K.K. Rokossovsky named 22-23 February as an approximate date for the start of the offensive, since the approach to the deployment line of the 19th Army and the 3rd Guards. the tank corps needed to make a 160-kilometer march. To accomplish the task set earlier, the front commander asked to strengthen his left wing with two combined-arms armies with two tank corps and provide 80 thousand reinforcements for rifle divisions and 20 thousand people for special forces.

On the evening of February 17, the Supreme Command Headquarters directives No. 11024 and 11026 approved the plans for operations in Pomerania presented by the commanders of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts. As a replacement for those requested by K.K. Rokossovsky of two combined-arms armies G.K. Zhukov was ordered: “The 47th Army and the 1st Guards. to have a tank army in reserve closer to the right wing of the front in order to use them, if necessary, at the junction with the 2nd Belorussian Front. " In connection with the new tasks of the fronts, the dividing line between them was re-cut; by decision of the Headquarters, it passed along the line of Bromberg, Flederborn, Neustättin, Kohlberg. The defeat of the main forces of the 11th enemy army G.K. Zhukov proposed to carry out within five to seven days, and the cleansing of the entire territory of Pomerania to the west of the meridian Neustettin, Curlin, Kohlberg to the river. Oder - within 14-16 days.

Initially, the Stavka accepted the proposed by G.K. Zhukov on February 19. However, in connection with the beginning of the German offensive, the date of the start of the operation was shifted. As it was recorded in the combat log of the 2nd Guards. tank army: "On the basis of this directive, the army commander at 13.00 17.2.45 gave the army troops combat order No. 09 / op, but the implementation of this order was suspended by the active actions of the enemy." On the originally appointed day, February 19, part of the 12th Guards. tank and 9 guards. rifle corps fought heavy defensive battles, and there could be no question of going over to the offensive. In addition, a more powerful blow from the Kallis, Stargard line on the flank and rear of the armies operating in the Berlin direction was expected. Under these conditions G.K. Zhukov decided to go over to the defensive on the entire front of the armies of the right wing in order to repel this blow. In the testimony of the prisoners, there were reports of the arrival of the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler division at the front, that is, there were reasons to believe that the 6th SS Panzer Army would still be involved in the Berlin direction. Accordingly, over the next 5–6 days, that is, approximately until February 25–26, the troops of the front's right wing were supposed to bleed the enemy's attacking formations with defensive battles, and then go over to the offensive themselves. As a result, the 2nd Belorussian Front was supposed to go on the offensive on February 24, and the 1st Belorussian Front on March 1.

To repel a possible strike from the north, the troops of the 1st Guards. the tank army was concentrated in the Berlinchen area and southeast of the city. They were tasked with covering the directions to Landsberg and Drizen (30 km south and southeast of Arnswalde). After the situation was defused - Arnswalde was evacuated - the corps of Katukov's army had to go out to the starting area for a new offensive in the period from February 25 to February 28 by night transitions. The troops of the 2nd Guards Tank Army, which still continued to engage in stubborn battles with the XXXIX enemy tank corps in the area south of Stargard, were to surrender their combat areas to rifle formations withdrawing to this direction, and by February 27, concentrate in the Arnswalde area.

Rokossovsky comes alone

Meanwhile, a battle unfolded on the left wing of the K.K. Rokossovsky. The march of the troops of the 19th Army into the assigned offensive zone was fraught with great difficulties. On February 20, 1945, due to the fact that the troops of the 19th Army were late in entering their offensive zone and therefore could not timely take over combat areas and replace the units of the army of the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front operating there, K.K. Rokossovsky was forced to urgently move the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps to this sector. The Cavalry Corps was ordered to advance to the Linde area by forced march and by 24 o'clock on February 20, change the formations and units of the right-flank army of the 1st Belorussian Front, occupy the designated area and firmly defend it. By the end of February 23, the troops of the 19th Army had replaced the left-flank units of the 70th Army and parts of the 3rd Shock Army and occupied the initial areas for the offensive.

The band of the 19th Army in the upcoming offensive was 17 km, while the total width of the band of the 2nd Belorussian Front was 212 km. The operational formation of the 19th Army for the offensive was envisaged in two echelons: two rifle corps in the first echelon and one in the second echelon. The battle order of the corps of the first echelon of the army was adopted for the right-flank corps in two echelons, for the left-flank - in three echelons. In the section of the breakthrough, which was equal to 10 km, the average density of artillery reached 152 guns and mortars (from 75 mm caliber and above). There were no direct support tanks for the infantry. The 19th Army's offensive operation was planned in two stages. The first stage included the breakthrough of the enemy's defense, the destruction of its opposing units and the capture of the Fletenstein-Neustättin line. The time for completing the tasks of the first stage is two days, the rate of advance is 20-25 km per day. At this stage, it was planned to introduce the 3rd Guards into the breakthrough. tank corps, reinforced by one rifle division at the expense of the corps of the second echelon. The second stage included the defeat of the enemy's operational reserves and repelling possible counterattacks by enemy infantry and tanks, reaching the coast of the Baltic Sea and turning the main army forces for an eastward attack on the city of Gdynia. The time to complete tasks at this stage is two days. The planned rate of advance is 30–35 km. The depth of the entire operation was 114 km, the average planned rate of advance was 25-30 km per day.

Destroyed tank "Panther" of the 10th SS Panzer Division "Frundsberg". East Pomerania, February 1945

The 18th Mountain Corps of the 2nd Army defended itself in the direction planned for the 19th Army's offensive. It consisted of the 32nd Infantry Division, removed from Courland, the Ax group (remnants of the 15th Latvian SS Division), the SS Nederland regiment, various training units and the 33rd SS Charlemagne Division (1st French SS) as a backup in the second line.

On the morning of February 24, the operation began. The 19th Army went on the offensive after forty minutes of artillery preparation. On the very first day, it moved 10–12 km forward and expanded the breakthrough section to 20 km. The 3rd Guards operated on the left flank of the army. cavalry corps. However, the battles of the first day showed that rifle formations without tanks of direct support of the infantry were not advancing fast enough, and this could affect the implementation of the operation plan. Taking this into account, the commander of the troops of the 19th Army decided to bring the 3rd Panzer Corps of General A.P. Panfilov (274 tanks and SAU) somewhat earlier than planned.

By the decision of the corps commander, the formations were entered into battle along two routes. The battle formation of the corps was built in two echelons: in the first echelon there were two tank brigades with reinforcements, in the second echelon there was one motorized rifle brigade. Each tank brigade of the first echelon was assigned one rifle regiment of the 313rd rifle division for reinforcement. At 11 o'clock in the morning on February 25, the formations of the tank corps went over to the offensive. The vanguard detachments of the 3rd and 18th Guards Tank Brigades with amphibious assault forces on tanks, overtaking the infantry at this line, rushed forward. Having entered the operational space, units of the 3rd Guards Tank Corps, knocking down the enemy cover detachments, began to rapidly develop the offensive. During the day of the battle, the tank corps advanced to a depth of 40 km and by the morning of February 26, the vanguard detachment of the 3rd Guards Tank Brigade captured Baldenberg. At this time, the 18th Guards Tank Brigade, having defeated a strong enemy defense center in the Schönau area, captured this city and station.

However, the offensive of the 19th Army, although it accelerated, still did not reach the planned pace. This was due, in particular, to the fact that parts of the tank corps operated in a relatively narrow strip and in one direction, and therefore large enemy strongholds remained in its rear, the resistance of which reduced the rate of advance of rifle formations. In addition, the units of the 19th Army that fought on a calm sector of the front in Karelia did not have combat experience comparable to the veterans of the western direction. As a result, by the end of February 25 (that is, in two days of the operation) the army's troops had advanced only 20-25 km, at a planned rate of advance of 20-25 km per day. The troops of the 70th Army, advancing to the right of the 19th Army, in two days of fighting had a slight advance within 4-6 km.

After a number of measures were taken to streamline the command and control of the 19th Army and the withdrawal of some formations to new directions, the offensive resumed in the morning of February 26. Meanwhile, the 3rd Guards Tank Corps captured the settlements of Sidov and Poret with advanced units, and soon Draven and Bublitz fell under the attacks of corps units. Having defeated the enemy garrisons in Schlochau, Barenwald and Hammerstein, the troops of the 19th Army advanced 22 km into the depths of Eastern Pomerania during the day of the battle and expanded the breakthrough along the front to 60 km.

However, the pace of advance of the infantry was still far behind the tankers. The 3rd Guards Tank Corps, which had advanced far to the north-west and was at a distance of 30-40 km from the rifle formations of the 19th Army, could find itself in a very difficult position and could undergo a flank attack from the south-west, where the enemy had a strong a grouping of mobile troops of the 3rd Tank Army, defending against the troops of the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front. In addition, the offensive of the shock group of Rokossovsky's troops into the formation of the 2nd German army was driven into a rather narrow wedge with initially weak flanks. Despite the fact that it was 1945, the danger of flank attacks was still great. On the left flank, the 3rd Guards was involved. cavalry corps advancing on Neu-Stettin. To protect the right flank K.K. Rokossovsky ordered the troops of the 70th Army, together with the right-flank formations of the 40th Rifle Corps of the 19th Army, to capture the Prehlau region by the morning of February 27.

One should not think that Rokossovsky was afraid of some kind of phantoms. Flank attacks on the units of the 19th Army and the 3rd Guards, which had penetrated to Bublitz. Panzer Corps were planned by the command of Army Group Vistula, and at the end of February, activities began to gather forces for a counterstrike. The formations were assembled by dismantling the shock groups of the "Solstice", which had already lost its relevance. To strike on the right flank of the 19th Army, a grouping of troops was assembled under the control of the VII Panzer Corps of General Mortimer von Kessel. It consisted of the 7th Panzer Division from the left flank of the 2nd Army, the 4th SS Polizai Division, transported from the Stargard area, and the 226th Assault Gun Brigade. To strike on the left flank of the 19th Army, the so-called corps group von Tettau (named after its commander, Lieutenant General Hans von Tettau) was created. It included: Panzer Division "Holstein", infantry divisions "Pommerland" and "Berwalde". The Holstein Division was hastily formed in February 1945 from the 233rd Reserve Panzer Division. It was relatively small in number: on February 15, it included 7028 people (195 officers, 25 officials, 1427 non-commissioned officers and 5441 privates, including 198 Khivi) and 25 Pz.IV tanks in one three-company battalion. Artillery "Holstein" consisted of two divisions, one of which was armed with twelve 88-mm anti-aircraft guns instead of howitzers. The von Tettau group and the VII Panzer Corps were to strike in converging directions and cut off the parts of the 3rd Guards that had escaped forward. Panzer Corps and the 19th Army. It was to direct the actions of the X SS corps and the von Tettau group that it was originally planned to use the command of Erhard Routh's 3rd Panzer Army.

The resulting situation forced the commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front to temporarily suspend the offensive of the tank corps and pull up the main forces of the 19th Army to the line he had captured. The front stopped when only about 50 km remained to the Baltic Sea coast. On February 27, 1945, the troops of the 19th army of the front, stopping at the lines reached the day before, put themselves in order, part of the forces of their right flank, in cooperation with their neighbor on the right (units of the 70th Army), fought an offensive battle in the Prehlau region, while repulsing numerous counterattacks by the enemy. 3rd Guards. the cavalry corps blockaded Neu-Stettin.

In principle, when the troops of K.K. Rokossovsky, the task assigned to the front by the Headquarters back on February 8 was partially completed. However, the armies of the right wing and the center of the 2nd Belorussian Front were unsuccessful during February 24 and 25 and fought on their previous lines. Accordingly, the 2nd Shock Army, reinforced by the 8th Guards. tank corps, continued to fight, being divided into two groups: besieging Graudenz and occupying a sector of the front in front of the 2nd enemy army. The 65th and 49th armies advanced 6-10 km, the 70th army 25-35 km.

"Royal Tigers" of the 503rd SS heavy tank battalion. East Pomerania, Arnswalde region, February 1945

On the last day of February, the commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front set tasks to the troops subordinate to him that were more related to consolidating what had been achieved and protecting the flanks than aimed at advancing to the coveted coast of the Baltic Sea. Rokossovsky was clearly waiting for the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front to go on the offensive. On February 28, the 3rd Guards Tank Corps, stopped by K.K. Rokossovsky in the Bublitsa area, organized a perimeter defense in this area. The 8th Mechanized Corps of Major General of Tank Forces A.N. Firsanovich was concentrated in the Chojnice area with the task of supporting the offensive of the 70th Army. By the end of February 28, 1945, the troops of the 70th Army advanced 10 km and broke the enemy's resistance in the Prehlau area, eliminating the threat to the flank of the 19th Army. Despite the loss of 2,529 people in February 1945, the 4th Panzer Division, which cemented the German defenses in the Chojnice area, was supported in a high completeness. As of March 1, it included 12,249 people out of 14,968 in the state, 13 Pz.IV tanks, 19 Pz.V Panther and Jagdpanther self-propelled guns, 3 Sturmgeshutz self-propelled guns, 4 PzJag.IV self-propelled guns, 230 armored personnel carriers , armored vehicles and command tanks. The equipment completeness of the 4th Panzer Division even increased in comparison with February 1, 1945: there were more armored personnel carriers, machine guns, artillery pieces and vehicles. The division retained the structure with two tank battalions, one of the four motorized infantry battalions was completely transferred to an armored personnel carrier. In short, the Germans managed to maintain their tank formations in good shape until a certain point.

At the same time, Soviet intelligence uncovered the concentration of the 7th Panzer Corps' strike group in the Rummelsburg area. On the last day of February K.K. Rokossovsky assigned the 40th Guards Rifle Corps of the 19th Army the task of changing the direction of its offensive from the north to the northeast. The corps was ordered to go to the Rummelsburg area and, having captured this city, have at least one rifle division with forward detachments on the Georgendorf-Voknin line northeast of the city. Thus, it was supposed to defeat the grouping assembled by the enemy for a counterattack before it goes over to the offensive. The commander of the 19th Army was ordered to reinforce the 40th Guards Rifle Corps with cannon, howitzer and anti-tank artillery. Covering the left flank was limited to the fact that the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps captured the city of Neu-Stettin.

Coup de grace

As we can see, even having introduced a fresh army into the battle, the 2nd Belorussian Front did not achieve a decisive result. The defeat of the left wing of Army Group Vistula in Pomerania could only be achieved by joint actions of two fronts. Even before the transition to the offensive of Rokossovsky's troops, on February 22, Zhukov, with operational directives No. front of the task of preparing and conducting an offensive operation. Compared with the version of the offensive plan in Pomerania submitted to the Headquarters on February 16, significant changes followed by February 22. According to the corrected decision of the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, the main blow was delivered by two combined arms (61st and 3rd shock armies) and two tank armies. In addition, two auxiliary strikes were delivered (47th Army and 1st Polish Army), their offensive was to begin on the second day of the operation. The 3rd Shock Army was reinforced by the 9th Panzer Corps from the front reserve, and the 47th Army received the 1st Mechanized Corps from the 2nd Guards for reinforcement. tank army. The commanders were ordered to submit detailed plans of operations for approval by 25 February. According to the report submitted by Zhukov to the Supreme Commander a week earlier (February 16), it was supposed to involve only the 2nd Guards. tank army, the main blow to be delivered by the 61st army, and the auxiliary - by the 3rd shock army. According to the new plan, the 3rd Shock Army became one of the two armies in the direction of the main attack, and its success was to be developed by the 1st Guards. tank army. The 47th Army and the 1st Army of the Polish Army became "pinned".

The preparation of the operation was accompanied by appropriate precautions:

"eight. I give permission to acquaint the chief of staff, chief of the operational department of the army headquarters and the commander of the army artillery. The rest of the performers set tasks within the limits of their duties. Not to give written orders to regimental commanders, to set tasks orally in two or three days. In the service of the rear, do not give general directives, confine ourselves to verbal orders.

9. To explain to all personnel of the army that our task is stubborn defense for a long time. Ml. to the command staff and the Red Army men to announce the task for the offensive 2 hours before the attack. "

The impending offensive was to set in motion an almost 200-km front occupied by the armies of the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front. The regrouping of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front was completed by the end of February 28. As a result of regrouping on a front of 250 km, thirty-two rifle divisions, four cavalry divisions, four tank corps, two mechanized corps with reinforcement units were assembled. Eighteen rifle divisions, one cavalry division, four tank corps and one mechanized corps were concentrated in the 75 km wide striking group of the front. Here 70-75% of the artillery units and formations allocated for the operation were collected. The general artillery preparation involved the artillery of the tank armies. The average density per rifle division in the direction of the main attack was 4 km, with an average operational density of 8 km per rifle division. The manning level of infantry formations of the 1st Belorussian Front was traditionally low for 1945. The average number of a rifle division in the 3rd Shock Army was 4,900 people, the 61st Army - 4,300 people, and the 47th Army - also 4,300 people. Each of these three armies had nine rifle divisions. Only the divisions of the 1st Army of the Polish Army (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 6th Infantry Divisions) were distinguished by a relatively high completeness - an average of 7400 people. In the 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies on March 1, there were 1,067 tanks and self-propelled guns.

Commander of the 10th SS Panzer Division, SS Brigadeführer Heinz Harmel.

The January offensive and the February battles in Pomerania significantly reduced the capabilities of the 2nd Guards. tank army. The 12th Guards suffered the most. tank corps. According to the "Information on the state of parts and connections of the 2nd Guards. TA at 13.00 on February 28, 1945 " in the ranks in the corps there were 77 T-34s, 12 SU-85s, 5 SU-76s and 12 IS-2s. Another 124 tanks were under repair, most of them overhauled. In the 48th Guards. the tank brigade, which was holding back the onslaught of the Frundsberg on Varnitz, had only 6 T-34 tanks left on the move. The 9th Guards were in somewhat better condition. tank corps. According to the same certificate dated February 28 at 13:00, in the corps' combat formations, there were 120 T-34s, 1 Valentine Mk.IX, 18 ISU-122, 7 SU-85 and 2 ° CU-76. 35 tanks were under repair. Tank army M.E. Katukova suffered much smaller losses in the January and February battles and as of March 1, 1945, she had 23 IS-2, 401 T-34, 11 ISU-122, 32 SU-85, 28 SU-76 and 83 SU-57 in the ranks. ... A more significant problem was the tank's operating hours. 62.8% of the T-34 tanks had a consumption of 180-200 hours, 22% - 225. These figures came close to the backbone of the tank fleet of the army of M.Ye. Katukov to a massive breakdown for technical reasons.

Units of the III SS Panzer and X Army Corps defended in front of the front of the 3rd Shock and 61st Armies, which dealt the main blow. In the offensive zone of the 61st Army, the following were defended: the 27th SS Volunteer Division Langemark, the 28th Wallonia Volunteer Division, and one regiment each from the Nordland and Nederland tank-grenadier divisions. During that period, the units of these two divisions acted separately. So, the 24th tank-grenadier regiment "Nordland" defended itself in isolation from other parts of the division south of Stargard. In the offensive zone of the 3rd Shock Army, the 5th Jaeger Division of the X SS Army Corps defended.

On March 1, after a 50-minute artillery and aviation preparation, the troops of the 3rd Shock and 61st Armies of the 1st Belorussian Front went over to the offensive. By 10.00 in the morning, the troops of the armies captured the main position of the enemy's defense and successfully advanced in the northern and northwestern directions. Further, from the side of Zhukov, followed the typical "konevschina", that is, the introduction of tank armies into battle, and not into a breakthrough. In the zone of action of the 3rd Shock Army, to develop the success, the 1st Guards. tank army. The forward detachments of the formations of the army of M.E. Katukov (1st and 44th Guards Tank Brigades with reinforcement units), 15 minutes before the end of the artillery preparation, began their advance to the forward edge. This ensured their entry into the combat formations of rifle formations an hour after the start of the movement and already at a depth of 2 km beyond the front edge of the enemy's defense. The advance detachments of the 1st Panzer Army, stepping up the infantry strikes, entered the battle. Developing the offensive in conjunction with rifle formations, the advance detachments soon broke away from the infantry and rushed forward. The main forces of the 1st Panzer Army, starting to advance from the initial area at 14.00 on March 1, at about 17.00 passed the infantry battle formations, overtaking the rifle formations. With a powerful blow, they finally broke the enemy's resistance and advanced 20-25 km in depth. The 11th Guards reached the greatest success. a tank corps moving along the road: its vanguard detachment reached the outskirts of Nerenberg by 2200 hours. Moving along country roads along the parallel route of the 8th Guards. the mechanized corps traveled a significantly shorter distance.

As a result of the onset of the thaw, battles took place mainly along the roads. As noted in the report drawn up at the headquarters of the 1st Guards. tank army, following the results of the operation, "movement on the side of the road, and even more so off the road, was impossible." In the conditions of constrained maneuver, mining of roads and forest blockages became a significant problem. Corps of the 1st Guards. tank army on March 2 changed places: 1st Guards. tank brigade of the 8th guards. mechanized corps took the lead, 10 km ahead of the 44th Guards. a tank brigade, which started fighting on the outskirts of Vangerin by 18.00. Parts of the army of M.E. Katukova from the woods came to the "Reichsstrasse No. 162".

Since on March 2 the mobile units of the 2nd Belorussian Front reached the Baltic Sea in the Keslin area, there was a danger of a breakthrough in the western direction of the units of the 2nd army of the enemy. In order to prevent such enemy actions, Katukov decided to deploy the 8th Guards. a mechanized corps with a front to the east, occupying the junctions of the Bellegarde and Kerlin roads.

A similar scenario initially unfolded events in the zone of the 61st Army of P.A. Belova. According to the initial decision, it was planned to put mobile formations into battle in the second half of March 1 from the Falkenwalde, Rafenstein, Schlagentin line. Since this milestone was not reached, the 2nd Guards. The tank army was ordered, together with the rifle formations of the right flank of the 61st Army, to complete the breakthrough of the enemy's defenses. By 14:00 on March 1, not only the forward detachments of tank formations, but also their main forces were deployed and entered the battle. However, the offensive developed here somewhat worse than in the zone of the 3rd Shock Army. On the first day of the operation, it was not possible to complete the breakthrough of the enemy's defense. Rifle and tank formations of the 61st and 2nd Guards. During the day of the battle, the tank armies captured only the enemy's main defense zone, advancing to a depth of 5–7 km.

Interim commander of the III SS Panzer Corps, Lieutenant General Martin Unrein.

