EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS No. 12/2007, p. 2-5

Used photos by A. Chiryatnikov,

V. Shcherbakov, as well as services

information and public relations

Ground Forces.

The Technics and Armament magazine constantly pays great attention to modern armored weapons and equipment. The Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, General of the ArmyA.F. Maslov

- Alexey Fedorovich! It is not the first year that the media and special editions have raised the issue of "reducing the role" of tank forces, that the time when tanks played a decisive role in combat operations is "left behind." How reasonable is it to classify tanks as "endangered brontosaurs"?

Indeed, one can often come across assertions that the "golden time" of tank forces is behind us, and that in the foreseeable future their importance will steadily decline. Such views are mainly adhered to by supporters of so-called "contactless" wars, who strive to prove that in military conflicts of our time, when fire damage becomes one of the most important operational factors, aviation and precision weapons play an almost decisive role in achieving success. Without diminishing their importance, I note that, as experience shows, the effectiveness of the use of aviation is quite high in the fight against an enemy who does not have or has an underdeveloped air defense at all, when conducting hostilities in open areas and destroying, as a rule, stationary objects. In addition, hostilities usually do not end with one fire defeat. It is necessary to be able to use the results of effective engagement to complete the defeat of the enemy, to capture important areas and lines and to liberate the territory he has seized.

The experience of local wars and armed conflicts of recent decades just shows that the ground forces have not lost their importance, and the tanks retain the leading role in combined-arms formations, both as a means of maneuver after the fire defeat of the enemy, and as the main weapon in close combat ... This is also confirmed by the trend towards an increase in their share in the composition of combined arms groupings of troops. So, if in the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1967 only about 2,600 tanks were used, in 1973 - about 5,300, then in the armed conflict between Iraq and the multinational forces in 1990-1991. - already over 9000. And in 2003 the Americans had to wage another war against Iraq, where, despite the widespread use of high-precision long-range weapons, the main role was assigned to ground groupings, a significant part of which were armored forces, which had about 5000 tanks.

Today in the Russian Army, despite the significant reduction, the tank forces still play an important role in solving the tasks facing the Ground Forces.

As before, the fundamental principle of the use of tanks in modern warfare remains their massive use for solving basic tasks by focusing on the main directions both in the offensive and in defense.

At the same time, tank units and subunits are used both in isolated directions and in separate areas on a focal principle. This gives the actions of divisions, brigades, and especially battalions, and sometimes even tank companies, an autonomous character in the absence of fire communication with neighbors. At the same time, tanks are used independently or as means of direct support for infantry as part of battalion (company) tactical groups. In such conditions, the need for direct support of tanks by combat helicopters, assault aircraft, artillery, as well as cover by air defense means sharply increases. But this, like the widespread use of precision weapons, by no means diminishes the role of tank forces. The use by the opposing sides of high-precision weapons and other modern means of warfare contributes to an increase in the transience of combat, and sharply increases the importance of preempting the enemy. Typical combat operations will be rapid and frequent transitions from one type of action to another. And in this regard, the role of tank forces, combining high mobility, maneuverability and firepower, for achieving success in a modern combined arms operation (battle) is only growing.

Views on the use of tank units and subunits are periodically updated. Moreover, we take into account not only foreign, but above all our own experience.

Thus, in the course of counterterrorist operations in the North Caucasus region, hostilities, as a rule, were conducted in the absence of a clearly defined front. The bandit formations made extensive use of ambushes, night and surprise strikes by small groups, and cities and towns turned into strong points saturated with anti-tank weapons. Unfortunately, during the first Chechen campaign, individual commanders often did not fully take into account the specific conditions of the situation. Due to the lack of the necessary experience in the use of tank units in mountainous and wooded areas and settlements, weak interaction with supporting units, tankers suffered serious losses.

Taking into account all these factors and the experience gained ensured the successful solution of tasks in the course of the further conduct of the counter-terrorist operation.

And yet, the use of tank forces in a counter-terrorist operation is a private, and not a characteristic task for them. The main purpose of tank units and subunits is to conduct combat operations in local and regional (large-scale) wars. In my opinion, there are no special grounds for allegations of a decrease in the importance of deep combined arms operations and the importance in them of such a striking force as tank troops.

- Could you briefly outline today's fleet of tank troops' combat vehicles?

Today, a fairly wide range of models of combat vehicles remains in service: T-62, T-64, T-72, T-80, T-90 and their modifications.

The manning level of tank units and constant readiness formations is 100%. Unfortunately, the share of modern models in formations and units is still not high, and the problem of equipping units of the Ground Forces of constant combat readiness with modern tanks is a top priority for us. Of course, we would like the troops to receive as much modern effective weapons as possible, including tanks. But taking into account the financial capabilities of the state, one has to be content with what is received annually within the framework of the state defense order.

The main battle tank of the Russian Armed Forces at the present time can be considered the T-90 tank, which is a further development of both the T-72B and T-80 tanks. The T-90 is equipped with a Shtora electronic suppression system, a modern fire control system, and an Arena complex for protection against modern anti-tank guided missiles and anti-tank grenades.

At the same time, I would like to emphasize that our industry has created a sufficient scientific and technical groundwork that makes it possible to comprehensively solve the tasks of increasing the combat and technical characteristics of armored vehicles by means of their modernization. The most expedient should be considered the modernization of T-72, T-80, T-90 tanks in the direction of a comprehensive increase in firepower, security, mobility.

What does a modern Russian tank fleet look like against the background of the main battle tanks of the armed forces of the most developed foreign countries?

Of course, each combat vehicle has its own advantages and disadvantages over its "competitors" (and the competition in tank building took place both in Soviet times and now). However, in comparison with serial tanks of leading foreign countries, Russian tanks are not only not inferior, but also surpass them in some characteristics. It is characteristic that in the modern arms market, domestic tanks enjoy well-deserved demand and respect. The positive qualities of our tanks are their low silhouette, good mobility, reliability, the presence of sufficiently effective guided weapons and an automatic loading mechanism (mechanism). At the same time, it should be noted that foreign tanks from the 1980s. are equipped with thermal imaging devices for observation and aiming, and our vehicles are not yet equipped with them in sufficient quantities. Currently, the best foreign tanks include the American "Abram", the French "Leclerc", the English "Challenger-2", as well as the German "Leopard-2A5 / A6". The Russian T-90 tank is approximately on a par with them.

The most pronounced trend in the development of armored vehicles can be considered a steady increase in the firepower of tanks, and the most dynamically improved, first of all, the complex of their weapons.

No amount of armor protection gives a combat vehicle absolute safety. To survive in a battle, you must first find the target and hit it. Today, tanks have the ability to fire effectively both from a standstill and on the move. And thermal imaging sights (sight channels) allow you to search for targets in difficult weather conditions not only during the day, but also at night. The armor penetration of shells also increased significantly (more than 3 times), complexes for remote detonation of high-explosive (shrapnel) shells and flight control of tank missiles appeared.

The main weapons of modern tanks are high-ballistic cannons of medium (120-125 mm) caliber, mainly with a smooth-walled barrel. Domestic tank guns, created on the basis of the "least mass" concept, are the lightest. The survivability of their barrels ranges from 400 to 700 shots. And the best performance is in barrels with an internal protective chrome coating of the channel.

Tank protection and crew armament are used as auxiliary weapons. As for the additional weapons, it provides self-defense against air targets, as well as the defeat of manpower and lightly armored targets. On modern tanks, for this purpose, autonomous 12.7-mm anti-aircraft machine guns are placed on the turret. There are also complexes of guided missile weapons that hit armored targets with high accuracy at a distance of up to 5000 m.

It is important to say something about this. The search for targets, the accuracy of shooting and the speed of the weapons depend on the fire control system (FCS). Modern control systems of domestic and foreign tanks are built on the principles of automating the processes of searching for targets and preparing for firing. As part of domestic control systems, for example, daytime gunner sighting systems with independent stabilization of the line of sight are used. Domestic control systems are also equipped with flight control equipment for tank missiles (it is not available on foreign ones). And the stabilization and guidance systems of weapons have an electro-hydraulic drive in the plane of the vertical hinge
denia (in foreign countries - electromechanical).

Let's take a look at the ammunition. It includes armor-piercing (kinetic, high-explosive, and cumulative action) and high-explosive (shrapnel) shells. But Russian tanks also have guided missiles. In foreign countries, multipurpose rounds are used (M830 in the USA, DM 12 in Germany) with HEAT shells. The main difference between domestic shots and foreign ones lies in separate loading, which makes it possible to store them in automatic machines and loading mechanisms located in the hull of tanks.

The use of automatic machines and loaders provides tanks with a high level of technical rate of fire, which does not depend on the physical capabilities of the loader, and reduces the number of crews to three people. So modern tanks are no longer "steel brontosaurs", but highly mobile armored complexes saturated with modern electronics and weapons.

