The Wrong Side of Power: A Short Course of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)
"Technology of Power" (8) - "August 1939: Stalin and Hitler"
Vladimir Tolts
Vladimir Tolts: Our radio cycle "Technology of Power", in which Doctor of Historical Sciences Yuri Felshtinsky speaks, has finally come to an extremely important point in the history of the twentieth century - by September 1, 1939. Yuri Georgievich, please!
Yuri Felshtinsky: In August 1939, at a time when, after the occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, it seemed to Europe that a big war with Hitler might not start, Stalin unleashed World War II. I say "Stalin unleashed" because Stalin knew very well why he was signing a Soviet-German non-aggression pact with Hitler together with a secret protocol specifying which countries were included in the USSR's sphere of influence.
By August 1939, the Soviet government had a choice. Stalin could sign an agreement with France and England on mutual assistance. According to such an agreement, in the event of an attack by Germany on France - and this is the only great power that Germany could attack, since it had no borders with Britain and the USSR, the USSR and England would have to come to the aid of France. In the absence of Poland's permission for the Red Army to pass through Polish territory [and this permission, as we discussed in the last broadcast, the Poles did not give, because they knew that Stalin would never leave Poland in this case], the Soviet Union really could not do anything help France and England. True, the Soviet Union could, from a practical point of view, maintain benevolent neutrality for France and England.
In fact, the signing of such a treaty would certainly lead to the fact that Hitler would not attack either France or Poland. Because if there was a treaty between France and the Soviet Union, Stalin would have to declare war on Germany. In September 1939, Hitler could not take such a risk.
Vladimir Tolts: Sorry, Yuri. Let's leave your reasoning that Stalin unleashed a war, etc. Let's talk about something else. It seems that you think that you, as in the theory of games, are now calculating the options for possible political decisions for Stalin and their possible political consequences. In fact, what is missing here is, in my opinion, an important element: there is no evidence that the given version of the political solution will cause precisely these and not other consequences. (Well, for example, why the existence of a hypothetical treaty between France and the USSR would certainly lead to the fact that Hitler would not attack France and Poland? - He could have attacked! And Stalin could have abandoned this treaty at such a moment). It should be admitted, whatever one may say, the Soviet Union, in any case, could have been drawn into a major European war as early as September 1939. And it happened. And in the same way, there is reason to say that this was not part of Stalin's plans.
Yuri Felshtinsky: You are absolutely right. Stalin risked that in September 1939 the Soviet Union could be drawn into an unwanted war with Nazi Germany. Therefore, Stalin had a different version of the foreign policy game. An absolutely calm option. He could not sign agreements with France and England, and not sign agreements with Hitler. In this case, the September 1939 scenario would have looked somewhat better for Hitler. In the first case, the Soviet Union found itself in a state of war with Germany in the event of her attack on Poland and France. In the second, the Soviet Union remained neutral. Then Hitler would either have to occupy all of Poland and reach the Soviet borders in August 1939, which would create for Hitler the risk of a new round of military clashes - with the Soviet army. Agree, it would be difficult to imagine that the Stalinist Soviet Union and Hitler's Germany - two extremely aggressive states headed by two irrational paranoids - could live in peace for a long time. In order not to have a common border with the USSR, Hitler could only occupy Western Poland, making a buffer zone out of Eastern Poland. How long such a "buffer" state could last is not clear. But, at least, if a common border with Germany appeared, and if a buffer Eastern Poland was created, the Soviet Union for some time could not participate in the big European war and watch from the sidelines how Hitler dealt with the rest of Europe.
Of course, the main risk for Stalin was that Hitler might not start a major war in Europe. Don't start at all. In September 1939, he could have limited himself with respect to Poland by solving one Danzig problem. The essence of the Danzig problem was that ethnic Germans lived in the city. Hitler raised the question of their reunification with Germany. This required not only transferring Danzig to Germany, but also creating a "corridor" - the so-called "Danzig corridor" - to connect Danzig and the rest of Germany. It is clear that the transfer of these Polish territories to Germany required the consent of Poland. But Hitler already had a successful Munich experience for him. And with Danzig, he planned to act out the same scenario. First, by blackmailing France, England and Poland with the threat of a big war, get Danzig and the corridor; then, accusing the Poles of not observing any conditions, enter Poland under the pretext of protecting the interests of ethnic Germans in Poland and occupy Western Poland. Ultimately, September 1939 would still have come for Poland, but it would have happened not in September 1939, but later, for example, in 1940-1941.
Western Poland, Hitler could also count on occupying without a major war. In the end, England, France and the Soviet Union allowed him to occupy the rest of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. Why is Poland better?
Vladimir Tolts: So why, in such a scenario, did Hitler need a non-aggression pact with Stalin? An agreement that destroyed the possibility of a "buffer" state of Eastern Poland [or the whole of Poland as a buffer state] and gave rise to what, in your words, was extremely undesirable for Hitler - the Soviet-German border?
Yuri Felshtinsky: You see, Hitler could have been afraid that Stalin, despite the absence of a mutual assistance treaty with France, would enter the war, cross the Polish border [with or without the consent of the Poles] and open the eastern front against the German army. Such a scenario for Hitler was extremely unprofitable and dangerous. Accordingly, Hitler could not take such a huge risk in September 1939. Without signing a non-aggression pact with Stalin, Hitler could not start a war against Poland.
Hitler could start a war only in one case - if Stalin, for his part, made a commitment not to support France and England and not to open a second eastern front against Germany. For this, it was absolutely necessary for the Germans to sign a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union before the start of offensive operations against Poland.
Vladimir Tolts: Wait! I'm trying to understand you: in your opinion, Hitler believed Stalin?
Yuri Felshtinsky: Of course, Hitler did not believe Stalin, and Stalin did not believe Hitler. And agreements are signed by such politicians solely in order to violate them, not to comply and, in the end, to break them (which, by the way, happened in 1941). But agreements, you must agree, are not terminated immediately after they are signed. This is not accepted in international diplomatic practice. From all the historical experience of mankind, it is known that treaties last for some time. The Brest-Litovsk agreement lasted from March to November 1918. The Soviet-German non-aggression pact, as we know, existed from August 1939 to June 1941.
It is clear that the payment for such an advantageous and necessary treaty for Hitler was Germany's consent to the occupation of a number of Eastern European countries by the Soviet Union. On August 20, 1939, Hitler, who was in a hurry to resolve the Polish issue, wrote a letter to Stalin, in which he openly announced that he was planning an attack on Poland and therefore was interested in the early signing of a non-aggression pact.
Announcer: From a collection of documents on Soviet-German relations in 1939-1941 "Subject to Publication":
"To Mr. Stalin, Moscow.
I accept the draft non-aggression pact that your Foreign Minister, Mr. Molotov, handed over to me, and I consider it imperative to clarify the issues related to this as soon as possible. […] The tension between Germany and Poland became unbearable. Poland's behavior towards the great powers is such that a crisis could break out any day. In the face of such a possibility, Germany in any case intends to protect the interests of the state by all means at its disposal. In my opinion, it is desirable, in view of the intentions of both countries, without wasting time, to enter a new phase of relations with each other. I therefore propose once again to host my Foreign Minister on Tuesday 22 August and at the latest on Wednesday 23 August. The Reich Foreign Minister has full authority to draw up and sign both the non-aggression pact and the protocol. Given the international situation, the imperial foreign minister would not be able to stay in Moscow for more than a day or two. I will be glad to receive your early reply.
Adolf Gitler".
Yuri Felshtinsky: Stalin responded by agreeing to Ribbentrop's arrival to sign a non-aggression pact and a secret additional protocol on the division of spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. I would like to emphasize once again that for all the disadvantages of the Munich Agreement of 1938, with all the epithets with which we award this agreement: cowardly, treacherous, etc., the Munich Agreement was signed in order to preserve the peace, while the Soviet-German agreement signed by Hitler and Stalin in order to start a war. That is why Hitler was in a hurry. Precisely in order to help Hitler start a war in Europe as soon as possible, Stalin agreed to urgently receive Ribbentrop in Moscow.
Announcer: (Stalin from the previous program):
To the Chancellor of the German State, Mr. Adolf Hitler.
I thank you for the letter. I hope that the German-Soviet non-aggression pact will mark a decisive turning point in improving political relations between our countries. The peoples of our countries need peaceful relations with each other. The consent of the German government to conclude a non-aggression pact creates the foundation for the elimination of political tensions and for the establishment of peace and cooperation between our countries. The Soviet government has authorized me to inform you that it agrees to the arrival of Mr. Ribbentrop in Moscow on 23 August.
Joseph Stalin".
Yuri Felshtinsky: Ribbentrop flew to Moscow on 23 August. On the same day, a Soviet-German non-aggression pact and a secret additional protocol were signed. To put it simply, according to the protocol, Russia received the Baltic States, Eastern Poland, Finland and Bessarabia. Here is the text of this protocol, excerpt.
Announcer: "The undersigned plenipotentiaries of both sides discussed in a strictly confidential manner the issue of delimiting the spheres of mutual interests in Eastern Europe. [...]
In the event of a territorial and political reorganization of the regions that are part of the Baltic states [Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania], the northern border of Lithuania is at the same time the border of the spheres of interests of Germany and the USSR. […]
In the event of a territorial and political reorganization of the regions that make up the Polish state, the border of the spheres of interests of Germany and the USSR will approximately pass along the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula and Sanaa.
The question of whether it is in mutual interests to preserve the independent Polish state and what the borders of this state will be, can be finally clarified only in the course of further political development.
In any case, both governments will resolve this issue by way of friendly mutual agreement.
With regard to the southeast of Europe, the Soviet side emphasizes the interest of the USSR in Bessarabia. The German side declares its complete political disinterest in these areas. "
Yuri Felshtinsky: Let's pay attention to the fact that Hitler did not ask Stalin to give his consent, for example, to the occupation of France, Belgium, Holland and other European states. Hitler only needed Stalin's consent to the war with Poland. Hitler, even during this period, still hoped to avoid a major war. This topic was discussed by Hitler during his meeting with Mussolini on April 15-16, 1939, i.e. shortly after the occupation of Czechoslovakia. Then the leaders of the two states agreed on the timing of the start of a big war: not earlier than 1943.