The commander of the III SS Panzer Corps Unrein in the face of a powerful blow from the Soviet troops saw no other solution than to gradually bend the left flank of his corps. It was supposed to move away from Ritz on Freewald, holding Stargard. Further Unrein decided to try to stay on the line "Reichsstrasse No. 158" (Stargard - Freewalde). Also, after identifying the direction of the main attack, it was replaced by a fusilier battalion and withdrawn to the corps reserve of the 24th tank-grenadier regiment of the "Nordland" division. However, it became more and more difficult to maintain command of the troops. The rapid penetration of the advancing tanks and infantry into the depths led to the disorganization of the German troops: the supply columns did not find "their" tanks and self-propelled guns, and sometimes even fell under the blows of Soviet tanks. On the morning of March 2, the advancing Soviet units reached Reichsstrasse No. 158. For a counterattack in the Vosberg area, all the remaining tanks of the 11th Nordland Panzer Regiment and the Royal Tigers of the 503rd SS Heavy Tank Battalion were brought in. This counterattack temporarily halted the offensive.

The 10th SS Panzer Division "Frundsberg", which was withdrawn from Eastern Pomerania under the command of the 9th Army of Büsse, was returned to the battle again. Initially, it was supposed to use the division in the Keslin area to prevent the breakthrough of Soviet tanks to the Baltic Sea. However, the division was soon re-aimed at the zone of the III SS Panzer Corps and disembarked in the area of ​​Massov, Plate and Naugard.

The problem of lagging behind the second shock grouping of the front (2nd Guards Tank and 61st Armies) G.K. Zhukov decided very simply. To the commander of the troops of the 2nd Guards. tank army S.I. Bogdanov was ordered, covered by part of the forces from the front, with the main forces to bypass the fortified positions by deep maneuver and strike at the flank and rear of the defending enemy grouping. Fulfilling these instructions of the front commander, the troops of the tank army carried out a maneuver through the offensive zone of the deeper advancing neighboring 3rd Shock Army, bypassing the flank of the opposing enemy. Further, the tankers attacked Naugard on the flank and rear of the III SS Panzer Corps, which was defending the front of the 61st Army. The courageous maneuver brought success. Although the SS men were still able to hold Stargard and Freenwalde on March 3, the front between them and north of Freenwalde collapsed. The German command decided to form a new front along the Stargard-Mass line. Thus, the front of the III SS Panzer Corps turned 90 degrees: if earlier its line went from east to west, now it went from north to south.

By the end of March 4, the troops of the 2nd Guards. Panzer army engaged in battles for Naugard, developing part of the forces to attack the Gollnov. The enemy's advance to the Naugard area and to the area between Naugard and the Frundsberg SS Mass Division was already too late. On March 5, Naugard was cleared of the enemy. The defeated units of the III SS Panzer Corps began to withdraw to the west and northwest. In pursuit of them, the forces of the 61st Army advanced more than 30 km in depth in three days and occupied Stargard on March 4. However, the resistance of the III SS Panzer Corps forced to adjust the plans for the use of the 2nd Guards. tank and 61st armies. In directive No. 00362 / op of February 28 G.K. Zhukov aimed these two armies on an offensive in the northeastern direction. 2nd Guards. The tank army's task was: "with an exit to the Freienwalde, Rossow, Schöneber area, continue the offensive in the general direction of Naugard, Goltsov, Kammin." Tank army S.I. Bogdanova was supposed to reach the coast of the Baltic Sea and take positions on the eastern shore of the Stettin harbor, blocking the "Reichstrasse No. 111" (at Wollin) and "Reichsstrasse No. 165" (at Divenov on the coast). The 61st Army was to take positions from the southern flank of the 2nd Guards. Panzer Army to Altdamme. However, the tankers of the 2nd Guards. the tank army was not destined to send bottles of seawater as reports, as their colleagues from the 1st Panzer Army did. Army S.I. Bogdanov and P.A. Belova were deployed to the west and had to defeat the main strike group "Solstice" on the eastern bank of the Oder.

The turn of the two armies to the west soon influenced the development of the operation as a whole. In the zone of the 3rd Shock Army, events initially developed in accordance with directives No. 00343 / op and 00362 / op of the front headquarters. Soviet troops successfully broke into the defense of the enemy's 5th Jaeger Division. Unlike the mechanized formations of Unrein's corps, the infantry could not effectively counter the Soviet offensive. The formations of Katukov's tank army, which had escaped into the operational space, were rapidly advancing in a northern direction, moving further and further away from Berlin. While the 8th Mechanized Corps gradually turned its front to the east, its neighbor moved north. 45th Guards. tank brigade of the 11th guards. tank corps A.Kh. Babadzhanyan captured the southwestern outskirts of Kolberg by 12:00 on March 4. At 0900 on March 5, units of the SS Charlemagne division were driven out of the Bellegarde road junction. The ground communications of the German 2nd Army, which stood on the path of the 2nd Belorussian Front's offensive into Pomerania, were finally intercepted.

Ironically, about a month before the described events in Germany, the film by director Feith Harlan "Kohlberg" about the defense of the city during the Napoleonic wars was released. This was the last, and color, film of the Third Reich. One of the scriptwriters was Joseph Goebbels. The film was shot for two years, and its screening began on January 30, 1945. However, in life it turned out quite differently from the movie screen.

The fire is conducted by a 105-mm light field howitzer of the 4th SS Division "Polizai". East Pomerania, February 1945

Kohlberg was declared a "festung" in November 1944, and by February 1945, fortifications had been erected around it. On March 1, 1945, there was a construction battalion, a Volkssturm battalion and an antiaircraft battalion in the city. On March 2, eight light field howitzers arrived in Kolberg, and on March 3, the 51st fortress machine-gun battalion. The war log of the Wehrmacht High Command on March 5 notes with annoyance: "There is only a weak garrison of our troops in the fortress." Not surprisingly, Kohlberg has become one of the shortest-living Festungs. The city's garrison numbered 4,000 people with six defective tanks and a battery of 88-mm anti-aircraft guns. The garrison was commanded by Colonel Fritz Fulride, wounded in July 1941 in the Baltic States, after his recovery in Tunisia, Italy, and in 1944 - near Warsaw. Artillery support for Kohlberg's garrison was provided by the destroyer Z-43. Here the German sailors came in handy with 150-mm destroyer guns, which were too heavy for ships of this class. After a two-week assault, the city was 90% destroyed. March 18, 1945 under the onslaught of formations of the 1st Army of the Polish Army and the 2nd Guards. Kohlberg's cavalry corps ceased resistance. According to the ZhBD OKV, 68 thousand refugees, 1223 wounded and 5213 servicemen (about 800 soldiers and officers of combat units, and the rest were railway workers, the Todt organization, etc.) were evacuated from the city by sea. According to Soviet data, 6292 soldiers and officers were taken prisoner in Kolberg. Kolberg's commandant, Colonel Fulride, was not captured, after evacuation he was promoted to major general and in the last days of the war commanded the 3rd Marine Division, surrendered to the Americans.

With the transition to the offensive of the 1st Belorussian Front, hostilities in the zone of the 2nd Belorussian Front intensified. It was not in vain that Rokossovsky suspended the offensive of his troops in anticipation of a strike by Zhukov's troops. On March 3, the advance of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front was 6-15 km. The forward detachments of the front's mobile units reached the Baltic Sea coast in the area northeast of Kezlin. The advancing units of the 19th Army captured the city of Rummelsburg. On March 4, by roundabout maneuver and assault, Kezlin was taken - a communications center, a large industrial center of Pomerania. March 6 K.K. Rokossovsky got rid of the Graudenz "festung" hanging around his neck. The city, defended by 7000 garrisons, was taken by storm by units of the 2nd Shock Army. More than 2,000 enemy soldiers and officers were taken prisoner on March 5 alone, including the commandant of the fortress, Major General Fricke with the headquarters. On March 7, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front reached the eastern outskirts of Kolberg and joined up with the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front.

The von Tettau group: flight instead of counterstrike

Breakthrough of the 1st Guards. tank army to the Baltic Sea put a bold cross on the German plans for a counterattack on the flank of the 19th Army, covered by Oslikovsky's cavalry, by the group of von Tettau. The planned counterattack did not take place: neither the VII Panzer Corps, nor the group of von Tettau could go on the offensive. On the evening of March 4, General von Tettau gave the order for a breakthrough to the west. It was also joined by the remnants of the 18th Mountain Corps defeated by the 19th Army - the SS Charlemagne Division and the Latvian SS 15th Division. On March 5, it turned out that the route of withdrawal along the highway through Regenwalde was blocked by Soviet troops. Von Tettau decided to make his way in the northwest direction, into the gap between the rifle units and the corps of Katukov's army, which had made its way to the sea.

The position of the von Tettau group was somewhat facilitated by the fact that the X SS Army Corps was surrounded to the southwest of it, in the area of ​​Dramburg. The main efforts of the combined-arms armies of the 1st Belorussian Front were concentrated against him. Zhukov ordered the commander of the 3rd Shock Army to prevent the enemy from retreating to the west and northwest. At the same time, the front commander gave an order to the 1st Army of the Polish Army to accelerate the advance and, in cooperation with other formations, defeat the encircled enemy. A little later, the front commander ordered the 1st Guards. part of the tank army to assist the 1st Army of the Polish Army in the destruction of the enemy's encircled X SS Corps, leaving small cover detachments in the areas of Bellegarde and Curlin. In order to prevent the enemy from retreating from the Curlin region to the west, it was ordered to destroy all crossings on the river. Perzante at Bellegarde, Curlin, Kohlberg.

Tank T-34-85 2nd Guards. tank army in ambush. East Pomerania, February 1945

Captured commanders of German divisions (the commander of the Berwalde division Reitel and the 402nd reserve division of Spainitz) indicate that the order to withdraw was given on the night of March 4-5 or in the morning of March 5th. But by that time he was already too late. The war log of the Wehrmacht High Command on March 5 says: "Our troops, which are still in their old positions, are united under the command of General Krappe and are making attempts to break through to the west to Labes." That is, while Babadzhanyan's tankmen had already reached Kolberg, they still occupied the same positions as on March 1. During 4 and 5 March, fierce fighting broke out in the area east and northeast of Labes. The 3rd Shock Army with the 12th Guards and 79th Rifle Corps advanced to the west, while the 7th Rifle Corps was left to cover the right flank and fight the encircled enemy grouping. Subsequently, the 79th Rifle Corps reached the Pomeranian Bay and the river. Oder at the Waldivenov site, Cummin. There he changed parts of the echelon of the development of the success of the 3rd Shock Army - 9th Guards. tank corps. Thus, the outer front of the encirclement of the von Tettau group and the remnants of the Krappe group was formed. The German High Command reacted to the collapse of the front in Pomerania in the traditional way: on March 8, Erhard Raus was removed from his post as commander of the 3rd Panzer Army, and was replaced by General of the Panzer Forces Hasso von Manteuffel. Prior to this, Manteuffel commanded the 5th Panzer Army in the west and received diamonds for the Knight's Cross in this position in February 1945.

After receiving the order to withdraw, the German formations between the adjacent flanks of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts had only to try to break through to their own. The commander of the Berwalde division, Lieutenant General Reitel, during interrogation in Soviet captivity, explained the logic of his actions as follows: “I built a breakthrough plan on my experience of tank warfare: after the tanks had passed, the infantry moved at some intervals and a continuous front was established gradually. I expected to pass between the infantry. " Soon the division had to abandon the artillery and rear services. However, Reitel misjudged the location of the gap between tanks and infantry. He withdrew his units strictly to the west and soon faced strong barriers. Fuel for the self-propelled guns "Sturmgeshutz" ran out, and the division lost the means of paving its way forward. The division was scattered, and Raitel himself was captured by the Poles. The 402nd Reserve Infantry Division of General von Spainitz had to abandon its artillery on March 5, and after that the defeat of the formation was a foregone conclusion. Spainitz himself from 6 to 16 March tried to escape the encirclement through the forests, but was captured.

Only the von Tettau group succeeded in breaking out of the encirclement. At night, containers of ammunition and fuel were dropped to the group. On March 5, parts of the von Tettau group concentrated in the area east of Schiefelbein. The path to the west along the "Reichsstrasse No. 162" was blocked by units of the 8th Guards. mechanized corps. A fatal mistake was made at this moment by the commander of the 1st Guards. tank brigade Colonel A.M. Temnik. His brigade continued the battle for Bellegarde, which began on March 4, instead of intercepting the enemy's withdrawal routes in the Gross Rambin area (halfway from Schiefelbein to Bellegarde). Thus, A.M. Temnik ignored M.E. Katukov, who ordered his brigade to go to the Gross Rambin area by 7.00 on March 5 and leave a screen from a company of tanks against Bellegarde. The breakthrough routes from Bellegarde to the west were supposed to be covered by the 20th Guards. mechanized brigade. As a result, the 1st Guards. the tank brigade was released only at 13.30, turned south and only by 18.00 was fighting in the Gross Rambin area with a front to the east and southeast. Movement to the area north of Schiffelbein 64th Guards. tank brigade of the 11th Guards. the tank corps was also completed only by 18.00 on March 5. However, on the morning of March 5, in a snowstorm, the divisions of the von Tettau group began to break through to the west. In the center were units of the Pommerland division, on the left - Berwalde, on the right - Holstein, and the SS men were moving in the rearguard. Faced with barriers on "Reichsstrasse No. 162" at Schiefelbein, the group bypassed the city from the north and slipped through the gap between the main forces of the 8th Guards. mechanized corps and 1st Guards. tank brigade. Only those who lagged behind the group were left to be "torn apart" by Katukov's tankmen.

On March 6, von Tettau's group took up a "hedgehog" (all-round defense) position in the forests southeast of Witzmitz. Here, radio contact was established with the headquarters of the 3rd Panzer Army. Von Tettau received the most important information from Routh: the German foothold at Wollin (strictly to the west of Witzmitz) was lost. This information forced the commander of the group to decide on a breakthrough to the north-west to the bridgehead held by German units at the very coast of the sea - in the area of ​​Divenova. On the night of 8-9 March, the von Tettau group made their way to the Baltic Sea and formed a bridgehead in the Horst area. However, after reaching the coast, the advancing Soviet troops came to grips with the remnants of the von Tettau group.

Tank IS-2 in Stargard. March 1945

Strictly speaking, in the original plan of the operation (reflected in directive No. 00362 / op) everything was built in such a way that the encircled did not have the slightest chance of slipping out. The outer front of the encirclement, according to the plan, was formed by the formations of the 2nd Guards. tank army. In the first week of March, the army's formations generally adhered to the plan. 9th Guards. Panzer Corps, after capturing Naugard, continued its offensive to the northwest. 65th Guards tank brigade of the 9th guards. Panzer Corps March 5 reached the approaches to Kammin, and the 47th and 50th Guards. tank brigades of the same corps - to Wallin. On March 6, Cummin was captured, and an advance detachment was sent to the sea in the direction of Valdivenova. However, advancing to the south on Gollnov, the 12th Guards, battered in the February battles. the tank corps had no success. Control errors were added to the low completeness, as a result of which on March 6 the corps trampled in front of a stream 2-2.5 m wide. Despite the artillery preparation with 152 artillery barrels at 13.00 on March 6, the battalions were raised to the attack only with the participation of the chief of artillery of the army, Major General Plaskov and the chief of the operational department of the army headquarters, Colonel Lyatetsky. Plaskov later wrote in his report: “I gathered all the sappers (everyone was hiding in the forest, they had to collect all by force), and within 30 minutes the bridge was ready, I forced the guns to roll out on my hands, we ferried tanks, artillery, cars, people [... ] Everything moved forward at 18.00 only after Lyatetsky and I arrived at the battalions and moved all living things and all equipment forward. " Following the results of the proceedings, the corps commander, General N.M. Telyakov received a reprimand. One way or another, Gollnov 12th Guards. the tank corps was not taken, which made it possible for the enemy to organize his defense by units of the SS Frundsberg division. Therefore, on March 7, the 9th Guards. the panzer corps was deployed south (actually 180 degrees) and on March 8 attacked Gollnow from the north. 65th Guards On March 7, the tank brigade surrendered its positions to the 713th Rifle Regiment of the 171st Rifle Division (79th Rifle Corps of the 3rd Shock Army) and also turned south.

Due to the turn of parts of the 2nd Guards. Panzer army to the west and south, the 3rd Shock Army was forced to take over the formation of both the internal and external encirclement front. Instead of advancing in marching columns behind a steam roller, 1st Guards. tank army formations of the 3rd shock army dispersed "like a fan" on a wide front. The main forces of the army (12th Guards and 79th Rifle Corps) were involved in the seizure of the coast of Stettin harbor. In this situation, I had to improvise. Zhukov ordered the forces of the 7th Rifle and 7th Guards Cavalry Corps to defeat the enemy troops in the area. I note that according to directive No. 00362 / op of the 7th Guards. the cavalry corps was planned to be "withdrawn to the front reserve on the fifth day of the operation." The command of the commander of the 3rd Shock Army, Major General N.P. Simonyak. Hero of the Soviet Union Nikolai Pavlovich Simonyak was a participant in the defense of Hanko and Leningrad, and he led the 3rd Shock Army in Kurland in October 1944, going up from the post of corps commander.

In accordance with the order of the front commander and the instructions of the commander of the 3rd shock army, the 207th rifle division, Colonel V.M. Asafova, advancing in the general direction of Gross-Justin, Renwald, was to seize the coast of the Baltic Sea in the Renwald-Pusthof sector. The task of the formation was to prevent the loading of enemy troops on ships in the Goff area, and part of the forces, upon reaching the sea, to take up a defensive front to the east. Colonel Asafov's division was reinforced by the 5th Motorcycle Regiment (transferred from the 2nd Guards Tank Army), the 163rd Guards Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment and the 2nd Division of the Corps Artillery Brigade. Thus, on the way of the von Tettau group, a screen was created from a reinforced rifle division.

In the near future, the 7th Rifle Corps of the 3rd Shock Army with the forces of two divisions was to take up defenses in the Dargen, Shtukhov, Kline-Justin sectors by the morning of March 10 and prevent the enemy from breaking through in the western and southwestern directions. The corps was ordered to have one rifle division in the second echelon in the area south of Shtukhov. The pressure on the encircled enemy was supposed to be carried out by the 7th Guards. cavalry corps. The cavalry was to develop an attack on Karnitz, pushing the enemy further east.

On the morning of March 10, the 207th Infantry Division went on the offensive in the given direction and, bypassing Gross-Justin, by the end of the day captured the settlement of Pusthof and started fighting for Goff. Thus, von Tettau's group was cut off the escape route along the coast of the Baltic Sea. However, if the formation of the screen was relatively successful, then the cavalry squeezing the "boiler" did not lead to the desired result. In the sector of operations of the 7th Guards Cavalry Corps, the enemy with a counterattack threw the 16th and 15th Guards Cavalry Divisions from Karnitz. This forced N.P. Simonyak change the task of the 7th Rifle Corps units. Already at 14.30 on March 10, the corps was ordered by two divisions to go on the offensive on Karnitz and provide assistance to units of the cavalry divisions. The strengthening of the 207th Infantry Division was postponed for the time being. Soon the enemy took advantage of this.

Tank T-34-85 1st Guards. tank army in the Ritsa area. March 1945

The breakthrough of the von Tettau group to the west was scheduled for 10 pm on March 10. It was led by the Holstein Panzer Division (which no longer had tanks). As a result of the intense battle, units of the 207th Infantry Division had to withdraw 5–8 km to the west, although they retained the western outskirts of Pusthof. To meet the breakthrough enemy, a blow was struck at units of the 171st Rifle Division of the 79th Rifle Corps. By the morning of March 11, a corridor was formed, along which the gradual withdrawal of units from the bridgehead began. On March 12, the last units of the Tettau group made their way to the bridgehead at Divenova, which was held by units from the Kriegsmarine. 180 officers, 1000 non-commissioned officers and 4300 privates left the 5th Jaeger and 402nd Infantry Divisions, 150 officers, 650 non-commissioned officers and 3000 privates. The Holstein Panzer Division has survived in the best condition - 90 officers, 500 non-commissioned officers and 3,000 privates.

Everything suggests that it was the breakthrough of the von Tettau group that cost the post of the commander of the 3rd Shock Army N.P. Simonyak - on March 16, he was replaced by V.I. Kuznetsova. Accordingly, instead of participating in the storming of Berlin, Simonyak was sent to a much less prestigious position - to finish off the Kurland Army Group as commander of the 67th Army. IN AND. Kuznetsov until March 1945 held the post of deputy commander of the 1st Baltic Front and was released due to its disbandment.

If the Tettau group was able to break through on their own, then the encircled Krappe group could not break through the barriers of the Soviet troops without outside help. The plan for the release of the X SS Army Corps is present in the entry from March 6 in the OKW ZhBD: “From 6.3 to Stettin, the Silesia Panzer Division arrives. North of Gollnov are units of the Marine Corps. The eastbound attacks will clear the way for the Krappe group. " However, all these measures are already hopelessly late. During March 6 and 7, the formations of the 7th Rifle Corps, in cooperation with the troops of the 1st Army of the Polish Army, completed the defeat of the enemy's X SS Corps. After the end of the fighting with the encirclements, the 7th Rifle Corps was withdrawn to the second echelon of the 3rd Shock Army. Polish units captured 262 guns of various calibers, 39 self-propelled guns, 31 tanks, 345 heavy machine guns, 126 mortars. The commander of the X SS Army Corps, Lieutenant General Gunter Krappe, was captured by the Poles on March 6, 1945. He was released in 1949 and died in 1981. Contrary to the assertions in the memoirs of S.G. Poplavsky that Krappe commanded a corps at Stalingrad and was taken out by plane, the German general during the Battle of Stalingrad was just a military attaché in Madrid. Krappe got to the front as the commander of the 61st Infantry Division only in February 1943 in the 18th Army near Leningrad. With Army Group North, he retreated to Courland, and then was appointed commander of the SS corps. The paradoxical situation, when the corps was called SS, the army divisions were subordinate to it, and the army general commanded it, was explained quite simply. The corps management was formed from units of the XIV SS corps in Pomerania, and the first corps commander was Obergruppenführer Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski. Further, the formed headquarters was used to control the army formations, and Bach-Zelevsky was replaced by Krappe. Obergruppenführer Bach-Zelewski was better known for his "exploits" in the field of fighting partisans and participation in the suppression of the Warsaw Uprising than for his successes in commanding troops on the battlefield.

The 10th SS Panzer Division "Frundsberg", which had withdrawn to the Gollnov area, was unable to deliver an effective counterattack, but made it difficult for units of the 2nd Guards to break through to the Oder. tank and 3rd shock armies. The city of Gollnov is located among the forests that cover the approaches to it from all sides. Forests are largely waterlogged. Four highways converge in the city. The wooded and swampy terrain did not allow for a wide maneuver. Upon arrival in Gollnow, the Frundsberg units immediately received reinforcements from Luftwaffe personnel and sailors. But, despite these difficulties, Soviet troops, after three days of stubborn fighting, by 4:00 am on March 8, took the city by storm. The decisive role in the capture of Gollnov was played by the units of the 9th Guards who came to the city from the north. tank corps. Crossings across the river. Ina in the Gollnov area were blown up by the enemy, but by 9.00 on March 8 a crossing for wheeled transport and artillery was built, and by 17.00 - for tanks. The offensive continued, Frundsberg retreated towards Altamm. With the capture of Gollnov, the troops of the 3rd Shock Army completed their mission, and they were ordered, after the transfer of combat areas to the 1st Army of the Polish Army and the 7th Guards Cavalry Corps, to concentrate 60 km south of Stettin by March 16.

