the past decade and a half testify to its claims to a certain key role in the processes associated with the dynamic transformation of the entire system of international relations, which is characterized by the action of two mutually exclusive tendencies. An important aspect is that NATO is de facto practically incapable of influencing the processes taking place in the world, and is the conductor of US policy, which was clearly demonstrated by the operations in Iraq and Yugoslavia. In this regard, a topical issue for Russia is the question of developing relations between our country and the North Atlantic Alliance, either as adversaries or as allies in the fight against terrorism.

2.3. NATO military operations.

Bosnia and Herzegovina. Under a UN mandate, following the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in December 1995, NATO deployed a Multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) to Bosnia and Herzegovina to oversee the implementation of the military aspects of the peace agreement. The IFOR mission was to stop hostilities and separate the conflicting parties, which represented the newly formed administrative-territorial units of the war-torn country: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska; as well as ensuring the transfer between them of the occupied territories. Within one year, the IFOR had completed its mission and in December 1996 it was replaced by the smaller Stabilization Force (SFOR).

As the situation improves, the international military presence in the region is gradually being reduced. At the beginning of 2004, SFOR numbered close to 7,000 troops, which is several times less than the original contingent of 60,000, and indicates the progress made by Bosnia and Herzegovina. Now, by mutual agreement, the reduced contingent of SFOR has been transferred to the management of the EU.

Kosovo . In 1998, the armed conflict in the predominantly ethnic Albanian Yugoslav province of Kosovo turned more than 300,000 people into refugees. The Yugoslav leadership ignored numerous international demands to withdraw Serbian forces and start negotiations with the Albanian population. In October 1998, NATO warned that if Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic failed to comply with the demands of the international community, military force would be used against his regime. President Milosevic agreed to comply with the ultimatum. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) deployed observers to Kosovo. For its part, NATO has organized aerial surveillance and deployed special forces in Macedonia.

In early 1999, a new outbreak of violence began. Persistent attempts by international diplomacy to resolve the conflict failed, and in March the mission of observers was evacuated. NATO soon launched an air campaign targeting specific targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. After 78 days of air strikes, the Milosevic regime agreed to meet the international demands of NATO and the EU.

As a result of the signing of the Military-Technical Agreement between the commanders of NATO and the armed forces of Yugoslavia, and in accordance with the UN mandate, the NATO KFOR force was deployed in Kosovo. Their task was to prevent the resumption of hostilities, create a safe environment, demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Army, support international humanitarian activities and the work of the UN mission. Initially, the KFOR forces numbered up to 43 thousand people. As a result of the gradual reduction, the contingent was almost halved to approximately 24,000. KFOR included formations from most NATO countries, 15 partner countries, as well as Argentina, Morocco and New Zealand.

Southern Serbia . In early 2001, NATO, the European Union and the OSCE developed a strategy for the peaceful resolution of the armed conflict in southern Serbia, which threatened stability in the region. Unrest began in late 2000 in the Presevo Valley, where a large ethnic Albanian community was under direct Serb rule and had limited political and social rights. Ethnic Albanian fighters armed with small arms carried out a series of attacks against Serbian security forces in the Border Security Zone, a five-kilometre buffer sector along Kosovo's inner border with Serbia. This piece of territory, which the Yugoslav Army had no access to, was under the control of NATO KFOR forces.

Macedonia . In 2001, NATO deployed a crisis management mission in Macedonia at the request of its government. Internal unrest in this country began in the spring of 2001, when armed groups of ethnic Albanians opposed the authorities. NATO condemned the rebel attacks and tightened controls on the border with Kosovo. At the same time. The alliance demanded from the government of the country to carry out constitutional reforms aimed at solving problems that caused discontent among ethnic Albanians. The NATO Secretary General played a key role in this process.

NATO agreed to an official Macedonian request for military assistance to demilitarize the so-called National Liberation Army, which consisted of ethnic Albanians. The condition for providing such assistance was a ceasefire and the signing of a plan for a peaceful settlement of the conflict. After the launch of the Framework Reconciliation Plan, NATO sent a contingent of 3,500 people to Macedonia to carry out a mission to disarm ethnic Albanian rebels. Since December 2003, thanks to the success achieved in stabilizing the situation, the military mission has been discontinued and replaced by an EU police mission.

Afghanistan . On August 11, 2003, NATO assumed responsibility for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan to assist the country's Transitional Government in providing security in Kabul and nearby areas.

The International Security Assistance Force has been operating under a UN mandate since the end of 2001. The first ISAF mission, which was carried out by the forces of different countries, mainly NATO members, was carried out by Great Britain. It was replaced by Turkey, then Germany and the Netherlands. In October 2003, in accordance with a resolution of the UN Security Council, the mandate of ISAF was expanded. NATO has agreed to expand its mission in Afghanistan, including by temporarily deploying units outside of Kabul and assuming military command of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). NATO has pledged to maintain its presence in the country for as long as necessary.

Other NATO operations, including in Iraq, Sudan and Operation Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean, are non-military.

Chapter 3. Russia and NATO.

3.1. General issues of development of relations.

The end of the Cold War destroyed the "Second World", which included the then Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community. The socialist system lost the competition to capitalism, also by its own standards: it failed to achievecreating a higher labor productivity than under capitalismand this was ultimately decisive for her fate. The intermediate position between developed and backward countries, which was consistently occupied by the Russian Empire, and then the USSR, turned out to be vulnerable not only economically, but also politically.

In my opinion, relations between Russia and NATO occupy one of the central places in the process of the formation of a new post-bipolar world order, they have an important impact on the contours of the emerging new security system not only in Europe, but throughout the world.