At the same time, it should be noted that the main emphasis is placed not only on improving the tactical and technical characteristics of the tanks themselves, but also on finding alternative solutions to increase the effectiveness of the use of tank units in battle. Of particular note is one of such urgent decisions as the inclusion in the staff of tank units of a tank support combat vehicle (BMPT), which is currently being tested. In terms of firepower, BMPT surpasses BMPs by 25-30%, and in terms of protection it is not inferior to tanks. The appearance of this machine will significantly change the views on the forms and methods of using tank units and will increase their combat effectiveness by about a third. India, Germany, Israel, France, and the USA, in particular, show great interest in BMPT. There are no analogues of such a machine in the world yet.

In addition to the main battle tanks, there are also "light" tanks. In our country, for several decades, this class was represented by the PT-76 amphibious tanks that are already going down in history. Is there a replacement for them?

PT-76s were in service, as a rule, in reconnaissance units of the Ground Forces. They, in the main, were also staffed with units and divisions of the Marine Corps. To date, the PT-76 has been discontinued, although it played a certain role in shaping views on the conduct of amphibious operations and the development of armored vehicles. It is being replaced by the Sprut self-propelled anti-tank system, which has recently been put into service. It is equipped with a 125mm tank cannon and is capable of effective fire both on the move and afloat. That is, in addition to high mobility, buoyancy and air transportability, we are also talking about a qualitative increase in firepower.

What is the situation in tank formations and units with combat training of personnel, does the state of their combat training differ from the state of affairs in all the Ground Forces?

Of course, in the combat training of tank formations, units and subunits, problems can be traced that are inherent in other branches of the Ground Forces. But the peculiarities of the use of tank forces, namely the cohesion factor of tank crews, the understanding that the survivability, power of the tank and its weapons directly depend on the training and ability of the crew to act harmoniously in any combat situation, have always distinguished the special and technical training of tankers. The question of complete interchangeability is also very relevant for tankers. After all, a tank remains a combat unit, even if only one of the crew members is physically capable of performing functional duties.

It should be borne in mind that the combat training of tankers is much more expensive than, for example, for motorized riflemen, in connection with which more attention is paid to training at tank firing camps with the performance of firing substitutes for standard shots and the use of simulators for training tank commanders, driver mechanics, gunners - operators individually and crews as a whole. New high-quality training aids and range equipment developed in recent years meet modern requirements, have been mastered by industry and will be supplied in sufficient quantities to the troops. This will significantly increase the level of training of tankers with a significant reduction in material and financial costs of training.

The material was prepared with the assistance of the Information and Public Relations Service of the Ground Forces.

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Main Structure Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Ground Forces Structure Tank

Tank forces

Tank forces- branch of the army and the main striking force of the Ground Forces. They are mainly used in conjunction with motorized rifle troops in the main directions and perform the following main tasks:

. on the defensive - for direct support of motorized rifle troops when repelling an enemy offensive and delivering counterattacks and counterattacks;

. on the offensive - to deliver powerful cleaving strikes to great depths, develop success, defeat the enemy in oncoming battles and battles.

The basis of the tank forces is made up of tank brigades and tank battalions of motorized rifle brigades, which are highly resistant to the damaging factors of nuclear weapons, firepower, high mobility and maneuverability. They are able to make the most of the results of fire (nuclear) destruction of the enemy and in a short time to achieve the ultimate goals of combat and operations.

The combat capabilities of tank formations and subunits allow them to conduct active hostilities day and night, in significant isolation from other troops, smash the enemy in oncoming battles and battles, cross vast zones of radioactive contamination on the move, force water obstacles, and quickly create strong defenses and successfully resist the offensive of superior enemy forces.

Further development and enhancement of the combat capabilities of tank forces is carried out mainly by equipping them with more advanced types of tanks, which optimally combine such important combat properties as high firepower, maneuverability and reliable protection. In improving organizational forms, the main efforts are focused on giving them a combined-arms character, which is most consistent with the content of modern operations (combat actions).

This Sunday soldiers-tankers, veterans of tank forces, workers of the defense industry - tank builders - will celebrate their glorious holiday - Day of the Tankman for the 60th time. It was established by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of June 11, 1946 in commemoration of the outstanding services of the armored forces of the Soviet Army in the Great Patriotic War, and since then it has been celebrated annually on the second Sunday of September.
On the eve of the holiday, Colonel-General Alexei MASLOV, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, talks about the current state of our tank forces and the prospects for their development.

Alexey Fedorovich, what is the purpose of the tank forces today, what are their composition, place in the general structure of the Ground Forces? Do you agree with the point of view that the "golden time" of tank forces is behind us and that in the foreseeable future their importance will steadily decline?

Tank forces are still one of the branches of the Ground Forces, designed to conduct combat operations in cooperation with other types of the RF Armed Forces, branches of the armed forces and special forces. Organizationally, they consist of tank formations, units and subunits.
The experience of local wars and armed conflicts of recent decades shows that tanks retain the leading role in combined-arms formations, including as the main weapon in close combat. This is also confirmed by the trend towards an increase in their share in the composition of combined arms groupings of troops. So, if 3 thousand tanks participated in the Arab-Israeli wars in 1967, then in the Persian Gulf zone during the operation against Iraq by multinational forces (2003) there were already more than 5 thousand tanks.
As before, the fundamental principle of the use of tanks in modern warfare remains their massive use for solving basic tasks by concentrating on the main directions both in the offensive and in defense.
At the same time, tank units and subunits are used both in isolated areas and in separate areas on a focal principle. This gives the actions of divisions, brigades, and especially battalions, and sometimes even tank companies, an autonomous character in the absence of fire communication with neighbors. At the same time, tanks are used independently or as means of direct support for infantry as part of battalion (company) tactical groups. In such conditions, the need for direct support of tanks by combat helicopters, assault aircraft, artillery, as well as cover by air defense means sharply increases.
The use by the opposing sides of high-precision weapons and other modern means of warfare contributes to an increase in the transience of combat. The role of forestalling the enemy is sharply increasing. Typical combat operations will be rapid and frequent transitions from one type of action to another. In this regard, the role of tank forces with high mobility, maneuverability and firepower for achieving success in a modern combined arms operation (battle) naturally increases.
Therefore, we cannot agree with the point of view that the "golden time" of tank troops is behind us and their importance will steadily decline. Such views are mainly held by supporters of so-called "contactless" wars, who strive to prove that in military conflicts of our time, when fire engagement becomes one of the most important operational factors, aviation and long-range precision weapons play an almost decisive role in achieving success. Without diminishing their importance, I note that, as experience shows, the effectiveness of the use of aviation is quite high in the fight against an enemy who does not have at all or has an underdeveloped air defense, when conducting hostilities in open areas and destroying, as a rule, stationary objects. In addition, hostilities, as a rule, do not end with one fire defeat. It is necessary to be able to use the results of effective engagement to complete the defeat of the enemy, to capture important areas and lines and to liberate the territory he has seized. However, it will be practically impossible to solve this problem without the use of tank formations and carrying out deep combined-arms operations of high intensity.
Therefore, in my opinion, in the foreseeable future, the role of tank units and formations is unlikely to diminish, as, accordingly, there are no special grounds for allegations of a decrease in the importance of combined arms operations. Moreover, their role will largely depend on the human factor, that is, on the correct tactics of using formations and units in specific conditions of the situation, as well as on the training of crews and their ability to fully use the combat and technical capabilities of tanks.

- What vehicles are currently in service with our such troops, in what quantity?

Currently, the Ground Forces are in service with about 12 thousand tanks of various modifications, ranging from the T-55 to the T-90. The manning level of tank units and constant readiness formations is 100%. Unfortunately, the share of modern tank modifications is only 4%.
It should be noted that our industry has created a sufficient scientific and technical groundwork that makes it possible to solve the tasks of modernizing armored vehicles and weapons in the army by increasing combat and technical characteristics. Mainly the T-72B, T-72B1, T-80B, T-80U, T-90 tanks are being modernized in order to comprehensively increase their firepower, protection and mobility.
Currently, the T-90 is becoming the main battle tank of the Russian Armed Forces, which is the result of the work of designers to improve the T-72B tank. The T-90 is equipped with a modern fire control system, a powerful diesel power plant, an electronic suppression system that allows the tank to be protected from modern anti-tank guided missiles, and modern communications.

- How do our tanks look in comparison with analogues from Germany, USA, Great Britain and other developed countries?

Currently, not many countries are developing and mass-producing modern tanks. This is due to the complexity of their design and manufacture. Competitive struggle in tank building took place both in Soviet times and now. It should be noted that in the modern arms market, domestic tanks are in deserved demand and respect.
In comparison with serial tanks of leading foreign countries, Russian tanks are not only not inferior, but also surpass them in some characteristics. The positive qualities of our tanks are their low silhouette, good mobility, reliability, and the presence of sufficiently effective guided weapons. A feature of our modern tanks is the absence of a loader and the presence of an automatic loader (mechanism). This made it possible to reduce the crew of the vehicle and increase the rate of fire from the main weapon.
It should be noted that since the 1980s, foreign tanks have been equipped with thermal imaging devices for observation and aiming, while ours still do not have enough of them.
Currently, the best foreign tanks include the American Abrams, the French Leclerc, the English Challenger, and the German Leopard. The Russian T-90 tank is approximately on the same level with them.