Elimination of the Altdam bridgehead

The last battle of the 1st Belorussian Front in Pomerania was the defeat of the II Army Corps (soon renamed XXXII Army Corps), the III SS Panzer Corps and the struggle for a foothold at Altdamme. Expanding the front of hostilities in Eastern Pomerania, on March 2, the troops of the 47th Army went on the offensive. Army F.I. Perkhorovich was opposed by the 9th Airborne Division, the 1st Marine Division and the 281st Infantry Division. The formations of the 77th and 125th rifle corps of the 47th army on the first day of the battle broke through the main line of defense of the enemy. To build on the success, on the morning of the second day of the offensive, the 1st Mechanized Corps was brought into battle. However, difficult terrain conditions and stubborn enemy resistance did not allow our troops to develop an offensive at a high pace. By the end of March 3, the troops of the 47th Army had advanced only 20 km into the depth of the enemy's defenses. The battles took on a stubborn and fierce character. By March 6, the troops of the 47th Army reached a large enemy stronghold on the outskirts of Altdam-Klebov. By that time, the II Army Corps had been reinforced by the 549th People's Grenadier Division from East Prussia.

After a week of the Soviet offensive in Eastern Pomerania, the front of the 3rd Panzer Army on the eastern bank of the Oder and the Stettin Bay began to gradually shrink to a point. Parts of the SS formations from different directions retreated to Altdamm - a junction of roads east of Stettin. The troops of the 61st Army, advancing on Altdam from the east, met stubborn resistance from the III Panzer Corps in the Massov area and south of this point. Within three days, they advanced only 10–12 km in a westerly direction. The enemy put up especially stubborn resistance in the city of Massov, where Soviet troops had to fight for every house. The city was defended by units of the SS Nederland division.

Tanks IS-2 on the march. 1st Belorussian Front, Eastern Pomerania, March 1945

Soon Massov was enveloped from the flanks, and on March 7 at 3.00 a division of the III Panzer Corps received an order to withdraw. It was not possible to catch on to the "Reichsstrasse No. 163" (highway Stargard - Massov - Naugard). During 7 and 8 March, parts of the SS divisions withdrew west in the direction of Aldamm. On the left flank of III Panzer Corps, Frundsberg's units were retreating from Gollnov. Completed the formation of a bridgehead at Altdamm, the offensive of the 47th Army. Overcoming stubborn enemy resistance and difficult terrain conditions, units of Perkhorovich's army captured the southern outskirts of Greifenhagen by March 10. However, the attempts of the attackers on the move to crush the denser defenses of the bridgehead at Aldamm were unsuccessful.

Under these conditions, Zhukov decided to suspend the offensive. Directive No. 00426 / op of March 12, 1945 stated: “As a result of the especially stubborn resistance of the enemy, the troops of the 61st Army, 47th Army and 2nd Guards. TA for three days had no success and could not break through the enemy's defenses on the move ”. Three armies were ordered to "suspend the offensive for two days and gain a foothold in their positions." Within two days, it was supposed to prepare for the continuation of attacks on the bridgehead. It was necessary to conduct a thorough reconnaissance of the enemy's front line of defense, its fire system, artillery firing positions, anti-tank weapons, to establish whether the enemy had tanks and places of their concentration. When preparing for the offensive and organizing the battle, it was ordered to pay special attention to organizing a clear interaction of the infantry with tanks, artillery and aviation. To carry out artillery preparation for the attack, it was ordered to strengthen the armies in this direction with four artillery breakthrough divisions. In the areas of the main strikes of the army, it was ordered to create a density of artillery of 250 barrels (61st Army) and 280 barrels (47th Army) per 1 km of the front. Aviation efforts were also concentrated in the zone of the 47th Army: the commander of the 16th Air Army was ordered to support the offensive with assault aviation strikes at the rate of 40% of sorties to support the 61st Army and 60% of the 47th Army. The artillery preparation was planned to begin at 7.30 am, and the infantry and tank attack at 8.30 am on March 14, 1945.

The main idea of ​​the new offensive was to transfer the efforts of the tank forces from the zone of the 61st Army to the zone of the 47th Army. Thus, the tanks were removed from an unfavorable wooded area and had to be used in a treeless area south of Altdamme. Directive No. 00426 / op ordered: “The commander of the 2nd Guards. TA mechanized and tank corps of the army to use for the offensive in the area of ​​the main attack 47 A, in close cooperation with the infantry. " Thus, S.I. Bogdanov, the 1st Mechanized Corps returned to it again. During a two-day pause, the tank army, having surrendered its combat areas to the rifle formations of the 61st Army, was to move to the right flank of the 47th Army. At 15.00 on March 12, as part of the 12th Guards. of the tank corps, there were 206 tanks and self-propelled guns according to the list (of which only 52 vehicles were in battle formations), in the 9th Guards. tank corps - 191 tanks and self-propelled guns according to the list (78 vehicles in battle formations), in the 1st mechanized corps - 206 tanks and self-propelled guns according to the list (116 in battle formations). Thus, the strike capabilities (in terms of the number of combat-ready vehicles) of the 2nd Guards. tank army were significantly reduced.

By mid-March 1945, quite large forces of the German 3rd Panzer Army had been assembled at the Aldamm bridgehead. The southern front of the bridgehead was defended by the 1st Marine Division, the 25th Panzer Grenadier Division and the Schlesien Panzer Division. The 549th People's Grenadier Division, the 281st Infantry Division and the 10th SS Panzer Division "Frundsberg" defended on the eastern face. Finally, in the northern part of the bridgehead, the Nordland and Nederland divisions defended.

Tank IS-2 of the 1st Army of the Polish Army in Eastern Pomerania. March 1945

On the planned day of March 14, the offensive did not take place and was postponed to the next day. At 9.00 on March 15, after artillery and aviation training of the troops of the 2nd Guards. tank, 47 and 61st armies resumed the offensive. The first position was suppressed by artillery and aviation, and rifle units, accompanied by tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, began to move forward, destroying the remaining centers of enemy resistance on the way of the offensive. As a result of three days of stubborn battles, Soviet troops, having eliminated a significant number of enemy strongholds and nodes of resistance, reached the last belt of enemy fortifications on the Altdam bridgehead.

In order to deliver the last crushing blow, G.K. Zhukov again ordered a temporary suspension of the offensive and some regrouping of artillery and tanks. In accordance with this order, the formations of the 61st, 47th and 2nd Guards Tank Armies, having stopped the offensive, again within two days prepared for its renewal.

On March 18, 1945, at 9:00 am, after an hour and a half of artillery preparation, the front troops resumed their offensive. In the zone of operations of the strike group of the 47th Army, Soviet troops broke the enemy's resistance in an area 2 km north of Klebov, broke through its last line of defense and began to develop an offensive in the western and southwestern directions. On March 19, the rifle formations of the 47th Army, together with the tank units of the 2nd Guards. Panzer army reached the bridges across the Oder north of the Autobahn. The bridges were prudently blown up by the Germans on the night of March 16-17. Thus, the attackers cut the enemy's Altdam grouping into two parts.

The German command quickly drew conclusions about the prospects for holding the bridgehead. Already on the night of March 18-19, heavy weapons and equipment began to be withdrawn to Stettin. Sappers began to undermine buildings and structures in Altdamme, which could be useful to the Soviet troops. The bunker, which housed the headquarters of the Nordland division, was even freed and blown up. On March 19, the command of the 3rd Panzer Army sent a report to the headquarters of Army Group Vistula, proposing a withdrawal and a transparent choice: "either take everything to the west bank tonight and keep or lose everything tomorrow." The withdrawal was unexpectedly quickly approved by Hitler. The withdrawal of troops to Stettin continued on the night of March 20, and after the Diriks battalion crossed over to the western bank of the Oder (the remnants of the Wallonia were merged into it) and two tanks, the last bridge took off. A few hours later, Greifenhagen fell under the blows of the 47th Army. As a result of the defeat of the Altdam grouping, Soviet troops took more than 12 thousand prisoners, 126 tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 200 guns of various calibers, 154 mortars and many other weapons and military equipment.

As a result of three weeks of fighting during the East Pomeranian operation, the combat effectiveness of the 2nd Guards. tank army. According to the "Information on the state of parts and connections of the 2nd Guards. TA at 15.00 on March 21, 1945 " the army's tank fleet sank to 162 vehicles in service in three corps, less than in one corps at the time of the start of the Vistula-Oder operation. In the 12th Guards. only 28 T-34s and 9 SU-76s remained in the tank corps. There was not a single IS-2 combat-ready tank or SU-85 self-propelled gun in the hull. If the February battles led to heavy losses in the 12th Guards. tank corps, the East Pomeranian operation led to the thinning of the 9th Guards. tank corps. In the corps, there were only 18 T-34s and 5 SU-85s in service on March 21. All ACS SU-76 and ISU-122 were under overhaul. In the 1st Mechanized Corps, 43 M4A2 Sherman, 9 SU-85, 16 SU-76 and 9 ISU-122 remained in service. Another 6 T-34, 13 M4A2 "Sherman" and 1 SU-76 were in the ranks in the army units.

In the history of the III SS Panzer Corps, the result of the battle is described as follows: “This is how the fighting in Pomerania ended. They also ended with the almost complete destruction of III SS Panzer Corps. He fought to the point of self-sacrifice to help evacuate the population of Pomerania. As a result, only battalions and regiments that had suffered heavy losses remained. Whole companies were completely destroyed "( Tieke W. Tragedy of the Faithful: A History of the III. (germanisches) SS-Panzer-Korps, p.264). According to the report of the headquarters of Army Group "Vistula" in OKH on March 23, the total number of the personal SS division "Nederland" was 3,955 people, and the "combat strength" (Kamfstaerke) - 1,355 people.

In seven-day positional battles, the troops of the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front defeated enemy forces in the western part of Eastern Pomerania, who were trying to hold onto an important operational foothold on the eastern bank of the Oder in the Altdam area. On March 21, the regrouping of the main forces that participated in the East Pomeranian operation of the armies began to the Berlin direction.

Forward to the east!

In the zone of the 2nd Belorussian Front, the events in March 1945 developed according to a similar pattern, but much more dramatic. Despite the generally successful offensive, personnel reshuffles followed as a result of the battles in the initial phase of the operation. On March 6, the commander of the 19th Army G.K. Kozlov was replaced by Lieutenant General V.Z. Romanovsky. Vladimir Zakharovich Romanovsky was distinguished from the previous commander by a serious experience of positional battles near Demyansk and Leningrad in 1942-1943.

After the withdrawal of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front to the Baltic Sea at Keslin, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command issued directive No. 11035 to K.K. Rokossovsky's mission to defeat the enemy grouping in the Danzig, Stolp area, capture the cities of Danzig, Gdynia and, no later than March 20, reach the entire front line on the Baltic Sea coast. Such an unusual combination of Polish and German names (Danzig and Gdynia) in one place is due to the fact that the port of Danzig had the status of a free city. Poland, in need of a port on the Baltic, built it from scratch. The city of Gdynia grew up in 1920–1930. from the small fishing village of Gdingen. After the occupation of Poland in 1939, the Germans renamed Gdynia Gotenhafen. But the name was difficult to get used to, and the Germans often call the city of Gdansk in their memories by the name of the village of Gdingen.

The land defense of Gdynia relied on a system of air defense posts erected to defend the base from the air. They encircled the city in a continuous ring within a radius of 12-15 km from its center. The location of air defense posts on the heights dominating the terrain, the presence of ready-made artillery positions and permanent structures, a ready-made observation and communication network gave the defenders indisputable advantages. The air defense system of the naval base was supplemented with a network of trenches, anti-tank obstacles and barbed wire. Anti-aircraft artillery with a caliber of up to 128 mm was prepared for firing at ground targets.

Machine gunners of the 1st Army of the Polish Army on the streets of Kolberg.

To develop the success of the 2nd Belorussian Front, by Directive No. 11034 of the Headquarters, on March 6, the 1st Guards was transferred from the 1st Belorussian Front. tank army. Together with the tank army M.E. Katukov's 2nd Belorussian Front was transferred to the 1st Polish tank brigade. Of course, the transition of tank formations from the subordination of one front to the subordination of the other did not happen instantly. Officially, the army was transferred to the subordination of K.K. Rokossovsky from 12.00 on March 8. March 6 1st Guards. the tank army continued fighting to destroy the encircled enemy groups in the Schiefelbein area. During these battles, 1960 enemy soldiers and officers were captured. On March 7, the battle with scattered detachments rushing to the west continued. At 7.30 am on March 7, one of these groups attacked units of M.E. Katukova. Parts of the headquarters suffered losses in personnel and vehicles. Only in the afternoon of March 7, the troops of the 1st Guards. tank army began to surrender the positions occupied by the 1st Army of the Polish Army. The advance to the Kezlin area began on the night of March 8. The first combat order from the headquarters of K.K. Rokossovsky army received on March 8. It ordered to go on the offensive in the morning of March 10. The combat potential of the 1st Guards. tank army by that time was still preserved. Army M.E. On March 10, 1945, Katukova had 302 T-34 tanks, 17 IS-2 tanks, 27 SU-85s, 34 SU-76s and 75 SU-57s in service. The army's artillery consisted of 285 guns, 79 mortars with a caliber of 120 mm and 35 rocket launchers.

Cut off from the main forces of Army Group "Vistula" by the breakthrough of Soviet troops to the Baltic Sea, the formations of the German 2nd Army in mid-March still retained their combat effectiveness (see table). For comparison: the 9th Army under the command of Walter Model attacked in July 1943 on the northern face of the Kursk salient with an average "combat" number of divisions of 3,500 men. Lagging behind the 2nd Belorussian Front in the total number of formations, the 2nd Army outnumbered the Soviet troops in terms of the average size of the division.

table

TOTAL AND "BATTLE" NUMBER OF UNITS OF THE 2nd ARMY ON MARCH 9, 1945

Even the subordination of the 2nd Belorussian Front to the tank army did not ensure the solution of the task in the time frame established by the Headquarters. Tank army M.E. Katukova could intercept the escape routes of the 2nd enemy army and prevent the Germans from settling on the fortifications near Danzig and Gdynia. But this did not happen: the tank army was used to simply push the enemy back into the Danzig area. Rokossovsky formulated the task of the 1st Guards. tank army as follows: "go on the offensive in the direction of Lauenburg, Neustadt and no later than 12.3 go to the coast of the Danzig Bay in the Gdynia, Putzig sector." That is, the tank army had to simply move along the coast and reach the bay north of Danzig. No attempts were made to cut off the enemy formations departing to the east from Danzig and Gdynia.

To the fortifications on the outskirts of Gdynia 1st Guards. the tank army left on March 12th. Their assault was scheduled for March 13, and a detachment of the 40th Guards was assigned to clear the Putziger-Nerung spit from enemy troops. a tank brigade consisting of 7 tanks, a battery of 76-mm guns, two platoons of machine gunners and a sapper platoon. However, attempts to break into the enemy's defenses together with the infantry of the 19th Army were unsuccessful. During March 13-15, units of the M.E. Katukov rammed the enemy's defenses, exposed to heavy shelling from ships and coastal batteries. Detachment of the 40th Guards. a tank brigade on the Putziger-Nerung (Hel) spit met a moat filled with water, a mined highway, and anti-tank obstacles. He covered the engineering barriers of the enemy armored train. The stubborn defense of the sand dunes was explained by the fact that huge masses of refugees accumulated on the spit, who were gradually evacuated by sea to Germany. The surrender of the Hel spit was postponed for a long time: it was handed over only in May 1945.

SPG "Vespe", abandoned in Eastern Pomerania. They did not even have time to unload them from the railway platforms.

As the group retreated, the grouping of the German 2nd Army gradually collapsed to a point with an increase in the density of formation of formations and a concomitant increase in resistance to the advance of Soviet troops. If at the beginning of the East Pomeranian operation the length of the front of the armies of the 2nd Belorussian Front was about 240 kilometers, now it did not exceed 60 km. The width of the strip of each of the armies operating in the strike direction was only 10-12 kilometers. With the front thickening, the fighting quickly moved into a positional phase. In addition, Danzig has been surrounded by fortifications since ancient times. In 1734, Russian troops under the command of Field Marshal B.K. Minich took Danzig after a 135-day siege; in 1807, it took Napoleon's army 87 days of siege to take the city. At the end of the 19th century, the fortifications of Danzig were significantly strengthened in accordance with the requirements of the time. Therefore, Danzig could in no way be attributed to naval bases, poorly protected from land. In addition, from the southeast, the city was covered by a tank-impenetrable water barrier - the Motlau Umfliter canal.

The status of a naval base provided Danzig with the support of the Kriegsmarine, in particular the "largest gunboat in the Baltic" - the heavy cruiser "Prince Eugen". During the 26 days of the siege, the cruiser fired 4871 20.3 cm rounds and 2644 10.5 cm caliber shells. When he left the Danzig bay, only 40 rounds of 20.3 cm caliber remained in the cellars. In connection with all of the above, one cannot fail to note a certain arrogance of K.K. Rokossovsky, who refused to encircle the enemy grouping withdrawing to Danzig until it reached the outer bypass of the city's fortifications.

But one way or another, the enemy divisions that hindered the advance of the 2nd Belorussian Front into Eastern Pomerania were punished. They were cut off from the main forces of the German army and trapped in a narrow space on the seashore with no hope of salvation. The German 2nd Army was transferred from Army Group Vistula to Army Group North. On March 12, Colonel-General Walter Weiss, commander of the 2nd Army, was appointed commander of Army Group North, and was succeeded as commander of the 2nd Army by the commander of the 4th Panzer Division, General of Panzer Forces Dietrich von Sauken.

K.K. Rokossovsky outlined the following plan for the defeat and destruction of the enemy grouping. The main blow was to be delivered in the direction of Zoppot (a small resort town between Danzig and Gdynia) in order to cut the defending enemy grouping and destroy it piece by piece. It was decided to break through the enemy's defenses and reach the coast of the Danzig Bay in the area of ​​Zoppot, then take these cities with strikes from various directions in Danzig and Gdynia and complete the defeat of the 2nd Army. In accordance with the decision taken, the front commander assigned tasks to the troops. The main task of cutting through the enemy grouping was entrusted to the troops of two armies, reinforced by two tank corps. Continuing their advance towards Danzig Bay, they were supposed to break through the defenses in the Espenkrug, Witzlin sector and, no later than March 14, capture the suburb of Oliva and the port of Zopot. In the future, one of the armies aimed at the assault on Danzig from the northwest, and the second was to advance on Danzig from the north along the coast of the Danzig Bay. To combat enemy warships and prevent them from approaching the berths, the commander of the 49th Army was ordered to put long-range artillery on the coast of the bay and use its fire to prevent enemy ships from approaching Danzig.

Begun on the morning of March 14, 1945, the Soviet offensive towards the town of Zopot developed very slowly. The troops of the 49th and 70th armies attacked Zopot with adjacent flanks, with the task of cutting the Danzig-Gdynian grouping of the enemy into two isolated groups, capturing the Oliva, Zoppot, Kolibken line and reaching the Danzig Bay at this line. In the combat report of the headquarters of the 2nd Belorussian Front to the General Staff, the position of the armies is described rather succinctly: “49 and 70 A - at 12.00 went on the offensive, in cooperation with units of the 1st and 3rd Guards. shopping mall Repulsed a counterattack by enemy infantry with self-propelled guns in the Barnin area. They had no success. "

At 2.30 am on March 18 K.K. Rokossovsky reported to the General Staff a plan of action to destroy the enemy grouping that had withdrawn to the Danzig and Gdynia area. The front commander estimated its number at 100-120 thousand people. The operation was supposed to be divided into three stages. At the first stage, the task of the troops was to reach the coast in the Zoppot area and capture the Gdynia area. This stage was planned to be completed on March 22-23. At the second stage, the goal of the offensive was to capture the forests west of Kolibken, Danzig and the encirclement of Danzig. The tasks of this stage according to the plan of K.K. Rokossovsky were to be resolved on March 23-27. Finally, the third stage was the assault on Danzig. Three days were allotted for it.

The battles were so stubborn that the advance of Soviet troops on other days was calculated only in hundreds of meters. Until March 22, the troops of K.K. Rokossovsky were advancing at a rate of no more than 1-1.5 km per day. The Soviet offensive was drowning in the March mud. In the report of the headquarters of the 1st Guards. the tank army noted: “The terrain conditions for the operation of tanks were very limited. There was only one highway in the direction of the corps. The muddy roads and heavily rugged terrain, covered with forest, forced to act along the highway, since attempts to advance off the roads led to the fact that tanks got stuck in the mud, becoming a target for enemy self-propelled guns and artillery. " The task of capturing two large ports was seriously complicated by anti-aircraft guns from their air defense, deployed for direct fire.

The 2nd shock, 65th, 49th and 70th armies acted against the most powerful Danzig grouping. The 19th Army, one rifle corps of the 70th Army and formations of the 1st Guards operated against the Gdynia grouping. tank army. During March 23-26, the offensive continued in the direction of Danzig and Gdynia. Destroying individual strongholds of the enemy, the troops of the 49th and 70th armies broke through two lines of enemy fortifications by March 24 and reached the third, last line of fortifications, which covered Zopot from the west. This line of fortifications, created 3 km from the coast of the Danzig Bay, passed through the Danzig Royal Forest and the heights adjacent to Zoppot and Danzig Bay from the west. In turn, the 1st Guards. Panzer and 19th armies captured Klein Katz on 24 March and advanced from the south towards Gdynia.

A group of "tank destroyers" with faust cartridges disembark from the truck. Such teams were an inferior replacement for self-propelled tank destroyers.

The Soviet command sought as quickly as possible to put an end to the encircled and pressed to the sea enemy in order to throw the main forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front on the Berlin direction. In addition, the question of eliminating the remnants of the 2nd German army was of political importance. In February 1945, at the Yalta Conference, British representatives raised the question of Soviet troops occupying Danzig and Gdynia as soon as possible, since 30 percent of the new German boats were supposedly built there at the shipyards. This was motivated by the fact that "it will be very difficult for the aviation and surface fleets of the allies to fight against submarines of the new series, since they have a high speed under water and are equipped with the latest technology." We are talking about series XXI submarines, the high technical characteristics of which created considerable difficulties for the allies. The Soviet participants in the Yalta Conference confirm the Allies' interest in Danzig. N.G. Kuznetsov recalled:

“It was not Field Marshal A. Brook, as expected, who spoke from the British, but Admiral E. Cunningham. In his report, one could clearly hear the familiar note about the difficulties of fighting German submarines and a plea for British help in this fight. Noting that German boats are being built mainly in Danzig, the admiral ended his speech with the words: "As a sailor, I want the Russians to take Danzig as soon as possible."