Relations between Russia and NATO were officially established in 1991 at the first ceremonial meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (later renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council), which was established after the end of the Cold War, as a forum for consultations to develop new cooperative relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe .

The dissolution of the Soviet Union took place precisely during this meeting. A few years later, in 1994, Russia joined the Partnership for Peace, an important program of practical security and defense cooperation between NATO and each of the partner countries.

According to the Russia-NATO Treaty, “Russia and NATO do not regard each other as adversaries. The common goal of Russia and NATO is to overcome the remnants of the previous confrontation and rivalry and strengthen mutual trust and cooperation,” however, this provision today, in connection with the recent events in the Caucasus, is more than debatable. NATO expansion is a direct threat to Russia's security. Based on this, in Russia since 1993. there is an active campaign against NATO expansion. Moscow has put forward many reasons why it is opposed to expansion:

1) Enlargement will keep the bloc approach, Russia and the Alliance will no longer trust each other, this will create new dividing lines in Europe. Russia will be forced to look for new allies, including the military. She will have to allocate more funds for defense, revise her military doctrine;

2) the emergence of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in NATO will create a military-strategic imbalance in favor of the expanding Alliance. NATO will establish not only its political control over the new members, but also the military infrastructure left over from the Warsaw Pact;

3) the NATO military machine will approach directly the borders of Russia. This will complicate the relationship between Russia and NATO. Russia will need security guarantees;

4) the previous argument is interconnected with the problem of adaptation to modern conditions. In particular, this is related to the deployment of nuclear forces and permanent armed forces of the Alliance on the territory of new members;

5) in addition, expansion can lead to a change in the situation within Russia itself - it will strengthen the positions of opponents of expansion, primarily the left.

NATO Secretary General George Robertson spoke about relations between Russia and NATO after the Cold War as follows: “At present, there is a paradox in relations between NATO and Russia. On the one hand, we have a huge range of issues that we must solve together- from nuclear security issues to the fight against international terrorism. But on the other hand, we still have not been able to use the existing potential for cooperation in this area, because we are still fixated on our differences.” As the practice of recent events has shown, relations between Russia and NATO are still far from ideal, practically in August 2008 there was a break in relations, which, however, is not an adequate way out of the current situation in the world.

Some of the NATO-Russia differences are very real and significant. Thus, J. Robertson emphasizes the need to overcome them: “We cannot allow our differences to jeopardize the entire range of issues that make up the essence of the relationship between NATO and Russia ... NATO and Russia play a leading role in ensuring European security, and a constant dialogue on strategic issues meets both our mutual interests and the interests of all other states.”

Russian-NATO cooperation is not limited to military and military-political areas. There are a number of other aspects of cooperation in the non-military sphere: civil emergency planning, search and rescue operations, scientific, environmental and economic cooperation.

In the Founding Act of 1997. the following was said about the development of cooperation between Russia and NATO: “...NATO and Russia will conduct consultations and cooperate in the following areas:

development of mutually agreed cooperation projects in the field of economy, environment and science;

implementation of joint initiatives and exercises in the field of emergency situations and elimination of the consequences of disasters”.

However, the old stereotypes of the Cold War era prevented the full realization of the possibilities for developing relations between Russia and NATO. In early 1999, Russia suspended its participation in the SPS due to disagreements over a NATO air campaign aimed at ending political and ethnic repression in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo. However, some types of cooperation continued unabated, including peacekeeping in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition, Russia played a key diplomatic role in resolving the Kosovo crisis, and a Russian peacekeeping contingent was present as part of the Kosovo Force deployed in June.

Since 1999, relations between Russia and NATO have begun to improve significantly. When Lord Robertson took over as NATO Secretary General in October of that year, he took it upon himself to get the Russia-NATO relationship off the ground. And after his election to the post of President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin announced that he would also contribute to the restoration of relations with NATO in the spirit of pragmatism.

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States served as a stark reminder of the need for concerted international action to effectively counter terrorism and other emerging security threats. Immediately after the attacks, Russia opened its airspace to the international coalition's campaign in Afghanistan and provided intelligence information in support of the antiterrorist coalition.

High-level contacts between Russia and NATO organized in the following months, including two meetings between Robertson and President Putin and a meeting of Russian and NATO Foreign Ministers in December 2001, explored opportunities, gave new impetus and new content to the relationship Russia-NATO.

Intensive negotiations led to the adoption of a Joint Declaration on a New Quality of Russia-NATO Relations, signed by the heads of state and government of Russia and NATO member countries on May 28, 2002 in Rome, which established the Russia-NATO Council.

The intense strengthening of Russia-NATO relations was put to the test in August 2008 when Georgia attacked South Ossetia. Recent events have clearly shown NATO's dependence on US policy. The main goal of the American provocation implemented by Saakashvili was not at all to restore the territorial integrity of Georgia. The main thing was to create conditions for achieving Washington's long-term plans in the Transcaucasus. The admission of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO is the next step in this direction.

Most observers are convinced that the US and NATO will continue the information war against Russia.

It should be noted that relations between Russia and NATO have gone through different periods in their history, including periods of serious cooling. And now, they have entered another "cold period" period. However, it should be noted that NATO is even more interested in cooperation with Russia than vice versa. This is due to the fact that it is impossible to imagine successful NATO operations in Afghanistan without the support of Russia, through whose territory both humanitarian and other cargoes of the Alliance member countries passed.

