Hitler openly proclaimed that his goal was German world domination. Everyone who took the hysterical leader of the Nazis seriously understood that his coming to power would inevitably lead to a new European and then world war.
From election to election, the Nazi National Socialist Workers' Party of Germany gained more and more votes and was already one step away from power. All the resistance of the Comintern under the pressure of Stalin and the Western Communist Parties, which threw all their strength into the fight against the Social Democrats, were split at the most decisive moment and the Nazi Party, having received only a third of the votes on parliamentary elections 1933, seized state power in Germany. Hitler became Chancellor, assumed unlimited powers, crushed the Social Democrats and Communists by force, and established a fascist dictatorship in the country. In the center of Europe, a state aspired to redistribute the world and was ready to sweep away everything in its path with armed force.
Germany began to carry out its program to equip the army with the latest weapons in 1936. The aggressiveness of Hitler's foreign policy was intensified by the growth of the country's military might. Its officially proclaimed goal was the annexation of all neighboring territories of states in which the majority of the population were Germans. This could only be achieved by breaking post-war boundaries by force or the threat of force. None of the major European countries, neither England nor France, were ready to fight for the interests of the small countries of Europe, to which Germany had territorial claims. Powers that were once part of the Entente for the sake of maintaining peace in Europe (especially in cases where this sacrifice was to be made by others).
That is why Hitler so brazenly and freely violated the terms of the Versailles Peace Treaty: he created the most numerous in Western Europe army and armed it with modern military equipment; sent troops to the border areas with France; annexed Austria to his Reich; obtained from the French and English governments the transfer of the Judicial Region and Czechoslovakia to Germany. (With the loss of this mountain range, which surrounded the plains of the country on three sides, Czechoslovakia became militarily defenseless - the line of defensive fortifications built in the Sudei Mountains fell into the hands of the aggressor without a fight).
The successes of the German aggressors attracted other countries to their side, whose leaders also dreamed of conquest; by the end of the 1930s, a military alliance of Germany, Italy, and Japan (called the Anti-Comintern Pact) had taken shape. Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria inclined to cooperate with Hitler. At the beginning of 1939, it became clear that it would not be possible to get along with fascism - Germany occupied, dismembered and turned Czechoslovakia into its colony, seized the Memel region from Lithuania (Lithuania Minor - the area of \u200b\u200bmodern Klaipeda), made claims to Poland; Italy subjugated Albania. Hitler chose a new victim in Europe, Mussolini set his sights on North Africa, Japan occupied one by one the provinces of China and developed plans to seize British and French possessions in Asia.
Plan "Barbarossa"
Preparing for the attack, Hitler and his leadership did not expect to mess around with the USSR for a long time. He expected to complete the entire campaign to enslave our Motherland within a few months. For these purposes, a plan was developed, which was called the “Barbarossa” plan, drawn up in the spirit of the “Lightning War”, which has already brought success more than once.
The strength of the Wehrmacht was the high professionalism of the officers, internal organization and good training of all branches of the military. Nevertheless, for Hitler, an attack on the USSR was an extremely risky business, both for objective reasons and for sound calculations, it promised very little chance of success. Even focusing on Soviet border¾ of its own armed forces with the addition of the army of its allies, Germany could not achieve equality of forces of the Red Army opposing it, especially in technology (in other matters, German intelligence in its reports erroneously underestimated the deployment of Soviet troops and the economic capabilities of the USSR. So in the book “50 Years of the Armed forces of the USSR "it is said: In fact, only in the western European districts there were 170 divisions and 2 brigades of the Soviet army. An especially large miscalculation was made by the Nazis when determining the number of Soviet troops stationed in the internal districts).
Strategic reserves, materials and ammunition for such big war obviously not enough, and there was nowhere to take them - except in the occupied territory of the enemy. With such an unfavorable balance of forces, the Germans could only count on the stunning surprise of the attack and the absolute unpreparedness of the Soviet troops to defend their own territory from unexpected aggression.
The plan of Operation Barbarossa provided for just such a strike with all available forces - while creating superiority in narrow, decisive sectors of the front. The task was to encircle and destroy the main forces of the Red Army in fleeting border battles; "The retreat of the combat-ready enemy troops to the wide expanses of Russian territory should have been prevented."
The essence of what Hitler conceived in terms of "Barbarossa" was as follows: On the evening of December 18, 1940, Hitler signed a directive on the deployment of military operations against the USSR, which received the serial number No. 21 and the symbol option "Barbarossa" (Fall "Barbarossa"). It was made in only nine copies, three of which were handed over to the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the armed forces (ground forces, air force and navy), and six were closed in OKW safes.
Directive No. 21 outlined only the general plan and initial instructions for waging war against the USSR and did not represent a complete war plan. The war plan against the USSR is a whole complex of political, economic and strategic measures of the Hitlerite leadership. In addition to the directive, the plan also included orders from the supreme command and the main commands of the branches of the armed forces on strategic concentration and deployment, logistics, preparation of the theater of operations, camouflage, disinformation and other documents. Among these documents, of particular importance was the directive on the strategic concentration and deployment of ground forces of January 31, 1941. It concretized and clarified the tasks and methods of action of the armed forces set out in Directive No. 21.
The Barbarossa plan called for the defeat of the Soviet Union in one brief campaign before the war against England was over. Leningrad, Moscow, the Central Industrial Region and the Donets Basin were recognized as the main strategic objects. A special place in the plan was given to Moscow. It was assumed that its capture would be decisive for the victorious outcome of the war. According to the plan of the German General Staff, with success in the western regions of the USSR, the German army could capture Moscow in the fall. “The ultimate goal of the operation, the directive said, is to reach the Volga-Arkhangelsk line by winter, and create a protective barrier against Asian Russia. It was not supposed to go further. Thus, if necessary, the last industrial region and the last military-industrial base of the USSR, left by the Russians in the Urals, should be destroyed by massive bombardments from the air, with the help of aircraft. For the rout Soviet Union planned to use all ground forces Germany, excluding only the formations and units necessary for the occupation service in the enslaved countries.
The German Air Force was tasked with "release such forces to support the ground forces during the eastern campaign, so that you can count on the rapid completion of ground operations and at the same time limit the destruction of the eastern regions of Germany by enemy aircraft to a minimum." For combat operations at sea against the three Soviet fleets - the Northern, Baltic and Black Sea - it was planned to allocate a significant part of the warships of the German Navy and the naval forces of Finland and Romania.
According to the Barbarossa plan, 152 divisions (including 19 armored and 14 motorized) and two brigades were allocated to attack the USSR. Germany's allies 29 infantry divisions and 16 brigades. Thus, a total of 190 divisions were allocated. In addition, two-thirds of the air force available in Germany and significant fleet forces were involved in the war against the USSR. The ground forces intended to attack the Soviet Union were reduced to three army groups: "South" - the 11th, 17th and 6th field armies and the 1st tank group; "Center" - 4th and 9th field armies, 2nd and 3rd tank groups; "North" - 16th and 18th and 4th tank groups. The 2nd separate field army remained in the reserve of the OKH, the army "Norway" was given the task of acting independently in the Murmansk and Kandalash directions.
The Barbarossa plan contained a somewhat refined assessment of the Soviet Armed Forces. According to German data, by the beginning of the German invasion (on June 20, 1941), the Soviet Armed Forces had 170 rifle, 33.5 cavalry divisions and 46 mechanized and tank brigades. Of these, as stated by the fascist command, 118 rifle, 20 cavalry divisions and 40 brigades stationed in the western border districts, 27 rifle, 5.5 cavalry divisions and 1 brigade in the rest of the European part of the USSR, and 33 divisions and 5 brigades in the Far East. It was assumed that Soviet aviation had 8,000 combat aircraft (including about 1,100 modern ones), of which 6,000 were in the European part of the USSR.
