Conscience is the ability of a person to critically assess his actions, thoughts, desires, to realize and experience his inadequacy. Conscience is different from the other internal control exercised by consciousness, the feeling of shame. Shame and conscience are quite close concepts. Shame is completely focused on the opinions of others, who can express their condemnation of the violation of the norms. In conscience, decisions, actions, and evaluations are not related to the opinions or expectations of others, but to duty.
Conscience performs the function of an internal regulator inherent in morality as a whole, acting in four directions.
1. As a motivator, guiding us towards compliance with moral requirements, creating a positive psychological attitude.
2. As a prohibiting factor, judging us in advance for the alleged choice.
3. Conscience can speak in us during action, correcting it.
4. As a controller, evaluating our actions, causing appropriate moral experiences.
The initial genetic basis of conscience is empathy, and since it is expressed mainly in a negative way, compassion. Determining the attitude of conscience to other phenomena of moral consciousness, it can also be noted that it is a special sensitivity to the manifestation of evil in one's own behavior (arrogance, arrogance, injustice committed in relation to another person).
Conscience is a person's subjective awareness of his duty and responsibility to society, it is the ability of a person to exercise moral self-control, independently formulate moral obligations for himself, demand from himself to fulfill them and make a self-assessment of his actions. Conscience can manifest itself not only in the form of a reasonable awareness of the moral significance of the actions performed, but also in the form of emotional experiences, for example, in a sense of remorse.
Conscience is a specific state of shame. It is formed in the process of socialization and upbringing through constant instructions to the child about "what is good and what is bad." In the early stages of socialization, conscience is manifested as the “voice” of the significant environment of parents, educators, peers, as the command of some authority. In the practice of upbringing, the teacher's appeal to the child's conscience often takes the form of a demand for diligence.
Conscience is the responsibility of a person to himself as the bearer of the highest, universal values. Conscience indicates the inappropriateness of the deed to duty. Therefore, the fulfillment of their obligations gives rise to such concepts as "clear conscience", "calm conscience." But this is a temporary phenomenon, because life is difficult, a person finds himself in different situations, therefore conscience turns into a feeling of guilt (it manifests itself more often as condemnation of oneself in the form of repentance, repentance, as regret for what has been done), then a sense of rightness is re-acquired, etc. etc.
However, it should be noted that the pangs of conscience can punish enough only the one who has it. For natures less developed in moral terms, it is not conscience itself in its pure form that matters, but a mixture of guilt and fear. Remorse has historically been shaped not only by compassion, but also by fear of future inevitable retribution. In everyday moral life, the role of punishment received from people is very important. At the same time, it is not so much the punishment in itself that is important as the real opportunity to bear it, the inevitability of punishment. In conditions of impunity, such a deep moral system as conscience also fails. This does not mean, however, that harsh punitive practice is the best way to cultivate conscientiousness. Penalties are necessary where serious vicious inclinations have already developed. At the very beginning, the main emphasis, of course, should be on the formation of the ability to empathize.
In everyday life, the term "freedom of conscience" is often used, which is understood as the human right to independence of inner spiritual life and the ability to determine one's own beliefs. Conscience should not be anything other than free.
CONSCIENCE
Philosophical Encyclopedic Dictionary. 2010 .