German relations with Poland have become even more unsatisfactory since spring, and in the past few weeks the situation has become simply unbearable. These reasons forced me to hurry up with the completion of the German-Russian negotiations.
The Kremlin’s willingness to begin reorienting its relations with Germany, which opened up after Litvinov’s ouster, has intensified over the past few weeks and has given me the opportunity, after successful preparations, to send my Foreign Minister to Moscow to conclude a treaty that is the broadest of the existing ones - a non-aggression pact. ... Thanks to these agreements, Russia’s goodwill is guaranteed in the event of any conflict. Thanks to the negotiations with Soviet Russia, a completely new position has arisen in international relations, which should bring the Axis the greatest possible gains. […]
Adolf Gitler".
Announcer: Letter from Mussolini to Hitler:
[…] If Germany attacks Poland and the conflict can be localized, then Italy will provide Germany with whatever political and economic assistance it needs.
If Germany attacks and Poland's allies launch a retaliatory attack against Germany, it would be better if I did not take the lead in the hostilities in view of the current state of Italian military preparations. […]
At our meeting, the war was planned by us for the period after 1942, and by that time I will be ready on land, at sea and in the air in accordance with the plans that were agreed upon. […]
Mussolini ".
Yuri Felshtinsky: Then everything went like clockwork. On August 31, Molotov delivered a long foreign policy speech before the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. On September 1, the day Germany invaded Poland, the speech was published in Pravda. The point of the speech was that just yesterday Nazi Germany was an enemy. Today she has become a friend. Let's listen to this interesting speech:
Announcer: "The non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany is a turning point in the history of Europe, and not only of Europe. Yesterday, the Nazis of Germany pursued a hostile foreign policy towards the USSR. Yes, yesterday we were enemies in the field of foreign relations. Today, however, the situation changed, and we ceased to be enemies. [...] Differences in worldviews and in political systems should not and cannot be an obstacle to the establishment of good political relations between the two states. [...] Thus, the field of possible military clashes in Europe is narrowing. Even if military clashes in Europe cannot be avoided, the scale of these hostilities will now be limited. Only the warmongers of a general war in Europe, those who, under the guise of peacefulness, want to ignite a pan-European military conflagration can be dissatisfied with this state of affairs. [...] These people demand that the USSR be drawn into the war on the side of England against Germany. ate wars? […] If these gentlemen have such an uncontrollable desire to fight, let them fight themselves, without the Soviet Union. [...] In our eyes, in the eyes of the entire Soviet people, they are the same enemies of peace, like all other warmongers in Europe. […] The Soviet-German non-aggression pact marks a turn in the development of Europe, a turn towards improving relations between the two largest states in Europe. This treaty not only gives us the elimination of the threat of war with Germany, narrows the field of possible military clashes in Europe and thus serves the cause of world peace - it should provide us with new opportunities for the growth of forces, the strengthening of our positions, the further growth of the influence of the Soviet Union on international development ".
Yuri Felshtinsky: You know, within the framework of our cycle "Technology of Power" we discussed a lot of topics. Some of them, let's face it, are complex, controversial, ambiguous. The listeners disagreed with many of my conclusions. The history of the Second World War is, in a sense, an absolutely black and white simple theme, where, as it seems to me, there can be no two opinions.
The first conclusion, which is obvious, is that Stalin could have stopped the Second World War. All he had to do for this was to sign a mutual assistance pact with France and England and abandon his own plans to capture Poland or Eastern Poland. Everything. Stalin did not have to do anything else in order to prevent the aggression of Hitler and the big war in Europe.
But Stalin, of course, had directly opposite tasks - to unleash the Second World War, to force Hitler to get into a big war and on this Trojan horse to enter Europe, both Eastern and Western, and capture it. Stupid Hitler got into the trap set up by Stalin. On September 1, Hitler attacked Poland. On the afternoon of September 3, first England, then France declared war on Germany. On the evening of September 3, the German government sent the first hasty top-secret telegram to Moscow asking the Soviet government to start military operations against Poland as soon as possible.
Vladimir Tolts: Well, “stupid Hitler” sounds as convincing and serious as “genius Stalin” from the lips of today's historian. Tell me better why, in your opinion, Hitler needed the military participation of the Red Army in the operation against Poland?
Yuri Felshtinsky: Well, first of all, the Germans suffered losses. Of course, these losses, as it turned out later, were incommensurably small in comparison with the losses of the Polish army, but nevertheless, for the first time in the history of Hitler's aggression in Europe, the Germans suffered losses in the thousands. Secondly, it was important for the Germans to prevent the situation when the Polish army retreats to the east into the Soviet sphere of influence, where the Germans cannot enter according to the non-aggression pact with the USSR. Thirdly, Hitler wanted to demonstrate to both Poland and Britain and France that Stalin in this war is an ally of Germany, and not an ally of democratic Europe.
But here's what else is very important. If Stalin had attacked Poland on September 1 or 2, who knows, England and France, perhaps, would not have declared war on Germany, but would have followed the Czechoslovak scenario. But this would also mean that the great Second World War in Europe would not have started. And Germany and the USSR would come to a common border with each other. It is clear that in this case the next aggressive step would have been a Soviet-German war, not World War II. Therefore, Stalin did what he did. He waited for Germany to attack Poland. This is the first thing. He waited for France and England to declare war on Germany. This is the second thing. He waited until the German government twice asked him to attack Poland. And only after that did he kindly agree to start hostilities.
Vladimir Tolts: That's it for today! Thank you, Yuri Felshtinsky!
Reprint from the site of Radio Liberty
On June 1, 1939, the French ambassador to the Nazi capital Coulondre told Foreign Minister Bonnet that Hitler “would risk starting a war if he didn’t have to fight Russia. If he knows that he will have to fight with Russia, he will retreat so as not to expose the country, the party and himself to death. "
Coulondre added that Hitler's two highest military leaders - OKW Chief of Staff Keitel and Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces Brauchitsch - told the Fuehrer that if Germany had to fight Russia, there would be little chance of winning the war.
Initially, the success of the military campaign against Poland outlined in the Weiss plan was directly linked by the German leader to the possibility of achieving political isolation of Poland: "" The goal of our policy is to localize the war within Poland. "
In Russian history, a myth is now popular that the USSR was very afraid of a war with Germany and therefore concluded a pact (Molotov-Ribbentrop) in order to better prepare for this war. But this is a blatant lie. Now we can cite data on the Red Army: after the mobilization of 1939. In September 1939, the payroll of the Red Army increased to 5.3 million people, in its armament were 43,000 guns, 18,000 tanks, 10,000 aircraft.
Data on the German army as of September 1939, after mobilization: the entire army numbered 4,528 thousand people (of which 3.7 million were in the ground forces), there were 3195 tanks including tankettes without guns and training vehicles (of which: 1145 - T-I, 1223 - T-II, 98 - T-III, 211 - TIV), 4500 aircraft, 27000 artillery pieces and mortars were also in service. Now I will not compare tanks and artillery, but I speak with confidence in the USSR they are better, for example, one fact, the German T-I tank did not have a weapon at all, the T-II tank had such a weak weapon that it could not hit the Soviet armored vehicles, and only 300 T-III and T-IV tanks (about 10% of the total) were relatively combat-ready.
So, at the time of the signing of the pact and the attack on Poland, the USSR had a superiority in men over Germany, in tanks more than fourfold, in artillery by 63%, in aircraft more than twice. In addition, Poland with an army of almost a million was between Germany and the USSR, and therefore, as of August 1939, the German invasion of the USSR was not threatened.
On August 23, Hitler's plan to partially isolate Poland was a success, the USSR and the Nazis signed a non-aggression pact, along with the non-aggression pact, a secret protocol was also signed according to which, during the reorganization of the regions that make up the Polish state, the border of the spheres of interests of Germany and the USSR will approximately run along the lines of the Pissa, Nareva, Vistula and Sana rivers.
This marked the beginning of the aggressive war against Poland and the Second World War, as a legal fact. But the signing of a non-aggression pact was also important because it removed the threat of war for Germany on two fronts. According to article 3 of the Polish-Soviet non-aggression pact, the USSR pledged not to take part in any agreements, from an aggressive point of view, clearly hostile to the other side. Undoubtedly, the secret agreements concluded by the USSR and Germany with respect to Poland in August-October 1939 were of a nature that clearly contradicted this article.
According to V.M. Molotov, pronounced by him during the negotiations in Berlin on November 12, 1940, the agreements of August 1939 were primarily "" in the interests of Germany ", which was able to" "get Poland," "and later capture France and start a serious war against Great Britain. having a "" strong rear in the East "".
Later, in 1946, recalling this event at the Nuremberg Trials, Ribbentrop said: “When I came to Moscow in 1939 to see Marshal Stalin, he discussed with me not the possibility of a peaceful settlement of the German-Polish conflict within the framework of the Briand-Kellogg pact, but made it clear that if he does not receive half of Poland and the Baltic countries without Lithuania with the port of Libava, then I can immediately fly back. "
Many accuse Britain and France of supporting Hitler's aggressive plans in 1938, referring to the Munich Agreement of 1938 regarding the peaceful transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany by Czechoslovakia. But there are cardinal differences, firstly, England and France did not take actions that could be interpreted as military aggression, secondly, they did not participate in hostilities on the side of the Nazis, and thirdly, they did not participate in the dismemberment of another state , with attaching part of it to yourself.
They tried to make concessions to Germany in terms of joining her ethnically German territories, unjustly taken away from the German nation, and to prevent another world war in Europe. It was England and France that declared war on Germany after the German attack on Poland, but on September 17 the USSR officially entered the war on the side of Germany, and on September 28 began to publicly threaten with its entry into the war against England and France if they did not stop all operations against the German army in the West. Now the passive war of the allies against Germany in the fall of 1939 is called strange, although if you look at it, everything is understandable, because they hoped that the military alliance between Germany and the USSR would quickly disintegrate, which, in principle, happened.
