Home Garden on the windowsill Correspondent approach to understanding the truth. The problem of truth in philosophy. Basic concepts of truth. Classical views of truth

Garden on the windowsill

Correspondent approach to understanding the truth. The problem of truth in philosophy. Basic concepts of truth. Classical views of truth

CORRESPONDENT THEORY OF TRUTH - a set of methodological directions that determine the truth of a certain piece of knowledge (statement, theory) through correspondence (Latin correspondentia) to the object of this knowledge; The main version of the correspondence theory of truth is the "classical" concept of truth (Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas), according to which truth is the correspondence of thoughts to reality. All three terms included in this definition are problematic. Variants of the correspondence theory of truth differ in the nature of the formulation and solutions of these problems. The first group of problems is related to the formulation of restrictions that indicate which thoughts can be characterized as true. For example, statements describing a certain state of affairs (“The cat is sitting on the carpet”) can be considered true, but statements expressing an order (“Hands up!”) Or having no definite meaning (“x - y \u003d z”) do not have truth values; statements that claim to be true must satisfy the syntactic and semantic rules of the language (for example, the statement "This square is round" is neither true nor false, but meaningless). The second group of problems is related to what exactly can be relied upon as reality, to which thoughts correspond. According to logical atomism (Russell, Wittgenstein,), statements are true if they correspond to "facts"; however, "facts" are certain cognitive constructs dependent on sensory perceptions and conceptual interpretations, therefore, by comparing statements with facts, we are comparing one thought with another. The main difficulty, especially emphasized by Kant, is that thought cannot be directly compared with its object (“thing in itself”), therefore knowledge has its own reality, within which only the question of the objectivity of this knowledge can be raised. The third group of problems is related to the interpretation of "correspondence": from the naive concept of "copying" reality to the pragmatic concept, the correspondence between knowledge and its object is established by checking all the practical consequences of this knowledge (Pearce's principle), such interpretations also include the "reflection theory" (Lenin ).

The correspondence theory of truth was clarified by Tarski, who showed that semantic paradoxes known since antiquity such as the "paradox of Eubulides" (let A \u003d "A is false", then A is true, if A is false, and vice versa) can be eliminated in languages that allow formalization , building a hierarchy of semantic levels: an object language for which syntax rules are specified, and a metalanguage with designation rules for each element of the object language. The semantic definition of "truth" is introduced by the concept of "feasibility", which has a precise meaning in metamathematics. A language free from semantic antinomies can be constructed only if all its initial expressions and construction rules are exactly listed, i.e. formalization conditions are met. Since this requirement is not fulfilled for natural languages, they inevitably contain the indicated antinomy. The correspondence theory of truth is one of the premises of realistic theories of knowledge (critical realism, scientific realism, etc.). In a number of methodological concepts, various interpretations of the “correspondence” between knowledge and its object are proposed: as a degree of confirmation (neopositivism), as “plausibility, verissimilitude” (Popper) (a hypothesis is considered “corresponding” to reality as long as it successfully resists refutation) and others. At the same time, instrumentalist, conventionalist and constructivist models of knowledge and its development are considered incompatible with the correspondence theory of truth. See also Art. Truth, Instrumentalism, Coherent theory of truth, Reflection.

V. H. Porus

New Philosophical Encyclopedia. In four volumes. / Institute of Philosophy RAS. Scientific ed. advice: V.S. Stepin, A.A. Huseynov, G.Yu. Semigin. M., Thought, 2010, vol.II, E - M, p. 313-314.

Literature:

Russell B. Human knowledge. Its scope and boundaries. K., 1997; Sandküler H.-J. The reality of knowledge. M., 1997; Chudinov E. M. The nature of scientific truth. M., 1977; TarskyA. The semantic concept of truth and the foundation of semantics. - In the book: Analytical Philosophy: Formation and Development. M., 1998; Popper K. Logic and the growth of scientific knowledge. M., 1983; O "Connor D. The Correspondence Theory of Tmth. L., 1975.

-- [ Page 2 ] --

substantiated that the correspondent concept of truth reveals the harmony of knowledge and reality, reality and its image;
It is proved that alternative concepts of truth correlate with the correspondent concept, revealing the harmony of human being in the world, namely: the coherent concept harmonizes the body of knowledge, turning it into an effective system; the pragmatist concept reveals harmony in the sphere of relations "man - practice"; the existential approach encourages a person in the pursuit of truth to find the harmony of his own being;
it has been established that the development of "minimizing" theories of truth reveals the need to harmonize the relationship between the changed type of rationality and basic human values, which include truth;
proved the illegality of reducing truth to a characteristic of knowledge, identifying it with certainty, in which truth is perceived as one-dimensional;
it has been established that metaphor, being a voluminous and multi-level form of linguistic expression of reality, is an effective means of comprehending multidimensional truth;
the dialectical nature of the relationship between truth and faith in human cognitive activity is revealed, and the complementarity of the categories of truth and faith in religious and scientific knowledge is substantiated;
revealed the truth characteristics of mystical knowledge, expressed in the desire to comprehend the integrity and fullness of being;
the onto-epistemological grounds for the interdependence of the categories of truth and goodness are revealed, since in the theoretical and practical activities of a person, truth and goodness are forms of harmony of human existence in the world;
it is substantiated that the plurality of images of truth, which constitutes its multidimensionality, is formed into a harmonic system; at the same time, the harmonic nature of the multidimensionality of truth manifests the harmony of human being in the world.

Theoretical significance of the study consists in the development of a meta-concept of truth, harmonizing the ontological, epistemological, existential, value and normative perspectives of the study of the problem of truth in philosophy. The revealed universal, invariant semantic meanings of the category of truth make it possible to see harmony in the multitude of its theoretical studies and the diversity of human experience, as well as resist attempts to narrow the scope or oust the category of truth from the field of knowledge.

Practical significance lies in the possibility of using the results of research in the theoretical and practical activities of philosophers, theologians, ideologists, art critics, teachers. The material of the dissertation will be reflected in the teaching of philosophy courses, special courses on the problems of being, cognition, thinking, values, artistic creativity.

Approbation of the study. The main provisions of the dissertation were published in 2 monographs, articles and scientific papers with a total volume of more than 35 p.p. Intermediate and final results of the study were presented at scientific congresses and conferences of international, all-Russian and interregional levels: II Russian Philosophical Congress "XXI century: the future of Russia in the philosophical dimension" (Yekaterinburg, 1999), III Russian Philosophical Congress "Rationalism and culture on the threshold of III Millennium” (Rostov-on-Don, 2002); conferences: "The scientific picture of the world as a phenomenon of culture" (Ufa, 1992), "Scientific substantiation and common sense" (Ufa, 1994), "The unity of ontology, theory of knowledge and logic" (Ufa, 1996), "Education is the future of Russia" (Ufa, 1996), "Worldview Foundations of Human Activity at the Turn of the 21st Century" (Ufa, 1997), "Philosophical Cosmos of Russia. In memory of N.A. Berdyaev (1874-1948)" (Ufa, 1998), "The Language of Science of the 21st Century" (Ufa, 1998), "The Acquisition and Comprehension of Spirituality" (Orenburg, 2000), "The Cultural Heritage of Russia: The Universe of Religious Philosophy" (Ufa, 2004 ), "Philosophy of the XXI century" (St. Petersburg, 2006); Summer Schools for Young Scientists (Ekaterinburg, 2000; Kazan, 2000; Foros (Ukraine), 2002; Samara, 2003).