In ancient Greek. S. mythology gets fantastic. the image in the form of the image of Erinyes, the goddesses of damnation, revenge and punishment, pursuing and punishing criminals, but acting as benefactors (eumenides) in relation to the repentant. In ethics, the problem of personal S. was first posed by Socrates, who considered the source of morality. judgments of his person (Old Greek συνείδησις, like Latin conscientia, means both S. and awareness). In this form, Socrates advocated the liberation of the individual from the unconditional power of societies over him. and ancestral traditions. However, only in the time of S. acquired a great deal in ethics, which reflected the liberation of the individual from the feudal-estate, guild and church. regulation during the development of the bourgeois. relationships. The question of personal S. is one of the center. in the ideology of the Reformation (Luther's idea that the voice of God is present in the consciousness of every believer and guides him independently of the church). Materialist philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries (Locke, Spinoza, Hobbes., Other materialists of the 18th century), denying innate S., draw on its dependence on society. upbringing, living conditions and interests of the individual. Limiting themselves only to the statement of this dependence, they, as, come to a relativistic interpretation S. Locke, for example, says that "... if we glance at people, what they are, we will see that in one place some feel remorse due to committing or not committing acts that others elsewhere consider worthy "(Izbr. Philos. Prod., vol. 1, Moscow, 1960, p. 99). Golbakh expresses a similar one (see "System of Nature", Moscow, 1940, p. 140). Relativistic interpretation of S., which has an antifeod among the enlighteners. and anticlerical. orientation, proclaiming the freedom of personal S., nevertheless deprives of meaning. To the extent of S. of her personal, "internal" character, makes her an object of influence of the state and society as a whole (although the educators do not deny that S. is the prerogative of the individual. Holbach defines S. as an assessment, to-ruu "... we in our own soul give to our actions "-" Pocket ", M., 1959, p. 172).
This is idealistic. developed the idea of an autonomous personality, which determines morals regardless of society. law. So, Rousseau believes that the laws of virtue "are written in the hearts of everyone" and for knowing them it is enough "... to delve into oneself and in the silence of passions to listen to the voice of one's conscience" . 56). Kant considers truly morals. law for a rational being is only that which gives to itself. The idea of individual autonomy ultimately led to the a priori. According to the interpretation of S. According to Kant, S. is not something acquired. Everyone, as a moral being, has a conscience from birth. The idea of personal autonomy was expressed even more sharply by Fichte, p. to-rogo unity. the criterion of morality is S. of the "pure I", and the submission to the candidate of l. external authority - shamelessness. Subsequently, this individualistic. S.'s interpretation was taken to an extreme in existentialism, in ethics. the concept to-rogo denies the universal character of morals. law: for example, Sartre considers unity. the criterion of morality for the "absolutely free" individual design, the refusal of a person from "bad faith" in k. objective criteria.
Criticism of the relativistic and subjectivist understanding of S. was given already by Hegel, who showed at the same time the contradictory nature of S. With t. Sp. Hegel, S. "has its own truth in the immediate certainty of itself," "determines, proceeding from itself." But this self-confidence of S. entails a "separate person" who can "give ... his conscientiousness" to any content. Therefore, Hegel points out, S. acquires its own only in "universal self-consciousness" thanks to the "general environment" (society) in which a person is located (see Soch., Vol. 4, Moscow, 1959, pp. 339–52 ). However, recognizing the priority of societies. consciousness over the personal, Hegel interprets it objectively and idealistically, as the embodiment of the abs. spirit, but its spontaneity. he considers religion to be an expression in the consciousness of the individual: “So, conscience in the greatness of its superiority over a certain law and any content of duty ... is moral, knowing that the inner voice of its immediate knowledge is the voice of divine ... This lonely worship is at the same time in essence, the service is for the general public ... "(ibid., pp. 351–52).
Feuerbach finds materialistic. the fact that S. appears to a person as the voice of his inner I and at the same time as a voice coming from the outside, entering with the person and condemning his actions. He calls S. "the other self" of man, but points out that this alter does not come from God and does not arise "by a miraculous way of spontaneous generation." "For, as a member of this community, as a member of this tribe, this people, this era, I do not possess in my conscience any special and other criminal statute ... I only reproach myself for what it reproaches me ... or at least he could reproach me if he knew about my actions or he himself became the object of an action deserving reproach "(Izbr. Philos. Prod., vol. 1, Moscow, 1955, p. 630).
