Andrei Illarionov: "In Washington, you can hear the stomp of Russians who are afraid of the" Kremlin report "

Olga BESPERSTOVA, "FACTS"
Law No. 3364 "On Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions", signed by Trump on August 2, 2017, states the need to increase pressure on the DPRK, Iran and Russia, to the actions of the leadership of which special attention is drawn.
Article 241 of the law says that the US Treasury Department needs to prepare a report within six months on the Kremlin's "financial servants" - the largest Russian entrepreneurs, the size and sources of their income, the assets of their relatives, and business contacts with foreign companies. The work on the preparation of the document took place in an atmosphere of the strictest secrecy.
Analysts believe that the law will become a new milestone in the legal "offensive" on Russia, since the consequences for its political and business elite, "enriched at the expense of the Russian people", can be very serious: individual sanctions, freezing of financial assets, a ban on entry into USA. After that, it will not be easy for American companies and citizens to cooperate with people caught in the sanctions rink.
The Office of Foreign Assets Control of the US Treasury Department is responsible for compiling the blacklists. In 2014, this department included in the lists of businessmen close to Putin, Gennady Timchenko, Arkady and Boris Rotenberg, Igor Sechin, Yuri Kovalchuk. We will soon find out who else will keep them company.
About the report, about the upcoming "elections" of the President of Russia, about the risks of introducing peacekeepers into the territory of Ukraine, "FAKTAM" spoke on Skype Russian economist Andrey Illarionov, who held a number of positions in the government of the Russian Federation, including the post of Putin's adviser (from 2000 to 2005), from which he resigned, announcing: "I will not work with such an authoritarian state." Illarionov has long and consistently harshly criticized the Putin regime; for the past few years he has been living in the United States. He is currently the President of the Economic Analysis Institute, a non-profit organization.

- Andrei Nikolaevich, how will events develop after the publication of the so-called Kremlin report?
- The most attention is now drawn to Article 241 (although others are also of interest) of Law No. 3364. Based on this article, a report is being prepared, where a list of representatives of Putin's entourage, as well as their close relatives, will be made public with justification why this or that character was included in it included. In addition to the open part of the report, a closed one is being prepared, which will be presented to the Congress, but not to the general public. The closed part of the list will not be published either.
What will happen next? Those who find themselves on the lists are in for trouble, to put it mildly. Based on these lists, American and international bodies involved in the control of financial transactions can impose sanctions regarding the conduct of these persons (or some of them) of business transactions, the use of their funds that have ended up in territories under American jurisdiction, and a ban on entry into the United States.

- Recently, a group of international experts - diplomat Daniel Fried, who was called "the chief of sanctions" in the Obama administration, professor of economics from Sweden Anders Åslund, scientist and publicist Andrei Piontkovsky, and you, in an article for the Atlantic Council website, formulated seven categories of future persons involved: politicians and businessmen responsible for aggressive, corrupt and / or criminal acts in the Russian Federation and abroad; the inner circle of "Putin's friends from St. Petersburg"; “Golden children” (it is known that part of the assets is often transferred to them); "Custodians of personal assets" of Putin; big businessmen who benefit from doing joint business with the Kremlin; corrupt managers of state-owned companies; heads of semi-state companies owned by those mentioned above ...
- I must correct you. The seven categories listed are our suggestions for criteria and groups of individuals, the compliance with which would make it possible to form a list of this report. However, since the authors of the report are employees of the Treasury Department, Department of State, National Intelligence of the United States of America, they are the ones who decide who to include on the list, according to what criteria and by what groups. I do not exclude that they can use some of our proposals. But, perhaps, their classification and approaches will differ. We expressed our views. But this does not mean at all that the final version of the document will be made according to our templates.

- Can you predict what will be the reaction of Putin's entourage to the report? Or will they again pretend that everything is great, and almost thank for the sanctions, as it was before?
- Judging by the comments, the Kremlin is really nervous. This is undeniable. Therefore, messengers were sent to Washington with intelligence purposes: to find out whether it is possible to stop the publication of the report, who will be included and who will not be included in the lists, what set of sanctions can be applied, whether it is possible in some way to discredit the experts involved in the development of the criteria for the report, and , therefore, to weaken the informational effect of it, at least on the Russian public. The Kremlin leadership is seriously concerned about this, since they perceive the probable limitation of the possibility of its actions very painfully.
What kind of reaction can there be? At first, apart from statements from the Kremlin, probably nothing special will happen. However, after the end of the so-called "elections" and the inauguration of Vladimir Putin for another presidential term, a new campaign is likely to begin, aimed both at confrontation with the West and at fighting the Russian opposition. The natural position for Putin and his entourage in this situation is to represent the country as a besieged fortress and try to achieve a total mobilization of the population around him, loved ones. The main propaganda slogan may be something similar to preventing "the flight of Russian citizens from the sinking ship."

- Let's get back to the report. When it comes to funds withdrawn abroad by Russian corrupt officials, different amounts are named. The most common figure is $ 1.2 trillion. Where did it come from?
- It is listed in a report prepared by a group of economists, including Tom Piketty (French economist, author of the bestselling Capital in the XXI Century. - Auth.). This study attempts to estimate the amount of funds withdrawn from Russia abroad since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Using a variety of techniques, they came up with a figure of approximately $ 1.2 trillion. But there are flaws in their approach, and therefore the named amount can be questioned. And even if it is correct, it does not follow from this that all this money was withdrawn abroad only by Putin's entourage. The funds stolen by them are really huge, but it is important to know who, how much, when and where withdrew.

- The mouthpieces of the Kremlin are already saying that the report will have no legal force. This is indeed the case, since everything depends on how firmly the Trump administration will behave, because it will have to enter into a confrontation with official Moscow. In addition, already bad relations with Congress may worsen. Please comment on this thesis.
- To some extent, one can agree with this statement, because the report itself is not a legal document, not an executive order for certain actions, and not even a legislative act of Congress. The report is intended primarily for publication and posting on the website of the US administration. Yes, he will certainly be quoted by the world media. Yes, the report will create a stir. But, strictly speaking, it does not bear legal consequences.
However, this report will undoubtedly create a new information reality, since it will name the names of citizens X, Y, Z and indicate why they are mentioned there. The peculiarity of the report is that it was prepared not by a respected journalist-researcher, not a representative of the opposition, not an academician scientist, but by employees of the executive bodies of the US government. Moreover, at the request of a law passed by Congress. That is, the status of this report will be quite special.

- A different weight category.
- It is clear that even before the introduction of sanctions, which can be adopted, for example, by FinCEN (a division of the US Treasury Department dealing with financial crimes) or FATF (an international group for the development of measures to combat money laundering), in a situation when in front of an American bank or a European the company will question whether to do business with the person whose name is mentioned in the report, in most cases, it is likely to decide not to. Potential business partners, at least in the United States and Europe, will most likely prefer not to deal with those involved in the Kremlin report, even if there are no official bans.

- Let's move on to another topic. Recently, Andrei Piontkovsky said that Putin is constantly changing his strategy in relation to Donbass: it was the concept of the “Russian world” and “Novorossiya”, then there was an idea to push the “L / DPR” into Ukraine and achieve federalization, now they started talking about the introduction of peacekeepers. The initiative of Kazakh President Nazarbayev to transfer negotiations from Minsk to Astana is clearly dictated by the Kremlin. What is Putin up to again?
- Perhaps this was done so that Alexander Lukashenko does not feel too needed by both sides and very independent. And, consequently, he moderated his ardor a little in the next flirtation of rapprochement with the West.
As for Putin's approach to the “DPR” and “LPR”, in general, its principles were determined quite a long time ago, back in 2014. So far, nothing has radically changed this approach. The idea remains the same: using the so-called Minsk agreements, to ensure the "pushing" of these "republics" into Ukraine - in order to torpedo the independent internal political development of the country. Thank God, the Ukrainian society and the Ukrainian authorities (although not all at once and not all) gradually came to an understanding of this simple truth. Over the past few years, they have been acting to prevent this “pushing in”.
However, the potential introduction of a peacekeeping mission could cause great damage to Ukraine and seriously weaken its position.