The Nazi command assumed that the Soviet troops deployed in the west, using field fortifications on the new and old state borders for defense, as well as numerous water barriers, would enter the battle in large formations west of the Dnieper and Zapadnaya Dvina rivers. At the same time, the Soviet command will strive to keep air and naval bases in the Baltic, and rely on the Black Sea coast with the southern wing of the front. “With an unfavorable development of the operation to the south and north of the Pripyat marshes,” it was noted in the “Barbarossa” plan, “the Russians will try to stop the German offensive on the line of the Dnieper and Western Dvina rivers. When trying to liquidate German breakthroughs, as well as possible attempts to withdraw threatened troops beyond the line of the Dnieper, the Western Dvina, one should reckon with the possibility of offensive operations from large Russian formations using tanks.
According to the Barbarossa plan, large tank and motorized forces, using aviation support, were to deliver a swift blow to a great depth north and south of the Pripyat marshes, break through the defenses of the main forces of the Soviet Army, presumably concentrated in the western part of the USSR, and destroy the disunited groupings of Soviet troops. To the north of the Pripyat swamps, the offensive of two army groups was planned: "Center" (commander Field Marshal F. Bock) and "North" (commander Field Marshal V. Leeb). The Army Group "Center" dealt the main blow and was supposed to concentrate the main efforts on the flanks, where the 2nd and 3rd tank groups were deployed, to carry out a deep breakthrough with these formations north and south of Minsk, to reach the Smolensk area, scheduled for the connection of tank groups . It was assumed that with the release of tank formations in the Smolensk region, prerequisites would be created for the destruction of the Soviet troops remaining between Bialystok and Minsk by field armies. Subsequently, upon reaching the Roslavl, Smolensk, Vitebsk line by the main forces, Army Group Center had to act depending on the situation developing on its left wing. If the neighbor on the left did not succeed in quickly defeating the troops defending in front of him, the army group was to turn the tank formations to the north, and the field armies would conduct an offensive in an easterly direction towards Moscow. If the army group "North" was able to carry out the defeat of the Soviet Army in its offensive zone, the army group "Center" was to immediately strike at Moscow. Army Group "North" received the task, advancing from East Prussia, to deliver the main blow in the direction of Daugavpils, Leningrad, to destroy the Soviet Army troops defending in the Baltic States and, having captured the ports on the Baltic Sea, including Leningrad and Kronstadt, to deprive the Soviet Baltic fleet of its bases. If this army group was unable to defeat the grouping of Soviet troops in the Baltic states, the mobile troops of the Army Group Center, the Finnish Army and the formations transferred from Norway were to come to its aid. Strengthened in this way, Army Group North was to achieve the destruction of the Soviet troops opposing it.
According to the plan of the German command, the operation of the reinforced army group "North" provided the army group "Center" with freedom of maneuver to capture Moscow and solve operational and strategic tasks in cooperation with the army group "South". South of the Pripyat swamps, the offensive of Army Group South was planned (commanded by Field Marshal G. Rundshtedt). She dealt one strong blow from the Lublin region in general, in the direction of Kiev and further south along the bend of the Dnieper. As a result of the blow, in which the main role was to be played by powerful tank formations, it was supposed to cut off Soviet troops, located in western Ukraine, from their communications on the Dnieper, to seize the crossings across the Dnieper in the region of Kiev and to the south of it. In this way, it provided freedom of maneuver for developing an offensive in an easterly direction in cooperation with troops advancing north, or for an attack on the south of the Soviet Union in order to capture important economic regions.
The troops of the right wing of Army Group "South" (11th Army), creating a false impression of the deployment of large forces on the territory of Romania, were supposed to pin down the opposing Red Army troops, and later, as the offensive on the Soviet-German front developed, to prevent organized withdrawal of Soviet formations beyond the Dnieper.
The Barbarossa plan was intended to use the principles of warfare that had justified themselves in the Polish and Western European campaigns. However, it was emphasized that, unlike actions in the West, the offensive against the Red Army must be carried out simultaneously on the entire front: both in the direction of the main attacks and in secondary sectors. “Only in this way,” the directive of January 31, 1941 said, “will it be possible to prevent the timely withdrawal of the enemy’s combat-ready forces and destroy them to the west of the Dnieper-Dvina line.
The plan took into account the possibility of active opposition of Soviet aviation to the offensive of the German ground forces. From the very beginning of hostilities, the German Air Force was tasked with suppressing the Soviet Air Force and supporting the offensive of ground forces in the directions of the main strikes. To solve these problems at the first stage of the war against the USSR. Attacks on the rear industrial centers of the USSR were planned to begin only after the Red Army troops were defeated in Belarus, the Baltic states and Ukraine.
The offensive of the Army Group "Center" was planned to be supported by the 2nd Air Fleet, "South" - by the 4th Air Fleet, "North" - by the 1st Air Fleet. The navy of Nazi Germany was supposed to defend its coast and prevent the breakthrough of the ships of the Soviet Navy from the Baltic Sea. At the same time, it was planned to avoid large-scale naval operations until the land forces captured Leningrad as the last naval base of the Soviet Baltic Fleet. In the future, the naval forces of fascist Germany were tasked with ensuring freedom of navigation in the Baltic Sea and supplying the troops of the northern wing of the ground forces.
The attack on the USSR was planned to be carried out on May 15, 1941. Thus, according to the plan, the immediate strategic goal of the Nazis in the war against the USSR was the defeat of the Red Army in the Baltic States, Belarus and the Right-Bank Ukraine. The subsequent goal was to capture Leningrad in the north, the Central Industrial Region and the capital of the Soviet Union in the center, and capture all of Ukraine and the Donets Basin in the south as quickly as possible. The ultimate goal of the eastern campaign was the exit of the Nazi troops to the Volga and the Northern Dvina.
On February 3, 1941, at a meeting in Berchtesgaden, Hitler, in the presence of Keitel and Jodl, heard a detailed report from Brauchitsch and Gaider on the plan for war against the USSR. The Führer approved the report and assured the generals that the plan would be carried out successfully: "When the implementation of the Barbarossa plan begins, the world will hold its breath and freeze." The armed forces of Romania, Hungary and Finland - allies of Nazi Germany - were to receive specific tasks immediately before the start of the war. The use of the Romanian troops was determined by the Munich plan, developed by the command of the German troops in Romania. In mid-June, this plan was brought to the attention of the Romanian leadership. On June 20, the Romanian dictator Antonescu issued an order to the armed forces of Romania based on it, outlining the tasks of the Romanian troops.
Before the outbreak of hostilities, the Romanian ground forces were supposed to cover the concentration and deployment of German troops in Romania, and with the outbreak of war, to tie down the grouping of Soviet troops stationed on the border with Romania. With the withdrawal of the Red Army from the line of the Prut River, which, as was believed, would follow as a result of the offensive of the German Army Group South, the Romanian troops were to move on to an energetic pursuit of the Red Army units. If the Soviet troops managed to hold their positions on the Prut River, the Romanian formations would have to break through the Soviet defenses in the sector of Tsutsora, Novy Bedrazh.