The Marxist understanding of S. reveals its social nature and shows it by the conditions of life of a person and his ideological societies. position. "A republican has a different conscience than a royalist, a possessor has a different conscience than a have-not, a thinking person has a different conscience than someone who is incapable of thinking" (K. Marx, see K. Marx and F. Engels, Soch., 2nd ed., Vol. 6, p. 140). Sources of collisions of personal S. should be sought in the final analysis in social contradictions, one way or another affecting the personality and reflected in her consciousness. Contradictions between the interests of different classes, between societies. and personal interests, between the reflection of the socio-historical. the need for the will of societies. institutions and understanding of the individual put before the individual's own. choice, alternatives to-rogo and constitute the problem of his personal S. It is in this sense that Lenin's instruction should be understood that "the idea of determinism, establishing the necessity of human actions, in no way destroys either the mind, or the conscience of a person, or the assessment of his actions" (Op. , vol. 1, p. 142). Marxism does not deny the specifically personal character of S., it only reveals its content: the higher the societies. development of the personality, its social activity and consciousness, the greater the role played in its life S. Conditions of this development of personality are the elimination of class antagonistic. relations in society and then communist. relations, as the approval of to-rykh legal coercion will gradually give way to moralities. influence, and this influence itself will increasingly coincide with the orders of the personal S. and therefore in the overwhelming majority of cases will be carried out through personal awareness of the individual. "... In human relationships, action will be nothing more than a sentence that the offender pronounces over himself ... In other people, on the contrary, he will meet natural saviors from the punishment that he himself imposed on himself ... "(K. Marx and F. Engels, Soch., 2nd ed., vol. 2, p. 197).
Lit .: Lenin V.I., On communist morality, M., 1961; I. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, St. Petersburg, 1908; his, Foundations to the metaphysics of morals, M., 1912; G. Karring, S. in the light of history, trans. from it., St. Petersburg, 1909; Kropotkin P. Α., Ethics, Part 1, P.–M., 1922; Hegel G. V.F., Phenomenology of spirit, Works, vol. 4, M., 1959, p. 339-61; his, Philosophy of Law, vol. 7, M. - L., 1934; Sartre J.-P., Existentialism is, M., 1953; Volchenko LB, Marxist-Leninist about S., "VF", 1962, No 2; Arkhangelsky L. M., Categories of Marxist Ethics, Sverdl., 1963; Berbeshkina Z. Α., The problem of S. in Marxist-Leninist ethics, M., 1963; Sartre JP, L "être et le néant, P., 1943; Revers WJ, Charakterprägung und Gewissensbildung, Nürnberg, 1951; Hollenbach JM, Sein und Gewissen, Baden-Baden, 1954; Das Gewissen des Kindes, Stuttiehr., 1956; R., An interpretation of Christian ethics, Ν. Υ., 1956; his own, Moral and immoral society, NY – L., 1960; Brunner E., Gott und sein Rebell, Hamb., 1958.
O. Drobnitsky. Moscow.
Philosophical Encyclopedia. In 5 volumes - M .: Soviet encyclopedia. Edited by F.V. Konstantinov. 1960-1970 .
CONSCIENCE
CONSCIENCE - the ability of a person, critically assessing himself, to realize and experience his inadequacy to his due - failure to fulfill his duty. Phenomenological manifestations of conscience are internal emotional discomfort ("reproaches, pangs of conscience"), guilt, etc. From a cultural and historical point of view, the idea and concept of conscience are formed in the process of comprehending various mechanisms of self-control. In contrast to fear (before authority, punishment) and shame (which also reflects a person's awareness of his non-compliance with certain accepted norms), conscience is perceived as autonomous. Historically, conscience is rooted in and related to shame; However, even the early attempts to comprehend the experience, which will later be called “conscience”, testify to the desire to differentiate shame itself and highlight as something special “shame in front of oneself” (Democritus, Socrates) - a kind of exteriorized version of the control mechanism that will be called conscience. In ancient Greek mythology, this function was performed by the Erinyes; in “Orestes” by Euripides it was interpreted as “the consciousness of perfect horror”. Corresponding Greek. the word - sineidesis (συνειδησιζ] - goes back to the verb ουνείδηνατ, used in expressions that indicated the responsibility of a person to himself for his wicked acts. , but also consciousness or memories of committed bad deeds or consciousness that evaluates its own actions as worthy or unworthy.