I must say that the allies not only demanded the fastest capture of Danzig, but also provided all possible assistance to the storming forces. On March 12, 700 Flying Fortresses and Liberators of the US Air Force dropped 1,435 bombs on the city and port. The attack of heavy bombers somewhat diversified the almost incessant raids of the Il-2 and Pe-2.

On March 23, an ultimatum signed by K.K. was sent to the German troops defending Danzig. Rokossovsky. In addition to the official appeal, 4.5 million leaflets with the text of the ultimatum were poured into the burning city and German positions. The psychological pressure on the German troops from the population increased. They were told: "The Russians guarantee your life, and you, like bad bulls, climb under the ax yourself and direct the terrible Russian fire on us!" However, the resistance has not subsided yet. All the advancing armies met with stubborn resistance and desperate counterattacks.

However, it was on March 23rd that a turning point in the battle came. On the night of March 23, Soviet troops by night assault broke through the last line of enemy fortifications at the junction between Danzig and Gdynia and at 6:00 in the morning broke into Zopot. In the course of street fighting, Zoppot was captured and the enemy grouping was finally divided into two parts. Units of XXIII, XXVII and XX Army Corps, XVIII Mountain Jaeger Corps, part of XLVI Tank Corps forces remained in the Danzig area. In the Gdynia area, the remnants of the VII and XLVI tank corps were blocked. At the same time, a chain of heights to the west of Danzig was captured. The city and the entire German defense system were visible at a glance.

The troops of the 19th Army, after a slight regrouping of their forces and the movement of artillery, resumed actions to capture Gdynia. Conquering one strong point after another, they broke into the enemy defenses; and on March 26 they began an assault on the city. Units of the 310th and 313rd rifle divisions that day finally broke through the defenses on the near approaches to Gdynia and burst into the city. The 310th Infantry Division was supported by the 40th, 44th and 45th Guards. tank brigades of the 11th Guards. tank corps. The 313rd Infantry Division was supported by the 1st Polish Tank Brigade. In fierce battles, they captured thirteen quarters of the city. March 27 1st Guards. the tank army was withdrawn from the 2nd Belorussian Front and returned to the Berlin direction. Tanks and self-propelled guns were sent by rail, and the rest of the units returned on their own.

On March 28, the troops of the 19th Army completely captured the city and port of Gdynia. Soviet troops took 18,985 prisoners, about 200 tanks and self-propelled guns, 600 guns of various calibers and purposes, 1,068 machine guns, 71 aircraft, 6246 vehicles, 20 different ships, including the old battleship "Schleswig-Holstein" (ship, who started World War II) and the battleship "Gneisenau".

Simultaneously with the offensive in the Zopot and Gdynian directions, intense battles were taking place on the right wing of the front, where the troops of the 2nd Shock and 65th Armies were attacking Danzig along the shortest direction from the south and southwest. On March 27, Soviet troops launched an assault on the city. Conducting an offensive on Danzig simultaneously from three directions, they captured most of the city by March 29. The formations of the 2nd shock army fought for the southern part of Danzig, the formations of the 65th army broke into the central part of the city, and the troops of the 49th and 70th armies captured its northern part. Danzig fell on March 30. The defenders of Danzig crossed the Vistula arm to the island of Hoybude. In Danzig, Soviet troops captured 45 submarines that worried the Allies so much.

Having played an important role in the defense of the city, the heavy cruiser "Prince Eugen" left the Danzig Bay for good, arriving in Copenhagen on April 20. After the war, under the terms of the Potsdam Agreement between the USA, USSR and Great Britain, Prince Eugen went to the United States. In 1946, the ship was sunk during an atomic weapon test at Bikini Atoll. Simultaneously with the Prince Eugen, the old battleship Schlesien, a sister ship of Schleswig-Holstein, built in Danzig at the Schihau shipyard, left the Danzig Bay. He ended his days at Swinemunde in May 1945.

After the capture of Danzig, the East Pomeranian operation was formally completed. The enemy troops, blocked in the area north of Gdynia, were defeated and captured by the 19th Army by April 4. From February 10 to April 4, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front captured 63,577 enemy soldiers and officers, captured 3,470 guns and mortars, 681 tanks and assault guns, 431 aircraft, 23,989 vehicles and 2,730 motorcycles. 32,170 Red Army servicemen and 25,872 servicemen from other countries were released from captivity. In fact, in Danzig and Gdynia, 32,775 prisoners were captured, 201 tanks and self-propelled guns, 134 aircraft (out of order), 727 guns, 566 mortars, 162 tractors and tractors, 15 armored trains, 151 ships and other property and weapons. In addition, two camps of "armed prisoners of war" remained: on the Hel Spit and in the Vistula delta southeast of Danzig. These units of the German 2nd Army surrendered after May 9th. By May 15, 1945 in the area southeast of Danzig, 15,134 people surrendered, on the Putziger-Nerung spit - 96,470 people, another 12,616 people surrendered on the island. Bornholm. Among those who surrendered were 12 generals, including the commander of the army, General of the Panzer Forces von Saucken, the commander of the IX Army Corps, General of Artillery Wutmann, the commander of the XX Army Corps, General of the Infantry Spechte, and others.

The East Pomeranian operation cost the 2nd Belorussian Front quite high losses. From February 10 to April 4, 1945, the troops of K.K. Rokossovsky lost 173,389 people (40,471 irrecoverable losses and 132,918 sanitary losses), that is, almost a third of their original number. The numbers of irrecoverable and total losses of the front are quite comparable with the losses of the troops of G.K. Zhukov in the Berlin operation. The total losses of the 1st Belorussian Front in the East Pomeranian operation were significantly less - 52,303 people.

1st Guards the tank army from 9 to 27 March 1945 irrevocably lost 68 tanks and self-propelled guns (57 T-34, 8 SU-76 and 3 SU-57), 120 combat vehicles received combat damage (98 T-34, 12 SU-85, 6 SU-76s and 4 SU-57s), 33 were stuck (31 T-34s and 2 SU-85s) and 67 vehicles were withdrawn from battle formations due to natural wear and tear. After the return of the 1st Guards. Tank army in Landsberg was withdrawn from combat formations after spending engine hours of 115 more tanks and self-propelled guns, and all of them were handed over for overhaul. G.K. Zhukov to return the 1st Guards. the tank army safe and sound could now only arouse a bitter smile.

Upper Silesian operation

The 1st Ukrainian Front was not allowed to rest and recuperate before the last attack on Berlin. While the troops of Zhukov and Rokossovsky fought for Danzig, the Altdam bridgehead and Küstrin, several of Konev's armies fought the last battle before Berlin on their left flank. The offensive operation was initiated by the Headquarters. Even during the February offensive of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front in Lower Silesia, the Supreme Command repeatedly drew the attention of I.S. Konev to a serious backlog of the troops of the left wing of the front. It emphasized that this circumstance in the future could complicate the preparation and conduct of the operation by the troops of the front in the Berlin direction.

To be precise, it was not so much the flank of the 1st Ukrainian Front that lagged behind as the 4th Ukrainian Front of I.E. Petrov, advancing into Upper Silesia from the east. As early as February 13, 1945 I.E. Petrov presented to the Headquarters a report with a plan of an operation to seize the Moravian-Ostrava industrial region. The purpose of the operation in the report was formulated as follows: “inflicting a concentrated strike with the forces of two armies (38th and 1st Guards A) in the direction of Olomouc, Pardubice, smashing the opposing enemy and, with the main forces on the r. Vltava, take possession of Prague. " For the operation, the 126th and 127th light mountain rifle corps and the 5th Guards were transferred to the 4th Ukrainian Front. mechanized corps. Directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 11029 of February 17, the plan presented by the command of the 4th Ukrainian Front was approved. I.E. Petrov was advised: "The operation should be started no later than March 10th." The plan of the March offensives clearly shows the desire of the Soviet command to carry out a coordinated operation with the adjacent flanks of the two fronts. Attacking Upper Silesia from the north, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front advanced to the flank and rear of the Heinrici army group, which was defending against the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front.

Following the instructions of the Stavka, the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front developed a plan for an offensive in Upper Silesia and on February 28 submitted it for approval. In his memoirs, Konev described his plan as follows: "When planning the Upper Silesian operation, we counted primarily on the encirclement of that part of the German fascist troops that were located on the very Opplensky ledge and directly in Oppeln." On March 1, the plan submitted to the Headquarters was approved.

To solve the problem posed by the Headquarters, I.S. Konev decided to use the overhanging position of the bridgehead captured by Soviet troops in the Grottkau area. To some extent, it repeated the operation to encircle Breslau, carried out in February 1945. In Upper Silesia, it was also planned to strike in converging directions from two bridgeheads on the Oder. In accordance with the general concept for the operation, the front commander created two shock groups - the Oppeln (in the salient northwest of Oppeln) and the Ratibor (on the bridgehead north of Ratibor).

The shelling of Gdynia is conducted by a 203-mm B-4 howitzer.

The 21st combined-arms and 4th tank armies, 34th guards were included in the opposition grouping. rifle corps of the 5th guards. army and 4th guards. tank corps. She was supposed to strike in the general direction of Grottkau, Neisse, Neustadt, where she would join with the Ratibor group. The ratibor grouping included the 59th and 60th armies, the 7th Guards. mechanized and 31st tank corps. This group had the task of striking from a bridgehead north of Ratibor in a westerly direction towards the forces of the opposition grouping and by the end of the third day of the operation to unite with it in the area of ​​Neustadt and Sulz.

Possessing a strategic initiative, the Soviet command could concentrate tank rams in any direction, providing itself at least the advantage of a first strike. The 4th Panzer Army, which had just been operating in a westerly direction between the Bober and Neisse rivers, was moving far to the southeast. In particular, the 6th Guards. the mechanized corps of the 4th Panzer Army withdrew from the bridgehead at Steinau on March 4-6 and set off on night marches past the surrounded Breslau to the southeast. He concentrated in the designated area by March 10. Battered in the February battles, the corps left the 49th Guards. mechanized brigade in the former deployment area. Only 4 T-34 tanks remained in it. But in general, in 1945, equipment was replenished regularly. In preparation for the operation, the 4th Panzer Army received 159 T-34-85, 45 IS-2, 21 SU-100 and 2 ° CU-76 for resupply. The newest SU-100 was received in the form of a brand-new 1727 self-propelled artillery regiment. In total, by March 14, D.D. Lelyushenko, there were combat-ready 302 T-34-85, 11 T-34-76, 47 IS-2, 2 SU-122, 21 SU-100, 5 SU-85, 52 SU-57, 38 SU-76 and 4 Valentine "Mk.IX / X. Another 6 vehicles (2 T-34-85, 3 IS-2 and 1 SU-85) were under maintenance due to minor malfunctions and were put into operation by the morning of March 15.

Survived in early March a meat grinder at Lauban 3rd Guards. the tank army was not ready for a new operation. Therefore, the second "claw" in the encirclement operation was made up of separate mobile units of the front. Surrounding in February Breslau 7th Guards. mechanized and 4th guards. Panzer corps moved with the 4th Panzer Army to the south and concentrated on the bridgehead at Ratibor. This maneuver allowed the Soviet command to achieve superiority in forces in the selected area of ​​operations. The enemy could only react by moving reserves to the emerging crisis after the success of the first strike of the Soviet troops.

"Cauldron" on the banks of the Oder

Information about the impending Soviet offensive leaked to the Germans in early March 1945. From interrogations of prisoners, information was even obtained on the approximate date of the start of the offensive - March 10. Colonel General Heinrici decided to launch a preemptive strike against the Soviet bridgehead between Kozel and Ratibor. With a counterattack on the launch pad of the Soviet offensive, it was necessary to defeat the concentrating troops and reduce the bridgehead. The maximum program was the elimination of the bridgehead. For the counterattack, a jaeger combat group was created as part of the 97th jaeger division and part of the 1st ski-jaeger division. She was concentrating against the southern face of the beachhead. The battle group was led by Lieutenant General von Pappenheim. Also in the offensive were to participate in the attack on the perimeter of the bridgehead formations of the XI Army Corps of General von Bunau - 371st Infantry Division, 18th SS Division "Horst Wessel". Since the Germans considered the date of the beginning of the operation of the Soviet troops on March 10, the counterstrike was supposed to be delivered on the night of March 8.

The German counteroffensive began at the appointed time. The Jaeger battle group advanced north along the banks of the Oder. The 371st Infantry Division was advancing towards the Jaegers from the west. The two shock groups were to join up and encircle the Soviet units in the southern part of the bridgehead. At first, the offensive developed successfully, but after three days of fighting it fizzled out. The Germans failed to achieve the encirclement of at least part of the Soviet troops on the bridgehead. Only a few kilometers were recaptured on the southern face of the bridgehead. After stopping the counteroffensive, the Germans regrouped units along the perimeter of the bridgehead. They had to wait for it to be "opened" by the Soviet troops.

The offensive of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front began on March 15 with the actions of the forward battalions of the 21st and 5th Guards armies from the Grottkau area. Artillery preparation began at 7.00 and lasted 1.5 hours. At 8.40 the main forces of the 21st and 4th tank armies went over to the offensive. Overcoming stubborn fire resistance of the enemy and repelling repeated counterattacks by his tactical reserves, by the end of the first day of the offensive, the formations of the armies broke through two fortified enemy positions on an 8-kilometer front and advanced 8 kilometers into the depth of the enemy defense.

The troops of the 59th and 60th armies, advancing from the bridgehead north of Ratibor in the direction of Neustadt, went on the offensive after 80 minutes of artillery preparation. Having broken the enemy's resistance, they broke through the main line of his defense on a 12-kilometer front and in a day of fighting advanced 6-8 kilometers.

The relatively low rate of advance on the first day of the operation was explained by a number of reasons. First, artillery preparation did not completely suppress the enemy's defense system. Aviation training on March 15, due to bad weather, turned out to be less intense than planned. Until 12.00, due to bad weather, Soviet aviation did not perform combat missions. Only from 12:00, as the weather improved, aviation began to carry out bomb-assault strikes against enemy strongpoints, headquarters and communication centers. However, instead of the 2995 sorties planned for the first day of the operation, the aviation made only 1283 sorties. Secondly, the spring thaw inevitably influenced the fighting. In the combat log of the 6th Guards. the mechanized corps noted: “The terrain in the area of ​​action is medium-rugged open. The soil is loamy and in some places sandy loam, the spring time made the soil loose and muddy, as a result, tanks could only operate on roads, which deprived the body of the main element in the offensive - maneuver on the battlefield. " It was much easier for the enemy to build up defenses along the roads than to maintain a solid front. Also in the offensive, the "edge effect" was manifested - the advancement of the 4th Guards Front, located on the right flank of the opposition grouping of the front. Panzer corps on the first day of the operation was insignificant. However, on the whole, the Soviet offensive developed successfully: the defenses of the 45th Infantry Division in the Grottkau area were hacked, and the regiments of the division lost contact with each other.

Self-propelled gun SU-85 on the outskirts of Gdynia.

Despite the information received from the prisoners about the impending Soviet offensive, the Germans clearly underestimated its scope. Therefore, before the start of the operation, they did not accumulate reserves in the immediate vicinity of the Soviet bridgeheads. The actual scale of the Soviet offensive was realized by the German command only after its start. On March 16, an entry appeared in the war log of the Wehrmacht's operational leadership headquarters: “South of Grottkau, the enemy managed to drive a deep wedge. The 4th Panzer Army appeared here, the whereabouts of which remained unknown. " Mechanized formations could become a "lifesaver". The 20th Panzer, 10th Panzer Grenadier and 19th Panzer Divisions were withdrawn from the Strehlen and Shvednitz area and rushed to the rescue. They were still capable of fighting. As of March 15, the 20th Panzer Division had 9 Pz.V Panthers, 21 Pz.IVs, 13 StuGIII self-propelled guns, 10 Panzerjaeger IV / 70 and 2 FlakpanzerIV, in the 10th Panzer-Grenadier Division - 29 StuGIII and StuGIV self-propelled guns and 9 Panzerjaeger IV / 70, in the 19th Panzer Division - 17 Pz.V "Panther", 20 Pz.IV and 11 Panzerjaeger IV / 70. Not all of these divisions were actually tank divisions by name. The 10th tank-grenadier division sank in number to the battle group. In itself, the name "battle group" meant a temporary association of tank, motorized infantry, sapper and artillery units under a single command to solve a tactical task. As a rule, a tank, tank-grenadier or infantry division was split into two or three battle groups. The fact that the division became a "battle group" meant that half, a third, or even a smaller fraction of its composition remained of the formation. In other words, the units left over from the division were only enough to create one typical battle group. To repel the Soviet offensive, separate units were also advanced. The 300th assault gun brigade was deployed from the Strigau area.

The arrival of the enemy's reserves inevitably complicated the situation on the flank of the opposition grouping of the 1st Ukrainian Front. In this regard, one cannot fail to note the thoughtful construction of the right-flank strike group of the front in the Upper Silesian operation by Konev. Two tank and mechanized corps followed parallel routes and began to move in a ledge in the depths of the enemy's defenses. 4th Guards. tank corps and 6th Guards. the mechanized corps of the 4th Panzer Army operated on the external front of the impending encirclement, the 10th Guards. tank corps - on the inside. The movement of the ledge led to the fact that a possible counterstrike to the flank of the 10th Guards. tank corps in the direction from west to east inevitably came under attack from the 6th Guards. mechanized corps moving from north to south. A blow to the flank of the entire tank army was under attack from the north of the 4th Guards. tank corps. The Germans met the expectations of the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front and acted exactly as he expected. Therefore, the greatest load in the operation fell on the 4th Guards. tank and 6th guards. mechanized corps. They were supposed to prevent the direct impact of the German reserves on the roundabout maneuver and reflect the deblocking strikes.

March 16 became the day of the struggle of the attackers with the arriving mechanized formations of the enemy. As is usually the case, the reserves were brought into battle in parts. The first to enter the battle were the 19th Panzer Division and the 10th Panzer-Grenadier Division. They could not fill the front, torn into rags. Therefore, the 10th Guards. tank corps of the 4th guards. The tank army quickly felt for a gap in the enemy's formation and advanced far ahead, starting a maneuver to encircle the enemy. Two other corps of the opposition grouping of the 1st Ukrainian Front were drawn into battles with enemy reserves. The battle group of the 10th Panzer-Grenadier Division covered the city of Neisse from the north. The 19th Panzer Division faced a dense screen at the base of the breakthrough created by the 4th Guards. tank corps and 34th Guards. rifle corps. 6th Guards. the mechanized corps, meanwhile, groped for gaps in the restored defenses for a breakthrough to the southwest. 16th and 17th Guards. mechanized brigades began to bypass Neisse from the west. Counterattacks by units of the 10th tank-grenadier division and the artillery of the 405th People's Artillery Corps resisted. The intensity of the fighting increased dramatically. If March 15, 6th Guards. the mechanized corps lost 7 people killed and 18 wounded, 16 tanks burned and wounded, then on March 16 corps losses amounted to 149 people killed and 247 wounded, 36 tanks and 2 SU-100. The number of tanks in the 16th and 17th Guards. corps mechanized brigades dropped to 16 vehicles.

Street fighting in Gdynia. For the 1st Guards. tank army, they became a rehearsal for the battles for Berlin.

March 17 became the day of throwing. On the previous day, the 10th Guards. tank corps successfully advanced to the river. Neisse to the east of the city of Neisse. At 3.00 a.m. D.D. Lelyushenko ordered the 6th Guards. the mechanized corps to unfold after its faster advancing neighbor and force the Neisse at Rotthaus. However, the corps commander could send only one 16th Guards to Rotthaus. mechanized brigade. 17th Guards. the mechanized brigade was left at the line captured the previous day as flank cover. At 8.20 am, the commander of the 4th Panzer Army changed his mind and ordered the 6th Guards. mechanized corps to capture the city of Ottmahau, and the 10th Guards. corps - the city of Neisse.

10th Guards. tank corps at 13.00 on March 17 crossed the river. Neisse at Rotthaus by the forces of the 61st Guards. tank brigade and followed up the success at Neustadt. 62nd Guards. the tank brigade was placed in a flanking barrier to avoid counterattacks from the Neisse. In a vain attempt to stop the advance of Soviet tanks, police from Neisse, armed only with small arms, were thrown towards the units of the 10th Panzer Corps. This led to the immediate destruction of the Neissen city police. Naturally, people who went into battle with the wrong weapons and with no hope of success tried to look for a better fate for themselves. However, Scherner put things in order with draconian measures: deserters were ruthlessly shot.

This is not to say that overcoming the 10th Guards. Panzer Corps of the River Neisse passed painlessly. The commander of the 10th Guards Army was killed in action near Rotthaus. tank corps Colonel N.D. Chuprov. Major General E.E. Belov - Deputy Commander of the 4th Tank Army. 6th Guards. the mechanized corps had to reap the consequences of throwing between the two directions in the afternoon of March 17. The stumbling block was the town of Stephansdorf on the way to Ottomachau. In the middle of the day, it was stormed by the 17th Guards. mechanized brigade, and in the afternoon - the 16th Guards, returned from Rotthouse. mechanized brigade. 17th Guards. the mechanized brigade defended itself by the front to the west in the second half of the day - the advance units of the enemy's 20th tank division were pulled up to the battlefield.

At the height of the battle in Upper Silesia, on March 17, 1945, the 4th Panzer Army D.D. Lelyushenko received the title of the Guards. Of the six Soviet tank armies that existed at that time, the army of D.D. Lelyushenko received the last guard. Formed in 1944, the 6th Panzer Army A.G. Kravchenko received a guards rank in September of the same year. Formed almost simultaneously with the 4th Tank Army, the 2nd Tank Army became the Guards Army in November 1944, the 1st Tank Army of M.E. Katukova joined the Soviet Guard in April 1944.The 3rd and 5th Tank Armies had been in the Guards rank since the spring of 1943.

ISU-122 in Danzig.

The 4th Panzer Army celebrated the assignment of the guards rank with successes on the battlefield. The task of closing the ring around the LVI tank corps connections was successfully solved by the 10th Guards. tank corps. At the end of the day on March 18, the 61st Guards. the tank brigade of the corps and the 93rd separate tank brigade went to the Buchensdorf area, where they connected with the units of the 7th Guards. mechanized corps and 31st tank corps, advancing from the east. The lid of the "cauldron" for four German divisions slammed shut. The following were encircled: the 20th SS Infantry Division (1st Estonian), the 168th and 344th Infantry Divisions, part of the forces of the 18th SS Division Horst Wessel.