There are extremely important areas where Russia and NATO are unquestionably allies and not adversaries - this is the fight against international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the resuscitation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The plan of military cooperation between Moscow and Brussels, adopted in 2003, set the goal of raising the level of operational interaction between the headquarters of Russian and NATO troops, and conducting joint exercises on land and at sea. This plan was successfully carried out. Among the very promising projects of Russia and NATO is joint air patrolling. This project was supposed to start working in a year or two, which would increase the safety of flights over Europe. Now this important and useful work has been curtailed. Thus, it should be recognized that the military-political situation in the world is not in favor of Russia, and cooperation with the West has not led to a reduction in the military danger. There are growing threats to international security from developed and developing non-European states. In general, an analysis of the scope and direction of NATO's internal and external transformation indicates the globalization of the alliance's interests, which creates the preconditions for a conflict of interests in various parts of the world, including the post-Soviet space and regions bordering Russia

3.2 NATO's eastward expansion: state of the art

Since 1993, the eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance has formed one of the leading storylines in relations between Russia and the West, in the formation of Russian foreign policy in general, in the struggle of ideas and political currents over the issue of Russia's military-strategic orientation, and ultimately about its civilizational affiliation. At the same time, the history of discussions about NATO expansion testifies to the deep differences in the perception of the problem by Russian and Western observers. In Russia, officials and most of the experts involved in "realpolitik" viewed expansion as a consolidated strategy of the West (or at least the American elites) and tried to either influence the situation with unsubstantiated threats or limit the damage with agreements with NATO on private matters. - thereby demonstrating to both supporters and opponents of expansion in the West their actual recognition of its inevitability.
In the 1990s, the world witnessed a struggle between supporters and opponents of expansion, the first stage of which ended with the victory of the supporters of expansion, while exposing deep contradictions both between the West and the East, which changed their geopolitical outlines, and within the Western elite itself on the issue of the future world order. . On March 12, 1999, an idea that until recently seemed senseless, unpromising and dangerous to many in the West came true: former members of the Warsaw Pact Organization (WTO) Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary became members of NATO. Meanwhile, two weeks later, the North Atlantic Alliance, now consisting of 19 states, in violation of the UN Charter and the entire international legal order, attacked the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). It became clear that Russian diplomacy and the expert-political community, which until now have been debating a particular issue extensions alliance, overlooked the formation of ideology and strategic plans for a much more extensive and far-reaching expansion.
The war in the Balkans and the adoption of NATO's New Strategic Concept marked a fundamental change in the existing structure of global politics. For the first time in the entire post-colonial history, the military-political situation in the world is determined by the expansion of the military bloc of the richest and most prosperous states, which does not have any significant counterbalance in the form of other blocs and organizations. The United Nations, not to mention other international institutions, has demonstrated its impotence and increasing marginality in relation to NATO. A virtual monopoly of NATO in matters of European security has been established. Finally, the expansion of NATO, combined with the Balkan war, marked a change of milestones in Russian domestic politics: for the first time in a long time, it created the ground for a national consensus on at least one strategic issue, and, moreover, on terms acceptable and favorable to the ruling elite.
What are the reasons for the expansion of the alliance and its consequences for Russia, Europe and the world? How can Russia ensure its national security under these conditions? These issues can be approached from different professional and philosophical points of view, and regardless of the chosen approach, an understanding of the existing areas of theoretical analysis is a necessary condition for rational understanding of the problem. Ultimately, the perception of the problem of NATO expansion and the development of specific recommendations in this regard rest on the question of what the alliance is and what forces determine its current evolution.
It should be noted that the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program played a very positive role in establishing relations between Russia and NATO. This program, focused on bilateral cooperation between the military departments of NATO and Eastern European countries, was developed in the fall of 1993 by the Pentagon and the Chiefs of Staff in cooperation with Secretary of State W. Christopher and his deputy S. Talbott. The PfP program was a political response of the American military departments, which were generally not interested in accelerated NATO expansion against the backdrop of cuts in defense spending, to the situation created after B. Yeltsin’s Warsaw statement on the admissibility of Poland’s entry into NATO and the start of a mass public campaign of the Polish American Congress together with Z. Brzezinski and G. Kissinger for the speedy expansion of the alliance. The adoption of the PfP program at the Brussels NATO summit in January 1994 gave Russia additional time to develop a strategy in relations with the alliance (for which the PfP and its creators were subjected to severe criticism from the American right-wing and Eastern European governments), while not removing the issue of expanding the alliance from the agenda. At the same time, the institutional transition from a structure based on multilateral participation to bilateral military contacts with NATO introduced elements of competition between Russia and Eastern European countries in cooperation with the military structures of the alliance that were unfavorable for Russia.
In Russia, the adoption of the PfP program caused a surge of euphoria, as it was perceived as an alternative to NATO expansion, and not as part of a process that depended in part on Russian actions, including pre-emptive ones. Ultimately, those observers who did not share the general euphoria turned out to be right, believing that “the big game around NATO expansion is just beginning.
In 1997-2000 in the Clinton administration, M. Albright and W. Cohen, tough supporters of expansion, were appointed to the key posts of secretary of state and minister of defense, respectively. Despite this, Washington's official policy envisaged a simultaneous movement "on two tracks" - towards the expansion of the alliance and the codification of the "special relationship" between NATO and Russia. The initiators of NATO expansion intended to build an agreement with Russia in such a way that the structure created on its basis (the future Permanent Joint Council) would be limited to information and advisory functions and exclude any role of Russia in making decisions that are within the competence of the alliance. Such an agreement was also intended to remove the hypothetical issue of Russia's entry into NATO from the agenda, since the task of drawing Russia into treaty relations with the alliance had already been resolved.
Some opponents of NATO expansion in the West believed that Russia was unlikely to agree to such an agreement under the current circumstances, or that the ratification of the treaty by the parliaments of NATO countries and Russia could be difficult, which, in turn, would slow down the expansion of the alliance. In fact, the Russian leadership accepted not only the idea itself, but also the structure of the Founding Act proposed by Washington as an intergovernmental agreement not subject to ratification, and therefore, contrary to Moscow’s subsequent assertions, an international legal obligation without force. Leading American newspapers wrote that B. Yeltsin agreed to sign the Paris Act in exchange for Clinton's promise to help Moscow obtain a new IMF loan and rename the G7 into the G8. It is a historical paradox that E. Primakov participated in the development of this document as the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, but it should be remembered that foreign policy, according to the 1993 Constitution, was the exclusive prerogative of the presidential power, and that Minister of Defense I. Rodionov, who was in a similar position, criticized the Kremlin's foreign policy, was scourged in front of television cameras and retired a few days before the president left for Paris to sign the Founding Act.
According to researchers, the Permanent Joint Council (JC) formed in accordance with the act set new institutional parameters for interaction between Russia and NATO. As the experience of subsequent years shows, the format of Russia's bilateral interaction with NATO as a whole significantly worsened Russia's position in negotiations with the alliance in comparison, for example, with the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, since within the framework of the new forum, Russian representatives did not deal with representatives of individual members and candidates for NATO. members of the alliance, but with a pre-consolidated position of the NATO elite, which is brought to the attention of Russia in a ready-made form and not subject to modification. In addition, the SPS initially acted within the framework of a strictly limited competence, which excluded the adoption of decisions that would impose any restrictions on the subsequent actions of the parties. In this context, any activity of the Union of Right Forces and Russia's participation in it, or, conversely, the freezing of its activities (as happened after the NATO attack on Yugoslavia) are purely symbolic and, at best, act as a reflection of deeper trends in relations between the West and Russia. . This situation is an inevitable and easily predictable retribution by Russian diplomacy for its passion for the idea of Russia's "special status" in relations with NATO as a whole, which in fact only contributes to the erection of institutional and psychological barriers between Russia and "small" European countries - both members and not members of the alliance.

