Home Roses Babkin sergey Krasnoyarsk regional department of the FSB. How peace returned to Chechnya: the story of an FSB general. Why is "unbending"

Babkin sergey Krasnoyarsk regional department of the FSB. How peace returned to Chechnya: the story of an FSB general. Why is "unbending"

The fight against extremism in Russia is gaining momentum. In this case, this is not about bloggers or criminals seeking to give a political shade to their person in order to avoid punishment, but about real extremists - those who commit terrorist acts and organize wars within sovereign states. In this regard, the memoirs of direct participants in the First and, especially, the Second Chechen wars seem especially valuable.


After all, it was precisely those events in the fate of Russia that showed how dangerous extremists can be if they are allowed to raise their heads even in a relatively small region. And how much grief they can bring to the whole country, trying by force to realize their ideas about the structure of society.

An interview with FSB General Sergei Leonidovich Babkin talks about those events. General Babkin surprisingly accurately showed the underlying reasons for the return of Chechnya to the Russian Federation, from which it was de facto withdrawn before the second Chechen war.

Much has been written about the events of the Second Chechen War. Some of the information about the actions of the security forces is, in principle, known. For example, the work of the Regional Operational Headquarters, the so-called ROSH, has been described quite well in the press. ROSH was responsible for the full return of Chechnya to Russia - both for the military and for the civilian component.

The greatest media attention, quite naturally, was awarded to the United Group of Troops (Forces) in the North Caucasus - OGV (s), which was headed at various times by famous Russian military leaders Viktor Kazantsev, Vladimir Moltenskoy, Sergei Makarov, Valery Baranov, Vyacheslav Dadonov. The increased attention to the OGV (s) is due to the fact that, of course, the most dramatic and publicly visible events unfolded with the participation of troops - first of all, units of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as special services - among which the FSB and the GRU played the most significant role.

In addition to the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSB, the OGV (s) included the Police, Border Troops, the Ministry of Justice, and the Prosecutor's Office. The total number of security officials controlled by the UGV (s) was about 100 thousand.

Much has been written about the heroic path of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, which at various times during this period was commanded by the legendary Russian military generals Vladimir Chirkin, Sergei Surovikin, Arkady Bakhin. It was this structure that provided military military measures in Chechnya - practically everything, except for the actions of combat aviation, which motorized riflemen simply do not have.

Much less is known about the actions of the FSB and the GRU in Chechnya, due to their traditional secrecy.

From the FSB General Babkin, who headed the FSB of the Chechen Republic during the Second Chechen War, in the first place, one could expect a story about the work of the FSB. However, as a strategically thinking and acting person, Lieutenant General Sergei Babkin showed that the return of Chechnya to Russia was a much deeper undertaking than military operations and the actions of special services. Surprisingly, Sergei Babkin showed something that, in principle, no one hid. However, not everyone who saw these facts lying on the surface noticed them, and even less understood them.

Here is an interview with Sergei Babkin:

The newest history of Russia has not yet been written. All the more important is the testimony of participants and eyewitnesses of the events. Our interlocutor today is retired FSB Lieutenant General Sergei Leonidovich Babkin. In 1999-2000, during the counter-terrorist operation on the territory of the Chechen Republic, he was the head of the FSB task force of the federal forces in the North Caucasus "West", which was commanded by Vladimir Shamanov, and in 2001-2003 he worked as the head of the FSB Directorate for the Chechen Republic.

Sergei Leonidovich, the situation in the North Caucasus at the start of the second Chechen campaign was difficult ...

Sergey Babkin: The situation was extremely difficult. According to the Khasavyurt agreements, Chechnya gained de facto independence from Russia. Federal government bodies did not operate on its territory. It would seem that Chechnya has achieved what it fought for - independence. But then nothing happened.

The central Chechen government was more nominal than real. There was a simple rule in the republic: the one who had more trunks was right. The republic actually turned into a criminal enclave, on the territory of which no laws at all worked. Various criminals from all over Russia fled there in droves and found refuge there.

Kidnapping and the slave trade flourished. Hundreds of people in all regions of Russia were forcibly captured and transported to Chechnya. Then they either demanded a ransom for them, or turned them into slaves. The republic was becoming a breeding ground for world terrorism. The well-known terrorist Khattab organized militant training camps, where various terrorist attacks were planned, which were then carried out in Russia.

Wahhabism flourished on this soil, which, under the slogan of creating a caliphate, led to an attempt to spread this order beyond the borders of Chechnya, to the entire North Caucasus. Armed detachments of militants invaded Dagestan and tried to take control of it. The patience of the federal authorities has run out. This is how the second Chechen war began.

Did the Chechens like this order?

Sergey Babkin: Most did not like it at all, but they simply had nowhere to go. But there were also real forces in Chechnya that tried to resist this order. First of all, these are groups controlled by Akhmad Kadyrov and the Yamadayev brothers. From the very beginning of the campaign, the federal authorities took a course of cooperation with them, and this decision contributed to the successful implementation of the tasks set.

What tasks did the federal troops face in Chechnya?

Sergei Babkin: The first thing is to defeat the militants and restore constitutional order. At the same time, to minimize the loss of personnel and civilian population - peaceful Chechens. General Shamanov, who commanded the western grouping of forces in 1999, came to an agreement with entire regions and their elders that he would not bomb the corresponding settlements, and from there there would be no shelling of federal troops. Of course, the elders took a big risk, because in the eyes of the militants they looked like "traitors." And yet it worked. The Chechens even surrendered their weapons - a little, but they did.