The expected I.S. Horse counterblows could no longer prevent the ring from closing. They were carried out by formations of Army Group Center transferred from other sectors of the front. The delay was caused by the need to make long marches before reaching the Neisse area. Already on the first day of the Soviet offensive, March 15, 1945, the 1st parachute-tank division "Hermann Goering" received an order to advance to a new concentration area. By that time, the division was withdrawn from the bridgehead at Muskau and was on vacation in the Gorlitz area. The first parts of the Hermann Goering were unloaded from the trains at Ottmahau on 17 March. The division received the task of attacking the extended flank of the "pincers" of the Soviet troops that surrounded the LVI Panzer and XI Army Corps. The starting point for the counterstrike was the area southeast of the city of Neisse. However, the offensive of the Soviet troops led to the disruption of the concentration of "Hermann Goering" at the starting positions for the counteroffensive. If not for the throwing of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps between the two directions on March 17, the starting positions for the counterattack would have simply been captured by Soviet troops.

On March 18, the reserves thrown by the Germans into battle faced the aggressive cover of the flank of the opposition grouping of the 1st Ukrainian Front. 6th Guards. the mechanized corps advanced southwestward. The task of the corps was to capture Ottmahau, the very station at which the Hermann Goering was unloaded. In the early morning of March 18, the 16th and 17th Guards. the mechanized brigades jointly captured the Stephansdorf road junction, which they had stormed one by one the previous day, and continued their attack on Ottmahau. However, the vanguard of the corps were met with ambushes, and further advance was halted. The Soviet mechanized corps stretched out like a wedge in the direction of Ottmahau.

The middle of the day passed in repelling the counterattacks of the arriving units of "Hermann Goering" and the 20th Panzer Division. 6th Guards. the mechanized corps posed an immediate threat to the Hermann Goering's flank and thus prevented an effective counterstrike. Resistance from the front was weak, but the threat to the flank forced the Germans to stop the advance to the east and to deal with the elimination of the threat from the north. Massive fire of the 17th Guards. mechanized brigade, as well as all artillery of the 16th Guards. mechanized brigade and corps artillery group all counterattacks of the units of "Hermann Goering" were repulsed. Also unsuccessful was the offensive of the 20th Panzer Division into the flank of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps. The received 4th Guards took part in repelling enemy attacks. tank army shortly before the operation in Upper Silesia, self-propelled guns SU-100. Realizing the importance of flank cover, the commander of the 4th Guards. The tank army also sent units of army subordination to support the mechanized corps: the 22nd self-propelled artillery brigade on the Lend-Lease SU-57 and the 57th motorcycle battalion.

Commander of the 6th Guards mechanized corps Colonel V.I. Koretsky.

Reflecting German counterattacks was personally led by the commander of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps. However, an excellent view of the battlefield from the front line also had a downside - the risk of falling under enemy fire. A shell that exploded at the command post fatally wounded the commander of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps General V.F. Orlov, the head of the corps intelligence department, Major Chernyshev, and the commander of the 17th Guards. mechanized brigade Hero of the Soviet Union Lieutenant Colonel L.D. Churilov. The command of the corps was assumed by the chief of staff of the guard, Colonel V.I. Koretsky. Despite the rather calm development of events, the Upper Silesian operation became for the 4th Guards. a tank army during a period of loss of command personnel. The total losses of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps on March 18 amounted to 99 people killed, 318 wounded, 8 tanks burned.

Commander of the Fuehrer Escort division Otto-Ernst Roemer (pictured with the rank of lieutenant colonel).

The formations transferred from other sectors of the front of Army Group Center were also brought into action directly south of the newly formed "cauldron". An enemy well-known to the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front - the XXIV Panzer Corps of Neringa, was advancing to the Leobshütz area. The 16th and 17th Panzer Divisions, the 78th Assault Division and the "Fuehrer Escort" division were subordinate to him. As of March 15, the 16th Panzer Division consisted of 14 Pz.V Panther and 31 Hetzer self-propelled guns, the Führer Escort division - 10 Pz.V Panther, 7 Pz.IV, 2 ° CAC StuGIII, 12 PanzerjaegerIV / 70 and 2 FlakpanzerIV. The condition of all these units was far from brilliant, but they could still play their role in the battle.

However, the encircled German divisions did not wait for the release. In the second half of the war, the expectation of outside help could already lead to fatal consequences. Memories of the destinies of the destroyed "Festungs" made me nervous. The commander of the 344th Infantry Division, General Jolasse, recalled: "Answers to all inquiries of the division regarding a possible breakthrough to the south through Deutsch Russelwitz were slowed down by the XXIV Panzer Corps." At 15.00 on March 19, Jolasse decided "to act independently in the face of a rapidly deteriorating situation." He signed the breakout order, which was originally set for 5pm. The general insisted in his memoirs that he made the decision to break through on his own. The breakthrough began at 19.00 on the same day. The 18th SS Division and the 344th Infantry Division went on to break through. If you call a spade a spade, then the German troops south-west of Oppeln (north of the positions of the Jolasse division) rushed this breakthrough to their fate. They soon found themselves in an isolated "cauldron" with no hope of salvation. When the commanders of the formations began to believe less and less the promises of the command about an early release, the principle of "every man for himself" inevitably began to operate.

The target of the breakthrough was the village of Deutsch Russelwitz. The area was open, with no natural shelter. As a result, the fire of Soviet guns and mortars punched holes in the ranks of the German units going to break through, mixed with refugees. A desperate dash paved the way for the salvation of the fortunate few. Deutsch Russelwitz was captured at about 22.00. There was a river 2 km from the village, but the bridge over it was blown up. Someone was looking for salvation by swimming, someone was waiting for the ford to be found. The next point of the breakthrough was the village of Hotzenplatz on the banks of the river of the same name. Here, too, the bridges across the river were prudently blown up by Soviet sappers. General Jolasse recalled: “The riverbank was turned into a continuous muddy mess and was under continuous fire from enemy artillery. Here we have suffered sensitive losses. Many vehicles, guns and the latest self-propelled guns got stuck trying to cross the Hotzenplatz. They were all blown up and thrown. " Those who were able to break through Hotzenplatz soon reached the positions of units of the XXIV Panzer Corps.

If the threat from the west from the "Hermann Goering", the 19th and 20th Panzer Divisions managed to fend off the 4th Guards. tank and 6th guards. mechanized corps, the XXIV Panzer Corps of Nering could well inflict a strong deblocking blow. However, without waiting for outside help, the remnants of the encircled troops went to break through. Therefore, the XXIV Panzer Corps had to restore the integrity of the front, in which, after the encirclement of the LVI Panzer Corps, an extensive gap formed.

While the encircled German units broke through from the encirclement, to the north-west of the city of Neisse, Soviet troops repelled enemy counterattacks. 6th Guards. the mechanized corps itself did not advance, but retained the positions captured on the previous days. In the war log of the headquarters of the operational leadership of the Wehrmacht, the situation on March 20 was outlined as follows: “The troops cut off between the bridgeheads are retreating. The attacks of the Hermann Goering division failed. The enemy managed to finally tie the bridgeheads and form a large bridgehead on the western bank of the [Oder] ”.

Tank T-34-85 with an infantry landing in the Danzig area.

Within five days, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front surrounded and liquidated a large enemy grouping on the western bank of the Oder. As a result, the possibility of a flank attack by the enemy against the front forces from Upper Silesia during the Berlin operation was eliminated. The Soviet offensive also forced the German command to withdraw the mechanized formations concentrated in the Zobten and Schweidnitz area and throw them into battle in the Neisse area. Thus, the plans to release Breslau were thwarted. On March 5, Lieutenant General Hermann Niehoff was appointed commandant of Breslau. He flew into the fortress by plane with Scherner's promise to break through to the encircled city from the outside. This promise remained unfulfilled. The losses of the 1st Ukrainian Front at the first stage of the operation can be assessed as moderate. Irrecoverable losses of armored vehicles in the front forces for the period from 15 to 20 March amounted to 259 armored units (196 tanks and 63 self-propelled guns).

Losses of equipment of the 4th Guards. tank army for the period March 15-22 and their distribution by the nature of damage are shown in the table. There were no losses from aviation and from faust cartridges in the units of Lelyushenko's army during this period. This is due to the air supremacy of the Soviet Air Force and the lack of street fighting. Failure due to technical malfunctions mainly fell on the development of a motor resource in throwing on the roads of Poland and Germany. By the beginning of the operation, the 4th Panzer Army had 123 tanks, which had completed 1.5-2 times the norm.

table

LOSSES 4th Guards. OF THE TANK ARMY IN THE PERIOD FROM 15 TO 22 MARCH 1945 AND THEIR DISTRIBUTION BY CAUSE OF DAMAGE

Just like the East Pomeranian operation of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts, the Upper Silesian operation took place in a spring thaw. This inevitably resulted in losses. In the report of the Department of Armored Supply and Repair of the 4th Guards. the tank army indicated that "the operation in the period from 15.3 to 22.3.45 took place during the spring thaw, movement off the roads was impossible even for tanks, which explains the large number of tanks stuck, stuck tanks, as a rule, were hit by the enemy."

Failure of I.E. Petrova and its consequences

If the offensive of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front was quite successful, then the 4th Ukrainian Front could not boast of any significant achievements. The ambitious plan of I.E. Petrova began to crumble, not even having time to achieve the goals of the first stage of the operation. The armies in the direction of the main attack were commanded by the future dignitaries of the upper echelon of power of the Soviet Union of the Brezhnev era. The 38th Army was headed by K.S. Moskalenko, 1st Guards Army - A.A. Grechko. In the auxiliary direction, the 18th Army of Lieutenant General A.I. Gastilovich. Like most of the Soviet armies on the Soviet-German front, they could not boast of a good completeness of rifle formations. The number of personnel in the rifle divisions of the 18th and 38th armies ranged from 3,000 to 4,000 people. Only two divisions of the 38th Army had 5,000 men each. The number of rifle divisions of the 1st Guards Army ranged from 4 to 5.5 thousand people.

The reasons for the failure were trivial enough. First, it was perceived as an unshakable date for the start of the operation - March 10. Perhaps the fact that the notorious L.Z. was a member of the Front Military Council played a role here. Mehlis. It is his pressure that can explain the impeccable implementation of the instructions of the Headquarters "to start the operation no later than March 10". As a result, the offensive began in conditions of incomplete preparation of troops for it. Instead of informing the top about the unpreparedness of the troops for the offensive, the front command preferred to keep silent about the difficulties that had arisen.

Secondly, a reception with the withdrawal of troops from the first trench worked against the shock group of the 4th Ukrainian Front. Information about the Soviet offensive leaked to the Germans. The date of its start has become known - March 10. On the evening of March 9, the German units defending in the direction of the alleged attack by Soviet troops received an order to withdraw to the second line of trenches. The retreat was completed before dawn on 10 March. The withdrawal, made under the cover of the outbreak of a blizzard, was not noticed and the artillery strike fell practically on an empty spot. The results of this blunder were not slow to show themselves. Instead of a breakthrough to a depth of 23-25 ​​km, on March 10, the army's troops wedged 3-4 km into the enemy's defenses at a 15 km front. The penetration of Soviet troops into the defenses of the Heinrici group attracted mobile reserves in the person of the 8th Panzer Division. As of March 15, this division included 42 Pz.IVs (of which 11 are serviceable), 10 Pz.V "Panthers" (of which 9 are serviceable) and 30 Panzerjaeger IV / 70 (of which 6 are serviceable). By the end of March 17, in the direction of the main attack, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front managed to advance only 12 km.

The obvious setback, as usual, was followed by conclusions. Directive of the Supreme Command Rate No. 11045 I.Е. Petrov on March 25 was removed from his post as commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front with the wording: "for an attempt to deceive the Headquarters about the true position of the front troops, not fully ready for the offensive at the appointed time." Place I.E. Petrov was taken over by A.I. Eremenko. A few days later, the chief of staff of the front was replaced: General F.K. Korzhenevich was replaced by Colonel-General L.M. Sandalov.

The commander's armored personnel carrier SdKfz. 251 abandoned on the shore of the Danzig Bay. Pay attention to the "whisk" of the antenna of a powerful radio station.

To withdraw the offensive of the 4th Ukrainian Front from the crisis, a tried-and-true method was used - shifting the direction of the main attack. K.S. Moskalenko, who commanded the 38th Army, described in his memoirs his impressions of observing the front line in the new direction as follows:

“One and a half kilometers south of the height was the small town of Zorau. It was small, but it was a junction of seven highways and three railways, beams radiating in all directions. Even closer, directly at the slopes of the height, a small river flowed. Its valley up to 500 m wide was a swampy area with many artificial ponds and covered Zorau from the northeast. We approached the city even closer, as far as the front line would allow. Now from Zorau we were separated by a distance of up to 1 km. The streets were clearly visible, quiet, calm. The soldiers walked along them unhurriedly and just as calmly. They didn't seem to expect a blow. Meanwhile, it should have been applied here. Moreover, to the northeast of Zorau, a forest was visible, which could provide a covert concentration of troops and equipment "( Moskalenko K.S. In the southwest direction. M .: Science. P. 568).

The decision to attack through Zorau was approved by I.E. Petrov, but A.I. Eremenko. For the breakthrough, the 95th Rifle and 126th Light Mountain Rifle Corps of the 38th Army were concentrated. Each of them received a tank brigade. The offensive in the new direction began on March 24 and developed much more successfully than on March 10. On the main axis, the 95th Rifle Corps and 126th Light Mountain Rifle Corps that day advanced to a depth of 7 km, and the 101st Rifle Corps, in the auxiliary direction, by 4 km.

The German command tried to plug the breakthrough formed at Zorau by the 715th Infantry Division of General von Rohr, who arrived by rail. The division arrived from Italy, and its soldiers and officers were completely unprepared for the realities of the Eastern Front. Having been hit by mountain rifle units of the 38th Army, it was scattered to pieces and suffered heavy losses. For the failure of his division, its commander was instantly demoted to the rank of colonel "by order of the Fuehrer." Also, by order of Hitler, the soldiers and officers of the 715th Infantry Division were deprived of all awards and insignia.

During March 25-28, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front advanced at an average daily rate of 4-5 km. By March 28, they were 20 km from Moravian Ostrava. At this line, they met increased enemy resistance and could not advance further. Realizing the importance of the Moravian-Ostrava industrial region, the enemy put forward the 16th and 19th tank divisions and the 10th tank-grenadier division to defend it. The 8th Panzer Division, which successfully participated in repelling the Soviet offensive on March 10-18, also advanced here. The fighting here froze until mid-April.

Second phase of the Upper Silesian operation

Since the 4th Ukrainian Front was hopelessly stuck, after the encirclement and defeat of the LVI Panzer and XI Army Corps divisions, the operation of the 1st Ukrainian Front did not stop. The collapse of the enemy front made it possible to push forward rifle divisions of the combined-arms armies and reinforce mechanized and tank brigades with them. 6th Guards. the mechanized corps, in cooperation with the 382nd and 72nd rifle divisions, was supposed to attack the city of Neisse from the north, to clear the northern bank of the Neisse river from the enemy. The next task was to advance along the northern bank of the river to Ottmahau. The task of flank cover was entrusted to the 128th Infantry Division. Closing the encirclement of the 10th Guards. the tank corps was deployed and, in cooperation with the 55th rifle corps, was supposed to advance on the city of Neisse, bypassed a few days ago, from the southeast.

SU-76 enter the streets of Neisse.

March 23 6th Guards. the mechanized corps and the approaching rifle divisions were simultaneously solving two tasks: defended by the front to the west and advanced to the south. The part of the city of Neisse lying on the northern bank of the Neisse was captured. By 20.00 on March 23, the 10th Guards entered the eastern outskirts of Neisse. tank and 55th rifle corps. The defenders of the city had only one escape route - to the west.

Once the city of Neisse was a fortress, but in 1945 it was already completely unsuitable for this role. As the commander of the 17th Army, General Schultz, put it, "Neisse's fortifications were suitable for battle during the time of Frederick the Great, but not during the Second World War." The main problem was the lack and limited capacity of the defenders. In the city of Neisse at the end of January, the 273rd and 274th Volkssturm battalions were formed. But their capabilities were simply paltry. Each consisted of four companies of about 60 people. Each company had one heavy machine gun and up to 15 faust cartridges. The Volkssturmists had about 60 rounds of ammunition per carbine. In addition, circumstances did not allow Volkssturm to take advantage of the battle on the city streets. The 273rd Volkssturm Neisse battalion was withdrawn from the city and took up a battle in the open. In these conditions, the outcome of the struggle for Neisse was a foregone conclusion. By the end of the day on March 24, the southern part of the city was cleared of German troops by the forces of the 10th Guards. tank and 55th rifle corps.

Volkssturmist examines the holes from the faust cartridges in the sides of the turret and hull of the Soviet T-34-85 tank.

After Neisse's surrender, the commander of Army Group Center Schörner demanded the death sentence for his commandant, Colonel Georg Sparre. Neisse, like many other German cities, was declared a "festung" (fortress). Sparre managed to save his life only by bluffing, announcing that he was the brother-in-law of Reichsleiter Bormann. Hearing the name of one of the highest dignitaries of the Third Reich, the judge stopped the process with a predetermined result. Therefore, instead of appearing before a squad of soldiers with rifles, Colonel Sparre went to the Glatz fortress for further investigation. There he soon became a prisoner of war from a prisoner of the Soviet troops.

In the meantime, it was necessary to galvanize the offensive of the 1st Ukrainian Front in the Ratibor area. Here the 60th army of P.A. Kurochkin. On the first day of the offensive, she advanced 8 km. In the memoirs of I.S. Konev wrote: “These rates of advance did not suit us in any way, and I brought in two corps of the 4th Guards Tank to the aid of the 60th Army. The tankers were supposed to deliver an additional blow from the north. " To be precise, the army units and one of the corps of the army were initially withdrawn to the new direction. On the morning of March 24, the 10th Guards. tank corps of the 4th Guards. Panzer Army was ordered to continue fighting for the southern part of Neisse in cooperation with the 55th Rifle Corps. Corps E.E. Belov was also transferred to the 1727th self-propelled artillery regiment on the SU-100. The rest of the forces of the army of D.D. Lelyushenko was supposed to be withdrawn from the Neisse area and on March 25, go on the offensive in a new direction.

Padded SU-85M. Silesia, March 1945

In addition, the 4th Guards. the tank army received a new connection with which it had to end the war. On March 24, 1945, the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps of Major General of Tank Forces B.M. Skvortsova. Initially, it was part of the 4th Ukrainian Front, but the failure in the offensive operation led to the transfer of the corps to the subordination of the more efficiently advancing 1st Ukrainian Front. Completeness of the 5th Guards. mechanized corps can be assessed as high. By the time of transition to the subordination of D.D. Lelyushenko mechanized corps B.M. Skvortsov, there were 171 tanks and self-propelled guns in good order (116 T-34-85, 17 IS-2, 18 SU-85, 2 ° CU-76). Since June 1944, Skvortsov's corps was in the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters, by February 7-8, 1945 it was fully equipped with tanks. However, the corps sorely lacked vehicles. Commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front I.E. Petrov was annoyed in February: “5 microns, concentrated in the Dembitsa area, is fully manned and equipped with tanks, but does not have cars - the shortage is 1243 units. 800 planned machines for the hull are on the way and some of them have not yet been shipped. Their delivery to the building is scheduled for 02/20/1945. " ... As a result, the corps went into battle only on March 10 and managed to irrevocably lose only 35 T-34-85. Therefore, the 5th Guards. the mechanized corps was well preserved at the time when most of the mobile formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front were thoroughly beaten in battles. By entering management, army units and one badly battered corps of the 4th Guards. tank army, the front commander did not so much strengthen the 60th army as he sought to increase the level of command and control in the Ratibor area.

The new compound of the 4th Guards. Panzer Army was the first to launch an offensive at a new stage of the operation. 5th Guards. the mechanized corps at 8:00 on March 24 went over to the offensive in the direction of Leobschütz-Troppau. On the first day of the offensive to the corps B.M. Skvortsov, only separate units of army subordination joined: the 93rd separate tank and 22nd self-propelled artillery brigades. However, instead of a gap in the collapsed front of the 4th Guards. Panzer Army met with the defense of XXIV Panzer Corps. As a result, the advance of the Soviet troops was only 3-4 km.

Stubborn resistance instead of loose ruins of defense in place of the liquidated "cauldron" was an unpleasant surprise. Conclusion of the 4th Guards. tank army to the new direction followed in a changed order relative to the original plan. The first was withdrawn from the captured city of Neisse by the 10th Guards. tank corps. Building E.E. Belova was brought into battle on March 25 to build up the blow to the left of the 5th Guards. mechanized corps. But by coincidence, in the planned direction of the strike, several German tank formations were assembled at once, sent to Oppeln and Ratibor as a "fire brigade": the 16th and 17th tank divisions, the "Fuehrer escort" division, the 254th infantry and 78th I'm an assault division. Despite the fact that the 17th Panzer Division was in the status of a "battle group", it could boast on 15 March 14 PzKpfw.IV (of which 10 are serviceable), 23 PzKpfw.V "Panther" (of which only 4 are serviceable), 19 Panzerjaeger IV / 70 (of which 18 are serviceable) and 3 anti-aircraft Flakpanzer.IV.

The unfinished series XXI submarines captured by Soviet troops in Danzig are a matter of concern for the Allies.

However, German reserves in 1945 could not have been ubiquitous. The path to success lay in probing new directions with blows. 6th Guards. the mechanized corps surrendered positions to the infantry after a two-day pause. The transfer of positions by the corps to the 21st Army's formations took place on the night of March 27, and already in the morning of March 28 it was necessary to go on the offensive. D.D. Lelyushenko explained in his memoirs as follows: "I decide on March 28 to bring the corps into battle in the direction of Steuberwitz, where the enemy did not expect our strike at all." By that time, the 6th Guards. mechanized corps consisted of 15 T-34s in the 16th Guards. mechanized brigade, 16 T-34 in the 17th Guards. mechanized brigade, 9 IS-2 in the 28th Guards. a heavy tank regiment, 17 T-34s in the 95th separate motorcycle battalion and 14 SU-76s in the 1433rd self-propelled artillery regiment. Compared to the mass of tanks in the Skvortsov mechanized corps, the Koretsky mechanized corps that remained in the two-brigade was much weaker. But even two brigades at the right time in the right place could play a significant role. The 107th Rifle Division was supposed to break through the gap in the enemy's defenses, and the 6th Guards. the mechanized corps was tasked with advancing on Troppau from the northeast. This blow brought the mechanized corps to the rear of the XXIV enemy tank corps. According to the plan of the part of the 6th Guards. the mechanized corps were supposed to break into Troppau in the evening of March 28. 5th Guards. mechanized and 10th Guards. the tank corps were to advance in the same direction, leading to Troppau from the north. Thus, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front were to form another "cauldron" in Upper Silesia.

