The POLISH UPRISING of 1863-1864 is the national liberation action of the Poles in the Russian Empire with the aim of restoring their state within the borders of 1772, which existed before the division of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Oh-va-ti-lo Tsar-st-vo Polskoe (CP), Lithuania, as well as partially Be-lo-rus-siyu and Pra-v-be-rezh-nyu Uk -ray-well. In it, do-mi-ni-ro-va-li 2 la-ge-rya. "Red-nye" (ra-di-cal-nye de-mo-kra-you), who were-that-s-ron-ni-ka-mi-armed re-establishment (na-me-ti -or his na-cha-lo in the spring of 1863) and social-re-forms, the group-pi-ro-va-lied around the ob-ra-zo-van-no-go in 1862 year not-le-gal-no-th Central National Committee (CNC) (S. Bobrovsky, A. Giller, J. Dom-brovsky, Z. Pad-levsky, B. Shvar -ce), us-ta-no-vi-whether con-so-you with the Russian re-in-lu-tsio-ne-ra-mi, for the help of some-ry-ry-counting-you-va -if-if-if-if-there is no fight-ba, even-to-go plan-on-action and armed or-ha-no-za-tion didn’t have. "White" (li-be-ra-ly L. Kron-n-berg, K. Maev-sky, E. Yur-gens) -mobility in day-to-day activities on the economic and cultural development of the Polish nation, in the power of the western having lived, they hoped to get from the Russian sovereign-state -vi-tel-st-in abroad (group-pa "Hotel Lam-ber" in Pa-ri-the same).

In the conditions of the revolutive broadening in the central center, the Russian governing body of pro-in-di-lo is national and religious-patriotic performances, and at the same time, rest-st-nav-li-va-lo you are his av-to-no-mi. In 1861-1862, the Emperor Aleksander II was instructed by the State Council of the Tsar of Poland, the selected governorate and county councils, removed from the subordination of the central ve-dom-st-you the local or-ga-nas of management, mail and ways of the community, in the region pro-in-di-las in-lo-ni-zation of the school and or-ha-nov ad-mi-ni-st-ra-tion and more. Was it-sh-t-in-flax-nye me-ro-welcome-ti-didn’t we expect res-zul-ta-tov. In 1862, the so-ver-shen-ni-ku-sheniya on the place-st-nik in the Central Committee of the Grand Duke Kon-stan-ti-na Ni-ko-lae-vi-cha, one hundred ron-no-ka li-beral-nyh pre-ob-ra-zo-va-niy, and at the beginning of the civil part in the region of mark-gra-fa A. Ve-le-pol-sko-go, av-to-ra re-form sa-mo-management. Soon, the devil-in-row-ki pe-re-grew-li in re-establishment. At-home in-service-lived a rec-rut-bor-bor, conducted in Warsaw on the night of 3 (15) .1.1863, not according to the priesthood, as usual -but, but in advance of the composition of the list of sleep-scams (for all CPUs, including 8 thousand people, mainly participants in the money-fest -cy). 10 (22) .1.1863, the TsNK called for restoration, announced the ra-vene-st-ve of all the citizens in the right-wah, before-re-yes-che -t-i-us in the property-st-ven-ness without you-ku-pa in-the-house-stranded-their land, which-ry-mi they use-zo-wa-were for wine -no-sti, he promised, at the state expense, to pay compensation for the landlords and to pour the earth into the new-shih to re-establishment without-earth-stranded cross-st-yang. On the night of 11 (23) .1.1863, the sta-ts na-pa-li on a number of Russian gar-ni-zones. Among-di-re-shikh pre-ob-la-da-li shlyakh-ta, go-ro-zha-not and ka-lich du-ho-ven-st-in (not looking at the fact that Pius IX of Rome condemned the volition). Cross-st-I-not usually for-not-ma-whether you-live-yes-and-yes-and-even-enemy in relation to the re- who were in position, especially after the announcement of the Russian governor-chief about the pro-ve-de-nition of the cross-st-yang reform -we are in Tsar-st-ve Polish in 1864. The insurgent movement was most actively developed in the Central Committee and Lithuania. TsNK dey-st-vo-shaft in Varsha-ve tai-no. Lacking a regular army, the re-emerged (about 200 thousand people in total, the maximum one-time number of about 30 thousand people in August 1863) used -Zo-va-whether tak-ti-ku par-ti-zan-war. Between the Russian troops and the Russian troops, according to official data, 631 military collisions took place (most often - in the -re-le - September 1863). Military ru-ko-in-di-te-la-mi (dik-ta-to-ra-mi) restoration of the appearance-la-fox L. Mero-Slav-sky, then - M. Lan-ge-vich; in February-ra-le - March 1863, they are from a number of times-thundering-le-ny, they are in-ki-nu-li Paul-shu. In February, for the restoration, the "whites" (28.4 (10.5) .1863) took over the leadership of the restoration -m and pe-re-name-no-va-whether the TsNK in the National Government), considering the armed struggle-boo as a way to help -to return the western countries to a decisive intervention in the Polish question. Soon the ru-ko-leadership of the resurrection went to the moderate "red", and in ju-not sfor-mi-ro-va-no ko- litsational governing body headed by K. Maev-skim. Several detachments, created in Ga-litsia by the Polish kom-mi-te-ta-mi, by-power-re-establishment, moved to the territory to the Russian im-peria.

Emperor Aleksander II man-festom from 31.3 (12.4) .1863 declared am-ness in the parties, which in the course of the month they lay down their weapons, and promised to continue to live re-forms. Prussian rule-of-law in co-with-vet-vii with Al-veens-le-be-na con-ven-tsi-she of 1863 pro-ve-lo in the principality of Po-znan- skom, in the sea and the sea-lezii mass-co-are-ests of the participants of the Polish national-os-in-bo-dit-le-tion and thus do not allow the races of the passion of re-establishment on their territory. Ve-li-co-bri-ta-nia, France and Av-st-ria in June 1863, according to the demand-bo-va-whether from the Russian sovereign-va-tel-va for-to-chit pe-re-mi-rie with rev-shi-mi, you-do not-sti-polish question on about-su-j-de-nie between-j-du-folk conference, am-ni-sti-ro-vat participants in the re-establishment, to re-create the Polish representative of the con-dative organ, the national hell -mini-ni-st-ra-tion and other Aleksandr II from-cloning these requirements as an intervention in the internal affairs of Russia, and on -me-st-nick and chief-commander of the voy-ska-mi in the Tsar-st-ve Polskom F.F. Berg and the Vilnius military guber-na-tor and the Grodnensky, Ko-Viennese and Minsk general-guber-na-tor M. Ni-ko-la- vich Mu-rav-yov in-lu-chi-whether the order ak-ti-vi-zi-ro-vat fight-boo with the rev-shi-mi, not o-ta-nav-li-va- I am in front of the hard-ki-mi re-press-si-mi in relation to the support-zhi-vav-she-theirs.

Per-spec-ti-va in-ra-ze-nia pri-ve-la to the lowering of the activity of the "whites", K. Maev-sky in September 1863, ext -vol-vol-but-os-ta-vil his post, again there was a form-mi-ro-va-no right-vic-tel-st-in "red" (I. Khme-lensky, F. Dob-ro-vol-skiy, S. Frank-skiy, P. Ko-by-ling-skiy), 5 (17) .10.1863 it ras-down, ru-in -dstvo of the re-establishment was led by R. Trau-gutt, who pre-accepted the torture-ki re-or-ga-ni-zo-vat-roz-n-n-n-n-n-n-n-n-n-n-ry-ry-dy in re-gul-ny army, find the means to continue the fight, to realize the announced CNC ag-rar reform. However, by May 1864, the revival was mainly over-so-le-no (window-cha-tel-but - by weight-not 1865), -or the pov-stannicheskogo governor-ve-tel-va kaz-ne-ny.

About 30 thousand participants of the rebellion perished, over 38 thousand people were sent to the next day and to work , emig-ri-ro-wa-whether about 10 thousand people. In the case of Russian troops - over 3.3 thousand people perished and wounded. After the re-establishment of the CP of windows-cha-tel-but-in-kor-po-ri-ro-va-no in the composition of the Russian im-peria (in connection with this, there was a pre-pri-nya-ta-try-to-drink for the Polish gu-ber-nia the name Pri-Vis-linsky region). Polish cross-st-I-not-sh-chi-if-earth-lu in its own-st-ven-ness and were-in-bo-awaited from wines in zu in-burghers, introduced-de-but all-with-word gmin-nye (vol-lo-st-noe) self-control. On the ter-ri-to-rii, for-t-well-that recovery, the system-te-ma management and su-da uni-fi-tsi-ro-va-na with general-Russian-si-sky, in ad-mi-ni-st-ra-tion, su-do-pro-from-water-st-ve and ob-ra-zo-va-nii vve-de- but the obligatory use of the Russian language, almost all ka-lichnye mo-na-ste-ri are closed; at n-zn-ness in positions in the local org-nah of management, by-li-tion, su-de, educational-ve-de- ni-yah pre-esteem from-da-va-los uro-females of the ve-li-ko-Russian gu-ber-niy, as well as the local lam pra-in-glorious-no-ve-ro-is-po-ve-da-niya (in Minsk, Vi-teb-skaya and Mo-gi-lev-skaya gu-ber-ni-yakh with 1869-1870 for-la-kam was for-most-but for-mother-of-government duties). Sub-versed se-to-ve-st-ru and pe-re-da-wa-came out-of-ve-li-ko-Russian guberniy 3454 having Polish couples -ryan, participating-in-vav-shikh in the re-establishment, on many paths-ti-whose na-lo-same-na kon-tri-bu-tsion for a total sum-mu 34 million rubles. In the Western Territory, the people of the ka-lichesky ve-ro-is-po-ve-da-nia were forbidden to acquire possessions. In the Polish lands of Prussia, there was also an excellent school pre-education in Polish, in or-ha-nah ad-mi-ni-st-ra- tion, self-control and in the su-de introduced the German language.

Despite the brutal defeat of the anti-Russian uprising of 1830, the Polish patriots continued their struggle. In 1863, the territory of Poland, as well as the lands of Western Belarus and Ukraine, stirred up a powerful new uprising against the Russian Empire. It lasted more than a year: from the beginning of 1863 to the end of 1864.

The rebels wanted to restore the country within the borders of 1772, that is, to return the lands on which both Belarusians and Ukrainians lived.

Emperor Alexander I treated the Poles well. Poland received a constitution more than a hundred years earlier than Russia. The Poles were promised various freedoms: speech, assembly, conscience. However, this was not enough for them - the Poles wanted to get an independent Poland. The famous Russian anarchist and revolutionary Pyotr Kropotkin wrote the following lines about the Poles: "Poland will never lose its national character - it is too harshly coined ..."

Prehistory of the uprising

Polish territories, after their incorporation into Russia, became a constant source of instability and separatism for the empire. Alexander I, who sympathized with the Poles, gave them a liberal constitution and freedoms that Russia could only dream of. But then he himself began to violate these rules, which led to the uprising of 1830.

His successor, Nicholas I, pursued a very tough policy in Poland. However, this did not change the mood of the Polish society. Many Poles fled abroad after the defeat of the 1830 uprising and formed a rather powerful diaspora, which in every possible way helped the revolutionary processes in their homeland. Irritation with Russia's policy was accumulating in Polish society, and there was enough excuse for a new uprising to break out. In Europe, the Italian lands were unified, and progressive reforms were carried out in neighboring Austria. All this inspired the Poles to fight.

After the death of the Russian governor, Paskevich, who pursued a very tough policy, his predecessors were neither tough nor talented in management.

In Poland, demonstrations began, and then unrest. Preparations for the uprising began as early as 1857. Throughout the country, underground organizations were created that were preparing precisely for an armed uprising.

Insurrection

In 1863, after the funeral of the wife of General Sowinski (hero of the 1830 uprising), riots broke out in Warsaw. Orthodox cemeteries were destroyed, signs in Russian were torn from shops, Russian residents of the city began to receive threats.

Later, a demonstration took place on the anniversary of the Grokhov battle; it ended in clashes with the troops. Five people were killed. Alexander II made concessions to the Poles: he restored the State Council and increased the level of self-government in Poland. Also, some more progressive reforms were carried out: they abolished corvee, improved the position of Jews, changed the education system. But it did not help.

At the same time, recruitment to the army was announced. The Russian authorities wanted to get rid of the revolutionary element by sending troublemakers into the army. It was planned to send about 12 thousand people suspected of revolutionary activity to the army. This caused the uprising. It was the men who dodged the draft that began to organize the first detachments.

After the outbreak of hostilities, a provisional national government emerged, headed by Stefan Bobrovsky, priests Mikoshevsky and Yanovsky.

On January 10, the interim government issued a manifesto, in which it called on the Poles for an armed struggle against Russia. Attacks on Russian garrisons began throughout the country. A partisan war against the invaders began throughout the country.

In response, the Russian government restored martial law, and the captured rebels were allowed to be tried in a field court. But these measures did not help, the fire of the uprising flared up.

The rebels were poorly armed and trained, so they usually suffered defeat in skirmishes with the tsarist troops. The rebels managed to liberate the southern and partly western border of Poland. Using it, they were able to receive reinforcements, weapons and other necessary things.

Rebel groups appeared on the lands of Western Ukraine and even in the Kiev region. However, there were a large number of Russian troops in these areas and the uprising was quickly suppressed there. There were also few insurgent groups in Western Belarus.