Why was the second Chechen campaign more successful than the first?

Sergei Babkin: A lot has changed in Russia itself. On December 31, 1999, President Yeltsin left office and transferred powers to Vladimir Putin. The first thing he did was fly to Chechnya and congratulate the servicemen on the New Year. I remember well - it then made a tremendous impression on everyone. If in the first Chechen war the federal troops were constantly haunted by some sense of betrayal on the part of the authorities, then in the second there was confidence that this time the matter would be brought to an end. The army and special services were given the opportunity to work as they can - professionally.

Much has changed in Chechnya as well. The euphoria from the "struggle for freedom" was gone, the independence obtained turned out to be not at all attractive for the majority. Therefore, the population already perceived the federal troops as liberators.

The defeat of the militants was, in general, predetermined. But this was only the beginning of solving a much more complex problem.

Sergei Babkin: Reconstruction of the Chechen economy, its reintegration into the Russian economic space. It is impossible to convey in words what the economy of the republic was. There are practically no industrial enterprises - in some places there are handicrafts. The education system has been destroyed, and so has the health care system. Even subsistence farming was dangerous - many fields were mined. Almost complete absence of energy, roads, infrastructure. We can say that the economy did not just exist - it existed with a minus sign. And without the economy, there can be no peaceful, stable life.

And where did the economic recovery begin?

Sergey Babkin: From the shots. At that time, Chechnya did not have its own managerial staff of such a scale to create from scratch the economy and financial system of an entire republic. After all, Chechnya had been at war for many years; it was not educated people who were in demand, but those who knew how to hold weapons. Therefore, we invited qualified specialists from all over Russia. An experienced power engineer and business executive Stanislav Ilyasov was appointed chairman of the Chechen government. He was originally from Dagestan, so he was perceived as "his own". And Sergei Abramov, a strong professional with a Caucasian character, became Minister of Finance. Oleg Zhidkov, an experienced Caucasian politician, was invited to the post of mayor of Grozny. Small teams of like-minded people arrived with them. I would like to especially emphasize: accepting the offer to work in Chechnya required from candidates not only high professionalism, but also considerable personal courage.

And what was it?

Sergey Babkin: At that time it was a very dangerous job. All members of the government took with them to work not only a briefcase with official documents, but also a machine gun. There was no other way ... I remember the difficult conditions in which the government and administration moved from Gudermes to Grozny in May-July 2001. The city was destroyed, the daily shelling and explosions, the working and living conditions are literally Spartan, and at the same time it was necessary to make a lot of urgent and responsible decisions.

Or the population census conducted in Russia and, naturally, in Chechnya in 2002. How can you plan something without knowing how many people live in the republic and which of them can work? So, the census takers went from house to house, accompanied by military commandant's offices or employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. And how many terrorist attacks aimed at destroying census data have been stopped by the FSB!

But the most difficult thing was for the members of the government. Here is Sergei Abramov, whom I mentioned. In what alterations have not been. Once he was late for a helicopter - and right before his eyes he was shot down, everyone on board died. In December 2002, suicide bombers attacked the Government House, killing and injuring a large number of people. The explosion was so powerful that the engine from the "Kamaz" terrorists pierced the building and got stuck in the last wall. She saved Abramov's employees and himself. Then he survived several more assassination attempts. And he did not break down, went down in the history of Chechnya as an "unyielding" minister of finance, and then as a prime minister.

Why "unbending"?

Sergei Babkin: Because "so simply", without legal grounds, I did not give money to anyone. Once Abramov was even taken to be shot for this. He had, let's say, a group of local residents armed with machine guns demanded to issue a large sum of money from the republican treasury. Having received a refusal, Abramov was taken out into the street, placed against the wall, took aim and fired a volley, as it turned out later, over his head. But we never got a dime. A lot can be said about the difficult everyday life of everyone who took on the heavy burden of establishing a peaceful life in Chechnya. I'm not even talking about law enforcement officers who performed heroic deeds on a daily basis. This is a separate topic, and you can talk about it for hours.

How was the result evaluated? According to the reports of the authorities or the military?

Sergey Babkin: Not only by reports. First, the Russian president personally repeatedly studied the situation, made adjustments, visiting both Grozny and remote areas. Secondly, Sergei Ivanov, who was then the Minister of Defense, constantly came to Chechnya. In addition to inspecting the troops of the 42nd division, which worked in Chechnya, he actively participated in establishing a peaceful life. Somewhere he helped with advice, but somewhere he used the resources of the Ministry of Defense. And when a leader personally sees how things are on the ground, you cannot fool him with phony reporting.

The head of the Operational Headquarters (OSH) - Director of the FSB Nikolai Patrushev, heads of the State Duma, ministries and departments regularly visited the republic. They immediately made a lot of decisions directly in the Chechen Republic, provided practical assistance to local authorities.

And the results were not long in coming. For example, they opened the Argunskaya CHPP with great enthusiasm, greeted the first plane after the restoration of air communication with the republic, the first train, rejoiced at the first calls via cellular communications.

In 2003, kindergartens and schools began to appear in military camps. The officers brought the families to Chechnya. This, of course, is an indicator that a peaceful life was actively improving. After all, who, if not the officers, knew the real state of affairs.

Have you covered the path to a peaceful life in three years?