The structure and scope of the dissertation. The dissertation consists of an introduction, 2 sections, 8 chapters, including 15 paragraphs, a conclusion and a list of references.

MAIN CONTENT OF THE WORK

The introduction provides a substantiation of the research topic, reveals its relevance, the degree of scientific development, defines the object and subject of research, formulates the goal and objectives, determines the methodological basis of the work, formulates the scientific novelty, theoretical and practical significance of the research, provides data on approbation and the structure of the dissertation.

In the first section "The multidimensionality of the philosophical conceptualization of truth" the theoretical developments of the problem of truth from the beginning of its constitution are considered, the possibility of their harmonization is identified and substantiated.

In the first chapter "The Correspondent Conception of Truth and Its Variations" presents an analysis of the main provisions of the theory of truth as a correspondence between knowledge and reality and the problems that arise in its application.

In the first paragraph " The Formation and Essence of the Correspondent Concept of Truth" the initial grounds for the formation of the concept of truth as a correspondence between knowledge and reality are considered.

Having arisen in the ancient period, the correspondent concept of truth became dominant in the theory of knowledge. Its central concept is the concept of correspondence. However, this concept is ambiguous. One can consider “correspondence” as a relationship between an object and a name, as a correspondence of an object to its concept (idea, essence). In this case, we are dealing with an ontological interpretation of truth. If we consider the correspondence of the concept (knowledge) to the subject, then this is an epistemological interpretation of the truth, which for a long time was absolutized in our country, since it is characteristic of the materialistic worldview. The first option, the ontological one, is characteristic of idealistic teachings. In any case, the main problems arise with the definition of the basic concept - "compliance". Within the framework of the correspondent concept, in order to achieve the truth, a correspondence must be established between the ideal world (knowledge, concepts, statements) and the material world (things, processes, phenomena). Obviously, a one-to-one correspondence is impossible, which gives rise to various interpretations of the concept under consideration.

In line with our research, the correspondent concept provides valuable material in several areas: firstly, it is the first ever philosophical conceptualization of truth, going back to Plato and Aristotle; secondly, it contains a wide range of interpretations of the idea of correspondence (correspondence); thirdly, it is almost universal in the breadth of application of its provisions. Correspondence theory remains in demand in the postmodern era, encouraging researchers to look for ways to develop and apply it in new conditions (for example, the work of P. Weingartner "Fundamental Problems of the Theories of Truth". M .: ROSSPEN, 2005; or a discussion in the journal "Epistemology and Philosophy of Science" ”, No. 2, 2008).

In the second paragraph "Development of the correspondent concept in a logical-semantic key" It is noted that the development of science in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the emergence of logical and semantic means of analyzing the language of science in the same period posed new serious problems for the correspondent concept of truth. The revolution in physics, associated with the revision of the fundamental ideas of the classical science of matter, space and time, showed that theories, which for centuries have not raised any doubts, have found the widest practical application and, it would seem, confirmation by the vast material of human activity, nevertheless, not true in the strict sense of the word.

If until now the correspondence concept was based on a rigid dichotomy "true-false", then with the advent of quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity, this dichotomy had to be significantly weakened. Of course, from the point of view of such a contrast, classical mechanics turned out to be just a false concept, just as the falsity of the geocentric picture of the universe was discovered three hundred years earlier. But if, as a result of the Copernican revolution, geocentrism was discarded as a simple delusion, then classical mechanics remained in science - as a "limiting case", as a partial truth, valid in a world of relatively low velocities and macroprocesses.

The logical directions of philosophical thought consider truth from the point of view of its "form", linguistic, symbolic expression. This approach reveals another aspect of the problem of truth - the specifics of its existence in a sign form, in particular, in language, as a completely original, unique product of human spiritual activity.

One of the founders of logical semantics is G. Frege. The concept of truth value introduced by him is also used in modern science. In his works, Frege began to study the relationship between the meaning and meaning of linguistic expressions, which was then continued by B. Russell, L. Wittgenstein and others. The concept of truth of the Polish logician and mathematician A. Tarski, called semantic, received independent significance. Tarski set himself the goal of giving formal rigor to the classical (Aristotelian) definition of truth and establishing the place and boundaries of its significance. He achieved important special results, at the same time, his semantic definition of truth opened the way to the semantic transformation of classical understanding with the inevitable features of abstract formalization. The logical result of the development of semantic ideas is the exclusion of the objectively true content of cognitive forms, the deprivation of the concept of truth of its objective nature. Tarski's concept does not solve the question of the nature of truth and does not even pose such a problem: it only shows how we can move from statements about reality to statements about the truth values of sentences, under what conditions we can do this - and the most important among these conditions is actually already the existence of some theory of truth, which is nothing more than an answer to the question about the nature of truth.

The significance of the logical-semantic approach is that it develops the theory of correspondence, transferring research into the field of language, involving another layer of human existence in the problematic field of truth.

Summing up the material of the first chapter, we can say that the correspondence concept of truth in all its variations, establishing the correspondence (however it is understood) of knowledge and reality, thus expresses the harmony intuitively felt by a person between reality and its image, between the world of material and ideal.

In the second chapter "Alternative conceptions of truth" competing approaches to the definition of truth are considered.

In the first paragraph "Coherent Conception of Truth" the foundations of the concept, which considers truth as the consistency of statements, are stated. According to this concept, the measure of the truth of a statement is determined by its role and place in some conceptual system; to say that what is said (the bearer of truth, such as a statement or proposition) is true or false is to say that it is coherent or incoherent with a system of other statements or propositions, i.e. is or is not part of this system. The more coherent or coherent our statements are, the more true they are: the truth of any true statement consists in its coherence with some definite set of statements. The elements of such a system must be connected with each other by relations of logical implication or consequence: this connection is the meaning of the coherence relation. To be coherent to the system for assertion means to be connected with the other members of the system by the same logical relations that they are connected with each other. To check the truth, therefore, means to check what relations this judgment is connected with the rest in the system, whether it is compatible with the system - for example, with the generally accepted scientific picture of the world.

With the help of the coherent theory, we can evaluate the truth of those statements for which we cannot - at the moment or in general, fundamentally - establish their correspondence with the facts. Such, in particular, is a significant part of our everyday knowledge. Moreover, and in many of the cases where empirical verification is available to us, we do not resort to it, being satisfied with the consistency with other assumptions that we support.