Some of our military (and not only military) theorists speak in the sense that the Ground Forces have outlived their usefulness as a type of armed forces and in future armed conflicts they will have to perform only auxiliary tasks. The argument is Operation Desert Storm, when ground forces were not deployed into Iraqi territory ...

To be more precise, then they were still introduced into the territory of Iraq, only they did not have the task of completely seizing its territory. As a result, in 1991, the Iraqi problem remained not fully resolved for the United States, and in 2003 they again had to wage another war, where the main role was assigned to ground groupings, a significant part of which were armored forces, which had about 5 thousand troops in their composition. tanks.
In our opinion, the assertions of all the same supporters of the concept of "contactless wars" about the reduction of the role of the Ground Forces are completely unfounded.
First, it all depends on the goals of the war. If the task is not just to force the government of the enemy country to make any political decisions, but to seize its territory or repel the invasion of superior enemy forces, then the Ground Forces in these cases will play a decisive role. After all, they are the troops of the territorial presence, capable of conducting a decisive offensive or active mobile defense.
Secondly, modern Ground Forces are also armed with long-range high-precision weapons that allow them to destroy the enemy without engaging in close combat. These are missile systems, air defense systems, long-range artillery, anti-tank guided missiles, etc. In addition, the effective range of fire from small arms, tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, grenade launchers is constantly increasing. Therefore, we should not talk about a decrease in the role of the Ground Forces in modern warfare, but about the need to equip them with modern long-range high-precision weapons to defeat the enemy.
And in general, it is not entirely correct to talk about the leading role and significance of certain types of the Armed Forces and combat arms, since victory in a modern operation (battle), as experience shows, is achieved only by their joint, well-coordinated efforts. But at the same time, it is the Ground Forces that form the basis of the groupings of forces operating in the continental theater of operations, and only the combined-arms commander (commander) organizes the interaction of all troops (forces) taking part in the operation.

What, in your opinion, is the specificity of organizing combat training in tank formations and units, as opposed to organizing combat training in the Ground Forces as a whole, are there problems that are characteristic only of tank units and subunits?

In the combat training of tank formations, units and subunits, the same problems can be traced that are inherent in other types of troops, especially since in modern conditions the main emphasis is on joint training, when military formations of all types of the Armed Forces must take part in conducting tactical exercises and exercises. branches of the armed forces and, if possible, other ministries and departments of the Russian Federation.
But there is, of course, its own specificity. The combat training of tankers is much more expensive than, for example, motorized riflemen, in connection with which more attention is paid to training at tank firing camps with the performance of firing substitutes for standard shots and the use of simulators for training tank commanders, driver mechanics, gunner operators separately, and the crews in general.
Unfortunately, modern technical training aids in the troops are still clearly insufficient, although many new high-quality and effective simulators have been developed at present. It is planned to supply them with priority formations and units of constant readiness, transferred to the contractual principle of manning, as well as district training centers.
Along with this, the troops receive little modern mobile complexes of range equipment, which allow real-time control of the target situation during tactical exercises with live fire.
But there are also positive aspects. So, next year it is planned to conduct military tests and accept for supplying the Ground Forces an integrated automated tactical training system "Bas-relief-SV", as well as begin deliveries to the troops of field simulators (field classes based on autonomous mobile simulators with a life support system) intended for individual preparation and training of crews (crews) as part of the unit.
The peculiarities of the use of tank forces, the understanding that the survivability, power of the tank and its weapons directly depend on the training of the crew and the ability to act harmoniously in any combat situation, have always distinguished the special and technical training of tankers. For tankers, the issue of complete interchangeability is very relevant, because the tank remains a combat unit, even if one of the crew members is physically unable to perform functional duties.

Recently, there have been positive trends in solving the problem of equipping the Ground Forces with modern weapons. How will the Land Forces be equipped with modern tanks during the implementation of state defense orders?

Of course, we would like to see the troops receive as much modern effective weapons as possible. This also applies to modern tanks, which, as mentioned above, are so lacking in the troops. But taking into account the financial capabilities of the state, one has to be content with what is received annually within the framework of the state defense order.
A feature of state defense orders in recent years is the supply of equipment that provides complete equipment for specific units and subdivisions of the Ground Forces. We believe this is the correct approach, since the results of such deliveries are immediately visible, expressed in an increase in the combat capabilities of specific military formations.
So, in 2006, the Ground Forces, along with other modern weapons, receive 31 T-90 tanks (that is, one battalion set), 125 armored personnel carriers (4 battalion sets).
When preparing proposals for the state defense order, the need to modernize the existing fleet of weapons and military equipment is also taken into account. This allows them to increase their efficiency at lower financial costs. In 2006, it is planned to carry out a major overhaul with the modernization of 139 tanks.

Tell me, how are the tasks of recruiting tank units and subunits with contract soldiers and sergeants carried out?

In accordance with the decree of the Government of the Russian Federation, on January 1, 2004, the Ground Forces began to solve the very important state task of transferring a number of formations and military units to the contract method of manning within the framework of the corresponding Federal Target Program. No one doubts the necessity of this now. This is one of the most important conditions for improving the professional skills of the personnel of tank forces.
Currently, measures are being taken to transfer to the contract method of manning a number of formations and units, including two tank regiments and 16 tank battalions of motorized rifle formations. Just to recruit specialists for tank forces in these units, it is necessary to recruit about 6 thousand servicemen under the contract for the positions of sergeants and soldiers.
To date, in general, tank units and permanent readiness units are staffed with contract servicemen in the positions of sergeants and soldiers by more than half. First of all, these units are filled with positions that determine combat readiness: tank commanders, driver mechanics, gunners-operators.
I would like to note that the manning of units and subunits of tank forces in a number of military districts significantly exceeds this figure. Much in solving this problem depends on the competent and precise organizational work of the military command and control bodies on the ground.
Of course, it is necessary to create normal living and living conditions for contract servicemen. Public services should be organized at such a level that the soldier (sergeant) is not distracted from performing his official duties, but in his free time he can engage in raising his intellectual and cultural level. Then the servicemen will strive to serve in the army for a long time, become real professionals, perfectly knowledgeable of high-tech tank and other weapons, military equipment and being able to competently use them on the battlefield.

How do you see the ideal of a modern Russian tanker in terms of the level of intelligence, physical data, equipment?

Even if a war or armed conflict in the 21st century is viewed as a confrontation between intelligent information and fire systems, then a person, regardless of the level he occupies in the army hierarchy, will still play a leading role. This fully applies to the servicemen of the tank forces. After all, it is no secret that a poorly trained crew (crew) will not fully use the capabilities of modern weapons and military equipment, which can only be mastered with a sufficiently high level of intelligence.
However, it is impossible to train a professional from a recruit in a short period of time in a training center, and it is very problematic to do this for the entire period of conscription service, especially since the intellectual level of recruits and their physical training do not always satisfy us. Therefore, a decision was made to transfer formations and units of constant readiness to the contractual principle of manning. But even a contract soldier will have to study constantly, during his entire service, which presupposes the availability of competent teachers.
In this regard, great importance in the Ground Forces is attached to the creation of an institute of professional sergeants, who must train and educate their subordinates every day, at each lesson and training session. We understand the importance of this task and have outlined a number of measures for its implementation.
The equipment of a tanker of the XXI century must also meet modern requirements. For this purpose, a protective kit for crew members of an armored vehicle has been developed and adopted for supply to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
This kit is designed to protect the crew of the tank from the effects of damaging elements (fragments) arising in the armored compartment when it enters the tank and from thermal effects. The set consists of a bullet-proof vest, an anti-splinter cover for a helmet, a fire-retardant suit (jacket and trousers). Its weight is about 6.5 kg.
About 1.5 thousand of these kits have already been received by the troops. Feedback from the troops about their practical use in daily combat training is generally positive.
On the eve of the Day of the Tanker, it is nice to make sure that, as the song says, "the armor is strong and our tanks are fast." The period of survival ended, and the build-up of the combat capabilities of the tank forces began due to qualitative changes. Therefore, tankers can meet their professional holiday with optimism. After all, their hopes for changes for the better are likely to be realized. For example, in May of this year. the tank battalion of the Taman division has already received new T-90s, and now the tankers of the Moscow military district will have to master the new vehicles.
As in the past decades, today tankers continue the glorious traditions of the older generations with dignity, persistently improving their combat skills. And today, taking this opportunity, I would like to cordially congratulate all the personnel and veterans of the tank forces, scientists, designers and workers who create armored vehicles on a great holiday - the Day of the Tankman. I wish you health, happiness, success in service and work for the good of Russia!

The editors would like to thank the Information and Public Relations Service of the Ground Forces for their help in organizing the interviews.

At one time, we started a discussion of the reasons for defeats in that war in order to understand how to win a future war and thereby prevent it. I have already written about the interaction of forces and means in battle. But I made a purely professional conclusion for myself, because by military profession I am a platoon commander of medium tanks.

