Home Roses Truth and myths about detachments. Partisan commanders of the great patriotic war detachments of the nkvd

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Truth and myths about detachments. Partisan commanders of the great patriotic war detachments of the nkvd

(ON THE EXAMPLE OF THE NORTHWESTERN THEATER OF MILITARY ACTIONS IN 1941)

The purpose, history of formation and actions of barrage detachments in the North-Western theater of military operations in 1941 are considered.

One of the little-studied pages in the history of the Great Patriotic War is the activity of barrage detachments. In Soviet times, this issue was covered with a veil of secrecy. According to the "Rules for maintaining military secrets in the press of the Red Army (for wartime)", approved by the order of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky No. 034 dated February 15, 1944:

14. All information about the barrage detachments, penal battalions and companies "

A similar order was maintained after the end of the war. It is not surprising that with the beginning of the perestroika "revelations" in the public opinion a certain ominous image of "executioners from the NKVD" was formed, shooting the retreating Red Army soldiers from machine guns.

In the last decade, a number of publications have been published with an attempt to analyze the history of barrage units based on archival documents (for example). However, the issue remains poorly understood. Thus, a widespread misconception is that the barrage detachments appeared only after the publication of the famous order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 227 of July 28, 1942.

Due to the vastness of the topic, it is impossible to consider it within the framework of one publication. In this article, we will restrict ourselves to the history of the creation and use of barrage detachments in the North-Western theater of operations in 1941. Thus, the scope of research includes:

The North-Western Front, formed on June 22, 1941, on the basis of the command and control forces of the Baltic Special Military District.

The Northern Front, formed on June 24, 1941, on the basis of the command and control and troops of the Leningrad Military District. Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command No. 001199 of August 23, 1941, the Northern Front was divided into the Karelian and Leningrad fronts.

The Baltic Fleet, which was from June 28, 1941, under the operational control of the Northern Front, and from August 30, 1941, under the operational control of the Leningrad Front.

Volkhov front, formed on December 17, 1941, i.e. two weeks before the end of the period in question is beyond the scope of this article.

In early February 1941, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs was divided into the NKVD itself and the People's Commissariat for State Security (NKGB). At the same time, military counterintelligence, in accordance with the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of February 8, 1941, was separated from the NKVD and transferred to the People's Commissars of Defense and the Navy of the USSR, where the Third Directorates of the NKO of the USSR and the NKVMF of the USSR were created.

On June 27, 1941, the Third Directorate of the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense issued directive No. 35523 on the work of its bodies in wartime. Among other things, it provided for "the organization of mobile control and barrage detachments on roads, railway junctions, for clearing forests, etc., allocated by the command with the inclusion of operational workers of the Third Directorate in their composition with the tasks of:

a) detention of deserters;

b) the arrest of all suspicious elements that have penetrated the front line;

c) a preliminary investigation carried out by operational workers of the organs of the Third Directorate of NCOs (1-2 days) with the subsequent transfer of the material together with the detainees by jurisdiction. "

In pursuance of this directive, on June 28, on the North-Western Front, a control and barrage detachment of the NKVD troops was created to guard the rear of the Army in the field. On July 2, 1941, it was disbanded, and instead of it, the 1st barrage detachment of the NKVD troops was created to guard the rear of the Army in the field.

In July 1941, the NKVD and the NKGB were united. On July 17, 1941, by the decree of the State Defense Committee No. 187ss, the bodies of the Third Directorate of the NCO were transformed into special departments and also transferred to the subordination of the NKVD. This contributed to the establishment of a closer connection between them and the territorial bodies of state security. At the same time, special departments are given the right to arrest deserters, and, if necessary, to shoot them on the spot.

The next day, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria, in his directive No. 169, explained the tasks of the special departments as follows: , deserters and all kinds of alarmists and disorganizers.

A ruthless reprisal against alarmists, cowards, deserters who undermine the power and defame the honor of the Red Army is just as important as the fight against espionage and sabotage. "

To ensure operational measures, by order of the NKVD of the USSR No. 00941 of July 19, 1941, separate rifle platoons were formed under special divisions of divisions and corps, separate rifle companies were formed under special divisions of the armies, and separate rifle battalions manned by the NKVD troops under special front divisions. ...

In carrying out their tasks, special departments, in particular, set up barrage detachments in the rear of our troops, as evidenced by, for example, "Instructions for special departments of the NKVD of the North-Western Front to combat deserters, cowards and alarmists":

Special departments of the division, corps, army, in the fight against deserters, cowards and alarmists, carry out the following measures:

a) organize a barrage service by setting up ambushes, posts and patrols on military roads, refugee roads and other traffic routes in order to exclude the possibility of any infiltration of military personnel who have left their combat positions without permission;

b) carefully check each detained commander and Red Army soldier in order to identify deserters, cowards and alarmists who fled from the battlefield;

c) all identified deserters are immediately arrested and an investigation is conducted to bring them to trial by a military tribunal. To complete the investigation within 12 hours;

d) all servicemen lagging behind a part are organized by platoon (port) and, under the command of verified commanders, accompanied by a representative of a special department, are sent to the headquarters of the corresponding division;

e) in especially exceptional cases, when the situation requires decisive measures to immediately restore order at the front, the head of the special department is given the right to shoot the deserters on the spot. The head of the special department reports each such case to the special department of the army and front;

f) carry out the verdict of the military tribunal on the spot, and, if necessary, in front of the formation;

g) keep a quantitative record of all those detained and sent to the unit and a personal record of all those arrested and convicted;

h) every day they inform the special department of the army and the special department of the front about the number of detainees, arrested, convicted, as well as the number of commanders, Red Army men and materiel transferred to the unit. "

The next document is the directive of the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR No. 39212 of July 28, 1941 on strengthening the work of barrage detachments to identify and expose enemy agents deployed across the front line. In particular, it says:

“One of the serious means of identifying the agents of German intelligence sent to us are organized barrage detachments, which must carefully check all servicemen without exception, unorganizedly sneaking from the front into the front line, as well as servicemen, in groups or alone, entering other units.

However, the available materials indicate that the work of the barrage detachments is not yet sufficiently organized, the check of the detained persons is carried out superficially, often not by the operational staff, but by the military.

In order to identify and mercilessly destroy enemy agents in the Red Army, I propose:

1. Strengthen the work of the barrage detachments, for which purpose experienced operational workers should be allocated to the detachments. Establish, as a rule, that interrogation of all detainees, without exception, should be carried out only by operatives.

2. All persons returning from German captivity, both detained by barrage detachments and identified by agents and other means, should be arrested and thoroughly interrogated about the circumstances of capture and escape or release from captivity.

If the investigation does not obtain information about their involvement in the German intelligence agencies, release such persons from custody and send them to the front in other units, establishing constant surveillance over them both by the organs of the special department and by the unit commissar. "

On the daily work of the barrage detachments in the first months of the war, the memorandum of the head of the 3rd department of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, divisional commissar Lebedev No. 21431 dated December 10, 1941, to the Military Council of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, gives a presentation. A defensive detachment under the 3rd Division of the Baltic Fleet was formed in June 1941. It was a maneuvering company equipped with vehicles. To strengthen it, on the initiative of the 3rd department, two homemade armored vehicles were manufactured at one of the enterprises in Tallinn.

Initially, the detachment operated on the territory of Estonia. In order to combat desertion, barriers were set up on the roads leading to Tallinn and Leningrad. However, since the land front at that time was far enough, there were few cases of desertion in the area of responsibility. In this regard, the main efforts of the detachment and the group of operational workers attached to it were aimed at combating the gangs of Estonian nationalists hiding in the forests and swamps. A significant number of small gangs, consisting mainly of members of the Kaitseliit organization, operated on the highways, attacking small units of the Red Army and individual military personnel.

As a result of the work of the detachment in the first days of the war in the Loksa area, six bandits were caught, one of them was killed while trying to escape. According to intelligence reports, three people were arrested at the same time on charges of aiding the bandits.