The problems that arise here are as follows. If a coherent system is to be the system of all true statements, then it is not possible for us to establish the truth of an individual proposition before we somehow find out which system is the system of all true statements, and we have no such possibility. If we compare a judgment with the system of our ordinary ideas or with some scientific theory, then its incompatibility with these ideas or with this theory will mean the falsity of this judgment only on the ground that it seems to us that these ideas or this theory are true. But the possibility cannot be ruled out that there may be two equally comprehensive, but different or even incompatible coherent systems - how then to decide which of them is the system of true propositions and which one should be chosen as the basis for testing other judgments?

However, despite the extensive criticism of the coherent concept, the requirement to harmonize knowledge with each other expresses the possibility of manifestation of harmony within the totality of human knowledge.

In the second paragraph "Pragmatist Conception of Truth" an original approach to solving the problem of truth, proposed by the philosophical trend of pragmatism, which arose and became most widespread in the United States, is analyzed. The pragmatist concept has nothing in common with the classical one, since it is concerned not with the correspondence of the acquired knowledge to reality, but with their most successful application in human activity.

The problem of truth plays a special role in the epistemology of pragmatism, although there is no single definition of truth in it. In pragmatism, the category of truth is inextricably linked with the main category of this doctrine - practice. The categories of practice and truth are two defining and closely related aspects in the theory of knowledge of pragmatism: practical success, the result is the goal of human life, and therefore all theories and views are true insofar as they serve to achieve practical results.

In their consideration of the problem of truth, the supporters of pragmatism shift the center of gravity from the realm of thinking to the realm of the subject's practical activity. They emphasize the role of practical activity in cognition, which, they believe, excludes the possibility of reaching truth in the classical sense. Empiricism is seen by them as an alternative to rationalistic contemplation.

The leading representatives of the direction of pragmatism are Ch.S. Pierce, W. James (or James), J. Dewey, R. Rorty. Pierce, who founded this trend, considers cognitive activity not as a relationship between the subject and the object of cognition, but transfers all attention to the subject, to his internal, to a large extent psychological processes. Peirce prefers to talk not about knowledge, but about faith, conviction, understanding by it the readiness or habit to act in one way or another. The process of cognition for Peirce does not mean a transition from ignorance to knowledge, but a transition from doubt to faith, however, not individual, but collective or social. As for truth, it was defined by Peirce as a universally valid coercive belief, to which, on every subject studied, an infinite community of researchers would come if the process of research continued indefinitely.

James develops Peirce's fundamental ideas and turns them into a coherent, flexible enough doctrine. It would seem that James does not deny the classical definition of truth as the correspondence of our ideas to reality. However, he clarifies what should be understood by "correspondence" and "reality", and first of all, "copying" of reality is rejected (by the term "copying" James means an adequate reflection of the external world in the mind of the cognizing subject). He proposes to consider as true any idea that helps us to operate with reality, achieving our goals.

James' final conclusions are that truth is "a kind of good", "what is best for us to believe", "what works best for us", that truth "must be done", etc. The interpretation of Dewey's pragmatism has no fundamental deviations from the direction set by Peirce and James. For pragmatism, the transformation of reality (or rather, “making reality”) is a process, the result of which is not a change in the material world, but a change in the subjective experience of an individual, a change in his beliefs and beliefs.

Thus, the pragmatist concept of truth is an alternative to the classical one, rejecting the very idea of objective truth. However, in our opinion, pragmatism is of great importance, as a theory that puts a person, his inner world, goals and values at the forefront. The principle of the “will to believe” proclaimed by James is that a person has the moral right to make a vital choice, guided not by rational, but by emotional grounds. The application of the pragmatic concept of truth makes it possible to reveal harmony in the sphere of relations "man - practice", to remove the problem of alienation, the conflict of individual and social values.

In the third paragraph "The Problem of Truth in the Existential Dimension" the conceptual foundations of the approach to truth, characteristic of Russian culture, as a “way to life” are presented. The main feature of Russian philosophical thought is its connection with the religious worldview. Here it is necessary to clarify: with the Orthodox worldview. For Catholicism, with its attempts to use rationalism to justify the existence of God, almost disgusted Orthodox Christianity. Russian religious philosophical thought asserts that the divine cannot in any way be comprehended and substantiated by reason. And in areas related to the sphere of the divine, to the transcendent, the claims of ratio are completely unfounded. This concerns, first of all, Truth.

Similar works:

the main interpretation of the concept of truth, which is considered classical. According to it, a statement is considered true if the state of affairs, the existence of which is asserted, takes place in the world.

Great Definition

Incomplete definition ↓

CORRESPONDENT THEORY OF TRUTH

a set of methodological directions that determine the truth of a certain piece of knowledge (statement, theory) through correspondence (Latin correspondentia) to the object of this knowledge; The main version of the correspondence theory of truth is the "classical" concept of truth (Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas), according to which truth is the correspondence of thoughts to reality. All three terms included in this definition are problematic. Variants of the correspondence theory of truth differ in the nature of the formulation and solutions of these problems. The first group of problems is related to the formulation of restrictions that indicate which thoughts can be characterized as true. For example, statements that describe some state of affairs (“A cat is sitting on a carpet”) can be considered true, but statements that express an order (“Hands up!”) Or that do not have a specific meaning do not have a truth value; statements that claim to be true must satisfy the syntactic and semantic rules of the language (for example, the statement "This square is round" is neither true nor false, but meaningless). The second group of problems is related to what exactly can be relied upon - the reality to which thoughts correspond. According to logical atomism (Russell, Wittgenstein, statements are true if they correspond to "facts"; however, "facts" are certain cognitive constructions that depend on sensory perceptions and conceptual interpretations, therefore, comparing statements with facts, we compare one thought with another. The main difficulty , especially emphasized by Kant, lies in the fact that thought cannot be directly compared with its object (“thing in itself”), therefore knowledge has its own reality, within which only the question of the objectivity of this knowledge can be raised. connected with the interpretation of “correspondence”: from the naive concept of “copying” reality to the pragmatic concept, the correspondence between knowledge and its object is established by checking all practical consequences! The correspondence theory of truth was clarified by Tarski, who showed that semantic paradoxes known since antiquity such as the “Eubulides paradox” (let A = “A is false”, then A is true, if A is false, and vice versa) can be eliminated in languages that allow formalization by constructing a hierarchy of semantic levels: the object language, for which syntax rules are specified, and the metalanguage, with notation rules for each element of the object language. The semantic definition of "truth" is introduced by the concept of "feasibility", which has a precise meaning in metamathematics. A language free from semantic antinomies can be constructed only if all its initial expressions and construction rules are exactly listed, i.e., the formalization conditions are met. Since this requirement is not fulfilled for natural languages, they inevitably contain the indicated antinomy. The correspondence theory of truth is one of the premises of realistic theories of knowledge (critical realism, scientific realism, etc.). In a number of methodological concepts, various interpretations of the “correspondence” between knowledge and its object are proposed: as a degree of confirmation (neopositivism), as “plausibility, verissimilitude” (Popper) (a hypothesis is considered “corresponding” to reality as long as it successfully resists refutation) and others. At the same time, instrumentalist, conventionalist and constructivist models of knowledge and its development are considered incompatible with the correspondence theory of truth. See also Art. Truth, Instrumentalism, Coherent theory of truth. Reflection. Lit.: Russell B. Human knowledge. Its scope and boundaries. K., 1997: Zandkuyaer H.-J. The reality of knowledge. M., 1997; Chudinov E. M. The nature of scientific truth. M., 1977: Tarski N.A. The semantic concept of truth and the foundation of semantics. - In the book: Analytical Philosophy: Formation and Development. M., 1998; Popper K. Logic and the growth of scientific knowledge. M., 1983; OConnor D. The Correspondence Theory of Truth. L, 1975.