Sergei Babkin: Not quite so. But after three years it became possible to bring families of servicemen, life was much quieter and safer. Although the process of eliminating bandit formations, as a rule, is very long. For example, after the Great Patriotic War, the "forest brothers" in the Baltic region were destroyed for more than ten years. There are about the same number of Basmachs after the civil one in Central Asia. When the territory of Chechnya was completely taken under control by the army, the militants switched to guerrilla tactics, and the difficult work of identifying and destroying them began. On the one hand, law enforcement agencies worked, and on the other, an economic base was created, jobs were opened so that people could quickly return to a peaceful life. Of course, all this was very difficult, every step forward improved the situation, but it remained very far from the norm.

But nevertheless, we managed to restore the economy of Chechnya, it is gaining momentum, the life of Chechens is changing for the better ...

Sergei Babkin: We did it. Most people think that all this is due to the fact that a lot of federal money was sent to the republic. This is, of course, true. But I think more about those people with whom I then had to work together. If it were not for their heroic work in the full sense of the word, now in Chechnya it would be completely different.


Our interlocutor

Babkin Sergey Leonidovich. Was born in 1960. Graduated from the Tyumen Higher Military School and the Yu.V. Andropov Red Banner Institute. During the events in the Republic of Dagestan, he was the deputy head of the FSB of the Russian Federation for the North Caucasian Military District. In the course of the counter-terrorist operation on the territory of the Chechen Republic, he headed the task force of the FSB of the Russian Federation for the "West" group, which was commanded by Vladimir Shamanov. From February 19, 2001 - Head of the FSB Directorate for the Chechen Republic.

Oleg Petrovsky: Sergei Leonidovich, the monstrous sabotage in the United States shocked humanity. The world has changed - people in many countries talk about it. Chechen fighters have someone to learn from. What can you expect from terrorists in the North Caucasus?

Sergey Babkin: As a professional, I can say that, in principle, such actions can be arranged in any country in the world. But in Russia there have always been quite strict security measures, both on domestic and foreign flights. The only thing is that terrorists can use the planes of foreign countries that are not searched in Russia. Can anyone give a 100% guarantee that the extremists will not try to hijack an airliner heading to Russia from some African country or a neighboring state? There are such concerns. In Chechnya itself, the bandits can charge a car with explosives to the maximum, drive it up and blow it up near an unguarded building. After the news of the terrorist attacks in America, we took additional security measures and increased security. I will not say that this is something out of the ordinary. It's just that we all shook ourselves up, gathered, because it is known that constant danger dulls our vigilance. Militant field commanders regularly express their intentions to carry out a major terrorist attack. They planned the next such date for September 15th.

OP: According to some reports, after the news of the explosions in American cities, one of the gangs, entrenched in the mountains, saluted success so violently that it betrayed itself and was partially destroyed by federal forces ...

S. B .: I do not know what they celebrated there and what they were happy about, but over the course of three days a number of shock strikes of artillery were delivered in the Vedeno region. This is confirmed by our operational data. There are losses in the detachments of Basayev and Khattab.

OP: At the beginning of this year, the leadership of the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya was transferred to the Russian FSB. Is this decision still in effect today?

S. B .: The fight against terrorists in Chechnya has its own specifics. We do not command the republic. The FSB of Russia coordinates the actions of all power structures present in the North Caucasus. Nobody canceled this decision. Moreover, a coordination department of the FSB of the Russian Federation will be created in the Chechen Republic ...

OP: And yet, why are the leaders of the extremists still evading retaliation?

S. B .: Professionals are acting against Russia who, realizing that they are being hunted, are extremely cautious. It is unrealistic to block all the paths and caves overnight. The militants have an effective system of reconnaissance, observation and warning. Part of the population, especially in mountainous areas, is accomplices of bandits, who are very hesitant. When strangers appear, militant observers report "upward", and the leaders leave the dangerous area. We lack efficiency to some extent, but not because we are clumsy. We will not throw people under bullets with a 50-50 guarantee. Neutralization operations for warlords are being prepared in such a way as to keep casualties to a minimum. So the opinion about the elusiveness of Maskhadov due to any underwater currents can only be formed in Moscow. I hope that by the end of this year, at least one leader of the extremists, who is responsible for more than one high-profile crime, will decrease.

OP: Can we talk about any time frame for the continuation of the entire counter-terrorist operation?

S. B.: This is not a war in the direct sense. With the capture of the capital, the defeat of one or another formation, one cannot celebrate a victory. World experience shows that the fight against terrorists can take a long time. I think in two or three years we will be able to say how long we will operate in the same regime in Chechnya - a year or five years.

OP: Your opinion on the possibility of introducing a state of emergency on the territory of Chechnya.

S. B .: Why don't they want to introduce an emergency? I think this question should be addressed first of all to the State Duma, to the presidential administration. It is possible that this step implies the infusion of financial and other huge funds, which is very problematic at the moment.

OP: The recent special operation in the village of Alleroy, during which more than 20 militants were killed and dozens detained, is called one of the most successful in recent years. At the same time, there were rumors that Maskhadov managed to escape from the blockaded village with the help of people related to the administration of the republic ...

S. B .: We do not comment on rumors.

OP: And yet, can this be allowed?

S. B .: Without being tied to specific names and place of action, I can assume that the head of a particular settlement may be associated with the militants. At least this cannot be ruled out. A person has a large family, he is dependent on bandits who can kill his relatives. The militants dictate conditions under the threat of death, and if they also pay, then the person will work for them. Today, without exception, all heads of the administrations of villages and auls are faced with a choice. But we only rely on specific facts. In particular, the FSB officers were actively working on the former deputy of the administration of the Chechen Republic Idrisov. This person, suspected of kidnapping and theft of funds, has been arrested. Kadyrov personally appealed to the President of Russia, fussing for Idrisov, but the facts speak for themselves, the law is the law.