Practice has shown that in the areas where gangs operate, it is very important to have informants in grocery stores, cafes and canteens in small settlements, since gangsters from time to time were forced to buy food, matches, cartridges, etc., sending their representatives. During one of these visits to a rural grocery store, four bandits were discovered by two scouts from the detachment. Despite the numerical superiority, the latter tried to delay them. As a result, one of the bandits was killed in a shootout, two managed to escape, the fourth, although, as it turned out, he was the Estonian champion in running in the past, did not manage to escape. He was wounded, captured and taken to the 3rd department.

The round-ups carried out by the detachment, combing the terrain, secrets and outposts significantly hampered the actions of the Estonian gangs, and the cases of armed attacks in those areas controlled by the detachment sharply decreased.

When the Virtsu Peninsula was liberated as a result of a counterstrike by the 8th Army in mid-July 1941, a platoon of a detachment detachment and a group of operational workers left for this area to carry out an operation to clear the peninsula of persons hostile to the Soviet regime and assisting the Nazis. On the way to Virtsu, a detachment platoon suddenly crashed into a German outpost, located at a fork in the Virtsu-Pärnu roads, on the Karuse farm. The platoon was fired upon by the enemy's rifle, machine-gun and mortar fire, dismounted and accepted the battle. As a result of the battle, the Germans, leaving the anti-tank gun, machine gun and ammunition, hastily retreated. The losses of the detachment were 6 killed and 2 wounded.

Having transferred the defense of the recaptured sector to regular units, the detachment platoon arrived in Virtsu. The task force immediately began work, as a result of which the head of the local organization "Kaitseliit", two former members of this organization who were members of the "self-defense" formation created by the German command, the owner of a local restaurant who was used by the Germans as a translator, as well as a provocateur who betrayed the fascist authorities two agents of our border guard. Six informants were recruited among the population of Virtsu.

In the same period, an operation was carried out to clear the bands from Cape Varbla and the village. Tystamaa, Pärnovsk district. Two platoons of the blocking detachment, reinforced with armored vehicles, together with a fighter battalion, seized the indicated settlements in battle, defeating the "self-defense" headquarters and capturing a heavy machine gun, 60 bicycles, over 10 telephones, several hunting rifles and rifles. Among the bandits there were killed and wounded, the captured 4 bandits were shot on the spot. Our losses are 1 killed.

In Tallinn, a detachment uncovered and liquidated a counter-revolutionary organization that was recruiting the local population into gangs. At the same time, weapons and explosives were seized.

In addition to the fight against banditry and desertion, the task force of the detachment launched work to send our agents into the German rear. Of the abandoned three agents, two returned. Having infiltrated the occupied city of Pärnu, they found out the location of German military installations. Using this information, the aviation of the Baltic Fleet successfully bombed enemy targets. In addition, information was collected about the local servants of the occupiers from among the Estonian nationalists.

During the battle for Tallinn, the detachment not only stopped and returned the retreating to the front, but also held the defensive lines. A particularly difficult situation developed on the afternoon of August 27. Separate parts of the 8th Army, having lost their leadership, leaving the last line of defense, fled. To restore order, not only a detachment was thrown, but also the entire operational staff of the 3rd department. The retreating, under threat of weapons, stopped and, as a result of the counterattack, threw the enemy back 7 kilometers. This played a decisive role in the successful evacuation of Tallinn.

The fact that the NKVD fighters did not hide behind other people's backs is evidenced by the losses suffered by the detachment during the battles for Tallinn - over 60% of the personnel, including almost all commanders.

Arriving in Kronstadt, the detachment immediately began to replenish and already on September 7, 1941 sent one platoon with two operatives to serve on the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland, and by September 18 the coast from Oranienbaum to the village. The estuary was fully serviced by the detachment.

In total, from the beginning of the war to November 22, 1941. the detachment detained over 900 people, of whom 77 were arrested and convicted. 11 people were shot on the spot or in front of the formation.

Their "land" colleagues operating in the vicinity of the Baltic Fleet detachment also fought against Estonian nationalists. From the special message of the special department of the NKVD of the Northern Front No. 131142 dated July 24, 1941 to the Front Military Council about the activities of the special department of the NKVD of the 8th Army to eliminate bandit groups in Estonia: “On July 15, 1941, two a spy from the local population who informed the enemy about the location of our units. Spies were shot on the spot. "

By the beginning of September 1941, the military situation had deteriorated significantly. In this situation, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, by directive No. 001650 of September 5, 1941, satisfied the request of the commander of the Bryansk Front, Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko: “The headquarters has read your memorandum and allows you to create barrage detachments in those divisions that have proven themselves to be unstable. The purpose of the barrage detachments is to prevent unauthorized withdrawal of units, and in case of flight, stop them, using weapons if necessary. "

A week later, a similar practice was extended to all fronts. "Directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 001919 to the commander of the fronts, armies, division commanders, the commander-in-chief of the South-Western direction on the creation of barrage detachments in rifle divisions" read:

The experience of fighting German fascism has shown that in our rifle divisions there are many panicky and outright hostile elements that, at the very first pressure from the enemy, drop their weapons and begin to shout: "We are surrounded!" and carry away the rest of the fighters. As a result of such actions of these elements, the division takes to flight, throws the material part and then begins to leave the forest alone. Similar phenomena are taking place on all fronts. If the commanders and commissars of such divisions were at the height of their task, alarmist and hostile elements could not have gained the upper hand in the division. But the trouble is that we do not have so many firm and stable commanders and commissars.

In order to prevent the above undesirable phenomena at the front, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:

1. In each rifle division, have a defensive detachment of reliable fighters, no more than a battalion (in the calculation of 1 company per rifle regiment), subordinate to the division commander and having at his disposal, in addition to conventional weapons, vehicles in the form of trucks and several tanks or armored vehicles.

2. The tasks of the barrage detachment are to consider direct assistance to the command staff in maintaining and establishing firm discipline in the division, stopping the flight of servicemen obsessed with panic, without stopping before using weapons, eliminating the initiators of panic and flight, supporting the honest and fighting elements of the division, not subject to panic, but carried away by the general flight.

3. To oblige the workers of special departments and the political personnel of the divisions to provide all kinds of assistance to the commanders of divisions and barrage detachments in strengthening the order and discipline of the division.

4. To complete the creation of barrage detachments within five days from the date of receipt of this order.

5. Report on receipt and execution by the commander of the fronts and armies.

Headquarters of the Supreme Command

I. Stalin

B. Shaposhnikov ".

In contrast to the barrage detachments that continued to exist under the special departments of the NKVD, focused mainly on the detention of deserters and suspicious elements, army detachments were created with the aim of preventing unauthorized withdrawal of units. These units were much larger (battalion per division instead of platoon), and their personnel were recruited not from NKVD servicemen, but from ordinary Red Army men. So, according to the staff of the barrage battalion of the 10th Infantry Division of the Leningrad Front, it should have 342 people (the commanding staff - 24, the junior commanding staff - 26, the rank and file - 292). However, the actual number of barrage battalions, as a rule, was much lower.

Table 1

The number of barrage battalions of rifle divisions of the Leningrad Front and their equipment with automatic weapons

Report date	Number of personnel	Heavy machine guns











		No information

As you can see from the table. 1, only in one of the nine divisions the number of the barrage battalion corresponded to the regular one. A very indicative example is the 43rd division, which suffered heavy losses in the December battles (as of January 1, 1942, its personnel totaled only 1165 people). It is obvious that the barrage battalion of the division, the number of which dropped to 64 people, did not avoid serious combat losses.

Simultaneously with the creation of barrage battalions of divisions, a decree of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front No. 00274 of September 18, 1941 "On strengthening the fight against desertion and the penetration of enemy elements into the territory of Leningrad" was issued. In this document, signed by the commander of the Leningrad Front, Army General G.K. Zhukov and members of the military council of the front A.A. Zhdanov and 2nd secretary A.A. Kuznetsov, in particular, was prescribed:

"5. To the head of the OVT (Protection of the military rear. - I.P.) of the Leningrad Front, Lieutenant General Comrade. Stepanov should organize four barrage detachments to concentrate and check all the servicemen detained without documents.

The head of the rear of the Leningrad Front, Lieutenant General Comrade Mordvinov to organize feeding points at these barrage detachments. " Indeed, these four barrage detachments were immediately created.