Great Definition

Incomplete definition ↓

correspondence theory of truth

CORRESPONDENT THEORY OF TRUTH(from the English correspondence - correspondence) - a theory that interprets the truth of a thought as its correspondence to its subject or reality. Interpretation truth as the correspondence of thought to reality goes back to antiquity, therefore K. t. also called the "classical concept of truth". The main idea of the classical concept was expressed by Plato: “He who speaks about things in accordance with what they are, speaks the truth; the one who speaks differently about them is lying. Later, Aristotle adopted the same understanding of truth. Important feature To. t. is that in it the truth is objective - in the sense that it does not depend on the will and desire of people, on its recognition or non-recognition. The correspondence of a thought to an object is determined by the object, its features, and not by our desires. Therefore, for example, the idea that bodies consist of atoms was also true in the time of Democritus, although it was recognized only in the 18th century. Corresponding understanding of truth grows out of our common sense and everyday practice, therefore it is the most common up to now. It should be noted that the reality about which our thoughts or statements are judged to be true or false need not be only physical reality; it can be the reality of ideal, let's say mathematical, objects or fiction. For example, the statement "Othello loved Desdemona" is true, while the statement "Hamlet was married" is false in the worlds created by the text of Shakespeare's plays. The correspondent concept of truth speaks of the conformity of thought to its object, but in no way concerns the nature of these objects. Despite the wide prevalence, To. t. and. gives rise to a number of serious problems that have not yet received a generally accepted solution. Firstly, it is not at all clear what the “correspondence” of a thought to reality, or the real state of affairs, means. When it comes to a sensual image, this correspondence can still be interpreted as a “similarity” between the image and the thing: it can be assumed that the sensual image of a tree is somehow similar to the real tree itself (although this raises certain doubts). But what kind of similarity can we talk about when we are talking about a statement and an object? In what way is the statement "A triangle has three corners" similar to a triangle? It is clear that one cannot speak of any "similarity" here. But then what is the “correspondence” of a thought to an object? This is still an open question. Secondly, how do we know that we are facing the truth and not a lie? how to distinguish truth from error? This is a question about the criteria of truth. R. Descartes, for example, believed that the criteria for truth are the clarity and distinctness of thought: if some thought is completely clear to me, then it is true. Apparently, this criterion does little. Here are two opposing thoughts: "Elephants live in Australia" and "Elephants do not live in Australia." Both are perfectly clear, but which one is true? Sometimes consistency is proposed as a criterion of truth: if a certain thought, theory is consistent, then they are true. This criterion makes it possible to cut off deliberately false ideas and concepts: if a thought is internally contradictory, then it is certainly false. However, not all non-contradictory constructions are true: it is possible to present a fairy tale without internal contradictions, but nevertheless it will not be true. Marxist philosophy proposed to consider practical activity as a criterion of truth: if, guided by some thought, we achieve success in activity, then this indicates that this thought is true. Apparently, in many cases of everyday life, this criterion helps us to distinguish truth from error. If you want to know whether a person is generous or stingy, go to a restaurant with him. If you want to know if the mushroom you found is edible or not, try eating it. At the level of everyday experience, the criterion of practice often helps us to distinguish truth from falsehood. However, already here it turns out that false ideas can also lead to success in practical activity. For example, we are still guided by the terrain, based on the fact that the Sun and the entire sky revolve around the Earth. When it comes to establishing the truth of scientific theories, the very criterion of practice becomes completely vague. It is now generally accepted that neither consistency, nor confirmation by experience, nor success in practice allow us to draw a clear line between truth and falsehood. Finally, thirdly, an important question that confronts K. t. and. arises in assessing the history of human knowledge. This theory speaks of only two evaluations - of truth and falsehood. Suppose, at the present moment, we are able to single out the truth from the totality of modern ideas and theories and separate it from falsehood. Looking from the point of view of modern truths at the previous ideas and theories, we find that all of them - or at least most of them - are erroneous. For example, it is now perfectly clear to us that Aristotle's natural-scientific views are erroneous, that the medical ideas of Hippocrates and Galen are erroneous, that Cuvier's and Lamarck's theories of evolution are erroneous, that even the great Newton was mistaken in his ideas about the nature of light, space and time. But how could a continuous chain of errors lead to modern truth? And how could past generations live and act guided solely by delusions? These consequences of the correspondent understanding of truth seem paradoxical. Consequently, the assessment of the history of knowledge requires some new concepts, or a change in the classical concept of truth. These problems, which arise when trying to interpret truth as the correspondence of thought to its subject, have forced many philosophers and scientists to abandon the concept of truth altogether, or have led to attempts to give the concept of truth a different meaning. see also True. AL. Nikiforov

Improvement of the classical concept of truth in the works of the outstanding Polish logician Alfred Tarski. Proponents of the concept of coherence. Karl Popper, Henri Poincaré, Paul Feyerabend about truth. Views of truth developed by conventionalists.

Send your good work in the knowledge base is simple. Use the form below

Students, graduate students, young scientists who use the knowledge base in their studies and work will be very grateful to you.

Posted on http://www.allbest.ru//

Correspondent (classical) concept of truth

One of the most common in the philosophy and science of this period is the correspondent (from the English word correspondence - correspondence) concept of truth, the origins of which we find already in Aristotle. Sometimes this concept is also called classical. As the name of the concept implies, the main concept for it is the concept of correspondence. The true here is the corresponding.

Moreover, the concept under consideration is initially dual. Indeed, on the one hand, one can speak (and most often speak in this way) about the truth of knowledge (about the truth of a judgment, statement, sentence, system of sentences). At the same time, knowledge corresponding to its subject is considered as true knowledge. - This is, so to speak, an epistemological interpretation of this formula. If we say, for example, that the sum of the interior angles of a triangle is one hundred and eighty degrees, then our statement is true. This is easy to verify by measuring the angles in real triangles with a protractor.

On the other hand, one can speak of the truth of "fragments of being", in particular, of the truth of things, meaning their correspondence to their ideas (their concepts, their essences). - This, as they say, is an ontological interpretation of the correspondent approach. So, we can say about a person: this is a true friend. Meaning a person who has qualities (loyalty, kindness, responsiveness, etc.), which we associate with the concept (idea) of "friend".