- Please explain why.
- In this case, you have to be extremely careful. If the so-called blue helmets are introduced, then one should be aware of whom they will obey. Peacekeepers, despite their soft and gentle name, are troops. You can discuss what they are, what they are armed with (light or heavy weapons). But these are the troops. The main thing is to understand that several tens of thousands of armed people who do not obey the Ukrainian authorities may appear on the sovereign territory of Ukraine.
You asked if Putin is changing his strategy. Obviously not. He changes tactics. One of his new tactical steps (while maintaining the previous strategy) is, in particular, the proposal to introduce peacekeepers into the territory of the “LPR” and “DPR”. That Zakharchenko and other "figures" of the occupied Donbass were protected not only by Russian troops, but also by the so-called peacekeepers. Whoever these international forces consist of (Belarusians, Armenians, Kazakhs, Sri Lankans, Tanzanians), by definition, they will have to ensure security and tranquility in the east of Donbass. Which means providing additional security and strengthening the existing political and military regime there (the occupation regime carried out by the Russian military and the “DPR” and “LPR” formations). That is, having given the go-ahead for the introduction of peacekeeping troops, the Ukrainian leadership agrees to use an additional powerful international military and political resource to strengthen the illegal bandit power on its sovereign territory.
If official Kiev, for example, agrees to the introduction of the troops of its allies, who are at the same time subordinate to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the government, the president, then this would be understandable. But the consent to the introduction of tens of thousands of armed people who do not obey Kiev raises the question: why?
Four years ago, during the Kremlin's campaign to seize Crimea, the Ukrainian authorities approached their Western partners with requests for help. And instead they received advice: not to resist and surrender the peninsula. Now imagine if a similar situation arises again and Western partners advise the same at a time when tens of thousands of servicemen who do not obey the Ukrainian authorities will be in your country. What will be Kiev's answer?

- It is difficult to argue with your arguments.
- It is very important that people in Ukraine think about why Putin proposed to bring peacekeepers into the territory of the occupied Donbass? And why does Ukraine need it?

- March 18 is the day of the presidential elections in Russia. How does the current election campaign differ from the previous ones, except for the known result?
- First of all, you cannot use the word "elections" without quotation marks in relation to such phenomena. Although, in my opinion, the terms “play, circus, booth, vaudeville” are more accurate. It is difficult to discern a fundamental difference between what is happening now and what happened in 2004, 2008 and 2012. Except that the understanding of the circus nature of this phenomenon has become broader than before.

- Why does Putin have such strange, to put it mildly, rivals: for example, the chairman of the Lenin state farm from the Moscow region Pavel Grudinin or Putin's shocking goddaughter Ksenia Sobchak?
- A new generation of "artists" has entered the arena. In 2004, the former chief of Zhirinovsky's security ( speech about Oleg Malyshkin. - Auth.)... Tell me, what's the difference: Malyshkin or Sobchak?

- By and large, none.
- Perhaps, except that Sobchak is more talented. For example, Russian ministers previously did not call for voting for Malyshkin, but now former Gaidar associates Nechaev and Yasin are actively campaigning for Sobchak. Agree, this is a major creative success of the scriptwriters and directors of the special operation called "Brothel".

- What surprise can Putin present to the electorate before the elections? Or is there no need for this, because everyone already likes him?
- Surprises are not excluded, but unlikely. Putin does not need any unusual events that could destabilize the situation. Any too bright news, a loud scandal, a problem, and even luck can bring confusion into the measured process of the coming enthronement. Putin doesn't need it now.

- Russian journalist Natalya Gevorkyan, who now lives in Paris, recently gave a big interview to the Gordon publication, where she talked a lot about 2024 - about the next presidential elections in Russia. She argues that the question of Putin's successor - his daughter Yekaterina - may be considered. Is this a wild fantasy? Or could such a story actually happen?
- Natalia Gevorkyan expressed this hypothesis for the first time, if I am not mistaken, in October last year, shortly after Sobchak's announcement of her nomination. In my opinion, this is the most rational explanation for her campaign. Other versions (for example, Sobchak will "take" votes from Navalny) do not hold water.
Gevorkian's assumption does not mean that this will happen in 2024. She only notes that Sobchak acts as an opening act for the audience for the possible future appearance of Ekaterina Tikhonova. Russian voters are being tested for their readiness to support a young woman with fairly modern views in the presidential campaign.
There is no doubt that the CEC will register Sobchak as a candidate. Because the authors of this idea need not only its participation in the presidential campaign, but also its decent result. If Sobchak gains, for example, three percent of the vote, then this is not very good, because it means that the Russian public is not yet ready to perceive a young woman as a potential president of Russia. If she gets, for example, eight to ten percent (like Mikhail Prokhorov in 2012), then the test is passed. Consequently, the next time another young woman, for whom there is no such information loop as for Sobchak, who politically positions herself more restrained and supported by all the power of the media controlled by the Kremlin, will indeed be able to get a significant number of votes, which, being strengthened by traditional falsifications, as well as by other tricks, in the end they will bring her to the presidency.

“A brilliant combination, I must say.
- Vladimir Vladimirovich has always been distinguished by non-standard ideas, multivariate approaches to solving the assigned tasks, long-term planning, careful study and systematic implementation of prepared plans for a long time.

- In March last year, in an interview with FACTS, you said that the safety margin of the Russian economy is quite large. Has the situation changed?
- A year ago, the Russian economy was slowly emerging from a two-year recession (production decline. - Auth.), launched in the spring of 2014 and provoked by the Kremlin's aggression against Ukraine. In the spring of 2016, there were faint signs of recovery from this recession. This process continued until the middle of last summer, when the Russian industry, apparently, entered a new recession. it the main economic event of the past year.

- Another question. Will there be a new prime minister in Russia? Or is the Putin-Medvedev alliance unshakable?
- Perhaps this issue deserves the most serious attention. Discussing whether Putin will take over as president again in 2018 is pointless. But who will become prime minister in May this year - it is necessary.
There are two forks in the answer. First - Medvedev or not Medvedev? When the film "He's not Dimon for you" appeared a year ago (An investigation film, shot by the Anti-Corruption Foundation, headed by opposition leader Alexei Navalny, was released on March 2, 2017. - Auth.), it seemed that in this way the siloviki practically destroyed Medvedev's reputation and that after such a blow it would be difficult for Putin to reappoint him as prime minister.
As the year passed, it became apparent that the psychological effect of the film had virtually disappeared. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that Medvedev will stay in the same chair in the following years. If Putin's goal is to hold another circus performance in 2024 exactly as we said, then Medvedev may also be a suitable prime minister to campaign for Putin's daughter as president.
However, other options are not excluded. If Putin approaches the issue of appointing the head of government from, so to speak, "party" positions (party in quotes, we are not talking about formal parties supposedly present in the State Duma, but about real parties existing in the Russian government), then he can appoint one of the representatives of these "parties". There are three such "parties" in the current Russian government.
The main candidate of the Sislib party (systemic liberals .- Auth.) — Alexey Kudrin(Minister of Finance of the Russian Federation from 2000 to 2011.- Auth.). If, in the context of a worsening economic situation, Putin decides to start something like "normalizing" relations with the West (which is unlikely, but not impossible), then theoretically Kudrin is suitable.
If, as a result of the intra-regime struggle, the siloviki push back the Sislibs, and Putin goes to further deepen the confrontation with the outside world and suppress the opposition, then a candidate from the siloviki party Sergei Naryshkin may become prime minister (the former head of the presidential administration of the Russian Federation, the former chairman of the State Duma, now the director of the Foreign Intelligence Service. - Auth.).
Finally, if Putin keeps both the Sislibs and the security forces at a distance and immediately focuses on solving the "problem of 2024", then it is possible that he can stop at the candidacy of the "Mikhail Ivanovich party" and the "Ozero cooperative" (a dacha cooperative on the shore of Komsomolskoye Lake was founded by Putin and seven shareholders in 1996, this is his closest circle. - Auth.) — Alexey Miller(Chairman of PJSC Gazprom. - Auth.).
Therefore, there are now four real candidates for the post of Prime Minister of Russia: Medvedev, Kudrin, Naryshkin, Miller. Putin has until May when he has to make this decision.