The operation began at 12:00 on March 28 with the advance of the 107th Rifle Division and the 31st Panzer Corps. At 18.00 he was joined by units of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps. The offensive developed on the whole successfully, but the pace was still much lower than the planned rush to Troppau. The approaches to the Stolmotz road junction lying on the path of the corps brigades' advance were heavily mined, and the bridge over the Zinna River was blown up. With fire from Stolmotz, the enemy also prevented a flanking maneuver. Clearing the roads, searching for a ford and crossing the Zinna took time, and Stolmotz was taken by the 17th Mechanized Brigade by 1.00 am on 29 March. The Stolmotz defense was surrendered to the 95th Motorcycle Battalion, while the two mechanized brigades continued their advance.

By the evening of March 29, 31st Panzer Corps captured Ratibor and linked up with units of the 60th Army that were advancing on the city from the east. The decisive role of artillery in the battles for Ratibor should be noted. For several days, the troops of the 60th Army unsuccessfully tried to capture this strong knot of enemy resistance. Then I.S. Konev ordered to concentrate in the Ratibor area the 17th artillery breakthrough division, the 25th breakthrough artillery division that had just arrived at the front, as well as most of the army's military artillery. The enemy's resistance was quickly broken by massed fire from this artillery, and Soviet troops captured the city.

The capture of Ratibor was reliably covered by the left flank of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps. On the contrary, the rest of the connections of the 4th Guards. the tank army could not yet boast of resounding successes. The right flank of the 10th Guards. tank corps and the left flank of the 5th Guards. mechanized corps advanced only 2 km. At 18.00 D.D. Lelyushenko ordered the commander of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps to create a mobile detachment and throw it forward to intercept the communications of the surrounded enemy. The detachment was created from the 95th separate motorcycle battalion, the battalion of the 17th Guards. mechanized brigade and two IS-2 tanks of the 28th Guards. heavy tank regiment. In total, the detachment consisted of 14 T-34s and 2 IS-2s. The detachment was led by the commander of the 17th Guards. mechanized brigade of the guard Major Bushmakin. The detachment was ordered to advance through Reisnitz to Piltsch.

However, the moment for a sudden breakthrough in depth was missed. On the direction of the strike of the 6th Guards. the mechanized corps was transferred to the "Fuehrer's Escort" division. On March 30, Bushmakin's detachment came under counter-attacks from newly arrived units, lost 10 tanks and 110 infantry, and retreated. Two brigades of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps continued to push forward.

On the last day of March, the right-flank strike group of the 4th Guards finally achieved some success. tank army. By the morning of March 31, the 61st Guards. tank brigade of the 10th guards. tank corps went to Reisnitz, and the 62nd Guards. tank brigade - to Dirschel. In the context of a drop in the number of tanks in tank brigades, units in key areas were replenished at the expense of secondary ones. Commander of the 61st Guards of the tank brigade recalled: “When we occupied the village of Nassidel by the end of the day on March 30, I was called to the telephone by the commander of the guard, Colonel-General D.D. Lelyushenko. He said that units from other parts of the 10th Guards Tank Corps were sent to replenish the brigade, and ordered immediately after their arrival to launch an offensive and by the morning of March 31 to capture the village of Reisnitz. Already in the dark, 11 tanks and self-propelled guns and two artillery regiments arrived at our disposal. "

The grouping of German troops defending in the Karscher area was in a semi-encirclement. From the front, it was pinned down by the 386th Infantry Division and the 22nd Self-Propelled Artillery Brigade of the 4th Guards. tank army. An attempt by the 1st Ski Jaeger Division to inflict a flank attack and break free through the rear of the 6th Guards. the mechanized corps ended in failure. In the battle to repel the counterstrike, the head of the operational department of the 6th Guards Army was killed. of the mechanized corps of the guard, Major Rybakov.

April 1 was followed by the last act of the drama, for which the 4th Guards. the tank army was withdrawn from the Berlin direction and sent to Upper Silesia. The task of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps was a breakthrough to meet the 61st Guards. tank brigade in Reisnitz. However, the solution of the problem "head-on" promised only great losses - it was necessary to ram the defense of the "Fuehrer's Escort" division. In these conditions, the commander of the 16th Guards. mechanized brigade Lieutenant Colonel G.M. Shcherbak went to the corps commander with a proposal to break through to Reisnitz along a different route. He offered to strike where the Germans had counterblowed on the previous day. This decision brought success, and parts of two corps of the 4th Guards. Panzer Army linked up at Reisnitz. Units of the 1st Ski Jaeger Division, the 500th Penalty Battalion and part of the forces of the "Fuehrer Escort" division were surrounded. It is interesting to note that Lieutenant Colonel G.M. Shcherbak was appointed brigade commander only on March 29. He replaced the ousted Lieutenant Colonel Makhno. The latter withdrew from the leadership of the battle and was removed by order of the corps commander. G.M. Before that Shcherbak was the chief of staff of the brigade. For the successful solution of the assigned task, the entire personnel of the 6th Guards. the mechanized corps was declared gratitude on behalf of the front commander. Colonel Vasily Ignatievich Koretsky received a high assessment of the first days of his tenure as commander of the mechanized corps. In the combat characteristics of the new commander of the 6th Guards. the mechanized corps was written: “Koretsky commanded the corps during three private operations to capture Neustadt, Neisse, Ratibor. In the battles he showed good organizational skills and fighting qualities. Brave. He knows how to organize a corps battle in difficult conditions. "

In general, I.S. Konev was dissatisfied with the development of events in the last days of March. He later recalled: “We continued to advance, but still extremely slowly. Day after day, stubborn battles were fought for the capture of small settlements, road junctions, heights and skyscrapers. The troops suffered heavy losses. This naturally caused a feeling of dissatisfaction. The operation was obviously proceeding in the wrong spirit, at the wrong pace, not at the level that we had the right to count on, based on our own experience, from our recent combat past. "

Indeed, the March offensives were difficult. The significant decrease in the number of equipment and personnel of the formations and the period of spring thaw, due to losses in the winter months, all influenced the pace of operations. A specific feature of the Upper Silesian operation was that the Sudetes lay behind the enemy. This limited the depth of strikes and, accordingly, the number of enemy formations surrounded in one operation. In fact, both encirclements passed "tightly" to the mountains. During the Upper Silesian offensive operation, the troops of the left wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front captured the southwestern part of Upper Silesia, surrounded and defeated five enemy divisions, and the rest of his forces were thrown back into the foothills of the Sudetenland. The losses of the enemy only by prisoners amounted to 18,518 soldiers and officers.

By April 2, as part of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps remained 3 tanks in the 16th Guards. mechanized brigade, 10 tanks in the 17th Guards. mechanized brigade, 5 IS-2 tanks in the 28th Guards. a heavy tank regiment and 5 tanks in the 95th motorcycle battalion. Another 4 cars remained in the 49th Guards. mechanized brigade that did not participate in the operation. In the 61st Guards. tank brigade of the 10th Guards. tank corps only 8 tanks remained. The total losses of the army of D.D. Lelyushenko in the second phase of the Upper Silesian operation are shown in the table.

table

LOSS OF TANKS AND SPGs of the 4th Guards. OF THE TANK ARMY IN THE PERIOD FROM MARCH 23 TO APRIL 2, 1945 AND THEIR DISTRIBUTION BY CAUSE OF DAMAGE

Most of the losses fell on the 5th Guards. mechanized corps. As noted in the report of the Department of Armored Supply and Repair of the 4th Guards. tank army, "the high percentage of vehicles irretrievably lost, especially in the Ratibor operation, is explained by the action of the army in mountainous terrain and partly due to insufficient skill in skillful maneuvering on the battlefield (when operating in mountainous terrain), which led to the failure of the tank." ... The main enemy of Soviet tanks was artillery (in this case, "artillery" should be understood not only as anti-tank guns, but also guns of tanks and self-propelled guns). This is due to the fact that the enemy of the formations of the army D.D. Lelyushenko were enemy tank divisions. They were armed with equipment, in particular the latest Panzerjaeger.IV / 70, capable of striking all types of Soviet tanks.

At the beginning of April, three corps of the 4th Guards, conducting the Upper Silesian operation. tank army and 7th Guards. the mechanized corps was withdrawn for replenishment and rest before the attack on Berlin. As a "legacy" from the Upper Silesian operation of the army of D.D. Lelyushenko got the 5th Guards. mechanized corps. The tank army became three-corps. In exchange for this acquisition, the 31st Panzer Corps remained in Silesia, starting the Vistula-Oder operation as part of the 1st Ukrainian Front, and ending the war in the Moravian-Ostrava operation as part of the 4th Ukrainian Front.

Discussion

In March 1945, the fronts operating in the Berlin direction carried out two operations, during which the advancing troops did not approach Berlin, but moved away from it. In the case of the 1st Belorussian Front, they retreated, advancing to the north, the 1st Ukrainian - to the south. The 2nd Belorussian Front, in the final stage of the operation, generally advanced to the east. The scheme of actions of the Soviet troops in Eastern Pomerania and Upper Silesia was similar. In both cases, a neighbor from the Berlin direction assisted the enemy who was stuck in an offensive on the defending front to the east. In the case of Eastern Pomerania, the 2nd Belorussian Front suffered a failure - its offensive, launched on February 10, developed without much success. In the case of Upper Silesia and the Moravian-Ostrava industrial region, the 4th Ukrainian Front was the lagging behind. To solve the problems of the lagging fronts, their neighbors aimed at Berlin were deployed to attack the flank and rear of the successfully defending German armies. In Eastern Pomerania, it was the 2nd Army, in Upper Silesia, the army group of Heinrici. The entry into battle of large forces from the Berlin direction immediately changed the situation in favor of the Soviet troops. The participation of tank armies especially revived the operation.

The East Pomeranian operation of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts can be assessed as generally successful. The enemy hanging over the flank of the 1st Belorussian Front was defeated or driven into the "camps of armed prisoners of war." On the contrary, the March offensives of the 1st and 4th Ukrainian fronts, with all the desire, cannot be assessed unequivocally positively. If the 1st Belorussian Front managed to align the line of contact with the enemy along the Oder from the Baltic to Frankfurt-on-Oder by the beginning of the Berlin operation, the 1st Ukrainian Front did not even have a bridgehead on the western bank of the Neisse. In addition, on the neck of I.S. Konev was left hanging ballast in the face of the extended left wing of the front, which had devoured two armies. He was also in charge of the besieged Breslau, which absorbed another army. Accordingly, less forces remained in the Berlin direction. Fewer forces remained not only in the calculation of the combined arms armies. The operation, with successes of a local nature, had a negative impact on the condition of the most valuable mechanized formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front. Having passed the Upper Silesian operation, the 5th and 7th Guards Mechanized Corps entered the battle for Berlin in ruins.

In the face of defeats on all fronts, local successes aroused violent delight in Hitler. General Gotthard Heinrici, who successfully defended against the 4th Ukrainian Front, was treated kindly by the Fuhrer. It was he who replaced Himmler on March 21 as commander of the Vistula Army Group, which was defending the Berlin sector. However, in his new position he had an opponent who was much more experienced and qualified than I.E. Petrov and L.Z. Mehlis. It should also be remembered that in Upper Silesia, Soviet and German troops solved different tasks. German troops defended a strategically important industrial area with the involvement of fairly large forces of mechanized formations. The 1st and 4th Ukrainian Fronts were solving the local problem of reducing the front line.

The offensives in the March mud seriously damaged the most valuable formations of the 1st Belorussian Front - the 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies. Both of them required urgent replenishment of people and equipment. But the most serious loss in the East Pomeranian operation was time. A synchronized offensive of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts on the Oder did not work out. After completing the defeat of the Danzig-Gdynian grouping of the enemy, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front in the period from 4 to 15 April 1945, fulfilling the directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 11 053, made a combined march of 250-350 km. When, by the end of April 16, the troops of K.K. Rokossovsky only occupied the starting position for the offensive, the 1st Belorussian Front was already fighting for the Seelow Heights shrouded in smoke.

East Pomeranian operation during the Second World War 1939-1945 - hostilities in Eastern Pomerania February 10 - April 4, 1945 1st Belarusian (Marshal G.K. Zhukov) and 2nd Belarusian (Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky) fronts. They were opposed by 28 divisions of Army Group "Vistula" under the command of SS Reichsfuehrer G. Himmler. The task of eliminating this grouping was initially assigned to the 2nd Belorussian Front, which launched an offensive on February 10. However, having advanced 60 km forward, the Soviet units got bogged down in the German defense and stopped the onslaught.

Meanwhile, the Germans tried to strike from Eastern Pomerania on the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front. On February 16, 1945, 6 German tank divisions launched an offensive from the Stargard area, trying to reach the rear of the units advancing on Berlin (see Vistula-Oder operation). In the early days, the Germans advanced 8-12 km, but could not break through the Soviet defenses. This blow forced the Soviet command to postpone the offensive on Berlin and to allocate part of the forces of the 1st Belorussian Front against the East Pomeranian grouping.

The strikes of the troops of both fronts from February 24 to March 5 proved to be more effective. On March 5, Soviet troops reached the Baltic Sea and cut the East Pomeranian grouping in two. Further, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front cleared the Baltic coast from the Kolberg to the lower reaches of the Oder, and the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, turning to the northeast, captured Danzig (Gdansk) on March 30. The remnants of the German troops were blockaded east of Danzig (they held out on the coast until May 9, 1945). After the liquidation of the East Pomeranian grouping, conditions were created for the Berlin operation. The losses of the Red Army in the East Pomeranian operation amounted to over 225 thousand people.

Used materials from the book: Nikolay Shefov. Battles of Russia. Military history library. M., 2002.

The East Pomeranian operation in 1945, an offensive operation of the troops of the 2nd and 1st Belorussian fronts in the Great Patriotic War, carried out on February 10 -4 anr. with the assistance of part of the forces of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet (KBF). As a result of the successful January offensive of 1945 (see Vistula-Oder operation 1945), the Sov. troops went to the river. Oder (Odra) and captured bridgeheads on its west. shore. (See the map on the insert to pp. 64-65.) ; 5 brigades, 8 battle groups and 5 garrisons of fortresses; commands. G. Himmler) managed to hold Vost. Pomerania. Between 1st and 2nd Belorus, fronts by the beginning of February. 1945 the rupture of St. 100 km. German fasc. The command was preparing with the forces of the Vistula Army Group to deal a blow from the north to the temper and wing of the 1st Byelorussian troops and the front, and to crush them by sowing. R. Warta, to gain a foothold in Pomerania and consolidate his position in Berlin. direction. The rate of owls. Top. Taking into account the current situation, the High Command freed the 2nd Belorussian Front (commander Marshal of the Soviet Union K. K. Rokossovsky) from further participation in the East Prussian operation in 1945 and ordered him to defeat the East Pomeranian. group of pr-ka, master Vost. Pomerania from Danzig (Gdansk) to Stettin (Szczecin) and reach the coast of the Baltic m. Troops of the center and the lion. wing of the 2nd Beloruss, the front, with the assistance of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet (teams, comm. V. F. Tributs), launched an offensive on February 10. from the bridgehead on the Vistula sowing. Bromberg (Bydgoszcz) in the general direction of Stettin. In difficult conditions of muddy roads and wooded-lake terrain, overcoming the fierce resistance of the enemy, who relied on strong and deep echeloners. defense, they are by the end of 19 Feb. managed to advance to the dep. directions up to 70 km, but were stopped at the turn of Gnev, Chersk, Chojnice, Rartsebur (Okonek). 16 Feb pr-k (6 divisions) inflicted a counterattack south of Stargard, pushed the troops of the 47th Army 8-12 km and captured the cities. Pyritz (Pyrice), Ban (Bang). It became obvious that the forces of the 2nd Belorussian front alone were not enough to defeat the Eastern Pomeranian. grouping up-ka, which already consisted of 29 infantry. Zhukov) and the 1st Army of the Polish Army (commanded by General Division S.G. Poplavsky). Zempelburg (Sempolno) in the direction of Kozlin (Koszalin) and 1st Beloruss, the front - from the Arnswalde (Choschpo) district to Kolberg (Kolobzhsg), go to the Baltic Sea, cut the East Pomeranian. grouping, and then destroy it in parts. The Red Banner Baltic Fleet was supposed to violate the sea with active actions of aviation, submarines and torpedo boats. messages pr-ka in the south. parts of the Baltic Sea, as well as facilitate the land. troops in the seizure of the coast of the Baltic Sea from the mouth of the river. Vistula to the mouth of the river. Oder. Despite the complexity of the situation, the troops of the fronts prepared for the offensive on time. With a slight overall superiority of owls. the command managed to create the necessary superiority in the directions of Ch. blows. So, in the 2nd Belorus, the front, strengthened on the eve of the offensive by the 19th Army and the 3rd Guards. tank corps, in the direction of the main attack in a strip 17 km wide ow. the troops had superiority: almost 3 times in infantry, 2 times in tanks, 3 times in guns. When carrying out the party-political. work, special attention was paid to the creation of a high offensive in the troops. impulse, swiftness and decisiveness of action in the depth of the defense of the pr-ka. The importance of this operation for ensuring the offensive of the Sov. troops in the Berlin direction. 24 Feb 2nd Belorussian, front (2nd shock, 65, 49, 70, 19th combined arms. And 4th air. Army) went on the offensive. 1st Belorussian, front, having created on the right wing a shock group consisting of the 3rd shock, 61st, 47th combined-arms, 1st and 2nd Guards. tank armies, 1st Army of the Polish Army, launched an offensive on March 1. Breaking through the defenses and breaking the stubborn resistance of the pr-ka, owls. By March 5, the troops reached the Baltic Sea in the Kozlin and Kolberg districts. East Pomeranian the enemy grouping was dismembered. Having reached the coast, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian front launched an offensive in the north-east. direction, and the 1st Byelorussian, front - in the north-west. During the operation, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, with its aviation, submarines, boats and torpedo boats, carried out a blockade from the sea. grouping pr-ka in the Danzig region, acted on the sea. communications in the south. parts of the Baltic m. 16th and 4th air. armies, aviation of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet and the 4th Polish mixed air division of the Polish Army inflicted a massir. strikes against troops and military. objects pr-ka. By March 10, units of the 1st Beloruss, front basically completed the liberation of the Baltic Sea coast to the mouth of the river. Oder, except for the Kolberg district, where a large garrison of the pr-ka defended with great ferocity. The operation to destroy it was entrusted to the 1st Army of the Polish Army, which successfully coped with its task and captured the Kolberg fortress on March 18. 2nd Belorussian, front with the 1st Guards transferred to him. tank. army successfully advanced to the Danzig Bay. On March 28, his troops after the brutalization. battles occupied Gdynia, and on March 30 - Danzig, completing V.-P. O. Remains of the 2nd German the armies blocked in the Gdynia region, on April 4 were finally defeated and captured by the troops of the 19th Army. A grouping of pr-ka pressed to the sea in the region of east. Danzig surrendered on May 9, 1945. Liquidation of a large German-Fash grouping. troops in Vost. Pomerania was of great importance. With the accomplishment of this task, the threat of a flank attack on the Sov. troops advancing towards the Oder in the Berlin direction. Vost was released. Pomerania, returned Polish to the people of Boe Polsk. Pomorie with major cities and important ports. The pr-k suffered serious losses in manpower and equipment. St. 21 divisions and 8 brigades were defeated, of which 6 divisions and 3 brigades were destroyed. 2nd Belorussian, the front captured St. 63.5 thousand German soldiers and officers, captured approx. 680 tanks and assault guns, 3470 op. and mortars, 431 aircraft, and many other weapons. The exit of the owls. troops to the coast of the Baltic Sea in the area from Danzig to Stettin Bay reliably provided the flank of Ch. strategist of the group operating in the Berlin direction; expanded the basing system of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, To-ry got the opportunity to more effectively Conduct a blockade from the sea surrounded. groupings pr-ka on the Kurland Peninsula and east. Danzig. Defeat him. Army Group Vistula made it difficult for the pr-ku to implement his plans for organizing a defense on the approaches to Berlin. After the completion of V.-P. O. freed 10 armies, to-rye began to regroup on the Berlin direction. Highly appreciating the merits of the Polish troops in this operation, Sov. the command awarded the 1st Polish Tank Brigade with the Order of the Red Banner. A number of connections and parts of owls. and Polish. troops were given the honorary title of Kolberg and Pomeranian.

N. A. Svetlishin

Used materials of the Soviet military encyclopedia in 8 volumes, volume 2.

Literature:

Zavyalov A.S., Kalyadin T.E. East Pomeranian offensive operation of the Soviet troops. Feb. - March 1945. M., 1960.

East Pomeranian operation

Plans are changing

The idea of ​​turning the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front from Berlin to the north appeared even before the first successes of the German offensive south of Stargard and the release of Arnswalde. The day before the start of the "Solstice" on February 15, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief demanded from the front commander to report on his views on further actions. In the late evening of February 16, Zhukov sent a report to Stalin with a plan for a private operation of the troops of the right wing of the front in the Stettin direction. The main blow to this plan was supposed to be delivered by the forces of the 61st Army, 2nd Tank Army, 7th Guards. cavalry and 9th tank corps in the northern direction in order to interrupt communications to the west of the Pomeranian grouping of enemy forces. The 1st Polish Army and two rifle corps of the 3rd Shock Army were involved in the auxiliary strike. Thus, it was supposed to repeat the same manipulation with the troops of the left wing of Army Group Vistula that had just been done with the enemy's East Prussian grouping. Zhukov promised the Supreme Commander-in-Chief that the front troops could go over to the offensive on 19 February. The planned duration of the offensive was 6-7 days.

Heinz Guderian and Walter Wenck (right) at work.

Even before the approval of the submitted plan by the Headquarters of G.K. Zhukov gave preliminary orders to the front troops by directive No. 00324 / op of February 16, 1945. It, in particular, prescribed: “61 armies with 2 Guards. TA in the morning of 19.2.45 go on the offensive and striking in the directions: Stargard, Gollnov and Pyritz, Altdam, throw the enemy back to the north and on 21-22.45 take over the border: Massov, Gollnov, Altdamm, Grothfenhagen in order to cut communications of the Pomeranian group of enemy forces in the west. Capture Stettin under favorable conditions. " The main blow was delivered by the main forces of the 61st Army with the support of the 12th Guards. tank corps of the 2nd Guards. Panzer Army to Stargard. The 61st Army was reinforced with artillery weapons withdrawn from the 47th Army. To strike to the north, the 8th Guards were also involved. mechanized corps of the 1st Guards. tank army. He was supposed to clear the eastern bank of the Oder from the enemy.

The idea of ​​isolating the enemy grouping in Pomerania with a strike in the direction of the Baltic Sea in mid-February was simply in the air. The day before the beginning of the "Solstice", February 15, 1945, K.K. Rokossovsky put forward proposals designed to galvanize the front offensive, mired in positional battles. The commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front sent a report to the General Staff, in which he proposed to shift efforts to another direction:

“Based on the front's cash, I believe that 19 A and 3 Guards. It is more expedient to use it on the left wing of the front with the task, deploying on the Schlochau, Ratzebur line, to advance in the general direction of Baldenberg, Bublitz, Kezlin in order to cut the enemy's Pomeranian grouping with access to the Baltic Sea coast on the front of Lake Jamundersee, Kohlberg ".