In both cases, this concept, at first glance, seems understandable and natural.

However, a closer examination of it shows that it contains many ambiguities.

The main one is the ambiguity of the content of the very concept of correspondence. Indeed, what does, for example, mean the correspondence between a statement about a thing and this thing itself? After all, the fundamental difference between a statement about a thing (knowledge about a thing) and the thing itself is obvious. We can say that statements (knowledge about a thing) and things themselves belong to different worlds: knowledge is part of the ideal world, and things are fragments of the material world. Accordingly, knowledge and things have nothing in common. Thus, a statement about a thing does not have a spatial form, does not contain the substance of which the thing is composed. It does not have the properties that a thing has. Etc. What then is the correspondence between the statement and the thing?...

An equally serious problem for the concept of truth under discussion is the problem of establishing the correspondence (degree of correspondence) or inconsistency between the statement and the thing (the problem of the criterion of the truth of the statement). Indeed, in order to establish the correspondence between a statement and a thing, some way, method (truth criterion) is needed. However, this method of recognizing true (or not true) statements itself must be checked for truth, which requires the involvement of another criterion of truth, and so on. The correspondent conception of truth has other problems as well. Nevertheless, this concept remains, so to speak, in the arsenal of philosophers throughout almost the entire history of philosophy.

The classical concept of truth received some improvement in the works of the outstanding Polish logician Alfred Tarski (1901-1983). He developed the so-called semantic concept of truth. Tarski showed, in particular, that a strict definition of truth must satisfy two requirements: 1) the requirement of material adequacy; 2) the requirement of formal consistency. The first requirement is expressed by the following formulation: "P" is true if and only if P. Here P is a sentence denoting a certain real situation. Accordingly, "R" here is the name of this sentence. The second requirement indicates the need for a careful distinction between the object language and the metalanguage. Such a distinction avoids some of the paradoxes that have long troubled philosophers. An example of this kind of paradox is the “liar paradox”, already known in antiquity.

The concept of coherence

Quite authoritative in philosophy and science is also the concept of coherence (from the Latin cohaerentia and the corresponding English coherence - connectivity, consistency). Supporters of this concept try to get around the difficulty of establishing a correspondence between fragments of knowledge and fragments of reality, the difficulty inherent in the correspondent concept of truth. They see the truth of knowledge not in that it corresponds to reality, but in the fact that it (knowledge) is coherent, that is, self-consistent, logically coherent, consistent.

Similar views on the truth of knowledge can be found, for example, in I. Kant. He wrote about this: “Formal truth consists only in the agreement of knowledge with itself, with a complete abstraction from all objects in general and from all their differences. And therefore, the universal formal criteria of truth are nothing more than the general logical signs of the consistency of knowledge with itself, or, which is the same, with the universal laws of reason and reason. However, Kant himself is very far from absolutizing the indicated (formal) criteria of truth. He emphasizes that “knowledge that is fully consistent with the logical form, i.e. which does not contradict itself, can nevertheless contradict the object. Therefore, he quite rightly believes that the self-consistency of knowledge and its compliance with the "universal laws of reason and reason" is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the content truth of this knowledge.

The concept under discussion undoubtedly has a "rational grain". Indeed, knowledge that claims to be true cannot be self-contradictory. After all, if one fragment of the considered system of knowledge (principle, law, theory) contradicts another (or others) of its fragment, then from such a system of knowledge (and is it a system?), in accordance with a known logical rule, any conclusion follows.

The concept of coherence is quite operational, that is, it can be used to determine whether a particular body of knowledge is capable of claiming truth. Let's assume that we have a certain set of statements describing a certain subject area. From this set, we can, by establishing mutual coherence of statements, select a subset of potentially true statements. This concept also substantiates the possibility of obtaining true knowledge by its logical conclusion from knowledge, the truth of which has already been established. The point is that knowledge deduced from a given system will be coherent to this system and self-coherent. This concept is especially widely and successfully used in the logico-mathematical sciences, as well as in those branches of natural science in which the axiomatic method is used.

The main difficulty of the concept of coherence is that it does not lead beyond knowledge. The coherence present in this concept characterizes only the relation of some fragments of knowledge to others, but does not directly concern the "coherence" of knowledge and reality. In other words, I. Kant's conclusion remains valid, according to which the coherence of knowledge is not a sufficient condition for truth (in the sense of the classical concept). However, the coherent concept has its own arguments here. First, the requirement of coherence can be applied almost indefinitely to ever-expanding areas of knowledge. That is, to check for coherence not only the knowledge contained in a given theory, but also to demand the coherence of this knowledge to other theories, a picture of the world, a philosophical system, etc. One can also demand the coherence of this knowledge to an ever-expanding empirical basis of knowledge. Finally, supporters of the concept under discussion have the right to point out the fact that knowledge is also reality, for it is a phenomenon of the existential spirit of man. Extravagant views on truth were developed by Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900). Truth, he proclaimed, is a kind of error without which a certain kind of living being could not live. In other words, the German philosopher, in the spirit of his doctrine of the will to power, argues that truth should be understood as an instrument of life, as an instrument of power, in extreme cases, as a means of adapting a person to reality. The value for human life, he is convinced, is the last foundation of what we call truth. The truth of this or that knowledge is proved, according to Nietzsche, by the usefulness of this knowledge, its ability to help a person in satisfying his needs, and also by the increased power of a person possessing this knowledge over other people and nature. This understanding of truth corresponds to the Nietzschean interpretation of science. Science, he argues, is "the transformation of nature into concepts for the purpose of dominating nature."

Such views were systematically developed by representatives of pragmatism. Pragmatism (from the Greek word pragma - deed, action) is a philosophical doctrine that developed in the last decades of the 19th century in the United States. The main ideas of pragmatism were put forward and developed by Charles Pierce (1839-1914), William James (1842-1910), John Dewey (1859-1852). They criticized the previous philosophy for its metaphysical orientation and proposed a variant of its (philosophy) radical reorientation. Philosophy, in their opinion, should become a general method for solving life's problems that confront a person. Philosophers should therefore pay the greatest attention not to abstract ideas, but to convictions and beliefs that act as regulators of people's activities and behavior. One of the key provisions of pragmatism, which he called the Pierce principle, is formulated by W. James: “Our beliefs are the actual rules for action. In order to reveal the meaning of any statement, we only need to determine the mode of action that it can cause: in this mode of action lies the entire meaning of this statement for us ”(Pragmatism. St. Petersburg, 1910, p. 34). In accordance with this attitude, pragmatists interpret the meaning of the concept of truth. Ideas, theories, beliefs are evaluated by pragmatists in terms of their practical implications. Only those that have favorable consequences for the subject possessing them can be called true, only those that turned out to be useful, beneficial for this subject. It is clear that with such an interpretation, truth is not something independent of man, it is not something immutable. On the contrary, truth is something individual and plural. Knowledge, ideas, beliefs are considered by W. James, and to an even greater extent by J. Dewey, not as an image (reflection, description) of reality independent of a person, but as a means of implementing a person’s intentions and plans, as tools, tools used man to adapt to the world and transform it. Accordingly, true knowledge, conviction, faith will be those that reliably, efficiently and successfully “work”, lead a person to success, and are useful for him.

