December 16, 2014, 17:37 Authors: Translation: Arseny Varshavsky, Dima Smirnov, based on Newsweek materials

Newsweek has studied the fate of world terrorist # 1. Read our translation.

On the rare occasions when ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi appeared in public, his surroundings resembled something between a president and a thieves' authority. “When he entered, the mobile connection disappeared,” says a 29-year-old Syrian resident - he asked to be mentioned in an interview only as Abu Ali - the man recalls the only time al-Baghdadi entered the mosque. “Armed guards cordoned off the territory. The women were sent upstairs to the women's prayer service. Everyone was warned that nothing can be photographed or filmed. Terribly nervous atmosphere. "

“What made her (the atmosphere more nervous) was when Baghdadi finally appeared, dressed in black from head to toe ... The guards shouted, 'Allahu Akbar! Allah Akbar!" Everyone got even more scared, ”says Ali. “Then the guards made us swear allegiance to him. Even when Baghdadi left, none of us were allowed to leave the mosque for the next half hour. "

In his hometown of Samarra, which is in the Sunni triangle north of Baghdad, al-Baghdadi (real name is Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri) is remembered in different ways. In his hometown, he was considered "a very quiet person," says a former neighbor, Tariq Hamid. “He was peaceful. He didn’t like talking for a long time. ”

Acquaintances of the leader of ISIS, under whose caliphate parts of Iraq and Syria are now controlled, say that al-Baghdadi grew up diligent, pious and calm. He was an introvert, without a lot of friends.

Hamid recalls him as a boy on a bicycle, dressed in the usual Iraqi men's clothing (dezhdasha), with a small white headdress on his head. “He always had religious or other books in the trunk of his bike, and I never saw him in trousers or a shirt, unlike most of the guys in Samarra ... A thin beard; and he never hung out in a cafe. He had only a narrow circle of acquaintances from the mosque "

It is believed that Abu Bakr was born in 1971 in Samarra. He grew up in Al Jibriah, a lower middle class area under the control of the Albu Badri and Albu Baz tribes. The area was also bombed by the United States after the 2003 invasion in an attempt to root out insurgents and terrorist cells.

Al-Baghdadi's family was not wealthy, but his two uncles worked in the protection of Saddam Hussein. This meant some kind of status and connection, which gave a certain respect or even fear in society. “He was from a poor but intelligent family,” recalls Hashem, a translator who knew his family. "He was very withdrawn ... went to the mosque, studied, read books, and that was all."

Al-Baghdadi grew up just a mile from the 10th century temple, Imam Hassan al-Shakri, one of the most sacred sites for Shiites and also an important Sunni monument in Samarra. According to ISIS sources, faith played a large role in al-Baghdadi's life. Another resident of Samarra, Yesser Fahmi, says that most of al-Baghdadi's childhood was spent in religious studies: "Ibrahim, like most of his family members, was a devout Muslim."

But a London-based Iraqi analyst at the Iraqi Institute for Economic Reform, Sajjad Jiyad, says he has not seen any conclusive evidence of his religious fervor. “I wonder if he was a religious person, most of the Iraqis who became jihadists were secular Baathists until 2003,” Jiyad explains.

In addition to religion, as his neighbors say, al-Baghdadi loved sports, mainly football, which he played in the courtyard near his house. “He rarely lost his temper during a match, even if you hit him or flare up,” recalls Hamid. "He was a great protector."

ISIS websites indicate that in the past al-Baghdadi studied the Qur'an in the mosques of Samarra and the Hadit - the traditions, deeds and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad. One neighbor says that al-Baghdadi was looked after by two prominent clerics: Sheikh Subni al-Saarai and Sheikh Adnan al-Amin.

There is controversy over al-Baghdadi's work as a cleric. Some sources say he preached in a mosque in Samarra, others in Baghdad. But Jiyad claims that this information is highly dubious, and ISIS is creating it for the image of al-Baghdadi.

Most believe that after high school, like most young people under Saddam's rule, he should have served in the Iraqi army. During this time, he could be taught the basics of military tactics and the correct handling of weapons.

At the age of 18, al-Baghdadi first went to Baghdad to study. The depth of his knowledge is also a subject of controversy. Some, like Hamid, believe that he has attained a professorship in religious sciences. It was not possible to clarify this information from family members. “Most of the relatives left Samarra, fearing associations with him,” says Fahmi. “Ibrahim left in 2003 to study in Baghdad. His nephew was arrested last year by Iraqi law enforcement agencies. When the last members of his family went to Baghdad to negotiate his release, they were also arrested. ”

As far as Fahmi knows, al-Baghdadi has not appeared in Samarra since 2003.

Prisoners pray at the American prison camp at Camp Bucca, Iraq.

LinkedInfor terrorists

Al-Baghdadi's brutal behavior stems from the bloodshed that began after the US invasion of Iraq to overthrow Saddam Hussein. US troops entered downtown Baghdad on April 9, 2003. Soon after, the country plunged into anarchy. Saddam and his supporters immediately fled - some went to villages near the Sunni Triangle, others fled to Syria. Sunni insurgents who remained in Iraq began to launch attacks on American military bases.

It is believed that al-Baghdadi helped in the creation of the terrorist group Jaish Ahl al Sunna Wal Jamaa. In 2004 or 2005 - the exact year is unknown, as is all information about al-Baghdadi - he was captured by American troops, presumably during a large-scale raid to capture the accomplice of the Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Al-Zarqawi, the leader of the Iraqi al-Qaeda cell responsible for numerous bombings and deaths, was killed by US forces in 2006.

After his arrest, al-Baghdadi was imprisoned at Camp Bukka prison in northern Iraq, near the city of Umm Qasr, which also held former prisoners of Abu Ghraib. Al-Baghdadi was listed as an "interneed civilian", which meant that he had connections with a terrorist group, but was not convicted of committing terrorist acts.

It is not known exactly how long al-Baghdadi spent at Camp Bucca. Some US military leaders who worked in the prison recall that al-Baghdadi was there between 2006 and 2007. Others state that he was in prison in 2006-2009. Syrian activist Abu Ibrahim al-Rakkawi says al-Baghdadi was imprisoned between January 2004 and December 2006. Middle East Forum researcher Aymen Jawad al-Tamimi says that since in 2005 al-Baghdadi was involved in terrorist groups, he should were released at the end of 2004.

Regardless of whether he was in prison for a year or two, al-Baghdadi spent this time profitably. At the time, Camp Bucca was a summer camp for ambitious terrorists. Under the supervision of American guards, the prisoners communicated with each other, exchanged information and combat tactics, and made important contacts for future operations. They drew inspiration from the torture at Abu Ghraib prison, the success of al-Zarqawi, and divisions within the Sunnis. Historian Jeremy Suri described Camp Bucca as "a virtual university for terrorists."

“Camp Bucca was a place where many jihadists got to know each other, and many ex-Baathists adopted radical views and associated with Islamist groups,” writes SyriainCrisis editor Aaron Land. "A lot of IS leaders have gone through this prison."

According to Jiyad, it is unlikely that al-Baghdidi was actively involved in the insurgency before the US invasion of Iraq, and Camp Bucca was the starting point for him. “It must have been a good opportunity for him to be a rebel,” he says. One of the people al-Baghdadi met at Camp Bukka was Taha Sobhi Falaha, also known as Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, a spokesman for ISIS.

After his release from Camp Bukka, al-Baghdadi continued his insurgency. In 2006, an umbrella organization composed of terrorist groups including al-Qaeda formed the Islamic State in Iraq. In May 2010, he was named the leader of this organization.

From the outset, IS had broad ambitions and an agenda that differed from that of al-Qaeda. IS has abandoned the use of the al-Qaeda flag, choosing a different one.

