- defensive operation of the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front (commander - Marshal Soviet Union Fedor Tolbukhin) with the participation of the 1st Bulgarian and 3rd Yugoslav armies, carried out on March 6-15, 1945 in the area of Lake Balaton (Hungary) in order to repel the counteroffensive of the Nazi troops.
Having completed the Budapest operation (1944-1945), the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front began preparing an offensive against Vienna. However, in mid-February, the Soviet command became aware of the concentration of large enemy forces in the area of Lake Balaton in order to prepare a counteroffensive. It was decided to temporarily go on the defensive with the forces of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, and then launch an offensive in the direction of Vienna.
The fascist German command hoped to crush the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, restore the defense front along the Danube River and stabilize the situation on the entire southern sector of the Soviet-German front in order to eliminate the threat to the southern regions of Germany and groupings of their troops in Yugoslavia, Austria and Czechoslovakia.
The enemy transferred from the Ardennes the 6th SS Panzer Army, equipped with latest types tanks. The German army group "Balk", the 2nd tank army of the army group "South", units from the composition of the army group "E" were also concentrated here. The enemy had 31 divisions (of which 11 were tank divisions), seven assault gun brigades, five battle groups, a motorized brigade, and four separate heavy tank battalions. The enemy grouping included over 430,000 soldiers and officers, more than 5,600 guns and mortars, about 900 tanks and assault guns, and 850 aircraft.
By the beginning of the operation, the 3rd Ukrainian Front had 37 rifle and six Bulgarian infantry divisions, an air army, two tank, mechanized and cavalry corps. The front consisted of more than 465 thousand people, about seven thousand guns and mortars, 400 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts (ACS), about 1000 aircraft.
The troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front outnumbered the enemy in artillery by 1.2 times, but were inferior in tanks and assault guns by 2.3 times.
The offensive of the Nazi troops began on the night of March 6. The main blow was struck between the lakes Velence and Balaton.
Concentrating on separate sections of 50-60 tanks per kilometer of the front, the enemy tried to dismember Soviet troops and go to the Danube. In addition to the main blow, the enemy delivered two auxiliary blows: from the area south of Lake Balaton to Kaposvár and from south coast river Drava on the city of Pecs.
Fierce fighting went on for ten days. The enemy, at the cost of heavy losses (over 40 thousand people, about 500 tanks and assault guns, over 300 guns and mortars, more than 250 aircraft), only managed to wedge into the defense of the Soviet troops south of Lake Velence for 12 kilometers, and west of the Sharviz Canal - for 30 kilometers, on auxiliary directions - for 6-8 kilometers. A wide maneuver of reserves and artillery, the high stamina of Soviet units and formations thwarted the counteroffensive of the Nazi troops. On March 15, the Nazi troops were forced to stop the offensive and go on the defensive.
The Balaton operation was the last major defensive operation of the Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War. It is an example of good organization and skillful conduct of defense by the forces of one front in two directions far apart from each other. Thanks to the maneuver, the density of artillery in certain directions reached 160-170 guns per one kilometer of the front.
The Balaton operation was characterized by the use of all artillery, including anti-aircraft, and aviation in the fight against tanks. For ten days, the 17th and 5th air armies made 5,277 sorties, of which 50% were ground attack aircraft to fight enemy tanks.
In the Balaton defensive operation, the total losses of the Soviet troops amounted to 32.9 thousand people, of which 8.5 thousand people were irretrievable.
Despite the intensity of the hostilities, part of the front's troops intended for the subsequent offensive did not participate in the defensive operation, which made it possible to start the Vienna operation on March 16 without a pause.
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Conclusion
The last German offensive operation was planned on a large scale and with far-reaching goals, but it was carried out without proper preparation, and most importantly, with a serious underestimation of the enemy's potential. It is also interesting from the point of view that the German-Hungarian tank units were an incomparable conglomerate of almost all types of tanks and self-propelled guns that had ever been in service with the German and Hungarian troops.
The Soviet command emphasized that the German armored units showed themselves weaker than in 1943 near Kursk. Accurate calculation and competent maneuvering were now replaced by stupidly fanatical attempts to crush the Soviet defense, which, in the conditions of spring thaw and lack of air supremacy, was almost impossible.