- The names of potential defendants in the "Kremlin report" are heard in the media: Oleg Deripaska, Mikhail Fridman, Alisher Usmanov, Roman Abramovich. How do big business and the business elite feel now in Russia? I read that the murmur intensifies, that “there is an atmosphere of fear and anxiety around”, that a coup, if it suddenly happens, can be initiated by representatives of the business elite. This is true?
“What is is not a murmur. This is, firstly, a whisper. Such a barely audible whisper in the so-called Rublev oligarchic kitchens. Of course, no big business is preparing any coup and, in principle, cannot. If there is something, it is a stomp. The stomp of those who flee to Washington are trying to negotiate so that they and their clients are not included in the sanctions lists. The stomp of those who began to distance themselves from Putin and the Kremlin, finding millions of reasons to avoid public events with the leadership of the regime. And, of course, the stomp of those who are vigorously hiding their funds, capital, operations, relatives from the possible blow of Western sanctions and almost guaranteed problems in the coming years in Russia.

March 1, 2017

Andriy Illarionov: The Kremlin's war against Ukraine is a betrayal

Ukraine needs to minimize contacts with the occupied territories and wait for the moment when they can be returned, as at one time the French Republic was waiting for the return of Alsace and Lorraine, and West Germany was waiting for reunification with the GDR, says Russian economist and former adviser to the Russian president Andrei Illarionov. In an interview with argumentua.com, he also told how much Russia has spent on the war against Ukraine, how long Putin will be in power and what role Navalny plays in the presidential campaign in Russia.

Earlier, 2-3 years ago, you predicted that Russia would start a full-scale war against Ukraine. This forecast did not come true. Why do you think?

After the occupation "live" of Crimea, it became clear that Putin could use the troops there and then, where and when he deemed possible and necessary. Since the so-called "uprising" in the South and East of Ukraine did not turn out to be as successful as he hoped, the only possible instrument left for the creation of the so-called "Novorossiya" was direct intervention. Then it seemed that he was ready to use open armed force the way he did in the Crimea and Donbass. However, this did not happen.

When analyzing the information about the number of Russian troops in the Ukrainian theater of operations, it became clear that an open intervention was not planned. Because on the Russian-Ukrainian border, regular armed units of no more than 50,000 people were concentrated. These troops were absolutely insufficient. In order to conduct any significant operation to seize southern or eastern Ukraine, even if this kind of military action is not too harsh, a grouping of about 1 million people is needed.

Therefore, when Putin posted 50 thousand people at the border, pretending to be active, it was pure blackmail. Unfortunately, a number of observers who are not professional military specialists, both in Ukraine and abroad, perceived these actions as preparation for open intervention.

Let us also pay attention to the fact that when Putin prepares a military operation by conventional means, he not only does not demonstrate his strength, on the contrary, he ensures their maximum disguise. The invasion of Georgia in August 2008 took place under the cover of secrecy. When Putin was planning the Crimean operation, no one, including American intelligence, discovered the concentration of armed forces, which then invaded and occupied Crimea. If Putin is showing troops, it is most likely for blackmail, and not for a real operation.

Is there any reason to expect that the Kremlin will try to carry out operations in the Odessa and Kharkov regions, given that these operations were previously prevented by the Security Service of Ukraine and now Russia probably has the situation in Donbass that suits it?

Of course, anything is possible, but Putin does not have much sense in carrying out such operations. You can do some nasty things from time to time, organize terrorist acts, carry out actions against Ukrainian symbols, people, organizations, buildings, institutions. But the time for a large-scale operation to seize territory and establish military control has gone irrevocably. Putin could carry out such operations in March, April, May 2014. It's already too late.

Recently there was the second anniversary of Minsk-2. What is the effectiveness of the format and its prospects? Is Minsk-3 or other similar agreements possible to resolve the war in Donbass?

I repeat that I have said more than once: Minsk is an extremely unfortunate decision. And Minsk-2 is much worse than Minsk-1, although Minsk-1 is far from an acceptable option. In essence, this is the surrender of Ukraine's sovereignty. Until now, the Ukrainian leaders have not answered why they surrendered the country's sovereignty. Now, two years later, this is already obvious to everyone - both in Ukraine and abroad. The only argument that could be taken to defend Minsk is the one according to which these agreements led to a small but decrease in the intensity of hostilities, and as a result, fewer people die. But the data on the number of deaths by periods, published some time ago, show that the decrease in the number of deaths is very small. In fact, the Minsk agreements themselves did not have any significant impact on reducing the intensity of hostilities. The current aggravation around Avdeevka confirms this once again. If something is holding back from intensifying hostilities, then it is not a paper signed by Putin or in the presence of Putin, but his own unwillingness to conduct hostilities when he does not consider it necessary to conduct them. Therefore, the Minsk agreements camouflage Putin's true intentions.

Does Kiev have other options for resolving this conflict, given that the sanctions are tied to the Minsk agreements? We will leave the military scenario for discussion by military experts. After all, perhaps there are other formats for a peaceful settlement?

A distinction must be made here. The sanctions were introduced without any connection with Minsk, their main package was introduced even before Minsk-1. Sanctions for the annexation of Crimea were introduced in March 2014. A large package of financial, sectoral, personal sanctions was introduced at the end of July 2014 for the conduct of hostilities in the Donbass, as well as in connection with the downing of the Malaysian liner MN-17. The first Minsk was signed in early September 2014, the second in February 2015. Therefore, there is no direct connection between the sanctions and Minsk.

What can the Ukrainian side do? It should recognize the current line of demarcation between Ukrainian forces and separatists and Russian forces in Donbas, and minimize its contacts with the territory and people on the other side. With the exception of residents who consider themselves Ukrainian citizens and perceive themselves as part of Ukrainian society. These citizens should be provided by the Ukrainian authorities with all the necessary assistance - from ensuring their transfer to the territory controlled by the Ukrainian authorities, to, if they do not want to move, resolving their issues on an individual basis. But contacts with the territory beyond the demarcation line must be minimized. Then one should wait for the moment when it will be possible to return to this issue - just as the French Republic returned to a similar issue after the occupation of Alsace and Lorraine by Prussian troops in 1871. They waited only 48 years, and in 1919 both of these provinces were returned to France. Then this story repeated itself, as we know, in 1940. But in 1945, these territories were finally returned. How long will have to wait in the Ukrainian case is impossible to predict.

- "Total" - is it in quotes or in the literal sense? "Only 48 years old" - is it a little or a lot?

Nobody knows that. In one case, the French waited 5 years during World War II. In another case, 48 years. In the third case, West Germany waited 40 years for reunification with East Germany. Western European nations worth learning from show us examples of how these kinds of issues have been dealt with in their difficult history. If the French were able to wait 5 and 48 years, and the Germans were able to wait 40 years, then this gives us some idea of ​​the limits of expectation in our case.

Are there any chances that Crimea will return to Ukraine? Can you name your options for returning Crimea?

Both Donbass and Crimea are occupied territories. Their return to Ukraine is inevitable. The only thing we know for sure is that these territories will return to Ukraine. After 1945, the principle of inviolability of international borders and sovereignty became one of the fundamental principles of international law, in Europe for sure. What we do not know yet, when this will happen, under what conditions, what particular scheme or model will be used. We also know other examples from history. The occupation of East Timor by Indonesia lasted more than 20 years. And then the Indonesian troops were withdrawn, and East Timor became independent. Kuwait was occupied by Iraqi forces and annexed. And seven months later, Iraqi troops left there, and Kuwait regained its independence.

But, most likely, this will not happen during the life of Vladimir Putin. Right?

I would say: not under the presidency of Vladimir Putin.

To what extent can the militarization of Crimea hinder this? Is the militarization of Crimea a threat to Ukraine or NATO countries? If such a threat really exists.

This is a threat primarily to Ukraine. But in the matter of returning Crimea, the militarization of Crimea does not matter much, since return is a legal decision. And this only means that the gigantic funds that are now invested in the militarization of Crimea, in the construction of bases, fortifications, the deployment of missiles, and so on, are all the money thrown away for the Russian budget.

I do not know what the Ukrainian government will do with this when it receives these territories. Then there will be another government in Moscow, which will look at the world around it differently. A future Russia will not pose a threat to Ukraine, and normal relations between Ukraine and Russia will be restored.

A question from the field of sociology: according to your estimates, during the war in Ukraine the share of Russians who support aggression on the territory of Ukraine has fallen or increased?