The tasks of the Finnish and German troops deployed in Northern and Central Finland were determined by the OKW directive of April 7, 1941 and announced by the operational directives of the Finnish General Staff, as well as the directive of the army commander "Norway" of April 20. The directive of the OKW provided that the armed forces of Finland, before the offensive of the Nazi troops, were to cover the deployment of German formations in Finland, and with the transition of the Wehrmacht to the offensive, to pin down the Soviet groups in the Karelian and Petrozavodsk directions. With the release of Army Group North to the line of the Luga River, Finnish troops had to go on a decisive offensive on the Karelian Isthmus, as well as between the Onega and Ladoga Lakes, in order to connect with the German armies on the Svir River and in the Leningrad region. The German troops deployed in Finland, according to the directive of the commander of the army "Norway", were tasked with advancing in two groups (each consisted of a reinforced corps): one - to Murmansk, the other - to Kandalaksha. The southern group, having broken through the defenses, was supposed to go to White Sea to the Kandalaksha area then advance along the Murmansk railway to the north, in order, in cooperation with the northern grouping, to destroy the Soviet troops stationed on the Kola Peninsula and capture Murmansk and Polyarnoye. Air support for the Finnish and German troops advancing from Finland was assigned to the 5th German Air Fleet and the Finnish Air Force.
At the end of April, the political and military leadership of Nazi Germany finally set the date for the attack on the USSR: Sunday, June 22, 1941. The postponement of the dates from May to June was caused by the need to redeploy to the borders of the USSR the forces involved in the aggression against Yugoslavia and Greece. In preparing for a war against the USSR, the Hitlerite leadership outlined major measures for the restructuring of its armed forces. They concerned primarily the ground forces. It was planned to bring the number of divisions of the active army to 180 and increase the reserve army. By the beginning of the war against the USSR, the Wehrmacht included a reserve army and SS troops, and was supposed to have about 250 fully equipped divisions.
Particular attention was paid to the strengthening of mobile troops. It was planned to deploy 20 tank divisions instead of the existing 10 and to increase the level of infantry motorization. To this end, it was planned to additionally allocate 130 thousand tons of steel for the production of military trucks, all-terrain vehicles and armored vehicles at the expense of the fleet and aviation. Big changes planned in the production of weapons. According to the planned program, the most important task was the production of the latest models of tanks and anti-tank artillery. A significant increase in the production of aircraft of those designs that withstood the test during the fighting in the West was also envisaged.
Great importance was attached to the preparation of the theater of operations. The directive of August 9, 1940, which received the code name "Aufbau Ost" ("Construction in the East"), planned the transfer of supply bases from west to east, the construction of new railways and highways, training grounds, barracks, etc. in the eastern regions. , expansion and improvement of airfields, communication networks. In preparations for aggression against the USSR, the Hitlerite leadership assigned the most important place to ensuring the surprise of the attack and the secrecy of the conduct of each preparatory measure, whether it concerned the restructuring of the economy, strategic planning, the preparation of a theater of military operations, or the deployment of armed forces. All documents related to the planning of the war in the east were prepared with secrecy. An extremely narrow circle of people was allowed to develop them. The concentration and operational deployment of troops was planned to be carried out in compliance with all camouflage measures. However, the Nazi leadership understood that it was impossible to completely hide the concentration of a multi-million army with a huge amount of military equipment near the Soviet borders. Therefore, it resorted to a widely conceived political and operational-strategic camouflage of the impending aggression, recognizing the number one task of misleading the government of the USSR and the command of the Red Army about the plan, scale and time of the start of aggression.
Both the bodies of operational and strategic leadership and the Abwehr (intelligence and counterintelligence) took part in the development of measures to disguise the concentration of Wehrmacht troops in the East. The Abwehr developed a directive, signed on September 6, 1940, which specifically set out the goals and objectives of disinformation. Instructions about the secrecy of preparations for war were contained in the plan "Barbarossa". But perhaps the most completely reveals the perfidious tactics of the Nazis is the directive on disinformation of the enemy, issued by the OKW on February 15, 1941. “The purpose of disinformation is,” the directive stated, “to hide preparations for Operation Barbarossa.” This main goal should form the basis of all measures to disinform the enemy. Camouflage measures were planned to be carried out in two stages. The first stage - until about mid-April 1941 - included the masking of general military preparations not related to the mass regrouping of troops. The second stage - from April to June 1941 - the camouflage of the concentration and operational deployment of troops near the borders of the USSR.
At the first stage, it was planned to create a false idea about the true intentions of the German command, using various kinds of preparations for the invasion of England, as well as for Operation Marita (against Greece) and Sonnenblum (in North Africa).
The initial deployment of troops to attack the USSR was planned to be carried out under the guise of conventional armies of displacement. At the same time, the tasks were set to create the impression that the center of concentration of armed forces was located in the south of Poland, in Czechoslovakia and Austria, and that the concentration of troops in the north was relatively small.
At the second stage, when, as noted in the directive, it would no longer be possible to hide the preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union, the concentration and deployment of the forces of the eastern campaign was planned to be presented in the form of false measures, allegedly carried out with the aim of diverting attention from the planned invasion of England. This distracting maneuver was presented by the Nazi command as "the greatest in the history of wars." At the same time, work was carried out aimed at preserving the impression among the personnel of the German armed forces that preparations for the landing in England were continuing, but in a different form - the troops allocated for this purpose were being withdrawn to the rear up to a certain point. “It was necessary, as long as possible, to keep even those troops destined for action directly in the East in error about plans.” Great importance was attached, in particular, to the dissemination of misinformation about non-existent airborne corps, allegedly destined for the invasion of England. About the upcoming landing on British Isles facts such as the seconding of translators from English to military units, the release of new English topographic maps, reference books, etc., should have testified. Rumors spread among the officers of Army Group South that German troops would allegedly be transferred to Iran to wage war for the British colonies.
The OKW directive on disinformation of the enemy indicated that the greater the concentration of forces in the east, the greater the effort needed to be made to keep public opinion misleading about the German plans. In the instructions of the chiefs of staff of the OKW of March 9, it was recommended to represent the deployment of the Wehrmacht in the east and as defensive measures to ensure the rear of Germany during the landing in England and operations in the Balkans.
The Hitlerite leadership was so confident in the successful implementation of the plan that, around the spring of 1941, they began to work out in detail further plans for the conquest of world domination. In the official diary of the Supreme High Command of the Nazi troops for February 17, 1941, Hitler's demand was stated that "after the end of the eastern campaign, it is necessary to provide for the capture of Afghanistan and the organization of an offensive against India." Based on these instructions, the OKW headquarters began planning Wehrmacht operations for the future. These operations were planned to be carried out in the late autumn of 1941 and in the winter of 1941/42. Their concept was outlined in draft directive No. 32 “Preparation for the period after the implementation of the Barbarossa plan”, sent to the ground forces, air force and navy on June 11, 1941.
The project provided that after the defeat of the USSR, the Wehrmacht would have to seize the British colonial possessions and some independent countries in the basin mediterranean sea, Africa, the Near and Middle East, the invasion of the British Isles, the deployment of military operations against America. Hitler's strategists expected from the autumn of 1941 to begin conquering Iran, Iraq, Egypt, the Suez Canal region, and then India, where it was planned to join the Japanese troops. The fascist German leadership hoped, by annexing Spain and Portugal to Germany, to quickly accept the siege of the islands. The development of Directive No. 32 and other documents indicates that after the defeat of the USSR and the solution of the "English problem", the Nazis intended, in alliance with Japan, "to eliminate the influence of the Anglo-Saxons in North America."