Defeat

The culmination of the uprising falls on 1863, then the hostilities gradually subside. In the spring of 1863, a manifesto was issued promising amnesty to the rebels, who would surrender to the authorities before May 1. But he didn’t bring results. In 1863, almost 550 military clashes were recorded between Russian troops and Polish rebels, in 1864 there were only 84. The superiority of the Russian troops was overwhelming. Russian sources claim that the rebels lost about 30 thousand people, the losses of the tsarist troops are estimated at about 3 thousand. Two thousand rebels were executed. It should be noted that these figures are very controversial and many historians doubt their authenticity. After the failure of the 1863 uprising began new wave immigration of Poles.

Another consequence of the uprising of 1863 can be called the land reform, which in the Polish and Belarusian lands was much more profitable for the peasant than in Russia. On the Western Ukraine and in Belarus this uprising led to the development of elementary school: the tsarist government believed that teaching children in the Russian Orthodox spirit would make them more loyal subjects in the future.

After the uprising, 12,500 people were deported to Siberia and to Far East, eight hundred of them were sentenced to hard labor.

In 1864, a ban was introduced on the use of the Latin alphabet in the Lithuanian lands. It remained in effect until 1904. In Lithuania and Belarus, persons of the Catholic faith were prohibited from holding public office.

Although the uprising of 1863 was defeated, it gave a powerful impetus to the development of the national identity of the Poles. Even in Siberia, thousands of kilometers from their home, Polish patriots raised uprisings (the Circum-Baikal Uprising).

Polish territories, after joining the Russian Empire, became a constant source of instability for the Russian authorities. Emperor Alexander, having given considerable autonomy to the Kingdom of Poland after the Congress of Vienna in 1815, made a big mistake. The Kingdom of Poland received a constitution earlier than Russia. A special Polish army and a diet were established. Higher and secondary education was widely developed in Poland, replenishing the ranks of the enemies of the Russian Empire with representatives of the Polish intelligentsia. The liberal attitude towards the Poles allowed the emergence and strengthening of both legal and secret opposition, which dreamed not only of broad autonomy and independence, but also of the restoration of the Polish state within its former limits, from sea to sea, with the inclusion of Lithuanian, Belarusian, Little Russian and Great Russian lands. During the years of its presence in the Russian Empire, the Kingdom of Poland prospered, the population grew, the culture and economy developed at a rapid pace. The Polish population lived in freer conditions than the population of other imperial territories.

The result was the Polish uprising of 1830-1831. Nicholas I did not stand on ceremony with the Poles and "tightened the screws." The tough regime of the governor of Prince Paskevich did not allow serious complications in the Kingdom of Poland. Aspirations for independence were inflated from abroad, where the main leaders of the uprising left: Prince Adam Czartoryski, Lelevel and others. The situation became more complicated during Crimean War when Western powers became more interested in Polish separatists. However, during the war itself, it was not possible to provoke an uprising.

Emperor Alexander II softened the regime, which aroused unfounded hopes among the Poles. The youth were inspired by the unification of Italy and liberal reforms in Austria. Many, having read Herzen and Bakunin, believed that the Russian Empire was on the eve of a revolution, which could be triggered by the Polish uprising. In addition, the Polish separatists hoped for the support of the then “world community”. In particular, great hopes were pinned on Napoleon III, who announced that he wished to see the idea of ​​nationality as the guiding international principle. In addition, control by the imperial governors weakened, after Paskevich, weak managers were appointed to Poland - Prince Gorchakov, Sukhozanet, Count Lambert.

In the Kingdom of Poland, demonstrations and various kinds of actions began on every important occasion from Polish history. Thus, a significant demonstration took place on November 29, 1860, on the anniversary of the 1830 Uprising. Polish students and urban poor have committed acts of vandalism in Orthodox cemeteries. Russian signs were torn down from shops, and written and verbal threats rained down on Russian residents. It got to the point that in the fall, the Russian sovereign himself was subjected to an insult. In the theater, the velvet was damaged in the imperial box, and a stinking liquid was spilled during the ceremonial performance. The unrest continued after the departure of the emperor. Alexander II demanded to tighten measures and introduce martial law, but Gorchakov persuaded him not to do so, thinking to reassure the Poles with concessions. On the anniversary of the death of Tadeusz Kosciuszko in 1861, churches were filled with worshipers who sang patriotic hymns. This caused a clash with the troops. The first victims appeared.

The Russian government only aggravated the situation by deciding to meet Polish demands. On March 26, 1861, a decree was issued on the restoration state council, provincial, district and city councils were established, it was decided to open higher educational institutions and reform secondary schools. The result of the reform was the granting of complete autonomy to the Kingdom of Poland. The sovereign appointed his liberal-minded brother, Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich, as governor, Velepolsky became his assistant for civil affairs, and Baron Ramsay became the commander of the troops. However, even these significant concessions did not calm the opposition's appetite. "White" - a moderate opposition, demanded the unification of all the lands of the Commonwealth into one whole with the constitutional order. "Reds" - radical democrats, went further and demanded full independence moving on to acts of terror. During the revolutionary terror, up to 5 thousand political assassinations were carried out, many people were injured. In June 1862, an attempt was made on the life of the governor of Leaders. While walking in the park, an unknown person shot him from behind with a pistol. The bullet pierced the general's neck, jaw and cheek, but Leaders survived. They also attempted to assassinate Konstantin Nikolaevich, he was slightly wounded. Twice they tried to kill the main reformer Velepolsky.

Preparations for the uprising proceeded very energetically, aided by the unreasonable actions of the government of Alexander II. The central authorities did everything they could to “help” the Polish separatists. So, on the occasion of the coronation from Siberia, exiled Poles, including participants in the uprising of 1830-1831, were returned to the Kingdom of Poland. Naturally, most of these people joined and strengthened the ranks of the conspirators. At the same time, the government replaced the firm managers in Warsaw, Kiev and Vilna with weak and unsuccessful ones.

At the end of 1862, the conspiratorial organization that was preparing the uprising already numbered about 20-25 thousand active members. An armed uprising was planned for the spring of 1863. Since the summer of 1862, preparations for the uprising were led by the Central National Committee, which was created in October 1861 under the leadership of Yaroslav Dombrovsky. The preparation of the uprising in the Belarusian and Lithuanian territories was led by the Lithuanian Provincial Committee, under the leadership of Konstantin Kalinovsky. The revolutionary underground groups were formed according to the system of triplets. Each ordinary conspirator knew only the members of his troika and the foreman, which excluded the possibility of crushing the entire organization.

The situation reached the point that Serakovsky, who graduated from the Academy of the General Staff in 1859, together with his university friend Ohryzko, a former senior official of the Ministry of Finance in the Russian capital, began to organize Polish circles and recruited not only Poles into them, but even and Russians. It should be noted that in the Academy of the General Staff among the administration and professors, the Polish element had a fairly strong position. For example, Spasovich was a teacher of jurisprudence and directly from the department taught that the huge state body of the Russian Empire could no longer exist in its integrity, but should be divided into its "natural" constituent parts, which would create a union independent states... Among the students of the Academy of the General Staff there were a significant number of Poles, who at the end of the course formed the personnel base for the commanders of the rebel gangs.

The beginning of the uprising

The reason for the uprising was the recruitment, announced at the beginning of 1863. It was initiated by the head of the administration in the Kingdom of Poland, Alexander Wielepolsky, who thus wanted to isolate dangerous elements and deprive the insurgent organization of its main cadres. In total, about 12 thousand people were included in the recruitment lists, who were suspected of belonging to revolutionary organizations.

In December 1862, "White" and "Red" Polish revolutionaries came to Warsaw for the congress. At this meeting, the leaders of the uprising were appointed: on the left bank of the Vistula - Langevich, on the right - Levandovsky and Chapsky, in Lithuania - Serakovsky, who came from France, where he was sent on a mission at the expense of the military department for scientific purposes; in the southwestern region - Ruzhitsky (headquarters officer of the Russian army). In early January 1863, the central committee was transformed into a provisional people's government - the people's rzhond (from Polish rząd - government). Its first composition included Bobrovsky (chairman) and Aveide, Maikovsky, Mikoshevsky and Yanovsky. A delegation was sent to Paris to Ludwik Meroslawski, which awarded him the title of dictator. Meroslavsky was the son of a colonel of the Polish legions of the Emperor Napoleon and an adjutant of General Davout, having absorbed hostility towards the Russians from childhood. He took part in the uprising of 1830 and after his defeat he hid in Austrian Galicia, then left for France. In 1845-1846 he tried to organize a Polish uprising in Prussia, but was arrested and sentenced to death. He was saved by the 1848 uprising in Berlin. He continued to fight in Prussia and was defeated. He was pardoned thanks to the intervention of French diplomats. Then he fought again against the Prussians, but was defeated and left for France. Meroslawski took an active part in Italian affairs, commanding an international legion in Garibaldi's army, and directed the Polish-Italian military school in Genoa. With the outbreak of the uprising, Meroslavsky arrived in the Kingdom of Poland.

The revolutionary government divided the Kingdom of Poland according to the old division into 8 voivodships, which were divided into counties, districts, hundreds and tens. In the French capital a commission was established to recruit officers and purchase weapons, the delivery of which was expected by the end of January.

On January 10 (22), the Provisional People's Government issued an appeal, in which it called on the Poles to raise. The uprising began with an attack by individual detachments on the Russian garrisons in Plock, Kieltsy, Lukov, Kurov, Lomazy and Rossosh, etc. The attacks were poorly prepared, the Polish detachments were poorly armed, acted separately, so the result of their actions was insignificant. However, the rebels, and after them the foreign press, announced a great victory in the struggle by the "Russian occupiers". On the other hand, these attacks became a tub of cold water for the Russian authorities and led to the understanding that concessions only exacerbate the situation. Tough measures were needed to pacify the Kingdom of Poland.

Forces of the parties

Russian troops. First steps. There were about 90 thousand people in the Warsaw Military District, and about 3 thousand more in the border guard. Infantry regiments consisted of 3 battalions, 4 companies each. The cavalry divisions consisted of 2 dragoons, 2 lancers and 2 hussars, 4 squadrons each. The troops were located based on the convenience of the military, and not on possible hostilities.

Martial law was immediately restored. The Kingdom of Poland was divided into military departments: Warsaw (Adjutant General Korf), Plock (Lieutenant General Semeka), Lublinsky (Lieutenant General Khrushchov), Radomsky (Lieutenant General Ushakov), Kaliszsky (Lieutenant General Brunner). Especially for the protection of communication lines, special departments were established: the Warsaw-Vienna railway, the Warsaw-Bromberg and the Warsaw-Petersburg. The chiefs of military departments received the extraordinary right to judge the insurgents taken with arms in the hands of a military court, to approve and carry out death sentences. Military court commissions were established, military commanders were appointed.

The units received an order to create autonomous detachments from all branches of the military and to gather in the most important settlements, to occupy communication routes, to send mobile columns to destroy the bandit formations. This order was carried out by January 20, but it soon became clear that it had negative aspects. Many county towns and industrial centers were left without the protection of the Russian troops. As a result, strong anti-Russian propaganda began in them, bandit formations began to be created, ordinary work was stopped at enterprises, and at some of them they began to produce weapons for the rebels. The Polish gangs got the opportunity to improve their organization, armament, taking advantage of the freedom in those places left by the Russian troops. Russian border guard, not reinforced army units, in a number of places could not hold back the onslaught of the enemy. Polish detachments were able to clear the southern, and somewhat later, part of the western border of Russia from the border guards. Thus, a free path was opened from Austrian Galicia, partly also from Poznan. The rebels got the opportunity to receive fresh reinforcements, various contraband, to escape from pursuit to Galicia.

Rebels. The uprising was attended by about 25 thousand participants in the conspiracy and several thousand students and urban lower classes. The Catholic clergy actively supported the rebels, promoting the ideas of liberation and even participating in battles. However, they constituted an insignificant percentage of the population of the Kingdom, millions of peasants chose to stay on the sidelines, suspicious of the "initiative" of the nobility and the intelligentsia. They tried to attract peasants by promising a free land allotment, and forcibly forcing them to join the gangs. But on the whole, the majority of the population remained neutral, the interests of the gentry and the Polish intelligentsia were far from the interests of the people, who preferred to live in peace, constantly improving their well-being.

The rebels' armament was weak. Pistols, revolvers, rifles were owned by the nobility, representatives of the wealthy strata of the population. The bulk was armed with hunting rifles, altered scythes, long knives that were made at local factories. In Liege, 76,000 rifles were ordered, but during delivery, almost half were intercepted by the Russian and Austrian authorities. And from the rest, many guns were captured by Russian troops. The insurgents had several guns of very poor quality, which deteriorated after a few shots. The cavalry was small, it was poorly armed, it was mainly used for reconnaissance and in surprise attacks. They tried to compensate for the weakness of weapons with the tactics of the partisans, unexpected attacks, in order to start a battle at close range.

The rebels took away food, clothing, horses, carts and other necessary property from the population, which also did not add to their popularity. True, people were given receipts, but it was obvious that people were parting with their property forever. Another step that "pleased" local population was the collection of taxes for two years in favor of the "people's government". Also, the rebels were engaged in extortion from wealthy individuals, robbing cash and post offices. In June 1863, with the help of officials supporting the rebels, 3 million rubles were stolen in Warsaw from the main treasury of the Kingdom of Poland. In other localities, about 1 million rubles more were plundered.

The rebels did not have a general army. Individual gangs gathered in various localities where conditions were most favorable for their activities. The organization of each gang depended on the knowledge and experience of its commander. But usually the "field brigade" consisted of three parts: riflemen, cosineers - infantrymen armed with converted scythes and cavalry. The wagon train was used not only for transporting property, but often for transporting infantry, especially during retreat.