K.K. Rokossovsky named 22-23 February as an approximate date for the start of the offensive, since the approach to the deployment line of the 19th Army and the 3rd Guards. the tank corps needed to make a 160-kilometer march. To accomplish the task set earlier, the front commander asked to strengthen his left wing with two combined-arms armies with two tank corps and provide 80 thousand reinforcements for rifle divisions and 20 thousand people for special forces.

On the evening of February 17, the Supreme Command Headquarters directives No. 11024 and 11026 approved the plans for operations in Pomerania presented by the commanders of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts. As a replacement for those requested by K.K. Rokossovsky of two combined-arms armies G.K. Zhukov was ordered: “The 47th Army and the 1st Guards. to have a tank army in reserve closer to the right wing of the front in order to use them, if necessary, at the junction with the 2nd Belorussian Front. " In connection with the new tasks of the fronts, the dividing line between them was re-cut; by decision of the Headquarters, it passed along the line of Bromberg, Flederborn, Neustättin, Kohlberg. The defeat of the main forces of the 11th enemy army G.K. Zhukov proposed to carry out within five to seven days, and the cleansing of the entire territory of Pomerania to the west of the meridian Neustettin, Curlin, Kohlberg to the river. Oder - within 14-16 days.

Initially, the Stavka accepted the proposed by G.K. Zhukov on February 19. However, in connection with the beginning of the German offensive, the date of the start of the operation was shifted. As it was recorded in the combat log of the 2nd Guards. tank army: "On the basis of this directive, the commander of the army at 13.00 17.2.45 gave the army troops combat order No. 09 / op, but the implementation of this order was suspended by active actions of the enemy." On the originally appointed day, February 19, part of the 12th Guards. tank and 9 guards. rifle corps fought heavy defensive battles, and there could be no question of going over to the offensive. In addition, a more powerful blow from the Kallis, Stargard line on the flank and rear of the armies operating in the Berlin direction was expected. Under these conditions G.K. Zhukov decided to go over to the defensive on the entire front of the armies of the right wing in order to repel this blow. In the testimony of the prisoners, there were reports of the arrival of the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler division at the front, that is, there were reasons to believe that the 6th SS Panzer Army would still be involved in the Berlin direction. Accordingly, over the next 5–6 days, that is, approximately until February 25–26, the troops of the front's right wing were supposed to bleed the enemy's attacking formations with defensive battles, and then go over to the offensive themselves. As a result, the 2nd Belorussian Front was supposed to go on the offensive on February 24, and the 1st Belorussian Front on March 1.

To repel a possible strike from the north, the troops of the 1st Guards. the tank army was concentrated in the Berlinchen area and southeast of the city. They were tasked with covering the directions to Landsberg and Drizen (30 km south and southeast of Arnswalde). After the situation was defused - Arnswalde was evacuated - the corps of Katukov's army had to go out to the starting area for a new offensive in the period from February 25 to February 28 by night transitions. The troops of the 2nd Guards Tank Army, which still continued to engage in stubborn battles with the XXXIX enemy tank corps in the area south of Stargard, were to surrender their combat areas to rifle formations withdrawing to this direction, and by February 27, concentrate in the Arnswalde area.

Rokossovsky comes alone

Meanwhile, a battle unfolded on the left wing of the K.K. Rokossovsky. The march of the troops of the 19th Army into the assigned offensive zone was fraught with great difficulties. On February 20, 1945, due to the fact that the troops of the 19th Army were late in entering their offensive zone and therefore could not timely take over combat areas and replace the units of the army of the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front operating there, K.K. Rokossovsky was forced to urgently move the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps to this sector. The Cavalry Corps was ordered to advance to the Linde area by forced march and by 24 o'clock on February 20, change the formations and units of the right-flank army of the 1st Belorussian Front, occupy the designated area and firmly defend it. By the end of February 23, the troops of the 19th Army had replaced the left-flank units of the 70th Army and parts of the 3rd Shock Army and occupied the initial areas for the offensive.

The band of the 19th Army in the upcoming offensive was 17 km, while the total width of the band of the 2nd Belorussian Front was 212 km. The operational formation of the 19th Army for the offensive was envisaged in two echelons: two rifle corps in the first echelon and one in the second echelon. The battle order of the corps of the first echelon of the army was adopted for the right-flank corps in two echelons, for the left-flank - in three echelons. In the section of the breakthrough, which was equal to 10 km, the average density of artillery reached 152 guns and mortars (from 75 mm caliber and above). There were no direct support tanks for the infantry. The 19th Army's offensive operation was planned in two stages. The first stage included the breakthrough of the enemy's defense, the destruction of its opposing units and the capture of the Fletenstein-Neustättin line. The time for completing the tasks of the first stage is two days, the rate of advance is 20-25 km per day. At this stage, it was planned to introduce the 3rd Guards into the breakthrough. tank corps, reinforced by one rifle division at the expense of the corps of the second echelon. The second stage included the defeat of the enemy's operational reserves and repelling possible counterattacks by enemy infantry and tanks, reaching the coast of the Baltic Sea and turning the main army forces for an eastward attack on the city of Gdynia. The time to complete tasks at this stage is two days. The planned rate of advance is 30–35 km. The depth of the entire operation was 114 km, the average planned rate of advance was 25-30 km per day.

Destroyed tank "Panther" of the 10th SS Panzer Division "Frundsberg". East Pomerania, February 1945

The 18th Mountain Corps of the 2nd Army defended itself in the direction planned for the 19th Army's offensive. It consisted of the 32nd Infantry Division, removed from Courland, the Ax group (remnants of the 15th Latvian SS Division), the SS Nederland regiment, various training units and the 33rd SS Charlemagne Division (1st French SS) as a backup in the second line.

On the morning of February 24, the operation began. The 19th Army went on the offensive after forty minutes of artillery preparation. On the very first day, it moved 10–12 km forward and expanded the breakthrough section to 20 km. The 3rd Guards operated on the left flank of the army. cavalry corps. However, the battles of the first day showed that rifle formations without tanks of direct support of the infantry were not advancing fast enough, and this could affect the implementation of the operation plan. Taking this into account, the commander of the troops of the 19th Army decided to bring the 3rd Panzer Corps of General A.P. Panfilov (274 tanks and SAU) somewhat earlier than planned.

By the decision of the corps commander, the formations were entered into battle along two routes. The battle formation of the corps was built in two echelons: in the first echelon there were two tank brigades with reinforcements, in the second echelon there was one motorized rifle brigade. Each tank brigade of the first echelon was assigned one rifle regiment of the 313rd rifle division for reinforcement. At 11 o'clock in the morning on February 25, the formations of the tank corps went over to the offensive. The vanguard detachments of the 3rd and 18th Guards Tank Brigades with amphibious assault forces on tanks, overtaking the infantry at this line, rushed forward. Having entered the operational space, units of the 3rd Guards Tank Corps, knocking down the enemy cover detachments, began to rapidly develop the offensive. During the day of the battle, the tank corps advanced to a depth of 40 km and by the morning of February 26, the vanguard detachment of the 3rd Guards Tank Brigade captured Baldenberg. At this time, the 18th Guards Tank Brigade, having defeated a strong enemy defense center in the Schönau area, captured this city and station.

However, the offensive of the 19th Army, although it accelerated, still did not reach the planned pace. This was due, in particular, to the fact that parts of the tank corps operated in a relatively narrow strip and in one direction, and therefore large enemy strongholds remained in its rear, the resistance of which reduced the rate of advance of rifle formations. In addition, the units of the 19th Army that fought on a calm sector of the front in Karelia did not have combat experience comparable to the veterans of the western direction. As a result, by the end of February 25 (that is, in two days of the operation) the army's troops had advanced only 20-25 km, at a planned rate of advance of 20-25 km per day. The troops of the 70th Army, advancing to the right of the 19th Army, in two days of fighting had a slight advance within 4-6 km.

After a number of measures were taken to streamline the command and control of the 19th Army and the withdrawal of some formations to new directions, the offensive resumed in the morning of February 26. Meanwhile, the 3rd Guards Tank Corps captured the settlements of Sidov and Poret with advanced units, and soon Draven and Bublitz fell under the attacks of corps units. Having defeated the enemy garrisons in Schlochau, Barenwald and Hammerstein, the troops of the 19th Army advanced 22 km into the depths of Eastern Pomerania during the day of the battle and expanded the breakthrough along the front to 60 km.

However, the pace of advance of the infantry was still far behind the tankers. The 3rd Guards Tank Corps, which had advanced far to the north-west and was at a distance of 30-40 km from the rifle formations of the 19th Army, could find itself in a very difficult position and could undergo a flank attack from the south-west, where the enemy had a strong a grouping of mobile troops of the 3rd Tank Army, defending against the troops of the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front. In addition, the offensive of the shock group of Rokossovsky's troops into the formation of the 2nd German army was driven into a rather narrow wedge with initially weak flanks. Despite the fact that it was 1945, the danger of flank attacks was still great. On the left flank, the 3rd Guards was involved. cavalry corps advancing on Neu-Stettin. To protect the right flank K.K. Rokossovsky ordered the troops of the 70th Army, together with the right-flank formations of the 40th Rifle Corps of the 19th Army, to capture the Prehlau region by the morning of February 27.

One should not think that Rokossovsky was afraid of some kind of phantoms. Flank attacks on the units of the 19th Army and the 3rd Guards, which had penetrated to Bublitz. Panzer Corps were planned by the command of Army Group Vistula, and at the end of February, activities began to gather forces for a counterstrike. The formations were assembled by dismantling the shock groups of the "Solstice", which had already lost its relevance. To strike on the right flank of the 19th Army, a grouping of troops was assembled under the control of the VII Panzer Corps of General Mortimer von Kessel. It consisted of the 7th Panzer Division from the left flank of the 2nd Army, the 4th SS Polizai Division, transported from the Stargard area, and the 226th Assault Gun Brigade. To strike on the left flank of the 19th Army, the so-called corps group von Tettau (named after its commander, Lieutenant General Hans von Tettau) was created. It included: Panzer Division "Holstein", infantry divisions "Pommerland" and "Berwalde". The Holstein Division was hastily formed in February 1945 from the 233rd Reserve Panzer Division. It was relatively small in number: on February 15, it included 7028 people (195 officers, 25 officials, 1427 non-commissioned officers and 5441 privates, including 198 Khivi) and 25 Pz.IV tanks in one three-company battalion. Artillery "Holstein" consisted of two divisions, one of which was armed with twelve 88-mm anti-aircraft guns instead of howitzers. The von Tettau group and the VII Panzer Corps were to strike in converging directions and cut off the parts of the 3rd Guards that had escaped forward. Panzer Corps and the 19th Army. It was to direct the actions of the X SS corps and the von Tettau group that it was originally planned to use the command of Erhard Routh's 3rd Panzer Army.

The resulting situation forced the commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front to temporarily suspend the offensive of the tank corps and pull up the main forces of the 19th Army to the line he had captured. The front stopped when only about 50 km remained to the Baltic Sea coast. On February 27, 1945, the troops of the 19th army of the front, stopping at the lines reached the day before, put themselves in order, part of the forces of their right flank, in cooperation with their neighbor on the right (units of the 70th Army), fought an offensive battle in the Prehlau region, while repulsing numerous counterattacks by the enemy. 3rd Guards. the cavalry corps blockaded Neu-Stettin.

In principle, when the troops of K.K. Rokossovsky, the task assigned to the front by the Headquarters back on February 8 was partially completed. However, the armies of the right wing and the center of the 2nd Belorussian Front were unsuccessful during February 24 and 25 and fought on their previous lines. Accordingly, the 2nd Shock Army, reinforced by the 8th Guards. tank corps, continued to fight, being divided into two groups: besieging Graudenz and occupying a sector of the front in front of the 2nd enemy army. The 65th and 49th armies advanced 6-10 km, the 70th army 25-35 km.

"Royal Tigers" of the 503rd SS heavy tank battalion. East Pomerania, Arnswalde region, February 1945

On the last day of February, the commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front set tasks to the troops subordinate to him that were more related to consolidating what had been achieved and protecting the flanks than aimed at advancing to the coveted coast of the Baltic Sea. Rokossovsky was clearly waiting for the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front to go on the offensive. On February 28, the 3rd Guards Tank Corps, stopped by K.K. Rokossovsky in the Bublitsa area, organized a perimeter defense in this area. The 8th Mechanized Corps of Major General of Tank Forces A.N. Firsanovich was concentrated in the Chojnice area with the task of supporting the offensive of the 70th Army. By the end of February 28, 1945, the troops of the 70th Army advanced 10 km and broke the enemy's resistance in the Prehlau area, eliminating the threat to the flank of the 19th Army. Despite the loss of 2,529 people in February 1945, the 4th Panzer Division, which cemented the German defenses in the Chojnice area, was supported in a high completeness. As of March 1, it included 12,249 people out of 14,968 in the state, 13 Pz.IV tanks, 19 Pz.V Panther and Jagdpanther self-propelled guns, 3 Sturmgeshutz self-propelled guns, 4 PzJag.IV self-propelled guns, 230 armored personnel carriers , armored vehicles and command tanks. The equipment completeness of the 4th Panzer Division even increased in comparison with February 1, 1945: there were more armored personnel carriers, machine guns, artillery pieces and vehicles. The division retained the structure with two tank battalions, one of the four motorized infantry battalions was completely transferred to an armored personnel carrier. In short, the Germans managed to maintain their tank formations in good shape until a certain point.

At the same time, Soviet intelligence uncovered the concentration of the 7th Panzer Corps' strike group in the Rummelsburg area. On the last day of February K.K. Rokossovsky assigned the 40th Guards Rifle Corps of the 19th Army the task of changing the direction of its offensive from the north to the northeast. The corps was ordered to go to the Rummelsburg area and, having captured this city, have at least one rifle division with forward detachments on the Georgendorf-Voknin line northeast of the city. Thus, it was supposed to defeat the grouping assembled by the enemy for a counterattack before it goes over to the offensive. The commander of the 19th Army was ordered to reinforce the 40th Guards Rifle Corps with cannon, howitzer and anti-tank artillery. Covering the left flank was limited to the fact that the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps captured the city of Neu-Stettin.

As we can see, even having introduced a fresh army into the battle, the 2nd Belorussian Front did not achieve a decisive result. The defeat of the left wing of Army Group Vistula in Pomerania could only be achieved by joint actions of two fronts. Even before the transition to the offensive of Rokossovsky's troops, on February 22, Zhukov, with operational directives No. front of the task of preparing and conducting an offensive operation. Compared with the version of the offensive plan in Pomerania submitted to the Headquarters on February 16, significant changes followed by February 22. According to the corrected decision of the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, the main blow was delivered by two combined arms (61st and 3rd shock armies) and two tank armies. In addition, two auxiliary strikes were delivered (47th Army and 1st Polish Army), their offensive was to begin on the second day of the operation. The 3rd Shock Army was reinforced by the 9th Panzer Corps from the front reserve, and the 47th Army received the 1st Mechanized Corps from the 2nd Guards for reinforcement. tank army. The commanders were ordered to submit detailed plans of operations for approval by 25 February. According to the report submitted by Zhukov to the Supreme Commander a week earlier (February 16), it was supposed to involve only the 2nd Guards. tank army, the main blow to be delivered by the 61st army, and the auxiliary - by the 3rd shock army. According to the new plan, the 3rd Shock Army became one of the two armies in the direction of the main attack, and its success was to be developed by the 1st Guards. tank army. The 47th Army and the 1st Army of the Polish Army became "pinned".

The preparation of the operation was accompanied by appropriate precautions:

"eight. I give permission to acquaint the chief of staff, chief of the operational department of the army headquarters and the commander of the army artillery. The rest of the performers set tasks within the limits of their duties. Not to give written orders to regimental commanders, to set tasks orally in two or three days. In the service of the rear, do not give general directives, confine ourselves to verbal orders.

9. To explain to all personnel of the army that our task is stubborn defense for a long time. Ml. to the command staff and the Red Army men to announce the task for the offensive 2 hours before the attack. "

The impending offensive was to set in motion an almost 200-km front occupied by the armies of the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front. The regrouping of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front was completed by the end of February 28. As a result of regrouping on a front of 250 km, thirty-two rifle divisions, four cavalry divisions, four tank corps, two mechanized corps with reinforcement units were assembled. Eighteen rifle divisions, one cavalry division, four tank corps and one mechanized corps were concentrated in the 75 km wide striking group of the front. Here 70-75% of the artillery units and formations allocated for the operation were collected. The general artillery preparation involved the artillery of the tank armies. The average density per rifle division in the direction of the main attack was 4 km, with an average operational density of 8 km per rifle division. The manning level of infantry formations of the 1st Belorussian Front was traditionally low for 1945. The average number of a rifle division in the 3rd Shock Army was 4,900 people, the 61st Army - 4,300 people, and the 47th Army - also 4,300 people. Each of these three armies had nine rifle divisions. Only the divisions of the 1st Army of the Polish Army (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 6th Infantry Divisions) were distinguished by a relatively high completeness - an average of 7400 people. In the 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies on March 1, there were 1,067 tanks and self-propelled guns.

Commander of the 10th SS Panzer Division, SS Brigadeführer Heinz Harmel.

The January offensive and the February battles in Pomerania significantly reduced the capabilities of the 2nd Guards. tank army. The 12th Guards suffered the most. tank corps. According to the "Information on the state of parts and connections of the 2nd Guards. TA at 13.00 on February 28, 1945 " in the ranks in the corps there were 77 T-34s, 12 SU-85s, 5 SU-76s and 12 IS-2s. Another 124 tanks were under repair, most of them overhauled. In the 48th Guards. the tank brigade, which was holding back the onslaught of the Frundsberg on Varnitz, had only 6 T-34 tanks left on the move. The 9th Guards were in somewhat better condition. tank corps. According to the same certificate dated February 28 at 13:00, in the corps' combat formations, there were 120 T-34s, 1 Valentine Mk.IX, 18 ISU-122, 7 SU-85 and 2 ° CU-76. 35 tanks were under repair. Tank army M.E. Katukova suffered much smaller losses in the January and February battles and as of March 1, 1945, she had 23 IS-2, 401 T-34, 11 ISU-122, 32 SU-85, 28 SU-76 and 83 SU-57 in the ranks. ... A more significant problem was the tank's operating hours. 62.8% of the T-34 tanks had a consumption of 180-200 hours, 22% - 225. These figures came close to the backbone of the tank fleet of the army of M.Ye. Katukov to a massive breakdown for technical reasons.

Units of the III SS Panzer and X Army Corps defended in front of the front of the 3rd Shock and 61st Armies, which dealt the main blow. In the offensive zone of the 61st Army, the following were defended: the 27th SS Volunteer Division Langemark, the 28th Wallonia Volunteer Division, and one regiment each from the Nordland and Nederland tank-grenadier divisions. During that period, the units of these two divisions acted separately. So, the 24th tank-grenadier regiment "Nordland" defended itself in isolation from other parts of the division south of Stargard. In the offensive zone of the 3rd Shock Army, the 5th Jaeger Division of the X SS Army Corps defended.

On March 1, after a 50-minute artillery and aviation preparation, the troops of the 3rd Shock and 61st Armies of the 1st Belorussian Front went over to the offensive. By 10.00 in the morning, the troops of the armies captured the main position of the enemy's defense and successfully advanced in the northern and northwestern directions. Further, from the side of Zhukov, followed the typical "konevschina", that is, the introduction of tank armies into battle, and not into a breakthrough. In the zone of action of the 3rd Shock Army, to develop the success, the 1st Guards. tank army. The forward detachments of the formations of the army of M.E. Katukov (1st and 44th Guards Tank Brigades with reinforcement units), 15 minutes before the end of the artillery preparation, began their advance to the forward edge. This ensured their entry into the combat formations of rifle formations an hour after the start of the movement and already at a depth of 2 km beyond the front edge of the enemy's defense. The advance detachments of the 1st Panzer Army, stepping up the infantry strikes, entered the battle. Developing the offensive in conjunction with rifle formations, the advance detachments soon broke away from the infantry and rushed forward. The main forces of the 1st Panzer Army, starting to advance from the initial area at 14.00 on March 1, at about 17.00 passed the infantry battle formations, overtaking the rifle formations. With a powerful blow, they finally broke the enemy's resistance and advanced 20-25 km in depth. The 11th Guards reached the greatest success. a tank corps moving along the road: its vanguard detachment reached the outskirts of Nerenberg by 2200 hours. Moving along country roads along the parallel route of the 8th Guards. the mechanized corps traveled a significantly shorter distance.

As a result of the onset of the thaw, battles took place mainly along the roads. As noted in the report drawn up at the headquarters of the 1st Guards. tank army, following the results of the operation, "movement on the side of the road, and even more so off the road, was impossible." In the conditions of constrained maneuver, mining of roads and forest blockages became a significant problem. Corps of the 1st Guards. tank army on March 2 changed places: 1st Guards. tank brigade of the 8th guards. mechanized corps took the lead, 10 km ahead of the 44th Guards. a tank brigade, which started fighting on the outskirts of Vangerin by 18.00. Parts of the army of M.E. Katukova from the woods came to the "Reichsstrasse No. 162".

Since on March 2 the mobile units of the 2nd Belorussian Front reached the Baltic Sea in the Keslin area, there was a danger of a breakthrough in the western direction of the units of the 2nd army of the enemy. In order to prevent such enemy actions, Katukov decided to deploy the 8th Guards. a mechanized corps with a front to the east, occupying the junctions of the Bellegarde and Kerlin roads.

A similar scenario initially unfolded events in the zone of the 61st Army of P.A. Belova. According to the initial decision, it was planned to put mobile formations into battle in the second half of March 1 from the Falkenwalde, Rafenstein, Schlagentin line. Since this milestone was not reached, the 2nd Guards. The tank army was ordered, together with the rifle formations of the right flank of the 61st Army, to complete the breakthrough of the enemy's defenses. By 14:00 on March 1, not only the forward detachments of tank formations, but also their main forces were deployed and entered the battle. However, the offensive developed here somewhat worse than in the zone of the 3rd Shock Army. On the first day of the operation, it was not possible to complete the breakthrough of the enemy's defense. Rifle and tank formations of the 61st and 2nd Guards. During the day of the battle, the tank armies captured only the enemy's main defense zone, advancing to a depth of 5–7 km.

Interim commander of the III SS Panzer Corps, Lieutenant General Martin Unrein.