3.3. Prospects for Relations between Russia and NATO

Life more and more convinced Russian diplomacy of the fallacy and futility of a one-sided pro-Western orientation and contributed to the gradual sobering of Russia's political leadership. Circumstances forced the president and the leaders of the Foreign Ministry to develop a foreign policy concept that would reflect a more realistic and broad geopolitical view of Russia's international policy.

The position of the Russian leadership, full of illusions about partnership, did not immediately realize the essence of American plans and even approved in August 1993 Poland's intention to join NATO. Later, the US ruling circles, despite Russia's negative position, simply presented it with a fait accompli of expanding NATO's zone of influence.

In their speeches and in official documents, the US and NATO leaders constantly emphasize the thesis about the transformation that NATO has allegedly undergone, becoming more of a political than a military organization. But the actual development of events shows that the North Atlantic Alliance has been and remains a military organization based primarily on forceful methods of solving international problems. In this regard, the desire of some American political scientists to portray NATO as a harmless club of democratic states, and to present its expansion only as a means of spreading liberal democracy to the CEE states, looks false.

In the concept of national security and the military doctrine of Russia, the understanding of the threat of NATO expansion to the east is currently rather vague.

From our point of view, there are enough grounds to assess the expansion of the alliance as a real threat from the military-strategic, political, cultural and civilizational points of view. The non-obviousness for a number of experts and politicians of the military threat from NATO is related to its dynamic nature, which in this case means the increase in the aggressiveness of the alliance as its composition changes and the elites regroup as a result of the victory of supporters of a tougher offensive strategy. While the top leadership of NATO or its individual members is not currently considering the conduct of any military action against Russia, whether by nuclear or conventional forces, as a realistic scenario, the demonstration of belligerent intentions at a lower level, especially by the states of the eastern and southern flank, represents is an independent threat to Russia, since it affects psychologically vulnerable elite groups that have lost immunity to various forms of blackmail and coercive pressure both inside the country and outside.

One of the ways to neutralize the cultural-psychological and, consequently, the political threat is to abandon the perception of the West as a monolithic, integrated whole, from giving historically transient institutional formations the status of spokesmen for some absolute idea of the West. Meanwhile, the radical rejection of the analytical tools of the Soviet era, combined with the impoverishment of information and scientific study of the Western world, gave rise to an exaggerated idea of the consolidation of the West in many Russian observers (which is, in a sense, the reverse side of the own, very real disunity of the Russian society). The confrontation within Western society, in particular American society, over the fate of NATO, the presence of serious opposition to expansion, including in power structures, went unnoticed in Russia or was hushed up due to the disadvantage of this information both for Russian isolationists and for fanatical adherents of total integration with West. In today's circumstances, an understanding of the deep internal conflict nature of the Western world, the rejection of the absolutization of the temporal balance of power within it, as well as between the West and other "poles" of the world community, is necessary first of all for Russian Westernizers if they want to restore the legitimacy of their direction as an integral part of the Russian socio-cultural and the political spectrum.

Obviously, Russia can find its place in the life of Europe and the West (while reserving the right to participate in other geopolitical configurations) only if there is a variety of variants of Western/European identity. Accordingly, the expansion of NATO, like any tendency towards the unification and Americanization of Europe and the West, deprives Russia of the freedom of civilizational maneuvering, and fatalistic resignation to the inevitability of this only plays into the hands of anti-Russian forces and can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. At the same time, we are not talking about weaving intrigues and bringing discord into relations between NATO members or some other subjects of Western politics.