Attitude of the Western Powers

The European powers reacted to the Polish uprising in different ways. Already on January 27 (February 8), 1863, an agreement was concluded between Prussia and the Russian Empire - the Anvelsleben convention. The treaty allowed Russian troops to pursue Polish rebels in Prussia, and Prussian units in Russian territory. The convention was signed in St. Petersburg by the Russian foreign minister, Prince A. M. Gorchakov, and the adjutant general of the Prussian king, Gustav von Alvensleben. The Prussians meticulously guarded their border so that the uprising would not spread to the Polish regions within Prussia.

The Austrian government was hostile to the Russians and was not averse to using this uprising in their own interests. The Viennese court at the beginning of the uprising clearly did not interfere with the Poles in Galicia, which became the base of the rebels, and for a long time fed it. The Austrian government even hatched the idea of ​​establishing a Polish state with one of the Habsburgs on the throne. England and France naturally took a hostile position towards Russia. They supported the rebels with false promises, giving them hope for foreign intervention in the conflict, like the Crimean campaign. In reality, London and Paris at this time did not want to fight with Russia, the Poles were simply used for their own purposes, undermining the power of the Russian Empire with their hands.

To be continued…

February 12th, 2018

The impetus for the next intensification of the Polish national movement was the war between France and Austria, which began in 1859. Napoleon III liberated Italy, and the Polish revolutionaries hoped that he would help Catholic Poland to restore its independence. The main generator and conductor of nationalist sentiments in the Kingdom of Poland, which was part of the Russian Empire, was the Polish nobility. The noblemen were infringed by the lack of privileges and the opportunity to participate in real government, they viewed the subordination of Russia as a humiliation and dreamed of the revival of the Commonwealth. In the years 1830-1831. in the Kingdom of Poland, a powerful uprising was already breaking out, suppressed by Russian troops.

Thirty-three years later, the Reds, as the unequivocal supporters of Poland's independence were called, began to prepare a new protest.

In October 1861, the Central National Committee was founded, which later played the role of the headquarters of the rebels. In addition, there was a Committee of Russian Officers in Poland, founded in 1861 and maintaining close ties with both Polish nationalists and Russian revolutionary democrats. After the arrest of the founder of the circle, Vasily Kaplinsky, who served in the Russian army with the rank of lieutenant, the Committee was headed by another officer - lieutenant of the Shlisselburg infantry regiment Andrei Potebnya. A member of the Committee was Yaroslav Dombrovsky, who also served in the Russian army as a junior officer and had even previously taken part in the Crimean War.

Yaroslav Dombrovsky

By the end of 1862, underground groups that were going to take part in the impending uprising numbered at least 20 thousand people. Social base the rebels were small Polish gentry, junior officers - Poles and Lithuanians, who served in the Russian army, students and students of Polish educational institutions, representatives of different intelligentsia. The priests played a special role catholic church... The Vatican unconditionally supported all plans to start the uprising, counting on the liberation of Catholic Poland from the rule of Orthodox Russia.

In 1860-1862. the situation became more and more aggravated. For example, a pogrom was staged at an Orthodox cemetery, the Russian inhabitants of Warsaw began to receive letters with threats, on February 15 (27), 1861, soldiers shot at the demonstration, as a result of which five of its participants were killed. In turn, Polish radicals have repeatedly attempted the life of Russian governor-generals. The Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich did not escape the assassination attempt, escaping with minor wounds. The formal reason for the uprising was the decision of Alexander II to begin recruiting in Poland. So the emperor wanted to isolate most of the protest youth.

On the night of January 10-11, 1863, bells began to ring in many cities in Poland. This was a prearranged signal that told the revolutionaries about the beginning of the action. It was the youth who evaded recruiting into the Russian army that became the backbone of the first insurgent detachments. The radicals formed the "Provisional National Government" (Zhond Narodovy), headed by a 22-year-old former philosophy student Stefan Bobrovsky. On the first day of the uprising, 25 attacks on Russian garrisons took place throughout the territory of the Kingdom of Poland. However, since the rebels were poorly organized and poorly armed, Russian soldiers fought off these attacks quite easily.

At the beginning of February 1863, 49-year-old Ludwik Meroslawski, godson of Napoleon's general Davout, a participant in the uprising of 1830-1831, arrived in Poland from France. and a professional Polish revolutionary. He was proclaimed the dictator of the uprising. But the "dictatorship" of Meroslavsky did not last long. On February 7 (19), 1863, at the edge of the Krzhyvosondz forest, a detachment commanded by the "dictator" himself entered into battle with the detachment of Colonel Yuri Shilder - Schundler, which included 3.5 companies of the Olonets infantry regiment, 60 Cossacks and 50 border guards. Even such modest forces inflicted a crushing defeat on the rebels, after which on February 9 (21), 1863, Ludwik Meroslawski abandoned the leadership of the uprising and fled back to France.

Mierosławski Ludwik

After the flight of Meroslavsky, the rebels were led by the promoted general, Colonel Marian Langevich (1827-1887), who had previously commanded the Sandomierz Voivodeship. Like Mieroslawski, Langevich, a former officer of the Prussian army, was a professional Polish revolutionary and lived in France and Italy, where he was engaged in military training of Polish youth. Nevertheless, formally Meroslavsky was considered the dictator for some time, and only on February 26 (March 10) Langevich was proclaimed the new dictator of the uprising. But luck did not smile at him either. Already on March 19, 1863, having been utterly defeated in two battles with Russian troops, Langevich fled to the territory of neighboring Austrian Galicia.

In addition to the centralized rebel forces, there were also numerous partisan detachments led by local "field commanders" in Poland. These were the detachments of Leon Frankovsky, Apolinarius Kurovsky, Zygmunt Podalevsky, Karol Fruche, Ignatius Mistkovsky and many others. Most of the detachments operated for a month - two, at most three months. Then they suffered crushing defeats from the Russian troops. One of the few exceptions was the detachment of Colonel General Mikhail Heidenreich, which managed to hold out from July to December 1863. This was not surprising, given that Mikhail Jan Heidenreich himself was in the past a career officer in the Russian army and graduated from the Academy of the General Staff.

Marian Langevich

In addition to Poland, the uprising also covered a number of provinces that were once part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Grodno, Vilna, Vitebsk, Minsk, Mogilev lands - everywhere there were insurgent formations created by Polish and Lithuanian gentry. It should be noted that the uprising from the very beginning was supported by the Polish emigration and revolutionary circles in Europe. Many Russian revolutionaries sympathized with the Polish rebels. A number of Russian and European radicals went to the Polish lands as volunteers. Several volunteer units were formed, staffed by French, Italian, Hungarian revolutionaries. For example, a "battalion of death zouaves" was created, commanded by the Frenchman François de Rochenbrune. A distinctive feature of this formation was the "death oath" - to commit suicide in case of defeat. Such Polish "death row".

In the European press, the Polish uprising was romanticized, presented exclusively as a national liberation movement of the proud European people against the Russian autocracy and national oppression. This attitude was inherited from the revolutionary movement of that time and the official Soviet historical science. Meanwhile, the rebels were not "soft and fluffy" romantic idealists who fought solely for freedom. The rebels, among whom the Polish gentry predominated, defended their class interests, namely, they advocated the return of that form of social and political order, under which the gentry felt most at ease. Religious differences played a role in motivating the rebels. It is known about the massacres of Orthodox priests, desecration of Orthodox churches and cemeteries.

In March 1863, Alexander II adopted a number of radical measures as part of the ongoing agrarian reform. So, in Vilna, Kovenskaya, Grodno, Minsk, and then Vitebsk, Kiev, Mogilev, Podolsk and Volyn provinces, the obligations of the peasants in relation to the landowners were terminated. Since the bulk of the landowners were Polish gentry, such a measure could not suit them. But far-sighted Russian politics deprived the Polish lords of the support of the bulk of the peasantry. Most of the peasants in the Kingdom of Poland and in the western provinces remained indifferent to the rebels. There are many known cases of peasants' actions against the rebels, who annoyed the rural population with their extortions, and even outright robberies.

The Polish lords were distinguished by their particular cruelty towards the peasant population, especially towards the Ukrainian and Belarusian peasants who professed Orthodoxy. Therefore, it was not surprising that the peasant population hated their exploiters and, at any opportunity, took any action against them. For example, more than once the peasants gathered troops and captured their lords, who sympathized with the rebels, in order to hand them over to the authorities. Moreover, the command of the Russian army even tried to somewhat cool the ardor of the peasantry, which, during the suppression of the uprising, tried to recoup the centuries of excesses of the gentry. In turn, the rebels launched a real terror against the peaceful peasant population, trying to intimidate the peasants and force them to support the rebels, or at least not cooperate with the tsarist troops. The lack of support from the peasantry was one of the main reasons for the rapid defeat of the Polish uprising of 1863-1864.

In the period from 1863 to 1865, in hostilities on the territory of the Kingdom of Poland and the western provinces, the Russian army lost 1221 soldiers and officers who died and died from wounds, 2810 - died from diseases and domestic injuries, 3416 - wounded, 438 - missing and deserted , another 254 people were captured by the rebels. There have been cases of individual soldiers and junior officers going over to the side of the rebels, and officers of Polish and Lithuanian origin usually went over to the rebels. In the process of suppressing the uprising, the authorities severely punished the leaders and the most active rebels. On March 22, 1864, Konstantin Kalinovsky was hanged in Vilna. The total number of death sentences carried out was in the period 1863-1865. about 400. At least 12 thousand people were deported to Siberia and other regions of the Russian Empire. About 7 thousand more participants in the uprising and sympathizers left the Kingdom of Poland and the western provinces and emigrated to the countries of Central and Western Europe. However, the actions of the tsarist government towards the rebels can hardly be called excessively harsh. Already on December 31, 1866, Alexander II replaced the indefinite hard labor for the insurgents sentenced to it for ten years. In total, only about 15% of the rebels were punished for participating in the uprising, and most of the participants in the hostilities from the side of the rebels remained at large.

After the suppression of the uprising, the tsarist government became concerned with the prevention of nationalism among the Polish gentry. In 1864, the Latin alphabet was banned, Mikhail Muravyov ordered to stop publishing any books in Lithuanian. In 1866, the governor-general of the Vilna province, Konstantin Kaufman, banned the use of the Polish language in public places and in official documents, and also introduced a ban on the use of any Polish national symbols. A serious blow was dealt to the positions of the Polish gentry. But as a result of the uprising, the peasantry won. The authorities, seeking to create a counterbalance to the Polish gentry, reduced the amount of redemption payments for peasants by 20% (in Lithuanian and Belarusian lands - by 30%). In addition, the centralized opening of primary schools for the children of Belarusian and Lithuanian peasants began, which had a completely understandable meaning - to educate the growing generations of peasants in loyalty to Russian authorities, in the Orthodox cultural tradition.

Although European public opinion idealized the rebels, viewing them solely as idealistic heroes, in reality the Polish uprising was not seriously helped by any European power. It was the hope for help from France and Great Britain that "warmed the souls" of the Polish gentry, who were counting on the beginning of a war between the Western powers and Russia. Even British newspapers admitted that if the rebel leaders had not counted on Western military aid, the uprising would have stopped by itself, or even would not have begun at all.

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Author: Ilya Polonsky

Political situation ¦ Forces of the parties ¦ Plans of hostilities

In 1807 Napoleon founded the Duchy of Warsaw. It did not satisfy the expectations of the majority of Poles, who dreamed of Poland "from sea to sea" with the inclusion of Lithuania and Western Russia... Alexander I in 1815 at the Congress of Vienna formalized the annexation of the Duchy of Warsaw to Russia under the name of the Kingdom of Poland and granted it a constitution. Poland received the right to have its own army of 30 thousand. Moreover, money for armaments, uniforms and food for this army was released not from the treasury of the Kingdom, but from the sums of the empire.

Alexander's arrangements regarding Poland met with no sympathy among the Russians. The historian Karamzin even spoke out sharply. “The tsar,” he wrote, “is correcting the partition of Poland by the partition of Russia; by this he will cause applause, but he will plunge the Russians into despair; the restoration of Poland will be either the destruction of Russia, or the Russians will irrigate Poland with their blood and once again take Prague by storm. "

“At one of the shows,” says Paskevich in his notes, who was then passing through Warsaw, “I go up to gr. Miloradovich and gr. Osterman-Tolstoy and ask: “What will come of this?” Osterman answered: “But what will happen - in 10 years you will be storming Warsaw with your division.” The prediction came true.

The Tsarevich, Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich, was appointed commander-in-chief of the Polish army, and the old veteran of the Polish army, General Zaionchek, who acted completely in accordance with the Grand Duke, was appointed governor of the Kingdom. Meanwhile, the post of governor cherished the hope of taking Adam Czartoryski in such an influential post to achieve the cherished Polish goals. Struck by failure, Czartoryski took over as trustee of the Vilna educational district and curator of the Vilna University and, with his mother, Isabella, became the secret center of all Polish intrigue.

Then there was the time of Freemasonry, the Decembrist movement in Russia, the Carbonari in Italy, etc. The Kingdom of Poland and the Western region quickly became covered with a network of secret societies. The anarchy that reigned in the government of Poland for centuries, the right of confederation, as if giving the appearance of legitimacy to each rebellion, gave a certain political education of the nation. The Poles were imbued with an indelible passion for conspiracies - this explains their constant readiness for reckless uprisings.