Again, as in the battle on Kursk Bulge, the basis of the Soviet defense was divisional and anti-tank artillery, which was used extremely massively. The weak point of the Soviet defense was the low resistance of the infantry cover, which often could not even withstand the first blow of German tanks and randomly retreated, leaving the gunners one on one with the advancing Germans. Most likely, this was due to the "offensive" moods that reigned in the minds of our troops throughout 1944, when the soldiers were unaccustomed to the sight of the advancing enemy, and also due to the fact that a significant part of the replenishment of the 3rd UV were conscripts from the liberated territories, since the front considered secondary.
Tactically, Soviet anti-tank, divisional and self-propelled artillery showed itself from the very better side. Techniques of firing from short and ultra-short distances into the most vulnerable places of tanks and self-propelled guns - sides and stern were firmly mastered. This was achieved by using tactics "fire bags", which were formed by the forces of 3 - 4 batteries, tactics "flirting tools", artillery ambushes carried out towards the enemy, etc.
The total result of the battles at the lake Balaton hard to overestimate. The Reich was not just defeated in one of the battles. The point is not that Germany lost its last ally and lost the "2nd Battle of Stalingrad", and at Balaton -" 2nd Kursk ". The most important thing was that, firstly, the German Panzerwaffe lost the last large combat-ready formations that could deliver serious counterattacks on the advancing troops of the countries Anti-Hitler coalition, and, secondly, Germany has practically lost sources of fuel for its armed forces. These losses were irreplaceable, until the end of the war the German industry could not compensate for the losses in armored vehicles near Lake Balaton, and synthetic fuel was sorely lacking. Victory in the battles near Lake Balaton really became, aptly G. Guderian"Grave of the Panzerwaffe".
The Balaton defensive operation to repel the January and March attacks of the German-Hungarian troops is unique in another respect: in the entire history of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet troops did not draw up such a detailed and thorough report on the front-line operation (there were only about 2,000 photographs).
At the end of the fighting, March 29 - April 10, 1945, the artillery headquarters of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, in the presence of representatives of the NIBTPoligon, the People's Commissariat for Armaments and the GAU KA, again examined the wrecked German military vehicles in the area of Lake Balaton, the Yelusha Canal, the Kaposh Canal, Tsetse, the Sarviz, the city of Szekesfehervar.
In the course of the work of the commission, 968 burnt, destroyed and abandoned tanks and self-propelled guns, as well as 446 armored personnel carriers and off-road vehicles were taken into account and examined. Just over 400 vehicles of the greatest interest were studied, marked and photographed. All heavy tanks, as well as new models of self-propelled artillery and heavy cannon armored vehicles, were subjected to a special study. Among the 400 burned-out armored vehicles, there were 19 tanks "Royal tiger", 6 tanks "Tiger", 57 tanks "Panther", 37 tanks Pz-IV, 9 tanks Pz-III (most of of which were flamethrower, command vehicles and tanks of advanced artillery observers), 27 Hungarian-made tanks and self-propelled guns, 140 assault and self-propelled guns, as well as 105 engineering vehicles, armored personnel carriers and armored vehicles. Among the examined samples, those hit by artillery fire prevailed (389 vehicles), and only a small part was blown up by mines or was destroyed by other means (for example, one tank "Panther" by all indications, was burned by a bottle of KS). According to the main statistical data, this study basically repeated the February one. What was new was that the number of shell holes made by 57-mm and 76-mm guns was approximately equal, and the number of holes made by 100-122 mm ammunition increased slightly (by 2.5-3.2%).
Thanks to the February and March-April reports of the commission of the 3rd UV, we can now clearly assess the damage inflicted on the German tank units in the Balaton battle.
*According to the reports of combined arms armies. There are no data on frontline subordination units. In brackets - captured trophies (prisoners)
Sources:
Collection of materials on the study of the experience of war (UIOP of the General Staff of the KA) M. 1946
Collection of combat documents of the Second World War (UIOP of the General Staff of the KA) M. 1947
Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War 1941 - 1945. (VNU General Staff) M. 1959
"Budapest - Vienna - Prague. April 4, 1945, April 13, 1945, May 9, 1945." ed. R.Ya. Malinovsky M. 1965
History of World War II 1939-1945. Volume 10. M 1979
Liberation of Hungary from fascism M. 1966
Tarasov S.K. "Fights at Lake Balaton" M. 1959
Tippelskirch K. "History of the Second World War" M. 1956.