It sounds paradoxical, but I came to the conclusion that tank troops, as such, have no combat sense and modern T-80 tanks are expensive toys that do not give anything for victory.

First, let me explain which tank troops I mean.

In our country, and in any army, the basis (main force) of the ground forces is the infantry, or, as it is commonly called, motorized riflemen. And the main striking force of the ground forces is considered to be tank troops.

Today (strictly speaking - as of 1972, when I passed the training camp, but I think no significant changes have occurred since then) our rifle troops are essentially rifle and tank forces. In a rifle regiment for 3 rifle battalions, which move in armored personnel carriers or infantry fighting vehicles, there is also a tank battalion. The tankmen of these battalions have red collar tabs, as do the riflemen.

In addition to these tankers, there are actually tank troops. In purely tank regiments there are only 3 tank battalions; there are no more or less serious rifle subunits in the tank regiments and divisions. The tankers of these troops wear black collar tabs, and when I say that tank troops are meaningless, I mean precisely these tank regiments, divisions and their formations.

I came to this idea, trying to follow the thought of the Germans, who were building their army on the eve and during the Second World War. Here it is important not just to mark what they had, but the reason why they had it, why and what they wanted from it. It is important to understand this because they did not always have everything in abundance, and they often proceeded not from an ideal, but from specific possibilities. But at the same time, the Germans remained sober in the question of how to win in battle (The more you get to know the Germans, the more respect arises for your fathers and grandfathers, who managed to overwhelm such a powerful enemy.)

In our Soviet understanding, tank troops are only Ganks, in the German (that war) understanding, they are mobile infantry armed with tanks with mobile artillery and other types of troops. Looking ahead, I will say: our today's motorized rifle troops are, in Guderian's understanding, tank troops. A division with only tank battalions is stupid from the German point of view. Unnecessary and harmful. Why?

Because the Germans had a clear idea of ​​what victory in a land battle meant - when the terrain was captured and cleared of the enemy. Only infantry can capture and clear the terrain, and tanks are irrelevant without it. Therefore, the development of German tank divisions went towards increasing the number of motorized infantry in relation to one tank.

If by the beginning of World War II in the German tank division there was a tank brigade consisting of two tank regiments of two-battalion composition (on average - 324 tanks) and one motorized infantry brigade consisting of one motorized infantry regiment and a motorcycle battalion, then by the beginning of the war with the USSR in a tank divisions of the Germans for one tank regiment had two motorized infantry regiments. That is, if in 1939 the ratio between tank and motorized infantry and motorcycle battalions was on average 1: 1, then by 1942 it was 1: 3, and the number of tanks in tank divisions was reduced to 149-209 units. In relation to the motorized rifle, the same number of tanks of our own are in our present motorized rifle division.

Moreover. In the tank corps of the Germans there were also motorized infantry divisions, which did not have tanks at all. Sometimes there was one motorized infantry for two tank, and sometimes two motorized infantry for one tank. That is, in our current motorized rifle corps in relation to the infantry there are more tanks than in the German tank corps of that war.

Then the question is: why did the Germans call their motorized infantry with tanks tank troops - tank divisions, corps, armies?

Due to economic difficulties. They did not have so many vehicles, tractors, self-propelled guns and armored personnel carriers to equip all their ground divisions. On the eve of the war with France, they demotorized the ground forces - they seized the vehicles of the combat units from all the infantry divisions and handed it over to the tank and motorized infantry divisions, and the infantry divisions were equipped with horse-drawn vehicles.

Consequently, the division of the German divisions into infantry and tank is a forced measure, according to their original idea, all divisions of the Wehrmacht should have been tank divisions in the German sense, that is, such as our current motorized rifle divisions.

Based on the meaning of what victory in battle is, our today's tank troops (regiments and divisions) are meaningless, since the tank itself is not able to clear the territory of the enemy, therefore, it cannot win a battle.

They will tell me that no one has set our tank troops the task of gaining victory on their own, they must act together with motorized riflemen. I know, though I am a reserve officer, I was taught tactics, and I remember with whom I should go on the attack.

When, having deployed my platoon into the battle line, I go into the attack, a motorized rifle company must follow me in the attack. All this is correct and all is well, but the question arises: if my tanks burn out in this attack and the crews die, who will be to blame for this? Me or the commander of a motorized rifle company who did not destroy the grenade launchers? If I am attached to this company commander, then it seems he is, but he also has reasons - maybe my tankers burned out because I did not prepare them well for battle or did not command them well in battle? That is - I myself am to blame.

Digress. The tactics were then read to us by Lieutenant Colonel N.I. Former, veteran, tanker. I remember a lesson in tactics - I am the commander of a tank going on the attack with the infantry, I need to give commands to the crew. I command the loader: "Armor-piercing!" To the gunner: "Landmark two to the right, 10 tank in the trench 1100!" And to confirm the loader "Done!" and the gunner "I see the target!" I give the command to the driver: "With a short one!" But to command "Fire!" Nikolai Ivanovich did not give me: "You can't stop!" (On the command "Short", the driver must stop for a while, while the gunner aims the gun at the target and fires, that is, for 3-5 seconds). "Why? - I was surprised. "After all, you will aim more accurately from the spot and the more likely it is that you will hit."

"Because, - explained a real tanker who went into such attacks during the war, - that the infantry, seeing that you stopped, will immediately fall down, and since bullets will whistle over it, it will be impossible to lift it and then you will go on the attack alone" ... This is to the question of how several types of troops interact in a real war.

But let's return to the example with the burned-out tanks. And the company commander can prove that he is not guilty, and I can. And if no one is to blame, then there is no one responsible for the battle, and if there is no one responsible, then there is no one-man command, and there is no one-man command, then this is no longer an army, but a mess.

You will say - but what about the Germans? After all, they, too, had tankers in a tank regiment, and the infantry in a motorized infantry regiment. Albeit in one division, but still divided into types of troops.

This division was not caused by the needs of combat, but by economic opportunities. On June 22, 1941, the German ground forces attacked us with 121 divisions, of which only 17 were tank divisions. But after all, the problems requiring tanks to solve them also arose in the infantry divisions. And the tank divisions sent their units (accompanied by repair and evacuation units) to the infantry divisions for a while. For this reason alone, it was impossible to include tanks in the infantry. For this reason, heavy tanks "Tiger" were not included in the army tank divisions at all, but made up 14 separate battalions and several companies in separate and SS divisions. That is, the fact that the Germans also had tank units did not come from their principle of fighting, but from necessity: the legs must be stretched over the clothes.

But we must pay attention to a question that no one among our historians even raises - this is an exclusive military partnership that existed in the Hitlerite army. After all, the Germans rescued each other at the cost of their lives, regardless of what kind of troops they were in. Here, for example, is a line from G. Guderian's notes: “On September 3, I drove past the rear units of the 10th Motorized Division and a bakery company that took part in the battle to the motorcycle units of the SS Reich Division”. How do you like this bakery company?

Or, here's the chief of staff of the 20th Panzer Division of the Germans reporting on the battles to block the formations of our 33rd Army near Vyazma. He reports that from 1 to 26 February 1942 he repulsed 65 attacks of more than a battalion with tank support and 130 attacks of less than a battalion, destroying 26 tanks with the forces of the division and 25 tanks with the attached batteries of 88-mm anti-aircraft guns. A tank division is a ground force subordinate to its commander-in-chief, Field Marshal Brauchitsch. 88-mm anti-aircraft guns are the Luftwaffe, subordinate to Reichmarshal Goering. And the 88-mm anti-aircraft gun is a large-sized weapon and weighs 8 tons. To roll it out for direct fire against our tanks is a big risk for anti-aircraft gunners, whose business is to shoot down planes. But they rolled out and knocked out our tanks. The Germans somehow knew how to unite their army in a single impulse.

In Grozny, Chechen fighters destroyed strongholds of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, and the nearby army units did not lift a finger. You will say that this is a betrayal of the Kremlin. Yes, but how was it expressed? The fact that on the same battlefield there were two types of troops with one task, but subordinate to different commanders. After all, if both the army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs were subordinate to the same, if this commander was responsible for each killed soldier and policeman in the same way, then this would not have happened.

These reflections once again led me to the first conclusion that tank troops in the form in which they exist today are of no use to anyone. Not only is their idea inconsistent with the idea of ​​victory in ground combat, but it also creates difficulties in commanding troops.

However, what is written above is trifles, trifles, and it would not be worth mentioning them, if not for more serious circumstances. Let's remember the history of the tank forces.

After its birth during the First World War and adolescence, the tank troops reached their heyday with the Germans.

In 1939, the then still few tank divisions marched ahead of the then still quite young army of Germany and ensured the defeat of the millionth army of Poland in two weeks.

In 1940, the German tank armies ensured the encirclement and defeat of the superior army of the Franco-British allies in almost two weeks.

In 1941, four German tank armies at the head of the ground forces ensured resounding victories for German weapons near Minsk, Smolensk, Vyazma, Kiev. And in 1942 - near Kharkov with access to the Volga and the Caucasus. In the same year, Soviet tank forces made gaps to encircle the Germans at Stalingrad, and then Soviet tankmen formed the fists of those blows with which the Red Army drove the Germans back to Berlin.