The Vilnius University and churches were the center of revolutionary ideas in Lithuania, and in the Ukraine, Volyn and Podolia - the Kremenets Lyceum, founded by Count Chatsky. The main propagandist in Vilna was the talented history professor Lelevel.

Of course, all this was known to the Russian government, but it either did not take any measures, or these measures were extremely unsuccessful. Since the annexation of Lithuania to Russia, nothing has been done to unite it with other parts of the empire. When it was reported that at the Vilnius University a professor of philosophy was giving lectures in a revolutionary direction, the captain-police officer was ordered to attend the lectures. In 1823 Czartoryski was replaced by Novosiltsev, and Lelevel was transferred to Warsaw, where he indulged in propaganda with even greater convenience.

The political mood of Poland was so clear to everyone that Nicholas I, leaving Warsaw in 1829 after being crowned as king of Poland, told the empress that they had been on a volcano that had been threatening to erupt for ten years. It is clear after this that the explosion of 1830 was not a surprise, and it is completely naive to assert that the revolution was made by the second lieutenants Vysotsky, Zalivsky and Urbanasy and the school of ensigns, "snotty" (snotty), as the Polish Minister of War Gauke called them.

The July revolution of 1830 in Paris and the August revolution in Brussels added fuel to the Polish fire. The final impetus for the uprising was the expulsion of the Polish troops along with the Russians to suppress the revolution in Belgium. With the removal of the national troops, all hope for the success of the revolution disappeared, and therefore the Poles decided to act. Thus, for the sake of political dreams, unrealizable already because their implementation affected the interests of three powerful states (Russia, Austria and Prussia), which concluded the former Polish provinces, the institutions already granted and the material well-being of the country achieved under Russian rule were sacrificed, which made such remarkable progress in 15 years that instead of the previous permanent deficit, the Treasury now had free cash of 66 million zlotys (15 k.).

On the evening of November 17, the conspirators attacked the residence of the Tsarevich Belvedere. Thanks to the valet Frize, the Grand Duke escaped, and Russian troops and part of the Polish gradually joined him and left the city on November 18 in the evening.

According to the Poles themselves, the uprising was easy to suppress at the very beginning, but the Tsarevich was at a loss. He kept repeating that “any spilled drop of blood would only spoil the matter,” and released the Polish troops who remained loyal (these excellent regiments joined the rebels), retreated with a Russian detachment through Pulawy to Wlodawa into the empire and surrendered the Lublin fortress to the Poles. important strategic importance, and large artillery reserves, and Zamosc. The uprising spread throughout the region.

General Khlopitsky, a well-known veteran of the Napoleonic troops, a man with great military talents, a favorite of the troops and the people, was declared commander-in-chief of the Polish troops. On January 13, 1831, the Sejm declared the Romanov dynasty deprived of the Polish throne. Czartoryski, who openly became the head of the revolutionary government, entered into negotiations with foreign powers to provide assistance to the Poles. The calculations turned out to be wrong. For Austria and Prussia, the restoration of Poland was dangerous, the sovereign withdrew the petitions of England and France, announcing that he considered the Polish question to be an internal one; other states could not show any influence.

The Poles responded to Nicholas's appeals for obedience by demanding the annexation of the western provinces to the kingdom. The struggle was becoming inevitable.

Forces of the parties. Poles. The Polish army consisted of 35 thousand (28 thousand infantry and 7 thousand cavalry) with 106 guns. The revolutionary government: firstly, it called for the service of old-time soldiers and dismissed officers - 20 thousand; secondly, announced the recruitment of 100 thousand, of which 10 thousand in the cavalry; thirdly, they took draft horses for the cavalry, and then they had to take peasants; fourthly, to form five 8-gun batteries, they took howitzers from Modlin, the Prussian cannons left over from the time of the Prussian domination, Turkish cannons and cast 20 cannons from the bells; Fifthly, from the school of ensigns and from the Kalisz cadet corps they made an increased release of officers, and in addition, they appointed gentry who had never served in the army to the officer's posts - an unsuccessful measure, because the campaigners were bad, but as revolutionaries they introduced a corrupting principle into the army.

By the beginning of hostilities, there were up to 140 thousand in total, but 55 thousand could be put in the field. The active army was divided into 4 infantry and 5 cavalry divisions, in addition, there were troops in fortresses and in detachments that had a separate purpose. Infantry regiments consisted of 4 battalions, cavalry - of 6 squadrons; the battalions were strong, much stronger than the Russian battalions.

The old troops were superbly trained thanks to the vigilant care of the Tsarevich. The new ones were significantly inferior to the old ones in training, discipline and endurance. The mistake was that from the old units they did not single out sufficiently strong cadres who would give strength and resilience to the new troops. The armament was good thanks to the stock of guns accumulated in the arsenal: the Tsarevich handed over all the more or less damaged guns to the Russian arsenal, and in return demanded new ones from the empire.

The commander-in-chief, after Khlopitsky's refusal, was appointed Prince Radziwill, who did not possess either military talents or the appropriate character, therefore he was entirely under the influence of Khlopitsky, assigned to him as an adviser. However, the power of the commander-in-chief does not tolerate any division, and therefore the position of the seemingly all-powerful Khlopitsky was still false and led to harm in the battle of Grokhov. In addition, Khlopitsky, although he possessed all the data to be at the head of the army, did not sympathize with the uprising - he refused offensive actions and believed that an honorable grave could only be prepared for the Polish army under the walls of Warsaw.

The chief of staff was Khrzhanovsky, an excellent officer of the General Staff. Quartermaster General Prondzinsky, in addition to his extensive education as an officer of the General Staff, was distinguished by the brilliance and courage of shrewd strategic considerations.

Although many of the Polish officers served in the Napoleonic troops, the Polish divisions were usually commanded there by the French, and therefore there were not enough experienced generals among them during the revolution.

The Poles were notable for their ardor of attacks, as well as their stamina in defense. The Pole is mobile, ardent, brave, enterprising, but he lacks moral fortitude. He considers his impulse to be insurmountable, but if he fails, then cowardice sets in, he becomes discouraged. Besides, partisanship caused a lot of harm. Over the centuries, love for the fatherland has turned into devotion to one's party. The triumph of the latter was the main goal- they were ready to sacrifice the interests of the state for him. All this led to disagreement among the highest, destroyed the unity that was so necessary in the war.

Russians. Infantry corps (as a norm) consisted of 3 infantry divisions, 3 two-regimental brigades each, regiments of 3 four-company battalions, but the third battalions (reserve) were left in the rear to occupy more important places in the border country.

Cavalry: 5 reserve cavalry corps, 2 divisions and 10 light cavalry divisions, one each with an infantry corps. Cavalry regiments - 6 squadrons. Each infantry division has 3 artillery companies with a 12-gun composition; with a cavalry company - 2 cavalry companies. Engineering troops - 11 sapper battalions, and with the Guards Corps and the first reserve cavalry - one cavalry pioneer battalion each. The shotguns were partly bad, spoiled by stupid cleaning, with bent barrels and faulty locks.

Not in the least inferior to the Poles in maneuvering the masses, the Russians turned out to be less prepared in single actions, in gunfire, etc. Frequent battle fire in a deployed formation was considered panache. Arakcheev's system had a harmful effect on the development of entrepreneurship and the ability to act independently in bosses.

The following were assigned to the active army: Rosen's 6th Infantry Corps (Lithuanian); the guards detachment of the Tsarevich is also ranked among him; 1st Pahlen 1st Infantry Corps; 3rd Reserve Caucasian Corps Witt and 5th Reserve Cavalry Kreutz; Shakhovsky's grenadier corps; Guards Grand Duke Mikhail Pavlovich; 2nd Pahlen 2nd Infantry Corps. A total of 183 thousand (of which 41 thousand are cavalry) and, in addition, 13 Cossack regiments.

The spirit of the troops, however, was the same; in this war, the usual prowess manifested itself. In all clashes with the enemy, the regiments maintained their old glory and showed their characteristic courage and fortitude. The Prussian general Brandt, who was then with the Russian army and knew it well, writes that Russian soldiers are the first in the world. The grenadier corps and the famous 13th and 14th Jaeger Regiments were especially distinguished for their exploits. This was not the spirit of Rosen's 6th (Lithuanian) corps. Many Polish officers who participated in secret societies served in it, and therefore sympathy for the Poles was noticed in the corps, "the entire Lithuanian corps is looking at Warsaw."

Before the outbreak of hostilities, the troops were given "Rules for observation during the march, in bivouacs, in cramped apartments and in the battle itself." This field manual was drawn up on the basis of the combat experience of that era by people who knew war, and therefore has a great price even for the present time. Unfortunately, the tactical training of the Russian army, under the influence of parade masters who did not know the war, were far from at the level and did not meet the basic requirements of the "Rules".

The troops had provisions for only 15 days and fodder for the cavalry for 12 days. Replenishment of these reserves was extremely difficult, since the country was not harvesting, and the inhabitants were either hostile or indifferent. They resorted to requisitions - and the tariff was set low - and residents avoided the assignment of food. Only money could extinguish the patriotism of the regiments. In addition, the requisitions were not without abuse and violence. The best means of securing food would have been a reliable arrangement of the army's transport unit, but the Russians expected to do away with the Poles immediately and then spread out in wide apartments with allowance from the residents, and therefore neglected this part. Inadequacies in the organization of food were detrimental to the hostilities.

Field Marshal Count Dibich-Zabalkansky, 45 years old, was appointed commander-in-chief, with enormous military ability, extensive combat experience and recognized authority. However, in 1831 he did not fully justify the hopes placed on him. He did not always show sufficient decisiveness and asked too complex combinations. After the death of his beloved wife, Diebitsch began to notice a decline in spirit and an addiction to alcoholic beverages. To complete Diebitsch's misfortune, at a time when the Russian army experienced all the crises, when the most important part of the campaign ended and the enemy was weakened, so that it remained to strike the last blow and reap the fruits of his labors, the commander-in-chief suddenly died of cholera - all the glory went to his successor Paskevich.

The chief of staff, Count Toll, was talented, educated, decisive, energetic, went through the military school of Suvorov and Kutuzov, and was on excellent terms with Dibich.

War plans. Poles. Around December 20, 1830, the Poles could muster about 55 thousand ready-made troops. Meanwhile, on the part of the Russians, only the 6th (Lithuanian) corps (38 thousand, and with the detachment of the Tsarevich 45 thousand) was ready, which Baron Rosen concentrated in two places (Brest and Bialystok), located 120 miles apart from one another. It is clear that it was more profitable for the Poles to attack in order to smash the Russians in parts and seize as much territory as possible (Lithuania) to expand the sources of manning the army and material resources.

Khlopitsky, for his political reasons, did not want to take any offensive actions and decided: the Polish army would deploy in echelons in two directions leading to Warsaw from Kovna and from Brest-Litovsk; when the Russians attack, retreat to the position at Grokhov and take battle there. It was considered that it was risky to move far ahead to cover Warsaw, for fear of being bypassed and cut off from the bridges in Prague and Molina. On the Grokhov position, one cannot be surrounded, the Russians, due to the conditions of the terrain, could not deploy all their forces and take advantage of the superiority, finally, the Poles relied on the vast sources of Warsaw and on the Prague tete-de-pon. However, it should be noted that the position of the Poles in terms of size did not correspond to the number of their troops, they got around from the left flank, and in the rear - big river with one bridge.

According to this plan, the 1st Infantry Division of Krukovetsky stood on the Kovenskoye Highway to Serotsk, and the cavalry division of Yankovsky moved to Rozhan. Zhimirsky's 2nd Infantry Division is on the Brest Highway, with forward regiments on the Livets River, and Sukhorzhevsky's Ulansky Division is in front on the Veprzh River. Skrzynecki's 3rd Infantry Division stood between these two axes at Stanislavov and Dobre. The general reserve (4th Infantry Division of Shembek and three Caucasian divisions) is in front of Warsaw. Separate detachments of Serovskiy, Dvernitskiy, Dzekonskiy, Kazakovskiy were assigned to guard the upper Vistula.

Russians. All forces intended against the Poles could not be immediately opposed to the enemy. The Lithuanian corps could assemble only at the end of December; The 3rd Reserve Cavalry Corps (from Podolia) took a month to join the Lithuanian Corps; by the beginning of January the 1st corps could approach Brest; in early February - grenadier; at the beginning of March - guards; at the end of March - the 2nd corps, that is, the entire army - in 3-4 months.

By January 20, 126 thousand were actually collected (of which 28 thousand were cavalry); leaving 12 thousand in the rear, there were 114 thousand for the offensive - the forces are quite significant.

Diebitsch's goal is to defeat the enemy army and capture Warsaw. For this, he intended to concentrate between Narew and Bug, between Lomrze and Nur and act depending on the circumstances, trying to cut off the enemy from Warsaw. If this fails, then cross the upper Vistula, surround Warsaw and force it, by hunger or storm, to capitulate.

The plan corresponded to the situation and pursued important goals (army, capital), but it did not take into account the possibility of a change in the weather, that is, that during a thaw, Bug and Narev would present an obstacle to the crossing. In addition, if it was already planned to cross the upper Vistula, then some advised to choose Brest-Litovsk as the center of action and from there to act according to circumstances either to Warsaw or to the upper Vistula. But the execution of this plan was fraught with various inconveniences, and most importantly, with the loss of time, meanwhile the field marshal hoped to soon put an end to the uprising and, moreover, with one blow.

Then Toll proposed a compromise: move through Drogichin to Siedlce and from there to Warsaw, or to the upper Vistula; in this case, the troops would move further near the border, and therefore food would be facilitated; but the path lengthened, and the army moved away from the grenadier and guards corps, following from the north of Kovna. Diebitsch did not agree and began to act according to the original version.