The capture of Canada and the United States was supposed to be carried out by landing large amphibious assault forces from bases in Greenland, Iceland, Azores and in Brazil - to the east coast of North America and from the Aleutian and Hawaiian Islands - to the west. In April-June 1941, these issues were repeatedly discussed at the highest German headquarters. Thus, even before the aggression against the USSR, the German fascist leadership outlined far-reaching plans for the conquest of world domination. The key position for their implementation, as it seemed to the Nazi leadership, was given by a campaign against the USSR.
In contrast to the preparation of campaigns against Poland, France and the Balkan states, the war against the USSR was prepared with particular care and for a longer time. Aggression against the USSR according to the Barbarossa plan was planned as a fleeting campaign, the ultimate goal of which - the defeat of the Red Army and the destruction of the Soviet Union - was proposed to be achieved in the fall of 1941.
The fighting was supposed to be carried out in the form of a blitz-krieg. At the same time, the offensive of the main strategic groupings was presented in the form of a continuous offensive at a fast pace. Short pauses were allowed only for the regrouping of troops and pulling up the lagging rear. The possibility of stopping the offensive due to the resistance of the Red Army was excluded. Excessive confidence in the infallibility of their ideas and plans "hypnotized" the fascist generals. The Nazi machine was gaining momentum to win the victory, which seemed so easy and close to the leaders of the "Third Reich".
But even if the plan to defeat the Red Army had succeeded, it would hardly be possible to consider the war over. Almost two hundred million people in the vast expanses of their country had the opportunity to resist foreign invasion for years, bleeding most German army. Therefore, Hitler constantly emphasized that the war in the East is fundamentally different from the war in the West - the final victory in Russia can only be won with incredible cruelty in the treatment of the population, the "depopulation" of vast territories, evictions and the extermination of tens of millions of people. A terrible threat hung over the peoples of the USSR.
The nature of the war.
It would be wrong to think that the Second World War arose by chance or as a result of the mistakes of some statesmen, although mistakes took place in the top leadership of the country, at the very beginning of the war, when Stalin hoped for friendship with Hitler. In fact, the war arose as an inevitable result of the development of world economic and political forces, that is, due to the uneven development of the capitalist countries, which led to a sharp disruption within the world system. Moreover, those countries that were provided with raw materials and sales markets made attempts to change the situation and redistribute "spheres of influence" in their favor by using an armed attack. As a result, hostile camps arose, and a war began between them.
Thus, as a result of the first crisis of the capitalist system of the world economy, the first world war arose; from this we can conclude that the second world war arose as a result of a second or other disagreement between states.
But the second world war is not a copy of the first, on the contrary, the second world war differs significantly from the first in its character. The main fascist states - Germany, Japan, Italy - before attacking the allied countries, destroyed the last remnants of bourgeois-democratic freedoms, established a brutal terrorist regime, trampled on the principle of sovereignty and free development of small countries, declared the policy of seizing foreign lands as their own. politics and declared publicly that they were seeking world domination fascist regime worldwide.
By seizing Czechoslovakia and the central regions of China, the Axis showed that they were ready to carry out their threat to enslave all freedom-loving peoples. In view of this, the Second World War against the Axis states, in contrast to the First World War, assumed from the very beginning the character of an anti-fascist war of liberation, one of the tasks of which was also the restoration of democratic freedoms.
The entry of the Soviet Union into the war against fascist Germany and its allies could only intensify - and indeed intensified - the anti-fascist and liberation character of the Second World War. On this basis, an anti-fascist coalition of the Soviet Union, the USA, Great Britain and other freedom-loving states was formed, which later played a decisive role in the defeat of the fascist army. The war was not and could not be an accident in the life of peoples, it turned into a war of peoples for their existence, and that is why it could not be fleeting, lightning fast. Such is the case with regard to the origin and character of the Second World War.
Causes of defeats in the summer and autumn of 1941
Many historians believe that before the war the USSR did everything possible to strengthen the country's defense capability, including the creation of a powerful Armed Forces. However, the Red Army was not brought to full combat readiness on the eve of the war. The troops did not take timely defensive lines along the Western border of the USSR. There were serious shortcomings in the organization of the defense of the border. The main blame for all the mistakes and miscalculations made in the pre-war period is laid on Stalin and, to a much lesser extent, on the military.
In his first address to the Soviet people On July 3, 1941, Stalin explained everything that had happened by the “surprise” of the attack, by the complete readiness of the German troops for the attack, by the experience of the war that they had acquired in the Western campaigns. Also, the cause of the disaster was that the troops of the Red Army before the war itself were in camps, at training grounds, in the process of reorganization, replenishment, redeployment and movement. However, with a deeper consideration of the cause of the defeat in the summer - autumn of 1941, it turns out that the matter lies not only in miscalculations and in the timing of the German attack on the USSR.
One of the main reasons for the defeat was the border battle in the summer of 1941. Its result was the defeat of the Red Army in the Western districts, our losses in manpower and equipment, the loss of a significant part of the country's territory, which led to the disaster of the people, great economic damage, and the protracted nature of the war. The unpreparedness of the troops to repel the enemy’s first strike due to Stalin’s stubborn (stubborn) unwillingness to analyze intelligence data (some of the data are given), his manic, inexplicable in the light of intelligence data, demand not to succumb to provocations, not to give Hitler a reason to declare the USSR an aggressor.
According to the commanders G.K. Zhukov and a number of other marshals, in order to win the border battle, it was necessary to create groupings of forces, keep them in the right areas combat-ready and combat-ready and capable of implementing an offensive. They did not carry out further forecasting of events.
An analysis of the diplomatic and other efforts of the Soviet leadership of that period makes it possible to identify the main conditions, the achievement of which was considered necessary to repel the enemy's aggression: a) the exclusion of a war on two fronts - against Germany and Japan; b) exclusion of the crusade of the Western countries against the USSR; the presence of allies in the fight against Hitler, in the limit - the formation anti-Hitler coalition; c) removal state border from vital facilities of the country, primarily from Leningrad; d) strengthening the combat capability of the Red Army, equipping it modern weapons; e) creation of such a structure of the army and navy, such an initial formation of their groupings, in order to repel the first blow of the enemy (but taking into account the conditions “a” and “c”), and then transfer them to the territory of the enemy fighting for the final disruption of aggression.
Among the most important reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in the summer of 1941 is the "cause of mass panic among the troops" at the beginning of World War II. These are flight from positions, and in hopeless situations - surrender or suicide. Awareness of the fact that all military propaganda, trumpeting about the power of the Red Army and our readiness for war, that in case of war we will fight " little blood on foreign territory," turned out to be a lie. The Soviet soldier felt on his own skin that he was not an "atom" great army, having meaningful tactics and strategy, he is cannon fodder in the hands of mediocre and confused military leaders. And then the people's consciousness singled out one of all the reasons for military failures - treason, in the "tops" themselves, in the leadership of the country and the army. Each new defeat revived this panic mood, which neither political agencies nor foreign detachments could cope with.
The situation was aggravated by the fact that the commanders of the defeated units and formations of the Red Army, who were surrounded and made their way to their own, were under the influence of the same sentiments about treason and could not explain anything to the soldiers. So in the author's manuscript of the memoirs of Marshal K. K. Rokossovsky, fully published only in recent years, many pages are devoted to describing the "shock" that our troops experienced in the summer of 1941 and from which they could not get out " long time". In November 1941, the commander of the defeated Soviet division, Kotlyarov, before shooting himself, left a note in which there were the following words: “General disorganization and loss of control. The higher headquarters are to blame. Get behind the anti-tank obstacle. Save Moscow. Ahead without prospects. Documents on the Battle of Moscow and many other documentary evidence of the events of 1941 tell about similar sentiments.