According to the news outlet al-Monitor, the rift was a result of gradually growing disagreements among al-Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan, as well as a search for other sources of funding for the organization. “Then, in mid-2013, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (now known as ISIS) and refused to carry out the orders of Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda. Al-Zawahiri wanted ISIS to operate only in Iraqi territory, and for Jabat al-Nusra to be al-Qaeda's representative in Syria. "

A former ISIS member who defected from the group, posing as "Hussein", says he was with al-Baghdadi during the severance of relations between him and al-Nursa's organization, which is in Syria and works with al-Qaeda. He recalls the paranoia and mistrust that prevailed at their meetings, which took place somewhere on the border between Syria and Turkey. “Al-Baghdadi met them in a trailer near the Turkish border,” he says. “He only introduced himself to high-ranking officials. He did not introduce himself to junior bosses. But interestingly, when he was in a large group, no one could say with certainty that he was in the room. Al-Baghdadi wanted to confuse the rest. "

Hussein said al-Baghdadi relied heavily on the advice of the late Haji Bakr, the top ISIS leader and former Iraqi army officer who was killed in January 2014. Hussein believes his death was a big blow to al-Baghdadi: “Haji Bakr improved al-Baghdadi's image - he prepared him for a prominent ISIS membership. But, to be honest, the real leader who ruled in the shadows was Haji Bakr. " Al-Baghdadi still relies on dedicated military experts. He met many of them at Cap Bucca.

Quiet paranoid

Little is known about al-Baghdadi's personal life, except that he is "cruel in relationships and calm in life," Jiyad said. "His behavior and activities are due to paranoia."

Most of the mentions of al-Baghdadi on social networks do not provide complete information about him, and it is rare in them to find information about his activities and personality. ISIS-affiliated social media mostly refers to al-Baghdadi when convincing new users to swear allegiance to the caliph.

Al-Baghdadi often changes his location, crossing the poorly guarded border of Iraq and Syria, and may live either in or near Raqqa. Jiyad says that before he fled with ISIS to Syria around 2010, al-Baghdadi probably lived in Baghdad and Mosul. “Very few people met him in those days, and those who saw him wore a mask,” Jiyad says. “His predecessors and peers were killed as a result of denunciations and actions of the special services. However, I also think that between 2010 and 2014 he was able to improve his religious knowledge, and he was able to create a mystical image around him. "

Lebanese officials said they arrested al-Baghdadi's daughter and ex-wife in early December, although the exact relationship with him remains unclear. The Iraqi Interior Ministry, referring to the source of the intelligence group of its department, states that al-Baghdadi has two wives - Asma Fawzi Mohammad al-Dulaimi and Israa Rajab Mahal al-Kwasi.

In public, al-Baghdadi wears a scarf over his face and does not allow the dissemination of photos or videos of him, unlike the leaders of other terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda. In old photographs taken in prison in 2004, he looks like "an ambitious terrorist, not a caliph."

Jiyad, who transcribed al-Baghdadi's audio recordings, says that they can be used to judge how he relates to, for example, Jabat al-Nursa and al-Qaeda. "He positions himself as the most important and has a share of contempt for organizations outside of Iraq."

Al-Baghdadi appears to be enjoying his role as "the world's top terrorist, heir to Osama bin Laden," Jiyad said.

“If we discard all mysticism and greatness, the“ caliph ”turns into an ordinary person who took advantage of his opportunity,” Jiyad notes. “He is no different from hundreds of other Iraqis who have tried to destroy the new Iraq. He could become an unknown terrorist or brutal criminal. And now he is in the center of world attention. "

The mysterious leader of the Islamic State (IS) group, the self-proclaimed "Caliph of all Muslims" Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, left his wife. And she literally left - from the territory controlled by IS. This news sheds some light on the personal life of the man who leads the most sinister terrorist group of our time. Nevertheless, very little is still known about the personality of al-Baghdadi, and not only to the citizens of Western countries, but also to the subjects of the Caliphate itself. "Lenta.ru" studied the facts of the biography of the leader of world jihadism and tried to understand how a ruthless extremist grew out of a quiet child.

Children's step of the future caliph

The future caliph Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al-Badri was born in the Iraqi city of Samarra, north of Baghdad, in 1971. The power in the country then belonged to the pan-Arab secularist party of the left wing "Baath".

Ibrahim's father, Avvad, actively participated in the religious life of the community and taught at the local mosque. It was there that his son took his first steps as a theologian: he gathered the neighboring boys, and they read the Koran together. It is said that Ibrahim was a quiet child and spent a lot of time honing his skills in reciting religious texts.

The Baathists did not encourage the active spread of the religion, but they did not fight against it either. Some of Ibrahim's relatives even joined the ranks of the ruling party. Two uncles of the future caliph worked in the special services of President Saddam Hussein; one of his brothers was an officer in the Saddam army, and the other brother was killed in the Iraqi-Iranian war. Ibrahim himself at the beginning of the conflict was too young to take part in it.

Among Ibrahim's relatives were supporters of the ideas of Salafism - according to some sources, his father was also a Salafi. Saddam Hussein's secular regime tried to limit the influence of radicals and win them over to its side, for which in 1989 the Saddam University of Islamic Sciences was opened in Baghdad.

Since 1993, the Iraqi leader began a "campaign to return to the faith": nightclubs were closed in the country, public consumption of alcohol was prohibited, Sharia norms were limited (for example, they began to chop off hands for theft). Over the course of several years, Saddam Hussein donated 28 liters of his own blood to use it to write a copy of the Koran, placed in one of the mosques in the capital.

Saddam Hussein encouraged a cult of his personality and feared the rise of radical Islamists - in whom he saw the main threat to his power.

From lawyer to extremist

When it came time to decide on a higher education, Ibrahim al-Badri tried to enter the Law Faculty of Baghdad University, but he was let down by his poor knowledge of English and poor grades. As a result, he entered the theological faculty, and then entered the University of Islamic Sciences, where he received a master's degree in qiraats (schools of public recitation of the Qur'an).

During his studies at the magistracy, at the insistence of his uncle, Ibrahim joined the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood. This supranational Islamist organization advocated the creation of religious Islamic states, but in most countries its followers chose cautious tactics and did not support armed struggle with the authorities. Al-Badri such ideas seemed too soft - he called their followers people of words, not deeds, and the future caliph quickly joined the most radical members of the organization.

After receiving his master's degree in 2000, al-Badri settled in a small apartment in a poor area of ​​Baghdad, next to a mosque. For four years he managed to change two wives and become a father of six children. The future leader of IS made a living teaching children to read the Koran and calling the faithful to prayer. There was a football club at the mosque, and al-Badri played so successfully that he earned the nickname "our Messi" among the locals. He also supervised Islamic piety: so, according to the testimony of neighbors, having once seen men and women dancing together at a wedding, Ibrahim resolutely demanded an end to the disgrace.

Jihad academy

In 2004, al-Badri was arrested by the Americans - he went to visit a friend who was on the wanted list. The future caliph ended up in the Camp Bucca filtration camp, where the occupation administration kept suspicious Iraqis. They were not forbidden to perform religious rituals, and the future caliph skillfully used this: he read lectures on religion, conducted Friday prayers and gave instructions to the captives in accordance with his interpretation of Islam.

The prisoners said that Camp Bucca had become a real jihadist academy. “Train him, instill an ideology and show him the way forward so that at the time of his release he becomes a blazing flame,” one of the former prisoners described the strategy of Islamic theologians within the filtration camp in relation to each newcomer.

Inmates at Camp Bucca during a collective prayer.

The guards figured out potential leaders, tried to separate the nascent terrorist cells in different cells, but failed to see the future Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in the quiet and inconspicuous Ibrahim al-Badri. “He was a bad guy, but not the worst of the worst,” says former Camp Bucca security guard Sergeant Kenneth King. According to him, al-Badri was not even transferred to the sector for dangerous suspects.

In 2006, al-Badri was released. “Well, guys, I'll see you in New York,” the future caliph said goodbye to the guards. “It sounded peaceful, sort of like 'meet me on occasion,'” King admitted.

Career Halift

After his release, al-Badri contacted the people of al-Qaeda in Iraq, who advised him to move to Damascus. In the Syrian capital, he had the opportunity, in addition to working for terrorists, to complete his dissertation. Then a conflict broke out in the ranks of the jihadists, which led to the transformation of the Iraqi branch of al-Qaeda into the brutal Islamic State of Iraq.

Al-Badri, who has a serious religious education, came in handy: he was appointed head of the religious direction in the Iraqi "provinces" of the organization. The Caliphate did not have territory at that time, so Ibrahim was mainly engaged in the development of a propaganda strategy and made sure that the militants strictly followed religious precepts.