OP: From time to time there are calls for negotiations with Maskhadov. How do you assess this prospect?

S. B .: We fight gangs and that says it all. What kind of negotiations can there be with murderers and pathological criminals? I can declare with full responsibility that no negotiations have been conducted with them and will not be conducted. We have a specific task ahead of us. Time will pass - the gangs will cease to exist, the Gelaevs, Abalaevs and so on will sink into oblivion. Another thing is that you can conduct a dialogue with those who have decided to end resistance and lay down their arms. For example, the same Gelayev has about 500 militants, among whom there are different people. We are ready to speak only with those on whom there is no blood. Gangs of 10, 15 people hand over weapons to us. Last week, two people came with a confession. As a rule, those who decided to return to a peaceful life contact us through intermediaries. There is only one answer - a person who participated in a bandit formation can be amnestied only if he did not kill, did not commit acts of terrorism. However, a lot has already been said on this topic.

OP: In Chechnya, special operations tactics are used against specific gangs and field commanders. On the other hand, in the last days of summer, the situation in the mountains, which were previously considered the fiefdom of Basayev and Khattab, worsened. How do you assess what is happening in the republic?

S. B .: Now we note a sharp aggravation of the operational situation in the republic as a whole, which may continue until mid-October. But we predicted this moment and prepared for new sorties and provocations of the militants. Their activity at this stage can be explained quite simply. If you remember, then in the spring of this year they (field commanders - OP) also shouted that with the onset of the greenfield, a black streak would come for the federal forces. This is a long-used technique, if you will, a method of information warfare. But threats and intimidation are one thing, and the real facts are quite another. The leaders of the militants - the same Basayev and Khattab - are well aware that they have a month or two left for active actions, and are trying to make the most of this time to destabilize the situation. Time doesn't work for bandits. By the end of October, the mountains will become "bare", and it will be problematic for gangs to move there. According to radio intercepts, the gang leaders fear the onset of the autumn-winter period.

In late August - early September, about 150 militants infiltrated the Shelkovo region of Chechnya. They crossed the Terek in groups of 15-20 people. The extremists tried to change the situation, but they failed.

"... On the territory of the Shelkovsky district, in the forest and the so-called burun section, in order to eliminate the Baltic Fleet, which penetrated there with the aim of committing sabotage and terrorist actions and organizing ambushes on the Kizlyar-Chervlennaya highway, the 6-1 brigades of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation were artillery strikes were made on places of probable accumulation of bandits.According to the intelligence data of the FSB of the Russian Federation in the Chechen Republic, a UAZ-469 car was destroyed, more than 5 militants were killed and wounded.

In the Shelkovsky district, officers of the RF FSB for the Chechen Republic, as part of the implementation of the previously obtained information, detained a bomber-demolitionist Charaev Luti, from whom a large number of components for the manufacture of radio-controlled IEDs, including a machine for detonating landmines, were seized. "

Slowly, but nevertheless, the situation is normalizing in the city of Grozny, where several gangs specializing in murders, laying mines and land mines have recently been neutralized. As a result, the number of explosions and shelling has decreased. But in the capital of the republic there are still about 10-15 terrorist groups of about 10 people each, which continue to raid. We benefit from the fact that they are scattered. The elimination of extremists continues. Last month, as a result of special operations, dozens of bandits were killed, more than fifty in the last decade of the month alone. This year, the FSB officers in the Chechen Republic have already brought 17 criminal cases to court on persons accused of terrorism, participation in illegal armed groups, illegal possession and possession of weapons.

OP: The American special services, investigating the barbaric terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, established Osama bin Laden's involvement in them. Meanwhile, Russia has repeatedly stated that terrorist # 1 is financing Chechen fighters. To what extent does this aid go to the militants?

S. B .: We also associate the current activity of the militants with the financial flows coming from abroad. In general, these amounts are calculated in millions of US dollars. Foreign tranches are managed by a circle of so-called field commanders. The money is scattered. The main supplier of funds is known - it is the international extremist organization "Muslim Brotherhood". In addition, Chechen militants constantly use private donations from tycoons from the Middle Eastern countries - Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman. According to the FSB of Russia, there is a separate financing of extremists in the North Caucasus and terrorist number one - Osama bin Laden. "Bloody" money comes to Chechnya through Dagestan, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Georgia. This year, by joint actions of the FSB of Russia, including our department, with representatives of other law enforcement agencies, it was possible to block and liquidate several channels through which large sums of money were received from abroad.

In the spring of this year, the flow of finance has decreased slightly. Some time ago, as a result of a joint operation of the FSB officers in the Chechen Republic and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, two couriers were detained, who more than once carried out assignments to deliver funds. Operational and investigative actions are carried out with them. And yet I repeat that even today the sums received by the field commanders are still significant. The obvious cannot be denied.

Another characteristic feature is that militants are increasingly using the fairer sex. The overwhelming majority of couriers are women. Money is smuggled across the border, taking advantage of the fact that women are paid less attention at border points, and are not searched at checkpoints.