Consequently, the main conclusion, the real reasons that made the events of 1941 develop in such an incomprehensible and obscure way, is not in Stalin's personal miscalculations, which many military leaders talk about in their memoirs, but in other circumstances. Historians, politicians, diplomats and the military, who created in their works the image of Stalin - a cunning, prudent, insidious intriguer (which corresponds to the image of an “outstanding politician” in historical literature), contradict themselves, attributing to his personal initiative all those orders that led to the collapse army on the eve of the war. Reaching supreme power Stalin would not voluntarily commit acts that defy a logical explanation - the very formulation of the question in this vein is anti-scientific.
Famous german plan"Barbarossa" can be briefly described something like this: it is Hitler's almost unrealistic strategic plan to capture Russia as the main enemy on the way to world domination.
It is worth remembering that by the time of the attack on the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, led by Adolf Hitler, almost unhindered captured half European states. Only Britain and the United States offered resistance to the aggressor.
The essence and goals of Operation Barbarossa
The Soviet-German non-aggression pact, signed shortly before the start of World War II, was for Hitler nothing more than a head start. Why? Because the Soviet Union, without assuming a possible betrayal, fulfilled the aforementioned agreement.
And the German leader thus bought time to carefully develop a strategy to capture his main enemy.
Why did Hitler recognize Russia as the biggest obstacle in the implementation of the blitzkrieg? Because the resilience of the USSR did not allow England and the United States to lose heart and, perhaps, to surrender, like many European countries.
In addition, the fall of the Soviet Union would serve as a powerful impetus to strengthen Japan's position on the world stage. And Japan and the United States had extremely tense relations. Also, the non-aggression pact allowed Germany not to launch an offensive in the adverse conditions of winter cold.
The preliminary strategy of the Barbarossa plan, point by point, looked something like this:
- The powerful and well-prepared army of the Reich invades Western Ukraine, defeating the main forces of the disoriented enemy with lightning speed. After several decisive battles, the German forces finish off the scattered detachments of the surviving Soviet soldiers.
- From the territory of the occupied Balkans, march victoriously to Moscow and Leningrad. Capture both archival cities to achieve the intended result of the city. The task of capturing Moscow as the political and tactical center of the country was especially highlighted. Interesting: the Germans were sure that Moscow would flock to defend every single remnant of the USSR army - and it would be easier than ever to utterly smash them.
Why was the German plan of attack on the USSR called the "Barbarossa" plan?
The strategic plan for the lightning-fast capture and subjugation of the Soviet Union got its name in honor of Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, who ruled the Holy Roman Empire in the 12th century.
The aforementioned leader went down in history thanks to his numerous and successful conquests.
In the name of the plan "Barbarossa", there was undoubtedly a symbolism inherent in almost all actions and decisions of the leadership of the Third Reich. The name of the plan was approved on January 31, 1941.
Hitler's goals in World War II
Like any totalitarian dictator, Hitler did not pursue any special tasks (according to at least, such that could be explained by applying the elementary logic of common sense).
The Third Reich unleashed the Second world war with the only goal: to seize the world, to establish domination, to subjugate all countries and peoples to their perverted ideologies, to impose their picture of the world on the entire population of the planet.
How long did Hitler want to take over the USSR
In general, the Nazi strategists allotted only five months for the capture of the vast territory of the Soviet Union - a single summer.
Today, such arrogance may seem unfounded, if you do not remember that at the time of the development of the plan, the German army in just a few months, without much effort and loss, captured almost all of Europe.
What does blitzkrieg mean and what are its tactics
Blitzkrieg, or the tactics of lightning-fast capture of the enemy, is the brainchild of German military strategists at the beginning of the 20th century. The word Blitzkrieg comes from two German words: Blitz (lightning) and Krieg (war).
The blitzkrieg strategy was based on the possibility of capturing vast territories in a record short time(months or even weeks) before the opposing army comes to its senses and mobilizes the main forces.
The tactic of a lightning attack was based on the closest interaction between the infantry, aviation and tank formations of the German army. Tank crews, supported by infantry, must break through behind enemy lines and surround the main fortified positions important for establishing permanent control over the territory.
The enemy army, being cut off from all communication systems and all kinds of supplies, quickly begins to experience difficulties in solving the simplest issues (water, food, ammunition, clothing, etc.). Thus weakened, the forces of the attacked country are soon surrendered or destroyed.
When did Nazi Germany attack the USSR?
According to the results of the development of the Barbarossa plan, the Reich attack on the USSR was scheduled for May 15, 1941. The date of the invasion was shifted due to the Nazis carrying out the Greek and Yugoslav operations in the Balkans.
In fact, Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union without declaring war on June 22, 1941 at 4:00 am. This sad date is considered the beginning of the Great Patriotic War.
Where did the Germans go during the war - map
Blitzkrieg tactics helped the German troops in the first days and weeks of the Second World War to cover vast distances across the territory of the USSR without any special problems. In 1942, a rather impressive part of the country was captured by the Nazis.
German forces reached almost Moscow. In the Caucasus, they advanced to the Volga, but after the battle of Stalingrad they were driven back to Kursk. At this stage, the retreat of the German army began. The invaders passed through the northern lands to Arkhangelsk.
Reasons for the failure of the Barbarossa plan
If we consider the situation globally, the plan fell through due to the inaccuracy of German intelligence data. Wilhelm Canaris, who led it, may well have been a British double agent, as some historians today argue.
If we take these unconfirmed data on faith, it becomes clear why he “fed” Hitler the misinformation that the USSR had practically no secondary lines of defense, but there were huge supply problems, and, moreover, almost all troops were stationed on the border.
Conclusion
Many historians, poets, writers, as well as eyewitnesses of the events described, admit that a huge, almost decisive role in the victory of the USSR over Nazi Germany, played the fighting spirit Soviet people, the love of freedom of the Slavic and other peoples who did not want to drag out a miserable existence under the yoke of world tyranny.
In principle, that there would be a march to the East, it was clear from the very beginning, Hitler was “programmed” for it. The question was different - when? On July 22, 1940, F. Halder received a task from the commander of the ground forces to think about various options for an operation against Russia. Initially, the plan was developed by General E. Marx, he enjoyed the Fuhrer's special confidence, he proceeded from the general input received from Halder. On July 31, 1940, at a meeting with the generals of the Wehrmacht, Hitler announced the general strategy of the operation: two main attacks, the first - in the southern strategic direction - to Kiev and Odessa, the second - in the northern strategic direction - through the Baltic states, to Moscow; in the future, a two-sided strike, from the north and south; later, an operation to seize the Caucasus, the oil fields of Baku.
On August 5, General E. Marx prepared the initial plan, "Plan Fritz". On him the main blow was from East Prussia and Northern Poland to Moscow. The main strike force, Army Group North, was to include 3 armies, a total of 68 divisions (of which 15 were armored and 2 were motorized). She was supposed to defeat the Red Army on westbound, capture northern part European Russia and Moscow, then help the southern group in the capture of Ukraine. The second blow was inflicted on Ukraine, Army Group "South" consisting of 2 armies, a total of 35 divisions (including 5 tank and 6 motorized). Army Group "South" was supposed to defeat the troops of the Red Army in the south-western direction, capture Kiev and cross the Dnieper in the middle reaches. Both groups were supposed to reach the line: Arkhangelsk-Gorky-Rostov-on-Don. There were 44 divisions in the reserve, they were supposed to be concentrated in the offensive zone of the main strike force - "North". main idea was in a "blitzkrieg", the USSR was planned to be defeated in 9 weeks (!) Under a favorable scenario and in the case of the most unfavorable scenario in 17 weeks.