Frisner G. "Lost battles" M. 1966
Fey W. Armor battles of the waffen SS 1943-1945. Winnipeg 1996
Sydnor Ch., Jr., Soldiers of Destruction. The SS Death,s Head Division. 1933-1945. Princeton 1977
G. Bernage, H. Mayer “12.SS Panzer-Division Hitlerjugend” . Heimdal, 1991
G. Bernage, J. Perrigault “C. and oth. Leibstandarte SS. Heimdal, 1996
H. Furbrinder “9.SS Panzer-Division Hohenstaufen”. Heimdal, 1996
Thomas L. Jentz. "Panzertruppen. The Complete Guide to the Creation and Combat Employment of Germany's Tank Force. 1933-1942" Shiffer Military History, Atglen PA, 1996
Barons. About "Balaton defensive operation" M. Exprint 2001
The defensive operation of the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front in the Great Patriotic War, carried out on March 6-15 in the region of Lake Balaton (Hungary) in order to repel the counteroffensive of the Nazi troops. Ended on 13 Feb. 1945 Budapest operation of 1944-45, the 2nd Ukrainian Front (commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union R.Ya. Malinovsky) and the 3rd Ukrainian Front (commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union F.I. Tolbukhin) began preparing an offensive in the direction of Vienna. In the middle of Feb. German-Fash. the command concentrated large forces in the region of Lake Balaton to launch a counteroffensive. From the Ardennes, the 6th tank was transferred, the SS army, equipped with the latest types of tanks. Against the 3rd Ukr. front (4th guards, 26th, 27th, 57th combined arms and 17th air armies and the operationally subordinate 1st Bulgarian army) the pr-k concentrated 31 divisions (including 11 tank), 5 combat groups, 1 motorized brigade and 4 assault gun brigades of Army Groups "South" and "E", numbering 431 thousand people, 5630 op. and mortars, 877 tanks and assault guns, 900 armored personnel carriers and 850 aircraft. In terms of tanks and assault guns, the pr-k had an overall superiority over the Soviet troops by 2.1 times. The fascist German command hoped to defeat the troops of the 3rd Ukr. front, restore defenses along the Danube, retain oil sources Hungary and eliminate the threat of prom. districts of Austria and South. Germany. Didn't leave fash. command and distant political. calculations: to use the Balkans as an "apple of discord" between the Soviet Union and England. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided by the stubborn and active defense of the 3rd Ukr. front to wear down and bleed the strike force of the pr-ka, and then go on the offensive in the direction of Vienna. There were 37 riflemen in the front. and 6 infantry. (Bulgarian) divisions, 2 tanks, 1 mech. and 1 cav. corps (approx. 407 thousand people, up to 7 thousand ordnance and mortars, 407 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations and 965 aircraft). The operational formation of the troops of the front was two-echelon. 4th guards, 26th, 57th combined arms and 1st Bulgarian. armies defended in the 1st, 27th army - in the 2nd echelons. In the reserve of teams, the front was the 23rd and 18th tank, 1st guards. mech., 5th Guards. kav. Corps, 84th Rifleman. division, six art. brigades. The main efforts were concentrated in the defense zones of the 4th Guards. and the 26th armies, where Ch. strength pr-ka. The defense plan provided for several. options for actions worked out with the troops on the ground, taking into account possible strikes of the pr-ka. Defense, including anti-tank, was created to a depth of 25-50 km and included the main, second and army lines, 2 front lines, intermediate lines and cut-off positions. The basis of the anti-tank defense was strong anti-tank districts and artillery anti-tank reserves. Wed oper. the density of anti-tank artillery was 18 op., the density of minefields. reached on otd. 2,700 anti-tank and 2,500 anti-personnel mines per 1 km. There were 68 movements in the front. barrier squads. Ground troops supported the 17th Air Army of the 3rd Ukrainian. and part of the forces of the 5th air. army of the 2nd Ukrainian. fronts. The front prepared in a timely manner and well to repulse the blow of the pr-ka. The interaction and command and control of troops was skillfully organized. Party political work was aimed at ensuring the stamina and perseverance of the personnel in defense and creating a high offensive for him. impulse to go on a decisive offensive.