Nowadays it is often asserted that the barrage detachments did nothing but shoot at their own people. In this case, it is completely incomprehensible why they should organize feeding points with them? To feed those being shot before execution?

In October 1941, the North-Western Front, together with the troops of the Kalinin and Western fronts, thwarted the enemy command's plan to bypass Moscow from the north. At the same time, according to a special message from the head of the special department of the NKVD of the North-Western Front, State Security Commissioner of the 3rd rank V.M. Bochkov dated October 23, 1941, addressed to the head of the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR, State Security Commissioner of the 3rd rank V.S. Abakumov, during the fighting near the village of Lobanovo, a number of servicemen fled from the battlefield. During October 21, the detachment detained 27 people. In another area near the village of Lobanovo, the detachment detained 100 people, including 5 junior commanders. The vicious deserters were arrested, one was shot in front of the line.

According to the certificate prepared by the deputy. Head of the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR, State Security Commissioner of the 3rd rank S.R. Milstein for the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria, “from the beginning of the war to October 10 of this year. Special departments of the NKVD and barrage detachments of the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear detained 657,364 servicemen who had lagged behind their units and fled from the front.

Of these, 249,969 people were detained by the operational barriers of the Special Departments and 407,395 servicemen were detained by the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear.

Of the detainees, the Special Departments arrested 25,878 people, the remaining 632,486 people were formed in units and sent back to the front.

According to the decisions of the Special Departments and the sentences of the Military Tribunals, 10,201 people were shot, of which 3321 people were shot in front of the line.

These data are distributed along the fronts:

Leningradsky: arrested - 1044 shot - 854 shot in front of the formation - 430 Karelian: arrested - 468 shot - 263 shot in front of the formation - 132 Northern: arrested - 1683 shot - 933 shot in front of the formation - 280 North-West: arrested - 3440 shot - 1600 shot in front of the line - 730 ... ”As we can see, the overwhelming majority of the servicemen detained by special departments and barrage detachments were not subjected to repression, but were sent to the front. Only about 4% of them were arrested, including 1.5% were shot.

Thus, under the name "barrage detachment" in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, formations of different subordination acted. Barrage detachments detained deserters and a suspicious element in the rear, and stopped retreating troops. In a critical situation, they themselves entered into battle with the Germans, often suffering heavy losses.

Bibliography:

Kokurin A., Petrov N. NKVD: structure, functions, personnel. Article two (1938-1941) // Free thought. - 1997. - No. 7.

Lubyanka in the days of the battle for Moscow: Materials of the USSR state security agencies from the Central archive of the FSB of Russia / Comp. A.T. Zhadobin et al. - Moscow: Zvonnitsa Publishing House, 2002. - 480 p.

RGANI. Form 89. Op. 18. D.8. L.1-3. Cit. Quoted from: Lubyanka. Stalin and the NKVD-NKGB-GUKR "Smersh". 1939 - March 1946 / Stalin's Archives. Documents of the highest bodies of party and state power. - M .: International Fund "Democracy", 2006. - S. 317-318. (636 s.)

State security bodies of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. T.2. Start. Book 1. June 22 - August 31, 1941. - M .: Publishing house "Rus", 2000. - 717 p.

State security bodies of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. T.2. Start. Book 2. September 1 - December 31, 1941. - M .: Publishing house "Rus", 2000. - 699 p.

Appendix No. 1 to the order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs No. 0205-1956. List No. 1 of directorates, formations, units, subdivisions and institutions of the NKVD troops that were part of the Army in the field during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. - B. m., 1956 .-- 100 p.

Pykhalov I.V. Great slandered war. - M .: Yauza, Eksmo, 2005 .-- 480 p.

Russian archive: Great Patriotic War: Orders of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR (1943-1945). - T. 13 (2-3). - M .: TERRA, 1997 .-- 456 p.

Soviet military encyclopedia: in 8 volumes. Vol. 2 / Ch. ed. commission. A.A. Grechko. - Moscow: Military Publishing, 1976 .-- 639 p.

Soviet military encyclopedia: in 8 volumes. Vol. 7 / Ch. ed. commission. N.V. Ogarkov. - Moscow: Military Publishing, 1979 .-- 687 p.

Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense (TsAMO). F.217. Op. 1221. D.5.

TsAMO. F.217. Op. 1221. D.94.

Since the time of the Khrushchev "thaw", a myth was born about the barrage detachments of the NKVD, which fired machine guns at the retreating units of the Red Army. After the collapse of the USSR, these nonsense flourished.

In addition, the supporters of this lie also argue that most of the population of the USSR did not want to fight, they were forced to defend the Stalinist regime "on pain of death." By this they insult the memory of our valiant ancestors.

The concept of a detachment is rather vague - "a permanent or temporary military formation created to perform a combat or special mission." It fits well under the definition of "special forces".

During the Great Patriotic War, the composition, functions, departmental affiliation of the barrage detachments were constantly changing. In early February 1941, the NKVD was divided into the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the People's Commissariat for State Security (NKGB). Military counterintelligence was separated from the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and transferred to the People's Commissariat for Defense of the USSR Navy, where the Third Directorates of the NKO and the NKVMF of the USSR were created. On July 27, 1941, the Third Directorate of the NCO issued a directive on its work in wartime.

According to the directive, mobile control-barrage detachments were organized, they were supposed to detain deserters, suspicious elements at the front line. They received the right to preliminary investigation, after which the detainees were handed over to the judicial authorities.

In July 1941, the NKVD and the NKGB were again united, the organs of the Third Directorate of the NKO were transformed into special departments and transferred to the subordination of the NKVD. Special departments received the right to arrest deserters and, if necessary, shoot them. Special departments had to fight spies, traitors, deserters, saboteurs, alarmists, cowards. By order of the NKVD No. 00941 of July 19, 1941, separate rifle platoons were created under the special divisions of divisions and corps, and under the special divisions of the armies - companies, at the fronts - battalions, they were manned by the troops of the NKVD.

These units became the so-called "barrage detachments". They had the right to organize a barrage service in order to prevent the flight of deserters, carefully check the documents of all servicemen, arrest deserters and conduct an investigation (within 12 hours) and transfer the case to a military tribunal. To send stragglers to their units, in exceptional cases, to immediately restore order at the front, the head of the special department received the right to shoot deserters.

In addition, the barrage detachments were supposed to identify and destroy enemy agents, check those who escaped from German captivity.

Fighting bandits

Among the daily tasks of the barrage detachments was the fight against bandits. So, in June 1941, at the third division of the Baltic Fleet, a detachment was formed - it was a maneuverable company on vehicles, reinforced with two armored cars. He operated on the territory of Estonia. Since there were almost no cases of desertion in the zone of responsibility, the detachment with a group of operatives was thrown into the fight against the Estonian Nazis. Their small gangs attacked individual servicemen and small units on the roads.

The actions of the detachment significantly reduced the activity of the Estonian bandits. The detachment also took part in the "cleansing" of the Virtsu peninsula, which was liberated in mid-July 1941 by a counterstrike of the 8th Army. On the way, the detachment met a German outpost, defeated it in battle. He carried out an operation to destroy the bandits in the Varla borough and the village. Tystamaa, Pärnovsky district, destroyed the counter-revolutionary organization in Tallinn. In addition, the detachment participated in reconnaissance activities, throwing three agents behind enemy lines. Two returned, they found out the location of the German military installations, they were attacked by the aviation of the Baltic Fleet.

During the battle for Tallinn, the detachment not only stopped and returned the fleeing, but itself held the defense. It was especially difficult on August 27, some parts of the 8th Army fled, the detachment stopped them, a counterattack was organized, the enemy was thrown back - this played a decisive role in the successful evacuation of Tallinn. During the battles for Tallinn, more than 60% of the detachment's personnel and almost all of the commanders were killed! And these are cowardly bastards who shoot their own people?

In Kronstadt, the detachment was restored, and from September 7, he continued to serve. Special departments of the Northern Front also fought the bandits.

Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command of September 5, 1941

By the beginning of September 1941, the military situation again sharply deteriorated, so the Headquarters, at the request of the commander of the Bryansk Front, General A.I. Eremenko, allowed the creation of detachments in those divisions that proved to be unstable. A week later, this practice was extended to all fronts. The number of detachments was one battalion per division, one company per regiment. They were subordinate to the division commander and had vehicles for movement, several armored cars and tanks. Their task was to help the commanders, maintain discipline and order in the units. They had the right to use weapons to stop the flight and eliminate the initiators of the panic.