At the present stage, all experts recognize the leading role of the Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF) in ensuring Russia's security. It is especially significant that strategic nuclear forces provide an opportunity under their "umbrella" to reform and raise to a new qualitative level the armed forces of Russia, weakened in the difficult economic situation in the country. Does not lose its relevance and nuclear deterrence, which is an integral factor of modern global strategic stability, remains a way to prevent aggression of any scale by military means.

In doing so, it should be borne in mind that the Bush administration does not believe that NATO should be a global defense and security organization. NATO should provide "effective support", serve as a stronghold for building up forces, collecting intelligence data, and locating military bases. Administration officials believe that the formation of modern, flexible and mutually reinforcing forces by the allies will help maintain a reliable Euro-Atlantic security system. This implies a change in the NATO command structure, including the rejection of the geographical and the transition to the functional principle of organizing force control, the creation of a single strategic command, the unification of the Supreme Command of NATO Forces in Europe and the US European Command, the elimination of the Supreme Command of NATO Forces in the Atlantic ( or its transformation into a training structure) and possibly the creation of a northern command that would be connected to the defense structures of the US territory.

There is also a widespread view, both among experts and within the administration itself, that NATO no longer matters in terms of US foreign and defense policy. The only decisive factor is the US military and cooperation with those countries that share America's priorities and are able to contribute to future operations. This view assumes that Europe is secure and stable and that the United States should focus its defense and security policy on solving the problems of the Middle East, South and East Asia, and the Caucasus.

The main problem of using NATO to integrate Russia into European structures lies not in relations between NATO and Russia, but in the North Atlantic Alliance itself. Despite the public's favorable attitude towards the meeting in Prague, US officials have expressed doubts about the future prospects for NATO's development. It is still not clear, although this issue is not discussed publicly, whether the cohesion of the members of the alliance will remain and whether the latter will be able to clearly define its new tasks. Otherwise, the effectiveness of NATO, and with it its political support from the United States, may be in question.

Today, the key problem of Russian foreign policy is the stable image of Russia as an unprincipled force that takes into account only material factors - an image that has taken root not only in the West, but also in the East, not only among the elites, but also in broad sections of public opinion. The domestic political circumstances shaping Russia's foreign policy suggest that in the foreseeable future this unattractive image will in any case not fade, and Russia's behavior as a subject of world politics will continue to be based on an assessment of the momentary ratio of material resources, outside of any system universal values and long-term principles that would be attractive to a wide range of participants in the world community.

Conclusion.

In the course of this work, the following conclusions were drawn:

The modern structure of NATO is very extensive and includes such elements as the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the Defense Planning Committee (MPC), the NATO Secretary General, the international secretariat, the military committee, the international military headquarters, the command structure.

The participation of European countries in the activities and organization of NATO takes a number of forms: joint defense planning; participation in an integrated military command structure; placing armed forces under NATO command; infrastructure maintenance; co-ownership of defense systems; participation in NATO nuclear planning; military-industrial cooperation.

The modern history of NATO begins with the Meeting of Heads of State/Government of Member States in Rome in November 1991, where the Strategic Concept was defined, defining new approaches to ensuring security based on dialogue, cooperation and collective defence. At the same meeting, the Declaration on Peace and Cooperation was adopted, which defined new tasks and directions for NATO's activities in the light of a new common institutional framework for security in Europe and the development of partnerships with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, once former adversaries. To establish closer relations with the latter, a special North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was established. With the development of these partnerships, the expansion of the number of partner countries at the expense of the CIS countries and the advent of the NATO Partnership for Peace program, in 1997. The NACC has replaced the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).

NATO's anti-crisis strategy and operations, their nature and direction are becoming critical in the modern world, which is striving for a multipolar world, both from the point of view of Russia's relations with the alliance, and in the light of the broader interests of ensuring the security of the Russian Federation. On the one hand, NATO's so-called crisis response in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq and other regions is the most visible (but by no means the only) manifestation of the expansion of the alliance's mission and sphere of influence. Moreover, depending on the location and nature of NATO's anti-crisis operations, they themselves can cause the most acute conflicts and crises, both local and regional, including in relations with the Russian Federation.

NATO's place in the emerging international political system on the European continent is determined by the Alliance's demonstrated political and military capacity, as well as by the expansion of its spatial areal. But due to the fact that this structure does not include Russia, the transformation of the North Atlantic Alliance in its current form into the central element of the “pan-European architecture” is either problematic or fraught with escalation of tension. This issue could be translated into a constructive plane as a result of a more radical transformation of the union and the formation of qualitatively new relations with Russia. May 1997 between them was signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, which defined "the goals and mechanism of consultations, cooperation, joint decision-making and joint actions that will form the core of the relationship between Russia and NATO." The Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council was created and began to function.

However, the question of the real nature and scope of their future cooperation, according to many authors, remains open. The possibility of such cooperation was jeopardized by NATO's military operation against Yugoslavia, which Russia described as an undisguised aggression. Such actions prompted it to go to a sharp decline in the level of relations with NATO (withdrawal of Russian representatives from the headquarters of the alliance, withdrawal from the PfP and other measures).

Bibliographic list

UN Charter http://www.un.org/russian/documen/basicdoc/charter.htm

Charter of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization/ http://supol.narod.ru/archive/official_documents/nato.htm

Founding act on mutual relations, cooperation and security between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation. // Russian newspaper - 1997. - May 28. - Section I.

History of NATO /http://www.istorichka.ru/texts/1094014840/view/

Davydov V F. Russia and the USA: problems of interaction and strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. - M, 1997.

Kachalova T.G. Non-military aspects of NATO/DA MFA of Russia, M., 2003.