In addition, on the "other" side, among the leaders of gangs and large detachments, their own "subjective" processes take place. According to our information, part of the funds allocated by Arab sponsors for the terrorist attacks and the purchase of weapons disappeared, or rather, was plundered by several field commanders, which caused irritation abroad. This misuse of funds forced the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood to send additional inspectors to Chechnya for verification. The so-called "operators" of this organization were present in the gangs before, controlling the use of their funds.

The issue of dividing money among terrorists is very acute. On this basis, conflicts have been recorded between the militants - local residents and alien bandits. Several lower- and middle-level Chechen warlords are dissatisfied with the fact that they are doing the main job, but the money still goes to the Arabs. In a number of regions of Chechnya there are groups of Arab mercenaries who use exclusively Chechens as demolitionists. In Grozny, the number of cases of undermining saboteurs with their own land mines has increased. Foreigners act as organizers - they simply hire "laborers", young people whose qualifications are at a low level. The fact that the mercenaries trust the militants from among the local residents less and less is also evidenced by the following fact: the Jordanian Khattab removed the Chechens from his personal guard. The terrorist is guarded by Dagestanis, Circassians, immigrants from Kabardino-Balkaria. The mercenaries are afraid that the Chechens will lead us to the base or to a particular leader.

OP: There is a fight against illegal oil business in Chechnya. Underground mini-factories, wells are regularly destroyed, but reappear in these or new places. At the same time, it was reported more than once that oil production and its sale bring income to the very field commanders who are hunted ...

S. B .: Clandestine oil production and processing plants are a source of real income for criminals, including militant warlords. In just eight months of this year, the employees of our department destroyed about 2,000 mini-factories, over 100 nalivnya. In addition, more than 200 tankers were detained. Subdivisions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defense are taking similar actions. But the militants use the income from the extraction and sale of oil products as a reserve, that is, not the main source. The scheme is simple: people involved in the oil business are taxed. Some of this money goes to the field commanders. In general, this can be considered a banal racketeering. Thousands of people are involved in the clandestine oil field. Many of them undermine health, getting poisoned and so on. But, given the massive unemployment among the population, there is an abundance of personnel. New people are hired to fill the vacancies.

OP: In the last days of August and early September, quite contradictory information was received from the Vedeno region. To what extent do the federal forces control the situation there?

S. B .: Yes, it's really not that simple there. Actually, it's not a secret for anyone that the Vedensky and Nozhai-Yurt districts are the base for the Khattab and Basayev gangs. It is easier for the militants to carry out sabotage there. A thorough knowledge of the area, a huge number of natural and artificial shelters, caves, hiding places, dugouts play a role. The same Basayev understands very well that he cannot jump over his head. Going out to the plain for him in order to carry out any large-scale action means one thing - destruction. And the militants simply do not have the strength to carry out anything serious in the central and northern regions of the republic. Do not forget that today is not 1998 or 1999.

The leaders are in secret mountain bases. Regional police departments, the FSB, the commandant's office, and units of the Ministry of Defense conduct special operations. How can the militants take control of the entire regional center if the commandant's office is in one part of Vedeno, and the regional police and FSB departments are in another? The action parade is a bluff. It can be assumed that a gang of 200 people will be able to fire for 30-40 minutes at the commandant's office. But what next? Our main forces will approach, and the bandits will once again scatter for burrows in the mountains. As it was more than once. Khattab can say anything about the parades in the very center of Vedeno and so on. On the so-called "Independence Day of Ichkeria" we took a number of measures to prevent sabotage. So militants can forget about parades forever. However, they will only have to march in one direction. Let them march. Can you guess where ...

In Vedeno, the local population is intimidated. The detachments of Basayev and Khattab suffered serious losses over the summer period and are now taking revenge on the residents of the region. Attacks and killings of government officials continue. In recent months, about 10 people have become victims of bandits, including the deputy head of the district administration, Raibek Tavzaev. He died in battle with the bandits, firing back to the end.

In the Vedeno region, militants operate in groups of 10-15 people, go out onto the roads and set up a "checkpoint", and in another way, they are engaged in lawlessness: robbing, killing. They trumpet that they are setting up roadblocks. But this is the most common banditry. Terrorizing the population for years, the militants have acquired a wealth of experience in terms of propaganda. While they can still inject, but no more. They are caliphs for an hour.

OP: What role does the motorized rifle battalion of the Moscow businessman Taramov play in the fight against the militants, who has repeatedly stated that he is close to the militants in Vedeno: either he or Basayev?

S. B .: At the moment, this unit has been disbanded as it has not justified itself. Only about one-eighth of the battalion will continue to serve. There were many words here. But during the entire existence of this unit, there was not a single detained and destroyed militant. So why then keep such a mass of armed men in the mountains? Taramov himself went to Moscow.

OP: According to official data released by representatives of the United Group of Federal Forces in the North Caucasus, in August alone, about 200 militants were killed in Chechnya. There are detainees on suspicion of participation in gangs. What is the total number of those who oppose us in the republic with arms in their hands?

S. B .: According to our data, up to 1,000 active militants are at bases in the mountains. They are divided into small detachments and groups, use "flea tactics", arranging attacks on columns of federal forces, mining roads and quickly retreating into the mountains. Plus, the bandits have an underground. We are talking about militants who managed to legalize themselves in cities and villages, infiltrate the administrations of settlements, the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Their goal is to penetrate the power and power structures of the republic. There are also about a thousand of them in Chechnya. Militants provide the gangs with food, medicine, housing, weapons and ammunition. They are also responsible for transporting the wounded and sick bandits to the regions of the republic neighboring with Chechnya. According to the FSB in the Chechen Republic, some of the militants are on the territory of Ingushetia. A detachment of the field commander Gelayev settled in Georgia. Recently, the leadership of the bandit formations has suffered losses. FSB officers of the republic took part in the liquidation of Abu Umar and a number of field commanders, including many Arabs.