Franz Halder (1884-1972), photo 1939
Weak points of E. Marx's plan: underestimation military power Red Army and the USSR as a whole; reassessment of their capabilities, i.e., the Wehrmacht; tolerances in a number of enemy response actions, for example, the ability of the military-political leadership in organizing defense, counterattacks, excessive hopes for the collapse of the state and political system, the economy of the state in the rejection of the western regions. Opportunities to restore the economy and the army after the first defeats were excluded. The USSR was confused with Russia in 1918, when, with the collapse of the front, small German detachments by rail were able to capture vast territories. No outgrowth scenario developed lightning war into a protracted war. In a word, the plan suffered from adventurism bordering on suicide. These mistakes were not eliminated later.
So, German intelligence was unable to correctly assess the defense capability of the USSR, its military, economic, moral-political, spiritual potentials. Gross mistakes were made in assessing the size of the Red Army, its mobilization potential, the quantitative and qualitative parameters of our Air Force and armored forces. So, according to the intelligence of the Reich, in the USSR, the annual production of aircraft in 1941 amounted to 3500-4000 aircraft, in reality, from January 1, 1939 to June 22, 1941, the Red Army Air Force received 17,745 aircraft, of which 3,719 were new designs.
The top military leaders of the Reich were also captivated by the illusions of the "blitzkrieg", so, on August 17, 1940, at a meeting at the headquarters supreme command Keitel called "it is a crime to attempt to create at the present time such production capacities that will have an effect only after 1941. You can invest only in such enterprises that are necessary to achieve the goal and will give the appropriate effect.
Wilhelm Keitel (1882-1946), photo 1939
Further development
Further development of the plan was entrusted to General F. Paulus, who received the post of Assistant Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces. In addition, Hitler involved in the work of the generals, who were to become the chiefs of staff of the army groups. They had to independently investigate the problem. By September 17, this work was completed and Paulus could generalize the results. On October 29, he submitted a memorandum: "On the main idea of the operation against Russia." It emphasized that it was necessary to achieve the surprise of the strike, and for this, develop and implement measures to misinform the enemy. The need was pointed out to prevent the retreat of the Soviet border forces, to surround and destroy them in the border zone.
At the same time, the war plan was being developed at the headquarters of the operational leadership of the supreme command. At the direction of Jodl, Lieutenant Colonel B. Lossberg dealt with them. By September 15, he presented his war plan, many of his ideas were included in the final war plan: to destroy the main forces of the Red Army by lightning actions, preventing them from retreating to the east, to cut off western Russia from the seas - the Baltic and Black, to gain a foothold on such a line that would allow them to capture the most important regions of the European part of Russia, while becoming a barrier against its Asian part. Three army groups already appear in this development: "North", "Center" and "South". Moreover, Army Group Center received most of the motorized and tank forces, beat on Moscow, through Minsk and Smolensk. With the delay of the "North" group, which hit in the direction of Leningrad, the troops of the "Center", after the capture of Smolensk, were supposed to throw part of their forces in the northern direction. Army Group "South" was supposed to defeat the enemy troops, surrounding them, seize Ukraine, force the Dnieper, on its northern flank come into contact with the southern flank of the "Center" group. Finland and Romania were drawn into the war: the Finnish-German separate task force was to advance on Leningrad, part of the forces on Murmansk. The final frontier of the advance of the Wehrmacht. The fate of the Union was to be determined, whether there would be an internal catastrophe in it. Also, as in the Paulus plan, much attention was paid to the surprise factor of the strike.
Friedrich Wilhelm Ernst Paulus (1890-1957).
meeting general staff(1940). Participants of the meeting at the table with a map (from left to right): Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht, Field Marshal Keitel, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Colonel-General von Brauchitsch, Hitler, Chief of the General Staff, Colonel-General Halder.
Plan "Otto"
In the future, the development was continued, the plan was refined, on November 19, the plan, code-named "Otto", was considered by the commander-in-chief of the ground forces Brauchitsch. It was approved without significant comments. On December 5, 1940, the plan was presented to A. Hitler, the ultimate goal of the offensive three groups armies were identified Arkhangelsk and Volga. Hitler approved it. From November 29 to December 7, 1940, according to the plan, a war game was held.
On December 18, 1940, Hitler signed Directive No. 21, the plan received the symbolic name "Barbarossa". Emperor Frederick the Redbeard was the initiator of a series of campaigns to the East. For the sake of secrecy, the plan was made only in 9 copies. For secrecy, the armed forces of Romania, Hungary and Finland were to receive specific tasks only before the start of the war. Preparations for the war were to be completed by May 15, 1941.
Walter von Brauchitsch (1881-1948), photo 1941
The essence of the plan "Barbarossa"
The idea of "blitzkrieg" and surprise strike. Final goal for the Wehrmacht: Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line.
The maximum concentration of forces of the ground forces and the air force. The destruction of the troops of the Red Army as a result of bold, deep and fast actions of tank "wedges". The Luftwaffe had to eliminate the possibility of effective actions of the Soviet Air Force at the very beginning of the operation.
The Navy performed auxiliary tasks: supporting the Wehrmacht from the sea; stopping the breakthrough of the Soviet Navy from the Baltic Sea; protection of its coast; to tie down the Soviet naval forces with their actions, ensuring navigation in the Baltic and supplying the northern flank of the Wehrmacht by sea.
Strike in three strategic directions: northern - Baltic-Leningrad, central - Minsk-Smolensk-Moscow, southern - Kiev-Volga. The main blow was in the central direction.
In addition to Directive No. 21 of December 18, 1940, there were other documents: directives and orders on strategic concentration and deployment, logistics, camouflage, disinformation, preparation of a theater of operations, etc. So, on January 31, 1941, a directive was issued OKH (General Staff of the Ground Forces) on the strategic concentration and deployment of troops, on February 15, 1941, an order was issued by the Chief of Staff of the High Command on camouflage.
A. Hitler personally had a great influence on the plan, it was he who approved the offensive by 3 army groups in order to capture the economically important regions of the USSR, insisted on special attention - to the zone of the Baltic and Black Seas, inclusion in the operational planning of the Urals and the Caucasus. great attention he gave to the southern strategic direction - the grain of Ukraine, the Donbass, the most important strategic importance of the Volga, the oil of the Caucasus.
Impact forces, army groups, other groupings
Enormous forces were allocated for the strike: 190 divisions, of which 153 were German (including 33 tank and motorized), 37 infantry divisions Finland, Romania, Hungary, two-thirds of the Reich Air Force, naval forces, air forces and naval forces of Germany's allies. Berlin left only 24 divisions in the reserve of the high command. And even then, in the west and southeast, there remained divisions with limited strike capabilities, intended for protection and security. The only mobile reserve was two armored brigades in France armed with captured tanks.
Army Group Center - commanded by F. Bock, it dealt the main blow - included two field armies - the 9th and 4th, two tank groups - the 3rd and 2nd, a total of 50 divisions and 2 brigades supported 2nd Air Fleet. She was supposed to make a deep breakthrough south and north of Minsk with flank attacks (2 tank groups), encircle a large grouping of Soviet forces between Bialystok and Minsk. After the destruction of the encircled Soviet forces and reaching the Roslavl, Smolensk, Vitebsk line, two scenarios were considered: the first, if Army Group North could not defeat the forces opposing it, send tank groups against them, and the field armies should continue to move to Moscow; second, if everything is going well with the Sever group, attack Moscow with all its might.