Diebitsch offensive to Warsaw

The Russians cross the Polish border ¦ Change the line of action ¦ The offensive of the Russian army towards Wavre ¦ The battle of Wavre on February 7 ¦ The battle at Bialolenka on February 12 ¦ The battle at Grochow on February 13 ¦ The location of the Russians in the apartments

On January 24 and 25, the Russian army crossed the Polish border with 11 columns over a vast area from Kovna through Grodna, Bialystok, Brest-Litovsk to Ustilug. Despite the apparent scatter, the entire movement and distribution of troops was calculated in such a way that 80 thousand could be concentrated in the main forces anywhere in 20 hours, while the Poles could not oppose more than 55 thousand.

On January 27, the main forces reached the line of Lomzha, Zambrov (1st corps of Palen), Chizhev (6th corps of Rosen), that is, they covered only 60 versts in three days, and meanwhile the transitions were forced. As a result of the thaw, the roads turned into swamps; walked no more than two miles per hour; The wagons put on the sledge track stopped. They gave the troops a rest. On January 27, the rain drove all the snow from the fields; On the 29th the thaw intensified; small rivers opened up, ice melted in places on the Bug. It was impossible to be drawn into the wooded and swampy space between the Bug and Narev.

After discussion at the military council, the field marshal decided to cross to the left bank of the Bug at Brok and Nur, pull off the troops at Vengrov and Siedlce, then use the Brest highway and continue moving towards Warsaw. The road to Drogichin could serve for communications.

Change of line of action. Thus, it was necessary to make a flank march and change the line of action. The crossing began on January 30. The difficulties in crossing were great. If the Poles showed proper activity, they could greatly interfere with Diebitsch. After the crossing, the army moved to the Livtsa River, on which it established itself almost without resistance from the Poles - there were small vanguard skirmishes. By February 2, the army stood in two masses at Vengrov and Siedlce, advancing the vanguards.

The march for 100 miles along disgusting roads was accomplished extremely quickly, but with great exertion. Rest was given on February 2, 3 and 4 - it was also necessary to pull up the carts.

On February 2, the head of the horse-jaeger division, Baron Geismar, from the 5th reserve cavalry corps, advancing from Kiev to Pulawy, allowed himself to be defeated in parts near the village of Stochek by the Polish general Dvernitsky (3 battalions, 17 squadrons and 6 guns).

Tall horse-rangers on massive horses could not act nimbly against the skittish Polish lancers on light horses. Taking advantage of the superiority of forces, Dvernitsky alternately defeated both Russian regiments, which were panicked. The Poles did not pursue them. The Russians lost 280 people and 8 guns, the Poles - 87 people.

Geismar went to Siedlce. Dvernitsky, having formed a battery of taken cannons and using the horses captured from the Russian, went back across the Vistula. This matter, unimportant in itself, had a very great moral significance for the Poles: it gave the people confidence in their troops, reinforced the conviction that it was possible to fight Russia. Dvernitsky immediately became a national hero, volunteers began to flock to him. In general, the significance of Stochek's case is determined by the fact that it was the first in the upcoming campaign.

The offensive of the Russian army to Wavru. On February 5, the 6th corps moved to Dobra; 1st building - from Liva to Kalushin; for communication between them, the Lithuanian Grenadier Brigade (Muravyov) - along the old Warsaw road to Zimnovody (then the road goes to Stanislavov, Okunev); reserves, under the command of Tol, - from Siedlce along the Brest highway. In the rear of the army, Nur, Vengerov and Siedlce were occupied by garrisons. With this direction of movement, the collisions between Skrzynetsky and Rosen at Dobre and Zhimirsky with Tol and Palen at Kalushin were inevitable.

Fight at Kalushin. Toll went to Kalushina before Palena and outflanked Zhimirsky's position from both flanks. Zhimirsky managed to retreat to Minsk without major losses.

Fight at Dobre. Skrzhynetsky took up a strong position in a forest clearing, relying on the village of Dobre. He stubbornly held out against Rosen's vanguard and even went on the offensive with the 4th regiment (the famous "Chvartaks"), but with the arrival of the main forces of the 6th corps, after a hot 4-hour battle, overturned; however, he retreated in order to Okunev. Losses of Russians 750 people, Poles 600 people.

Skrzynetskiy had 12 battalions, 12 guns, 4 squadrons; Rosen - 19 battalions, 56 guns, 2 lancers and a Cossack regiment, but he brought troops into battle in parts and still did not bring in all. In addition, the Poles had an advantageous position, and the Russians could not deploy their numerous artillery.

On February 6, pressed by the Russians, Skrzhinetsky retreated to the Grokhov position to the Olkhovaya Grove, and Zhimirsky settled down, not reaching Wavr. Rosen moved to Okunev (avant-garde), Palen - to Milosna (avant-garde); the left flank of the army was guarded by Geismar at Shennitz.

Battle of Wavre on 7 February. The battle was accidental for both sides. On February 7, the field marshal did not count on a battle. He ordered the 1st and 6th corps to set out at 7 o'clock in the morning and take possession of the exits from the forest gorges to the Grokhov plain. The 1st corps had to walk 8 versts along the highway, and the 6th corps 12 versts to the Vygoda tavern along the bad old Warsaw road. It is clear that the movement of the columns was not uniform.

Khlopitsky also did not think to accept the battle, but since Zhimirsky was strongly pressed by Palen, Shembek's division was sent to replace and to support; they had only 18 battalions.

Battle of Wavre in 1831

In the main forces of the vanguard of Palen, a brigade of horse rangers was walking between the infantry, in addition, in the tail - another 22 squadrons and 16 corps.

Khlopitsky ordered to attack Palen, moving mainly forward with the left flank, Krukovetsky - to take Vygoda, behind Krukovetsky was Skrzhinetsky. Thus, almost the entire Polish army found itself on the battlefield. Polish artillery opened frequent fire.

The chief of the vanguard, Palen Lopukhin, was quickly overturned. The Black Sea Cossack regiment barely rescued the ataman Vlasov, who had already fallen under the sabers. Palen immediately moved the 1st cavalry-artillery company to the left of the highway, ordered the cavalry to clear a place for the infantry and move to the left in order to hold the pressure of the right flank of the Poles. The regiments of the 3rd Infantry Division that had come running hurriedly deployed to the highway and to the right; They delayed the enemy a little, but nevertheless, Zhimirsky, who was leaning forward, pressed the right flank of the 1st corps and threatened to cut it off from the 6th. Palen pushes the Newingermanland regiment to the right flank. Toll, who arrived, moved the Staroingermanland regiment and other infantry units to the right, while the artillery of the 3rd division set up a ledge behind the horse.

Diebitsch arrived at about 11 o'clock. He ordered the mounted rangers to let the infantry pass. But while the cavalry was clearing the highway, the Poles made another attack on the right flank. The cavalry company suddenly doused them with buckshot; the Poles fled, but the skirmishers rushed to the battery. Diebitsch sent his convoy against them (a half-squadron of the Lubensky hussars) and supported him with a sapper battalion, that is, he even brought into action even these units that were at hand, regardless of their special purpose, into action. The skirmishers were thrown back and disappeared into the forest.

It was already 12 o'clock. Diebitsch sent to rush Rosen, who managed to turn around only at 3 o'clock in the afternoon. It was necessary, if necessary, to bring the troops of Palen into battle in parts, as they approached: Lopukhin's haste put the Russian army in a critical situation.

Meanwhile, the head of the vanguard of the 6th corps, Vladek, having passed the Gribovskaya will, heard shots from the direction of Palen and immediately moved 3 battalions of rangers towards him into the forest, which attacked the enemy along with the right flank of Palen. The field marshal, hearing the cannonade from Rosen, no longer fearing for his right flank, ordered a general offensive, and sent Saken to the extreme left flank to lead the numerous cavalry. Poles are thrown away everywhere; Lubensky, overturned by Saken, tries to find protection behind the infantry, but Zhimirsky and Shembek are also being pressed. Then Khlopitsky himself directs the guards grenadier regiment.

Diebitsch orders the horse rangers to attack directly along the highway. They are glad in front of the field marshal's eyes to make amends for their failure at Stochek. The Württemberg Horse-Jaeger Regiment overturned the 3rd Polish Horse-Jaeger Regiment, then cut into the square of the Guards grenadiers, threw them into the swamps, scattering and chopping up some of the people. Gradually pushing the enemy, the Russians occupied Wavre.

Khlopitsky also had Skrzynecki's division, which he did not use. If he did not mean a decisive attack and intended to give the final battle in the Grochow position, then it is not clear for what purpose he fought the battle at Wavre on such a large scale. Krukovetsky tried to keep Rosen, but, attacked by significant forces and seeing the retreat of the rest of the troops, he retreated to Olkhovaya Grove, occupied by Skrzhinetsky. Rosen also occupied Cavenchin, driving out a small Polish detachment from there. At 4 o'clock, Diebitsch already took possession of the exits from the forest, which he considered the battle goal achieved.

The damage of the Russians was 3,700 people, the Poles lost no less, considering the 600 people taken by the Russians as prisoners.

On February 8, a firefight broke out at the forward posts near Olkhovaya Grove. Rosen sent Reibniz's 25th Division to drive the Poles out of there. Reibniz was driven back with a loss of 1,620 men.

Diebitsch, having learned about this useless bloodshed, confirmed the order to refrain from any clashes with the enemy.

Battle of Bialolenka on February 12. Prince Shakhovskoy with a grenadier corps went from Kovna (starting on January 24) to Mariampol, Kalwaria, Suwalki, Raigrod, Shchuchin, Lomzha and on February 8 reached Ostrolenka. Here he crossed the Narew and went further to Pultusk, Serotsk and Zegrzh. Having crossed here on February 11 through Bugo-Narev, Shakhovskoy at Neporent connected with Saken (1 battalion, a lancer regiment, a company of sappers, 2 guns), sent by the field marshal to facilitate the movement of Shakhovsky. At this time Khlopitsky sent a detachment of Jankowski to the north of Warsaw to collect food. Yankovsky attacked Shakhovsky early in the morning on February 12 and was repulsed. Then Shakhovskoy went to Bialolenka, intending to cut off Yankovsky.

Diebitsch, meanwhile, created a plan for the Grokhov battle, at which he intended to put forward, as suddenly and secretly as possible, Shakhovsky with part of the other troops against the left flank and rear of the Polish army and deliver the main blow to it in this direction.

Field Marshal Shakhovsky did not explain his plan, but simply sent an order (in fact, this is not an order, but a command) to stop at Neporent or where the messenger would find him. A Cossack with a note stumbled upon Yankovsky, was late and arrived at Shakhovsky, when he was already approaching Bialolenka, heavily occupied by Malakhovsky and Yankovsky. Shakhovskoy attacked; The Poles withdrew to Brudno, where Krukovetsky united his division and 18 guns, that is, forces equal to those of Shakhovsky. Losses on both sides of 650 people.

The battle at Bialolenka showed the field marshal that his calculations for surprise were violated. Fearing that the Poles would not attack Shakhovsky in superior forces, he sent him the order that night, again without explaining the purpose, to stay and not to engage in battle again, and if the Poles attacked him, then our main forces would attack the enemy with front. The adjutant who brought the order said that Diebitsch was extremely dissatisfied with the occupation of Bialolenka. This greatly agitated the old man Shakhovsky, he began to consult on what should be done, but nothing was decided.

On the morning of February 13, Shakhovskoy, imagining that the entire Polish army could rush at him, decided to retreat through Grodzisk and Marki to join Dibich. Krukovetsky, seeing the retreat of the Russians, opened artillery fire and moved on to the attack. Shakhovskoy left safely, having lost only one weapon stuck in the swamp. The battle ended at 11 o'clock in the morning.

Diebitsch, hearing Shakhovsky's cannonade, decided to attack the Poles with his main forces for his rescue. As a result, the Grokhov battle broke out a day earlier than expected - on the 13th instead of the 14th, and not at all according to the previously worked out plan.

Battle of Grokhov on February 13. Grokhovskaya position was located on a vast low-lying plain, crossed by marshes and drainage ditches. A swampy strip 1–2 versts wide stretches from M. Grokhov past Kavenchin and Zombka to Bialolenka.

To the south of B. Grokhov, Shembek's division was located, in the grove there were notches. Zhimirsky's division occupied the Olkhovaya Grove, to the north of M. Grokhov (about 1 mile along the front and ½ mile in depth, cut by a fathom ditch). The swampy soil was frozen and allowed movement. Roland's brigade scattered a thick line of skirmishers with strong reserves at the back along the edge. The main mass of the brigade stood behind the moat in a deployed formation with intervals between units so that the overturned front troops could go back and settle under the cover of battle fire and bayonets of deployed units. Another brigade of Chizhevsky stood behind, in reserve. Nearby behind the grove, epaulements have been dug up for the batteries that permeated the entire grove. 2 batteries fired at the area to the left of the grove to Kavenchin. Skrzhynecki stood behind Zhimirsky's division, who was also assigned to defend the grove.

Battle of Grokhov in 1831

The cavalry of Lubensky stood between the highway and the village of Targuvek. Uminsky Cavalry Corps (2 divisions with 2 horse batteries) - at the count. Elsner. Krukovetsky acted against Shakhovsky at Brudno; near Prague - militias with scythes (kosinery) and parks. There was no general reserve, because cosigners cannot be considered for it.