OP: What role do mercenaries play in the structure of bandit formations?

S. B .: Mercenaries fought in Chechnya during the first campaign. Some of them never left the republic. Today, mercenaries make up about a third of the total number of militants. Moreover, there is no "cannon fodder" among them, they are mainly professional terrorists, fanatics who fought in Afghanistan, the Balkans, in "hot spots" on the territory of the republics of the former USSR. In Chechnya, Arabs, Slavs and Balts are fighting on the side of the militants. A few days ago, the FSB officers detained a citizen of Ukraine Kusey.

From the messages of the public relations group of the FSB RF for the Chechen Republic:

“During the implementation of operational information, a young man was detained on suspicion of participation in an illegal armed group. He turned out to be Andriy Kusey, a native of the Lviv region, a citizen of Ukraine. Astrakhan In the course of further operational and investigative actions, it was established that in St. Petersburg at the Moscow railway station he met a certain Akhmedov Sultan, who later recruited Kusey for an armed struggle against federal forces on the territory of Chechnya. about $ 1.5-2 thousand a month.) The work of the detainee, as Akhmedov explained, consisted in group attacks on FS convoys, organizing the bombing of armored vehicles and killing servicemen. he will refuse to travel to Chechnya.On September 4, he arrived in Grozny, where he was detained by officers of the FSB of the Russian Federation in the Chechen Republic and the commandant's office the next day".

During a special operation in the village of Alleroy, a Russian citizen, a Tatar by nationality, was detained, suspected of being an active member of an illegal armed group. By the way, a detachment of the field commander, also a mercenary, Rabbani, is operating in that area. I want to say that we do not have any special task to detain the mercenaries. All of them are members of illegal armed groups, which must either be brought to justice or be destroyed. We do not divide bandits by nationality. The methods of action of the units of the federal forces are justifying themselves. Bomb assault strikes on the positions of the militants in the mountains bring results. Radio interception data confirm serious losses among the militants. Information appeared on the air that the bandits were finishing off their wounded, including mercenaries. These graves will be found. We know the approximate place where one of these gangs was destroyed by air strikes.

OP: Recently, from the reports of news agencies, it became known that a detachment of Slavic mercenaries is operating in the Argun region. The surname of their commander, the Ukrainian mercenary Mikhailenko, was also named ...

S. B .: Objectively speaking, specifically Ukrainian mercenaries have never made the weather in the bandit camp. Yes, there is information that at the end of 2000 there were mercenaries from Ukraine in Chechnya, in particular, UNA-UNSO militants. But lately there are fewer and fewer of them here. The conditions of "work", so to speak, have changed radically. The mercenary must be paid a lot of money. Yes, recruiters of militants promise "wild geese" large sums, for example, 3 thousand dollars a month. But in reality, everything looks different. The leaders of the gangs long ago switched to self-financing, paying for specific terrorist acts and attacks. There is no permanent "salary" for mercenaries, which reduces their influx into the republic. The field commanders have their own "wage scale". For example, professional Arab demolitionists are paid handsomely. And Chechens who are in gangs may not be given money at all for months.

OP: How is the investigation of the terrorist attack in the building of the administration of the Chechen Republic progressing?

S. B .: I will not divulge the details ahead of time. Let me just say that there are several versions. According to one of them, a woman carried the explosive into the administration building. There are suspects.

OP: Your structure is also involved in the exchange of servicemen and hostages captured by militants. How many of our soldiers are in captivity?

S. B .: The exchange of prisoners and the release of hostages are being dealt with by a commission under the President of Russia, the prosecutor's office, and the mission of General Lebed. There is no uniform data on the number of prisoners held by the militants. According to our information, about 100 people are now with the militants. Our structure does not exchange captives and hostages, we only create conditions for exchange. So, the other day, five servicemen were released who were being held by the militants.

Recently, we receive information about prisoners less and less often. Although the hostage-taking in Chechnya continues. Basically, conscripts are captured in order to exchange them for arrested relatives. But we believe that it is impossible to exchange ardent fighters. This gives rise to an endless chain of seizures of people. It all depends on many conditions. If a person is not involved in murders and other grave crimes, but is detained, for example, for possession of weapons, then we can talk about an exchange. Terrorists, on the other hand, must be brought to trial unconditionally.

OP: In a number of media outlets, facts are published that relatives have to ransom residents detained during the sweeping operations from servicemen. Do you have any facts of human trafficking?

S. B .: Probably it would be foolish to deny everything. Of course, among people in uniform, however, as elsewhere, there are unscrupulous people striving for profit. At the same time, such cases did not take on the character of an epidemic. Military counterintelligence officers and our department are working on them. The most vivid example is the arrest of Colonel Savchenko, who took the wounded militants to safe places for money.

Just as the human body cannot live with a gaping wound, so Russia cannot live with a wide open territory, which is extremely difficult to protect, based on the realities of geography and the centuries-old traditions of joint life of the peoples of the Russian Empire, and then the USSR. When the guns died down in the Second Chechen War, and units of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs occupied the entire territory of the republic, which suffered an economic fiasco in an experiment with complete independence from Russia, the restoration of peaceful life in the republic and its reintegration into Russia began.