In March 2007, he returned to Baghdad, where he defended his dissertation and became a Doctor of Koran Studies. His scientific success attracted the attention of the then leader of the Islamic State of Iraq, Abu Ayub al-Masri, and he made al-Badri the head of the Sharia Committee - that is, responsible for all the religious work of the terrorist organization.

In 2010, Masri was killed and IS was de facto beheaded. Then Haji Bakr, a former intelligence officer of Saddam Hussein and the chief strategist of the Islamic State of Iraq, came to the aid of the future caliph. He could not become the leader of the organization - he was compromised by his reputation as a former secret service, and then Haji Bakr, through manipulation and persuasion, achieved the election of the authoritative theologian al-Badri to the post of interim leader of the group. Bakr hoped to be able to control the new "emir". In part, he succeeded - people from the Iraqi intelligence service of the times of Hussein were appointed to key posts.

In 2013, the group began to participate in hostilities in Syria and changed its name to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), and after the blitzkrieg of the summer of 2014 reduced it to the Islamic State. At the same time, Avwad Ibrahim al-Badri declared himself the caliph, finally becoming Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

“I have been appointed to lead you, but I am not the best among you. If you see me acting righteously, follow me. If you see me acting unrighteously, give me advice and guide me. If I disobey Allah, do not listen to me, ”he declared in his first public speech of the ruler of the quasi-state. This was a paraphrase of the statement of the righteous Caliph Abu Bakr, the first leader of the Muslim community after the death of the Prophet Muhammad.

Companions of Abu Bakr

Little is known about the first two wives of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, with whom he lived until 2004 - he kept them at home and did not show them to the public. The “wife” who escaped at the end of February 2016 is called Diane Kruger, the girl was helped to escape to freedom by her two friends. The Iraqi press reported that al-Baghdadi sent a squad of thugs in pursuit of the women, but their search was unsuccessful.

In the Caliphate, Diana was responsible for organizing the life of women: in particular, she formulated the rules of their behavior in accordance with Sharia law and led the female "morality police", whose units watched that the fairer sex did not appear in public without the accompaniment of men (husband or male relatives) and in not modest enough clothes. The police acted in accordance with the brutality of the entire IS: for example, in January of this year, a Syrian girl was beaten to death for inappropriate appearance.

Kruger also had a combat component: she headed a full-fledged educational institution in Iraqi Kirkuk, where female students were trained as suicide bombers. Al-Baghdadi and German Kruger got married in October 2015; what caused the discord of the newlyweds is not yet clear.

One of the most famous wives of al-Baghdadi was Saja ad-Dulaimi, nicknamed for her influence in the jihadist world the "caliphess". The marriage of al-Baghdadi and al-Dulaimi was short-lived - it was concluded in 2009 and lasted only three months - but it did the Caliphate a lot of benefits.

After a divorce (Iraqi tribal customs make it easy to part with his wife), she, her sister and father moved to Syrian Homs, where in March 2014 she was captured by troops friendly to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Soon, the Jabhat al-Nusra militants exchanged her and 149 other women and children for 13 captured Greek Orthodox nuns.

Frame: video Al Jazeera

Saja ad-Dulaimi with children during the exchange for Lebanese soldiers.

“Our sister, the wife of Sheikh Abu Bakr, may Allah bless him, was released by us. We did it because that was our duty, ”one of the group’s“ emirs ”wrote on Twitter at the time. Abu Bakr himself did not comment on this event.

After her release from captivity, Saja went with the refugees to Lebanon, but then she repeatedly crossed the border of the two countries, hiding jewelry and money received from sponsors of terrorist groups under her veil. Without hiding her face under the hijab, she publicly called on women from all over the world to go to IS, promising them faithful husbands and a decent life. Her image contrasted so much with the typically disenfranchised woman in radical Islamist society that she was called an "honorable man."

In early 2015, she was captured for the second time - the Lebanese authorities detained her with small children (one of them, a five-year-old girl, is her daughter from Abu Bakr) while crossing the border. Al-Baghdadi again did not comment on this, and al-Dulaimi and the child were again freed by the Jabhat al-Nusra militants: they and 12 other people were exchanged for captured Lebanese soldiers.

It is known that the captive American social worker Kayla Muller, captured in 2013, was also considered by Abu Bakr to be his “wife” and raped until she died (according to IS, from an American airstrike, according to the US, from the hands). Together with Müller, there was a Yazidi girl who managed to escape from IS; according to her stories, Abu Bakr at that time had three "official" wives.

The cost of a terrorist

For the head of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the American authorities are promising $ 10 million: on the State Department website rewardsforjustice, he is named by the pseudonym of Abu Dua. Despite the fact that in monetary terms, the leader of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, is valued almost twice as expensive, after the death of Osama bin Laden, it is the self-proclaimed caliph and IS leader Abu Bakr who is considered today the “terrorist number one”.

Islamic State, Al-Qaeda and Jabhat al-Nusra are recognized as terrorist organizations and are banned in Russia.

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Real name - Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al-Badri al-Husseini al-Samarrai, also known as Abu Dua.

Born in 1971 in the Iraqi city of Samarra (120 km north of Baghdad). Graduated from the University of Baghdad with a PhD in History and Islamic Law.

Until 2003, he was a preacher and teacher of Islamic law in the Diyala province in central Iraq.

Soon after the invasion of Iraq by Western coalition troops in 2003, al-Baghdadi joined the ranks of the rebels, which began armed resistance against the foreign presence.

Later he joined the terrorist organization "Al-Qaeda" and by the fall of 2005 became known as one of the most prominent leaders of this group. He, in particular, was engaged in the transfer of volunteers from Syria and Saudi Arabia to participate in the war against the Western coalition in Iraq.

In October 2005, an American plane struck a terrorist base near the Iraqi city of Al-Qaim on the border with Syria, where al-Baghdadi was allegedly hiding. However, after the airstrike, his body was not found.

According to some sources, in 2005 he was taken prisoner during an operation by American troops in the rebellious Sunni cities of Fallujah, Ramadi and Samarra, and was held in the American camp for especially dangerous extremists, Camp Bocca in southern Iraq. According to some media reports, during his imprisonment, a meeting was organized between al-Baghdadi and American General David Petraeus (February 2007 - September 2008 - Commander of the Multinational Force in Iraq; in 2010-2012, Director of the CIA). In 2009, al-Baghdadi was released along with other prisoners of the camp, which was closed by an agreement between the US administration of George W. Bush and the Iraqi government of al-Maliki. As some sources write, saying goodbye to the commander of the Camp Bocca security unit, American Colonel Kenneth King, al-Baghdadi said goodbye to him: "See you in New York, guys!"

According to other media, citing the US Department of Defense, al-Baghdadi was placed in the camp as a "civilian internee" and was there from February to December 2004. The US Department of Defense does not provide any other information about his detention.

On May 16, 2010, he headed the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) terrorist organization after the assassination of its leader Abu Omar al-Baghdadi (April 2010).

In 2011, with the outbreak of armed confrontation in Syria, al-Baghdadi sent his assistant Adnan al-Haj Ali (better known as Abu Muhammad al-Jaulani) there, who formed and led the anti-government terrorist jihadist group Jabhat al-Nusra there.

In October 2011, the US Department of State announced a $ 10 million bounty for any information leading to the capture and execution of al-Baghdadi. He was officially included by the United States on the list of especially dangerous terrorists.

Since April 9, 2013 - the leader of the terrorist jihadist group Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), which united the Syrian Jabhat al-Nusra and the Iraqi Islamic State of Iraq.

In November 2013, a split occurred between the Iraqi and Syrian factions. Jabhat al-Nusra separated from ISIS and again began to operate independently. Al-Baghdadi remained the leader of the ISIS group, with a total number of up to 15 thousand people, fighting both in Iraq and in Syria.

In January 2014, under the leadership of al-Baghdadi, the Sunni cities of Fallujah and Ramadi were seized.

Since the beginning of June 2014, ISIS has been actively advancing in Iraq with the aim of creating an Islamic caliphate on the territory of the Sunni provinces. ISIS managed to capture the cities of Mosul and Tikrit bordering Iraqi Kurdistan and take control of most of the provinces of Ninawa, Salah al-Din and Diyala. Currently, ISIS fighters continue to advance from north to south towards Baghdad.