The offensive of the German-fascist. troops began on the night of March 6 by delivering auxiliary strikes from the district south of Lake. Balaton on Kaposvar and from the border of the river. Drava on S. Ch. the strike of the pr-k was delivered in the morning of this day, as expected, against the troops of the 4th Guards. and the 26th armies, defending between the lakes Velence and Balaton. Having concentrated a powerful armored fist (on separate directions 50-60 tanks per 1 km of the front), he tried to dismember the owls. troops and go to the Danube. Continuous strikes of art and aviation met the owls. troops onslaught strike force pr-ka. For March 6, 17th air. the army made 358 sorties, incl. 227 for the 6th tank, SS army. As soon as the direction of Ch. strike pr-ka, teams, the front strengthened the defense of the 4th Guards. and 26th armies. Mobile reserves were advanced to the previously prepared defense zone south of Sheregeyesh. Formations of the 27th Army occupied the area from the lake. Velence to the Sharviz Canal. To strengthen the south. wings from the front's reserve district of Pecs concentrated 133rd shooter. frame. Only at the cost of huge losses did the enemy succeed on the 1st day of the offensive in the direction of Ch. strike wedge into our defenses app. Canal Sharviz up to 2 km, in the Sheregeyesh region - up to 3-4 km. The same stubborn resistance was offered to the Nazi troops advancing south of Lake. Balaton and from bridgeheads on the Drava River, 57th Army, troops of the 1st Bolg. and 3rd Yugoslav armies. On March 7, the battle unfolded from new force. Up to 2 infantry advanced in the zone of the 26th Army. divisions and St. 170 tanks.
The 5th Guards were sent to strengthen the army. kav. case and art. connections transferred from other directions. As a result of the maneuver Sheregeyesh, a grouping of arts was concentrated in the composition of 160 op. The rate of advance of the pr-ka has decreased even more. He advanced south of Lake Velence and west. Canal Sharviz only 2-3 km. In the following days, German-Fash. command, regardless of losses, continued to build up forces. On March 8-10, 3 tanks, divisions (2nd, 9th SS and 3rd) were introduced into battle, and on March 14 - the last reserve - the 6th tank, division. 10 days continued bitterly. battles, in which St. 800 thousand people, more than 12.5 thousand op. and mortars, approx. 1300 tanks and assault guns and over 1800 aircraft. Wide maneuver with reserves and artillery, high stamina of owls. units and formations, the heroism of soldiers and officers nullified the efforts of the enemy. Pr-ku managed to achieve only tactical results - to wedge into the defense of the owls. troops south of the lake. Velence at 12 km, and west. Canal Sharviz - up to 30 km. Having lost over 40 thousand people, approx. 500 tanks and assault guns, 300 op. and mortars, the Nazi troops were forced on March 15 to stop the offensive and go on the defensive.
Balaton operation was the last major defensive operation Soviet army during the Great Patriotic War. As a result, the attempts of the fascist German command to stop the offensive of the Soviet troops to the south were completely thwarted. wing of the Soviet-German front. The Balaton operation is an example of high organization and conduct of operational defense by forces of one front on two directions far apart from each other, bold maneuver of reserves and second echelons. The anti-tank defense reached perfect forms, which included company strongholds, combined into battalion anti-tank units, anti-tank districts, echeloned in depth, strong artillery anti-tank reserves and mobile detachments of barriers. in formations and armies. In the Balaton operation, the use of all artillery to fight tanks, incl. anti-aircraft, and aviation. Thanks to the maneuver, the density of artillery in some directions exceeded 160-170 op. 1 km front. For 10 days, military aviation made 5277 sorties, of which 50% were attack aircraft. Tanks and self-propelled guns were used, as a rule, in ambushes on the probable directions of enemy tank attacks. In addition, tank self-propelled art. units acted as mobile anti-tank reserves. The second echelons of the front and reserves were used to reinforce the troops of the first esh. in the fight for the beat, the defense zone. Main, second and arm. the defense lines were occupied in advance by troops. At the same time, part of the troops of the front, intended for the offensive, did not participate in the defensive operation. The successful completion of the Balaton operation allowed the Vienna operation of 1945 to begin without a pause on March 16.