In Christianity, conscience is interpreted as “God's power”, as an indicator of moral duty (Rom. 2:15) - first of all, duty to God (1 Peter 2:19). At the same time, the Apostle Paul speaks of conscience as a value consciousness in general and thereby recognizes that those who adhere to different faiths also have different consciences (1 Cor. 8: 7,10), and therefore the conscience needs Christian cleansing (Heb. 9:14). ), achieved through faith and love. In medieval literature, the deepening of the analysis of the phenomenon of conscience was mediated by the emergence of a special term - sindeiesis - and the formulation of an additional Latin in relation to the traditional. conscientia concepts. In scholastic philosophy, this concept denotes the commanding power of the soul, the inner knowledge of principles, which, in contrast to the “law of reason” (lex rationis), is instilled in man by God. Conscience synderesis, in contrast to conscience-conscientia, that is, a person to evaluate specific actions as good (good) or evil (bad), was interpreted as: a) the ability (or habit) to judge the correctness of actions from the point of view of “initial correctness” which is preserved in the human soul despite the Fall, and b) the ability of the will to perform the right actions. At the same time, the epistemological of these abilities was interpreted differently (by Thomas Aquinas, St. Bonaventure, Duns Scotus). The controversy around this concept revealed the various functions of conscience, more broadly, of moral consciousness: the awareness of values as general foundations of behavior and specific actions in which the accepted values are affirmed or trampled upon, that is, the correlation of specific actions with values. The distinction between conscientia and synderesis was partly preserved by the early Protestant moral theorists. In many new European teachings, conscience is presented as a cognitive and moral force (reason, intuition, feeling), the fundamental human ability to express value judgments, to be aware of oneself as a morally responsible being, deliberately defined in relation to good. In Kant, conscience denotes practical reason in the sense of the medieval concept of synderesis. The development of this line naturally led within the framework of modern European philosophizing to the formation of a broader concept of moral consciousness (in many languages the word “conscience” is related and in tune with the words denoting “consciousness”, “knowledge”), the allocation of its cognitive, imperative and evaluative functions. Along with this, attempts are being made to specify the actual concept of “conscience”. In the most general sense, it is interpreted as an “inner voice”; the differences relate to the understanding of the source of this “voice”, which is perceived either as not dependent on the “I” of a person, or as the voice of his innermost “I”, or as “another I”. Associated with this are various theoretical attitudes regarding the nature of conscience. 1. Conscience is the generalized and interiorized voice of significant others or culture, and its content is culturally and historically changeable; in this vein, conscience can be interpreted as a specific form of shame (T. Hobbes, F. Nietzsche, 3. Freud); in its extreme form, the provision on the external conditionality of conscience is found in the conclusion that conscience is from the political views or the social position of the individual (K. Marx). 2. Conscience expresses a person's feeling of disagreement with himself (J. Locke) and thus acts as one of the certificates of personality and self-awareness of a person (J. Butler, G. Leibniz). Close to such an interpretation is the understanding of conscience as the voice of an impartial rational person (J. Rawls). 3. Conscience, not only metaphorically, but also in essence, is interpreted as “the voice of another”; “With the lips of conscience” the Universal Law, the highest Truth, as it were, is the voice (“call”) of transcendental forces: the guardian angel (Socrates), God (Augustine), natural law (Locke), presence-Desein (M. Heidegger).
These statements are not completely mutually exclusive. The first focuses on the mechanisms of the historical and individual development of conscience; in the other two, on the phenomenology of a less and more mature conscience. As a form of moral self-awareness and self-control, conscience expresses a person's awareness of the failure to fulfill his duty, the failure of good; in this respect, conscience is associated with feelings of responsibility and duty, and no less with the ability to be responsible and to fulfill one's duty. Reproaches of conscience indicate to a person his alienation from the ideal and cause a feeling of guilt. In its highest state, conscience means the disappearance of duty in free good will.
These differences are associated with discrepancies in the understanding of the content of conscience and the role that it plays in the moral life of a person. Conscience can be interpreted negatively and positively. As a negative conscience appears reproving and warning, even frighteningly warning (Nietzsche), critical of the past, judging (Kant). In a positive interpretation, conscience, contrary to popular beliefs about it, also appears to be calling, prompting for care and “determination” (Heidegger). The interpretation of conscience as the voice of God is predetermined by the understanding of it as a call to perfection; accordingly, conscience is recognized by a person as the will to perfection and is the main manifestation of the inner liberation of the individual. The perfectionist dominant of conscience in individual moral experience is revealed in such a moral self-puzzling of a person, in which he is determined precisely in relation to the morally better.