On June 29, 2014, ISIS decided to establish a quasi-state - the "Islamic Caliphate" and to appoint Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as Caliph (head of the Caliphate). ISIS also decided to rename ISIS to "Islamic State" (a group banned in the Russian Federation - TASS note). The decisions were made on the first day of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. In a special statement, the group called on Muslims around the world to recognize the creation of the Caliphate, as well as "swear allegiance to it (the" Islamic Caliphate ") and support it ... territory ".

The media calls al-Baghdadi "the true heir to Osama bin Laden", he is known for his radicalism and brutality. As a result of the terrorist activities of the group he leads, several thousand civilians have died in Iraq. More than 1,200 people have already died since June 10, 2014 alone. It is believed that al-Baghdadi is very careful, he covers his face even in the presence of his entourage. Al-Baghdadi proclaims himself the direct heir of the Prophet Muhammad.

Najib Ben Abdel Kader Compilation@ abounour2006

Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi is a real person, however, this is just a nickname or pseudonym. The same applies to his entire environment. There is not a single member of the Al-Baghdadi Council whose last name or first name would be real.

And Al-Baghdadi is 100% Iraqi. No other nationality is accepted as he doesn't trust anyone.

The number of members of the Military Council of Al-Baghdadi is increasing, then decreasing, ranging from 8 to 13 people.

Al-Baghdadi's Military Council is headed by three former members of Saddam's army, former Baathists. Chief among them is the General Staff Colonel Haji Bakr, an officer in Saddam's Baathist army.

Who is Haji Bakr? What is his relationship with Al-Baghdadi and when did it start?

Tweets from 12/14/2013

As already mentioned, the Al-Baghdadi Military Council is headed by three people, the main of whom is a former Baathist officer, Colonel of the General Staff named Haji Bakr. Colonel Haji Bakr joined the state of Iraq at a time when the state of Iraq was headed by Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. Haji Bakr was at that time a simple member of the military organization, offering his services in the military field, his experience of serving in the Baathist army of the Al-Baghdadi organization. Colonel Haji was known for his loyalty to the Baath Party. He was the highest-ranking military leader in the inner circle of Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi, whom he had not previously met. However, through intermediaries associated with Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi and Abu Hafs Al-Muhajer, he was admitted to the inner circle, on the condition that he would connect the organization with the leadership of the army and provide valuable information about it.

The General Staff Colonel was close to the leadership of the Iraqi state as a military adviser under Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi and Abu Hafsa Al-Muhajer. Colonel General Staff Haji Bakr provided the leadership with information and plans of a military nature and, through communications, connected him with the former military leadership of the Baath Party. The leadership of the state of Iraq was drawing closer and closer to Colonel Haji, in just a few weeks discerning in him a significant storehouse of military and administrative experience. The strange thing is that the current leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was not yet a member of the leadership of an organization such as Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. Until the very death of the latter, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi was a member of the organization not included in its leadership. He lived in western Iraq, and more specifically in the province of Al-Anbar, or more precisely, in Felluj.

Haji Bakr remained in the leadership as an adviser to al-Baghdadi and al-Muhajer for about 50 days, when a disaster struck the state of Iraq - both al-Baghdadi and al-Muhajer were killed by a shell. Colonel Haji Bakr was not injured. At one point, both leaders, who were the largest and most prominent leaders of the state of Iraq, were killed. Leadership positions were found to be vacant. Then Haji was appreciated by all. Haji Bakr had a friend - a colonel named Mazin Nahir. Haji Bakr often visited Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, accompanied by him, either presenting Mazin as an unofficial member of the organization collaborating with the organization, or as a trusted agent introduced into the ranks of the regime's supporters who would not like to be exposed either in the leadership of the organization or on his meetings after the assassination of two leaders. Colonel Haji Bakr told his entourage and the leadership of the organization that he had sworn allegiance to the new emir of the state of Iraq, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi. This news came as a surprise to everyone.

Application: Abu Hamza Al-Muhajer, who accompanied Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi, is an Egyptian named Abdel Munnom Azzeddin Badawwi, whose last two nicknames, before joining Al-Baghdadi, (Abu Omar) were: 1) Abu Ayyub; 2) Abu Hafs.

Tweets from 12/15/2013

When, during a special meeting, one hour after the death of the leader of Al-Baghdadi (the First) and Al-Muhajer, Colonel Abu Bakr invited Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi to become emir and Abu Bakr expressed his concerns to him, Colonel Haji Bakr reassured him, promising help and support from the rear, which delighted both Al-Baghdadi himself and those from his approach who were with him from the very beginning of his leadership.

A new stage in the history of the state of Iraq began, called the period of dual leadership - one leader, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi - in sight, and the shadow leader - Colonel General Staff Haji Bakr. The activities of the state of Iraq began to proceed in an atmosphere of fear of the presence in the state (organization) of a person endowed with extraordinary powers - Haji Bakr, who was very close to the emir. The image of a beardless colonel, who is always on the right hand of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, caused misunderstanding among the members of the state (organization), what both the leaders, al-Baghdadi and the colonel, felt.

The colonel from the first weeks began to grow a beard and change his image and manner of communication. None of the members of the organization had any questions for the leadership, since a question is doubt, and doubt is a split in the ranks, which in one way or another can lead to bloodshed and liquidation of the organization. None of the members of the organization knew the colonel until Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi came to the leadership of the organization. About two months later, Colonel Haji Bakr began to hold special meetings with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in order to prepare the structure of the new state. Their first agreement was the creation of two apparatuses: an apparatus for preventing a split in the state and protecting it from within by creating security units that eliminate everyone who poses a threat to the existence of the organization, and an apparatus that ensures the flow of material resources to the state.

First: security apparatus.

The first steps to ensure security were that Colonel General Staff Haji Bakr recommended the ceremonial leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi to avoid personal meetings with the heads of regional divisions so as not to be subject to their influence or instructions, but to convey to them the orders of the emir through the leadership of the formed colonel. Advisory Board. Subsequently, Colonel Haji Bakr became a necessary person for Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, with whom he never parted, became, as it were, his personal minister, a really shadow leader of the organization.

The second step in creating a security body was the formation of scattered units dealing with the liquidation and secret killings, formed by the colonel initially in the composition of 20 people, and then, over several months, brought up to a hundred people.

Orders for these units came only directly from the top management. They were not subordinate to any of the regional emirs. The selection of personnel in them took place on the basis of personal acquaintances of the colonel from among his especially trusted colleagues in his former activities under the collapsed Iraqi Baathist regime. The task of these units was to secretly eliminate those suspected of schismatic activities or opposing the State of Iraq, up to the elimination of field commanders and Sharia judges.

At the same time, orders to liquidate them did not pass through the organizational structures of the leaders of the state, bypassing them. At the head of these units, the colonel put his former colleague, a former officer named Abu Savfan Rifai. Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi felt safe and felt grateful to Colonel Haji Bakr. He began to consider him the person he needed. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi even felt that he could not remain the leader of the organization without Colonel Haji Bakr, who, thanks to his experience in the army, is acting as the minister of defense and the head of the security services.

Second:

The State of Iraq, under the leadership of its former leader Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi, has taken serious steps to attract large financial resources based on:

1) Confiscation of financial resources of all Shiites, Christian minorities, Druze, as well as all collaborators with the Assad regime, even from among the Sunnis;

2) The appropriation of state oil fields, state energy and fuel facilities, enterprises and any financial resources;

3) All companies that have contracts with the ruling regime, whether they are maintenance companies, housing and communal services companies, gas stations, communications enterprises. All of them were considered partners of the ruling regime. The owners of those who could not fully subordinate to their control received threats of murder and blowing up of the company's facilities or stores they owned in case of their refusal to pay the monthly tax. And they paid it out, fearing for their property.

4) Roadblocks were set up on long ground highways that charged heavy truck drivers, sometimes amounting to $ 200.