In addition to the subjectivism of their interpretation of the truth, unconcealed by the pragmatists themselves (which cannot be considered only as a manifestation of the weakness of the concept under consideration, especially since the pragmatists did not deny the significance of social ties and human relations), this interpretation is characterized by a peculiar narrowness, limitation. We have in mind the fact that far from any knowledge can be evaluated in terms of success, usefulness, profitability. Applied knowledge can be assessed more or less adequately with the help of these categories. It is much more difficult to do this in relation to fundamental knowledge, as well as in relation to philosophical convictions. It is therefore logical that the pragmatists strive for "radical empiricism", the desire to overcome the abstractness and contemplation of traditional philosophy.

Each of the concepts discussed above fixes, in our opinion, an essential "dimension" of truth. Thus, the classical concept characterizes the truth of knowledge through the relationship of knowledge and its (object) object: knowledge is true if it corresponds to its (object) object. The concept of coherence characterizes the truth of knowledge through the relation of knowledge to this knowledge itself: knowledge is true if it is coherent, if it is consistent with itself. Finally, the pragmatist concept characterizes the truth of knowledge through its relation to the subject of knowledge and knowledge: knowledge is true if it is useful (in the broadest sense of the word) to a person. Obviously, these concepts are not mutually exclusive. They can be seen as complementary and enriching each other.

In other words, it is quite legitimate to speak of an agreement, a harmonization of the most authoritative conceptions of truth. There is no doubt that such coordination is not only possible, but necessary. Here, apparently, a stereometric analogy would be appropriate. Within the framework of this analogy, individual concepts of truth (correspondent, coherent, pragmatic, conventionalist, etc.) should be likened to projections of a spatial body onto the corresponding planes of the coordinate system. Each of these projections, of course, contains valuable and irreplaceable information about the spatial body of interest to us. However, each such projection gives only one-sided (“planar”) information about this body. Complete information about the body we are studying can be obtained only by combining the data contained in all planar projections. Note that there are not necessarily three such projections. There can be much more of them, since the body we are studying can be spatially multidimensional. In our case, a multidimensional body corresponds to a holistic concept of truth. It, obviously, can be obtained only through synthesis, through the coordination and harmonization of particular (“planar”) concepts of truth. Of course, such a synthesis is much more difficult to implement than solving the problem of restoring a spatial body from its planar projections. But, I think, “the game is worth the candle”: the result of such a synthesis will be mutual enrichment and mutual complementation of private concepts of truth; as a result of such a synthesis, a very meaningful and holistic conception of truth can be formed. Each "private" concept of truth fixes only one (however, very significant) moment of the content of the category of truth. We can say that each such concept is one-sided, abstract in the Hegelian sense of the word. It does not take into account many other (essential) aspects of the content of the category of truth. So, for example, the correspondent concept focuses on the relationship between knowledge and its subject; the concept of coherence - on the ratio of various elements of knowledge; pragmatist concept - on the correlation of knowledge (beliefs, convictions) and the results of human activity organized on the basis of this knowledge, etc. All these (“private”) conceptions of truth, with their appropriate interpretation, can undoubtedly be harmonized with each other. And this harmonization is the way to a more concrete and multifaceted, to a more holistic conception of truth.

Karl Popper, Henri Poincaré, Paul Feyerabend on truth

Many researchers working in the field of epistemology and philosophy of science are convinced that, due to the ambiguity of the content of the concept of “truth” and the difficulty (impossibility) of achieving it, it is necessary to generally minimize the use of this concept in philosophy and science.

So, for example, K. Popper insisted for a long time that attempts to understand the idea of truth (“this very strange and elusive idea”) are hopeless, that no scientific theory can be considered true in the strict sense of the word. He developed an approach called falsificationism, or fallibilism. He opposed this approach to verificationism (justificationism). Proponents of verificationism argued that scientific knowledge must be positively (empirically) justified, confirmed. K. Popper was convinced that the program of verificationism could never be fulfilled. “We falsificationists,” he wrote, “believe that we have succeeded in discovering a way to realize the old ideal of distinguishing between rational science and various forms of prejudice, despite the collapse of the original inductivist or justificationist program. We believe that this ideal can be realized very simply if it is recognized that the rationality of science lies not in its traditional recourse to empirical evidence in support of its propositions (the astrologer does the same), but only in a critical approach, which , of course, along with other arguments, it also critically uses empirical evidence (in particular, in refutation). Therefore, for us, science has nothing to do with the search for certainty, probability, or reliability. Our goal is not to establish the certainty, reliability, or likelihood of scientific theories. Conscious of our fallibility, we seek only to criticize and test our theories in the hope of finding our mistakes, learning from those mistakes, and, with luck, building better theories.”

In accordance with this approach, he considered it more adequate to use the concept of "verisimilitude" (verisimilitude) rather than the concept of "truth" to characterize scientific theories. In such a case, there are no more or less true scientific theories, but there are theories more plausible than others. K. Popper himself, explaining the meaning of the term he introduced, wrote about the earlier theory T(1) and the later theory T(2). "one. T(2) makes more precise statements than T(1), and these more precise statements withstand more precise tests; 2. T(2) takes into account and explains more facts than T(1); 3. T(2) describes or explains facts in more detail than T(1) does; 4. T(2) passed those checks that T(1) did not pass; 5. T(2) proposed new experimental tests, not discussed before its appearance (these tests were not put forward by the theory of T(1) and may not even be applicable to T(1)), and T(2) passed these tests; 6. T(2) united or connected various problems that before its appearance had no connection with each other. For example, according to this approach, Einstein's theory of relativity is more plausible than Newton's.

However, in his later works, after studying the semantic concept of truth, developed, as already noted, by the Polish logician Alfred Tarski, K. Popper begins to use quite intensively the concept of truth, objective truth in particular. Thus, in the work just cited, he emphasizes: "The theory of objective truth ... allows us to make statements like the following: some theory may be true even if no one believes in it." In fairness, it should be noted that, while recognizing the legitimacy of using the concept of truth, K. Popper continues to be a fallibilist in his later works. Characteristic in this regard is his statement: "Even when we come across a true theory, we can usually only guess about it, and it may be impossible for us to know that this is a true theory."

Curious views on the truth are developed by conventionalists (from the Latin word conventionio - agreement). They affirm the conventional nature of, in fact, all provisions of science, the conventional nature of all scientific truths. One of the most famous and authoritative representatives of conventionalism was the French mathematician and physicist Henri Poincaré. As early as the beginning of the twentieth century, Poincaré discussed the question of which geometry (Euclidean or any of the many non-Euclidean) characterizes real space. In other words, he discussed the question of which of the geometries is true. At the same time, he came to a paradoxical conclusion: “No geometry is more true than another; one geometry or another can only be more comfortable.” Poincaré came to a similar conclusion when discussing the advantages and disadvantages of Newton's mechanics in comparison with the advantages and disadvantages of Einstein's mechanics. We can, he argued, retain the principles of Newtonian mechanics because experience has shown us that they are convenient. Thus, according to conventionalism, scientific knowledge is based on conventions (agreements) between scientists, concluded by them for reasons of convenience, simplicity, familiarity, etc.