But then everything went wrong. The Second World War ended, tank troops in all countries continuously developed towards a sharp rise in the cost of tanks and the maintenance of these troops. They seemed to be getting stronger and more effective. But…

The Arab-Israeli wars, in which the Egyptians and Syrians had superior tank forces and our advisers, ended in defeat for the Arabs. The presence of tank forces did not lead to victory.

The Afghan war showed the uselessness of these troops even against a rather weak enemy.

The war in Chechnya showed the same.

It turned out that the side that has developed tank forces and "ultra-modern" tanks costs nothing to lose the war.

They will tell me that Arabs are bad soldiers, that it is inconvenient for a tank to fight in the jungle, that it is inconvenient for it to fight in the mountains, that it is inconvenient for it to fight in cities. And why? Why are there such tanks today that it is not convenient for them to fight anywhere? Why can't a tank, covered with 100 mm of armor, fight in the city, but an infantryman, covered only with his own tunic, can? Why are we building such tanks that cannot fight where it is necessary to fight?

And who said that they are capable of fighting where they supposedly can fight - in an open field? After all, even there, from camouflaged trenches, they can jump from a grenade launcher no worse than from a window of a building in a city. Moreover, in the open field they are waiting for something that cannot be used in the city - anti-tank missile guided missiles (ATGMs).

So the point is not that tanks are used where, in the opinion of armchair theorists, they "cannot be used", but that current tanks are not suitable for any battle - these are useless costs incurred by society.

How current specialists look at the use of tanks can be clearly seen from the article by V. Ilyin and M. Nikolsky "Modern tanks in battle" from the journal "Technics and weapons" No. 1.1997. Although the article is generally devoted to comparing ours and Israeli tanks, but it also shows specific examples of battles.

Lebanon, 1982. The first tanks of the new generation to take part in real battles were the T-72 of the Syrian army and the Israeli "Merkavas" Mk.1. On June 6, 1982, the fifth Arab-Israeli war began. In Operation Peace for Galilee, the Israeli army, supported by powerful air strikes, invaded southern Lebanon and began its advance towards Beirut, smashing camps of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which was backed by Syria.

The first two days of fighting, the Israelis were opposed only by the Palestinian brigades "Ain Jalut", "Khatyn" and "El Qadissiya", armed with outdated Soviet weapons (in particular, T-34 and T-54 tanks). The main forces of the Syrian group in Lebanon - three divisions in the first echelon and two in the second - were in reserve areas by the beginning of the Israeli offensive. Only covering forces remained in the defensive zone, as well as decoys - inflatable tanks, guns and anti-aircraft missile launchers camouflaged in the color of the terrain, covered with metallized paint and equipped with thermal emitters imitating the operation of engines. Therefore, the first air-artillery strike of the Israelis before the crossing of the Zahrani River fell practically on an empty spot.

The main tank battle unfolded on the morning of June 9: overnight, Syrian troops moved out of the reserve areas and occupied pre-equipped defensive zones. At dawn, four Israeli divisions on a front more than 100 kilometers wide — from the Mediterranean coast to the Garmon mountains — advanced against the enemy. On both sides, about three thousand tanks and infantry fighting vehicles took part in the battle. The battle lasted all day and did not bring any clear success to any of the opponents. On the night of June 9-10, the Syrians launched a powerful artillery counterattack on the enemy's forward positions, and at dawn a Syrian barrage of fire fell on the second echelon of the Israelis. On June 10, their offensive practically fizzled out along the entire front.

During these battles, Syrian ground forces destroyed more than 160 Israeli tanks. A significant contribution to the success in the battles of June 9-10 was made by the T-72 tanks, which only recently entered service with the Syrian army. They were opposed by modernized M60A1 tanks (some of which were equipped with Israeli-made Blazer reactive armor), as well as the latest Israeli Merkava Mk.1 vehicles (by the beginning of hostilities Israel had 300 tanks of this type).

As a rule, tank battles began at ranges of 1500–2000 m and ended at the approach line of up to 1000 m. According to the chief military adviser to the Syrian Ministry of Defense, General G.P. Yashkina, who personally took part in the leadership of hostilities in Lebanon, the T-72 tanks showed their complete superiority over the enemy armored vehicles. Affected by the greater mobility, better security and high firepower of these machines. So, after the battle in the frontal sheets of some "seventy-two" counted up to 10 dents from the "blanks" of the enemy, nevertheless, the tanks retained their combat effectiveness and did not leave the battle. At the same time, 125-mm T-72 shells confidently hit enemy vehicles head-on at a range of up to 1,500 meters. So, according to one of the eyewitnesses - a Soviet officer who was in the combat formations of the Syrian troops - after a shell of the D-81 TM cannon hit from a distance of approximately 1200 m into the Merkava tank, the tower of the latter was ripped off the shoulder strap.

... The Israeli front was facing the threat of collapse, but on June 11 at 12 o'clock, hostilities were suspended: American emissaries Schultz and Habib, who arrived in Damascus, convinced the Syrian leadership to end the counteroffensive, guaranteeing that Israel would withdraw its troops from Lebanon within 10 days and join in negotiations with Syria.

However, peace never came to Galilee. Fighting resumed on July 18, when the Israelis again attempted a large-scale offensive, the fighting was extremely fierce. Only the 21st brigade of the 3rd Panzer Division of the Syrians in the battles on the approaches to the Damascus plateau destroyed 59 armored vehicles of the enemy. This time, in addition to T-72 tanks, the Fagot mobile anti-tank missile systems proved to be excellent, with which the urgently created mobile anti-tank platoons of the Syrian army's tank brigades were armed. 120 ATGMs (with ammunition load of six missiles each) were airlifted from the USSR. Already in Syria, the complexes were mounted on Jeep vehicles. For several days of fighting, they burned more than 150 enemy tanks (inherited from the "Fagots" and "Merkavs").

... The Israeli tank "Merkava" Mk.1 has also proven itself well, providing excellent protection for the crew. This is evidenced, in particular, by the memories of one of the participants in the battles, who was in the Syrian army. According to him, a battalion of Syrian T-72s, making a night march, unexpectedly "jumped out" to the "Merkav" unit, which was waiting for the arrival of tankers. A fierce night fight ensued at a short distance. Syrian tanks, which developed a high rate of fire, quickly fired at their ammunition in the drums of automated ammunition racks. However, to the annoyance of the Syrian tankers, the results of their firing were not visible: the enemy tanks did not burn or explode. Having decided not to tempt fate anymore, the Syrians, who suffered practically no losses, retreated. After a while, they sent out reconnaissance, which discovered a truly amazing picture: a large number of enemy tanks abandoned by the crews were blackened on the battlefield. Despite the gaping holes in the sides and towers, not a single Merkava really caught fire: the perfect high-speed automatic fire extinguishing system with IR sensors and a Galon 1301 booking ".

From this description of the battles, it is completely impossible to see that the current tank troops interact with the riflemen at least to a small extent. Tank battles are fought only by tanks and somehow separate from the rest of the war.

But back to the tank. Based on the general philosophy of ground combat, what qualities should a tank have? A tank, not an expensive trophy, for which the current shooters begin to hunt already from 3000 m.

The tank is blind, and the brave infantryman will always seize the moment to shoot at a tank located at a strongpoint protected by a rifleman. Therefore, and above all - the tank must be invulnerable to the fire of weapons at the disposal of the shooters. Otherwise, it is not a tank: it will not be able to protect its infantry from losses and will not give anything for victory in battle.

Second. The tank must have a weapon with which it is convenient to destroy enemy infantrymen. This is understandable, otherwise, being even safe and sound in a strongpoint, he will not be able to keep the enemy's riflemen from firing at his infantry. Such a tank will also not fulfill its purpose and is also not needed.

In terms of the tank's weapons, several questions arise.

The tank cannot enter the enemy stronghold and stand up: a stationary target is a very good target. In addition, a strongpoint is one or more trenches dug in a zigzag manner, and firing points in the depths of the strongpoint. The enemy arrows will hide at the bottom of trenches and fortifications, and they will not be visible. The tank must pass over the trenches and fortifications and sweep the enemy out of them with fire. When he turns along the trenches at the strongpoint, he will have his troops on one side, and the enemy on the other. This enemy must also be kept from firing at the tank and its infantry with the fire of the tank's weapons. Therefore, the tank must be able to fire simultaneously in at least two directions.

The tanks of the beginning of that war possessed this ability. They could walk along the trench, and a machine gunner in the frontal plate of the tank shot through the trench in front of the tank. And the turret gunner (the gunner of the cannon and the machine gun paired with it), deploying the turret, shot through the enemy's rear. (When German tanks went over our trenches, in some cases they opened a hatch in the bottom of the tank and a radio operator from a machine gun shot through the trenches from top to bottom).

Current tanks are not capable of this - they have only one firing point - a cannon and a coaxial machine gun in the turret.