Lit.: Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War. 1941-1945. T.4. M., 1959; Great Patriotic War Soviet Union. 1941-1945. Short story. Ed. 2nd. M., 1970; Liberation Mission of the Soviet Armed Forces in World War II. Ed. A.A. Grechko. Ed. 2nd. M., 1974; Budapest - Vienna - Prague. 4 Apr. 1945, 13 Apr. 1945, May 9, 1945. Historical and memoir work. Ed. R.Ya.Malinovsky. M., 1965; Sharokhin M.N., Petrukhin V.S. Way to Balaton. M., 1966; The liberation of Hungary from fascism. M., 1965; Malakhov M.M. Liberation of Hungary and Eastern Austria. M., 1965; Tarasov. P. Fighting at Lake Balaton. M., 1959. S.P. Ivanov, P.F. Shkorubsky.
Balaton defensive operation - the last major defensive operation of the Red Army against German troops during the Great Patriotic War. It was carried out from March 6 to March 15, 1945 by part of the forces of the 3rd Ukrainian Front with the assistance of the 1st Bulgarian and 3rd Yugoslav armies in the area of Lake Balaton. During the battle, Soviet troops repelled the offensive of the Wehrmacht under code name"Spring Awakening" (German: Frhlingserwachen), which was the last major offensive operation German armed forces in World War II.
Battle of Balaton. Defeat of German tanks.
In the winter of 1945, the Red Army smashes the German troops on all fronts.
On February 13, Budapest was taken. The next destination on the southern route to Berlin is Vienna.
The danger of capture hangs over the last oil fields near Lake Balaton, with their loss, the Reich is left without oil products.
Despite the direct threat to Berlin, Hitler transfers the elite 6th SS Panzer Army to Balaton. The Soviet formations between Balaton and the Danube will have to withstand a powerful blow, in which the Germans have invested their last reserves and the despair of the doomed!
Review of the film from the colonel of our Kassada:
The Wargaming campaign continues to successfully combine the gaming industry with patriotic education and historical enlightenment, which has always favorably distinguished the image positioning of Belarusian developers. In addition to popular science films and videos about the history of the development of armored vehicles, the "potato" does not hesitate to make films dedicated to military history. A fresh example is an excellent documentary about the Balaton operation. Everything is presented concisely, informatively and intelligibly. In general, this is a very competent cultural enlightenment, which, through the possibilities popular game, makes it possible to involve young people in the study of the history of their own country
And further:
Fierce fighting went on for ten days. The enemy, at the cost of heavy losses (over 40 thousand people, about 500 tanks and assault guns, over 300 guns and mortars, more than 250 aircraft), only managed to penetrate into the defense of the Soviet troops south of Lake Velence for 12 kilometers, and west of the Sharviz Canal - for 30 kilometers, on auxiliary directions - for 6-8 kilometers. A wide maneuver of reserves and artillery, the high stamina of Soviet units and formations thwarted the counteroffensive of the Nazi troops. On March 15, the Nazi troops were forced to stop the offensive and go on the defensive.
...
The Balaton operation was characterized by the use of all artillery, including anti-aircraft, and aviation in the fight against tanks. In ten days, the 17th and 5th air armies made 5,277 sorties, of which 50% were ground attack aircraft to fight enemy tanks.In the Balaton defensive operation, the total losses of the Soviet troops amounted to 32.9 thousand people, of which 8.5 thousand people were irretrievable.
Despite the intensity of the hostilities, part of the front's troops intended for the subsequent offensive did not participate in the defensive operation, which made it possible to start the Vienna operation on March 16 without a pause.
431,000 people;
about 6000 guns and mortars;
877 tanks and assault guns;
900 armored personnel carriers;
about 850 aircraft;
400,000 people;
6800 guns and mortars;
400 tanks and self-propelled guns;
700 aircraft.
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