That is, their difference from the detachments under the special departments of the NKVD, which were created to fight deserters and suspicious elements, is that army units were created in order to prevent unauthorized flight of units. They were larger (a battalion for a division, not a platoon), they were manned not from the NKVD fighters, but from the Red Army. They had the right to shoot the initiators of panic and flight, and not shoot those who flee.

As of October 10, 1941, special departments and detachments detained 657,364 people, 25,878 of them were arrested, 10,201 of them were shot. The rest are again sent to the front.

Barrage detachments also played a role in the defense of Moscow. In parallel with the barrage divisional battalions, detachments of special divisions existed. Similar units were created by the territorial bodies of the NKVD, for example, in the Kalinin region.

Battle of stalingrad

In connection with the breakthrough of the front and the exit of the Wehrmacht to the Volga and the Caucasus, on July 28, 1942, the famous order No. 227 of the NKO was issued. According to it, it was ordered to create 3-5 detachments in the armies (200 fighters in each), to place them in the immediate rear of unstable units. They also received the right to shoot alarmists and cowards in order to restore order and discipline. They obeyed the Military Councils of the armies, through their special departments. The most experienced commanders of special departments were placed at the head of the detachments, the detachments were provided with transport. In addition, barrage battalions were rebuilt in each division.

By order of the People's Commissariat of Defense No. 227, 193 army detachments were created on October 15, 1942. From 1 August to 15 October 1942, these units detained 140,755 Red Army soldiers. 3980 people were arrested, 1189 of them were shot, the rest were sent to penal units. Most of the arrests and detentions were on the Don and Stalingrad fronts.

The defensive detachments played an important role in restoring order, and returned a significant number of servicemen to the front. For example: on August 29, 1942, the headquarters of the 29th rifle division was surrounded (due to the breakthrough of German tanks), the units, having lost control, retreated in panic. The defensive detachment of Lieutenant GB Filatov stopped the fleeing, returned to defensive positions. In another sector of the division's front, Filatov's detachment stopped the enemy's breakthrough.

On September 20, the Wehrmacht occupied a part of Melikhovskaya, the combined brigade began an unauthorized retreat. The defensive detachment of the 47th Army of the Black Sea Group of Forces restored order in the brigade. The brigade returned to its position and, together with the detachment, threw back the enemy.

That is, the detachments in critical situations did not panic, but put things in order and fought the enemy themselves. On September 13, the 112th Rifle Division yielded its positions under enemy attack. A detachment of the 62nd Army under the command of State Security Lieutenant Khlystov repelled enemy attacks for four days and held the line until reinforcements arrived. On September 15-16, a detachment of the 62nd Army fought for two days in the area of the Stalingrad railway station. The detachment, despite its small number, repulsed the enemy's attacks and itself counterattacked and surrendered the line in inviolability to the units of the approaching 10th Infantry Division.

But there was also the use of the barrage detachments for other purposes, there were commanders who used them as line units, because of this, some detachments lost most of their composition and they had to be formed anew.

During the Battle of Stalingrad, there were three types of barrage detachments: army detachments, created by order number 227, restored barrage battalions of divisions and small detachments of special departments. As before, the overwhelming majority of the detained fighters returned to their units.

Kursk Bulge

By order of the Council of People's Commissars dated April 19, 1943, the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD was again transferred to the NKO and the NKVM and reorganized into the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" ("Death to Spies") of the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense and the Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" of the People's Commissariat of the Navy.

On July 5, 1943, the Wehrmacht began its offensive, some of our units wavered. The detachments have fulfilled their mission here as well. From 5 to 10 July, the detachments of the Voronezh Front detained 1,870 people, arrested 74 people, the rest were returned to their units.

In total, in the report of the head of the counterintelligence department of the Central Front, Major General A. Vadis, dated August 13, 1943, it is indicated that 4501 people were detained, of which 3303 people were sent back to the unit.

On October 29, 1944, by order of the People's Commissar for Defense I.V. Stalin, the detachments were disbanded due to a change in the situation at the front. The personnel was replenished with rifle divisions. In the last period of their existence, they no longer acted according to their profile - there was no need. They were used in the protection of headquarters, communication lines, roads, for combing forests, personnel were often used for logistical needs - cooks, storekeepers, clerks, and so on, although the personnel of these detachments were selected from the best fighters and sergeants awarded with medals and orders, who had extensive combat experience.

Outcome

The detachments performed the most important function, they detained deserters, suspicious persons (among whom there were spies, saboteurs, agents of the Nazis). In critical situations, they themselves entered into battle with the enemy. After a change in the situation at the front (after the Battle of Kursk), the barrage detachments actually began to perform the functions of commandant companies. To stop the fleeing, they had the right to shoot over the heads of the retreating, shoot the initiators and lead them in front of the line. But these cases were not massive, only individual. There is not a single fact that the soldiers of the barrage detachments shot to kill at their own people. There are no such examples in the memoirs of front-line soldiers. In addition, they could prepare an additional defensive line in the rear to stop the retreating and so that they could gain a foothold on it.

The defensive detachments made their contribution to the common Victory, honestly doing their duty.
________________________________
Lubyanka in the days of the battle for Moscow: materials of the USSR state security agencies from the Central archive of the FSB of Russia. Compiled by A. T. Zhadobin. M., 2002.
"Arc of Fire": the Battle of Kursk through the eyes of the Lubyanka. Compiled by A.T. Zhadobin et al. M., 2003.
State security bodies of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. M., 2000.
Toptygin A.V. Unknown Beria. M., SPb., 2002.

Photo: website

The essence of the myth and its use

Back in the 60s of the twentieth century, against the background of the "debunking of the cult of personality" in the kitchens of the country, rumors spread about "terrible executioners" who forced the Red Army men to flee under the fire of the Nazis, shooting them in the back from light machine guns. They began to compose songs about this like:

"This company was advancing through the swamp
And then she was ordered and she went back.
This company was shot with a machine gun
Your own barrage detachment".

"Testimonies of veterans," which no one had seen, began to be passed from mouth to mouth. Like: "My father's cousin, a neighbor's godfather, knows veterans who were driven into battle by the NKVDs with machine guns." From these conversations, a supposedly "fair indignation" began to emerge about "how can we consider both those who fought and those who shot them in the back to be veterans." The spread of this myth was facilitated by the fact that the official authorities were in no hurry to comment on it - we will dwell on the reasons for this behavior below. By the end of the Soviet era, veterans began to retire en masse, and, accordingly, to communicate less in collectives, and after the collapse of the USSR and to this day, to our great regret, they generally became much less. And spreading lies just got easier.

The myth of the "barriers" was actively used to denigrate the memory of the Great Patriotic War during the collapse of the Soviet Union and to justify the "need" for liberal reforms in Russia, Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries. He played especially effectively in Ukraine during the events of 2004-2014. Foaming at the mouth, the nationalists argued that there were practically no "real" veterans left, and those who did exist were allegedly mythical "NKVEDists with machine guns." Even on the 70th anniversary of the Victory, this topic surfaced in almost every third liberal blog. The authors would like - they would figure it out. But they don't want to. Therefore, today the truth is important and needed more than ever. And in order to preserve the self-respect and historical memory of the entire people, and in order to pay tribute to the veterans - both those who are nearby and those who, unfortunately, no longer exist. After all, this myth is a spit in the soul of all who fought. It turns out that do not drive them with machine-gun fire in the back, and there would be no Great Victory? Wouldn't you be at war? Would everyone pass? Isn't that mean to them?

What's the truth?

The myth of the detachments, as mentioned above, is gossip from several fundamentally different phenomena related to the activities of various departments.