The expressions “clear conscience” or “clear conscience” in ordinary speech denote a person's awareness of the fulfillment of their obligations or the realization of all their capabilities in a given situation. Essentially, in such cases, it is about dignity. The interpretation of the actual phenomenon of “clear conscience” is different in different normative-value contexts. First, a "clear conscience" confirms the consciousness, oriented towards the external, its compliance with the requirements imposed from the outside, and therefore evokes a feeling of well-being and security,
CONSCIENCE - the ability of a person to critically assess his actions, thoughts, desires, experiencing and realizing his inadequacy to the requirements of duty and ideal. The idea and concept of S. are formed in the process of comprehending various mechanisms of self-control. In contrast to fear (before authority, punishment) and shame (which also reflects a person's awareness of his inadequacy to a number of accepted norms), S. is perceived as an autonomous entity. As a moral regulator, it is valued above prudence, orients a person to follow the perfect ideal.
S. is ontologically rooted in shame and is related to it; however, S. is a special kind of shame, “shame before oneself,” a person's sense of responsibility before oneself for committed wicked acts. The Latin word "conscientia" was used to denote not only consciousness in general, but also the awareness of committed bad deeds or consciousness that evaluates its own actions as worthy or unworthy. According to Christian teaching, S. is "God's power" in man and is fully revealed through the revelation of Christ. In the Christian era, S. is interpreted as an internal moral law, "the voice of God"; S.'s torment is perceived as an expression of internal discord, and the inner discord itself is assessed as an undoubted sign of conscientiousness ( Augustine). In medieval literature, the deepening of the analysis of the phenomenon of S. was mediated by the emergence of a special term - "sinderesis", additional to the traditional Latin concept of "conscientia"; by means of "sinderesis" is denoted the commanding power of the soul, the inner knowledge of principles, which, in contrast to the "law of reason", is instilled in man by God. At the same time, the epistemological status of C.-synderesis and C.-conscientia was interpreted differently. In modern European thought, S. is presented as a cognitive and moral force, as a fundamental human ability to express value judgments, to be aware of himself as a morally responsible being, deliberately determined in relation to good. The development of this line in the analysis of the phenomenon of S. naturally led to the formation of a broader concept of moral consciousness (in many languages the word “S.” is related and consonant with words denoting “consciousness”, “knowledge”), the allocation of its cognitive, imperative and evaluative functions. Along with this, attempts are being made to specify the actual concept of "C."
In the most general terms, S. is interpreted as an "inner voice"; the differences relate to the understanding of the source of this "voice", which is perceived as independent of a person's I or as the voice of his innermost I, or as "another I". Associated with this are various theoretical attitudes regarding the nature of S: a) S is a generalized and interiorized voice of significant authorities or culture as a whole, and its content is culturally and historically changeable; b) S. expresses a person's feeling of disagreement with himself and thus acts as one of the certificates of personality and self-consciousness of a person; c) S. is interpreted not only metaphorically, but also in essence as “the voice of another”; "Through the mouth of S." says the Universal Law, the highest Truth. S. is the voice ("call") of transcendental power. These attitudes are not completely mutually exclusive; in the first - attention is focused on the mechanisms of historical and individual development of S .; in the other two - on the phenomenology of the less and more mature S. As a form of moral self-awareness and self-control, S. expresses a person's awareness of the failure to fulfill his duty, the failure of good; in this respect, S. is associated with feelings of responsibility and duty, and also, to an equal degree, with the ability to be responsible and to fulfill one's duty. S.'s reproaches indicate to a person his deviations from the ideal and cause a feeling of guilt.