Fedor von Bock (1880-1945), photo 1940
Army Group North was commanded by Field Marshal Leeb, it included the 16th and 18th field armies, 4 tank groups, a total of 29 divisions, with the support of the 1st air fleet. She was supposed to defeat the forces opposing her, capture the Baltic ports, Leningrad, and the bases of the Baltic Fleet. Then, together with the Finnish army and the German units transferred from Norway, they will break the resistance of the Soviet forces in the north of European Russia.
Wilhelm von Leeb (1876-1956), photo 1940
Army Group "South", which hit south of the Pripyat swamps, was commanded by Field Marshal G. Rundstedt. It included: the 6th, 17th, 11th field armies, the 1st tank group, the 3rd and 4th Romanian armies, the Hungarian mobile corps, with the support of the 4th Reich air fleet and the Romanian Air Force and Hungary. In total - 57 divisions and 13 brigades, of which 13 are Romanian divisions, 9 Romanian and 4 Hungarian brigades. Rundstedt was to lead the attack on Kiev, defeat the Red Army in Galicia, in western Ukraine, capture the crossings across the Dnieper, creating the prerequisites for further offensive actions. To do this, the 1st Panzer Group, in cooperation with units of the 17th and 6th armies, was supposed to break through the defenses in the area between Rava Russa and Kovel, going through Berdichev and Zhitomir, to reach the Dnieper in the Kiev region and to the south. Then hit along the Dnieper in south- eastbound to cut off the Red Army forces operating in Western Ukraine and destroy them. At this time, the 11th Army was supposed to give the Soviet leadership the appearance of the main blow from the territory of Romania, pinning down the forces of the Red Army and preventing them from leaving the Dniester.
The Romanian armies (plan "Munich") were also to tie down the Soviet troops, break through the defenses in the sector of Tsutsora, New Bedrazh.
Karl Rudolf Gerd von Rundstedt (1875-1953), photo 1939
The German army "Norway" and two Finnish armies were concentrated in Finland and Norway, in total 21 divisions and 3 brigades, with the support of the 5th Reich Air Fleet and the Finnish Air Force. The Finnish units were to pin down the Red Army in the Karelian and Petrozavodsk directions. When Army Group North entered the line of the Luga River, the Finns had to launch a decisive offensive on the Karelian Isthmus and between the Onega and Ladoga lakes, in order to join the Germans on the Svir River and the Leningrad region, they had to take part in the capture of the second capital of the Union , the city should (or rather, this territory, the city planned to destroy, and the population "utilize") to go to Finland. The German army "Norway", with the help of two reinforced corps, was to launch an offensive against Murmansk and Kandalaksha. After the fall of Kandalaksha and access to the White Sea, the southern corps was supposed to advance north along the railway and, together with the northern corps, capture Murmansk, Polyarnoye, destroying Soviet forces on the Kola Peninsula.
Discussion of the situation and issuance of orders in one of the German units immediately before the attack on 06/22/1941
The overall plan for Barbarossa, like the early designs, was adventurous and based on a few "ifs". If the USSR is a “colossus with feet of clay”, if the Wehrmacht can do everything correctly and on time, if it is possible to destroy the main forces of the Red Army in the border “boilers”, if the industry, the economy of the USSR will not be able to function normally after the loss of the western regions, especially Ukraine. The economy, the army, the allies were not prepared for a possible protracted war. There was no strategic plan in case the blitzkrieg failed. In the end, when the blitzkrieg failed, we had to improvise.
Plan of the attack of the German Wehrmacht on the Soviet Union, June 1941
Sources:
The suddenness of the attack is a weapon of aggression. M., 2002.
Criminal purposes Nazi Germany in the war against the Soviet Union. Documents and materials. M., 1987.
http://www.gumer.info/bibliotek_Buks/History/Article/Pl_Barb.php
http://militera.lib.ru/db/halder/index.html
http://militera.lib.ru/memo/german/manstein/index.html
http://historic.ru/books/item/f00/s00/z0000019/index.shtml
http://katynbooks.narod.ru/foreign/dashichev-01.htm
http://protown.ru/information/hide/4979.html
http://www.warmech.ru/1941war/razrabotka_barbarossa.html
http://flot.com/publications/books/shelf/germanyvsussr/5.htm?print=Y
The fascist aggression against the Soviet Union, named after the Roman emperor "Plan Barbarossa", was a fleeting military campaign, pursuing one single goal: to defeat and destroy the USSR. The final date for the completion of hostilities was supposed to be the autumn of 1941.
A year before in December 1941, late in the evening, the Fuhrer signed the directive under the serial number 21. It was printed in nine copies and was kept in the strictest confidence.
The directive received a code name - the Barbarossa plan. It provided for the end of the campaign to defeat the USSR even before the end of the war against Great Britain.
What was this document and what goals did the Barbarossa Plan pursue - this is a carefully designed aggression directed against the Soviet Union. With it, Hitler, intending to achieve world domination, had to remove one of the main obstacles to his imperial goals.
Moscow, Leningrad, Donbass and the Central Industrial Region were indicated as the main strategic objects. At the same time, a special place was assigned to the capital, its capture was considered decisive for the victorious outcome of this war.
To destroy the USSR, Hitler planned to use all German ground forces, with the exception of only those that were supposed to remain in the occupied territories.
Barbarossa's plan provided for the release of the forces of the fascist air force to assist the ground forces of this eastern operation, so that the ground part of the campaign could be completed as quickly as possible. At the same time, the directive ordered by any means to minimize the destruction of eastern Germany by enemy aircraft.
Naval combat operations against the Northern, Black Sea and Baltic Soviet fleets were to be carried out by ships of the Reich Navy together with maritime forces Romania and Finland.
For a lightning attack on the USSR, the Barbarossa plan considered the participation of 152 divisions, including tank and motorized, two brigades. Romania and Finland intended to field 16 brigades and 29 land divisions in this campaign.
The armed forces of the satellite countries of the Reich were to operate under a single German command. The task of Finland was to cover the northern troops, who were supposed to attack from Norwegian territory, as well as the destruction of Soviet troops on the Hanko Peninsula. At the same time, Romania was supposed to bind the actions of the Soviet troops, helping the Germans from the rear areas.
Barbarossa's plan set certain goals, which were based on pronounced class contradictions. It was the idea of starting a war, which turned into the destruction of entire nations with unlimited use of violent methods.
Unlike the military invasion of France, Poland and the Balkans, the blitz campaign against the Soviet Union was prepared very meticulously. The Hitlerite leadership spent enough time and effort to develop the Barbarossa plan, so defeat was ruled out.
But the creators could not accurately assess the strength and strength of the Soviet state and, based on the exaggeration of the economic, political and military potentials of the fascist empire, they underestimated the power of the USSR, the combat capability and morale of its people.
Hitler's "machine" was gaining momentum for victory, which seemed to the leaders of the Reich very easy and close. That is why the fighting had to be a blitzkrieg, and the offensive - a continuous advance deep into the USSR, and at a very high speed. Short breaks were provided only for pulling up the rear.
At the same time, the Barbarossa plan completely ruled out any delays due to the resistance of the Soviet Army. The reason for the failure of this seemingly victorious plan was excessive self-confidence, which, as history has shown, destroyed the plans of the fascist generals.
The art of war is a science in which nothing succeeds except what has been calculated and thought out.
Napoleon
The Barbarossa plan is a plan for Germany's attack on the USSR, based on the principle of lightning war, blitzkrieg. The plan began to be developed in the summer of 1940, and on December 18, 1940, Hitler approved a plan according to which the war was to be ended by November 1941 at the latest.