Starting the war against Poland, Hitler wanted to return only the original German lands occupied by the Poles, according to the Treaty of Versailles. On the remaining territory, he admitted the existence of Poland as an independent state, even taking into account the transfer of Western Ukraine and Belarus to Russia. It would be a buffer between Germany and the USSR.
But Stalin insisted on the complete elimination of Poland. It was thanks to this decision of Stalin that Germany and the USSR received a common border. So, concluding a pact with Germany and a secret protocol on the division of Poland and the Baltic States, Stalin acted not for defense purposes, but solely to seize new territories and unleash a war in Europe and its subsequent Sovietization.
From September 1, the Minsk radio station began to be used as a radio beacon to support Luftwaffe raids. This was a direct violation of the V Hague Convention on the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in the Event of the 1907 Ground War, ratified by Russia. That is, already on the first day of the war, the USSR was not neutral, but supported the Nazis in the war against Poland.
September 3rd. Ribbentrop sends telegram No. 253 to the German Ambassador in Moscow
Please discuss this with Molotov immediately and see if the Soviet Union deems it desirable for the Russian army to march at the right moment against Polish forces in the Russian sphere of influence and, for its part, occupy this territory. For our reasons, this would not only help us, but also, in accordance with the Moscow agreements, it would be in Soviet interests.
4 September. All German ships in the North Atlantic were ordered to "follow to Murmansk, keeping as much of a northern course as possible." On September 8, Moscow gave permission for German ships to enter Murmansk and guaranteed the transportation of goods to Leningrad. In the first 17 days of September, 18 German ships took refuge in the Soviet port.
8 September. Telegram of the German ambassador in Moscow No. 300 from, sent to the German Foreign Ministry: “I have just received the following telephone message from Molotov:“ I received your message that German troops entered Warsaw. Please convey my congratulations and greetings to the government of the German Empire. " Moscow gave permission for German ships to enter Murmansk and guaranteed the transportation of goods to Leningrad. In the first 17 days of September, 18 German ships took refuge in the Soviet port.
September 14th. Telegram of the German ambassador in Moscow No. 350, sent to the German Foreign Ministry: “In response to your telegram No. 336 of September 13, Molotov called me today at 4 pm and said that the Red Army had reached a state of readiness sooner than expected.
Given the political motivation of the Soviet action (the fall of Poland and the protection of Russian "minorities"), it would be extremely important for [the Soviets] not to act before the fall of the administrative center of Poland - Warsaw. Therefore, Molotov asks to be informed as accurately as possible when it is possible to count on the capture of Warsaw. "
September 17th. A Soviet group of about 600,000 people, about 4,000 tanks, more than 5,500 artillery pieces and 2,000 aircraft struck the rear of the Polish army fighting the Nazis, which was a direct violation of the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Poland (later Stalin would call a treacherous violation of non-aggression pacts, actions Germany in June 1941). There were more than 300 thousand Polish servicemen in the zone of the Soviet offensive.
September 25. In telegram No. 442 from the German ambassador writes to the German Foreign Ministry “Stalin and Molotov asked me to come to the Kremlin today at 20 o'clock. Stalin stated the following. In the final settlement of the Polish question, it is necessary to avoid anything that in the future may cause friction between Germany and the Soviet Union.
From this point of view, he considers it wrong to leave the remnant of the Polish state independent. He proposes the following: from the territories to the east of the demarcation line, the entire Lubelskie Voivodeship and that part of the Warsaw Voivodeship that reaches the Bug should be added to our portion. For this we renounce our claims to Lithuania.
September 28, 1939. A Treaty of Friendship and Border between the USSR and Germany was signed, by which the territory of Poland was divided between the two aggressors in accordance with the previously signed secret protocol of August 23, 1939. At the time of the conclusion of the treaty, Germany was militarily almost completely depleted, the troops had used up almost all the ammunition and fuel.
Germany did not even have any opportunities to wage a defensive war on the Western Front. To save his ally, Stalin comes out openly in support of Germany and threatens France and England with the support of the Nazis if the war continues. It was the possibility of a war against Germany and the USSR that kept France and England from attacking Germany in the fall - winter of 1939 (Strange War).
The results of the military aggression of the USSR against Poland.
The combat losses of the Red Army during the Polish campaign of 1939, according to the Russian historian Grigory Krivosheev, amounted to 1,173 killed, 2,002 wounded and 302 missing. Losses in the equipment of tank and mechanized brigades of the Red Army (including irrecoverable ones) amounted to 42 armored units - of which 26 were along the Belorussian front and 16 along the Ukrainian front.
Estimating the combat losses of the Polish army in the battles with the red army, the Russian historian Mikhail Meltyukhov names 3500 killed, 20,000 missing and 454,700 prisoners. According to the Polish Military Encyclopedia, 250,000 servicemen were captured by the Soviet Union. Almost all of the captured officers were subsequently shot by the NKVD, including about 14,000 captured officers were killed by Soviet executioners near Katyn.
In a statement made in October 1939, Molotov named the following figures for the captured military property: "over 900 guns, over 10 thousand machine guns, over 300 thousand rifles, over 150 million cartridges, about 1 million shells and up to 300 aircraft." So the USSR's invasion of Poland was an aggressive military operation, not a liberation campaign.
JOINT STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET AND GERMAN GOVERNMENTS OF SEPTEMBER 28, 1939
After the German government and the government of the USSR finally settled the issues that arose as a result of the disintegration of the Polish state by the treaty signed today, and thereby created a solid foundation for a long-term peace in Eastern Europe, they in mutual agreement express the opinion that the elimination of the real war between Germany, on the one hand, and England and France, on the other hand, would meet the interests of all peoples.
Therefore, both Governments will direct their common efforts, if need be, in agreement with other friendly powers, in order to achieve this goal as soon as possible. If, however, these efforts of both governments remain unsuccessful, then the fact will be established that Britain and France are responsible for the continuation of the war, and if the war continues, the governments of Germany and the USSR will consult with each other on the necessary measures.
If we turn to the recordings of the conversation with Ribbentrop and Stalin on September 28, 1939, then Stalin in his (the first after Ribbentrop's long reasoning) statement (according to the German record) stated his point of view as follows: “The point of view of Germany, which rejects military aid, is worthy of respect ...
However, a strong Germany is a prerequisite for peace in Europe - therefore, the Soviet Union is interested in the existence of a strong Germany. Therefore, the Soviet Union cannot agree to the Western powers creating conditions that could weaken Germany and put her in a difficult position. This is the commonality of interests of Germany and the Soviet Union. "
September 30, 1939. The newspaper Pravda published a statement by Ribbentrop “... Both states want peace to be restored and that England and France stop the absolutely senseless and hopeless struggle against Germany. If, however, the warmongers prevail in these countries, then Germany and the USSR will know how to respond to this. "
The USSR, not only in word, but in deed, helped the Nazis not only, in September 1939, hitting the rear of the Polish army, which accelerated the transfer of German units to the West. The "anti-fascist" socialist state did everything to weaken the trade blockade of Nazi Germany and help her in the war against England and France as much as possible, for which on February 11, 1940, an economic agreement between the USSR and Germany was signed in Moscow. It stipulated that the Soviet Union would supply Germany with the following goods:
1,000,000 tonnes of feed grains and legumes, worth 120 million Reichsmarks
900,000 tons of oil, worth about 115 million Reichsmarks
100,000 tons of cotton worth about 90 million Reichsmarks
500,000 tons of phosphates
100,000 tons of chromite ores
500,000 tons of iron ore
300,000 tons of pig iron scrap and pig iron
2 400 kg of platinum
"The trade turnover between Germany and the USSR in the first year of the agreement will reach a volume exceeding the highest ever achieved since the World War" [Pravda, 13.02.1940].
In 1940, open pro-Nazi propaganda was also carried out in the USSR. Articles published in the Soviet press, including in the Soviet officialdom - the newspapers Pravda and Izvestia were used by the department of Dr. Goebbels for its propaganda purposes. Reproduced propaganda speeches in the German press, including direct speeches by Hitler.
In this case, a special place was occupied by information messages from the front of the war in the West, mainly about the successes of the Luftwaffe in the "Battle of England". According to radio broadcasts in the "Latest News" programs, the loss of British aviation and the destruction of British cities was called a feeling of deep satisfaction. Every day, Wagner's music was performed on radio stations, which was very popular among the leadership of the NSDAP.
Also, the following facts are in no way incompatible with the neutral status of the state: the transit through the entire territory of the USSR from the Far East to Germany of a large group of officers from the German cruiser Graf Spee sunk in the Pacific Ocean.
No circumstance can justify the consent of the Soviet leadership to serve German-fascist warships in Soviet ports in the Barents Sea basin (in October 1939, the Soviet Union agreed to the use by the German navy of the port of Teriberka east of Murmansk as a repair base and supply point for ships and submarines conducting operations in the North Atlantic).
Molotov's note on Stalin's meeting with British Ambassador Stafford Cripps in July 1940: “Stalin does not see any threat of hegemony from any country in Europe, and he is even less afraid that Europe may be absorbed by Germany. Stalin follows the policy of Germany and is good knows several German leaders. He did not find any desire on their part to swallow European countries. Stalin does not believe that Germany's military successes pose a threat to the Soviet Union and its friendly relations with it ... ".
It is no coincidence that already after the Second World War, at the end of November 1945, the list of issues that were not subject to discussion at the Nuremberg Trials approved by the Soviet delegation in order to prevent counter-accusations of the defense against the governments of the anti-Hitler coalition countries, paragraph one provided for the prohibition of discussing the attitude of the USSR to the Treaty of Versailles , and point nine - the question of Soviet-Polish relations.
With the defeat of Poland by German and Soviet troops, only the first act of World War II ended. Almost immediately after the end of hostilities in Poland, the "peaceful" socialist state starts a war against Finland. Military actions, which were a completely failed blitzkrieg attempt with huge losses and ended after 3.5 months of fierce battles with a Pyrrhic victory (from the Soviet side, up to 960 thousand people participated in them, and the irreparable losses of the Red Army amounted to more than 131 thousand, and according to data military Russian historian
Krivosheev, the total sanitary losses amounted to 264,908 people. That is, the loss of a neutral state, which allegedly did not take part in the outbreak of the world war, many times exceeded the irrecoverable losses of the Wehrmacht in the first two years of the second world war.