The history of science shows that conventions (agreements) do play a big role in scientific knowledge. For example, the scientific community widely uses conventions to develop definitions of scientific concepts and terms, when choosing a system of units for measuring physical and other quantities, when choosing symbols used in the presentation of a particular theory, when resolving many other theoretical and practical problems of science. Nevertheless, there are quite rigid, dictated by a specific scientific and sociocultural context, boundaries within which only working, viable scientific agreements are achievable. These boundaries are determined, first of all, by the characteristics of the object of knowledge itself. So, for example, we can agree among ourselves in what units to measure the mass of an electron (in grams, kilograms, pounds, etc.). However, the mass of an electron will not change depending on the units in which we measure it. In addition, these limits (limits to the freedom of scientific conventions) are also dictated by those characteristics that the conventionalists themselves list: simplicity, convenience, familiarity. Indeed, why, for example, is it convenient for us to use Euclidean geometry to describe the spatial characteristics of the macrocosm, that is, the world of the scales familiar to us? - Apparently, not least because this geometry adequately describes them - the spatial characteristics of this world. Note, however, that a deeper consideration of the question of the geometry of various fragments of the world, carried out in the general theory of relativity, leads to the conclusion that different fragments of reality are characterized by different (non-Euclidean) geometries.

We also note that in recent decades, the philosophy of science has significantly increased interest in those aspects of science that are a consequence, the result of scientific agreements, and the understanding of the high significance of scientific agreements in the life of the scientific community has strengthened. Let us mention in this connection the concept of scientific consensus. This concept is intensively used in modern philosophy of science. In particular, it is necessary to describe the significance for the real process of scientific knowledge not only of the relationship "the subject of scientific knowledge - the object (subject) of scientific knowledge", but also the relationship of different subjects of scientific knowledge, to describe the significance of scientific communications. This concept is necessary for understanding many processes important for science: giving some scientific hypothesis the status of a scientific theory, accepting some empirical data as reliable, choosing the most true one from several competing theories, making a decision on financing a particular scientific project, etc. Of course, any scientific consensus has a socio-culturally determined and historically transient character. But the very presence of consensus in science is absolutely inevitable. The significance and inevitability of the presence of consensus in science is explained, in particular, by the always underdetermined nature of scientific concepts, problems and statements. Overcoming this underdetermination is achieved through scientific consensus, through the adoption of an individual or group decision, which has a cognitive-volitional character.

The American philosopher and methodologist of science Paul Feyerabend (1924-1994) is also very critical of the concept of truth and the possibility of its achievement. He developed an approach that can be characterized as epistemological anarchism. One of the principles of this approach is the principle of proliferation (multiplication) of theories. This principle, Feyerabend points out, "calls for the creation and development of theories that are incompatible with accepted points of view, even if the latter are highly confirmed and generally accepted." New theories must compete with old theories. And, in turn, they will be crowded with even newer theories. Moreover, according to Feyerabend, the greater or lesser authority of theories depends not only (and perhaps not so much) on their internal perfection and the degree of their empirical confirmation, but also on the propaganda activities of the creators and supporters of the corresponding theories. As a result, he comes to the conclusion that knowledge (including scientific knowledge) is not a process that brings us closer to some ideal, to truth. “Knowledge,” writes P. Feyerabend, “in this case turns out to be an ocean of ever-increasing alternatives, each of which forces others to clarify their points of view, and all of them together contribute - thanks to the process of competition - to the development of the power of our thinking.”

truth coherence conventionalist

Is truth achievable

The numerous difficulties in reaching the truth, or even its unattainability, have been spoken of throughout the history of philosophy. The arguments of skeptics, relativists and agnostics are well known. These arguments are serious enough and deserve an equally serious discussion. Among them is an indication of infinity, the inexhaustibility of the universe, on the one hand, and the finiteness of the experience of man and mankind at any stage of its development, on the other. Among them is the emphasis on the historical variability and socio-cultural conditionality of the knowledge that a person has. Here - a statement of the fact that knowledge and knowledge is always subjective, subjectively loaded. That is, cognition and knowledge inevitably bear the stamp of personal and socio-cultural characteristics of the subject of cognition. If we have in mind precisely philosophical knowledge, then the unattainability of truth in it is evidenced, as it seems, by continuous discussions between representatives of different philosophical schools and trends and a kind of “proliferation” of philosophical concepts that has continued throughout the history of philosophy. The great philosopher of the twentieth century, Martin Heidegger, writes in this connection: “Do we not see ... in the whole history of philosophy, with regard to its efforts to achieve absolute truth and certainty, constantly one catastrophe after another? Thinkers like Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz and Hegel have to put up with being refuted by some doctoral student.” Therefore, many modern philosophers believe that philosophy should abandon claims to achieve truth and be just a worldview sermon.

It seems, however, that such a position is unnecessarily categorical, one-sided, straightforward. Its foundation is the unacceptable identification of truth with absolute truth, understood in the context of epistemology as complete, exhaustive and final knowledge about the world and man. The unattainability of such - absolute - truth seems undoubted in the light of the recognition of infinity, the inexhaustibility of the universe. Absolute truth is a representative of the series, which also includes other absolutes: absolute freedom, absolute goodness, absolute justice, absolute meaning. One can hope to achieve these absolutes, in fact, only within the framework of a religious (or quasi-religious) worldview. Achieving them by a man would mean that he ceased to be a man and became God. If, however, one does not identify truth with absolute truth and consider that truth is always commensurate with a person, that it is an attribute of a person, then the claims of a person (humanity) to achieve truth, to possess it, are quite legitimate. Then it is quite legitimate to say that a person can not only seek, find and create truths, but also that a person has truths. He possesses them, if only because he lives, acts, achieves practical success, and, all the more, because he manages (however, not always and not in all respects) to realize himself as a person. By striving to be a man, a man acquires the truth. Thus, man is the creator, bearer and criterion of truth.

Returning to epistemology, it should be emphasized: of course, the truths that a person (humanity) possesses must be characterized as historically and socio-culturally determined and limited, as relative, partial and even subjective. At first glance, these characteristics - historical and socio-cultural conditioning, limitation, relativity, partiality, subjectivity - cannot be characteristic of true knowledge. Is not independence from the subject, objectivity, an essential sign of truth? Is not truth equally true for man, angel, God? - Let's not rush to conclusions. Let us consider whether the subjectivity of knowledge is compatible with its objectivity.