The commander of the III SS Panzer Corps Unrein in the face of a powerful blow from the Soviet troops saw no other solution than to gradually bend the left flank of his corps. It was supposed to move away from Ritz on Freewald, holding Stargard. Further Unrein decided to try to stay on the line "Reichsstrasse No. 158" (Stargard - Freewalde). Also, after identifying the direction of the main attack, it was replaced by a fusilier battalion and withdrawn to the corps reserve of the 24th tank-grenadier regiment of the "Nordland" division. However, it became more and more difficult to maintain command of the troops. The rapid penetration of the advancing tanks and infantry into the depths led to the disorganization of the German troops: the supply columns did not find "their" tanks and self-propelled guns, and sometimes even fell under the blows of Soviet tanks. On the morning of March 2, the advancing Soviet units reached Reichsstrasse No. 158. For a counterattack in the Vosberg area, all the remaining tanks of the 11th Nordland Panzer Regiment and the Royal Tigers of the 503rd SS Heavy Tank Battalion were brought in. This counterattack temporarily halted the offensive.

The 10th SS Panzer Division "Frundsberg", which was withdrawn from Eastern Pomerania under the command of the 9th Army of Büsse, was returned to the battle again. Initially, it was supposed to use the division in the Keslin area to prevent the breakthrough of Soviet tanks to the Baltic Sea. However, the division was soon re-aimed at the zone of the III SS Panzer Corps and disembarked in the area of ​​Massov, Plate and Naugard.

The problem of lagging behind the second shock grouping of the front (2nd Guards Tank and 61st Armies) G.K. Zhukov decided very simply. To the commander of the troops of the 2nd Guards. tank army S.I. Bogdanov was ordered, covered by part of the forces from the front, with the main forces to bypass the fortified positions by deep maneuver and strike at the flank and rear of the defending enemy grouping. Fulfilling these instructions of the front commander, the troops of the tank army carried out a maneuver through the offensive zone of the deeper advancing neighboring 3rd Shock Army, bypassing the flank of the opposing enemy. Further, the tankers attacked Naugard on the flank and rear of the III SS Panzer Corps, which was defending the front of the 61st Army. The courageous maneuver brought success. Although the SS men were still able to hold Stargard and Freenwalde on March 3, the front between them and north of Freenwalde collapsed. The German command decided to form a new front along the Stargard-Mass line. Thus, the front of the III SS Panzer Corps turned 90 degrees: if earlier its line went from east to west, now it went from north to south.

By the end of March 4, the troops of the 2nd Guards. Panzer army engaged in battles for Naugard, developing part of the forces to attack the Gollnov. The enemy's advance to the Naugard area and to the area between Naugard and the Frundsberg SS Mass Division was already too late. On March 5, Naugard was cleared of the enemy. The defeated units of the III SS Panzer Corps began to withdraw to the west and northwest. In pursuit of them, the forces of the 61st Army advanced more than 30 km in depth in three days and occupied Stargard on March 4. However, the resistance of the III SS Panzer Corps forced to adjust the plans for the use of the 2nd Guards. tank and 61st armies. In directive No. 00362 / op of February 28 G.K. Zhukov aimed these two armies on an offensive in the northeastern direction. 2nd Guards. the tank army was given the task: "with an exit to the Freienwalde, Rossow, Schöneber region, continue the offensive in the general direction of Naugard, Goltsov, Kammin." Tank army S.I. Bogdanova was supposed to reach the coast of the Baltic Sea and take positions on the eastern shore of the Stettin harbor, blocking the "Reichstrasse No. 111" (at Wollin) and "Reichsstrasse No. 165" (at Divenov on the coast). The 61st Army was to take positions from the southern flank of the 2nd Guards. Panzer Army to Altdamme. However, the tankers of the 2nd Guards. the tank army was not destined to send bottles of seawater as reports, as their colleagues from the 1st Panzer Army did. Army S.I. Bogdanov and P.A. Belova were deployed to the west and had to defeat the main strike group "Solstice" on the eastern bank of the Oder.

The turn of the two armies to the west soon influenced the development of the operation as a whole. In the zone of the 3rd Shock Army, events initially developed in accordance with directives No. 00343 / op and 00362 / op of the front headquarters. Soviet troops successfully broke into the defense of the enemy's 5th Jaeger Division. Unlike the mechanized formations of Unrein's corps, the infantry could not effectively counter the Soviet offensive. The formations of Katukov's tank army, which had escaped into the operational space, were rapidly advancing in a northern direction, moving further and further away from Berlin. While the 8th Mechanized Corps gradually turned its front to the east, its neighbor moved north. 45th Guards. tank brigade of the 11th guards. tank corps A.Kh. Babadzhanyan captured the southwestern outskirts of Kolberg by 12:00 on March 4. At 0900 on March 5, units of the SS Charlemagne division were driven out of the Bellegarde road junction. The ground communications of the German 2nd Army, which stood on the path of the 2nd Belorussian Front's offensive into Pomerania, were finally intercepted.

Ironically, about a month before the described events in Germany, the film by director Feith Harlan "Kohlberg" about the defense of the city during the Napoleonic wars was released. This was the last, and color, film of the Third Reich. One of the scriptwriters was Joseph Goebbels. The film was shot for two years, and its screening began on January 30, 1945. However, in life it turned out quite differently from the movie screen.

The fire is conducted by a 105-mm light field howitzer of the 4th SS Division "Polizai". East Pomerania, February 1945

Kohlberg was declared a "festung" in November 1944, and by February 1945, fortifications had been erected around it. On March 1, 1945, there was a construction battalion, a Volkssturm battalion and an antiaircraft battalion in the city. On March 2, eight light field howitzers arrived in Kolberg, and on March 3, the 51st fortress machine-gun battalion. The war log of the Wehrmacht High Command on March 5 notes with annoyance: "There is only a weak garrison of our troops in the fortress." Not surprisingly, Kohlberg has become one of the shortest-living Festungs. The city's garrison numbered 4,000 people with six defective tanks and a battery of 88-mm anti-aircraft guns. The garrison was commanded by Colonel Fritz Fulride, wounded in July 1941 in the Baltic States, after his recovery in Tunisia, Italy, and in 1944 - near Warsaw. Artillery support for Kohlberg's garrison was provided by the destroyer Z-43. Here the German sailors came in handy with 150-mm destroyer guns, which were too heavy for ships of this class. After a two-week assault, the city was 90% destroyed. March 18, 1945 under the onslaught of formations of the 1st Army of the Polish Army and the 2nd Guards. Kohlberg's cavalry corps ceased resistance. According to the ZhBD OKV, 68 thousand refugees, 1223 wounded and 5213 servicemen (about 800 soldiers and officers of combat units, and the rest were railway workers, the Todt organization, etc.) were evacuated from the city by sea. According to Soviet data, 6292 soldiers and officers were taken prisoner in Kolberg. Kolberg's commandant, Colonel Fulride, was not captured, after evacuation he was promoted to major general and in the last days of the war commanded the 3rd Marine Division, surrendered to the Americans.

With the transition to the offensive of the 1st Belorussian Front, hostilities in the zone of the 2nd Belorussian Front intensified. It was not in vain that Rokossovsky suspended the offensive of his troops in anticipation of a strike by Zhukov's troops. On March 3, the advance of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front was 6-15 km. The forward detachments of the front's mobile units reached the Baltic Sea coast in the area northeast of Kezlin. The advancing units of the 19th Army captured the city of Rummelsburg. On March 4, by roundabout maneuver and assault, Kezlin was taken - a communications center, a large industrial center of Pomerania. March 6 K.K. Rokossovsky got rid of the Graudenz "festung" hanging around his neck. The city, defended by 7000 garrisons, was taken by storm by units of the 2nd Shock Army. More than 2,000 enemy soldiers and officers were taken prisoner on March 5 alone, including the commandant of the fortress, Major General Fricke with the headquarters. On March 7, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front reached the eastern outskirts of Kolberg and joined up with the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front.

The von Tettau group: flight instead of counterstrike

Breakthrough of the 1st Guards. tank army to the Baltic Sea put a bold cross on the German plans for a counterattack on the flank of the 19th Army, covered by Oslikovsky's cavalry, by the group of von Tettau. The planned counterattack did not take place: neither the VII Panzer Corps, nor the group of von Tettau could go on the offensive. On the evening of March 4, General von Tettau gave the order for a breakthrough to the west. It was also joined by the remnants of the 18th Mountain Corps defeated by the 19th Army - the SS Charlemagne Division and the Latvian SS 15th Division. On March 5, it turned out that the route of withdrawal along the highway through Regenwalde was blocked by Soviet troops. Von Tettau decided to make his way in the northwest direction, into the gap between the rifle units and the corps of Katukov's army, which had made its way to the sea.

The position of the von Tettau group was somewhat facilitated by the fact that the X SS Army Corps was surrounded to the southwest of it, in the area of ​​Dramburg. The main efforts of the combined-arms armies of the 1st Belorussian Front were concentrated against him. Zhukov ordered the commander of the 3rd Shock Army to prevent the enemy from retreating to the west and northwest. At the same time, the front commander gave an order to the 1st Army of the Polish Army to accelerate the advance and, in cooperation with other formations, defeat the encircled enemy. A little later, the front commander ordered the 1st Guards. part of the tank army to assist the 1st Army of the Polish Army in the destruction of the enemy's encircled X SS Corps, leaving small cover detachments in the areas of Bellegarde and Curlin. In order to prevent the enemy from retreating from the Curlin region to the west, it was ordered to destroy all crossings on the river. Perzante at Bellegarde, Curlin, Kohlberg.

Tank T-34-85 2nd Guards. tank army in ambush. East Pomerania, February 1945

Captured commanders of German divisions (the commander of the Berwalde division Reitel and the 402nd reserve division of Spainitz) indicate that the order to withdraw was given on the night of March 4-5 or in the morning of March 5th. But by that time he was already too late. The war log of the Wehrmacht High Command on March 5 says: "Our troops, which are still in their old positions, are united under the command of General Krappe and are making attempts to break through to the west to Labes." That is, while Babadzhanyan's tankmen had already reached Kolberg, they still occupied the same positions as on March 1. During 4 and 5 March, fierce fighting broke out in the area east and northeast of Labes. The 3rd Shock Army with the 12th Guards and 79th Rifle Corps advanced to the west, while the 7th Rifle Corps was left to cover the right flank and fight the encircled enemy grouping. Subsequently, the 79th Rifle Corps reached the Pomeranian Bay and the river. Oder at the Waldivenov site, Cummin. There he changed parts of the echelon of the development of the success of the 3rd Shock Army - 9th Guards. tank corps. Thus, the outer front of the encirclement of the von Tettau group and the remnants of the Krappe group was formed. The German High Command reacted to the collapse of the front in Pomerania in the traditional way: on March 8, Erhard Raus was removed from his post as commander of the 3rd Panzer Army, and was replaced by General of the Panzer Forces Hasso von Manteuffel. Prior to this, Manteuffel commanded the 5th Panzer Army in the west and received diamonds for the Knight's Cross in this position in February 1945.

After receiving the order to withdraw, the German formations between the adjacent flanks of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts had only to try to break through to their own. The commander of the Berwalde division, Lieutenant General Reitel, during interrogation in Soviet captivity, explained the logic of his actions as follows: “I built a breakthrough plan on my experience of tank warfare: after the tanks had passed, the infantry moved at some intervals and a continuous front was established gradually. I expected to pass between the infantry. " Soon the division had to abandon the artillery and rear services. However, Reitel misjudged the location of the gap between tanks and infantry. He withdrew his units strictly to the west and soon faced strong barriers. Fuel for the self-propelled guns "Sturmgeshutz" ran out, and the division lost the means of paving its way forward. The division was scattered, and Raitel himself was captured by the Poles. The 402nd Reserve Infantry Division of General von Spainitz had to abandon its artillery on March 5, and after that the defeat of the formation was a foregone conclusion. Spainitz himself from 6 to 16 March tried to escape the encirclement through the forests, but was captured.

Only the von Tettau group succeeded in breaking out of the encirclement. At night, containers of ammunition and fuel were dropped to the group. On March 5, parts of the von Tettau group concentrated in the area east of Schiefelbein. The path to the west along the "Reichsstrasse No. 162" was blocked by units of the 8th Guards. mechanized corps. A fatal mistake was made at this moment by the commander of the 1st Guards. tank brigade Colonel A.M. Temnik. His brigade continued the battle for Bellegarde, which began on March 4, instead of intercepting the enemy's withdrawal routes in the Gross Rambin area (halfway from Schiefelbein to Bellegarde). Thus, A.M. Temnik ignored M.E. Katukov, who ordered his brigade to go to the Gross Rambin area by 7.00 on March 5 and leave a screen from a company of tanks against Bellegarde. The breakthrough routes from Bellegarde to the west were supposed to be covered by the 20th Guards. mechanized brigade. As a result, the 1st Guards. the tank brigade was released only at 13.30, turned south and only by 18.00 was fighting in the Gross Rambin area with a front to the east and southeast. Movement to the area north of Schiffelbein 64th Guards. tank brigade of the 11th Guards. the tank corps was also completed only by 18.00 on March 5. However, on the morning of March 5, in a snowstorm, the divisions of the von Tettau group began to break through to the west. In the center were units of the Pommerland division, on the left - Berwalde, on the right - Holstein, and the SS men were moving in the rearguard. Faced with barriers on "Reichsstrasse No. 162" at Schiefelbein, the group bypassed the city from the north and slipped through the gap between the main forces of the 8th Guards. mechanized corps and 1st Guards. tank brigade. Only those who lagged behind the group were left to be "torn apart" by Katukov's tankmen.

On March 6, von Tettau's group took up a "hedgehog" (all-round defense) position in the forests southeast of Witzmitz. Here, radio contact was established with the headquarters of the 3rd Panzer Army. Von Tettau received the most important information from Routh: the German foothold at Wollin (strictly to the west of Witzmitz) was lost. This information forced the commander of the group to decide on a breakthrough to the north-west to the bridgehead held by German units at the very coast of the sea - in the area of ​​Divenova. On the night of 8-9 March, the von Tettau group made their way to the Baltic Sea and formed a bridgehead in the Horst area. However, after reaching the coast, the advancing Soviet troops came to grips with the remnants of the von Tettau group.

Tank IS-2 in Stargard. March 1945

Strictly speaking, in the original plan of the operation (reflected in directive No. 00362 / op) everything was built in such a way that the encircled did not have the slightest chance of slipping out. The outer front of the encirclement, according to the plan, was formed by the formations of the 2nd Guards. tank army. In the first week of March, the army's formations generally adhered to the plan. 9th Guards. Panzer Corps, after capturing Naugard, continued its offensive to the northwest. 65th Guards tank brigade of the 9th guards. Panzer Corps March 5 reached the approaches to Kammin, and the 47th and 50th Guards. tank brigades of the same corps - to Wallin. On March 6, Cummin was captured, and an advance detachment was sent to the sea in the direction of Valdivenova. However, advancing to the south on Gollnov, the 12th Guards, battered in the February battles. the tank corps had no success. Control errors were added to the low completeness, as a result of which on March 6 the corps trampled in front of a stream 2-2.5 m wide. Despite the artillery preparation with 152 artillery barrels at 13.00 on March 6, the battalions were raised to the attack only with the participation of the chief of artillery of the army, Major General Plaskov and the chief of the operational department of the army headquarters, Colonel Lyatetsky. Plaskov later wrote in his report: “I gathered all the sappers (everyone was hiding in the forest, they had to collect all by force), and within 30 minutes the bridge was ready, I forced the guns to roll out on my hands, we ferried tanks, artillery, cars, people [... ] Everything moved forward at 18.00 only after Lyatetsky and I arrived at the battalions and moved all living things and all equipment forward. " Following the results of the proceedings, the corps commander, General N.M. Telyakov received a reprimand. One way or another, Gollnov 12th Guards. the tank corps was not taken, which made it possible for the enemy to organize his defense by units of the SS Frundsberg division. Therefore, on March 7, the 9th Guards. the panzer corps was deployed south (actually 180 degrees) and on March 8 attacked Gollnow from the north. 65th Guards On March 7, the tank brigade surrendered its positions to the 713th Rifle Regiment of the 171st Rifle Division (79th Rifle Corps of the 3rd Shock Army) and also turned south.

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The maneuvering period of the war - operations on the German-Austrian front: the Battle of Galicia and the East Prussian operation Before the first campaign in East Prussia, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich announced his readiness to start moving towards Berlin with four armies: the first two

The East Pomeranian was carried out with the aim of routing the enemy's East Pomeranian grouping, capturing Eastern Pomerania and liberating the Baltic Sea coast. The operation was attended by the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front and the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front. On March 1, 1945, the 1st Army of the Polish Army joined the operation. The ground forces were assisted by the forces of the Baltic Fleet. As part of this operation, the Chojnice-Kezlinskaya, Danzig, Arnswalde-Kolberg, Altdam front-line offensive operations were carried out.

The duration of the operation is 54 days. The width of the front of hostilities is 460 kilometers. The depth of advance of Soviet troops is 130-150 kilometers. The average daily rate of advance is 2-3 kilometers.

The composition of the troops of the opposing sides:
Eastern Pomerania was held by the enemy with part of the forces of Army Group "Vistula" (commanded by the SS Reichsfuehrer Himmler), which included the 2nd and 11th armies, which had 16 infantry, 4 tank, 2 motorized divisions, 5 brigades, 8 separate groups and 5 garrisons of fortresses. The reserve contained 4 infantry and 2 motorized divisions. These troops were preparing an attack on the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front.
The headquarters of the Supreme Command, taking into account the current situation, freed the 2nd Belorussian Front (commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky) from further participation in the East Prussian operation and set the task of crushing the enemy's East Pomeranian grouping, seizing Eastern Pomerania and clearing the Baltic Sea coast.

The 2nd Belorussian Front included the 65th, 49th, and 70th armies, the 1st Guards Tank and 8th Mechanized Corps, and the 4th Air Army.

Operation progress:
On February 10, 1945, the troops of the center and the left wing of the 2nd Belorussian Front, with the assistance of the Baltic Fleet, launched an offensive from a bridgehead on the Vistula River, north of Bydgoszcz, in the general direction of Stettin. In difficult conditions of muddy roads and wooded-lake terrain, overcoming fierce resistance from the enemy, relying on a deeply echeloned defense, by the end of February 19, 1945, they advanced 40-60 kilometers, but were stopped at the line of Wrath, Chojnice, Ratzebur.

On February 16-20, 1945, the enemy with the forces of 6 divisions struck a counterattack from the area southeast of Stettin, pushed the troops of the 47th Army of the 1st Belorussian Front (commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov) by 8-12 kilometers. However, the troops of the front repulsed the enemy's counterattack and inflicted significant damage on him. The enemy went over to the defensive along the entire front from the Vistula to the Oder.
On February 24, 1945, the 2nd Belorussian Front launched an offensive. By this time, the front included the 2nd shock, 49th, 70th, 19th armies and the 4th air army.

On March 1, 1945, the grouping of the 1st Belorussian Front began to attack, having in its composition the 1st Army of the Polish Army, the 3rd shock, the 61st and 47th armies, the 1st and 2nd Guards tank armies. Having broken through the enemy's defenses, by March 5, Soviet troops reached the Baltic Sea in the areas of the cities of Köslin and Kolberg, dismembering the enemy's grouping into two parts. The Baltic Fleet blocked the enemy from the sea, surrounded in the area of ​​the city of Danzig.

By March 10, 1945, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front basically completed the liberation of the Baltic Sea coast from the Kolberg region to the mouth of the Oder River.

On March 18, 1945, the 1st Polish Army captured Kohlberg. The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front occupied Gdynia on March 28, and the city of Danzig on March 30, 1945.

The remnants of the enemy's 2nd army, blockaded in the Gdynia region, were defeated on April 4, 1945 by the forces of the 19th army. The enemy grouping close to the sea in the area east of Danzig surrendered on May 9, 1945.

Operation results:
Soviet troops, which included the 1st Army of the Polish Army, reached the coast of the Baltic Sea, captured the cities of Kolberg, Gdynia and Danzig. The enemy pressed to the sea capitulated. With the defeat of the German Army Group Vistula, the threat of an enemy counterstrike to the flank and rear of the main forces of the 1st Belorussian Front, which was preparing to attack the city of Berlin, was eliminated.

All the Polish seaside with large cities and ports on the Baltic Sea was returned to the Polish people.

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EASTERN POMERANIAN OPERATION 1945, an offensive operation of Soviet troops in the Great Patriotic War, carried out February 10 - April 4 in order to defeat the enemy group in Eastern Pomerania and capture the Baltic Sea coast from Danzig (now Gdansk, Poland) to Stettin (now Szczecin, Poland) ). Initially, the liquidation of the East Pomeranian grouping of German troops was entrusted to the 2nd Belorussian Front (commander - Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K.Rokossovsky; 370 thousand people, 263 tanks and self-propelled guns, about 10.2 thousand guns and mortars, about 450 combat aircraft ), which was opposed by part of the forces of the German army group "Vistula" (SS Reichsfuehrer G. Himmler; over 230 thousand people, 382 tanks and assault guns, over 2.9 thousand guns and mortars, about 300 combat aircraft). On the morning of February 10, Soviet troops launched an offensive, but after 10 days of fighting, they advanced only 40 km. On February 17, the Soviet Supreme High Command decided to involve part of the forces of the 1st Belorussian Front (Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov) in the operation, clarifying the task for the troops. The grouping of forces of both fronts (about 770 thousand people, over 2 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, about 16.8 thousand guns and mortars, over 960 combat aircraft) were given the task of dismembering the Vistula army group (605 thousand people, about 1.5 thousand tanks and assault guns, 6.5 thousand guns and mortars, about 850 combat aircraft), cut it off from the rest of the German troops and destroy it in cooperation with the Baltic Fleet (Admiral V.F. Tributs). The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front began an offensive on February 24, and on March 1, the armies of the 1st Belorussian Front went on the offensive, by March 5 they reached the coast of the Baltic Sea and cut the enemy's East Pomeranian grouping into 2 parts. By March 10, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front had cleared the entire right bank of the Oder River from German troops, and on March 20, they liquidated the enemy's bridgehead in the Stettin area. The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, reinforced by the 1st Guards Tank Army from the 1st Belorussian Front, reached the coast of the Danzig Bay on March 13, dismembering the enemy grouping into 2 parts (Danzig and Gdynia), and on March 28 captured Gdynia (the remnants of the German troops near Gdynia were defeated on April 4), and on March 30 - by Danzig (the enemy grouping of eastern Danzig surrendered on May 9).

As a result of the East Pomeranian operation, Soviet troops defeated the German Army Group Vistula (destroying 6 divisions and 3 brigades, defeating 21 divisions and 8 brigades), liberated Polish Pomorie, and secured the northern flank of the Red Army grouping in the Berlin direction. The losses of the Soviet troops were: irrecoverable - over 53 thousand people, sanitary - about 172.5 thousand people.

Lit .: Zavyalov A.S., Kalyadin T.E. East Pomeranian offensive operation of Soviet troops, February - March 1945, M., 1960; Batov P.I. To the 40th anniversary of the East Pomeranian operation // Military History Journal. 1985. No. 2; Popel N.P. Ahead - Berlin! 2nd ed. M., 2001.