Many argue that the USSR did not carry out military aggression against Poland in September 1939, but made a kind of liberation campaign with the aim of reuniting Belarusians and Ukrainians or even restoring the historical borders of the Russian Empire. But these arguments are groundless.
Firstly, Belarusians and Ukrainians in the territories of Poland did not ask for such a liberation campaign of the USSR, more than 400 thousand people were repressed in the first two years after the Soviet occupation. Secondly, according to existing international treaties, the invasion of the territory of a foreign state was aggression.
According to Art. 2 of the Convention on the Definition of Aggression concluded in London on July 3, 1933 by the USSR with other states, aggression is recognized not only as a declaration of war to another state (this case is provided for in paragraph 1 of Article 2), but also the invasion of the armed forces, even if without a declaration of war , on the territory of another state (clause 2 of article 2), an attack by land, sea or air armed forces, even without a declaration of war, on the territory, sea or aircraft of another state (clause 3 of article 2).
Moreover, according to Art. 3 of the said convention, no considerations of a political, military, economic or other order can serve as an excuse or justification for an attack provided for in article 2 3. As an example of such "" considerations "", the signatories to the convention, in paragraph three of the Annex to article 3 of the convention called the internal situation of any state, the alleged shortcomings of its administration.
In a conversation with the chairman of the Comintern, Dimitrov, Stalin said: “The destruction of this state [Poland] under the current conditions would mean one less bourgeois fascist state! What bad would it be if, as a result of the defeat of Poland, we extended the socialist system to new territories and populations. " (Diary of G. Dimitrov, entry on September 7, 1939).
The attack on Finland led to the fact that in December 1939 the USSR as a military aggressor was expelled from the League of Nations. The immediate reason for the expulsion was the massive international protests against the systematic bombing of civilian targets by Soviet aviation, including the use of incendiary bombs.
Between June 15 and June 20, 1940, the "peace-loving" Soviet Union took decisive steps and made the Baltic countries, using threats of military force, violating previously signed treaties, to create pro-Soviet governments. After suppressing the press, arresting political leaders, and outlawing all parties except the communist ones, the Russians staged a mock election on July 14 in all three states.
After the "elected" parliaments voted in this way to join their countries to the Soviet Union, the Supreme Council (parliament) of Russia accepted them into their homeland: Lithuania - August 3, Latvia - August 5, Estonia - August 6.
But how did it happen that between the two allies - the Nazis and the Communists in June 1941, a military conflict began, which grew into the so-called Great Patriotic War.
The chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces (OKH), Colonel-General F. Halder, analyzing the situation in 1940 after the war, believed that at that time Hitler believed it was possible to avoid a war with Russia if the latter did not show expansionist aspirations in the western direction. For this, Hitler "considered it necessary to divert the Russian expansion into the Balkans and Turkey, which would certainly lead to a conflict between Russia and Great Britain."
In early 1940, Romania agreed to transfer its oil fields in Ploiesti (the only explored fields in Europe at that time) to the Germans in exchange for political and military protection. On May 23, in the midst of the battle for France, the Romanian General Staff sent an SOS signal to the OKW, informing the Germans that Soviet troops were concentrating on the Romanian border.
The next day, Jodl summarized the reaction to this message at Hitler's headquarters: "The situation in the East is becoming threatening due to the concentration of Russian forces on the borders of Bessarabia." However, the USSR, threatening with military aggression, forced Romania to cede Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, and the latter was not included in the circle of areas of Soviet interests agreed with Germany. Under the influence of these steps, a threat was created for the Romanian region of Ploiesti - the only serious source of oil supplies for Germany, which could paralyze the German economy and army.
German Foreign Minister I. Ribbentrop: “On June 23, 1940, a telegram from our ambassador in Moscow arrived in Berlin: the Soviet Union intends to occupy the Romanian province of Bessarabia in the coming days, and is only going to inform us about it. Adolf Hitler was then overwhelmed by the rapid Russian advance without prior consultation with us. The fact that at the same time the predominantly German-inhabited Northern Bukovina, the ancestral land of the Austrian crown, was subject to occupation, especially stunned Hitler.
He took this step by Stalin as a sign of the Russian onslaught on the West. The large concentration of Soviet troops in Bessarabia caused serious apprehensions in Adolf Hitler from the point of view of further waging the war against England: under no circumstances could we give up the vital Romanian oil for us. If Russia had advanced here further, we would have found ourselves in the further waging of the war dependent on Stalin's goodwill. During one of our conversations in Munich, he told me that, for his part, he was considering military measures, because he did not want to be taken by surprise by the East ”.
So let's give another word to the second man in Nazi Germany, Joseph Goebbels, the Reich Minister of Education and Propaganda:
06/25/40 Stalin informs Schulenburg that he intends to act against Romania. Again, this is contrary to our agreement.
29/06/40 Romania lost to Moscow. Bessarabia and S. Bukovina will go to Russia. This is not pleasant for us in any way. The Russians are taking advantage of the situation.
5/07/40 Slavism spreads throughout the Balkans. Russia is seizing the moment.
11/07/40 There is some concern among the [German] people about Russia.
07/17/40 Russians continue to pull troops [to Romania]. We are no less. King Karol wants a German military occupation. It doesn't matter when and where. Fear of Moscow.
07/19/40 The Russians have gotten pretty cocky. "
And, finally, the Fuehrer of the German people, Adolf Hitler (in a conversation with Mussolini on 19/01/41): “Previously, Russia would not pose any danger to us at all, since it was not able to threaten us. Now, in a century aviation, the Romanian oil fields can be turned into smoking ruins as a result of an air attack from Russia or the Mediterranean region, and the very existence of the Axis powers depends on these oil fields "(B. Liddel-Hart." World War II "M. AST 2002).
German Foreign Minister I. Ribbentrop: “... Molotov's visit to Berlin (November 12-13, 1940 - Comp.) Did not stand under a lucky star, as I wished. From these conversations with Molotov, Hitler finally got the impression of a serious Russian striving for the West. " The next day, Jodl summarized the reaction to this message at Hitler's headquarters: "The situation in the East is becoming threatening due to the concentration of Russian forces on the borders of Bessarabia."
From Stalin's speech to graduates of military academies in May 1941 “... Our policy of peace and security is at the same time a policy of preparing for war. There is no defense without an offensive. We must educate the army in the spirit of the offensive. We must prepare for war. " (Diary of G. Dimitrov, entry 05.05.1941).
Politburo member Andrei Zhdanov, at a meeting of the Main Military Council of the Red Army on June 4, 1941, said: “We have become stronger, we can set more active tasks. The wars with Poland and Finland were not defensive wars. We have already embarked on the path of an offensive policy ... There is one step between peace and war. That is why our propaganda cannot be peaceful ... We had an offensive policy before. This policy was defined by Lenin. Now we are only changing the slogan. We have started to implement Lenin's thesis. "
Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union N. G. Kuznetsov (in 1941 - Admiral. People's Commissar of the USSR Navy, member of the Central Committee, member of the Headquarters of the High Command since its inception): "For me, one thing is indisputable: J. V. Stalin not only did not rule out the possibility of war with Hitler's Germany, on the contrary, he considered such a war ... inevitable ... JV Stalin conducted preparations for war - broad and versatile preparation - proceeding from the time he himself had outlined ... Hitler violated his calculations "(On the Eve. p. 321).
A small touch to the big picture. 13-14 / 05/40. Moscow. Meeting on military ideology. Chief of General Staff Meretskov speaks: "We can say that our army is preparing for an attack, and we need this attack for defense. Based on political conditions, we must attack, and the Government will tell us what we need to do."
So, after all, Hitler was the "icebreaker" of the world socialist revolution for the communists, who had been arming Germany since the 1920s. It was the fighting of the Nazis that gave grounds for the subsequent entry of the Red Liberators into Western Europe. And you can't get away from it. But he struck a preemptive blow to Bolshevism, this blow, despite the defeat of Germany and the temporary victory of the communists, turned out to be fatal for communism.
I think that sooner or later we will take an impartial look at the actions and policies of Nazi Germany and come to the obvious conclusion that Hitler saved the modern world from the red plague, and the Holocaust is a primitive invention of communists and Jewish bankers, whose expansion the Germans tried to stop.
Until now, no one has found a single gas chamber or mass graves, allegedly killed by the Germans of Jews. The Red Cross in official information indicated that less than 400 thousand people died in German concentration camps in 12 years, but Jews continue to tell us tales about millions of victims in Nazi concentration camps. It was the Germans who first offered the world to build a state for white people (now Europe and the United States contain more than 100 million black and colored dependents from the Third World, who are the main source of crime and terrorist attacks), who eat hundreds of billions annually, which should have been spent on scientific -technical development of civilization.
The Germans demonstrated by their example simply fantastic rates of economic growth, which no one in the world could surpass. In addition, it was Nazi Germany that gave the world an incredible amount of breakthrough technologies that were absolutely dishonestly appropriated by the USSR and its Western allies.
For comparison, the USSR managed to organize three Holodomors on the territory of Ukraine in 1921, 1933 and 1947, in peacetime, while there was no famine during the German occupation during the war, as well as large-scale repressions. To honestly assess the facts, so far not a single evidence of mass repressions or murders committed by the Germans on the territory of Ukraine has been found, not a single mass grave of those killed has been found.
All we have is a collection of communist myths. Having honestly and impartially looking at the facts, we will understand that the Ukrainians and the West fought on the side of their enemy - the Stalinist USSR, which really brought evil and destruction to the world. And all the economic and social problems of modern Ukraine and the United States, Britain and the West as a whole are associated with this civilizational choice.
But even if you don’t want to, if you “bury your head in the sand”, you will still see that as a result of these “ large-scale reforms " Ukraine is divided, there is a civil war in it, the people are rapidly becoming impoverished, its per capita GDP is already more than three times lower than that of Cuba.
And Tusk appreciates it. Wow!