The state of Iraq, under the leadership of Abu Bakr and the colonel, concentrated very significant financial resources, due to which the size of wages and payments for participation in hostilities was increased. With the growth of financial opportunities among Iraqis, the attractiveness of joining the State and the commitment to it has grown significantly. The financial apparatus of the state of Iraq was created. It is surprising that Colonel Haji Bakr himself became its leader, combining the duties of the military leader of the state. Five managers were assigned to him. During this period, the colonel established a group of consultants with him, the composition of which the Consultative Council of the State of Iraq appointed from seven to thirteen people, of whom there was not a single non-Iraqi.

Now I would like to receive answers from the State of Iraq to the following questions:

- How did the idea of ​​forming the state of Iraq and the Levante come about? Who came up with the idea of ​​redeploying al-Baghdadi to Syria three weeks before it was officially announced, and where did he live all this time?

- Why did he rush to announce his redeployment and why did he choose the Turkish border as his place of stay before the announcement of the redeployment? Why did he choose mobile iron wagons near the refugee camps as his place of residence?

- With what threat did he address Abu Muhajir Al-Jolani before the announcement of the creation of the state and what should Al-Jolani or Jabhat al-Nusra take or not do at his request on the issue of its dissolution?

There is a photograph of al-Baghdadi with his advisers taken on the border with Turkey a week before the announcement of the creation of the state of Iraq and the Levant and the dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusra.

Tweets dated 12/17/2013

With the outbreak of the Syrian revolution, the eyes of the state of Iraq and the Levante turned to Syria, especially the eyes of members of the organization of non-Iraqi origin, and especially those from Syria. Colonel Haji Bakr was frightened by the possibility of penetration by members of the state of Iraq and its leadership, who, as its members, are looking for ways to split its ranks, and may choose Syria as a loophole to escape from the state.

Colonel Haji Bakr advised Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi to leave all thoughts of moving to Syria to leaders of all levels. Anyone who leaves for Syria will be considered a schismatic and a renegade. Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi issued such a statement, which contained threats. The reason for this was clear - the situation was unclear and should have refrained. In the ranks of the members of the state of Iraq, fermentation began, which could lead to a split, vacillation and an uncontrolled flight of its members, especially from among non-Iraqis, to Syria. The colonel proposed to form a non-Iraqi group, which should be sent to Syria under the command of a Syrian, with a ban on any leader of non-Iraqi origin from being part of this group. In this he saw an opportunity to save the state of Iraq from a split.

The new leadership in Syria will attract non-Iraqi supporters and foreigners into its ranks. The Jabhet al-Nusra organization was formed, which began to develop under the leadership of Abu Muhajir Al-Jolyani. The name of the organization and its authority began to gain strength. The name of Abu Muhajir Al-Jolyani gained international resonance. Many Mujahideen from the Persian Gulf region, Tunisia, Libya, Morocco, Algeria, Europe and Yemen began alarmingly swiftly and en masse to join Jebhat al-Nusra. This strengthening of Jabhat al-Nusra began to cause fear among the colonel and al-Baghdadi, since in the ranks of Jabhat al-Nusra there is no loyalty to either the state of Iraq or al-Baghdadi personally. Colonel Haji Bakr was frightened by the strengthening of Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Jolani, which threatened Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the state of Iraq with the loss of their role in the process as a whole. Therefore, Haji Bakr called on al-Baghdadi to order al-Jolani to announce on the radio that Jabhat al-Nusra is officially a division of the Iraqi state under the leadership of al-Baghdadi. Al-Jolani promised to think about it, however, in every possible way he delayed the answer.

Days passed, but there was still no statement. Al-Baghdadi sent al-Jolyani a reminder containing reprimands and reproaches, to which he replied with further promises to consult with his circle of mujahideen and scholars. Al-Jolyani sent a letter to Al-Baghdadi, in which, to the great disappointment of the colonel, he noted that such a statement, in the opinion of all members of the Advisory Council, would not be in the interests of the revolution. Al-Baghdadi was also angry. They, under the guise of mujahideen and advisers of the Al-Baghdadi wing, sent spies in order to, being among the close associates of Al-Jolyani, monitor his movements, so that he did not give orders and with whom he entered into an alliance.

This fact greatly worried Al-Jolyani, as it limited his freedom of movement and action. He began to speak to his entourage with restrained compliments to the state of Iraq and Al-Baghdadi, which only further increased suspicions against him. He felt that he would be eliminated. His sense of unease and fear for his life was greatly increased when the United States called for the inclusion of Jabhat al-Nusra on the list of terrorist organizations, and Al-Jolani himself on the list of the most wanted persons.

Al-Jolani had a chance to hide from the people sent by Al-Baghdadi to spy on him, isolating himself among a limited, closed circle of people he personally selected. The inclusion by the United States of Jabhat al-Nusra as a terrorist organization, and Al Jolyani himself on the list of the most wanted people in Syria, has increased the fears and concerns of Colonel Haji Bakr and al-Baghdadi about Jabhat al-Nusra's competition with the state.

Abu Muhajer Al-Jolani was an intelligent politician who tried to maintain moderation and instill peace in Al-Baghdadi's soul. However, the fears of the colonel and al-Baghdadi surpassed all the reassurances emanating from al-Jolyani, which made the colonel think about further steps to annex Jabhat al-Nusr to the state of Iraq. Colonel Haji Bakr advised Al-Baghdadi to send Al-Jolyani an order to carry out a military action against the leadership of the Free Army during any meeting in Turkey in order to inflict maximum damage on the composition of the leaders of the Free Army.

Al-Baghdadi sent Al-Jolyani a letter instructing to carry out two explosions, the first of which in Turkey, and the second in Syria, the targets of which would be the places of greatest concentration of the leaders of the Free Army. Such actions were justified by the need to prevent future contacts and rapprochement with the United States and to eliminate them before the situation in Syria aggravated, preventing the growth of their popularity among the people. The names of the leaders of the Free Army, subject to liquidation, were determined (we have a list of these names). These orders were communicated to the senior leaders of Jabhat al-Nusra and their divisions. A meeting of Jabhat al-Nusra was held.

The gigantic order was unanimously rejected. A detailed response was sent to al-Baghdadi, stating that Jabhat al-Nusra and his Advisory Council reject this order because they are Muslims, and also do not consider it possible to carry out such events in Turkey, which is a significant state that provides significant support for the revolution. ... The holding of the action will disrupt the development of the jihadist movement and that Dzhebhat al-Nusra is more visible, since he is closest to these processes. This angered Colonel General Staff Haji Bakr and Al-Baghdadi even more, who considered this fact as a clear withdrawal from obedience.

The colonel and al-Baghdadi sent al-Jolyani a letter in harsh colors, in which they presented him with a choice: either to carry out the order, or to dissolve Jabhat al-Nusra and form a new organization. Al-Jolani delayed the answer. The Colonel and Al-Baghdadi expected an answer that was all late. Al-Jolani expressed deliberate disregard for the instructions, since the ultimatum had expired. Al-Baghdadi sent his envoy to meet with Al-Jolani so that he would listen to his explanations. Al-Jolani tried to avoid this meeting, citing some circumstances.

The wait for the meeting dragged on, and Al-Baghdadi's envoy returned with nothing. Al-Baghdadi sensed a real danger. He felt that Jabhat al-Nusra considers himself to be a larger force than the state of Iraq and has gotten out of his control. The colonel suggested to Al-Baghdadi the following: he will send the leaders of Iraqi units with the task of holding meetings with the regional leaders of Jabhat al-Nusra with the aim of spying and probing their sentiments, throwing them the idea of ​​dissolving Jabhat al-Nusra and looking at their reaction, and at the same time finding out the degree of popularity of Al -Baghdadi in their midst. This was actually done.

The colonel and al-Baghdadi sent ten Iraqis to the location of Jabhat al-Nusra, who spent ten days among the mujahideen. During this time, they held meetings with mujahideen and some influential persons in Jabhat al-Nusra, especially with immigrants from Saudi Arabia. The results of these meetings were mixed. Reactions ranged from support for the idea to rejection. There was a large stratum supporting common Islamic aspirations and dreams of creating a state from Iraq to Syria under a unified leadership, most of whose representatives were represented by newly adjoining Jabhat al-Nusra, who had previously faced the leadership of Jabhat al-Nusra, who prohibited and punished any manifestation apostasy.