The main role here was played by such structures as the FSB (the Department of the Federal Security Service for the Chechen Republic was headed by Sergei Leonidovich Babkin) and the Prosecutor's Office.

Moreover, the common people in Chechnya have suffered to such an extent from the militants, during the independence of the republic, that a rare phenomenon occurred: the prosecutors, whom few people usually love, are still remembered by common people in Chechnya with gratitude.

At least this applies to V.G. Chernov, who headed the prosecutor's office of the Chechen Republic in the most difficult period, and Y.A. Both prosecutors turned out to be so uncompromising in relation to the militants, and so clearly defended the interests of civilians and the restoration of the republic's economy that, along with the leadership of the FSB and members of the Government of the republic, they were sentenced to destruction by the militants and became targets of assassination attempts.

But, of course, the main thing in General Babkin's interview is the story about the strategic reasons for the return of Chechnya to Russia and the details of this difficult and long process. This is unique information, and at such a deep level, hardly anyone other than Sergei Babkin could systematize and explain those events.

- Sergei Leonidovich, the situation in the North Caucasus at the start of the second Chechen campaign was difficult ...

The situation was extremely difficult. According to the Khasavyurt agreements, Chechnya gained de facto independence from Russia. Federal government bodies did not operate on its territory. It would seem that Chechnya has achieved what it fought for - independence. But then nothing happened.

The central Chechen government was more nominal than real. There was a simple rule in the republic: the one who had more trunks was right. The republic actually turned into a criminal enclave, on the territory of which no laws at all worked. Various criminals from all over Russia fled there in droves and found refuge there.

Kidnapping and the slave trade flourished. Hundreds of people in all regions of Russia were forcibly captured and transported to Chechnya. Then they either demanded a ransom for them, or turned them into slaves. The republic was becoming a breeding ground for world terrorism. The well-known terrorist Khattab organized militant training camps, where various terrorist attacks were planned, which were then carried out in Russia.

Wahhabism flourished on this soil, which, under the slogan of creating a caliphate, led to an attempt to spread this order beyond the borders of Chechnya, to the entire North Caucasus. Armed detachments of militants invaded Dagestan and tried to take control of it. The patience of the federal authorities has run out. This is how the second Chechen war began.

- Did the Chechens like this order?

Most did not like it at all, but they simply had nowhere to go. But there were also real forces in Chechnya that tried to resist this order. First of all, these are groups controlled by Akhmad Kadyrov and the Yamadayev brothers. From the very beginning of the campaign, the federal authorities took a course of cooperation with them, and this decision contributed to the successful implementation of the tasks set.

- What tasks did the federal troops face in Chechnya?

The first is to defeat the militants and restore constitutional order. At the same time, to minimize the loss of personnel and civilian population - peaceful Chechens. General Shamanov, who commanded the western grouping of forces in 1999, came to an agreement with entire regions and their elders that he would not bomb the corresponding settlements, and from there there would be no shelling of federal troops. Of course, the elders took a big risk, because in the eyes of the militants they looked like "traitors." And yet it worked. The Chechens even surrendered their weapons - a little, but they did.

- Why was the second Chechen campaign more successful than the first?

Much has changed in Russia itself. On December 31, 1999, President Yeltsin left office and transferred powers to Vladimir Putin. The first thing he did was fly to Chechnya and congratulate the servicemen on the New Year. I remember well - it then made a tremendous impression on everyone. If in the first Chechen war the federal troops were constantly haunted by some sense of betrayal on the part of the authorities, then in the second there was confidence that this time the matter would be brought to an end. The army and special services were given the opportunity to work as they can - professionally.

Much has changed in Chechnya as well. The euphoria from the "struggle for freedom" was gone, the independence obtained turned out to be not at all attractive for the majority. Therefore, the population already perceived the federal troops as liberators.

The defeat of the militants was, in general, predetermined. But this was only the beginning of solving a much more complex problem.

- Which?

Reconstruction of the Chechen economy, its reintegration into the Russian economic space. It is impossible to convey in words what the economy of the republic was. There are practically no industrial enterprises - in some places there are handicrafts. The education system has been destroyed, and so has the health care system. Even subsistence farming was dangerous - many fields were mined. Almost complete absence of energy, roads, infrastructure. We can say that the economy did not just exist - it existed with a minus sign. And without the economy, there can be no peaceful, stable life.

- And how did the economic recovery start?

From frames. At that time, Chechnya did not have its own managerial staff of such a scale to create from scratch the economy and financial system of an entire republic. After all, Chechnya had been at war for many years; it was not educated people who were in demand, but those who knew how to hold weapons. Therefore, we invited qualified specialists from all over Russia. An experienced power engineer and business executive Stanislav Ilyasov was appointed chairman of the Chechen government. He was originally from Dagestan, so he was perceived as "his own". And Sergei Abramov, a strong professional with a Caucasian character, became Minister of Finance. Oleg Zhidkov, an experienced Caucasian politician, was invited to the post of mayor of Grozny. Small teams of like-minded people arrived with them. I would like to especially emphasize: accepting the offer to work in Chechnya required from candidates not only high professionalism, but also considerable personal courage.

- And what was it?

It was a very dangerous job at the time. All members of the government took with them to work not only a briefcase with official documents, but also a machine gun. There was no other way ... I remember the difficult conditions in which the government and administration moved from Gudermes to Grozny in May-July 2001. The city was destroyed, the daily shelling and explosions, the working and living conditions are literally Spartan, and at the same time it was necessary to make a lot of urgent and responsible decisions.