Decreased, of course. The war against Ukraine is extremely unpopular in Russia, no matter who says anything. The war against the Ukrainians is perceived as a treacherous war, as a fratricidal war. Regardless of how Ukraine now feels about Russia and Russians, in Russia a huge number of people still perceive Ukrainians as the closest people. And the conduct of hostilities against the closest people is perceived as an unacceptable betrayal.

The fact that the Russians do not believe that the Kremlin is waging a war on the territory of Ukraine is still an illusion, but in fact the Russians know about the troops on the territory of Ukraine?

This is an artificial psychological defense for many. It is incredibly unpleasant, painful to perceive that your country is waging military operations against the closest people, so many people try to hide behind childish lies that "not we", but "some separatists" are waging the war.

According to your estimates, how much could Russia have spent on the war in Donbass?

The question is how to count. Only the war in Donbass can be considered. But the war in Donbass is part of the war against Ukraine, including in the Crimean direction. And the war against Ukraine is part of a more general war against the outside world. If we talk not only about the Ukrainian theater of military operations, but about this whole war, which the Kremlin propagandists often call the Fourth World War, then we need to count how much has been spent on waging this entire war from the moment it began.

If we take the beginning of the hybrid war against Ukraine on July 27, 2013, when anti-Ukrainian sanctions were announced, as a starting point, then over 3.5 years of the war, about 150 billion dollars were spent on it.

What can you say about the Kremlin's preparations for the Russian presidential elections in 2018? Are there any signs of how the Kremlin is preparing for this campaign, some kind of strategy looming?

The word "elections" cannot be used in Russia without quotation marks. There are no elections without quotation marks in Russia. A few weeks ago, Freedom House published its latest report on political freedom in the world. For the first time, Russia dropped to the lowest level in terms of political freedoms, to the seventh, that is, where North Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Turkmenistan are located. This is the first time this has happened in the past 30 years. Therefore, the words "elections", "presidential campaign" in relation to Russia can be used either in quotation marks or as a bad joke.

Will Navalny's verdict prevent him from running in this election?

I think that he was lucky in the sense that the Kremlin demonstrated a special humanism towards him, and not the means that were applied to Sergei Yushenkov, Boris Nemtsov, Vladimir Kara-Murza.

I don’t quite understand, do you think that by this the Kremlin guaranteed that he would not participate in the campaign?

Navalny will not run in the elections. But Navalny is already participating and will participate in the "elections."

In this conversation, I will probably mention Borovoy, who claims that Navalny is the Kremlin's decoy duck. Do you agree with this? Or is it from the field of conspiracy theories?

He is not a decoy in the sense that the Kremlin did not create him. But the Kremlin is quite effective in managing Navalny's actions. Of course, Navalny makes his own decisions. But Navalny is competently put in such a framework, forcing him to take such steps, which the Kremlin expects of him, and which are beneficial to the Kremlin. This was best demonstrated during the campaign for the so-called "elections" of the mayor of Moscow in the summer of 2013, when it was the Kremlin that helped Navalny to register, when United Russia deputies provided him with signatures, when the Kremlin provided him with PR support. It was then important for the Kremlin to demonstrate that the "elections for the mayor of Moscow" were free. And Navalny played a very important role, misleading the public and playing the same game with the Kremlin. In the end, he provided the Kremlin with exactly what it wanted. Naturally, Navalny did not become the mayor of Moscow, but created the impression of "competition" for an inexperienced public.

Why was Navalny's verdict passed only now, and not when his election campaign had not yet begun? Why wait?

So that the campaign does not seem completely dull. But Navalny will not participate in real elections.

Could Putin have feared Navalny as a real electoral competitor?

One of the most important lessons Russian intelligence agencies have drawn from the democratic experiments of the past three decades is that elections are unpredictable. Boris Yeltsin, ousted from the party Olympus, covered in mud, completely discredited, seemed to have no chance of returning to politics. Nevertheless, he rose from the ashes, won the parliamentary elections to the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, then won the parliamentary elections to the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia, then won the elections to the post of chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Russia, then won the presidential elections in Russia. In this post, he played one of the key roles in the liquidation of the Soviet Union, the temporary weakening of the special services and, in general, in changing the political, economic and ideological landscape in our countries. From this painful experience, the intelligence services learned an important lesson: the issue of power must be taken extremely seriously, not a single, any modest, insignificant, minimal, microscopic chance for the victory of unacceptable candidates who do not belong to the special services corporation should be left. It does not matter whether such a candidate is an oppositionist or non-oppositionist, liberal or conservative, nationalist or globalist. Everyone who had the potential to be elected had a similar fate. Suffice it to recall - Galina Starovoitova, General Rokhlin, Boris Nemtsov, in Ukraine - Vyacheslav Chornovol, it almost happened with Viktor Yushchenko ...

Recently I saw an interview with Boris Nemtsov, in which he tells the following story: when the 'Nord-Ost' theater was seized by the militants, several Russian politicians went there to negotiate with the militants about the release of people. Boris Nemtsov also gathered there. Then Putin called him and asked him not to go to the theater. Nemtsov admitted: "I did a stupid thing to listen to him, and I really didn't go there." And then he learned that with a similar request, Putin turned to another person - Yuri Luzhkov, the mayor of Moscow. Later, Nemtsov turned up at a meeting in the Kremlin and asked why Putin asked him and Luzhkov not to go to Nord-Ost and not engage in negotiations on the release of the hostages. To which, according to Nemtsov, Voloshin, on behalf of Putin, replied: “The fact is that you (in the sense of Nemtsov and Luzhkov) already have high ratings, and they continue to grow, so your arrival at Nord-Ost and negotiations would further boost your ratings "...

What is the real support for Putin among the population of Russia? It is clear that these 90 or 88% are drawn, and no one, probably, knows the real numbers. What's your rating?

In September 2016, the "elections" to the State Duma were held in two regions, in which they had not been held before, and in which, by all indications, they were held without a large number of falsifications. These are Sevastopol and the "Republic of Crimea". Sevastopol is a city of former and current sailors, military and special services. This is the most pro-Putin region in which the so-called "elections" were held. For "United Russia" (of course, this is not for Putin, but still gives some idea), 53% of those who came to the polls, or 24% of the total number of voters, voted. Now we know the ceiling of support for the pro-Putin party. To assess support for Putin, this figure should be adjusted upward. But if in Sevastopol the support among all voters is 25%, then what is it in the non-Putin regions?

You have to forgive me for this question, but how long will Vladimir Putin stay in power? And what could be the real reason for his departure?

Until the end of his life, no matter how long it lasts, and no matter how it ends. He will not leave on his own, even for health reasons.

How high is the likelihood that a circle of those willing to eliminate Vladimir Putin may form within the system?

A circle of willing can form, but they will never do it.

Due to personal qualities.

How likely are the weakening or lifting of sanctions against Russia in the near future?

To date, this probability has significantly decreased. If they are not canceled and weakened in the next six months, they will remain until the full return of all the occupied territories to Ukraine.

There are completely different assessments of the benefits of sanctions. Some experts say that you just have to wait and the sanctions will take effect. Others are inclined to believe that it is naive to hope for them. What version do you adhere to?

It is necessary to distinguish between the spheres of public life in question. The effectiveness of the sanctions in terms of changes in the Kremlin's foreign and domestic policy is zero. The effectiveness of the sanctions in terms of impact on the economic situation in Russia is very modest. The Russian government cannot get loans on the foreign market, companies that find themselves under sanctions cannot get loans on the foreign market, and for some technologies, world markets are closed. They can, of course, be bypassed, but these are additional costs and complications.

As for the personal sanctions applied to about 150 persons related to the occupation and annexation of Crimea and the waging of the war against Ukraine, they seem to be the most effective.

And, finally, there is one more cut, emotional and psychological. Sanctions are the only thing the West has taken against the Kremlin since the start of the aggression. Therefore, the lifting or weakening of the sanctions would mean that the West did not react at all to the flagrant violation of the norms of international law. As long as there are sanctions, the West can assert: "We have not left this aggression unrequited."

Vladislav Kudrik

The central theme of recent Russian economic discussions has been the dramatic decline in economic growth. The last 18 years are traditionally divided into two periods: a ten-year boom period in 1999-2008, when the average annual growth rate of Russian GDP (according to Rosstat data) was 7.1% (an actual doubling of GDP per decade), and an eight-year period of stagnation in 2009-2008. 2016, during which the growth rate fell to 0.4% (cumulative GDP growth over eight years was only 2.7%).