There were also those who met their death at the hands of Jabhat al-Nusra for inciting apostasy, or were severely punished for this. Any education seeks to give its members maximum freedom, and Jabhat al-Nusra imprisoned, persecuted and disarmed some of its members for spreading ideas of apostasy. Among those imprisoned under the sentence of Jabhat al-Nusra were: Tunisians Abu Ritaj As-Sousi, Abu Omar Al-Ibadi, Moroccans Abu Damdam Al-Husni, Abu Hajaj Al-Navari, Saudi Abu Bakr Omar Al-Kakhtani.

The Saudi Arabian Abu Bakr Omar Al-Kahtani, who was punished by Jabhat al-Nusr, was seized and punished three times for spreading inflammatory apostate ideas. He was on the side of the violators of the foundations of Jabhat al-Nusra. He was on the side of a group of persons punished by Jabhat al-Nusra on suspicion that they supported al-Baghdadi, who found a response in the ranks of Jabhat al-Nusra. This Saudi later became the chairman of the Sharia court of the Al-Baghdadi state and the first renegade.

Two weeks after al-Baghdadi announced the dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusra, ten of al-Baghdadi's spies returned to Iraq with a vague picture of the extent to which Jabhat al-Nusra members supported the idea of ​​its dissolution and subordination to a single state. Colonel Haji Bakr suggested that Al-Baghdadi not make any decision regarding the dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusr, but go with him in order to personally understand the situation on the spot, since the announcement of the creation of the state of Iraq and Syria during the absence of Al-Baghdadi in Syria did not able to inspire and lead the masses.

People would like to see Al-Baghdadi, and his physical presence would be an effective factor. Al-Baghdadi agreed with the colonel's opinion and sent people to prepare a secret and safe place. After these people got in touch, a safe place on the Turkish border was determined, his redeployment was prepared, accompanied by his personal assistant and colleague in the leadership of the organization, Colonel General Staff Haji Bakr, and only three other people. What was Al-Baghdadi doing since his arrival in Turkey and where exactly did he live? How many days did he spend there before announcing the dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusra?

Part 2

Tweets from 12/18/2013

When did al-Baghdadi appear in Syria? How was the dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusra announced? What does Saudi officer Bender Al-Shaalyan have to do with the formation of the new state of Al-Baghdadi?

Al-Baghdadi, the colonel and their entourage arrived in Syria three weeks before the announcement of the dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusra, after which they immediately went to a secret place on the Turkish border. For Al-Baghdadi, the following was prepared: iron mobile carriages near the Syrian refugee camp - the safest place for him and the most distant from prying eyes. Al-Baghdadi and his companions resided in these wagons, where Al-Baghdadi met with regional leaders of Jabhat al-Nusra, persuading them to recognize their leadership.

Al-Baghdadi decided not to disclose to them the differences and conflicts that took place between him and Al-Jolyani, explaining to them that the essence of the idea lies in general leadership in the name of common interests and to everyone's satisfaction, and that everyone, both leadership and Sharia advisers, this choice in favor of the transfer of Jabhat al-Nusra under the wing of the state seems correct. It's just a matter of returning one branch of the organization to its foundations. This is a purely organizational issue.

Al-Baghdadi's meetings with influential members of Jabhat al-Nusra took place in two versions, the first of which was the option when a prominent figure Jbhat al-Nusra met and talked with him in private, being personally acquainted with him, and, second, when a low-ranking leader I did not have a personal one-on-one meeting with him, but met with him in the presence of about ten people, one of whom said that Al-Baghdadi was present among the dozen and heard your answers.

They call for the unity of the ranks and the creation of a single organization. This will happen very soon. They gave advice on how to achieve cohesion and unity, talked about how dangerous enemies and vacillation in the ranks are, that Al-Jolani keeps silent, that there are no disagreements and differences between him and Al-Baghdadi. Upon learning of Al-Baghdadi's arrival in Syria and his meetings with influential people from the leadership of Jabhat al-Nusra, Al-Jolani was extremely angry.

Jabhat al-Nusra's leadership was worried, foreshadowing al-Baghdadi's next steps. Al-Baghdadi has sent an invitation to Al-Jolani for an urgent meeting. Al-Jolani declined to meet. He became aware of Al-Baghdadi's anger and the likelihood of his assassination. He refrained from meeting, surrounding himself with increased security. Al-Baghdadi was unable to establish the exact location of Al-Jolyani, and he sent a message to Al-Jolyani, in which he informed about the imminent dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusr, demanding that he make a personal statement in the interests of maintaining unity. Al-Jolani replied with an even more sincere and frank letter, indicating in it that the annexation of Jabhat al-Nusr to the state of Al-Baghdadi would be a fatal mistake and would lead to a rupture of the popularity and authority won by Jabhat al-Nusr among the Syrian jihadists. , and that the people of Syria categorically reject such a decision, advising Al-Baghdadi to return to Iraq, leaving Jabhat al-Nusra alone.

Colonel Haji Bakr advised Al-Baghdadi to issue a statement on the dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusr on his own behalf, but not to issue a statement on the resignation of Al-Jolyani, since he may still return after the crisis in relations is over. The colonel asked to postpone the statement until a combat battalion is formed in Syria from among the defectors from Jabhat al-Nusra, capable of becoming the core of al-Baghdadi's security after his statement.

Colonel Haji Bakr summoned the leaders of Jabhat al-Nusr, loyal to him, and agreed with them that they, from among their subordinates, would form a guard battalion, which would become the guarantor of the success of the statement, spreading the news about it among the supporters of Jabhat al-Nusr. In three days, the colonel managed to train commanders, in whose subordination there were about one thousand fighters and secretly notify them about the time of the release of the statement on the dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusra.

The day before the statement, the colonel informed all the other leaders of Jabhat al-Nusra about the presence of Emir Al-Baghdadi in Syria, so that they were ready to accept the dissolution and obey him, swearing allegiance to him during this period as part of the statement on the dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusra and the formation of the state of Iraq and Syria. The hour "zero" has come (the hour of the announcement). It was met with approval by the leaders, with whom an agreement had been reached in advance. They expressed their pleasure in solving problems. Leaders and Sharia judges were elected from among the members of Jabhat al-Nusra, who were to meet with Al-Baghdadi to confirm them in office, so that, returning to their subordinates, they could tell them about their meeting and conversation with Al -Baghdadi.

Colonel Haji Bakr warned al-Baghdadi that the current period is very decisive and security measures should be loosened when organizing face-to-face meetings with Jabhat al-Nusra supporters to take the oath so that people feel freer, especially after al-Jolyani violated the entire previous period the oath given to them. So that the top leaders and Sharia judges feel the difference when they see a person who is more prominent than they are, namely, Al-Baghdadi. This will be a big psychological factor and must be done.

After the release of the Statement, Jabhat al-Nusra split into three parts. Part of him, and this is almost half of the composition, joined Al-Baghdadi. Another part, and this is a quarter of the composition, adhered to neutrality, and the last quarter remained with Al-Jolyani. Al-Baghdadi felt the threat posed by the non-aligned neutral or hostile half of him. The colonel sent an angry message to Al-Jolyani, in which he suggested that he either join al-Baghdadi or accept death, since his actions, according to Khariji, are open disobedience, and, according to Islamic Sharia law, deserve death. Al-Jolani did not receive the message, since he changed his place of stay and his headquarters.

Members of his staff were informed about the essence of this message. The colonel, on behalf of al-Baghdadi, began to send his representatives to all the governing bodies of non-aligned units with al-Baghdadi with threats, calling them fugitives and stating that everything they have belongs to the state, and they must swear allegiance to it, or by disarming , it is safe to leave the territory of the country. They have no third choice.

Colonel Haji Bakr demanded that the defectors from Jabhat al-Nusr give out the names of influential persons from the non-aligned formations to al-Baghdadi in order to bribe or intimidate them. At this time, the name of the former Saudi officer Bender Al-Shaalyan, who had good relations with the Al-Baghdadi state since the time of the first Al-Baghdadi, began to appear. Bender Al-Shaalyan played an important role during two periods: the first - the state of Iraq before Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, and, the second - the period of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi. Bender Al-Shaalyan was among the influential persons of the state of Iraq before Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi.