Position benefits: Russian troops did not have enough space for deployment and had to execute it when leaving the forest under artillery and even rifle fire. Flaws: the left flank hung in the air, which gave Dibich the basis for his bypassing this flank with Shakhovsky's corps, but failed - in the rear there is a large river with one bridge, so the retreat is dangerous.

The forces of the Poles - 56 thousand; 12 thousand of them are cavalrymen; without Krukovetsky - 44 thousand; Russians - 73 thousand, of which 17 thousand are cavalry; without Shakhovsky - 60 thousand.

AT 9? hours the Russians began a cannonade, and then their right flank began to move to the right in order to attack the Olkhovaya Grove. The attacks were conducted incorrectly: the troops were brought into battle in parts, there was no artillery preparation and by means of encirclement. First, 5 battalions burst into the edge, but stumbled upon reserves behind the ditch and were driven out of the grove by Roland's battalions. Reinforced with 6 battalions. The Russians broke in again, but Chizhevsky, together with Roland (12 battalions), again forced them to retreat. The Russians bring in 7 more battalions. A long line (18 battalions) of the Russians rapidly rushes at the Poles and knocks the entire division out of the grove at about 11 o'clock in the morning. Zhimirsky himself was mortally wounded. But, not supported by enough artillery, the Russians suffered greatly from the Polish buckshot. Khlopitsky brings Skryzhenetsky's division into action. 23 Polish battalions capture the grove.

At 12 o'clock in the afternoon, Diebitsch strengthens the attack with 10 more battalions, begins to surround the grove on the right and left, where new batteries are set up on the flanks. Having successfully displaced from the edge, the Russians on the right could only reach a large ditch; on the left, on the left, fresh regiments of the 3rd division rounded the grove and went far ahead, but came under the closest battery fire.

Khlopitsky, wishing to take advantage of this moment, brings into action both divisions (Zhimirsky and Skrzhinetsky) and 4 fresh battalions of guards grenadiers, whom he personally leads into the attack. Seeing in the midst of their beloved leader - calm, with a pipe in his mouth - the Poles, singing "The Polish has not died yet," with irresistible force attack the Russian weary, frustrated regiments. The latter are beginning to recede. The Poles gradually capture the entire grove, their columns approach the very edge, the skirmishers run forward.

Prondzinsky, pointing at the Russian battery, shouts: "Children, another 100 steps - and these weapons are yours." Two of them were taken and directed to the height where Diebitsch stood.

This was the last desperate effort of the Poles. The Field Marshal directs what is possible from the infantry (2nd Grenadier Division) into the grove; reinforces artillery: more than 90 guns acted on the sides of the grove and, advancing forward from the right side (from the north), heavily hit the Polish batteries behind the grove; To bypass the grove on the right, the 3rd cuirassier division with the Uhlansky Highness' Life Guards regiment and 32 guns was moved to help capture the grove, and at the same time to break the front of the retreating Poles and try to push even their right flank to the swamps near the Brest highway. Still to the right, Muravyov's Lithuanian grenadier brigade with the Uhlan division occupied the colonies of Metzenas and Elsner, advancing forward, contacting the cuirassiers with the left flank.

The agitated Diebitsch gave his horse spurs and, galloping up to the retreating troops, shouted loudly: “Where are you guys, the enemy is there! Forward! Forward!" - and, standing in front of the regiments of the 3rd division, led them into the attack. A huge avalanche fell on the grove from all directions. The grenadiers, not responding to the fire of the Poles and bowing their bayonets, burst into the grove; behind them went the 3rd division, then the 6th corps of Rosen. In vain Khlopitsky, already wounded in the leg, personally bypasses the front line and tries to inspire the Poles. The Russians cross the ditch along the piles of bodies and finally take possession of the grove.

Khlopitsky ordered Krukovetsky to go to the grove, and Lubensky with his cavalry to support the upcoming attack. Lubensky replied that the terrain was inconvenient for the actions of the cavalry, that Khlopitsky was an infantry general and did not understand cavalry affairs, and that he would carry out the order only after receiving it from the official commander-in-chief Radziwill. It was at what critical moment that Khlopitsky's position was incorrect. He went to Radziwill. On the way, the grenade hit Khlopitsky's horse, exploded inside and injured his legs. His activity ceased. The whole affair of the Poles fell into disarray, the general administration disappeared. Radziwill was completely at a loss, whispered prayers and answered questions with texts from Scripture... The faint-hearted Shembek was crying. Uminsky quarreled with Krukovetsky. Skrzynecki alone retained his presence of mind and showed discretion.

Diebitsch entrusted the leadership of the actions of the cavalry mass to Tol, who got carried away with particulars and scattered his cavalry across the field, only one cuirassier Prince Albert's regiment, headed by the division of Lieutenant Colonel von Zon, rushed to pursue the randomly retreating Poles. The regiment passed the entire battle formation of the enemy, and only near Prague itself 5 Polish Uhlan squadrons took the Zone in the flank. But he deftly led his cuirassiers onto the highway and escaped from the fire of the infantry and the rocket battery. The attack lasted 20 minutes for 2? versts. Although the losses of the cuirassiers reached half of the composition (Zon was mortally wounded and taken prisoner), the moral effect of the attack was enormous. Radzwill with his retinue rode off to Warsaw.

The Olviopol hussars famously attacked Shembek, pinned two regiments to the Vistula and scattered them. The Poles were pushed aside everywhere. Skrzynecki gathered and arranged the remains behind in position, on the sandy hills.

At about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Shakhovsky finally showed up, who showed complete inactivity that day. The delighted Diebitsch made no reproach, only announced that the honor of completing the victory belonged to them, and he himself became the head of the grenadier. But when they approached the enemy position, it was 5 o'clock, the day was leaning towards evening. The field marshal pondered and, after some hesitation, ordered an end to the battle.

Losses of Poles - 12 thousand, Russians - 9400 people.

Meanwhile, a terrible disorder prevailed among the Poles. Troops and carts crowded around the bridge, only by midnight the crossing ended, under the cover of Skrzhynecki.

Under such conditions, it would have been easy for the Russians to cope with Skrzynetskiy and then storm the Prague tete-de-pon. It is completely incomprehensible why Diebitsch did not do this. His plan was to put an end to the uprising with one blow and, moreover, as soon as possible. The opportunity presented itself, and the field marshal did not take advantage of it. The dark question of the reasons has not yet been clarified by history.

The location of Russians in apartments. The next day, the Poles occupied and heavily armed the Prague fortifications. It was possible to attack only with the help of siege weapons, and their delivery took 4 months. Crossing the upper Vistula, in order to then attack Warsaw from the west, also took time. Therefore, Diebitsch placed the army in wide apartments (Okunev, Kolbel, Zhelekhov, Radzyn, Siedlce), about 40 miles along the front and 40 deep in order to facilitate food by requisitioning.

Meanwhile, by March 10, the Vistula had cleared of ice and it was possible to proceed with the crossing. For this, Tyrchin was chosen (outside the sphere of influence of the Polish army, the width is only 400 steps, the fairway is closer to the right bank, the Veprz flows near it, which can be used for harvesting and alloying materials). Although the thaw had reached its extreme limit, Diebitsch was in a hurry and on March 15 ordered the army to move towards the crossing.

Offensive actions of the Poles

Expedition Dvernitsky ¦ Offensive Skrzynecki

The Poles took advantage of the suspension of the actions of the Russian main army for private enterprises. Since the Lublin Voivodeship was poorly occupied by the Russians, and cr. Zamoć could serve as a support for a partisan detachment, then at the insistence of Lelevel, Dvernitsky's detachment (2 battalions, 22 squadrons, 12 guns - 6,500 people) was assigned to move to Volyn in order to instigate an uprising there. On February 19, Dvernitsky crossed the Vistula and at Kurov attacked the cavalry detachment of General Cover, overturned the Finnish dragoons and captured 4 guns. On February 21, Diebitsch moved from different sides significant forces, and entrusted the leadership of the whole affair with Tolya. Then Dvernitsky took refuge in Zamoć on March 4.

At the end of March, Dvernitsky decided to continue the expedition to Volhynia: he quickly moved to Krylov and there on March 29 he crossed the Bug. Ridiger's troops were against the Poles in Volhynia - 11 thousand with 36 guns.

Dvernitsky, moving along the Austrian border, became convinced that in this side with the dominant Russian population there was nothing to think about a general uprising, and therefore decided to make his way to Podolia. On Styr near Boremli (Mikhailovka) Ridiger blocked his path.

Dvernitsky at night secretly withdrew from the position: he walked along the border, and Ridiger pursued in parallel. On April 15, Dvernitsky took up a strong position at the Lyulinskaya inn, with his rear facing the Austrian border. Ridiger attacked, but at the last minute Dvernitsky did not accept the attack, crossed the border and was disarmed by Austrian troops.

Skrzynecki's offensive. To support the army moving towards the crossing, Rosen's 6th corps was temporarily left on the Brest highway, ordered to observe Prague, cover the rear of the movement, provide the edge and especially guard Siedlce and communication with Brest. In the event of an attack by the Poles in superior forces, retreat to Kalushin and even to Siedlce.

Adjutant General Count Karl Fedorovich Tol

On March 17, the army left the apartments. The march was very difficult: the people were exhausted from fatigue, the infantry was dragging the artillery, the carts fell behind, the pontoons got stuck in the mud. But still, on March 19, the army approached the crossing. It took another 2-3 days to tighten the wagon train. Already the field marshal was ready to begin the crossing, when the Poles went on the offensive and struck Rosen a blow, which upset Diebitsch's entire plan.

On March 19, Rosen's corps consisted of 18 thousand, of which 6 thousand were in the vanguard of Geismar at Wavr. Despite the Field Marshal's instructions, Rosen did not pull back the vanguard. The Poles, realizing all the difficulties of the direct defense of the Vistula, decided to attack Rosen among 40 thousand and thus distract Diebitsch from the crossing. All measures of secrecy were taken. At 3 o'clock in the morning on March 10, in the midst of a thick fog, the Poles began to debush from Prague.

Although Geismar acted energetically, the attack was partly sudden, and the Poles pressed Geismar, who had retreated to Dembe Wielka, for 8 hours in a row.

Rosen managed to bring his troops out of their apartments, but in three places: at Dembe-Velke (10 thousand together with Geismar), at Ryshe (3 versts to the right) and at Mistov (in the rear). The terrain in front of the position was swampy, inaccessible to the enemy, but the swamps stretched at an angle to the retreat path (highway) that ran along the left flank. Meanwhile, Rosen didn't even break the bridge here.

The battle went very well for the Russians; numerous attempts by the Poles were repelled. However, a brilliant attack by the cavalry division led by Skarzhinsky, made in the evening, forced Rosen to retreat. The corps went to Minsk. Losses: Russians - 5,500 people and 10 guns, Poles - 500 people.

On March 20, the retreat continued in the direction of Siedlce, the rearguard stopped at Jagodna. Skrzynetskiy is located at Latovich.

The movement of the main Russian army. On March 23, Diebitsch convened a council of war, at which it was decided, at the suggestion of Tol, to temporarily abandon the crossing and move against the Polish main army and its communications. The disposition was already given for the movement of the army on March 28 to Garwolin, as the general-commander of the D.S. With. Abakumov reported to Diebitsch that the provisions of the troops were not at all ensured, since due to the lack of roads, the waiting transports were far behind; the military reserve was already mostly spent, and it is impossible to replenish with requisitions due to the exhaustion of the country. Diebitsch decided on March 28 with a flank march to Lukov to get close to supplies in Siedlce and Miedzirzec and with transports from Brest and Drogichin. On March 31, the Field Marshal entered Siedlce.

Prondzinski persuaded Skrzyniecki to finish off Rosen at Siedlce, advance to Brest and cut off Dibich from communications with the north. Plan: from the front, from Boime, Skrzhynecki himself; on the left, through Sukha, Lubensky and on the right, through Vodyna, Prondzinsky, who is entrusted the main role(12 thousand). This led to the battle on March 29 at Igane, where the 13th and 14th Jaeger regiments were badly damaged and Prondzinsky managed to scatter 2 regiments of the rearguard of General Fezi.

Losses: Russians - 3 thousand, Poles - much less. Only late in the evening did the Polish troops appear from Sukha, and then Skrzynecki himself. He arrived at the troops on the morning of March 29, awaiting him under arms. Without leaving the carriage, he began to complain of fatigue, in the nearest village he had breakfast and lay down to rest; did not dare to wake him. The commander-in-chief slept through the battle. The troops from Sukha did not receive any instructions.

Diebitsch's stay at Siedlce. During the forced inactivity, the field marshal took measures to provide the army with food in order to meet current needs and form another two-week supply for 120 thousand people. For this, among other things, 450 regimental wagons and 7 mobile artillery parks were sent from the army to Brest for food, which were ordered to lay down ammunition in Brest and bring grain fodder. The transports from Volyn to Kotsk began to approach.

To support the rear, Brest-Litovsk was fortified, equipped with a significant garrison of 12 battalions, 10 squadrons and 60 guns under the command of Rosen. This should have calmed the already worried Lithuania.

Diebitsch's first offensive. Finally, it was decided to move with the army through Vodyna and Yeruzal to Kuflev in order to bypass the Polish vanguard from the south, suddenly attack the main enemy forces and overturn them from the highway to the north.

The preparations were quite long, the measures of secrecy were not taken during the march on April 12, and, by the way, the Poles were already aware of the Russian enterprise before. As a result, Skrzynecki managed to slip away and retreated to Dembe Wielka, where the position was well fortified. The whole enterprise was expressed in a rearguard battle near Minsk, where the Poles lost 365 people.