Of course, this statement could have been treated as an ordinary anti-Russian propaganda rhetoric if Tusk was not a Pole. If it weren't for them!
But since Tusk is a Pole, he can quite seriously talk about the ruin of Ukraine as a heroic deed. Let me stress that the Pole Tusk can really think that ruining his country is a feat.
Look at the history of Poland - the Polish elite, solely out of their meanness and stupidity, ruined Poland itself several times a century, but at the same time, to this day, is inexpressibly proud of these "exploits" of theirs.
Let's look at the "large-scale" activities of the Polish elite on the eve of World War II, which, as it is believed today, began not with the annexation of Austria and the liquidation of Czechoslovakia (as the Nuremberg Tribunal believed), but with the attack on Poland on September 1, 1939. Not only that, today it is also believed that the “Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact”, concluded on the eve of August 23, 1939, led to the war.
However, pay attention to the subtle meanness that arose during perestroika - at the time when the falsified protocol to this "pact" was published. After all, this agreement is actually called the "Non-aggression Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union."
The literal translation from German (Deutsch-sowjetischer Nichtangriffspakt) has the same meaning - "Soviet-German non-aggression pact." Then why is this treaty called the "Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact"? Niht ferstein? Think for yourself - how can one blame the beginning of the war on the countries that have concluded a non-aggression treaty (pact) between themselves? No way.
War is preceded by military alliances, and this treaty cannot be issued as a military alliance - in a non-aggression treaty, by definition, there can be no joint actions against anyone - only disagreements between the parties to the treaty are settled. Here anti-Russian scoundrels and changed this contract title to pass off the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany as a military alliance against innocent Poland.
Well, but the war still began and the question arises: was there a military alliance in Europe on the eve of the war that predetermined the war, and by whom? Yes, I was! But first, a few words about the situation in Europe.
Let's start with the fact that before the war, the Poles with the Nazis (not with the Germans in general, but only with the Nazis) almost kissed on the gums, the Nazis (the same Goebbels) were in admiration of the head of Poland, Jozef Pilsudski, so much that a joint campaign with Poland against the USSR was planned not under the general command of a German general, but, while Pilsudski was alive, under his command.
Until the spring of 1939 (the beginning of the deterioration of relations with Poland), the German General Staff had no plans for a war with Poland at all. The only thing is that in those days the Poles and the Germans behaved arrogantly, and believed that they had a reason for this - the Polish army was considered one of the strongest in Europe, at least stronger than the Red Army in the USSR.
For example, the USSR achieved an economic opportunity and set itself the goal of bringing the Red Army to a number of 1 million people only in 1935, and Poland, on the eve of World War II (according to its future head in exile Tomasz Artsiszewski) mobilized 3.5 million into the army. human. That is, by September 1, 1939, she had both weapons and ammunition for an army of this size.
In addition, the conflict that arose between Germany and Poland in the spring of 1939 and officially led to the war, was minor, and related to this.
When the borders of Poland were determined after the First World War, the territory of defeated Germany was divided into two parts that were not in contact with each other - Germany itself and East Prussia (now the Kaliningrad region). They divided Germany with a wide strip of land from the borders of Poland proper to the Baltic Sea, so that along this strip Poland would have access to the sea. It turned out that free communication between these parts of Germany was possible only by water, or through Polish border guards and customs officers.
Germany, in 1939, asked Poland for permission to build an extraterritorial railway from Germany to East Prussia through this strip, so that the Germans could move from one part of Germany to another without stopping, but also without customs and passport control. Naturally, the Germans promised to generously pay both for the land for this road and for its operation.
In addition, there was no port on the coast of this corridor to the sea allocated to Poland, and therefore the winners cut off another piece from Germany, which was defeated in the First World War (from East Prussia) - the Vistula delta with the port and city of Danzig.
But Poland was not given it!
It was the territory of a free city with its own currency (guilder), its own self-government, and of the 400 thousand inhabitants of Danzig, 95% were Germans. Poland had a customs union with Danzig, and Danzig conducted foreign affairs through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland. (The USSR had diplomatic relations with Danzig since 1924) Danzig was under the protection of the League of Nations (then the UN), and there was the High Commissioner of the League of Nations to resolve disputes between Danzig and Poland.
Until Poland used the port of Gdynia on its coast, the Germans of Danzig were happy with this situation, since they handled all of Poland's sea exports and imports (2/3 of the total volume of foreign trade). But since 1928, Poland began to send its exports through Gdynia, the economic situation in Danzig deteriorated sharply, however, the League of Nations nevertheless forced Poland to allocate a quota in cargo turnover to Danzig, but the very fact that Poland at any moment could stifle Danzig economically raised the question on the return of Danzig to Germany.
Indeed, if Poland already had its own port in the Baltic, then why then keep German Danzig in the state of a “free city”, moreover, a hungry “free city”?
These were the requests of Germany to Poland, and judge for yourself how impracticable they were.
Poland refused to the Germans, and already in the spring of 1939 began to mobilize.
But, nevertheless, I do not want to think of the Poles as complete idiots, therefore, I believe that they still would have signed an agreement on the railway and Danzig with the Germans, and Europe would have avoided war in 1939 if Poland had not been able to conclude MILITARY UNION with Great Britain.
That is, the very fact that Poland was so strengthened due to the alliance with England, gave the Poles exceptional impudence. They were now knee-deep in the sea, and a military alliance against the Germans with the USSR was unnecessary, and their commander-in-chief Rydz-Smigly promised to beat the Germans in a week ( and even started posing for the artist as he enters Berlin on a white horse ).
Looking ahead, let's say that it lasted a long time. Whole three days Poles fought with Germans, until we ran.
All at once. The generals are ahead. But okay, I got ahead of myself.
But here's what our story is: in contrast to the "Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact", about the content of this Anglo-Polish treaty, which directly provoked the war by pushing the idiots on an adventure, like the Maidowns on the Maidan, historians are deafly silent.
So. On August 25, in London, the British Foreign Secretary, the Honorable Viscount (the viscount is the youngest son of a count, to whom the title is not transferred) Halifax, on the one hand, and the Polish Ambassador to Great Britain, Count Raczynski, on the other, signed an agreement. And the Viscount and the Count began with the following:
« Article 1.If one of the Contracting Parties becomes involved in hostilities with a European power as a result of the latter's aggression against this Contracting Party, the other Contracting Party will immediately provide the Contracting Party involved in hostilities with all the support and assistance that is in its power. ".
Already from the first article it is clear that this is a military alliance, but against whom? What European power are the counties bothering about the aggression of ?. Indeed, in continental Europe there were only three states that could be defined as "powers": France, Germany and the USSR.
France is an ally, therefore, disappears. Who - the USSR or Germany - must or must attack the Contracting Parties for the Anglo-Polish military alliance to take effect? Or either of the two? But then why in article 1 "European power" is it in the singular?
As you can see, not everyone can understand what the graphs wrote in the Agreement. To the counts, however, too. Therefore, Halifax and Rachinsky signed a secret protocol to the agreement, in which they explained to themselves what they had written in the text of their military alliance available to the public.
“The Polish government and the government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have agreed on the following understanding of the mutual assistance agreement signed today as the only correct and binding:
a) Under the expression "European power" used in the agreement, understood Germany.
b) In the event that an action corresponding to the meaning of Articles 1 and 2 takes place on the part of a European Power other than Germany, the Contracting Parties will jointly discuss the measures to be taken jointly ".
So, " European power "- this is still Germany, but why not write about it directly? After all, the war was already at the borders. On the day of the signing of this military alliance in Poland, classes in schools were already terminated, all cars were requisitioned in favor of the army, and the evacuation of the British and French from Poland began. Why darken?
I don’t know what thoughts you might have on this matter, but I don’t see any other answer: with this military alliance, Great Britain and Poland wanted to put pressure on Hitler (with whom England was conducting backstage negotiations at that time). Press to force him to abandon plans to attack Poland, but, at the same time, invite Hitler to attack the USSR... After all, the military alliance between Great Britain and Poland could easily be transformed from anti-German to anti-Soviet, by interpreting in his text the "European power" as the USSR.
Moreover, it follows from the text that follows that this treaty is not defensive, but offensive. Since Article 1 open to the public was followed by Open Article 2:
"Article 2.1. The provisions of Article 1 shall also apply in the event of any action by a European Power which clearly jeopardizes, directly or indirectly, the independence of one of the Contracting Parties and is of such a nature that the party concerned considers it vital to resist with its own armed forces.
2.2. If one of the Contracting Parties becomes involved in hostilities with a European power as a result of the action of that power, which endangers the independence or neutrality of another European state in such a way that it poses a clear threat to the security of that Contracting Party, the provisions of Article 1 will apply. , without prejudice, however, to the rights of another European state, to which it concerns ".
As you can see, it is also impossible to understand what is written in article 2 without a secret protocol. But please note that, according to article 2, Poland and Great Britain do not attack a "European power" after it itself has committed aggression against them, and the first - at your own discretion.
Either UK or Poland "Consider it vital" or think that "This poses a clear threat to the security of that Contracting Party"... This, mind you, is not some kind of division of spheres of interest, as in the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany, according to which propaganda cannot be carried out outside of one's own sphere. This is a direct agreement to attack Poland and Great Britain on their own initiative.(and it is not known from the open text of the treaty who they will attack - the USSR or Germany), little of this, with direct encroachment on third countries.
And these third countries are listed in the secret protocol to the Halifax-Rachinsky pact:
“A) The two governments will from time to time determine by mutual agreement hypothetical cases of German action falling within the scope of Article 2 of the agreement.
b) Until the two governments decide to revise the following provisions of this paragraph, they will consider: that the case provided for in paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the agreement relates to the Free City of Danzig; that the cases provided for in paragraph 2 of Article 2 relate to Belgium, Holland, Lithuania.
c) Latvia and Estonia will be considered by the two Governments as included in the list of countries provided for in paragraph 2 of Article 2, from the moment when the agreement on mutual assistance between the United Kingdom and the third state enters into force, which applies to the two named states.
d) With regard to Romania, the Government of the United Kingdom refers to the guarantee it has provided to that country; and the Polish government refers to the mutual obligations under the Romanian-Polish alliance, which Poland never saw as incompatible with its traditional friendship with Hungary ".