At the start of the war, military counterintelligence was part of the People's Commissariat of Defense (analogous to the modern Ministry of Defense). On June 27, 1941, the Third Directorate of the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense issues directive No. 35523 on the work of its bodies in wartime:

"Organization of mobile control and barrage detachments on roads, railway junctions, for clearing forests, etc., allocated by the command, with the inclusion of operational workers of the Third Directorate in their composition with the following tasks:

A) detention of deserters;
b) the arrest of all suspicious elements that have penetrated the front line;
c) a preliminary investigation carried out by operational workers of the organs of the Third Directorate of NCOs (1-2 days) with the subsequent transfer of the material together with the detainees by jurisdiction "(State security organs of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. Vol. 2. Beginning. Book 1. June 22 - August 31, 1941. M., 2000. P.92–93) "

No machine guns and mass shootings. I think everyone can imagine how difficult it was in the immediate rear in the first days of the war. Some of the military units could not withstand the blow and retreated. Some units are in a panic. Individual fighters from recently mobilized residents fled to their homes. Masses of civilian refugees fled eastward. One cannot belittle the heroism and tremendous courage of those who took the first blows and held their positions - both units of the Red Army and the NKVD and the fleet. But there were also those who did not have enough fortitude for this, or who simply became a victim of circumstances.

In addition, the situation was actively used by both criminals-marauders and Nazi saboteurs from the Abwehr and the SS. A significant number of Ukrainian nationalists and immigrants from Russian émigré circles, who were fluent in Russian and Ukrainian, and easily pretended to be local residents, were involved in serving in their special forces. Many were deliberately dressed in Soviet uniforms.

It was these spies, saboteurs, criminals, and deserters that were supposed to be stopped by the employees of the first detachments. In addition, they had, in fact, to help the confused soldiers who had fought back from their units. No one was shot in the back. After the trial, the detainees were either sent to their places of service or residence (civilians), or they were handed over to law enforcement agencies "by jurisdiction."

In July 1941, the NKVD and the NKGB were merged into one structure. The former Third Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense, which was engaged in military counterintelligence, was merged into the NKVD - special departments were formed on its basis. The day after the unification, Lavrentiy Beria signed directive No. 169:

"The meaning of transforming the organs of the Third Directorate into special departments with their subordination to the NKVD is to wage a merciless struggle against spies, traitors, saboteurs, deserters and all kinds of alarmists and disorganizers. Merciless reprisals against alarmists, cowards, deserters who undermine the power and defame the honor of the Red Army is just as important as the fight against espionage and sabotage.".

"The message of the State Security Commissioner of the 3rd rank S. Milstein to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs L.P. Beria on the actions of the Special Departments and barrage detachments of the NKVD troops of the USSR for the period from the beginning of the war to October 10, 1941
Top secret
TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
To the General Commissioner of State Security
to comrade BERIA
REFERENCE

From the beginning of the war to October 10 of this year. Special departments of the NKVD and barrage detachments of the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear detained 657,364 servicemen who had lagged behind their units and fled from the front.
Of these, 249,969 people were detained by the operational barriers of the Special Departments and 407,395 servicemen were detained by the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear.
Of the detainees, the Special Departments arrested 25,878 people, the remaining 632,486 people were formed in units and sent back to the front.
Among those arrested by the Special Departments:
spies - 1505
saboteurs - 308
traitors - 2621
cowards and alarmists - 2643
deserters - 8772
distributors of provocative rumors - 3987
skirmishers - 1671
others - 4371
Total - 25,878
According to the decisions of the Special Departments and the sentences of the Military Tribunals, 10 201 people were shot, 3321 of them were shot in front of the line.
Deputy Beginning Directorate of the OO NKVD of the USSR
State Commissioner security rank 3
Milstein
[October] 1941 "(Toptygin A.V. Unknown Beria. Moscow – St. Petersburg, 2002. P.439–440)."

What does arithmetic tell us this time? Of the 657,364 detained by all kinds of barriers and barriers, about 25,000 were arrested (not shot!). Only 4%! Shot - about 10 thousand - or about 1.5%! And they were shot not by "unauthorized detachments", but by the decision of the courts! Where are the "bloody executioners" ??? Think about it, about 1.5% of the total number of those detained were shot by a court decision.

And now let's return to the topic of the "minelayers" from the NKVD. On July 24, 1941, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a resolution "On measures to combat enemy parachute assault forces and saboteurs in the frontline zone." According to him, the fight against reconnaissance and sabotage groups and enemy paratroopers was assigned to the NKVD. In the NKVD, the posts of front-line and army chiefs of protection of the military rear were introduced. The personnel of the border troops and part of the personnel of the internal troops of the NKVD were transferred to their subordination (the rest, as we already wrote, acted at the front, like ordinary rifle units). In April 1942, in connection with the increase in the number of combat missions performed by the NKVD troops in the frontline zone, an independent Directorate of the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear of the active Red Army was created as part of the GUVV. Their total number was about 45 thousand people. The length of the front was up to 3,000 kilometers, so there was no way to "block" it completely with such forces. Separate outposts operated.

" The purpose of the barrage outposts: a) the fight against desertion, espionage, saboteurs and airborne forces of the enemy; b) the detention of all servicemen who have fought off their units, traveling separately or as part of units, as well as the detention of all suspicious persons ..."

As we can see, the detention of the "strayed" servicemen was categorically not their main task. And "detention" had nothing to do with executions and arrests ...

But the enormous heroism of these warriors should be noted. Their main enemy was the best professionals of the special forces of the Third Reich. In the autumn-winter of 1941, the NKVD troops sent more than 95 thousand Red Army men and commanders to assembly points. 2,500 deserters were also detained. But most of them were sent to assembly points, and only 12 people - under a military tribunal!

A new stage in the activities of the detachments began with the defense of Stalingrad. On July 28, 1942, the famous 227th order of the People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin was issued:

" 2. The military councils of the armies and, above all, the commanders of the armies:

b) to form within the army 3-5 well-armed barrage detachments (200 people in each), put them in the immediate rear of unstable divisions and oblige them to shoot panic-mongers and cowards on the spot in case of panic and indiscriminate withdrawal of divisional units, and thus help honest fighters divisions to fulfill their duty to the Motherland"...

The defensive detachments were subordinate to the Military Councils of the armies through their special departments. They were formed not from the NKVD servicemen, but from the best Red Army men.

The message of the Special Department of the NKVD of the Stalingrad Front to the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR dated August 14, 1942 "On the progress of the implementation of order No. 227 and the response of the personnel of the 4th Panzer Army to it":

" In total, 24 people were shot during the specified period. So, for example, the commanders of the 414 SP, 18 SD, Styrkov and Dobrynin, during the battle, chickened out, abandoned their squads and fled from the battlefield, both were detained by the barriers. by a detachment and a resolution of the Special Division, they were shot in front of the formation.

A Red Army soldier of the same regiment and division Ogorodnikov self-injured his left hand, was exposed for the crime, for which he was brought to trial by a military tribunal.

On the basis of Order No. 227, three army detachments were formed, each with 200 men. These units are fully armed with rifles, machine guns and light machine guns.

Operational workers of special departments were appointed as the chiefs of the detachments.

By the indicated detachments and barrage battalions on 7.8.42, in units and formations in the army sectors, 363 people were detained, of which 93 people. left the encirclement, 146 - lagged behind their units, 52 - lost their units, 12 - came from captivity, 54 - fled from the battlefield, 2 - with dubious wounds.

As a result of a thorough check: 187 people were sent to their units, 43 - to the staffing department, 73 - to special camps of the NKVD, 27 - to penal companies, 2 - to the medical commission, 6 people. arrested and, as indicated above, 24 people. shot in front of the line"...

Isn't the "scale impressive"? This is for two tank corps, several divisions, tens of thousands of personnel ...

In October 1942, 193 army barrage detachments were formed, of which 16 were on the Stalingrad front and 25 on the Donskoy front. About 10 million Red Army men had less than 40 thousand personnel of the barrage detachments. Tell me, could 40 thousand "drive into battle", "shooting in the back," 10 million? The question is rhetorical.

But on the whole, they acted effectively. From August 1 to October 15, 1942, the detachments detained 140,755 servicemen who had escaped from the front line. Of the detainees, 3,980 people were arrested, 1,189 people were shot, 2,776 people were sent to penal companies, 185 people were sent to penal battalions, 131,094 people were returned to their units and to transit points.

On the Volga, the soldiers of the blocking detachments showed miracles of heroism. Moreover, they not only held back the panic, but also fought the enemy themselves in the most difficult and critical areas!