These differences are associated with discrepancies in the understanding of the content of S. and the role that it plays in the moral life of a person. S. can be interpreted negatively and positively. As negative, S. appears reproachful and warning, even frighteningly warning (Nietzsche), critical of the past, judging (Kant). As positive, S., in contrast to popular ideas about her, also appears to be inviting, encouraging care and "determination" (Heidegger). By the discretion of S. as the voice of God, the understanding of her as a call to perfection is predetermined; accordingly, conscience is recognized by a person as the will to perfection and is the main manifestation of the inner liberation of the individual. A person's inability to orient himself towards the perfect and spiritually higher can lead to the distortion or destruction of the "act of conscience" ( I.A. Ilyin).
Expressions "calm S." or "pure S." in ordinary speech, they denote a person's awareness of the fulfillment of their obligations or the realization of all their capabilities in a given specific situation; while "pure S." can be interpreted as an expression of: a) feelings of well-being and security, as a consequence of obedience and dependence (E. Fromm); b) a person's reaction to the achieved perfection, to the inner wholeness and completeness, self-righteous consciousness (Hegel); c) the tendency not to pay attention to the judgments of S. (Kant). And vice versa, S.'s torment means rejection of oneself as such; condemnation of oneself, repentance, expression of regret for the deed and the intention not to do it in the future. The expression "freedom S." denotes the right of a person to the independence of the inner spiritual life and to independently determine their beliefs. In a narrower sense, "S.'s freedom" means freedom of religion and worship. In the strictly ethical sense of the word, S. cannot be other than free, and freedom in its consistent expression is nothing more than life according to S.
Literature:
Hegel G. The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate / Philosophy of Religion. T. 1.M., 1975;
Ilyin I. A. The path of spiritual renewal / The path to evidence. M., 1993;
Kant I. Metaphysics of Mores / Works. T. 4 (2). M., 1965;
Nietzsche F. Genealogy of Morality / Works. In 2 xt. T. 2.M., 1990;
Heidegger M. Genesis and Time. M., 1997;
Fromm E. Man for himself / Psychoanalysis and ethics. M., 1993;
Butler J. Five Sermons Indianapolis: Hackett Publ. Co., 1983.
Dictionary of philosophical terms. Scientific edition of Professor V.G. Kuznetsova. M., INFRA-M, 2007, p. 523-524.
Conscience represents the ability of a person, critically assessing their actions, thoughts, desires, to realize and experience their inadequacy - failure to fulfill their duty.
Just as duty is autonomous, so a person's conscience is essentially independent of the opinions of others. In this, conscience differs from another internal control mechanism of consciousness - shame. Shame and conscience are generally quite close. Shame also reflects a person's awareness of his own (as well as those close and involved in it) of inconsistency with some accepted norms or expectations of others and, therefore, guilt. However, shame is completely focused on the opinion of others, who can express their condemnation of violations of norms, and the experience of shame is stronger, the more important and significant these persons are for a person. Therefore, an individual may experience shame - even for accidental, unintended results of actions or for actions that seem normal to him, but which, as he knows, are not recognized as such by the environment. The logic of shame is something like this: “They think this way about me. They are wrong. And nevertheless I am ashamed because they think so about me. "
The logic of conscience is different. And this was comprehended historically quite early.
Democritus, who lived at the turn of the 5th and 4th centuries. BC he does not yet know the special word "conscience". But it requires a new understanding of the shameful: “Do not say or do anything wrong, even if you are alone with yourself. learn to be much more ashamed of yourself than of others. " And in another place: “One should be ashamed of oneself as much as others, and equally not do evil, whether it remains unknown to anyone or everyone knows about it. But most should be ashamed of himself, and in every soul should be inscribed the law: "Do not do anything obscene."
In conscience, decisions, actions, and evaluations are not related to the opinions or expectations of others, but to duty. Conscience requires you to be honest in the dark - to be honest when no one can control you, when the secret becomes clear, when no one finds out about your possible dishonesty.
Subjectively, conscience can be perceived as an inner, but alien voice (especially when it rarely declares itself or is rarely listened to), as a voice, as if independent of a person's “I”, the voice of “another self”. Hence, two opposite conclusions are drawn regarding the nature of conscience. One is that conscience is the voice of God. Another is that conscience is a generalized and internalized (transferred to the inner plane) voice of significant others. So conscience is interpreted as a specific form of shame, and its content is recognized as individual, culturally and historically changeable. In extreme form, this conclusion is found in the position that conscience is determined by the political views or social status of the individual.