This periodization allows us to imagine a radical (17-fold) drop in the average annual economic growth rate in Russia and the transition from boom to stagnation mainly by external factors - the impact of the global economic crisis of 2008–2009, the fall in world oil prices, and the imposition of Western sanctions against Russia. Such a periodization is convenient for the propaganda presentation of our country as an innocent victim of external forces, which the open Russian economy is unable to resist. At the same time, they try not to draw attention to the fact that in those eight years, while the Russian economy was in stagnation, the world economy (despite the global crisis and its consequences), according to the IMF, grew by 31.6%, and the economy of energy exporting countries (despite the decline in energy prices) - by 23.8%.

A closer look at our recent history reveals that the above approach combines in one period periods of time with qualitatively different economic dynamics. So, from May 2009 to July 2012, the average annual growth rate of the output intensity index for basic types of economic activity (an indicator close in content to GDP, calculated by the HSE Development Center for a narrower nomenclature with the elimination of seasonal and calendar components) was 5, 6% - although not a boom 7.1%, but nevertheless quite a decent result. In other words, after the crisis of 2008-2009. the recovery of the Russian economy was proceeding at a rate comparable to the rate observed in the previous decade. And the post-crisis recovery has been going on at such a speed for more than three years.

It should be especially noted that during the entire almost fourteen-year era of "normal economic growth" - that is, from September 1998 to July 2012 (including the period of the 2008-2009 crisis) - the average annual growth rate of the output intensity index were 5.2%, that is, the same or even slightly less than 5.6%, achieved during the recovery of the Russian economy after the crisis of 2008-2009. (calculated according to the HSE Development Center). This means that there seem to be no qualitative differences in the nature of Russian economic growth during this entire almost fourteen-year era, both before and after the 2008–2009 crisis.

A qualitative change in the nature of Russian economic growth took place not in 2008-2009, but in the summer of 2012. Starting from July 2012 to April 2017 (the last month for which comparable data are currently available), the average annual growth rate of real output amounted to minus 1.2%. Such a periodization naturally brings to the center of public attention the question of the reasons for the radical change in economic dynamics: why did it happen in the summer of 2012?

The traditionally popularized explanation of the dependence of Russian economic growth on world oil prices does not help in this case: in July 2012, prices were very high - about $ 100 / bbl., Moreover, they continued to remain approximately at this level for at least another two years - until summer 2014

The search for the causes of a radical change in the nature of economic dynamics somehow leads the observer to political factors - to the assumption of the presidency once again by Vladimir Putin and to the domestic and foreign policy that the "new old" leader began to pursue then. In the first 10 months after the announcement of the Medvedev-Putin reshuffle in September 2011 (that is, until July 2012), the average annual economic growth rate fell 1.5 times - from 6.9 to 4.3% (here and further - the author's calculations based on the data of the HSE Development Center). In the next 10 months - from August 2012 to May 2013, when the characteristic features of the "renewed" political regime became quite obvious, the growth rate fell more than threefold - to 1.3% per year. From June 2013 to March 2014, when Crimea was annexed, stagnation gave way to recession, the average annual rate of which reached minus 0.1%. Finally, from April 2014 to January 2015, when hostilities in Ukraine became most violent, the rate of economic decline reached minus 3.2%.

The economic situation in Russia since the summer of 2012 can be called a "lockout" or, to use the terminology of Ayn Rand from the novel Atlas Shrugged, "a strike of entrepreneurs in response to the interventionist and aggressive policies of the authorities." This strike is especially prominent in the data on the radical change in the investment behavior of Russian citizens. If during the period of "normal economic growth" (from September 1998 to July 2012), the average annual growth rate of investment in the Russian economy was, according to the HSE Development Center, an impressive 9.2%, then during the "nationwide strike of entrepreneurs" ( from July 2012 to April 2017) - minus 4.3%. In April 2017, the volume of investments remained 23% lower than in June 2013. As life shows, in an aggressive political environment, investments are not made, and business is not expanding the scale of its activities.

The impact of the authorities' policy on the dynamics of industrial production was no less dramatic. In a typical business cycle, output dynamics usually take a U- or V-shape - production initially declines, then bottoms out, followed by recovery and recovery. This is exactly how the Russian economy behaved during the “usual” crises of 1998 and 2008–2009, primarily due to economic reasons. However, during the 2014–2016 recession, caused primarily by political and geopolitical reasons, the dynamics of output began to resemble a staircase leading downward.

The first stage of the fall in industrial production fell on the summer Ukrainian campaign in 2014. The second stage coincided with the hostilities in the winter of 2014–2015. (battles for Donetsk airport and Debaltseve). The third phase of the fall in output, which started in October 2015, began simultaneously with the involvement of Russia in the Syrian conflict. In other words, even unofficial military campaigns (the involvement in which the Russian authorities deny) cause an acute paralysis of the economic activity of Russian entrepreneurs.

Identifying the causes of the economic recession in recent years gives the responsible forces interested in overcoming the recession and restoring sustainable economic growth in Russia a completely logical answer to how this could be done. First, stop military adventures in the near and far abroad; withdraw Russian troops from all foreign territories; stop supporting separatists conducting subversive activities against the legitimate authorities of neighboring sovereign states. Secondly, to restore the effect of the Russian Constitution, at least in terms of the inadmissibility of holding the presidency of the country by the same person for more than two terms. Will it help economic growth? Undoubtedly.

Nevertheless, such measures alone will not be able to ensure economic growth rates capable of reducing (let alone overcome) Russia's economic lag behind the most developed countries in the foreseeable future. The reason for this is the so-called captivity trap - an insurmountable barrier of political captivity to rapid and sustainable economic growth.

Among the highly developed countries (with a GDP per capita of at least 60% of the average level of the OECD countries, with the exception of such small energy exporting countries as Bahrain, Brunei, Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates), there is not a single politically unfree country according to the criteria of the Political Rights and Civil Rights Index. Freedom House. Among the economically highly developed countries, there are only two countries with partially free political regimes - Hong Kong and Singapore. All other developed countries are politically free countries.

For non-free countries (to which Russia has belonged since 2004), the situation is aggravated by the impossibility not only to reduce their lag behind highly developed countries in terms of economic development, but even to maintain it in the medium term.

In 1939, Hitler's Germany was the most highly developed among the then totalitarian states (Mussolini's Italy, Franco's Spain, Stalin's USSR lagged behind her noticeably). Then GDP per capita in Germany exceeded those of many European countries and most countries of the world with the exception of Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the USA. The German figure was then 82% of the American level (according to Angus Maddison).

In 1961, the richest among countries with totalitarian political regimes was Czechoslovakia, its GDP per capita was 46% of the US level. In 1983, the richest totalitarian state was the GDR, its GDP per capita reached 47% of the US level. In 1975, per capita GDP in the communist USSR was 38% of the American level. In 2013, the richest of the countries with a non-free political system turned out to be Russia, its GDP per capita was equal to 30% of the US level; in 2016, it dropped to 27% (according to data from the Maddison database with the addition of recent years according to the IMF data).

Thus, over time, the economic lag of politically unfree countries from highly developed politically free countries not only does not decrease, it does not even remain at the same level. This lag is growing every decade. The maximum relative levels of economic development (as a percentage of the level of GDP per capita in the United States) achieved by politically unfree countries - 82% in the 1930s, 46–47% - in the 1960s – 1980s, 27–30 % - in the 2010s.

Therefore, it is obvious that no matter what wonderful programs of economic development are developed in the depths of the Russian government, no matter what "radical" reform projects are proposed to the "new old" president for his next term by the Center for Strategic Research or the Academy of National Economy, even in that incredible case, if these projects and programs were really implemented, this would hardly fundamentally change the situation with the medium- and long-term growth rates of the Russian economy. If political lack of freedom persists, Russia, alas, will continue to lag behind both the level of highly developed states and the world average.

A chance (not a guarantee) to overcome our growing strategic lag will appear if a triple political miracle occurs: the Russian authorities will stop aggressive campaigns abroad, Russia will switch to a regular change of top leadership in accordance with the Constitution, and a free political system will be formed in the country and will start operating.