"On August 29, 1942, the headquarters of the 29th Infantry Division of the 64th Army of the Stalingrad Front was surrounded by the enemy tanks that had broken through, parts of the division, having lost control, retreated to the rear in panic. A detachment under the command of State Security Lieutenant Filatov, taking decisive measures, stopped the retreating in disorder In another sector of this division, the enemy tried to break through to the depths of the defense. The detachment entered the battle and delayed the enemy's advance.

On September 14, the enemy launched an offensive against units of the 399th Rifle Division of the 62nd Army. The soldiers and commanders of the 396th and 472nd Rifle Regiments began to retreat in panic. The chief of the detachment, junior lieutenant of state security Elman, ordered his detachment to open fire over the heads of the retreating. As a result, the personnel of these regiments was stopped and two hours later the regiments occupied the former lines of defense.

On September 20, the Germans occupied the eastern outskirts of Melekhovskaya. The composite brigade, under the onslaught of the enemy, began an unauthorized retreat. The actions of the blocking detachment of the 47th Army of the Black Sea Group of Forces put things in order in the brigade. The brigade occupied the previous lines and, on the initiative of the political commander of the company of the same blocking detachment, Pestov, by joint actions with the brigade, the enemy was driven back from Melekhovskaya.

At critical moments, barrage detachments entered directly into battle with the enemy, successfully restraining his onslaught and inflicting losses on him.

So, on September 13, the 112th Rifle Division, under pressure from the enemy, withdrew from the occupied line. A detachment of the 62nd Army, under the leadership of the head of the detachment, Lieutenant of State Security Khlystov, took up defensive positions on the approaches to an important height. For four days, the soldiers and commanders of the detachment repelled the attacks of the enemy machine gunners, inflicting heavy losses on them. The detachment held the line until the arrival of the military units.

On September 15-16, a detachment of the 62nd Army successfully fought a battle with superior enemy forces in the area of the Stalingrad railway station for two days. Despite its small number, the detachment not only repulsed the attacks of the Germans, but also counterattacked, inflicting significant losses on the enemy in manpower. The detachment left its line only when units of the 10th rifle division came to replace them. "

"On October 15, 1942, during fierce battles in the area of the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, the enemy managed to reach the Volga and cut off from the main forces of the 62nd Army the remnants of the 112th Infantry Division, as well as the 115th, 124th and 149th separate rifle divisions. At the same time, among the leading command staff there were repeated attempts to abandon their units and cross over to the eastern bank of the Volga.Under these conditions, to fight cowards and alarmists, a special department of the 62nd Army created an operational group under the leadership of senior operative lieutenant of state security Ignatenko. platoons of special departments with the personnel of the 3rd Army Barrier Detachment, she did an exceptionally great job of putting things in order, arresting deserters, cowards and alarmists who, under various pretexts, tried to cross to the left bank of the Volga. Within 15 days, the task force was detained and returned to the field battle up to 800 private and command personnel, and 15 military personnel by the order of the special agencies, they were shot in front of the formation ".

The army detachments fought very well on the Kursk Bulge.

In 1942 - 1943, the soldiers of the army detachments not only performed barrage functions and not only fought on the front line, but actively assisted the military counterintelligence agencies in identifying enemy spies and saboteurs.

By 1944, the army leadership, which already often used obstacle detachments, as a reserve or as ordinary commandant units, completely stopped using them "for their intended purpose" in the absence of such a need. In October 1944, they, as such, were eliminated.

The lie about the detachment units rages the real veterans. During the war, many of them did not encounter the activities of the detachments at all, and if they did, it was very rare.

" Yes, there were barrage detachments. But I do not know that any of them fired at their own people, at least in our sector of the front. Already now I have requested archival documents in this regard, no such documents were found. The detachments were located at a distance from the front line, covered the troops from the rear from saboteurs and enemy troops, detained deserters, who, unfortunately, were; put things in order at the crossings, sent soldiers who had strayed from their units to assembly points. I will say more, the front received replenishment, of course, not fired, as they say, not smelling gunpowder, and the barrage detachments, consisting exclusively of soldiers already fired upon, the most persistent and courageous, were, as it were, a reliable and strong shoulder of the elder. It often happened that the detachments found themselves face to face with the same German tanks, chains of German machine gunners and suffered heavy losses in battles. This is an irrefutable fact."...

" Yes, now those who know about the war from book pictures are composing such fables ... Indeed, such detachments were exhibited in threatening areas. These people are not some kind of monsters, but ordinary soldiers and commanders. They played two roles. First of all, they prepared a defensive line so that the retreating could gain a foothold on it. Secondly, they suppressed alarmism. When the turning point in the course of the war came, I did not see more of these units."...

What do we have in the bottom line?

This is the truth that our liberals, Ukrainian Nazis and other liars, falsifiers of history, do not like very much.

"NKVD barriers" in the form in which they are portrayed by pro-Western filmmakers and bloggers never existed. The defensive detachments under the military counterintelligence of the NKO, and then under the NKVD, were very small in number, and had completely different tasks - they fought as saboteurs, spies, paratroopers, and caught "as many as" those who had fought back from their own military and deserters. Moreover, no one was shot or arrested - but sent to assembly points or (in exceptional cases) transferred to law enforcement agencies "under investigation."

The army detachments were formed not from the personnel of the NKVD, but from the Red Army men - and the best and most honored. There were also few of them - and they could not drive 10 million people into battle.

Not a single case of the execution of retreating units has been recorded in history! Maximum - there was shooting overhead, execution on the spot or arrest of only the instigators of the panic for a subsequent trial ...

The fighters of the blocking detachments themselves served in parallel as an army reserve and fought with the enemy on the front line in the most dangerous areas.

Oh yeah, silences ... Why did they arise? Firstly, in the USSR they generally did not like to talk about the real methods of work of the special services. Secondly, in the story of the detachments there was not always a pleasant truth just about not their activities, but the activities of a significant part of the Red Army soldiers, because the account of those who were confused at some point and left their positions often went to tens of thousands of people. They were not punished for this, they were given the opportunity to rehabilitate, and, as a rule, subsequently they behaved courageously and with dignity. But the Union did not want to discuss this fact even in this vein. And yes. Obstacle detachments had to be used in areas where rifle and tank units fought, which included many recently mobilized. In the units of border guards or marines, barrage measures were never carried out due to lack of need. They never retreated without an order.

This is how the truth is fundamentally different from the myths that movies and "yellow literature" bring to our ears. Given the scale of the problem, I think there is no doubt that history was deliberately distorted in the course of a large-scale information and psychological operation against our people.

A significant contribution to the victory of the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany was made by partisan detachments operating behind enemy lines from Leningrad to Odessa. They were headed not only by regular military personnel, but also by people of peaceful professions. Real heroes.

Old Man Minai

By the beginning of the war Minai Filipovich Shmyrev was the director of the Pudot Cardboard Factory (Belarus). The past of the 51-year-old director was fighting: he was awarded three St. George's Crosses in World War I, in the Civil War he fought against banditry. In July 1941, in the village of Pudot, from the workers of the factory, Shmyrev formed a partisan detachment. In two months, the partisans fought the enemy 27 times, destroyed 14 cars, 18 fuel tanks, blew up 8 bridges, and defeated the district council of the Germans in Surazh. In the spring of 1942, Shmyrev, by order of the Central Committee of Belarus, united with three partisan detachments and led the First Belarusian Partisan Brigade. The partisans drove the fascists out of 15 villages and created the Surazh Partisan Territory. Here, before the arrival of the Red Army, Soviet power was restored. On the Usvyaty-Tarasenki section, the "Surazh Gate" existed for half a year - a 40-kilometer zone through which the partisans were supplied with weapons and food. All the relatives of Father Minay: four small children, a sister and mother-in-law were shot by the Nazis. In the fall of 1942, Shmyrev was transferred to the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement. In 1944 he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. After the war, Shmyrev returned to economic work.