These points of view are not mutually exclusive: the first focuses on the mechanism of functioning of a mature conscience, the second on how it matures and is formed; the first considers conscience primarily from the side of its form, the second - from the side of its concrete content. Conscience is in fact formed in the process of socialization and education, through constant instructions to the child about “what is good and what is bad,” etc. In the early stages of personality formation, conscience is manifested as a “voice” of a significant environment (reference group) - parents, educators, peers, as a command of some authority, and, accordingly, is found in fear of possible disapproval, condemnation, punishment, as well as in shame for their actual or perceived inconsistency with the expectations of significant others. In the practice of upbringing, the appeal of the educator to the conscience of the child, as a rule, expresses the requirement of diligence, obedience, compliance with the prescribed norms and rules. But this is the case from the point of view of the development of this moral ability. However, a formed conscience speaks a language that is timeless and non-dimensional. Conscience is the voice of the “other self” of a person, that part of his soul that is not burdened with the cares and consolations of every day; conscience speaks as if in the name of eternity, referring to the dignity of the individual. Conscience is the responsibility of a person to himself, but to himself as the bearer of the highest, universal values.
Since conscience indicates the conformity or non-conformity of an act to duty, then, therefore, an "act according to conscience" is an act out of a sense of duty, it is an act that the conscience requires. The conscience insists on the fulfillment of duty. On the duty to conscience, Kant said:
"Cultivate your conscience, listen more and more to the voice of the inner judge and use all means for this."
And this is the duty that a person has to himself: to improve, including in the honest and consistent performance of duty.
The moral consciousness is intriguing with conclusions, which to a sound mind seem to be either logical circles or tautologies. But these are all signs of the autonomy of the moral spirit, which cannot get itself out of anything and, unable to calm down, asserts itself through itself.
In ordinary speech, we can use expressions "Clear conscience" or "Clear conscience". They are understood as the fact of a person's awareness of the fulfillment of their obligations or the realization of all their capabilities in a given specific situation. Strictly speaking, in such cases we are talking about dignity, and the words "clear conscience" can only express a person's ambition to achieve perfection, to inner integrity and harmony. The state of a "clear", "calm" conscience (if we take this phrase literally) is a sure sign dishonesty, that is, not a lack of conscience, but a tendency not to pay attention to her judgments. It is not for nothing that it is generally accepted that a "clear conscience" is an invention of the devil.
In the parable of Jesus about the prayer of the Pharisee and the publican, it is said that the Pharisee in prayer thanked God for his special piety, while the publican, without raising his eyes to heaven and striking his chest, only asked God for mercy to himself for his sins. The publican is justified before God, “for everyone who exalts himself will be humiliated, but he who humbles himself will be exalted” (Luke 18: 9-14).
The Pharisee is confident that he has fulfilled his duty and that his conscience is clear. But duty to God means, among other things, humility. Self-conceit and arrogance contradict him.
The highest moral duty of a person is to contribute to the good of others and to improve, in particular in the performance of duty. Improvement is potentially endless. The assumption of an individual that he has achieved perfection indicates his imperfection (more on this in topic 26).
So confidence in the purity of one's own conscience is either hypocrisy, or a sign of moral underdevelopment, blindness in relation to one's own mistakes and mistakes, inevitable for every person, or evidence of calmness and, therefore, the death of the soul. On the contrary, there is hope in the feeling of the uncleanness of one's own conscience. In the pangs of conscience - not only contempt for oneself, but also longing for enlightenment and self-purification, which means a desire to correct a mistake, to answer for a crime. In the throes of conscience - an effort to perfection. The pangs of conscience mark the rejection of oneself as such. Condemnation of oneself consists repentance, or repentance, as a clearly expressed regret for the deed and the intention (or at least hope) not to do what will be regretful in the future. In an admission of guilt (which can take the form confessional confession) and in the conscious acceptance of punishment, redeemer guilt, this intention can turn into determination. In the strict sense of the word, this determination is virtue in general: as a person's resilience in the performance of his duty - despite natural hesitation, doubt, skepticism, despondency.