I think that if the countries named here at that time found out that they were featured in this treaty, they would all have soared with indignation - after all, the military alliance between Great Britain and Poland directly trampled on their independence.
Let's start in order.
The Poles had no arguments in defense of Danzig's belonging to Poland, as mentioned above, and it is no wonder that Halifax and Rachinsky hid Danzig in a secret protocol.
How would the world perceive the news that Poland and Great Britain unleashed a world war because of something that did not belong to them - because of Danzig - because Poland actually appropriated itself, ignoring the decision of the League of Nations? Let's go further.
Let's leave Holland and Belgium for Great Britain and consider Lithuania, which got into the protocol. Lithuania, of course, had nothing to love Germany for, but Lithuania simply hated the Poles. Let me remind you that Poles in 1920, insolently, contrary to the demands of the Entente, took away from Lithuania its capital - Vilnius(then Vilna).
And now Poland, in accordance with Article 2 of the agreement with Great Britain, secretly from Lithuania undertook to “defend the independence” of Lithuania without her consent to this, and even not the independence that Lithuania wants, but the one that which Poland wants.
Indeed, according to the articles of the military alliance between Great Britain and Poland, Poland could calmly observe how Germany seized Lithuania in order to reach the borders of the USSR, since Poland could believe that this did not threaten her, Poland, and security.
But then, when Germany was weakened in the war with the USSR, Poland could demand Lithuania from Germany for itself, threatening to war with itself and England. Demand, and thereby "restore the independence" of Lithuania in such a way that it "does not threaten Poland." How else would you interpret Article 2 § 2 of the military alliance between Great Britain and Poland?
As for the desire of Great Britain to allegedly soon conclude a military alliance with Latvia and Estonia, noted in a secret protocol to a military alliance between Great Britain and Poland, this is an open provocation in order to give Germany a reason to occupy or subjugate these states.
Indeed, four months earlier, on April 17, 1939, the USSR officially proposed to Great Britain to create a military alliance, according to which:
"1. England, France, the USSR conclude an agreement with each other for a period of 5—10 years of mutual obligation to provide each other immediately with all kinds of assistance, including military, in the event of aggression in Europe against any of the contracting states.
2. England, France, the USSR undertake to provide all kinds, including military, assistance to the Eastern European states located between the Baltic and Black Seas and bordering the USSR in the event of aggression against these states ".
AND it was Great Britain that abandoned this union... At the suggestion of the USSR, Latvia and Estonia could indeed be helped, since the USSR would have done it in alliance with Britain and France.
But how, without the Soviet Union, was Halifax going to provide military assistance to the Balts?
And the Poles committed the utmost meanness towards the Romanians. After all, they were Poland's military allies, albeit against the USSR, but allies. But the fact is that the Germans did not have borders with Romania, and in order to capture or subjugate Romania as a springboard for an attack on the USSR, they had to act together with their ally in the Anti-Comintern Pact (with which the Germans have already divided Czechoslovakia) Hungary.
And stating that "Mutual obligations under the Romanian-Polish union" Poland will take away in the name "Traditional friendship with Hungary" Poland agreed with Great Britain that it would not lift a finger when the Germans raped Romania.
So. Germany originally planned to attack Poland on August 26, 1939. On the territory of Poland, the Germans threw sabotage groups to capture bridges, tunnels, passes. The order to postpone the deadline did not reach everyone, the group of Lieutenant Herzner in the morning of August 26 captured the Yablunkovsky Pass and held it for several hours with battles. That is, the war between Germany and Poland was already underway. At such a crucial moment, Poland and England would have to negotiate how long Poland needs to hold out without help, when exactly England will start bombing Germany, when it mobilizes, etc. etc.
And these county Polish-British cretins, signing a military alliance between Great Britain and Poland, dreamed of how they would play Germany against the USSR and profit from it. With the Poles, everything is clear, but the British are such idiots - they dreamed of defending Belgium and Holland with the help of Poland! Better hope for the Martians!
And mind you, because today there is no criticism of the actions of the Polish elite, sample of 1939, and there is no trace of- for the Poles, this military alliance between Great Britain and Poland was a commendable "large-scale reform".
In 1927, at the congress of legionnaires in Kalisz, a Lithuanian by nationality and a Polish nationalist in spirit, Marshal Piłsudski could not resist and said: “I have invented many beautiful words and definitions that will live on even after my death. and who put the Polish people in the category of idiots» .
When the then British Prime Minister Chamberlain in the spring of 1939 provided Poland with not yet a military alliance, but only British "guarantees against aggression", this already amazed not only Churchill, but also a lot of people who knew Poles firsthand.
The English historian D. Fuller in his work on World War II wrote:
“I was in Berlin shortly after the guarantees were given and asked a prominent American journalist what he thought of them. Here is his answer: "I believe that your prime minister has made a gross mistake since the adoption of the stamp law." (This refers to the law passed by the English Parliament in 1765)
Well, and the military alliance with Poland that followed in August 1939 was "voosche" for knowledgeable Poles!
History teaches that, in general, these are good guys. The main thing is not to enter into any close ties with them - do we need madmen at the gunpowder factory?
And we are not responsible for NATO.
"Peace or war? This issue has entered a critical phase. Its solution entirely depends on the position taken by the Soviet Union. We are absolutely convinced that if we conclude an alliance agreement with France and Great Britain, Germany will be forced to abandon Poland and ... war will be avoided ... On the other hand, if we accept Germany's familiar proposal to conclude a non-aggression pact with her, she will undoubtedly attack Poland, and then the entry of England and France into this war will become inevitable. Under the circumstances, we will have a good chance of staying away from the conflict, and we will be able, being in an advantageous position, to wait until our turn comes, which is what our interests demand.
So our choice is clear: we must accept the German proposal, and the British and French delegations must politely refuse and send them home. It is not difficult to foresee the benefits that we will derive by acting in this way. It is obvious to us that Poland will be defeated before England and France can come to her aid. In this case, Germany will hand over to us part of Poland up to the approaches to Warsaw, including Ukrainian Galicia. Germany will give us complete freedom of action in the three Baltic countries. It will not interfere with the return of Bessarabia to Russia. She will be ready to cede Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary as a zone of influence to us ... However, we must foresee the consequences of both defeat and victory for Germany. Consider the option associated with the defeat of Germany. England and France will have enough strength to occupy Berlin and destroy Germany, which we can hardly provide effective assistance.
Therefore, our goal is for Germany to be able to wage the war for as long as possible, so that tired and extremely exhausted England and France would not be able to defeat Germany. Hence our position: while remaining neutral, we help Germany economically, providing it with raw materials and food ...
Let us now consider the second hypothesis related to the German victory. Some believe that such an opportunity would pose the greatest danger to us. There is some truth in this statement, but it would be a mistake to believe that this danger is as close and great as some imagine. If Germany wins, she will come out of the war too exhausted to fight us in the next ten years. Her main concern would be to watch the defeated England and France to prevent their rise. On the other hand, victorious Germany will have huge colonies; their exploitation and adaptation to German orders will also occupy Germany for several decades. It is obvious that Germany will be too busy with others to turn against us.
Comrades ... I have given you my thoughts. I repeat that it is in your interests for a war to break out between the Reich and the Anglo-French bloc. It is very important for us that this war lasts as long as possible, so that both sides exhaust their forces. It is for these reasons that we must accept the pact proposed by Germany and help to ensure that the war, if any, will last as long as possible ... "
I. Stalin, August 1939
On June 1, 1939, the French ambassador to the Nazi capital Coulondre told Foreign Minister Bonnet that Hitler “would risk starting a war if he didn’t have to fight Russia. If he knows that he will have to fight with Russia, he will retreat so as not to expose the country, the party and himself to death. " Coulondre added that Hitler's two highest commanders, OKW Chief of Staff Keitel and Commander-in-Chief of Ground Forces Brauchitsch, told the Fuehrer that if Germany had to fight Russia, it would have little chance of winning the war. Initially, the success of the military campaign against Poland outlined in the Weiss plan was directly linked by the German leader to the possibility of achieving political isolation of Poland: "" The goal of our policy is to localize the war within Poland. "
In Russian history, a myth is now popular that the USSR was very afraid of a war with Germany and therefore concluded a pact (Molotov-Ribbentrop) in order to better prepare for this war. But this is a blatant lie. Now we can cite data on the Red Army: after the mobilization of 1939. In September 1939, the payroll of the Red Army increased to 5.3 million people, in its armament were 43,000 guns, 18,000 tanks, 10,000 aircraft. Data on the German army as of September 1939, after mobilization: the entire army numbered 4,528 thousand people (of which 3.7 million were in the ground forces), there were 3195 tanks including tankettes without guns and training vehicles (of which: 1145 - T-I, 1223 - T-II, 98 - T-III, 211 - TIV), 4500 aircraft, 27000 artillery pieces and mortars were also in service. Now I will not compare tanks and artillery, but I speak with confidence in the USSR they are better, for example, one fact, the German T-I tank did not have a weapon at all, the T-II tank had such a weak weapon that it could not hit the Soviet armored vehicles, and only 300 T-III and T-IV tanks (about 10% of the total) were relatively combat-ready. So, at the time of the signing of the pact and the attack on Poland, the USSR had a superiority in men over Germany, in tanks more than fourfold, in artillery by 63%, in aircraft more than twice. In addition, Poland with an army of almost a million was between Germany and the USSR, and therefore, as of August 1939, the German invasion of the USSR was not threatened.
On August 23, Hitler's plan to partially isolate Poland was a success, the USSR and the Nazis signed a non-aggression pact, along with the non-aggression pact, a secret protocol was also signed according to which, during the reorganization of the regions that make up the Polish state, the border of the spheres of interests of Germany and the USSR will approximately run along the lines of the Pissa, Nareva, Vistula and Sana rivers. This marked the beginning of the aggressive war against Poland and the Second World War, as a legal fact. But the signing of a non-aggression pact was also important because it removed the threat of war for Germany on two fronts. According to article 3 of the Polish-Soviet non-aggression pact, the USSR pledged not to take part in any agreements, from an aggressive point of view, clearly hostile to the other side. Undoubtedly, the secret agreements concluded by the USSR and Germany with respect to Poland in August-October 1939 were of a nature that clearly contradicted this article.