Kotlyar B.C. The evolution of NATO's strategic doctrine//Modern Europe. - 2004. - No. 2.

Kashirina T.V. Russian-American relations in 1992-1996. // Abstract of the dissertation for the degree of candidate of historical sciences. - M., 1999.

Likhotal A.A. Atlantic Alliance: lack of responsibility in the context of nuclear confrontation. - M., 1997.

NATO Handbook. - M., 2001.

Troitsky M.A. transatlantic union. 1991-2004. Modernization of the US-European partnership system after the collapse of bipolarity. - M. - 2004 diplomas

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SZAGS, International Relations, 3rd year
The concept of integration. Integration associations and m / n organizations.
The main forms of multilateral associations in the history of Europe (antiquity, the Middle Ages, modern times).
Singular multidimensional. relations between world wars.
Integration activation. processes after World War II.

Another anniversary of the creation of the North Atlantic Alliance by the United States has passed. In his congratulations on the re-election of Barack Obama, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said: "President Obama has shown excellent leadership in maintaining the transatlantic relationship, and I look forward to continuing our close cooperation to ensure NATO remains effective in our changing world."

Indeed, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate Barack Obama managed to do a lot during his first presidential term to improve the activities of the most powerful military-political alliance of our time. It was created in 1949 so that the United States could, on the one hand, "come to the aid of Europe in the event of Soviet encroachments, and on the other hand, it was a way to convince the shaky governments of the continent to resist the spread of communist ideology within their countries."

Today, both of these reasons that forced the United States to go for the creation of the North Atlantic Alliance are absent, nevertheless, NATO continues its activities, adapting for self-preservation to the changed situation in the world after the end of the Cold War. To this end, NATO's new strategic concept provides for the use of force by the alliance on a global scale to counter an expanded list of new threats.

On the eve of the Lisbon summit, the US representative to NATO, one of the authors of the above article, an ardent supporter of the globalization of the alliance, Ivo Daalder, said: “We are launching NATO 3.0. It is no longer just about Europe… NATO is not a global alliance, but it is a global driving force” (it must be assumed that version 1.0 covered the Cold War period, and the version after the end of the Cold War and before the summit). That NATO is planned to become a “global driving force” follows from the “Defense and Deterrence” section of the new strategic concept of the alliance, in which paragraph 19 states: “We will ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to repel and defend against any security threat our peoples. To this end, we will maintain the ability to simultaneously conduct large joint operations and several smaller operations to provide collective defense and crisis management, including at a strategic distance. That is, the alliance must be able to simultaneously, if necessary, conduct all these operations in all corners of the globe. This conclusion follows from the text of the concept of operations at "strategic distance" and the statement by the US permanent representative to NATO that the alliance is becoming a "global driving force."

However, as practice shows, all these grandiose plans do not have any logistical support. During the Libyan war, Great Britain and France practically exhausted their capabilities after 48 hours, and America provided not only air refueling, reconnaissance and the supply of smart weapons, but also acted in accordance with the term "leading from behind", choosing to remain in the reserve. As for Mali and the terrorist destabilization of Africa in the area between the Mediterranean and the Sahel, the situation does not seem to look better here, although America has long had an “African command”. That is why the Munich Security Conference, according to the newspaper, issued a clear warning to the Europeans: America does not want and cannot bear the burden of maintaining world order alone.

In a speech on the subject, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said: “If current trends in defense spending continue, this will limit the practical ability of NATO European countries to work together with their North American allies. But it would also be a risk of weakening political support for our alliance in the United States.” True, at the same time he noted that NATO is still "the most important military force in the world."

The aforementioned NATO report indicates that the US share in the total military spending of the countries - members of this alliance in 2012 amounted to 72%. In 2007, for comparison, it was less and amounted to 68%. This means that the main military allies on the European continent - France, Germany, Italy and Great Britain - are reducing their national military spending, shifting more and more responsibility to the Americans. The report specifically noted the major reduction in military spending by France, whose armed forces are currently conducting military operations in Africa. The question is, why does the US need it today? If, when creating NATO, they sought to invest any means to prevent the spread of communism to the whole of Europe, then in modern conditions this is not necessary. Nothing and no one threatens Europe, which is why the European countries are reducing their financial burden in the alliance, and the United States is forced to compensate for this. In this regard, the NATO report treats the reduction in military spending politically: "It potentially undermines allied solidarity and threatens the ability of European allies to act without the participation of the United States."

This was especially evident during the Libyan conflict, which took place on the opposite coast of the Mediterranean Sea from Europe, that is, already at a “strategic distance”. In fact, it meant that it was time for Europe to stop using security at someone else's expense and start contributing to "hard power". The author of the article noted: “The United States and Europe are increasingly at odds on military issues. America is increasingly referring to itself as a Pacific player rather than a European one and is focusing on challenges from China. European governments, meanwhile, are cutting defense budgets as they try to cope with the economic maelstrom.” This is why major NATO operations at a “strategic distance” may be needed.

In addition, the new strategic concept, in order to make the alliance a "global driving force", expands the list of threats that NATO must counteract. If the alliance was created as a military-political alliance to counter two threats, today this list includes cyber attacks, terrorism, drug trafficking, piracy, disruption of energy supplies, missile strikes, and WMD proliferation. All these threats are global not only for NATO members, but for the entire world community. Therefore, the alliance, as Ivo Daalder said, should become a "global driving force" in the fight against them. However, the expansion of the list of threats that NATO must counteract automatically leads to an increase in the costs of maintaining the organization's activities. After Munich, it became clear that the alliance could not rely on the United States.