Or the population census conducted in Russia and, naturally, in Chechnya in 2002. How can you plan something without knowing how many people live in the republic and which of them can work? So, the census takers went from house to house, accompanied by military commandant's offices or employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. And how many terrorist attacks aimed at destroying census data have been stopped by the FSB!

But the most difficult thing was for the members of the government. Here is Sergei Abramov, whom I mentioned. In what alterations have not been. Once he was late for a helicopter - and right before his eyes he was shot down, everyone on board died. In December 2002, suicide bombers attacked the Government House, killing and injuring a large number of people. The explosion was so powerful that the engine from the "Kamaz" terrorists pierced the building and got stuck in the last wall. She saved Abramov's employees and himself. Then he survived several more assassination attempts. And he did not break down, went down in the history of Chechnya as an "unyielding" minister of finance, and then as a prime minister.

- Why "unbending"?

Because "so simple", without legal grounds, he did not give money to anyone. Once Abramov was even taken to be shot for this. He had, let's say, a group of local residents armed with machine guns demanded to issue a large sum of money from the republican treasury. Having received a refusal, Abramov was taken out into the street, placed against the wall, took aim and fired a volley, as it turned out later, over his head. But we never got a dime. A lot can be said about the difficult everyday life of everyone who took on the heavy burden of establishing a peaceful life in Chechnya. I'm not even talking about law enforcement officers who performed heroic deeds on a daily basis. This is a separate topic, and you can talk about it for hours.

- How did you evaluate the result? According to the reports of the authorities or the military?

Not just reports. First, the Russian president personally repeatedly studied the situation, made adjustments, visiting both Grozny and remote areas. Secondly, Sergei Ivanov, who was then the Minister of Defense, constantly came to Chechnya. In addition to inspecting the troops of the 42nd division, which worked in Chechnya, he actively participated in establishing a peaceful life. Somewhere he helped with advice, but somewhere he used the resources of the Ministry of Defense. And when a leader personally sees how things are on the ground, you cannot fool him with phony reporting.

The head of the Operational Headquarters (OSH) - Director of the FSB Nikolai Patrushev, heads of the State Duma, ministries and departments regularly visited the republic. They immediately made a lot of decisions directly in the Chechen Republic, provided practical assistance to local authorities.

And the results were not long in coming. For example, they opened the Argunskaya CHPP with great enthusiasm, greeted the first plane after the restoration of air communication with the republic, the first train, rejoiced at the first calls via cellular communications.

In 2003, kindergartens and schools began to appear in military camps. The officers brought the families to Chechnya. This, of course, is an indicator that a peaceful life was actively improving. After all, who, if not the officers, knew the real state of affairs.

- Have you covered the path to a peaceful life in three years?

Not certainly in that way. But after three years it became possible to bring families of servicemen, life was much quieter and safer. Although the process of eliminating bandit formations, as a rule, is very long. For example, after the Great Patriotic War, the "forest brothers" in the Baltic region were destroyed for more than ten years. There are about the same number of Basmachs after the civil one in Central Asia. When the territory of Chechnya was completely taken under control by the army, the militants switched to guerrilla tactics, and the difficult work of identifying and destroying them began. On the one hand, law enforcement agencies worked, and on the other, an economic base was created, jobs were opened so that people could quickly return to a peaceful life. Of course, all this was very difficult, every step forward improved the situation, but it remained very far from the norm.

- But nevertheless, we managed to restore the economy of Chechnya, it is gaining momentum, the life of Chechens is changing for the better ...

Succeeded. Most people think that all this is due to the fact that a lot of federal money was sent to the republic. This is, of course, true. But I think more about those people with whom I then had to work together. If it were not for their heroic work in the full sense of the word, now in Chechnya it would be completely different.

Igor Igoshin, who heads the reception of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, resigns and leaves the Kirov region. The head of the regional election headquarters of "United Russia" intends to move to the Vladimir region, where he takes part in the ONF primaries and run as a candidate for the State Duma.

In his place, Lieutenant-General of the FSB Reserve Sergei Babkin, who will also head the Kirov branch of the ONF, has been appointed head of Vladimir Putin's public reception office in the Kirov region.

Babkin's candidacy is included in the list of participants currently undergoing the ONF primaries, based on the results of which a list of candidates for the State Duma is to be formed.

Curriculum Vitae:
Babkin Sergey Leonidovich
Born on May 17, 1960 in the village of Partizan, Abatsky District, Tyumen Region.
Father - a native of the village of Babkintsy, Kumensky district of the Kirov region, mother - a native of the village of Strelki, Kumensky district.
In 1977 he graduated from the Selezenevskaya secondary school of the Zuevsky district and entered the Tyumen higher engineering command school of the engineering troops.
Since 1984, in the KGB of the USSR.
In 1990 he graduated from the Andropov Institute of the KGB of the USSR.
Served in various positions in the FSB directorates for the Western Group of Forces, the Siberian and North Caucasian military districts.
In the period from 2001 to 2003 - Head of the FSB Directorate for the Chechen Republic. Then he was appointed head of the FSB Directorate for the Moscow Military District. Transferred to the reserve in May 2011
During the period of service in the FSB, he was awarded the orders "For Merit to the Fatherland" of the 3rd and 4th degrees, "Courage", "For Military Merit". Honorary employee of the state security agencies.
He is married and has three sons.

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