Another moment. Imagine that during the attack, when your tank is ironing the main trench of the strongpoint, a retreating enemy machine gunner, 300–500 meters away from you, jumped over some highway and settled down behind its embankment. You can only see his head and a machine gun, from which he will give a burst and hide behind the embankment, and then emerge 10 m to the right or left and again give a burst. And the German MG-42 machine gun spat out 250 rounds in 10 seconds. With such a line it is not difficult to lay down about 10 of your infantrymen running to the attack.

If you are in a modern tank, then you need to contrive, controlling the mechanisms that rotate the multi-ton tower and raise and lower the multi-ton cannon with a coaxial machine gun, bring the aiming mark right under the chin of the nimble machine gunner until he disappears. It is not simple. A cannon or a machine gun, but you only need to shoot him directly in the head, because you can't get him in any other way, and that's why.

A modern tank has a very powerful 125-mm cannon that sends a projectile weighing about 30 kg at a tremendous speed. This projectile flies for a long distance almost in a straight line (along a flat trajectory). If the projectile deviated 20 cm from the machine gunner's head (even if he did not have time to remove it), it will explode in the outer embankment of the highway. The shells of the powerful cannon fall flat on the ground and give almost no lethal fragments. The Heavy will probably be hit by a blast, that's all. If the projectile deviates upward 20 cm from the machine gunner's head, it will explode 200 meters behind him. To hit such a machine gunner from a modern cannon, you have to be a shooter who hits the squirrel in the eye offhand.

But if you have a gun on your tank, as on the first releases of the German T-III and T-IV tanks (low-power, with a barrel length of only 24 caliber), then, despite its small caliber (75-mm), you are this machine gunner you will get it very quickly. The projectile of this cannon flies along a steep trajectory already for short distances, that is, first up and then down. With such a trajectory, the embankment of the highway is not an obstacle for you - you will throw a shell across the highway on the head of even a hidden machine gunner. In addition, with such a trajectory, the projectile no longer falls flat, but at an angle to the ground and gives a lot of lethal fragments. So, if the machine gunner runs away from the place where you fired, then the fragments will catch up with him.

That is why Guderian regretted when such short-barreled cannons on tanks had to be replaced with powerful ones - there was nothing to shoot at the infantry.

In addition, it is impossible to shoot from the cannons of modern tanks for a long time. If the main tanks of the belligerent parties in that war had a reserve of at least 80 rounds for the cannon, or even more than 100, then the modern T-80U tank has 45 rounds for the cannon. A quarter of them are considered NZ (safety reserves) and are consumed only with the permission of the command. With three dozen shots, you don't shoot much.

We've dealt with tank weapons, now let's deal with anti-tank weapons. In order to disable a tank and its crew, you need to pierce its armor. There are two types of shells for this.

The first type is actually armor-piercing projectiles, which, striking the outside of the armor, push it apart, push inside a part of the armor in front of them and themselves fly into the armor-piercing space of the tank, breaking equipment and killing the crew. (Inside the tank, armor-piercing shells can also explode if an explosive charge is placed in them.)

Breaking through the armor in this way is a very big job, so an armor-piercing projectile, flying up to a tank, must have a very large kinetic energy. This energy, as should be known from the school, is proportional to the mass of the projectile and the square of its speed. Hence, the thicker the armor that must be pierced, the heavier the projectile must be, or, more efficiently, the higher its speed. In practice, they take a heavy projectile, and they try to give it the highest possible speed.

For example, a German 7.92 mm rifle with an armor-piercing bullet weighing about 8 g with a steel core, flying out of the barrel at a speed of 895 m / s, pierced 10 mm of armor at a distance of 100 m.At the same distance, but a bullet with a tungsten core flying out of the barrel at a speed of 930 m / s, pierced a sheet of armor with a thickness of 13 mm. An anti-tank rifle of the same caliber 7.92 mm, but firing a bullet weighing 14.5 g, with an initial speed of 1210 m / s, pierced armor 30 mm thick at a distance of 100 m. With distance, the speed of the bullet decreases, therefore, at a distance of 300 m, the anti-tank rifle penetrated the armor of 20–25 mm.

It's the same with the cannons. Our 76-mm cannon, mounted on T-34 and KV-1 tanks, with an armor-piercing projectile weighing 6.3 kg, flying out of the barrel at a speed of 662 m / s, penetrated 69 mm of armor at a distance of 500 m, and with a special armor-piercing projectile (sub-caliber ) weighing 3 kg, but having an initial speed of 965 m / s, at this distance it pierced the armor of 92 mm. A 152-mm howitzer cannon, standing on self-propelled guns, with its 49-kg projectile flying at a speed of 600 m / s, penetrated 100 mm of armor even at a distance of 2 km.

In short, in order to penetrate thick armor with an armor-piercing projectile, you need a powerful cannon with a long barrel, giving the projectile as high a speed as possible - this is firstly. Secondly, the thicker the armor, the larger the caliber of the gun. Well, the further the cannon is from the tank, the less likely it is to penetrate its armor due to the drop in the projectile's flight speed.

But there is another type of shells - cumulative. The main thing in them is an explosive, usually of a cylindrical or conical shape, in which a cumulative (collecting, accumulating) spherical or conical recess is made in the end facing the armor. In an explosion, the shock wave moves perpendicular to the surface of the explosive. In a cumulative notch, waves from the surface of a sphere or cone converge at one point, forming a jet with very high pressure. If the point of formation of this jet is placed on the armor, then the pressure pushes it, throwing a shock wave, gases and fragments of the armor itself into the tank. The hole itself, punched in the armor, is sometimes small in diameter, but there are enough fragments and a shock wave to disable the crew and the mechanisms of the tank. (When destroyed, the steel of the armor heats up so much that it partially melts. Therefore, previously cumulative shells were called armor-burning.)

For a cumulative projectile, neither its speed nor the distance from which it flew matters. You can shoot them with a cannon, or you can throw it with your hand - the effect will be the same. The main thing is that explosives themselves require relatively little to penetrate tank armor.

In 1943, Soviet soldiers received an RPG-6 cumulative anti-tank grenade, which weighed 1.1 kg. The TNT weight in it was 620 g, and it penetrated 120 mm armor. The German faustpatron, weighing about 5 kg, fired at a distance of up to 70 m with a grenade weighing about 3 kg. The weight of the shaped charge was 1.7 kg, which provided armor penetration of 200 mm. And such armor today is beyond the power of a tank, it can only be placed in the front, but even heavy tanks have armor plates of 60–80 mm on the sides and stern.

Cumulative grenades (grenade launchers and their varieties) solved the issue of the fight between infantry and tanks - the infantry ceased to be afraid of them.

But the cumulative projectile has one feature - it must explode in a strictly oriented and strictly on the armor. If it falls flat on the armor, then the cumulative jet will pass by the armor or slide over it and cannot penetrate it. If the cumulative projectile explodes before reaching the armor, the cumulative jet will scatter and the armor will not break.

Now let's look at where the tankers started and how they got to the current state of affairs.

It is difficult to say whether the generals of the Red Army before the war understood the philosophy of future battles (their principle). For example, in his well-known report "The Nature of a Modern Offensive Operation" at the Conference in December 1940 G.K. Zhukov taught that rifle corps should break through the enemy's defenses, and placed the tank corps in the rear for a future throw into the gap made by the arrows. Apparently, he looked at the tanks as a self-propelled cart that travels faster than a tarantass.

Strictly speaking, the tanks that corresponded to the philosophy of future battles are the T-35 (five-turret) and T-28 (three-turret). These tanks had a low-power cannon, and their firing points made it possible to fire not only in two, but also in three and five directions. But they had very thin armor, they were weak and, most importantly, the Germans did not have to knock them out - the overwhelming majority of them broke down before reaching the battlefield. Having received these trophies, the Germans did not use them in battles (they used the T-34 and KV-1), however, one captured T-28 was in service with the Finnish army.

The light tanks of the Red Army (T-26 and BT) did not correspond to the philosophy of battle in any way - their armor was penetrated from a rifle, there was only one firing point, and the 45-mm cannon was relatively powerful with a flat trajectory of fire.

The best tanks were the T-34 and KB - their powerful armor could hardly be penetrated even by cannons, and the German infantry was powerless against it. There were two firing points - enough. But the gun on them was powerful, anti-tank. Nevertheless, the T-34 aroused the envy of even Guderian, and the KB the Germans used heavy tanks in their battalions when our gunners and tankmen knocked out the "tigers" from them.

The Germans prepared their equipment for battles absolutely precisely - their main tanks T-III and T-IV and even the light 38-t had armor, against which our riflemen had no weapons, except for bundles of anti-personnel grenades and bottles of gasoline. All of the above German tanks could fire simultaneously in two directions, the main tanks had short-barreled low-power anti-personnel guns, and only the 38-t had a long-barreled 37-mm cannon, but simply because no other could be put on this light tank.

Let me remind you what I already wrote about - the Germans did not intend to use their tanks to fight ours. Our tanks had to be destroyed by their artillery and aircraft, which, unfortunately, they succeeded in.