After a day's rest between Minsk and Dembe-Velke, the Russian army (60 thousand) retreated.

New war plan

Diebitsch's second offensive ¦ Cholera

Emperor Nicholas himself indicated a plan of military action. Diebitsch's difficulties consisted in providing the rear of the active army and in supplying it with food. The provision of the rear was assigned to the newly formed reserve army of Count Tolstoy and to the 1st army, which existed before. Thus, Diebitsch's hands were untied. His army was ordered to move to the lower Vistula, securing the supply of food initially by purchasing in Prussia, and subsequently by delivering water from Russia through Danzig and further along the Vistula.

Thus, it was necessary to completely change the line of action, that is, it was necessary to clear the Brest highway of hospitals and warehouses and arrange everything again on the line from Narew to the lower Vistula.

Soon the Poles learned about these new proposals.

Diebitsch's second offensive. Khrzhanovsky's movement in Zamoć disturbed the field marshal, who received false information that Skrzynetskiy on May 1 intends to move against the left flank of the Russian army and attack Siedlce. Then Diebitsch, at dawn on May 1, moved along the highway himself. The first Polish troops retreated nonstop. The Russians stopped at Yanov's for the night, and the next day they moved back. From the prisoners they learned that the troops belonged to the Uminsky detachment. Diebitsch concluded that Skrzynecki had escaped again. In fact, the Polish commander-in-chief went against the guards, which Diebitsch did not know.

Cholera. If the monthly stay at Siedlce helped the Russian army to settle down, then the Poles also completed their troops, completed the formation of new regiments, believed in their strength and in the significance of their private successes. Now Skrzynecki had at his disposal 5 infantry and 5 cavalry divisions, very well-equipped.

At the same time, cholera was rapidly developing in the Russian army. It appeared on the northern coast of the Caspian Sea as early as 1830, and the next year it spread throughout Russia and even in Western Europe... She entered the army through Brest, where transports and staffing converged from everywhere. It appeared on March 6, but at first it was weak, so that in March only 233 patients were counted, in April, due to a crowded and motionless parking lot, there were 5 thousand of them. In early April, cholera also penetrated the Polish army, which suffered from it no less than the Russian one.

Skrzynecki's campaign against the guards

The Guards Corps under the command of Grand Duke Mikhail Pavlovich stood apart from the main army between the Bug and Narev and was not completely subordinate to Diebitsch. This situation was harmful. If, when advancing to the crossings on the upper Vistula, Diebitsch could dispose of the guards, then perhaps there would not have been a catastrophe with Rosen's corps.

Now the Poles decided to smash the guard before Diebitsch came to her aid, and then to join the union with the Lithuanian insurgents through the Augustow Voivodeship. Stopped on the Brest highway to defend Warsaw, Uminsky (11 thousand), joining with a detachment of Dzekonsky, who was on the upper Vistula, and Khozhanovsky from Zamosc, could collect 25 thousand and act for Diebits in the rear, or join up with Skrzynecki for a general attack, in the event that Diebitsky will go to the aid of the guards.

In total, Skrzhynecki had 46 thousand, and the Russian guard with Saken's detachment, which strengthened it, had only 27 thousand. It is clear that the chances of success were significant, but Skrzynecki hesitated. First, on April 30, the Poles left their location near Kalushin to Serock, from where they divided into three columns: 1) Dembinsky (4200 people) - along the highway along the right bank of the Narew to Ostrolenka opposite Saken; 2) Lubensky (12 thousand) - up the Bug to the Nur to destroy bridges and interrupt Dibich's communications with the guards; 3) Skrzynetskiy (30 thousand) - in the middle between the two previous ones on Lomza.

The guard concentrated at Zambrov, the vanguard of Bistrom - at Vonsev, the vanguard of General Poleshka - at Pzhetyche.

On May 4, the Polish vanguard of Jankowski pressed the Cossacks, but at Przhetyche met stubborn resistance from the guards rangers. Poleshko, in order, step by step, went to Sokolov. The Grand Duke at this time concentrated the main forces at Snyadov.

On May 5, the Russian vanguard went to Yakots. Lubensky took Nur. To help the Lithuanians, Skrzyniecki sent General Khlapovsky with an Uhlan regiment, 100 infantrymen and 2 guns, in the form of personnel for future Polish troops, in the intervals between Diebitsch and the guard.

Prondzinsky insisted on attacking the guards (23 thousand), taking advantage of the superiority of the Polish forces (30 thousand). Skrzhynecki did not agree, but went with Gelgud's division to Ostrolenka. Saken managed to retreat to Lomza; Gelgud pursued him and occupied Myastkovo, that is, almost in the rear of the guard. On May 7, the Grand Duke reached out to Bialystok.

So, Skrzynecki's blow fell in the air; moreover, by going so far, he put the army in a perilous position. Moving to join the guards, Diebitsch on May 10 defeated Lubensky at Nur.

The field marshal continued to move to join the guard, on May 12 he reached Vysoko Mazowiecka, and the guard was already in Menzhenin. Skrzynecki hastily retreated to Ostrolenka.

On May 13, Diebitsch made an extraordinary forced march. Palen's troops traveled 50 miles, Shakhovskoy - 40 miles, and yet after a short night halt, the field marshal continued to move.

Battle of Ostrolenka on May 14. The town of Ostrolenka lies on the left bank of the Narew and is connected to the right by two bridges about 120 fathoms long: permanent on piles and floating. About 700 fathoms from the coast stretch sandy hills covered with small and rare bushes. The whole area is somewhat marshy. The battlefield presented many benefits to passive defense especially if bridges are destroyed. But this could not be done, since there were still many Polish troops on the other side of the river: the Gelgud division in Lomza and the rearguard of Lubensky. Prondzinsky planned, having covered the troops in the bushes, smash those who crossed with artillery fire, and then with a joint attack from several sides, throw them back to Narew, and because of the tightness, the Russians would not be able to turn around or use significant forces, especially cavalry. Skrzynetsky, counting on the usual slowness of the Russians, did not expect a battle the next day and, completely reassured, left Prondzinsky to make the necessary orders; he himself went to m. Kruki and spent the night at the inn, enjoying champagne.

The 1st and 3rd Infantry Divisions stood on the sandy hills. In front of the left flank on the hill - 10 guns of Tours; Bielitsky with 12 guns advanced to the bridge itself; the cavalry initially became more to the right, beyond the river. Omulev.

Already at 6 o'clock in the morning on May 14, Bistrom appeared in view of Lubensky, who, after some resistance, began to retreat to Ostrolenko. At about 11 o'clock in the morning, the head of the Russian army approached the city, having made at 32 hours 70 miles, and the troops retained excellent order and good spirits. In the Polish main camp, complete carelessness reigned: in the cavalry the horses were unsaddled, the infantry dispersed for firewood, water and for bathing.

Opening artillery fire, the grenadiers swiftly attacked Lubensky. Despite the deep sands, they quickly rushed into the city and passed through it, overturning or cutting off the enemy. Even the famous 4th regiment ("Chvartaks") was pressed out and completely upset by the guards horse-rangers and lancers. A total of 1200 people were taken prisoner.

Although the army was greatly stretched out, Diebitsch ordered to continue the battle and seize the bridges. Immediately, 3 guns were set up in the street opposite the bridge, 4 guns to the right of the city and 2 to the left. Then these batteries, which were very important, increased to 28 and 34 guns, respectively.

The Poles tried to destroy the bridge, but Russian buckshot forced them to step back. The Astrakhan Grenadier Regiment, headed by the Cavaliers of St. George, rushes, despite the buckshot of two Bielitsky's guns, along the bends and captures the cannons. The boy with the remnants of the rearguard attacks the Astrakhan people, but General Martynov with a battalion of the Suvorov (Fanagoria) regiment ran across the floating bridge; another battalion was sent across the pile bridge, and by common efforts the enemy was driven back. Skrzhynetsky, who arrived on the battlefield, was completely puzzled by what had happened and began to throw his troops in parts to attack the Russians who had crossed to the left bank.

Meanwhile, the Suvorov and Astrakhan men broke into the battery and took possession of several guns, but they could not take them away, for the Polish horse rangers appeared on the left. Suvorovites without rank lined up in a heap and met the enemy with fire. Horse rangers were not embarrassed by the fire, jumped from the battalion and, trying to break into the square, chopped the Russians with sabers. Then the battalion commander ordered to sound the alarm and shout "hurray"; the frightened horses rushed back.

The Hungarian brigade thrown forward by Skrzhynecki fought hand-to-hand with the Russians at the highway. A battalion of Suvorovites who crossed the bridge struck the Poles in the flank - they were thrown back. The artillery from the left bank gives the Russians the strongest support.

Hungarian put his brigade in order and again led the attack. But Martynov also received help: two more regiments crossed the bridge. Hit the Hungarian from the flank, threw back and captured one gun. The Hungarian lost half of his men and went into the bushes. Then Skrzhynetsky ordered Langerman's brigade not only to push the Russians across the river, but also to capture the city. The attack was unsuccessful.

In indescribable excitement, the Polish commander-in-chief galloped along the front and shouted: “Malakhovsky, go ahead! Rybinsky, go ahead! All forward! " He continued to consistently smash the brigades against the Russian grenadiers. Finally, he took Krasitsky's brigade, reinforced with an infantry regiment and several squadrons, and led the attack himself. Inspired by the presence of the commander-in-chief, the Poles sang "The Polish has not died yet" and rushed at the Russians. Proud of their already accomplished feats, the grenadiers overturned this attack too, and inflicted severe damage, for they had 4 cannons. Krasitsky, knocked off his horse with a butt, was taken prisoner.

At 4 o'clock, 17 battalions had already gathered on the right bank. They advanced and drove the enemy back. The 2nd Polish Uhlan regiment, famous for its bravery, tried to attack, but all its attacks were repulsed.

Skrzynecki retained his unshakable firmness; For 8 hours he was exposed to fire, seeking death. “Here we must conquer or perish everything,” he said. "The fate of Poland is being decided here." He planned to carry out a general attack with the remnants of all divisions. The decision is belated - the Russians have already established themselves on the right bank, and the Poles are greatly weakened. Skrzynetskiy himself became the leader, and yet he had to withdraw with the loss of 250 prisoners.

Private attacks were repeated several more times, and in the end half of the troops were out of action. Now Skrzhynetsky is trying only to prolong the battle until the night. He ordered to collect all the scattered units and individual people, to bring them to battalions, at the head of which to put all available officers. A long line of battalion columns without a reserve moved forward, and the battery galloped as close as possible to the troops of the 3rd Division, who had just crossed the bridge, and doused them with buckshot. Stunned, the Old German and New German regiments ran back to the bridge. But the commanders managed to restore order, and the same regiments courageously attacked the Poles and pursued them.

At 7 o'clock in the afternoon, the battle ceased. At 8 o'clock, due to a misunderstanding, the artillery firefight resumed, but immediately it died down. The Polish army was in complete disarray; the transition of the Russians to a decisive offensive could lead to complete extermination. But the field marshal, under the influence of some secondary thoughts, or about the unknown where Gelgud's division is located, did not dare to pursue with all his might and at night he sent 3 regiments of Cossacks. Already on the 15th in the afternoon, 7 thousand were sent under the command of Witt, and even he was moving so slowly that in 5 days he walked 56 miles.

The retreat of the Poles took the form of the most disorderly flight; to take the guns away, they demanded cabs from Warsaw. Diebitsch himself with the main forces only on May 20 left Ostrolenka and went over to Pultusk. Losses of Russians - up to 5 thousand, Poles - up to 9,500.

Death of Diebitsch. The field marshal was vigorously preparing for the crossing of the lower Vistula. Significant supplies of food, transportation means, artillery and hospital supplies, materials for the device of the crossing were prepared. Finally, reconnaissance of the places for the crossing and the routes to them were made. Thus, when all the difficulties were experienced, everything was prepared for a decisive blow to the weakened enemy, when the victory was to crown the whole work of the field marshal and his glory would shine with new splendor, at this time, on May 29, Count Diebitsch died of cholera within a few hours. On the basis of the law, the chief of staff, Count Tol, took over in command of the army, but only before the arrival of the newly appointed commander-in-chief, Count Paskevich-Erivansky.

Partisan actions in Lithuania and Podolia

The uprising in Lithuania spread everywhere, and only the cities of Vilna, Kovna and Vizda were in the hands of the Russians. The organization of the rebel forces in Samogitia, Rossieny and Telši advanced especially far. For the Russian detachments, the fight against the insurgents, despite the constant successes in battles, was painful, for the enemy was downright elusive.

Khlapovsky, skillfully making his way between the Russian troops, gathered a detachment of up to 5 thousand people and organized it into several infantry and cavalry regiments.

After the battle at Ostrolenka, a detachment of General Gelgud was sent to Lithuania, with a force of up to 12 thousand with 26 guns. Gelgud was a brave but spineless and incapable person. General Saken with a detachment acted against him, on May 21, he reached Kovna, passing 150 miles in 4 days, and on the night of May 31, Saken came to the Vistula with 7 thousand and took a position 7 miles west on the Ponar Heights ...

Gelgud's forces increased to 24 thousand. Under the influence of Khlapovsky, Gelgud decided to attack the Russians on the Ponar Heights, but hesitated to implement this plan. Meanwhile, the detachments of Sulima, Prince Khilkov, and others were drawn to Vilna. Finally, on June 4, Kuruta approached. In total, 24 thousand were assembled with 76 guns.