He was one of the commanders of the Iraqi military unit. Then he returned to Saudi Arabia, and a new state was formed under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, with whom Bender maintained good ties. However, only for this period did he turn from the path laid out for him. He was constantly in contact with the state of Iraq and supported him in every possible way both before and after the dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusra. He fulfilled his task of establishing acquaintances and connections between influential persons Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Baghdadi.

Al-Shaalyan's first action was Al-Baghdadi's acquaintance with Abu Bakr Omar Al-Kahtani. He believed that the Saudi Arabian flag would influence the mujahideen. It was a rare chance for the Saudi Arabian Abu Bakr Omar Al-Qahtani to transform from a prisoner in Al-Jolani's prisons to a visitor to Al-Baghdadi. Al-Qahtani was summoned to meet with Al-Baghdadi and Colonel Haji Bakr, where he immediately swore allegiance to them, expressing his readiness to influence the followers of Jabhat al-Nusra and entice them, especially the Saudis.

Al-Qahtani was not previously known among the leadership of the state of Iraq, and Saudi Arabia duly directed his actions to influence the rest of the members of Jabhat al-Nusra. Al-Qahtani began a new stage with his transformation from an illegal military prisoner Jabhat al-Nusr to a close associate of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Part 3

Haji Bakr and al-Baghdadi have learned that al-Jolani is not going to follow their call for the dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusra and that he will likely make a public statement of his refusal to comply. Colonel Haji Bakr proposed to al-Baghdadi to immediately form a security group with two tasks: the first is to seize all the weapons depots of Jebhat al-Nusra, and all who oppose this should be immediately eliminated so that Jebhat al-Nusr has no weapons left. no ammunition for people to leave Jabhat al-Nusra, scatter and adjoin the state of Iraq.

The first task was solved with great success. A group of mujahideen Dzhebhat al-Nusra, the guards of the warehouses, who refused to transfer the warehouses they were guarding, was liquidated. The second task was even more decisive: the formation of a security group designed to eliminate the leadership of Jabhat al-Nusra, starting with Al-Jolyani himself, the most influential Sharia legalists, including Al-Muhajir Al Qahtani.

Colonel Haji Bakr formed a group with the task of carrying out the assassinations and assassinations of fifty people under the command of a former Iraqi officer, which was, firstly: to locate the leadership of Jabhat al-Nusra, and, secondly: to organize surveillance of all of them. movements and eliminate them using vehicles with explosives attached under their bottoms, the detonation of which is carried out with the help of a clock mechanism.

Al-Jolyani was searched for, his movements were found out, some of his former confidants were arrested to find out his movements. However, the place where he was hiding did not work. Then the group of Colonel Haji Bakr established surveillance of the main Sharia lawyer Jabhat al-Nusra Al-Muhajer Al-Kahtani.

Colonel Haji Bakr was informed of his whereabouts and all his movements. However, it was also reported that Al-Muhajer Al-Qahtani did not go anywhere unaccompanied by two guards and was never seen alone. Then the order was given to liquidate him, along with those accompanying him.

Al-Muhajer Al-Kahtani is used to being accompanied in his car by two people, the first of whom is Abu Haws An-Najdi Omar Al-Muheisani and the second is Abu Omar Al-Jazrawi, called Abdel Aziz Al-Osman. The elimination group of Colonel Haji Bakr planted an explosive device in the car of Al-Muhajer and his companions. The car drove off in the direction of one of the positions held by Jabhat al-Nusra. On the way, the target of elimination of al-Qahtani got out of the car to meet with one of the members of Jabhat al-Nusra at the location of one of its command posts, and asked his escorts to wait in the car.

At this time there was an explosion of the car with the attendants who were in it. Allah kept Al-Qahtani. He realized that he was the target of the action. After making sure that both of his escorts were killed, he disappeared, fearing a safety ambush. Colonel Haji Baku was informed of the death of Al-Qahtani and his entourage, Al-Baghdadi was also reported that the second man in Jabhat al-Nusra had been secretly eliminated.

The news of the death of Al-Qahtani circulated among the state of Iraq all day, until it became known from conversations among the supporters of Jabhat al-Nusr that he was alive and well and that the action had failed. Colonel Haji Bakr demanded an urgent convocation of an emergency meeting of the leadership of the liquidation group, during which he sharply criticized them, saying that this unsuccessful operation would deprive such operations for many months.

Al-Jolani's refusal to dissolve Jabhat al-Nusra remains the main danger for Al-Baghdadi and Colonel Haji Bakr from the moment they took over the leadership of the state of Iraq. The colonel demanded that Al-Baghdadi provide a solution to the problem of his competence. Al-Baghdadi expressed to him his fears that Al-Jolyani might resort to the help of Al-Zawahiri to aggravate the conflict situation. This actually happened. Al-Jolani managed to strengthen his position with the help of three people, one of whom was a Saudi commander, and the other two were Syrians (we have their names).

Az-Zawahiri asked not to rush and search for a cardinal solution to the problem. Al-Zawahiri sent a message to Al-Qaeda leader in Yemen, Nasser Al-Wahishi, asking for mediation before he makes a final statement embarrassing al-Qaeda. Al-Wahishi sent a written message to Al-Jolyani and Al-Baghdadi, to which Al-Baghdadi did not respond. Al-Jolani's response to Al-Wahisha's message was a word-for-word repetition of his excuses, given by Al-Baghdadi himself and, subsequently, Al-Zawahiri, that Al-Baghdadi's participation was the most painful mistake of the Syrian revolution.

Al-Wahishi informed Al-Zawahiri of the failure of his mediation and that a solution should be reached by Al-Zawahiri himself in a personal statement. Al-Baghdadi, after receiving a message from Al-Wahishi, felt that the problem was getting more complicated. Al-Baghdadi at that time was in a difficult psychological state, and Colonel Haji Bakr advised him how to remain committed to the idea, strength and resilience.

Kuwaiti Hamid Hamd al-Ali met with Al-Jolani to offer him his mediating role in defusing the conflict. Al-Jolani expressed to him his views and commitment to the thought regarding the danger of Al-Baghdadi's presence in Syria. Kuwaiti Al-Ali considered Al-Jolyani's arguments in favor of his commitment to Al-Nusr compelling, and also agreed that having a state called the Levante State headed by Al-Baghdadi was a gross political and legal error.

The Kuwaiti Al-Ali, through one of the close associates of Al-Baghdadi Sharia leaders, Abu Ali Al-Anbari, demanded a meeting with Al-Baghdadi. Such a meeting took place. Sound recording was made at the meeting. During the meeting, Al-Baghdadi and the colonel expressed their commitment to the state of Iraq and the Levant, while the Kuwaiti declared the importance of unity and resolution of the conflict situation. In short, an agreement was reached between them on the following: wait for what Az-Zawahiri will say in his speech to the media.

Colonel Haji Bakr expressed uncertainty about the removal of Az-Zawahiri. Al-Baghdadi asked him to calm down. After the departure of the Kuwaiti Al-Ali, the colonel reproached Al-Baghdadi for linking the fate of their state with Al-Zawahiri, who sent Nasser Al-Wahishi on a mediating mission. Colonel Haji Bakr demanded that Al-Baghdadi leave Al-Zawahiri in order to put an end to Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Jolyani, their leadership and dissolve Al-Nusr even from a legal point of view. The colonel began to take steps in many directions at once:

• first, to intensify the role of the liquidation unit;
• secondly, to act among Sharia lawyers, recruiting them from among influential muftis with the obligatory taking of the al-Baghdadi oath;
• third, increased recruitment through the media on the Internet, glorifying Al-Baghdadi and his state, posting reports on the operations carried out and their confirmation, publishing appeals directed against Al-Nusr and his leadership.

The liquidation group continued to operate. However, she changed her tactics, moving from using plastids to recruiting highly trained snipers. She again returned to the search for iconic figures and leaders, began recruiting among the Sharia lawyers of Jabhat al-Nusra with the involvement of the Iraqis Abu Al-Anbari and Abu Yahya and the Saudi Abu Bakr Omar Al-Kahtani. Two Iraqis were tasked with recruiting supporters from the Maghreb and Levant countries, and the Saudi Al-Qahtani - the Saudis and immigrants from the Persian Gulf countries.