Having hit our troops with their tank divisions on June 22, 1941, the Germans began a rapid advance, during which our artillery became the main target. Our historians write about the losses of aviation and tanks, but somehow they are silent about the losses of the material part of the artillery regiments. But here the situation was no less catastrophic. Here, for example, I have in front of me data on the presence of artillery in our 43rd Army at the beginning of 1942, before this army tried to go on the offensive and break through to the rescue of the 33rd Army formations encircled near Vyazma.

In our division, in two artillery regiments and in batteries of rifle regiments, there should have been 90 artillery barrels of 76-mm and higher caliber per staff. In 7 divisions and one rifle brigade of the 43rd Army, on average, the formation had not 90, but 23 barrels - a quarter of the standard number.

By the beginning of the war, there were 36 guns in the artillery regiments across the state. In 6 howitzer and cannon artillery regiments of the 43rd Army (corps and RGK), on average, there were 15 barrels - a little more than 40%.

Even according to the pre-war states, each division should have had 54 45-mm anti-tank guns. On average, the 43rd Army's formations had 11 barrels each, and this was with captured 20- and 37-mm cannons, that is, barely a fifth of the number was not even required, but the number of barrels.

But this is the state of the army's artillery, which had been advancing since December 1941, and what was it like during the endless retreats of summer and autumn?

The Germans armed their anti-tank self-propelled guns "Marder" with our Grabin 76-mm F-22 cannons and produced a total of 555 of these self-propelled artillery units. But after all, even with this number of guns, more than 15 of our divisions were previously armed, and how many of these guns were destroyed or disabled by the surviving numbers of the crews before they were thrown? (The Germans themselves believe that in the 1941 offensive they took half of our artillery.)

Our troops, left without artillery, had nothing to destroy German tanks, and the command was forced to use Soviet tanks against them, that is, to use these tanks not to reduce losses of Soviet infantry in attacks, but as anti-tank guns on tracks. Fortunately, all our tanks were armed with powerful cannons, even forty-five light tanks BT and T-26 were capable of destroying any German tank of that time at close range. We began to impose tank battles on the Germans and with success.

And when such a battle is imposed on the tanks, it is very difficult for them to evade. It was in defense that a tank could hide behind anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, but in an offensive it goes ahead of all combat arms - how can you dodge, and even from our fast BT and T-34? Guderian wrote:

“Our T-IV tank, with its short-barreled 75-mm cannon, was able to destroy the T-34 tank only from the rear side, hitting its engine through the blinds. This required great skill. Russian infantry attacked from the front, and tanks delivered massive strikes on our flanks. They've already learned a thing or two. The severity of the fighting gradually exerted its influence on our officers and soldiers ... Therefore, I decided to immediately go to the 4th Panzer Division and personally get acquainted with the state of affairs. On the battlefield, the divisional commander showed me the results of battles on October 6 and 7, in which his battle group performed important missions. The tanks knocked out on both sides were still in place. The losses of the Russians were much less than our losses ... I was embarrassed by the fact that the last battles had an effect on our best officers. "

By this time, it became clear that the blitzkrieg was over, and the Urals would build tanks in ever-increasing numbers. Consequently, it became clear to the Germans that our command would continue to consider the tank as the main means of fighting German tanks.

The Germans had nowhere to go, and they decided to deteriorate their tanks - they began to install powerful long-barreled guns on them for single combat with our tanks. Why did it worsen the tanks?

Because you only need a cannon to fight tanks. If the tank is intended to fight tanks, then it senselessly carries two more machine guns, a shooter, ammunition - after all, none of this is required for a battle with tanks.

The self-propelled artillery unit (ACS) is optimal for fighting tanks. She has only a powerful cannon from her weapon. The installation is lighter than the tank, since it does not need a turret, so, by the way, you can install thicker frontal armor.

Look here. The Germans put a powerful 75-mm cannon on the T-IV tank and the Hetzer self-propelled guns. The T-IV had almost vertical frontal plates 50 mm thick, while the Hetzer's frontal plates were inclined to the horizontal at an angle of 30 °, but the thickness was 60 mm. However, the T-IV weighed 24 tons and the Hetzer 16 tons.

It must be said that the Germans were fighting: some of the tankers insisted that a low-power cannon or a howitzer be installed on the new Tiger and Panther tanks. But the fear of colliding with Soviet tanks was so great that both Hitler and Guderian defended their powerful guns.

True, they were constantly looking for compromise options. Thus, a company (14 vehicles) of old T-III tanks with a short-barreled cannon was added to the Tigers' heavy tank battalions, usually consisting of 43 vehicles, but in general it was already impossible to stop the emerging trend towards installing a powerful cannon on a tank.

In response to the T-34, the Germans installed a 75 mm long-barreled cannon on their tanks and increased the frontal armor to 80. In response, we increased the T-34's armor to 90 mm and installed a powerful 85 mm cannon. The Germans installed 100 mm armor and a powerful 88 mm cannon on the Tiger. In response, we increased the armor to 120 mm on the IS-2 heavy tank, and installed the cannon with a caliber of 122 mm.

And this race in tank building continues to this day. In the 60s, we had a T-55 medium tank with a powerful 100 mm cannon. The West Germans installed a 105mm smoothbore cannon on their Leopard. In response to the T-62, we delivered a smoothbore 115 mm. I don’t remember who aimed us at the next feat, maybe the English Chieftain with its 120-mm cannon, but we had already installed a smooth-bore 125-mm fool on the T-64.

The weight of the tank is constantly increasing. For the sake of the cannon and armor, we already in 1944 removed the directional gunner from the tanks, the tanks lost the ability to fire in two directions and completely turned into an anti-tank gun on a cart. The Germans withstood this issue only until the end of the war.

The armor also grew continuously, raising the total weight of the tank - in the latest models, the multilayer armor exceeds half a meter. If in 1941 a medium tank weighed 20-25 tons, today its weight is close to the 50-ton "tiger".

When I had already written this article, I bought the magazine "Technics and Armaments" No. 7/98 with a problematic article by M. Rastopshin "What are our tanks today?"

Our T-80U tank with a weight of 46 tons carries armor protection weighing 23.5 tons and at the same time is inferior to the American M1A2 tank, which has 30 tons of armor, but the American himself already weighs 59 tons.

At the same time, these tanks have really thick armor only in the front. If we put the tanks in the center of the circle, then in a sector of 30 degrees to the right and to the left, their front armor reaches a thickness equivalent to 500-700 mm of homogeneous steel armor. In the remaining sector at 300 degrees and on top of the armor is 40-60 mm.

The American 120mm cannon penetrates the frontal armor of our T-80U, and therefore our designers have an idea to create the Black Eagle tank with even thicker armor. Under this idea, American designers are already developing a 140 mm cannon. The designers are not discouraged. In response to their 140 mm fool, we are already planning the layout of our tank with a 152 mm cannon.

With such armor and a cannon, today's tanks can be placed on a barge and safely sent into battle with battleships, but it is dangerous to let these tanks near the infantry - the infantry quickly turns them into scrap metal.

Indeed, from 1943 to our time, and faust cartridges with a cumulative warhead also developed into numerous light, cheap, mobile means capable of penetrating any, even the thickest, armor. The infantry is so armed today that the tank becomes a tasty prey for it.

Here is an episode of a particular fight. In Chechnya, our riflemen approached the aul, but ran into heavy fire from the Chechens and lay down. Two T-80 tanks left to help them. No sooner had the tanks approached the aul 1.5 km away than the Chechen ATGM operator launched two anti-tank guided missiles (with a cumulative warhead) at them one after the other and burned them instantly. This is an example of using tanks in open areas.

Today, only tanks pierce the armor of tanks with an armor-piercing projectile, and even then they have cumulative ammunition. All other types of troops, including artillery and aviation, switched to fighting tanks with only this type of projectile.

The tank completely lost its invulnerability and, combined with the loss of other combat properties, stopped determining anything in battle - it became an expensive toy for generals.

Where is the exit? Is it possible to defend against a cumulative projectile? Yes, you can. At least with the same screen. Then the question is, why haven't the designers shielded the tank so far?

Because a cumulative projectile is an explosive of considerable weight. It not only creates a cumulative jet piercing through the armor, but also blows everything around with a shock wave. Hence it follows that in order to withstand several dozen hits on the screen, probable in battle, the screen must be very durable and, therefore, heavy. And there is nowhere to make the tank heavier, it will not cross every bridge anyway. The designers used the entire weight of the tank to create thick armor - protection from an armor-piercing projectile. There was no weight left to protect against HEAT shells.

The designers did what they could - they hung screens on the chassis, and containers with explosives (explosive reactive armor) were fixed on the armor. Upon entering this container, the cumulative jet detonates the explosives in the container, and its explosion scatters this jet, preventing it from penetrating the armor. But the weight of the explosive in the projectile is added to its weight in the container - only thick armor can withstand such a blow on its own. Therefore, tanks are protected with such containers in places where the armor is already thick. The sides, roof and stern remain unprotected, and these are precisely the directions along which the infantry is selected to the tank. No one will beat him in the forehead from a grenade launcher - nevertheless, a machine gun and observation devices are located in the front of the tower. And from the sides and from behind the tank is both blind and defenseless.