According to V.M. Molotov, pronounced by him during the negotiations in Berlin on November 12, 1940, the agreements of August 1939 were primarily "" in the interests of Germany ", which was able to" "get Poland," "and later capture France and start a serious war against Great Britain. having a "" strong rear in the East "". Later, in 1946, recalling this event at the Nuremberg Trials, Ribbentrop said: “When I came to Moscow in 1939 to see Marshal Stalin, he discussed with me not the possibility of a peaceful settlement of the German-Polish conflict within the framework of the Briand-Kellogg pact, but made it clear that if he does not receive half of Poland and the Baltic countries without Lithuania with the port of Libava, then I can immediately fly back. "
Many accuse Britain and France of supporting Hitler's aggressive plans in 1938, referring to the Munich Agreement of 1938 regarding the peaceful transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany by Czechoslovakia. But there are cardinal differences, firstly, England and France did not take actions that could be interpreted as military aggression, secondly, they did not participate in hostilities on the side of the Nazis, and thirdly, they did not participate in the dismemberment of another state , with attaching part of it to yourself. They tried to make concessions to Germany in terms of joining her ethnically German territories, unjustly taken away from the German nation, and to prevent another world war in Europe. It was England and France that declared war on Germany after the German attack on Poland, but on September 17 the USSR officially entered the war on the side of Germany, and on September 28 began to publicly threaten with its entry into the war against England and France if they did not stop all operations against the German army in the West. Now the passive war of the allies against Germany in the fall of 1939 is called strange, although if you look at it, everything is understandable, because they hoped that the military alliance between Germany and the USSR would quickly disintegrate, which, in principle, happened.
Starting the war against Poland, Hitler wanted to return only the original German lands occupied by the Poles, according to the Treaty of Versailles. On the remaining territory, he admitted the existence of Poland as an independent state, even taking into account the transfer of Western Ukraine and Belarus to Russia. It would be a buffer between Germany and the USSR. But Stalin insisted on the complete elimination of Poland. It was thanks to this decision of Stalin that Germany and the USSR received a common border. So, concluding a pact with Germany and a secret protocol on the division of Poland and the Baltic States, Stalin acted not for defense purposes, but solely to seize new territories and unleash a war in Europe and its subsequent Sovietization.
From September 1, the Minsk radio station began to be used as a radio beacon to support Luftwaffe raids. This was a direct violation of the V Hague Convention on the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in the Event of the 1907 Ground War, ratified by Russia. That is, already on the first day of the war, the USSR was not neutral, but supported the Nazis in the war against Poland.
September 3rd. Ribbentrop sends telegram no. 253 to the German ambassador in Moscow:“Please discuss this with Molotov immediately and see if the Soviet Union deems it desirable for the Russian army to act at the right moment against the Polish forces in the Russian sphere of influence and, for its part, occupy this territory. In our opinion, this not only helped it would be for us, but also, in accordance with the Moscow agreements, it would be in Soviet interests. "
4 September. All German ships in the North Atlantic were ordered to "follow to Murmansk, keeping as much of a northern course as possible." On September 8, Moscow gave permission for German ships to enter Murmansk and guaranteed the transportation of goods to Leningrad. In the first 17 days of September, 18 German ships took refuge in the Soviet port.
8 September. Telegram of the German ambassador in Moscow No. 300 from, sent to the German Foreign Ministry: “I have just received the following telephone message from Molotov:“ I received your message that German troops entered Warsaw. Please convey my congratulations and greetings to the government of the German Empire. " Moscow gave permission for German ships to enter Murmansk and guaranteed the transportation of goods to Leningrad. In the first 17 days of September, 18 German ships took refuge in the Soviet port.
11 September. Hysterical anti-Polish propaganda was unleashed in the Soviet media.
September 14th. Telegram of the German ambassador in Moscow No. 350, sent to the German Foreign Ministry: “In response to your telegram No. 336 of September 13, Molotov called me today at 4 pm and said that the Red Army had reached a state of readiness sooner than expected. Given the political motivation of the Soviet action (the fall of Poland and the protection of Russian "minorities"), it would be extremely important for [the Soviets] not to act before the fall of the administrative center of Poland - Warsaw. Therefore, Molotov asks to be informed as accurately as possible when it is possible to count on the capture of Warsaw. "
September 17th. A Soviet group of about 600,000 people, about 4,000 tanks, more than 5,500 artillery pieces and 2,000 aircraft struck the rear of the Polish army fighting the Nazis, which was a direct violation of the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Poland (later Stalin would call a treacherous violation of non-aggression pacts, actions Germany in June 1941). There were more than 300 thousand Polish servicemen in the zone of the Soviet offensive.
September 25. In telegram No. 442 from the German ambassador writes to the German Foreign Ministry “Stalin and Molotov asked me to come to the Kremlin today at 20 o'clock. Stalin stated the following. In the final settlement of the Polish question, it is necessary to avoid anything that in the future may cause friction between Germany and the Soviet Union. From this point of view, he considers it wrong to leave the remnant of the Polish state independent. He proposes the following: from the territories to the east of the demarcation line, the entire Lubelskie Voivodeship and that part of the Warsaw Voivodeship that reaches the Bug should be added to our portion. For this we renounce our claims to Lithuania.
September 28, 1939. A Treaty of Friendship and Border between the USSR and Germany was signed, by which the territory of Poland was divided between the two aggressors in accordance with the previously signed secret protocol of August 23, 1939. At the time of the conclusion of the treaty, Germany was militarily almost completely depleted, the troops had used up almost all the ammunition and fuel. Germany did not even have any opportunities to wage a defensive war on the Western Front. To save his ally, Stalin comes out openly in support of Germany and threatens France and England with the support of the Nazis if the war continues. It was the possibility of a war against Germany and the USSR that kept France and England from attacking Germany in the fall - winter of 1939 (Strange War).
The results of the military aggression of the USSR against Poland.
The combat losses of the Red Army during the Polish campaign of 1939, according to the Russian historian Grigory Krivosheev, amounted to 1,173 killed, 2,002 wounded and 302 missing. Losses in the equipment of tank and mechanized brigades of the Red Army (including irrecoverable ones) amounted to 42 armored units - of which 26 were along the Belorussian front and 16 along the Ukrainian front. Estimating the combat losses of the Polish army in the battles with the red army, the Russian historian Mikhail Meltyukhov names 3500 killed, 20,000 missing and 454,700 prisoners. According to the Polish Military Encyclopedia, 250,000 servicemen were captured by the Soviet Union. Almost all of the captured officers were subsequently shot by the NKVD, including about 14,000 captured officers were killed by Soviet executioners near Katyn.
In a statement made in October 1939, Molotov named the following figures for the captured military property: "over 900 guns, over 10 thousand machine guns, over 300 thousand rifles, over 150 million cartridges, about 1 million shells and up to 300 aircraft." So the USSR's invasion of Poland was an aggressive military operation, not a liberation campaign.
JOINT STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET AND GERMAN GOVERNMENTS OF SEPTEMBER 28, 1939
After the German government and the government of the USSR finally settled the issues that arose as a result of the disintegration of the Polish state by the treaty signed today, and thereby created a solid foundation for a long-term peace in Eastern Europe, they in mutual agreement express the opinion that the elimination of the real war between Germany, on the one hand, and England and France, on the other hand, would meet the interests of all peoples. Therefore, both Governments will direct their common efforts, if need be, in agreement with other friendly powers, in order to achieve this goal as soon as possible. If, however, these efforts of both governments remain unsuccessful, then the fact will be established that Britain and France are responsible for the continuation of the war, and if the war continues, the governments of Germany and the USSR will consult with each other on the necessary measures.
If we turn to the recordings of the conversation with Ribbentrop and Stalin on September 28, 1939, then Stalin in his (the first after Ribbentrop's long reasoning) statement (according to the German record) stated his point of view as follows: “The point of view of Germany, which rejects military aid, is worthy of respect ... However, a strong Germany is a prerequisite for peace in Europe - therefore, the Soviet Union is interested in the existence of a strong Germany. Therefore, the Soviet Union cannot agree to the Western powers creating conditions that could weaken Germany and put her in a difficult position. This is the commonality of interests of Germany and the Soviet Union. "
September 30, 1939. The newspaper Pravda published a statement by Ribbentrop “... Both states want peace to be restored and that England and France stop the absolutely senseless and hopeless struggle against Germany. If, however, the warmongers prevail in these countries, then Germany and the USSR will know how to respond to this. "
The USSR, not only in word, but in deed, helped the Nazis not only, in September 1939, hitting the rear of the Polish army, which accelerated the transfer of German units to the West. The "anti-fascist" socialist state did everything to weaken the trade blockade of Nazi Germany and help her in the war against England and France as much as possible, for which on February 11, 1940, an economic agreement between the USSR and Germany was signed in Moscow. It stipulated that the Soviet Union would supply Germany with the following goods:
1,000,000 tonnes of feed grains and legumes, worth 120 million Reichsmarks
900,000 tons of oil, worth about 115 million Reichsmarks
100,000 tons of cotton worth about 90 million Reichsmarks
500,000 tons of phosphates
100,000 tons of chromite ores
500,000 tons of iron ore
300,000 tons of pig iron scrap and pig iron
2 400 kg of platinum
"The trade turnover between Germany and the USSR in the first year of the agreement will reach a volume exceeding the highest ever achieved since the World War" [Pravda, 13.02.1940].
In 1940, open pro-Nazi propaganda was also carried out in the USSR. Articles published in the Soviet press, including in the Soviet officialdom - the newspapers Pravda and Izvestia were used by the department of Dr. Goebbels for its propaganda purposes. Reproduced propaganda speeches in the German press, including direct speeches by Hitler. In this case, a special place was occupied by information messages from the front of the war in the West, mainly about the successes of the Luftwaffe in the "Battle of England". According to radio broadcasts in the "Latest News" programs, the loss of British aviation and the destruction of British cities was called a feeling of deep satisfaction. Every day, Wagner's music was performed on radio stations, which was very popular among the leadership of the NSDAP.