In this situation, it should be recalled that only the UN Security Council, on the basis of Art. 39 of the UN Charter defines "the existence of any threat to the peace, any breach of the peace or act of aggression, and makes recommendations or decides what measures should be taken ... to maintain or restore international peace and security." Therefore, by adopting a new concept, NATO actually made an application to replace the UN Security Council, which, as practice has shown, turned out to be beyond its power.

Moreover, the world community is unlikely to instruct NATO to lead the fight against any of these threats in the future. And the alliance itself will not show a desire to once again take up, for example, the fight against terrorism, as it was in Afghanistan. The situation with Mali is proof of this. On February 11, the NATO Secretary General gave an interview to the EU Observer information resource, in which he, in particular, said: “NATO cannot act as a world gendarme. We cannot travel from one country to another country, resolving every conflict. It's just not possible." Such a statement means that the French will continue to solve the problem of Mali alone, with little support from other NATO countries.

The war in Afghanistan was a test for the alliance. If he cannot fight in distant countries, he is not worth the money that is spent on him. However, Europe has not passed its own test. The Europeans, with a few notable exceptions, proved too timid and weak to fight, and they knew too little of Afghanistan to help train local forces. From the point of view of the US military, their help was generally useless.

Indeed, the mandate given by the UN Security Council in August 2003 to NATO to lead the International Security Assistance Force appears to be unfulfilled. NATO-led troops, which were called upon to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan, not only failed in their task, but also contributed to the growth of anti-Western and anti-American sentiment among the local population. And the deeper the US and its NATO allies got bogged down in the Afghan campaign, the stronger these sentiments became. And the latest leaks of classified information from the Pentagon and official UN reports of a rise in civilian casualties suggest that the NATO-led coalition in Afghanistan has reached a stalemate. Apparently, this prompted US President Barack Obama to officially announce before both houses of Congress the end of hostilities in Afghanistan by the end of 2014.

Naturally, what is happening in Afghanistan cannot but excite its neighbors. The reason for this situation is simple. NATO has failed in all the years of the military campaign to realize two of the most important goals: to defeat the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, so that their restoration would be impossible. The solution of these two tasks turned out to be beyond the strength of the alliance. As for the ability of the Afghan army to ensure security in the country, the Pentagon recently presented a report in which its condition is assessed as extremely pessimistic. So, its experts came to the conclusion that out of the 23 brigades currently in the Afghan Armed Forces, only one is capable of conducting operations on its own - without air, reconnaissance, rear and other support from NATO forces. This data confirms fears that after 2014 the Afghan army will find it extremely difficult to resist the Taliban and al-Qaeda. This is the likely end result of NATO's first "strategic distance" operation. It can be unequivocally stated that the alliance, as a military-political union, striving to become a "global driving force", turned out to be unable to counteract new threats, and above all international terrorism, which undermines the stability and security of the world community.

The US and NATO plans to deploy a missile defense system in Europe also do not contribute to strategic stability. For the first time, the need for its creation is legally fixed in the new NATO strategic concept. The signatories of the concept in the "Defense and Deterrence" section in paragraph 19 indicate that "we will ... develop the capacity to protect our peoples and territories against ballistic missile attack as a key element of our collective defense, which will be a contribution to the indivisible security of the alliance ". As you know, the concept of "indivisible security of the alliance" means that if the United States creates a global missile defense system to protect against a possible strike by Russian missiles on its own territory, then they should do the same in Europe to protect their allies, that is, create a European missile defense system. True, NATO continues to assert that the European missile defense system is intended only to counter Iranian missiles and is not directed against the Russian nuclear deterrence potential. Then, to neutralize whose threat does NATO aviation patrol the airspace of the Baltic States today? This was clearly done to protect the airspace of these countries from Russian aviation. Naturally, EuroPRO is also designed to protect against a possible retaliatory strike by Russian ballistic missiles, that is, to neutralize Russia's nuclear deterrence potential.

This is also confirmed by NATO's refusal to give Russia legal guarantees that the European missile defense system is not directed against its nuclear deterrence potential. Here is the explanation of the US Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul on this matter. At the end of last year, in response to a question from Interfax why Washington cannot give written guarantees to remove Russia's concerns, he said: “Because we do not know how the threat in Iran will develop. This has nothing to do with Russia. We cannot hold our military forces against the threat."

That is, since Iran, apparently, will continue to improve its missiles, the European missile defense system should also be improved. And if the current missile defense systems are not yet able to influence Russian missiles, then in the future they will be able to. Thus, in the event of a nuclear conflict between Russia and the United States, missile defense systems deployed in Europe will also be used against Russian missiles that launch a retaliatory strike on US territory. That is why no one is going to give any legal guarantees, because it would be completely absurd. The US Ambassador explained it diplomatically, but perfectly understandable. If this were not the case, then it would be absolutely logical, in the light of what was said at the Munich conference, to close this expensive European missile defense project, as well as the global missile defense project, in order to save money, since even the most modern missile defense system is not able to provide 100% protection. Then the intention of the United States to propose to Russia to go for even deeper reductions in its strategic nuclear arsenals, as Barack Obama announced in his State of the Union address, would look very attractive.

The US president's promise to show flexibility in the deployment of European missile defense in order to take into account Russia's interests cannot be fulfilled for the simple reason that this would affect the interests of NATO allies. Here it is appropriate to recall a historical example of 50 years ago. As you know, a nuclear war during the Caribbean crisis in 1962 was avoided thanks to a compromise reached by the leadership of the USSR and the USA. The Soviet Union withdrew its missiles from Cuba in exchange for US President John F. Kennedy's promise not to invade the island and to remove its Jupiter missiles from Turkey. However, this fact about the withdrawal of missiles was kept secret for a quarter of a century, since any leak "would have a devastating effect on the security of the United States and its allies."