Plan Barbarossa was named after Frederick Barbarossa, a 12th century emperor who became famous for his conquests. This traced elements of symbolism, to which Hitler himself and his entourage paid so much attention. The plan received its name on January 31, 1941.
Number of troops to implement the plan
Germany prepared 190 divisions for war and 24 divisions as a reserve. For the war, 19 tank and 14 motorized divisions were allocated. The total number of the contingent that Germany sent to the USSR, according to various estimates, ranges from 5 to 5.5 million people.
The apparent superiority in the technology of the USSR should not be taken into account, since by the beginning of the wars, German technical tanks and aircraft were superior to Soviet ones, and the army itself was much more trained. Enough to remember Soviet-Finnish war 1939-1940, where the Red Army demonstrated weakness in literally everything.
Direction of the main attack
The Barbarossa plan defined 3 main directions for the strike:
- Army Group South. A blow to Moldova, Ukraine, Crimea and access to the Caucasus. Further movement to the line Astrakhan - Stalingrad (Volgograd).
- Army Group Center. Line "Minsk - Smolensk - Moscow". Advance to Nizhny Novgorod, leveling the line "Wave - Northern Dvina".
- Army Group North. Attack on the Baltic states, Leningrad and further advance towards Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. At the same time, the army "Norway" was to fight in the north together with the Finnish army.
| SOUTH | CENTRE | NORTH | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Target | Ukraine, Crimea, access to the Caucasus | Minsk, Smolensk, Moscow | Baltic States, Leningrad, Arkhangelsk, Murmansk |
| population | 57 divisions and 13 brigades | 50 divisions and 2 brigades | 29 division + army "Norway" |
| Commanding | Field Marshal von Rundstedt | Field Marshal von Bock | Field Marshal von Leeb |
| common goal | Get on line: Arkhangelsk - Volga - Astrakhan (Northern Dvina) |
||
Approximately by the end of October 1941, the German command planned to reach the Volga-Northern Dvina line, thereby capturing the entire European part THE USSR. This was the plan of the blitzkrieg. After the blitzkrieg, the lands beyond the Urals should have remained, which, without the support of the center, would quickly surrender to the winner.
Until about mid-August 1941, the Germans believed that the war was going according to plan, but in September there were already entries in the diaries of officers that the Barbarossa plan had failed and the war would be lost. The best proof that Germany in August 1941 believed that only a few weeks were left before the end of the war with the USSR is the speech of Goebbels. The Minister of Propaganda suggested that the Germans additionally collect warm clothes for the needs of the army. The government decided that this step was not necessary, since there would be no war in the winter.
Implementation of the plan
The first three weeks of the war assured Hitler that everything was going according to plan. The army advanced rapidly, winning victories, Soviet army suffered huge losses.
- 28 divisions out of 170 disabled.
- 70 divisions lost about 50% of their personnel.
- 72 divisions remained combat-ready (43% of those available at the start of the war).
During the same 3 weeks, the average rate of advance of German troops inland was 30 km per day.
By July 11, the army group "North" occupied almost the entire territory of the Baltic states, providing access to Leningrad, the army group "Center" reached Smolensk, the army group "South" went to Kiev. These were recent achievements, which fully corresponded to the plan of the German command. After that, failures began (still local, but already indicative). Nevertheless, the initiative in the war until the end of 1941 was on the side of Germany.
German failures in the North
The army "North" occupied the Baltic states without problems, especially since there was practically no partisan movement there. The next strategic point to be captured was Leningrad. It turned out that the Wehrmacht was not capable of this task. The city did not capitulate to the enemy, and until the end of the war, despite all efforts, Germany failed to capture it.
Failures of the Army Center
The "Center" army reached Smolensk without any problems, but got stuck under the city until September 10. Smolensk resisted for almost a month. The German command demanded a decisive victory and the advance of the troops, since such a delay under the city, which was planned to be taken without heavy losses, was unacceptable and cast doubt on the implementation of the Barbarossa plan. As a result, the Germans took Smolensk, but their troops were pretty battered.
Historians today evaluate the battle for Smolensk as a tactical victory for Germany, but a strategic victory for Russia, as they managed to stop the advance of troops on Moscow, which allowed the capital to prepare for defense.
Complicated the advance of the German army inland partisan movement Belarus.
Failures of the Army of the South
The "South" army reached Kiev in 3.5 weeks and, like the "Center" army near Smolensk, got stuck in battles. In the end, it was possible to take the city in view of the clear superiority of the army, but Kiev held out almost until the end of September, which also made it difficult for the German army to advance, and made a significant contribution to the disruption of the Barbarossa plan.
Map of the advance plan of the German troops
Above is a map showing the plan of the German command for the offensive. The map shows: in green - the borders of the USSR, in red - the border to which Germany planned to reach, in blue - the deployment and the plan to advance the German forces.
General state of affairs
- In the North, it was not possible to capture Leningrad and Murmansk. The advance of the troops stopped.
- In the Center, with great difficulty, we managed to get to Moscow. At the time the German army entered the Soviet capital, it was clear that no blitzkrieg had happened.
- In the South, they failed to take Odessa and capture the Caucasus. By the end of September, the Nazi troops had only captured Kiev and launched an offensive against Kharkov and the Donbass.
Why did the blitzkrieg fail in Germany?
Germany failed the blitzkrieg because the Wehrmacht was preparing the Barbarossa plan, as it later turned out, on false intelligence. Hitler admitted this by the end of 1941, saying that if he had known the real state of affairs in the USSR, he would not have started the war on June 22.
The lightning war tactics were based on the fact that the country has one line of defense on the western border, all large army units are located on the western border, and aviation is located on the border. Since Hitler was sure that all Soviet troops were located on the border, this formed the basis of the blitzkrieg - to destroy the enemy army in the first weeks of the war, and then rapidly move inland without encountering serious resistance.
In fact, there were several lines of defense, the army was not located with all its forces on the western border, there were reserves. Germany did not expect this, and by August 1941 it became clear that the lightning war had failed, and Germany could not win the war. The fact that World War II lasted until 1945 only proves that the Germans fought very organized and brave. Due to the fact that they had the economy of the whole of Europe behind them (speaking of the war between Germany and the USSR, many for some reason forget that the German army included units from almost all European countries) they managed to fight successfully.
Did Barbarossa's plan fail?
I propose to evaluate the Barbarossa plan according to 2 criteria: global and local. Global(landmark - the Great Patriotic War) - the plan was thwarted, because the lightning war did not work, the German troops were bogged down in battles. Local(landmark - intelligence data) - the plan was implemented. The German command drew up the Barbarossa plan on the basis that the USSR had 170 divisions on the country's border, there were no additional defense echelons. There are no reserves and reinforcements. The army was preparing for this. In 3 weeks, 28 Soviet divisions were completely destroyed, and in 70, approximately 50% of the personnel and equipment were disabled. At this stage, the blitzkrieg worked and, in the absence of reinforcements from the USSR, gave the desired results. But it turned out that the Soviet command has reserves, not all troops are located on the border, mobilization brings quality soldiers into the army, there are additional lines of defense, the “charm” of which Germany felt near Smolensk and Kiev.
Therefore, the disruption of the Barbarossa plan must be regarded as a huge strategic mistake of German intelligence, led by Wilhelm Canaris. Today, some historians associate this person with the agents of England, but there is no evidence for this. But if we assume that this is indeed the case, then it becomes clear why Canaris slipped an absolute “linden” to Hitler that the USSR was not ready for war and all the troops were located on the border.