Al-Qahtani worked day and night on the issue of fatwas on the need to swear al-Baghdadi, and even established contacts with influential circles in Saudi Arabia, the Gulf countries and the Maghreb. But, all this did not bring results. He then went to meet with the Sharia jihadist legalists in order to convince them to swear allegiance to al-Baghdadi. He had a meeting with Saudi Osman Al-Nazih and persuaded him to side with the Iraqi state, which was triumphantly announced by Abu Ali Al-Ansari.

Al-Anbari was the most prominent Sharia authority in the state of Al-Baghdadi, however, was an Iraqi. Al-Anbari asked the Saudi Osman to meet in order to find out the extent of his influence, but found the exact opposite of what Al-Qahtani had told him about. Al-Anbari reported to Al-Baghdadi that Osman al-Nazih is not suitable to be nominated for the role of Sharia leader, because he has weak personal qualities and is not able to conduct a conversation and participate in theological confrontation.

Colonel Haji Bakr and Abu Ali Al-Anbari asked Saudi Abu Bakr Omar Al-Kahtani to issue fatwas on his behalf, telling him that Saudi Arabia's Sharia authorities would support his commitment to the Al-Baghdadi state.

• ISIS, forbidden v Of Russia terrorist organization

The actions of the ISIS * group amaze the imagination with their cruelty and barbarism. Its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, proclaimed himself "caliph", but with much greater right he can claim another title - "Terrorist number 1". Repeatedly in the last couple of years, there have been reports in the media about the destruction of the leader of the militants, but each time they did not find confirmation. Al-Baghdadi tried to take heightened precautions and did not seek publicity. Much more often interviews were given by his runaway wives. However, this time in the bloody biography of the organizer of the "jihad" a fat point can be put. First, the Russian Foreign Ministry said that the destruction of al-Baghdadi can be said "with a high degree of probability." And now the Iraqi TV channel "Al-Sumaria", referring to a source in the "Islamic State" *, confirmed the death of al-Baghdadi.

The path from football player to terrorist

The future militant leader Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al-Badri (this is the real name of al-Baghdadi) was born in 1971 in the vicinity of Samarra in Iraq. His biography could well have developed differently. The boy belonged to the Sunni minority, his relatives served in the security forces under Saddam Hussein, and his father taught at the mosque.

Al-Baghdadi himself was going to become a lawyer and tried to enter the University of Baghdad, but to no avail. Then he decided to give preference to religious education and became a master of qiraat (reading of the Quran for ritual purposes) at the University of Islamic Sciences. After that, the future al-Baghdadi settled at the mosque and taught the reading of the Koran to children. Then he got a hobby - football. According to friends, the future terrorist played very well.

In 2003, the precarious religious balance in Iraq was disturbed by outside interference. American troops entered the country. They decided to overthrow Saddam Hussein, accusing him of creating and storing "weapons of mass destruction."

The new pro-American local authorities decided to "democratically" rely on the majority of the population - Shia Muslims. As a result, the popularity of radical ideas among the Sunni minority has grown sharply, and the terrorist underground began to massively replenish the Sunni security forces expelled from the civil service.

"See you guys in New York!"

Al-Baghdadi also joined the Iraqi cell of the international terrorist organization Al-Qaeda *.

There he was in charge of religious direction and recruiting militants. In 2005, the Americans arrested the "political officer" of the terrorists, but then nothing said about his future status. Among the other inhabitants of the filtration camp, Camp Bukka al-Baghdadi was not considered either the most dangerous or the most powerful. He himself leaned more on religion. True, the former prisoners later recalled that in the camp the preachers were actively planting radical ideas under the very noses of their guards. The employees of the camp administration themselves have rather pleasant memories of parting with al-Baghdadi. Leaving Camp Bucca, he said:

"Well guys, I'll see you in New York."

Then no one took this phrase for an aggressive hint or threat.

Camp Bucca Camp

And in 2010, al-Baghdadi became the head of the terrorist organization "Islamic State of Iraq" * after the assassination of its former leader. Soon after the outbreak of hostilities in Syria, the organization's ambitions spread to the neighboring country. This is how the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant * or ISIS * came into being. At first, the jihadists were entrenched in Syria, and in 2014 they captured a significant part of northern Iraq. Al-Baghdadi proclaimed a "caliphate" in the controlled territories, and demanded from now on to call himself "caliph".

Photo:livejournal. com

Sexual pleasures of the "true leader"

The leader of the militants became famous not only for his unprecedented cruelty, but also for his "love of love." Even during his law-abiding youth under Saddam Hussein, he was married at least twice and managed to have six children. Since then, stories about his new wives and sex slaves have repeatedly leaked to the media. Moreover, a new portion of revelations usually appeared after the next passion managed to escape. German woman Diane Kruger was responsible in the “caliphate” for the behavior of all the fairer sex, she also headed the Sharia court for women. In particular, she made sure that all residents of the controlled territories behaved quite modestly. Tolley militants became disillusioned with Diana's abilities on the "moral" front, or something else went wrong, but in 2016 Diana fled.

Another ex-wife of al-Baghdadi, Sajah al-Dulaymi, also gained fame. In the midst of her husband's bloody actions, she and her children went to his enemies in Europe. In the hope of getting a permanent home.

“I want to live in one of the European, not Arab countries. I want my children to live and get an education. Even if the mother was married to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, a terrorist ... Is the child to blame for this? " - said the woman to Swedish journalists.

Al-Baghdadi's personal life was not limited to communication with official wives. The militants organized entire harems in which they contain sex slaves. Most of them are girls, including minors, from families of religious minorities. In particular, the Yezidi Kurds. One of them, 16-year-old Zeinat, spoke about how she was forced to spend more than one night with al-Baghdadi.

People were killed and tortured in front of the girls. And when Zeynat tried to escape, she herself was almost killed.

“They beat all of us, they didn't leave a living place for us. We were almost black with bruises. They beat us with everything that came to hand: wires, belts, wooden sticks, ”the prisoner recalled.

Al-Baghdadi, she said, took a personal part in the massacre. Yazidis, according to jihadists, are "devil worshipers" and do not deserve pity.

6 deaths of al-Baghdadi

The leader of ISIS * has long been the main target of the special services and armed groups of many countries taking part in the conflict in Iraq and Syria. For the first time, the Americans reported about his murder back in 2005, but later the information was not confirmed. The next time the Arab media announced the possible destruction of al-Baghdadi, it happened in February 2015. A month later, representatives of the pro-Western coalition "killed" him again, and the journalists even managed to "transfer" power to Abdurrahman's successor Mustafa Al Sheikhlar. However, information soon emerged that the head of ISIS * was only wounded.

In 2016, al-Baghdadi was “killed” a couple more times. First as a result of an airstrike by the Western coalition, then through poisoning.

In the spring of 2017, the command of the Russian group of forces in Syria received information that the militant leaders were going to hold a meeting on the outskirts of Raqqa on May 28. There it was planned to discuss a plan for the withdrawal of jihadists from the surrounded city. Drones confirmed the intelligence, and the SU-35 and SU-34 planes destroyed the terrorists' command post. As a result, high-ranking militant leaders, 30 field commanders and about 300 bodyguards were killed.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Oleg Syromolotov stressed then that information about the death of al-Baghdadi is being verified. His liquidation, according to the diplomat, will undoubtedly "bring fear and panic" into the ranks of the militants.

“Based on the experience of defeating the terrorist bandit underground in the North Caucasus, I can say that if this information is confirmed, it will be possible to state another major success of the Russian Aerospace Forces in the fight against international terrorism,” Syromolotov said.

And now, the information seems to have really been confirmed. If we draw a parallel with the same "Al-Qaeda" *, then after the death of Osama bin Laden, the activity of this terrorist group really began to decline. But even then there were dozens of various and contradictory rumors, gossip, myths, conjectures, misinterpretations and versions that the "elusive" Osama is actually alive and only hid for a while ... So, even though the "immortal" al-Baghdadi is dead, but the terrorists, like a flag, will certainly wave for a long time in their interests for a long time to come.

* Extremist organization banned in Russia.

Alexander Sablin