Also, the following facts are in no way incompatible with the neutral status of the state: the transit through the entire territory of the USSR from the Far East to Germany of a large group of officers from the German cruiser Graf Spee sunk in the Pacific Ocean. No circumstance can justify the consent of the Soviet leadership to serve German-fascist warships in Soviet ports in the Barents Sea basin (in October 1939, the Soviet Union agreed to the use by the German navy of the port of Teriberka east of Murmansk as a repair base and supply point for ships and submarines conducting operations in the North Atlantic).
Molotov's note on Stalin's meeting with British Ambassador Stafford Cripps in July 1940: “Stalin does not see any threat of hegemony from any country in Europe, and he is even less afraid that Europe may be absorbed by Germany. Stalin follows the policy of Germany and is good knows several German leaders. He did not show any desire on their part to swallow European countries. Stalin does not believe that Germany's military successes pose a threat to the Soviet Union and its friendly relations with it ... ".
It is no coincidence that already after the Second World War, at the end of November 1945, the list of issues that were not subject to discussion at the Nuremberg Trials approved by the Soviet delegation in order to prevent counter-accusations of the defense against the governments of the anti-Hitler coalition countries, paragraph one provided for the prohibition of discussing the attitude of the USSR to the Treaty of Versailles , and point nine - the question of Soviet-Polish relations.
With the defeat of Poland by German and Soviet troops, only the first act of World War II ended. Almost immediately after the end of hostilities in Poland, the "peaceful" socialist state starts a war against Finland. Military actions, which were a completely failed blitzkrieg attempt with huge losses and ended after 3.5 months of fierce battles with a Pyrrhic victory (from the Soviet side, up to 960 thousand people participated in them, and the irreparable losses of the Red Army amounted to more than 131 thousand, and according to data Russian military historian Krivosheev, the total sanitary losses amounted to 264,908. That is, the loss of a neutral state, which allegedly did not take part in the outbreak of the world war, many times exceeded the irrecoverable losses of the Wehrmacht in the first two years of the Second World War.
Many argue that the USSR did not carry out military aggression against Poland in September 1939, but made a kind of liberation campaign with the aim of reuniting Belarusians and Ukrainians or even restoring the historical borders of the Russian Empire. But these arguments are groundless. Firstly, Belarusians and Ukrainians in the territories of Poland did not ask for such a liberation campaign of the USSR, more than 400 thousand people were repressed in the first two years after the Soviet occupation. Secondly, according to existing international treaties, the invasion of the territory of a foreign state was aggression.
According to Art. 2 of the Convention on the Definition of Aggression concluded in London on July 3, 1933 by the USSR with other states, aggression is recognized not only as a declaration of war to another state (this case is provided for in paragraph 1 of Article 2), but also the invasion of the armed forces, even if without a declaration of war , on the territory of another state (clause 2 of article 2), an attack by land, sea or air armed forces, even without a declaration of war, on the territory, sea or aircraft of another state (clause 3 of article 2). Moreover, according to Art. 3 of the said convention, no considerations of a political, military, economic or other order can serve as an excuse or justification for an attack provided for in article 2 3. As an example of such "" considerations "", the signatories to the convention, in paragraph three of the Annex to article 3 of the convention called the internal situation of any state, the alleged shortcomings of its administration.
In a conversation with the chairman of the Comintern, Dimitrov, Stalin said: “The destruction of this state [Poland] under the current conditions would mean one less bourgeois fascist state! What bad would it be if, as a result of the defeat of Poland, we extended the socialist system to new territories and populations. " (Diary of G. Dimitrov, entry on September 7, 1939).
The attack on Finland led to the fact that in December 1939 the USSR as a military aggressor was expelled from the League of Nations. The immediate reason for the expulsion was the massive international protests against the systematic bombing of civilian targets by Soviet aviation, including the use of incendiary bombs.
Between June 15 and June 20, 1940, the "peace-loving" Soviet Union took decisive steps and made the Baltic countries, using threats of military force, violating previously signed treaties, to create pro-Soviet governments. After suppressing the press, arresting political leaders, and outlawing all parties except the communist ones, the Russians staged a mock election on July 14 in all three states. After the "elected" parliaments thus voted to join their countries to the Soviet Union, the Supreme Council (parliament) of Russia accepted them into their homeland: Lithuania - August 3, Latvia - August 5, Estonia - August 6.
But how did it happen that between the two allies - the Nazis and the Communists in June 1941, a military conflict began, which grew into the so-called Great Patriotic War.
The chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces (OKH), Colonel-General F. Halder, analyzing the situation in 1940 after the war, believed that at that time Hitler believed it was possible to avoid a war with Russia if the latter did not show expansionist aspirations in the western direction. For this, Hitler "considered it necessary to divert the Russian expansion into the Balkans and Turkey, which would certainly lead to a conflict between Russia and Great Britain."
In early 1940, Romania agreed to transfer its oil fields in Ploiesti (the only explored fields in Europe at that time) to the Germans in exchange for political and military protection. On May 23, in the midst of the battle for France, the Romanian General Staff sent an SOS signal to the OKW, informing the Germans that Soviet troops were concentrating on the Romanian border. The next day, Jodl summarized the reaction to this message at Hitler's headquarters: "The situation in the East is becoming threatening due to the concentration of Russian forces on the borders of Bessarabia." However, the USSR, threatening with military aggression, forced Romania to cede Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, and the latter was not included in the circle of areas of Soviet interests agreed with Germany. Under the influence of these steps, a threat was created for the Romanian region of Ploiesti - the only serious source of oil supplies for Germany, which could paralyze the German economy and army.
German Foreign Minister I. Ribbentrop: “On June 23, 1940, a telegram from our ambassador in Moscow arrived in Berlin: the Soviet Union intends to occupy the Romanian province of Bessarabia in the coming days, and is only going to inform us about it. Adolf Hitler was then overwhelmed by the rapid Russian advance without prior consultation with us. The fact that at the same time the predominantly German-inhabited Northern Bukovina, the ancestral land of the Austrian crown, was subject to occupation, especially stunned Hitler. He took this step by Stalin as a sign of the Russian onslaught on the West. The large concentration of Soviet troops in Bessarabia caused serious apprehensions in Adolf Hitler from the point of view of further waging the war against England: under no circumstances could we give up the vital Romanian oil for us. If Russia had advanced here further, we would have found ourselves in the further waging of the war dependent on Stalin's goodwill. During one of our conversations in Munich, he told me that, for his part, he was considering military measures, because he did not want to be taken by surprise by the East ”.
So let's give another word to the second man in Nazi Germany, Joseph Goebbels, the Reich Minister of Education and Propaganda:
06/25/40 Stalin informs Schulenburg that he intends to act against Romania. Again, this is contrary to our agreement.
29/06/40 Romania lost to Moscow. Bessarabia and S. Bukovina will go to Russia. This is not pleasant for us in any way. The Russians are taking advantage of the situation.
5/07/40 Slavism spreads throughout the Balkans. Russia is seizing the moment.
11/07/40 There is some concern among the [German] people about Russia.
07/17/40 Russians continue to pull troops [to Romania]. We are no less. King Karol wants a German military occupation. It doesn't matter when and where. Fear of Moscow.
07/19/40 The Russians have gotten pretty cocky. "
And, finally, the Fuehrer of the German people, Adolf Hitler (in a conversation with Mussolini on 19/01/41): “Previously, Russia would not pose any danger to us at all, since it was not able to threaten us. Now, in a century aviation, the Romanian oil fields can be turned into smoking ruins as a result of an air attack from Russia or the Mediterranean region, and the very existence of the Axis powers depends on these oil fields "(B. Liddel-Hart." World War II "M. AST 2002).
German Foreign Minister I. Ribbentrop: “... Molotov's visit to Berlin (November 12-13, 1940 - Comp.) Did not stand under a lucky star, as I wished. From these conversations with Molotov, Hitler finally got the impression of a serious Russian striving for the West. " The next day, Jodl summarized the reaction to this message at Hitler's headquarters: "The situation in the East is becoming threatening due to the concentration of Russian forces on the borders of Bessarabia."
From Stalin's speech to graduates of military academies in May 1941 “... Our policy of peace and security is at the same time a policy of preparing for war. There is no defense without an offensive. We must educate the army in the spirit of the offensive. We must prepare for war. " (Diary of G. Dimitrov, entry 05.05.1941).
Politburo member Andrei Zhdanov, at a meeting of the Main Military Council of the Red Army on June 4, 1941, said: “We have become stronger, we can set more active tasks. The wars with Poland and Finland were not defensive wars. We have already embarked on the path of an offensive policy ... There is one step between peace and war. That is why our propaganda cannot be peaceful ... We had an offensive policy before. This policy was defined by Lenin. Now we are only changing the slogan. We have started to implement Lenin's thesis. "
Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union N. G. Kuznetsov (in 1941 - Admiral. People's Commissar of the USSR Navy, member of the Central Committee, member of the Headquarters of the High Command from the moment of its creation): "For me, one thing is indisputable: J. V. Stalin not only did not rule out the possibility of war with Hitler's Germany, on the contrary, he considered such a war ... inevitable ... JV Stalin conducted preparations for war - broad and versatile preparation - proceeding from the time he himself had set ... Hitler violated his calculations "(On the Eve . P. 321).
A small touch to the big picture. 13-14 / 05/40. Moscow. Meeting on military ideology. Chief of General Staff Meretskov speaks: "We can say that our army is preparing for an attack, and we need this attack for defense. Based on political conditions, we must attack, and the Government will tell us what we need to do."
So, after all, Hitler was the "icebreaker" of the world socialist revolution for the communists, who had been arming Germany since the 1920s. It was the fighting of the Nazis that gave grounds for the subsequent entry of the Red Liberators into Western Europe. And you can't get away from it. But he struck a preemptive blow to Bolshevism, this blow, despite the defeat of Germany and the temporary victory of the communists, turned out to be fatal for communism in Europe.
See also.