In the current situation, even the postponement of the deployment of missile defense systems on the territory of Poland has already caused a negative reaction from Polish politicians. It seems to them that the presence of a missile defense system on Polish soil will add importance and incredible significance to the country for NATO. It is also necessary to take into account the fact that the creation of a European missile defense system is written in the strategic concept of NATO, and the US President will not be able to radically change anything in this process openly or secretly, like John F. Kennedy. There is no doubt that if NATO had remained in the same composition after the end of the Cold War, that is, without the admission of new members from Eastern Europe, this problem would not have arisen today, since missile defense systems would then be deployed far from Russian borders. However, the United States decided to expand NATO.

In the “Open Doors” section of the strategic concept in paragraph 27, in particular, it is written that “the door to NATO membership remains fully open to all European democracies that share the values of our alliance, who are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership and whose entry can contribute to overall security and stability.” It is difficult to say how the admission of the states of Eastern Europe, as well as the Baltic states to NATO, contributed to overall security and stability. Rather, on the contrary, the example of the deployment of the European missile defense system and the economic problems that have arisen for the United States caused by the growth of their financial contribution to NATO as a result of the expansion of the alliance will suffice.

Indeed, NATO could not prevent the terrorist attacks in the US, Spain, Great Britain, which took place already in the 21st century, just as it cannot do anything with the terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan. This is understandable, because even such a powerful military-political alliance as NATO is not equipped to counter such threats, that is, its existence in its current form is useless. Last fall, while in Tajikistan, Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke about the North Atlantic Alliance. In particular, the Russian president said that he frankly did not understand for what purposes NATO exists, and called the alliance an atavism of the Cold War. Vladimir Putin wished that NATO quickly transform from a military organization into a political one, as the Atlanticists themselves have repeatedly stated at the alliance's headquarters in Brussels. Nevertheless, there are those who want to join NATO in the hope of ensuring their security with the help of the United States.

Within the framework of the Chicago summit of the alliance, the foreign ministers of NATO member countries met with four postgraduate countries - Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia and Montenegro. The North Atlantic alliance should be expanded in the near future - such a position was voiced then by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on the eve of this meeting. Of all the NATO graduate countries invited to the summit, Georgia received the most attention. The declaration adopted at the end of the Chicago summit confirmed support for Georgia's desire to join the alliance. All visitors to Tbilisi are constantly talking about this support. US Vice President Joseph Biden, speaking in the Georgian Parliament on July 23, 2009, said: “We oppose nineteenth-century spheres of influence. They have no place in the 21st century.”

Presumably, the US Vice President was told in Tbilisi that Georgia was in the 19th century in Russia's sphere of influence. How this sphere of influence arose follows from the Supreme Manifesto of September 12, 1801 of Emperor Alexander I, in which, addressing the Georgian people, he wrote: “The predatory peoples surrounding you were ready to attack your kingdom and tear its remnants to pieces. Standing in this abyss, you repeatedly called for Russian protection. The entry of our troops stopped your death, frightening all the predators that fill the Caucasus mountains. Sedition among you subsided, and all of you unanimously and solemnly appealed to the Russian authorities to govern you directly ... Not for the increase in strength, not for self-interest, not for the expansion of the limits of the already vast empire in the world, We accept the burden of governing the kingdom of Georgia. Judging by the statements of Georgian politicians, they forgot that they were once saved by Russia, and today they are striving to completely eliminate Russian influence in Georgia.

Joseph Biden's statement unequivocally shows that the expansion of NATO to the East and the ongoing admission of new members, primarily Georgia, is dictated by the desire of the United States to prevent political forces and politicians from coming to power in these states that could strengthen good neighborly relations with Russia. This is confirmed by the words of former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who in December last year said that the United States would oppose the integration processes in the post-Soviet space, which she regarded as an attempt to revive the Soviet Union. “There is a movement towards re-Sovietization of the region,” Clinton quotes. It won't be called that. It will be called the Customs Union, it will be called the Eurasian Union and stuff like that. Let's not be delusional about this. We know what the goal is and are working to develop effective ways to slow it down or prevent it.” This is the answer to the question: why does NATO not recognize the CSTO.

As is known, the West's policy of isolating the USSR in the pre-war years, when it was surrounded by a "cordon sanitaire" of unfriendly states, ultimately led to the impossibility of preventing Nazi Germany from unleashing World War II. Today, as we see, the West continues the same policy. Only if, when creating NATO, one of its goals was to resist the spread of communist ideology in the countries of Western Europe, today this goal has been transformed into countering Russia's influence in the post-Soviet space. That is why NATO continues its steady expansion to the East. As Doug Bandow writes in his article “More Friends, More Wars,” “The United States managed to get through the entire Cold War without ever starting a hot conflict. There is no point in taking the unnecessary risk of war with Russia today. Or, to put it bluntly, to risk Washington for the sake of Tbilisi. Contrary to the assertions of supporters of NATO expansion, membership in the alliance does not mean that food will be free.

In fact, the alliance's promises alone that Georgia would soon be admitted to NATO prompted Mikheil Saakashvili to attack South Ossetia and the Russian peacekeepers on its territory in 2008. And at a "strategic distance", supporting its new friends in Libya, NATO played the role of a fuse in North Africa. With all their might, some members of the alliance, led by the United States, are now trying to do the same in Syria. How not to recall the words of the famous Russian historian and philosopher Vasily Klyuchevsky here: “History is not a teacher, but a warden, a mentor of life: it does not teach anything, but only punishes for ignorance of the lessons.”

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