SPECIAL OPINION

Andrey ILLARIONOV: "Putin calculated: the death of hundreds of Europeans of flight MH17 will shock the leaders of the EU, and they will demand from Poroshenko to stop the offensive of the ATO forces"

On July 17, 2014, the Malaysian Boeing MH17, en route from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur, was shot down from the Buk anti-aircraft missile system over the occupied areas of Donetsk region. All 298 people on board, including 83 children, including three babies, died. The downing of a passenger airliner was not a fatal mistake by the militants, but a special operation by the Kremlin, Andrei Illarionov, a senior researcher at the Cato Institute in Washington, told the Internet publication GORDON.

He is convinced that out of 17 flights that ended up in the Buk's affected area, the Russian leadership chose the board with the Europeans, whose death would force the EU leaders to put pressure on Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko and stop the offensive of the ATO forces. “If a Russian, Ukrainian, or any other flight from the CIS countries had been shot down, by and large, Europe would not have bothered much,” Illarionov emphasized.

"To save" Lugandonia "from the final defeat, it was necessary to stop
the offensive of the anti-terrorist operation forces. Such an "effective" means was the terrorist act - the downed Malaysian Boeing "

- For three years, you have consistently defended the version according to which the downed Malaysian Boeing is not a fatal mistake of the Russian militants, but a planned special operation: supposedly the Kremlin needed the Malaysian Airlines passenger plane MH17. Why?

- In principle, one cannot completely exclude the possibility that passengers of two more international flights that flew over the Donbas on July 17, 2014, could become victims of a terrorist attack. But the shooting down of the Malaysian Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur best solved the military-political tasks set by the Kremlin in planning and implementing this special operation.

- Why did the Russian leadership need a special operation in the middle of the summer of 2014?

“By this time, the Novorossiya project, aimed at preventing Ukraine's integration into Western economic, political and military alliances, was on the verge of complete collapse. Ukrainian troops conducted a successful offensive, consistently liberating territories captured by the separatists. A few more weeks - and only historical memories would remain of "Lugandonia". In order to save it from a complete and final defeat, it was necessary to stop the offensive of the ATO forces. By mid-July, it turned out that:

The separatist military resistance is melting before our eyes;

Western diplomatic pressure on Kiev through Merkel, Hollande and other Western leaders proved ineffective;

A direct full-scale invasion of Ukraine by regular Russian troops at that time was deemed inappropriate.

It was necessary to find another means that, according to the Kremlin's plan, could shock the until then sleepy European public so that, horrified by the death of a civilian aircraft and its passengers, it would rigidly demand from its governments to exert any pressure on the Ukrainian leadership so that it would immediately stop the offensive. forces ATO. Once again (alas, not the first and not the last) such an "effective" means was a terrorist act - the downed Malaysian Boeing MH17.

- According to an international investigation, the Russian Buk-M1 arrived in the Ukrainian village of Pervomaisky at about 13.00, launched a rocket and left at about 18.30. During these five and a half hours, 61 civil aircraft were within the reach of the Buk. Why did the Malaysian flight Amsterdam - Kuala Lumpur become the target of the Kremlin special operation?

- Of these six dozen flights, only 17 passed over the site of a future disaster, moving from the north, northwest, west to south, southeast, east. It is these directions of movement that could (if desired) be presented as a threat to the separatists from the side of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The list of these flights looks like this:

1.32 Emirates 242 Toronto - Dubai.

2.13.38 UIA 515 Kiev - Tbilisi.

3.13.49 Austrian 659 Vienna - Rostov.

4.14.17 Qatar Airways 178 Oslo - Doha.

5.14.32 JET 229 Brussels - Delhi.

6.14.45 Zabaikal Airlines 703 Kharkov - Yerevan.

7.14.52 Jet 119 London - Mumbai.

8.15pm Lufthansa 758 Frankfurt - Madras.

9.15.18 SIA 323 Amsterdam - Singapore.

10.15.37 no data.

11.15.48 Air Astana 904 Amsterdam - Atyrau.

12.16.00 Lufthansa 762 Munich - Delhi.

13.16.19 Malaysian 17 Amsterdam - Kuala-Lumpur.

14.16.27 EVA 88 Paris - Taipei.

15.16.38 SIA 333 Paris - Singapore.

16.17.09 Emirates 158 Stokholm - Dubai.

17.17.11 no data.

Two of these 17 flights were not identified (no data). Of the remaining 15 flights, one was operated by a Ukrainian company, one by a Kazakh company, and one by a Russian company. The emotional and political effect of the death of these planes and their passengers on European (Western) public opinion would be minimal. It would, perhaps, be insufficient also in the case of plane crashes taking off from the Norwegian Oslo, Austrian Vienna, Swedish Stockholm.

Of the remaining nine flights, six were unacceptable to the Kremlin for geopolitical reasons, as they took off from the airports of the G7 countries: Canada (from Toronto), Great Britain (from London), France (two from Paris) and Germany (flights from Frankfurt and Munich ). Thus, there were only three flights left, departing from the capitals of NATO member countries that are not members of the G7 club:

1.14.32 JET 229 Brussels - Delhi.

2.15.18 SIA 323 Amsterdam - Singapore.

3.16.19 Malaysian 17 Amsterdam - Kuala-Lumpur.

Therefore, the victims of a terrorist attack planned by the Kremlin could, in principle, become passengers of any of these three flights. However, for a number of political and personal reasons, the flight from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur was obviously preferable for the leaders of the terrorists.

- Why?

- Because the Brussels-Delhi flight was operated by Indians, the Amsterdam-Singapore flight was operated by Singapore Airlines, and the Amsterdam-Kuala Lumpur flight was operated by Malaysian Airlines. In other words, the Indian or Singaporean authorities would have to investigate the downing of the Delhi or Singapore flights. The Kremlin understood that the political weight of India and Singapore was greater, and that their potential for influencing the inevitable international investigation was higher than that of Malaysia. Therefore, it was more convenient for the Kremlin to deal with the investigation into the death of a passenger plane belonging to a politically weaker Malaysia.

“The Kremlin carefully prepared the information cover operation, unceremoniously
pushed the public towards the version "Terrorists' mistake" or "Monkey with a grenade"

- Maybe you shouldn't breed conspiracy theories and demonize the Kremlin too much, attributing such well-thought-out special operations to it? The version of "Monkey with a grenade", first voiced by Russian journalist Yulia Latynina, seems more believable. A fatal accident happened: the militants planned to shoot down a Ukrainian military plane, but hit a civilian one.

- Almost simultaneously with the tragedy, the Kremlin threw this version into the information space. In my list of three main versions discussed, it is called version # 1 - "Terrorists' error" or "Monkey with a grenade." The Kremlin carefully prepared this information cover operation. From the very first report of LifeNews about the "Ukrainian An-26 shot down by the militia," the Kremlin has been unceremoniously pushing the public to accept this particular version. But there was no "mistake of terrorists" and could not be. That's why:

First. From reports released to date by Bellingcat, the Dutch Security Council, and an international team of investigators, we know for sure that the Malaysian Boeing was shot down by a Russian Buk-M1 anti-aircraft missile system from the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade of Air Defense, stationed in Kursk.

According to the investigation, on June 20, 2014, an air defense division left Kursk, that is, not one, but at least six vehicles: launchers, command and loading vehicles, as well as mobile radar stations. However, only one Buk-M1 anti-aircraft missile system crossed the Ukrainian border. If the Russian authorities really set the task of “protecting the skies of Donbass from Ukrainian military aircraft,” they would have transported to the territory of Ukraine not one car, but at least one division, moreover, already fitted to the border. But this was not done.

Second. The SBU released an intercepted telephone conversation between terrorists with the callsigns Buryat and Khmury, which took place at 9.22 a.m. on July 17, seven hours before the downing of Boeing. Khmury is Sergei Dubinsky (pseudonym - Petrovsky), an officer of the Russian military intelligence of the GRU and a former deputy "Minister of Defense of the DPR". He asks Buryat: "Have you brought me one or two?" He replies: “One, because there was a misunderstanding. They unloaded them and drove them under their own power. "

That is, a division really left Kursk. Khmury-Dubinsky-Petrovsky was expecting at least two Buks to cross the border. However, in reality, only one installation crossed the border. At the same time, the leadership of the special operation launched a disinformation campaign to convince everyone, including ordinary terrorists: the separatists now have their own Buks. But only one car was thrown across the border. This was clearly not enough to effectively protect Lugandonia from Ukrainian aviation.