Son of the fist "Uncle Kostya"

Konstantin Sergeevich Zaslonov was born in the city of Ostashkov, Tver province. In the thirties, his family was dispossessed and exiled to the Kola Peninsula in Khibinogorsk. After school, Zaslonov became a railway worker, by 1941 he worked as the head of a locomotive depot in Orsha (Belarus) and was evacuated to Moscow, but voluntarily went back. He served under the pseudonym "Uncle Kostya", created an underground, which with the help of mines disguised as coal, in three months derailed 93 echelons of fascists. In the spring of 1942, Zaslonov organized a partisan detachment. The detachment fought with the Germans, lured to its side 5 garrisons of the Russian National People's Army. Zaslonov died in a battle with the RNNA punishers, who came to the partisans under the guise of defectors. He was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

NKVD officer Dmitry Medvedev

A native of the Oryol province, Dmitry Nikolaevich Medvedev was an NKVD officer. He was fired twice - either because of his brother - "an enemy of the people, then" for the unjustified termination of criminal cases. In the summer of 1941 he was reinstated in the ranks. He headed the reconnaissance and sabotage task force "Mitya", which conducted more than 50 operations in the Smolensk, Mogilev and Bryansk regions. In the summer of 1942, he headed the "Winners" special detachment and carried out more than 120 successful operations. 11 generals, 2,000 soldiers, 6,000 Banderites were killed, 81 trains were blown up. In 1944, Medvedev was transferred to staff work, but in 1945 he went to Lithuania to fight the Forest Brothers gang. He retired with the rank of colonel. The hero of the USSR.

Saboteur Molodtsov-Badaev

Vladimir Alexandrovich Molodtsov has been working at the mine since the age of 16. He rose from a trolley racer to a deputy director. In 1934 he was sent to the Central School of the NKVD. In July 1941 he arrived in Odessa for reconnaissance and sabotage work. He worked under the pseudonym Pavel Badaev. Badayev's detachments hid in the Odessa catacombs, fought with the Romanians, tore communication lines, organized sabotage in the port, and carried out reconnaissance. They blew up the commandant's office with 149 officers. At the station Zastava, a train with the administration for the occupied Odessa was destroyed. The Nazis threw 16,000 people to eliminate the detachment. They let gas into the catacombs, poisoned the water, mined the passages. In February 1942, Molodtsov and his messengers were captured. Molodtsov was executed on July 12, 1942. Hero of the Soviet Union posthumously.

OGPU employee Naumov

A native of the Perm region, Mikhail Ivanovich Naumov, by the beginning of the war, was an employee of the OGPU. Shell-shocked while crossing the Dniester, was surrounded, went out to the partisans and soon led the detachment. In the fall of 1942 he became chief of staff of the partisan detachments of the Sumy region, and in January 1943 he headed a cavalry unit. In the spring of 1943, Naumov conducted the legendary Steppe raid, 2379 kilometers long, along the rear of the Nazis. For this operation, the captain was awarded the rank of Major General, which is a unique event, and the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. In total, Naumov conducted three large-scale raids on the rear of the enemy. After the war, he continued to serve in the ranks of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Kovpak Sidor Artemievich

Kovpak became a legend during his lifetime. Born in Poltava in a poor peasant family. In World War I, he received the St. George Cross from the hands of Nicholas II. During the Civil Partisan, he fought against the Germans, fought with whites. Since 1937 he was the chairman of the Putivl city executive committee of the Sumy region. In the fall of 1941, he led the Putivl partisan detachment, and then the formation of the detachments of the Sumy region. The partisans carried out military raids on the rear of the enemy. Their total length was over 10,000 kilometers. 39 enemy garrisons were defeated. On August 31, 1942, Kovpak took part in a meeting of partisan commanders in Moscow, was received by Stalin and Voroshilov, after which he made a raid across the Dnieper. At that moment, Kovpak's detachment had 2,000 fighters, 130 machine guns, 9 guns. In April 1943 he was promoted to the rank of major general. Twice Hero of the Soviet Union.

When they talk about barriers of a given time, there is always a confusion in terminology. The fact is that in different periods completely different structures were called this term. Before the war, this term was used in relation to individual units that were part of the Directorates of the NKVD troops. And it was used mainly in the border troops. This consonance is used by "historians" like Suvorov, declaring that "... in 1939 the barrage service of the NKVD was created ... in July 1939, the barrage detachments were secretly revived." ... “Omitting” from attention that in this context we are simply talking about the border service.

After the outbreak of hostilities, they began to call the units of the rear protection of the Active Army. Very often, although not necessarily, such units were created from retreating border detachments. Here is an example of how this happened: “The border detachments - 92nd, 93rd, 94th - after withdrawing from the border in July 1941, reached the line Zhitomir - Kazatin - Mikhailovsky farm and were united into one consolidated barrage detachment. ... The consolidated detachment, as it concentrated, moved forward: to guard the rear of the 5th army - the 92nd border detachment and the 16th motorized rifle regiment of the NKVD and to protect the rear of the 26th army - the 94th border detachment and the 6th motorized rifle regiment of the NKVD. Thus, on the Kazatin-Fastov section, the above-mentioned units moved forward to carry out barrage service. The 93rd border detachment, which I continued to command at the same time, remained in Skvira and constituted the reserve of the commander of the combined detachment. " The rear guard units were engaged in exactly the same thing that the military police in any army in the world do.

The tasks of the blocking detachments included checking on roads, railway junctions, in the forests, arresting deserters, arresting all suspicious elements that penetrated the front line, etc. Most of the detainees were sent back to the front. But not all, some were transferred to the disposal of the Special Departments or sent to the tribunal.

"Sov. Secret
Nar. To the Commissar of the USSR Internal Affairs.
To the General Commissioner of State Security
Comrade Beria.
REFERENCE:

From the beginning of the war to October 10 of this year. Special departments of the NKVD and Z.O. 657,364 servicemen who had lagged behind their units and fled from the front were detained by the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear.
Of these, 249,969 people and Z.O. troops of the NKVD for the protection of the rear - 407,395 servicemen.
Of the detainees, the Special Departments arrested 25,878 people, the remaining 632,486 people were formed in units and sent back to the front.
Among those arrested by special departments:
Spies - 1.505
Saboteurs - 308
Traitors - 2.621
Cowards and alarmists - 2.643
Deserters - 8.772
Distributors of provocative rumors - 3.987
Skirmishers - 1.671
Others - 4.371
Total - 25.878
According to the decisions of the Special Departments and the sentences of the Military Tribunals, 10.201 people were shot, of which 3.321 people were shot in front of the line.
Deputy Beginning Office of the OO NKVD of the USSR Commissioner of the state. security rank 3 S. Milshtein (October 1941) "

But these detachments were not only engaged in the protection of the rear. "The fact that the NKVD fighters were not hiding behind other people's backs is evidenced by the losses incurred by the detachment during the battles for Tallinn - over 60% of the personnel, including almost all commanders."

Some confusion in the description of events is introduced by the fact that at the same time completely different structures were sometimes called obstacle detachments, for example, a dedicated strike detachment that served as a reserve. "Major General Panfilov ... create and keep in hand a strong reserve, a barrage detachment, in order to throw it into a dangerous area at any moment."

In the fall of 1941, army detachments began to be created. Gradually, the initiative of individual commanders. Unlike the NKVD detachments, focused on detaining deserters and protecting the rear, the army detachments were tasked with serving the barrage directly behind the combat formations of units, preventing panic and mass exodus of servicemen from the battlefield. These detachments were not formed from NKVD servicemen, ordinary Red Army men and were much larger (up to a battalion). Since September 12, this measure has been legalized by the high command and applies to all fronts:

Directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 001919 to the commander of the fronts, armies, division commanders, the commander-in-chief of the South-Western direction on the creation of barrage detachments in rifle divisions September 12, 1941

“The experience of fighting German fascism has shown that in our rifle divisions there are many panicky and outright hostile elements, which, at the very first pressure from the enemy, drop their weapons and begin to shout:“ We are surrounded! ” and carry away the rest of the fighters. As a result of such actions of these elements, the division takes to flight, throws the material part and then begins to leave the forest alone. Similar phenomena are taking place on all fronts. If the commanders and commissars of such divisions were at the height of their task, alarmist and hostile elements could not have gained the upper hand in the division. But the trouble is that we do not have so many firm and stable commanders and commissars.