A much more common expression "freedom of conscience" denotes a person's right to the independence of his inner spiritual life and the ability to determine his own convictions; in a narrower and more widespread sense, "freedom of conscience" refers to freedom of religion and organized worship.
However, in the strictly ethical sense of the word, conscience cannot be other than free, and freedom in its consistent expression cannot be anything other than living according to conscience.
CONTROL QUESTIONS
1. What is the imperative of morality?
2. How do the value and imperative characteristics of morality compare?
2. What are the main approaches to the problem of the relationship between the proper and the valuable in the history of philosophy?
4. How is the universality (universality) of moral precepts expressed?
5. What is the commonality and difference between shame and conscience?
6. How can the requirement “ Be honest in the dark»?
ADDITIONAL LITERATURE
Hegel G.V. F. philosophy of law. M., 1990.S. 172-198.
Drobnitsky O.G. The concept of morality. M., 1974. S. 299–329.
Kant I. Foundations of the metaphysics of morality // Kant I. Op. in 6 t.M., 1965.T. 4 (1). S. 243-283. Or, according to a new translation: Kant I. Foundations for the metaphysics of morals // Kant I. Soch. M., 1997.T. III. S. 99–205.
This text is an introductory fragment.4. Conscience. - If ignorance is a turning point from which the source of every possibility affects us, if dizziness and horror force us to move, if fear as the consciousness of the possibility of being destroyed in mixed freedom (das bewu? Tsein m? Glichen Vertilgtwerdenk? Nnens in verwirrter
§ 4. Conscience Conscience is sometimes called the other side of duty. Conscience is a self-evaluating feeling, an experience, one of the most ancient intimate personal regulators of human behavior. Conscience is a category of ethics that characterizes a person's ability to carry out moral
2. Conscience Whoever speaks and ponders over the evil he has done, over the meanness he has committed, what he thinks about it means that he is absorbed - with his whole soul completely immersed in his thoughts, and therefore he is still not free from their meanness. And he surely won't be able to
JUNE 19 (Conscience) Conscience is the consciousness of its spiritual origin. And only when she is such a consciousness, she is the true leader of people's lives.1 During the period of conscious life, a person can often notice in himself two separate beings: one is blind, sensual, and
SEPTEMBER 10 (Conscience) The instructions of conscience are infallible when they require us not to affirm our animal personality, but to sacrifice it. God does not give by measure (John 3:34), cannot
OCTOBER 23 (Conscience) Conscience is the consciousness of the divine principle living in us.1 “Conscience! Children's delusions, prejudices of upbringing, - I hear the friendly voices of imaginary sages. “There is nothing in a person’s mind except that which is given by experience,” they say. Even more, they
Conscience Conscience is the ability of a person, critically assessing his actions, thoughts, desires, to realize and experience his inadequacy - non-fulfillment of duty. Just as a duty is autonomous, so a person's conscience, in essence, is independent of opinion
a. Authoritarian conscience An authoritarian conscience is the voice of an internalized external authority: parents, the state, or whoever a given culture recognizes as an authority. As long as people's attitude to authority remains external, devoid of ethical sanction,
b. Humanistic Conscience Humanistic conscience is not an internalized voice of authority that we seek to please and whose displeasure we fear; it is our own voice that resounds in every human being and does not depend on external sanctions and
Conscience “Whoever speaks and ponders over the evil he has done, over the meanness he has committed, what he thinks about it means that he is absorbed - with his whole soul completely immersed in his thoughts, and therefore he is still not free from their meanness. And he surely won't be able to
v. Humanistic Conscience Humanistic conscience is not the internalized voice of authority that we try to please and fear of discontent; it is our own voice, independent of external sanctions and approvals. What is the nature of this voice?
Conscience Sometimes tragedies are played out in life with a plot so mathematically verified that it seems: it was composed for an instructive analysis in an ethics lesson or during a discussion on a moral topic.