Third. The Buk was sent to the farthest rear of the Lugandonia near the Russian border. If we overlay the missile strike zone of the Buk stationed in Pervomayskoye on the map of the territory then controlled by the militants, it turns out that at least a third of the area “defended” by the Buk ended up not in Lugandonia, but in Russia. Agree, it is rather ridiculous to transport the Buk to the DPR in order to defend the airspace of Russia from there.

To protect the skies of "Lugandonia" there was no point in placing the car so close to the Russian border. If the task was to defeat Ukrainian military aircraft, then the Buk would have to be transported to the northern, northwestern or western combat zones. It was there in July 2014 that the most fierce battles took place, it was those areas that were most often attacked by Ukrainian aviation, it was there that there was a chance to shoot down Ukrainian military aircraft. Instead, the Buk was driven into the deepest corner of the separatist territory, from where its missiles, in principle, could not reach the northern, north-western, and western borders of the ATO zone. It is quite obvious that the leadership of the planned special operation was not going to use the Buk to protect the separatists from the Bandera aircraft.

Fourth. On July 17, 2014, not a single overflight of Ukrainian military aircraft took place over Lugandonia, because the day before, a Ukrainian Su-24 was shot down at an altitude of six to eight kilometers. Until the circumstances of this incident were clarified, the military command of Ukraine had forbidden to take its planes into the air.

- This was the official statement of the Ukrainian side.

- Right. An independent researcher should not trust just one side. I had to carefully look through the reports of the separatists for that day: none of them mentioned the flights of the Ukrainian aviation. Although both before and after July 17, the information resources of the militants constantly wrote: they say, the junta swooped in again, bombed again.

Fifth and last, why the version of "Monkey with a grenade" is untenable. If the Buk command had the task of protecting the skies of Lugandonia, then after the release of the first missile, the anti-aircraft missile system would remain on the territory of the separatists. Despite the tragedy, the terrorists would have shrugged their shoulders: they say, unpleasant, missed, shot down a civilian flight. But you still need to defend against raids by Ukrainian military aviation. Then the Buk would have either been left in the same place, or transported to a new area, where it would have waited for the arrival of Ukrainian planes in the following days. Instead, immediately after its only volley, the anti-aircraft missile system with the remaining three missiles took off and immediately, on the night of July 17-18, returned to Russia. Why? Because, in principle, he had no goal to shoot down Ukrainian military aircraft.

The Russian Buk-M1 in the Donetsk region had only one target - a passenger plane, most likely a Malaysian Boeing. That is why the missile complex was brought not to the front line, but to the rear - to the very point over which the MH17 route passed. That is why one, not four, rockets were fired. That is why, after completing the combat mission set by the Kremlin to shoot down a passenger Boeing, the Buk was immediately returned to Russia.

“The version of the SBU that the militants confused the settlements does not stand up to criticism.
Colonel of the GRU Khmuryi, in charge of the deployment of "Buk", originally from the Donbass,
perfectly orientates in those places "

- Let's say the first version - "Monkey with a grenade" - is untenable. But why do you dismiss the version of the then head of the SBU Valentin Nalyvaichenko? He argued that they planned to shoot down a Russian passenger plane from the Buk: allegedly, this created a casus belli and would give Putin the legal right to send his troops into Ukraine. But, according to Nalyvaichenko, the Russian military crew that drove the Buk got confused in the terrain and instead of the village of Pervomayskoye, Yasinovatsky district, brought the car to the village of Pervomaysky, Snezhnyansky City Council.

- Indeed, out of six dozen flights that flew on July 17 from 13.00 to 18.30 over the war zone, 26 flights were carried out by Russian airlines. If the task of the terrorist command was to shoot down a Russian plane with Russian citizens on board flying from or to a Russian airport (which could be presented as the so-called casus belli), then this could be done without much difficulty once. However, it never happened.

Consider this version of the SBU: the command in Moscow allegedly planned to shoot down the Russian flight SU2074 Moscow - Larnaca, for which it was necessary to bring the Buk to the village of Pervomayskoye, Yasinovatsky district (about 20 kilometers north-west of Donetsk), but "accidentally" the performers confused and arrived at the village Pervomaisky Snezhnyansky City Council (about 80 kilometers southeast of Donetsk). This is a ridiculous version.

Firstly, from the north-western Pervomaisky, the rocket could not reach a passing Russian plane. The Moscow - Larnaca flight took place about 50 kilometers from the village of Pervomayskoye, while the maximum range of the Buk-M1 was 35 kilometers. That is, in terms of its tactical and technical characteristics, this installation, located in Pervomayskoye, in principle, could not shoot down the Moscow-Larnaca flight.

To at least theoretically get an Aeroflot plane, the Buk had to be transported not to the village of Pervomayskoye, but to the city of Krasnogorovka, which is about 15 kilometers south-west of Pervomayskoye. Then it turns out that the militants confused not only the east with the west, but also Pervomaisky with Krasnogorovka? But even then, the anti-aircraft missile system would operate at the limit of its technical capabilities, since the Moscow-Larnaca flight was within Buk's reach for only a few seconds. It was almost impossible to shoot down an Aeroflot flight.

But the more important reason for the unrealism of this version was different. For several days prior to July 17, both Krasnogorovka and northwestern Pervomaiskoye were under fire from the Ukrainian troops, which were actively advancing. Fierce battles were raging along the entire western perimeter of the "DPR". The separatists began to evacuate their people not only from Krasnogorovka, but even from Donetsk: then they were not sure that they would hold these cities. That is, on July 17, sending a Buk to the north-west and west of Donetsk would be almost guaranteed to destroy the installation or, worse, to hand it over to the advancing Ukrainian forces. Therefore, the Kremlin did not plan to take the Buk to the village of Pervomayskoye, Yasinovatsky District, and shoot down the Russian flight.

Secondly, the so-called justification of the SBU, as if the military had confused the two settlements, does not stand up to criticism. Khmury-Petrovsky-Dubinsky, who was responsible for the deployment of the Buk, was a colonel of the GRU General Staff (now a major general). He himself comes from Donbass, these are his native places, he is perfectly oriented in them.

Judging by the intercepted telephone conversations, the Buk air defense missile system was escorted by tanks from the Vostok battalion. Their crews were, at least in part, local. During the movement of the column, the separatists regularly contacted the command and specified where they and the Buk should arrive. If an error was found, it would be immediately corrected and the air defense system would be redirected to another location.

Thirdly and most importantly, in order to carry out a massive invasion of Ukraine, if such a decision were made, Putin did not need any casus belli. For an invasion, it would be necessary to have only a sufficient number of troops, ammunition, fuel, food, and auxiliary equipment. But there were no such forces on the border between Russia and Ukraine at that time.

“10 thousand killed Ukrainians did not agitate the President of France, but several hundred
Syrians - very much even. It is cynical and terrible, but for Europeans the blood of different people has a different price. "

- Well, how was there no “such forces on the border” if, according to official reports, in the spring and summer of 2014, up to 40 thousand Russian soldiers were concentrated near the eastern borders of Ukraine?

- The maximum estimate of the number of Russian troops on the border is about 50 thousand people in April 2014, in July - 30 thousand. These forces would be enough for the occupation of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, and then only if their entire population met the occupiers with flowers, caps and cakes.

For comparison: during the invasion of Georgia with a population of about four million people in August 2008, the Kremlin needed a group of about 100 thousand people. The population of Donbass is 7.5 million people, its territory is almost four times larger than that on which hostilities took place during the Russian-Georgian war. So 30, 40 or 50 thousand troops on the border with Ukraine for a large-scale invasion is a bluff.

If Putin planned a full-scale invasion of Ukraine with the occupation of, for example, Right-Bank Ukraine, he would have to concentrate a group of at least 800-900 thousand people on the border. Putin had neither these nor any comparable forces.

It is also worth remembering the Kremlin's official statements in the summer of 2014, before the operation in Ilovaisk. Putin all the time asked, persuaded, demanded, begged Poroshenko and Western leaders to sign a truce. Then he wanted only one thing - for the Ukrainian troops to stop the offensive on the "DPR" and "LPR".

- You seem to argue clearly and logically, but still I can't understand: why the purpose of the special operation was not a Russian passenger plane? From the Kremlin's point of view, this would be ideal: the "Ukrainian junta" killed innocent citizens of the Russian Federation ...