In order to prevent the above undesirable phenomena at the front, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:

4. To complete the creation of barrage detachments within five days from the date of receipt of this order.

5. Report on receipt and execution by the commander of the fronts and armies.

Headquarters of the Supreme Command
I. Stalin
B. Shaposhnikov "

As the situation improved, by the end of 1941 there was no need for army detachments and they were disbanded. The NKVD detachments remain and continue to guard the rear.

A new stage in the history of blocking detachments began with Order No. 227 of July 28, 1942. It is these newly created detachments that remain in the memory, they are referred to by modern myth-makers. So how did these detachments prove themselves, what did they do? The answer to this is given by the following documents. Memorandum 00 of the NKVD DF in the UOO of the NKVD of the USSR "On the work of special agencies to combat cowards and alarmists in parts of the Don Front for the period from October 1, 1942 to February 1, 1943" of February 17, 1943

“In total, for the period from October 1, 1942 to February 1, 1943, according to incomplete data, the special agencies of the front arrested 203 cowards and alarmists who fled from the battlefield, including:
a) sentenced to VMN and shot in front of the formation - 49 hours.
b) sentenced to various terms of labor camp and sent to penal companies and b-nas 139 hours. "

This is the big picture. Let us single out from it the following examples of the activities of the detachments.

“On October 2, 1942, during the offensive of our troops, individual units of the 138th division, met with powerful artillery and mortar fire from the enemy, wavered and fled in panic through the battle formations of the 1st battalion 706 SP, 204 SD, which were in the second echelon.

By the measures taken by the command and the detachment battalion of the division, the situation was restored. 7 cowards and alarmists were shot in front of the formation, and the rest were returned to the front line.

On October 16, 1942, during a counterattack by the enemy, a group of Red Army men of 781 and 124 divisions in the number of 30 people showed cowardice and in panic began to flee from the battlefield, dragging other servicemen with them.

The army detachment of the 21st army located in this sector eliminated the panic by force of arms and restored the previous situation.

On November 19, 1942, during the offensive of units of the 293st division, during an enemy counterattack, two mortar platoons of 1306 joint venture along with platoon commanders - ml. Lieutenants Bogatyrev and Egorov - without an order from the command, they left the occupied line and in panic, dropping their weapons, they began to flee from the battlefield.

A platoon of submachine gunners of an army blocking detachment located in this area stopped the fleeing and, having shot two alarmists in front of the formation, returned the rest to their former lines, after which they successfully advanced forward.

November 20, 1942, but during the enemy counterattack, one of the companies of the 38th section of the division, which was at the height, did not offer resistance to the enemy, without an order from the command, it began to randomly withdraw from the occupied sector.

The 83rd detachment of the 64th Army, carrying the barrage service directly behind the combat formations of the 38th SD units, stopped the fleeing company in panic and returned it back to the previously occupied section of the height, after which the personnel of the company showed exceptional endurance and perseverance in battles with the enemy. "

Is it cruel? Severely? May be. But do not forget that at that time any commander could, to prevent retreat and panic, shoot an alarmist on the spot. And this was normal for the functioning of any army in the world. War is beautiful only in action films. But this is not the main thing. Another thing is interesting - so where are the pictures of mass shootings from machine guns of retreating units, or even just units that did not fulfill their combat mission? But this is exactly the picture that some publicists are trying to paint. There is no it.

“As for the barrage detachments, about which, due to the lack of reliable information, a lot of all sorts of conjectures and fables were circulated (as well as about the penal units) (they drove the troops into the offensive at gunpoint, shot the retreating units, etc.), then no one researchers have not yet been able to find in the archives a single fact that would confirm that the barrage detachments fired at their own troops. Such cases are not cited in the memoirs of the front-line soldiers either. "

It is worth noting, perhaps, the inconsistency of the assertion that the soldiers were "driven by detachments into the attack." Yes, some commanders used to make such proposals. But the command did not meet such an understanding.

"Memorandum of the OO NKVD DF to the UOO NKVD USSR on the offensive operations of the 66th Army" October 30, 1942 "Front commander Rokossovsky, under the impression that the reason for the failure was the bad actions of infantry soldiers, tried to use barriers to influence the infantry. Rokossovsky insisted that the detachments follow the infantry units and force the fighters to attack by force of arms.

However, the opinion of the command of the front and the army that the reason for the failure is the lack of preparation of the soldiers of the infantry units does not have a solid foundation. "

Carried out detachments and other functions. Very often they simply plugged all the holes at the front, as the last line of defense. "Certificate 00 of the NKVD STF in the UOO of the NKVD of the USSR on the activities of the barrage detachments of the Stalingrad and Don fronts" Not earlier than October 15, 1942

“At critical moments, when support was required to hold the occupied lines, the barrage detachments entered directly into battle with the enemy, successfully restraining his onslaught and inflicting losses on him.

On September 13 of this year, the 112th division, under pressure from the enemy, withdrew from the occupied line. A detachment detachment of the 62nd army under the leadership of the chief of the detachment (lieutenant of state security Khlystov) took up defensive positions on the approaches to an important height. For 4 days, the soldiers and commanders of the detachment repelled the attacks of the enemy machine gunners and inflicted heavy losses on them. The detachment held the line until the arrival of the military units.

September 15-16 this year a blocking detachment of the 62nd army for 2 days successfully fought against superior enemy forces in the railway area. railway station in Stalingrad. Despite its small number, the detachment not only repulsed the enemy's attacks, but also attacked him, causing him significant losses in manpower. The detachment left its line only when units of the 10th front division came to replace it.
…
September 19 this year the command of the 240-page division of the Voronezh Front of one of the companies of the blocking detachment of the 38th Army gave a combat mission to clear the grove of a group of German submachine gunners. In the battles for the grove, this company lost 31 people, of which 18 people were killed.

The defensive detachment of the 29th Army of the Western Front, being in operational subordination to the commander of the 246th division, was used as a combat unit. Taking part in one of the attacks, a detachment of 118 personnel lost 109 people killed and wounded, in connection with which it was re-formed.

According to the 6th Army of the Voronezh Front, according to the order of the Military Council of the Army, 2 barrage detachments on September 4 of this year. 174 p. divisions were attached and put into battle. As a result, the detachments in battle lost up to 70% of their personnel, the remaining soldiers of these detachments were transferred to the named division and thus disbanded. 3rd detachment of the same army on September 10 of this year. was put on the defensive.

In the 1st Guards Army of the Don Front, by order of the army commander Chistyakov and a member of the Military Council Abramov, 2 barrage detachments were repeatedly sent into battle, like ordinary units. As a result, the detachments lost more than 65% of their personnel and were subsequently disbanded. "

This practice existed despite reproaches that “the barrage detachments were used incorrectly by individual commanders of the formations; a significant number of barrage detachments were sent into battle on a par with line subunits, which suffered losses, as a result of which they were diverted for reorganization, and the barrage service was not carried out. " This practice existed during the entire critical period in 1942-43. These detachments were distracted from the tasks of the obstacle later, but not in such active forms.

From Gorbatov's memoirs, it is clear that the detachments were often used to occupy inactive sectors of the front in order to remove units from there to strengthen the offensive grouping.

“- And who will hold the defense on the 70-kilometer front at this time? the commander asked.

A fortified area and two armored trains will be left against the enemy bridgehead, and to the north of the village of Shapchintsy I will put a reserve army regiment, a detachment, detachments and chemical companies ... " with a powerful reinforcement for the defense of the northern direction between the Dnieper and Drut 'rivers. ... I had to do this: today, withdraw from the defense and concentrate the 129th rifle division near the village of Litovichi, replacing it with detachments; tomorrow, withdraw the 169th Infantry Division from the defense, together with the command of the 40th Corps, replacing it with a reserve regiment. "

Gradually, the need for detachments disappeared. And in accordance with the order of the NKO of the USSR No. 0349 of October 29, 1944, they are disbanded by November 20, 1944.

The total number of detachments has changed at different times. “In accordance with the order of the NCO No. 227 in the units operating in the Red Army as of October 15 of this year. 193 barrage detachments were formed. Of these, 16 were formed in the Stalingrad Front and 25 in the Donskoy. In the future, their number only decreased.