Is it possible to reliably protect the tank from HEAT shells at the disposal of the infantry? Undoubtedly. But it is necessary to free the designers from the ridiculous requirement to put on the tank armor that can withstand the impact of an armor-piercing projectile. Remove the requirement to have a ridiculous ship cannon on the tank. The tank will immediately return to its original weight of 15–20 tons, and it will be possible to put on a durable, anti-cumulative shield, give it the ability to shoot in two directions and load with hundreds of shells for this.

As an engineer, my hands itched to discuss a couple of proposals on the design of this tank, but I resisted - the chapter was already long, and the tank designers can handle this work without me, and much better than me. The main thing is to correctly set the task for them.

And it should sound like this: create SOMETHING that, having hit the enemy strong point, will not allow his infantry to fire on their own, occupying this strong point, arrows. And that's all, that's enough. It is not even necessary to demand that the designers create a "tank". Maybe they will give what they construct a different name, more accurate.

Let me explain the thought about this "something". Here is what a veteran of the war in Afghanistan A. Chikishev writes in the "Soldier of Fortune" magazine No. 6/99:

“Attacking the enemy in its classical sense during the war in Afghanistan was an extraordinary phenomenon. If Soviet troops went into frontal attacks on enemy machine guns, as happened during the Great Patriotic War, then our losses in Afghanistan would have amounted not to fifteen thousand killed, but a much larger number. As a rule, no one went to the attack. The only exception was special forces.

His interaction with helicopter pilots reached such a degree that it made it possible to attack the positions of the Mujahideen even in open areas. It happened as follows: the helicopter entered the target and opened fire on it from all machine guns, cannons and cassettes with NURSs. The nerves of the Mujahideen, who had previously fired from a large-caliber machine gun and felt invulnerable, could not stand it. The Mujahideen were in a hurry to hide from death in shelters. At this moment, the special forces made a dash, approaching the target. Then they lay down, when the helicopter, having come out of the dive, went to a turn to re-enter the machine-gun position of the enemy. Having made several runs, the commandos threw grenades at the calculation of the machine gun, if it did not have time to escape, throwing down the weapon, or was not destroyed by the fire of the helicopter pilots.

Having received helicopters at their disposal, the special forces were now doing things that they couldn’t even think about before. ”

That is, the functions that the tanks performed for the Germans at the beginning of World War II were performed by a helicopter in Afghanistan, but this, of course, only because the enemy's infantry did not yet have mobile means of combating air targets. With this example, I wanted to show that this "something" does not have to look like a tank, but in this case we are talking about a ground vehicle.

I believe that our designers will certainly cope with this work, but, for the sake of clarity of conclusions, let's assume not. And even in this case, we must say goodbye to what we call tank troops - this is a useless waste of energy and money for Victory ...

What conclusions can be drawn from all this? The existing tank divisions need to be reorganized into rifle divisions. And I see the organization of rifle regiments as follows.

The rifle platoon should include the tank that our designers will create. We have in this platoon 3 infantry fighting vehicles or 3 armored personnel carriers, there will also be 1 tank. And the regiment should include a division of self-propelled guns with a powerful cannon, in extreme cases - a company of T-80.

Then the idea of ​​battle is formulated as follows. Artillery and aviation are plowing the enemy strong points. When they transfer fire to the second line of defense, the strongpoints attack the infantry platoons, launching their tanks ahead of them. The infantry is followed by ACS batteries, which, if the terrain and visibility allow, destroy visible targets on the battlefield and behind enemy lines with their fire.

If the enemy counterattacks with tanks, then their tanks and infantry retreat behind the line of the self-propelled guns, and those, in cooperation with ATGM and aviation, deal with enemy tanks.

In essence, this is a demand for a return to the specialization of combat arms. It is impossible to repeat the mistake of the Germans, who, under our pressure, began to make universal tanks from vehicles specialized for fighting infantry, allegedly for fighting both infantry and tanks at the same time. This universalism is good only in theory, but in practice the machines turned out to be neither for fighting tanks, nor for fighting infantry.

We need specialization: tanks to fight infantry, self-propelled guns - to fight tanks.

Tank troops are a branch of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the main striking force of the Ground Forces and a powerful weapon of warfare designed to solve the most important tasks in various types of combat operations.

Tank troops are a branch of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the main striking force of the Ground Forces and a powerful weapon of warfare designed to solve the most important tasks in various types of combat operations.

They are used mainly in the main directions to deliver powerful and deep blows to the enemy. Possessing great firepower, reliable protection, high mobility and maneuverability, tank forces are able to make the most of the results of fire strikes, and in a short time to achieve the ultimate goals of combat and operations.

Organizationally, TVs consist of formations, units, and subdivisions. They also include motorized rifle, missile, artillery, anti-aircraft artillery, anti-aircraft missile, special, as well as rear units and subunits.

The combat capabilities of tank formations and units allow them to conduct active offensive operations day and night, in significant isolation from other troops, to destroy enemy groupings in oncoming battles and battles, and to overcome vast zones of radioactive contamination and water obstacles on the move. They are also capable of quickly creating strong defenses and successfully resisting the offensive of superior enemy forces.

The TV is armed with highly mobile tanks with powerful armor protection and weapons, equipped with a stabilization system, automatic loading, effective sights, allowing accurate fire from a place and on the move, day and night.

The history of armored forces in the Russian army begins in 195-17, when tanks of foreign designs were adopted by the Russian Imperial Army, and it was also planned to start mass production of the Porokhovshchikov's Vezdekhod tank.

In the 1920s, the production of our own tanks began in our country, and with it the foundations of the concept of the combat use of these vehicles were laid. In 1927, in the "Infantry Fighting Regulations", special attention was paid to the combat use of tanks and their interaction with infantry units. So, for example, in the second part of this document it is written that the most important conditions for success are: the sudden appearance of tanks in the attacking infantry, their simultaneous and massive use in a wide area in order to disperse artillery and other anti-armor, enemy weapons; echeloning of tanks in depth while simultaneously creating a reserve of them, which makes it possible to develop an attack to a greater depth; close interaction of tanks with the infantry, which secures the points occupied by them.

The issues of using these armored vehicles were most fully disclosed in the "Temporary instructions for the combat use of tanks", issued in 1928. It provided for two forms of participation of tank subunits in battle: for direct support of the infantry and as a forward echelon operating outside of fire and visual communication with it. Subsequently, this Soviet concept, rejected in our country in the late 1930s, was taken as a basis, modified and developed by the German "tank leader" Heinz Guderian, who studied the intricacies of tanking in Kazan.

For the first time, tank brigades began to be created in 1935 as separate tank brigades of the reserve of the High Command. In 1940, on their basis, tank divisions were formed, which became part of the mechanized corps. But due to the huge losses in tanks suffered by the Soviet troops at the beginning of the war, and the insufficient production of tanks by the USSR industry, it was decided to make significant adjustments to the organizational structure of the armored forces. In accordance with the directive letter of the Supreme Command Headquarters dated July 15, 1941, the abolition of mechanized corps began, which lasted until early September 1941. In connection with their disbandment, the tank divisions were transferred to the subordination of the army commanders, and the motorized ones were reorganized into rifle divisions. Because of these reasons, it was necessary to switch from a divisional to a brigade organization of armored forces established by order of the NKO No. 0063, and in September 1941 - to the creation of separate tank battalions of various staff numbers (from 29 to 36 tanks in a battalion). Tank brigades and separate tank battalions became the main organizational forms in the Soviet armored forces. On December 1, 1941, the Soviet Army had 68 separate tank brigades and 37 separate tank battalions, used mainly for direct support of the infantry. Such an organization was forced under the conditions of 1941. In 1942, in connection with the restoration of tank corps, and then mechanized corps, tank brigades were formed, which were included in their composition. The brigade included 2 tank and 1 motorized rifle and machine gun battalions, as well as a number of separate units (53 tanks in total). In the future, the organizational and staff structure of tank battalions was improved in order to increase its independence, strike and firepower. Since November 1943, the brigade had 3 tank battalions, a motorized submachine gun battalion, an anti-aircraft machine-gun company and other units (a total of 65 T-34 tanks). For military merits, 68 tank brigades received the title of Guards, 112 were given honorary titles, 114 were awarded orders. In 1945-46, tank brigades were reorganized into tank regiments.

In 1942-54. these troops became known as armored and mechanized troops. They consisted of tank (from 1946 - mechanized) armies, tank, heavy tank, mechanized, self-propelled artillery, motorized rifle brigades (from 1946 - regiments). Since 1954, they began to be called armored forces; they included tank and mechanized units.

Currently, the Russian army is armed with 3500 T-80 tanks of various modifications, 4000 T-64, 9000 T-72, 8000 T-62, 1100 PT-76 (light amphibious tank), as well as a number of T-54/55 , which are mainly in service with the Marine Corps, and about 300 T-90s, which are concentrated mainly in the Siberian Military District.

Russian Civilization