“Then, from the Kremlin’s point of view, the objectives of the operation would not have been achieved. A Russian plane was shot down, for example, 300 Russian citizens were killed - and what's the point? None. The Ukrainian offensive continues as if nothing had happened. Who in this case will put pressure on Kiev and force it to interrupt the offensive of the ATO forces?

- That is, from the Kremlin's point of view, the death of the Europeans was needed?

- Sorry for this cynical approach, but this is not my cynical approach. If a Russian, Ukrainian, or any other flight from the CIS countries had been shot down, Europe, by and large, would not have bothered much.

Over the three years of the war, over 10 thousand people have died in Ukraine. And how does Europe react to this? Reacts, but sluggish. How did Europe react to the death of 298 passengers on the flight from Amsterdam? How did Europe react to the Russian bombing of Syrian Aleppo, when several hundred people were killed there?

- She reared up.

- Former French President Hollande immediately called Putin a war criminal. That is, 10 thousand killed Ukrainians did not agitate the President of France, and several hundred Syrians did not really care. It is cynical and terrible, but for Europeans the blood of different people has a different price.

- And Syrian blood is more important for the leader of France, because? ..

- ... Syria, together with Lebanon, was the mandate territory of France. Since the time of the Crusaders, it has had special historical, cultural, and linguistic ties with France. The death of Ukrainians, Russians, representatives of other nationalities of the former USSR touches Europe less than the death of its citizens or residents of the former colonies.

Knowing the psychology of Europeans, Putin calculated that the death of several hundred of their fellow citizens would cause such a shock to the EU leaders that they would immediately demand that Poroshenko stop the offensive of the ATO forces.

"Alas, the SBU and the Ukrainian leadership did not take advantage of the fantastic result and did not begin to demonstrate to the whole world that the Kremlin wanted to shoot down the Malaysian Boeing with the Europeans on board."

- There is one thing but in your version about a planned operation to shoot down the Malaysian Boeing. The Kremlin could not fail to understand: a meticulous international investigation would begin, during which it may become clear that the Buk was brought from Russia together with a Russian military crew. Hence, he had to seriously insure himself. But, judging by the reports of the international commission, the Kremlin has something to do with it. What is it?

- There were several punctures. The largest of these occurred on July 17 and became known the morning after the tragedy. Before that, everything was going strictly according to the Kremlin scenario of the cover operation: Girkin published a post that “the bird was shot down”, the LifeNews channel immediately reported that the “militia” shot down a Ukrainian military transport plane, Yulia Latynina promptly began to spin up version number 1 - "Monkey with a grenade."

But then there was a failure - because of the SBU. This is what became decisive in solving the Kremlin's crime.

- And what exactly did the SBU do?

- Perhaps, many citizens would still remain fully confident that the separatists shot down the passenger airliner, and that it was shot down by accident. But on the morning of July 18, 2014, the SBU published telephone conversations between the Russian geeruni Khmurym-Petrovsky-Dubinsky and a militant with the call sign Buryat. In the interception, Khmury asks: "Did she come under her own power?"

“Crossing the strip” means that the Buk-M1 air defense missile system has crossed the Russian-Ukrainian border. The gloomy one aggravated the picture by asking: "With the crew?" “Yes, yes, with a crew,” his interlocutor replied. This interception buried the misinformation version of the cover, as if the Buk was either local or seized from the Ukrainians, which the militants were able to repair, provide with a local crew and fire from it.

The publicized interception of the Khmury-Buryat negotiations tore into shreds the special operation that the Kremlin had been so thoroughly preparing. Alas, the SBU and the Ukrainian leadership did not take advantage of this fantastic result and did not demonstrate to the West and the whole world that the Kremlin wanted to shoot down the Malaysian Boeing with the Europeans on board. Instead, they came up with an absurd version that has nothing to do with reality, as if the Buk's crew had confused the village of Pervomayskoye with the village of Pervomaysky.

- The last question: why is it so important for you to prove that the Kremlin's target was precisely the Malaysian Boeing? What, in essence, is the difference whether the rocket hit the side by chance or not, if the fact remains: 298 people died, 83 of whom were children?

- First, truth is truth, and fiction is fiction.

Second, truth helps to understand the logic of terrorists. And thus more accurately predict their next actions. Therefore, in principle, it can help save lives in the future.

Thirdly, the perpetrators of a crime should be punished according to the correct article - not for “murder by mistake or negligence,” but for international terrorism.

If you find an error in the text, select it with the mouse and press Ctrl + Enter

Coming out) It's more and more pleasant to watch Solovyov. They sat down and scold people from the Russian Federation for "snitching" who are helping the United States draw up lists of sanctions against the Kremlin. Including the pathetic Raykhelgauz here says that “it is not good to inform”. And others say that this is a betrayal of the Motherland.

Strongly overdone. The most interesting thing is that these assholes themselves missed the material. This is for them DM. Simes from the USA suggested paying attention.

Andrey Illarionov, bravo!)))
“Compiling this list of“ Putin's friends ”is not an easy job and requires knowledge of Russian realities. A former economic adviser to Putin, Andrei Illarionov, volunteered to help in this matter. He was joined by a former adviser to Russian ministers, the Swedish economist Anders Aslund, who is well acquainted with the origins of today's Russian quasi-capitalism. In the early nineties, Aslund worked in the Russian Federation in the team of the American economist Jeffrey Sachs, who helped Yegor Gaidar carry out well-known reforms.

A week ago Andrei Illarionov, Anders Aslund, Andrei Piontkovsky and Daniel Fried published a memorandum in English “. How to define the Kremlin ruling elite and its agents ”.

One of the authors of the memorandum, Daniel Freed, is presented as the US State Department's sanctions policy coordinator, who "developed US sanctions against Russia, the largest US sanctions program to date, and agreed to impose similar sanctions from Europe, Canada, Japan and Australia."

As you know, on August 2, 2017, the President signed the Countering US Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). Article 241 of this act instructs the "US Treasury Secretary in cooperation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of State" to submit to the US Congress a detailed report (part of which may be classified), which should include "the identification of the most important high-ranking political figures and oligarchs in the Russian Federation determined by their proximity to the Russian regime and their net worth ”. Article 241 states that the report should examine the relationship of these persons with the President of Russia, determine their involvement in corruption, assess their net worth and known sources of income. The article also poses similar objectives for parastatal entities with distributed property serving the Russian state.

As one of the criteria for selecting persons for the blacklist, the authors of the memorandum suggest "the proximity of high-ranking political figures, businessmen and semi-state actors to the current Russian political regime."

The second criterion is involvement in corruption, which "allowed them to enrich themselves at the expense of the Russian people."

It is noteworthy that it is proposed to include in the black list also inconspicuous ordinary citizens who can play the role of secret "wallets". “A person used to store Putin’s assets in operations that are a cover for corruption, even if the person himself does not personally participate in the above actions, and his known personal fortune is not large enough to be considered as“ oligarchic, ”the authors formulate. memorandum.

Potential targets of US sanctions are grouped into seven categories. The first is “high-ranking politicians, parastatal organizations, businessmen responsible for aggressive, corrupt or criminal operations within and outside the Russian Federation”. The second category is "Putin's inner circle of friends from St. Petersburg, with whom he has done business since the early 1990s." The third category is the "golden children" to whom members of Putin's inner circle donated part of the wealth. The fourth category is "Putin's personal friends who keep his personal funds." The fifth category is "well-known" oligarchs "who are big businessmen who benefit greatly from doing direct business with the Kremlin." The sixth category is "corrupt managers of state-owned companies who owe their position to a close relationship with Putin and use their positions to outright steal." The seventh category is formed by "semi-state companies owned by persons identified in the sixth category."

It is no secret that under the conditions of Russian quasi-capitalism, any kind of big business is impossible without the subordination of the bureaucracy and the siloviki, who are included in the Kremlin vertical. Therefore, the authors of the memorandum propose to make concessions for some of the entrepreneurs. “Large Russian businessmen should not be included in the list just because of the size of their assets. Some of them made their fortunes before Putin, and then, in order to survive, were forced to pay a large tribute to the Kremlin. The inclusion of such persons in the Kremlin report would not be consistent with the objectives of Article 241, "the authors of the memorandum make a note."