First of all, we note that this issue has already been touched upon by us above. Here we add only a few explanations to what has been said. First, the subject of cognition is multilevel and diversely rooted in the universe. Thus, for example, in philosophy, in epistemology in particular, they have long spoken of an empirical subject and a transcendental subject. It is clear that the empirical subject, to a much greater extent than the transcendental one, is burdened with its own subjective, individual characteristics (these should include the features of the physiology and psychology of this empirical subject, the uniqueness of his interests, the specifics of his education and upbringing, etc.). The transcendental subject is a kind of invariant present in every empirical subject. In relation to epistemology, the transcendental subject is a synthesis of the basic cognitive abilities of a person: sensuality, reason, reason, imagination, memory, etc. In other words, the transcendental epistemological subject is freed from many characteristics of the empirical epistemological subject, characteristics that distort, deform the process and result of cognition. Therefore, obviously, the result of cognition carried out by a transcendental subject will be objective to a much greater extent than the result of cognition carried out by an empirical subject. Since the transcendental subject is present in every empirical subject of cognition, in every person, every person, at least potentially, can achieve knowledge of a high degree of objectivity. Of course, the transcendental subject remains a subject. But, apparently, this is the subjectivity that is attributively inherent in man. Man can overcome such subjectivity only by ceasing to be a man. We do not consider such a possibility here.

The substantiation of the compatibility of the characteristics of subjectivity and objectivity of true knowledge can be continued, bearing in mind the already mentioned diverse rootedness of man in the existence of the universe. We have already written that it is possible to substantiate the knowability of the universe and, accordingly, the legitimacy of human claims to achieve true knowledge only by considering cognition and knowledge as ontological phenomena. It was also said there that knowledge is a special form of self-disclosure of the universe, realized through the cognitive ability of a person. In other words, in a certain sense, the knowledge of the universe by man is the realization of self-knowledge of the universe. Cognition of the universe by man, in this way, is an ontological, objective process. This process has the deepest (subhuman, including) origins and is woven into many other (individual and social) processes that a person performs.

Here we should definitely mention one of the actively developing areas of epistemology in recent decades - evolutionary epistemology. In the spirit of this epistemology, the late K.R. Popper, K. Lorentz, J. Piaget. The essence of this epistemology is well disclosed in the book by K. Hahlweg and K. Hooker. These authors state: "The development of knowledge is a direct continuation of evolutionary development, and the dynamics of these two processes are identical." “We believe,” they continue, “that the structures and processes that we wish to reveal explain the entire evolution of life on the planet, from the formation of cells (and probably from the chemical evolution that preceded this) to the formation of cultures.”

In other words, from the point of view of supporters of evolutionary epistemology, the evolution of human cognition, in particular, the evolution of scientific cognition, is a part and stage of a single evolutionary process that includes both biological evolution and human cultural evolution.

We consider evolutionary epistemology as an important component of the ontological foundation of cognition and knowledge. It is worth emphasizing that the ideological basis of evolutionary epistemology can be extended to a wider range of processes than biological and cultural evolution. In this case, we are talking about prebiological evolution, about the processes of self-organization that prepared the formation of biological systems. We are talking, accordingly, about the currently intensively developing research on self-organization processes, we are talking about synergetics. If we keep in mind such a - broad - version of evolutionary epistemology, then we can say that the evolution of human cognition is a part and stage of a single process of evolution of the Universe in which we live and which we know.

Of course, evolutionary epistemology still has a lot to do to demonstrate the unity of the development of human knowledge and the various stages, levels and forms of the evolution of the Universe. It needs to free itself from attempts to reduce the process of human cognition to certain forms of biological activity, from straightforward transfers of the categories and principles of synergetics to the sphere of epistemology. We are by no means inclined to absolutize its current explanatory and heuristic possibilities. But, firstly, we are also not inclined to underestimate them: what has already been achieved by evolutionary epistemology inspires a certain optimism. Secondly, as we have already noted, this version of epistemology is valuable for its strategy of ontological substantiation of the knowability of the world, the legitimacy of human claims to achieve true knowledge.

In order to reveal the essence of truth and to substantiate the possibility of a person achieving true knowledge, it is necessary, in our opinion, to use the category of measure.

It is well known that in the history of philosophy (in Hegel's system, for example), the category of measure was closely associated with the categories of quality and quantity. The measure, therefore, fixes the unity, the interdependence of the qualitative and quantitative characteristics of the subject of interest to us. We can say that it is an expression of the essence, the certainty of this subject. In other words, in order to truly know an object, we need to comprehend our own measure of this object. It is necessary, as K. Marx pointed out in his time, to approach each object in accordance with its own measure. It can also be said that the true approach (theoretical or practical) of a person to an object (subject), which is based on taking into account both the human measure (the measure of the subject), and the measure of this object. At the same time, it is very important not to attribute, not to impose on the object being studied the measures inherent in this subject of cognitive activity. The danger of such attribution and imposition is quite real. Already Protagoras, as we remember, asserted an anthropocentric view of the process of cognition. "The measure of all things is man!" he proudly proclaimed. Max Stirner, in his acclaimed book The One and His Property, went even further. “Not a person, but I am the measure of all things,” wrote the German philosopher, developing a purely subjectivist, frankly egocentric position. We know what the movement along the anthropocentric path has led mankind to. Attempts to forcibly impose a subjectivistically distorted human measure on earthly nature - isn't this the main reason for the current deepest ecological crisis. By the way, in the considered plan, the approach that could be associated with the name of Plato is not more preferable. According to this approach, "God is the measure of all things." Indeed, as shown by L. Feuerbach, Z. Freud and many other thinkers, theocentrism is a kind of hidden anthropocentrism. In any case, the approaches of Protagoras (Stirner) and Plato can be characterized as varieties of the monistic point of view, which asserts the existence of some single, universal (human for Protagoras or divine for Plato) “for all things” measure. Such a point of view, as already mentioned, leads to the “imposition” of some particular measure on the entire universe. It tries to present the particular (or particular) as universal. It is she who serves as the basis for the identification of truth with absolute truth. It is she who serves as the basis for the narrowly pragmatic, "master's" attitude of man to nature. The monistic (in the indicated sense) point of view does not meet the requirements of modern knowledge, nor the requirements of modern practice. It should obviously be replaced by a pluralistic point of view, based on the recognition of the multidimensionality (not to say "infinite-dimensionality") of any fragment of reality.

This - pluralistic - approach emphasizes the multi-level and multi-formity (multi-dimensionality, infinite-dimensionality) of each object, as well as the multi-level and multi-formity (multi-dimensionality, infinite-dimensionality) of a person. Recognition of the multidimensionality (and, moreover, infinity) of the universe leads to the recognition of the relativity, limitation and variability of all human truths. It can be said that within the framework of the pluralistic approach, truth appears as a fundamentally unfinished process of harmonizing the variety of measures inherent in man and the variety of measures characteristic of the universe. Such harmonization, of course, can be carried out only on the basis of a synthesis of the most diverse - scientific and non-scientific - types of cognitive practices.

Hosted on Allbest.ru

...