On June 7, a battle took place on the Ponar Heights, in which Saken commanded, although General Kuruta was the senior. The Poles acted clumsily and in parts, the Russians - decisively (the Volyn and Orenburg Uhlan regiments were especially distinguished). The Poles were completely defeated and began to retreat hastily.

There were signs of panic among the retreating Poles. Saken was preparing to inflict a decisive defeat with vigorous pursuit, but ... at this time Kuruta declared his seniority and decisively told Saken, "No, you will not pursue." The damage of the Russians - 364 people, the Poles - together with 2 thousand who fled.

With the approach of Tolstoy's reserve army to Vilna, Gelgud made an unsuccessful attempt to capture the town of Shavli, where Lieutenant Colonel Kryukov was with 5 battalions and 5 guns, after which his detachment dispersed: Khlapovsky, pursued by the Russians, crossed the Russian border at Gudaun on June 30, and Roland - 3 July at Deguce.

During the turmoil at the Prussian border on June 30, Gelgud was on horseback; the officers showered him with reproaches and curses. The adjutant of the 7th regiment, Lieutenant Skulsky, shot Gelgud in the chest with a pistol shot and calmly joined his regiment.

Dembinsky's campaign is an excellent example of partisan action. There were up to 4 thousand in total. Dembinsky avoided open spaces and significant cities; he made his way through the forests between the Russian detachments, smashing the smaller ones and bypassing the stronger ones. On June 28, he set out in the direction of Belovezhskaya Pushcha and reached it on July 15. Acting successfully and happily slipping past the detachment of Generals Savoini and Rosen, Dembinsky through Rudnya, Sterdyn arrived at Marki near Warsaw on July 22.

The uprising in Podolia flared up mainly between the gentry, because it was not possible to anger the mass of the peasant Russian population. The Sabansky brothers, landowners near Olgopol, raised the banner of uprising. By the end of April, the number of rebels reached 5,000 under the command of retired General Kolyshko. The commander of the 5th corps Roth from Bessarabia arrived in forced marches and defeated them completely near Dashev (the loss of the Poles was 1600 people). The remnants were once again defeated by General Sheremetyev at Maidanek (near Derazhnya). The remnants of 700 people crossed the Austrian border at Satanov on 14 May.

Pacifying the insurgency by Paskevich

Toll was going to make a flank march from Pultusk past the Polish army, which was based on Lublin, along convenient roads that had already been explored earlier. But Paskevich, who arrived in Pultusk on June 13, sent the army north, ostensibly for safety. On June 22, the movement began in four columns. The march on bad roads was very difficult, everything was drowning in the mud that was out of the way. There were no roads for communication between the columns, and therefore, in case of need, one could not provide assistance to the other.

Osek was chosen for the crossing, near the Prussian border. The construction of bridges by Palen 1st began on July 1, as well as the construction of tete-de-pons on both banks. On July 8, the crossing of the entire army, which was stationed in the vicinity of Neshava, was completed.

Actions on the Brest highway. Paskevich ordered Rosen to put forward a vanguard under the command of General Golovin in order to: 1) disturb the enemy, 2) distract the Poles from the main army crossing, but at the same time avoid a decisive collision with the strongest enemy, 3) demonstrate to Prague and Lublin. Less than 7 thousand were given for all this. Golovin moved towards Kalushin and on July 2 decided to attack the enemy in several small columns, capturing the routes adjacent to the highway. On the same day, Khrzhanovsky, having concentrated 22 thousand under his command, also decided to attack. Of course, the Poles overthrew the Russians, but only with such audacity Golovin could achieve the goal of reconnaissance and distraction of the enemy.

Paskevich's movement towards Warsaw. The prudent field marshal's plan, fearing to risk his newly acquired laurels, was to bring the army to Warsaw, if possible without a fight, and then force it to surrender by blockade.

Having provided himself with a surplus of food delivered from Prussia, the field marshal on July 15 moved through Brest-Kuyavsky, Gostynin, Gombin (July 18). The Poles occupied a well-known position near Sokhachev across the river. Baura; you can get around it through Lowicz. The Poles did not appreciate the importance of Lowicz, and therefore the advanced units of the Russian army occupied Lowicz on July 20, and on the 21st the entire army was concentrated there. Pushing the Poles over the river. Ravka, the Russians stopped, and so both armies remained until the first days of August.

At this time, great excitement arose in Warsaw. Dembinsky was appointed commander-in-chief instead of Skrzynecki, crowned with the glory of a recent skilful movement from Lithuania. On the night of August 3, he withdrew the army to Warsaw and took up a position behind Wola. On August 3, the outrage of street mob flared up in Warsaw; looked for traitors and killed many suspects and innocent people. The old schemer Krukovetsky was elected president of the board, and the old man Malakhovsky was elected commander-in-chief. The taxation of Warsaw began on 6 August; the army went over to Nadarzhin and the surrounding area.

Ridiger's actions. He occupied the Lublin Voivodeship. Paskevich suggested that he also cross the Vistula. Field Marshal Saken, commander of the 1st Army, to whom Ridiger was subordinate, agreed, and Ridiger (12,400 men and 42 guns) crossed the Vistula and Józefów on July 26. The Polish general Rozhitsky, who had no more than 5 thousand people in several detachments, acted against Ridiger. On July 31, Ridiger occupied Radom.

In early August, Rozhitsky increased to 8 thousand and began to act offensively. On August 10, Ridiger destroyed the Gedroyc detachment, and took him prisoner. Then Rozhitsky calmed down, but Ridiger, who at the invitation of Paskevich sent a division to him and left the guard of the bridge, himself remained with 4 battalions and could not do anything.

Actions on the Brest highway. On the night of August 10, Romarino set out from Prague with 20 thousand and went to Garvolin and Zhelekhov with the aim of defeating Golovin and Rosen separately. Romarino managed to achieve small private successes and even reach Terespol (near Brest), but failed to defeat Golovin and Rosen. On August 24, Romarino stopped in Miedzirzec, as he learned about the negotiations between Krukovetsky and Paskevich.

The assault on Warsaw on August 25 and 26. Paskevich managed to concentrate 70 thousand and 362 guns at Nadorzhin. There were 35 thousand Poles in Warsaw with 92 guns. If you count 20 thousand Romarino, then the highest is 55 thousand. True, Rozhitsky still had 8 thousand, in the Płock Voivodeship near Lubensky 4 thousand, in the garrisons of Lublin and Zamosc 10 thousand, which in total will give 77 thousand and 151 guns. But all these troops did not take part in the defense of the capital, as well as Romarino.

To strengthen Warsaw, Khrzhanovsky proposed to build several strong forts at intervals to go on the offensive. To occupy them, he considered it necessary to assign 15 thousand, and 10 thousand to the reserve, a total of 25 thousand would be enough. The Engineering Committee rejected this project and sketched out a whole hundred small fortifications, which they did not even have time to finish by the day of the assault. To occupy all the fortifications would need at least 60 thousand. The troops, scattered in small units behind weak parapet, which did not cover from the fire of the numerous Russian artillery, could not offer staunch resistance, especially in the absence of an external reserve.

The fortifications formed three circles. The most strong strengthening in the 1st line there was the Volya redoubt (no. 56) with half-bastions at the corners, with a reduite in the southwestern corner and with flank defenses of the ditches. The internal fortifications were divided into two parts by a retransmission: in the larger of them there was a garden, and in the smaller - a stone church with a stone fence, adapted for defense. The approaches to Wola were defended by lunette No. 57. The second line was especially strong along the Kalisz highway, fortifications No. 22 and 23. The third line was the city rampart, 10 feet high and thick, built opposite the contraband, without any consideration of the conditions of the defense; only then it was reinforced with lunettes and flushes. The Jerusalem outpost is the strongest place of the third line, fortifications No. 15, 16, 18. In addition to field guns, there were 130 serfs in service, but they were widely scattered.

The Uminsky corps (20 thousand) defended the territory from the Chernyakovskaya outpost to No. 54, and Dembinsky (13 thousand) - everything else.

The Russians decided to attack Wola. With the fall of this strongest fortification, the assault on the rest seemed easy. In addition, during a battle inside the city in this direction, it was more likely to get to the Prague Bridge.

1st day of the assault, August 25. According to the will of the sovereign, Paskevich offered the Poles to submit on the condition of a general amnesty. Krukovetsky answered about the desire to restore the fatherland in the ancient limits. From the evening of August 24, the troops took the following places: 1) Palen (11 thousand) at the Kalish highway at the Khrzhanov hill; the target is the attack of Will. 2) Kreutz (12 thousand) about s. Vlohi; attack the fortifications to the right of Will. 3) Ants (3 thousand) at Rakov; distract the attention of the enemy along the Krakow highway. 4) Shtrandman (2 thousand) at Sluzhevets; for a false attack on the Lublin highway. 5) Khilkov (2800 cavalry) near Khrzhanov, to the left of Palen, to guard the left flank. 6) Nostitz (2100 light guards cavalry) behind Zbarzh, for communication between Strandman and Muravyov and for repelling sorties. 7) Guards and Grenadiers (2700) reserve, behind Palen and Kreutz. 8) artillery cut (198 guns) and Witt's reserve cavalry (8 thousand) at Solibsa, not far from Kreutz. 9) The Cossacks are distributed to different points. At 5 o'clock in the morning, artillery opened fire, and an hour later two troops rushed to the assault. Kreutz on the fly took possession of fortifications No. 54 and 55. It was more difficult for Palen No. 57. The Poles met the attacker with the strongest rifle fire, passing through the wolf's pits and crossing the moat. The bayonets stuck in served as steps for the ascent to the parapet of the brave men. Despite desperate resistance, the lunette was taken, most of the garrison was put on the spot, 80 people were taken prisoner.

The assault on Volya was imminent, which was occupied by the aged General Sovinsky with 5 battalions and 12 guns. The Russians put forward 76 guns, and then selected infantry came from three sides. She burst through the shaft, but was then stopped by desperate resistance. Finally, the Poles were knocked out of the garden, but the reduite remained in their hands, it was impossible to shoot them with artillery fire, so as not to shoot at their own. Paskevich sent several more regiments, with Toll leading the grenadiers. Under heavy enemy fire, the Russians overcame a number of obstacles, but the proximity of the target set everyone on fire. Having climbed over the fence of the church, the soldiers approached the palisades that fenced off the entrance to the church. Having made a break, they found themselves in front of the littered doors of the church, which had to be knocked out. Finally, at 11 o'clock, they managed to break into the church, where, after a fierce battle, the enemy was exterminated or taken prisoner. Sovinsky fell under the bayonets of the grenadier at the altar. Prisoners of 30 officers and 1200 lower ranks, among the prisoners one of the instigators of the mutiny - Vysotsky.

Muravyov took Rakovets, Shtrandman - Shops. Meanwhile, Uminsky made a demonstration against them. Then Paskevich sent support to Muravyov, and at the same time ordered, despite Tol's ideas, to suspend all offensive actions... This was completely mistaken: the more troops Uminsky sent against Muravyov and Shtrandman, the easier it would be to attack in the main direction. The Poles took advantage of the suspension to correct mistakes in the distribution of their troops, which caused unnecessary effort and casualties on the part of the Russians the next day. Finally, the Poles took the suspension for the exhaustion of the Russian forces and immediately went on the offensive against Volya, and approached her with a semi-weapon shot. Then two carabinier regiments, without any order, rushed forward with bayonets with desperate swiftness and overthrew the Poles. But the battle did not end there - they had to go into bayonets 3 times, made their way behind the second line of fortifications and even into the Volskoye suburb, but, by order of the field marshal, they were withdrawn back. It was one of the bloodiest episodes of the day.

Uminsky took the Shops away from Strandman, but Muravyov kept Rakovets. It was still only 3 o'clock in the afternoon, but the field marshal did not want to continue the assault that day. The troops spent the night without greatcoats and warm food, many even without a piece of bread, since there was only one day's supply.

2nd day of the assault, August 26. The next day, Paskevich had a meeting with Krukovetsky, but it did not lead to anything. Polish troops concentrated mainly in the center between the Volsk and Jerusalem outposts. At about 2 pm the Russians began a cannonade. At the very beginning of the case, Paskevich was wounded by a cannonball in his arm and, pale, with a distorted face, he fell to the ground. He handed over unlimited command of the army to Tolya.

A 120-gun battery was immediately concentrated and began to fight the Polish battery of 112 field and fortress guns. Muravyov was ordered to advance energetically. Muravyov, reinforced by a guards brigade, led the attack in two columns. One, after a stubborn battle, captured fortification No. 81, and the other rushed to No. 78. Uminsky sent infantry and cavalry regiments against it. Then Nostitz sent to the aid of the guards dragoons, who covered themselves here and arrived in time to help them, the life-hussars with unfading glory in the fight against the enemy, four times the strongest.

At about 5 o'clock, Kreutz went in two columns to fortifications No. 21 and 22: the 4th cavalry company of Colonel Zhitov jumped 200 steps to redoubt No. 21 and showered the enemy with such cruel buckshot that he fled without waiting for the attack, and the horse artillery hunters rushed on horseback into redoubt and seized the gun. Thus, Zhitov showed an extremely rare example of an independent attack with artillery without the help of other types of troops.

No. 22 with two battalions was occupied by the troops of Kreutz after a stubborn battle, and the garrison was almost completely destroyed.

Pahlen took possession of No. 23 and 24, and then, after a fierce battle, the Evangelical cemetery. It was already about 6 o'clock in the evening, dusk was falling. Some generals suggested to Tol to postpone the assault until the morning. "Now or never," Toll answered and ordered to bring the troops in order, reinforce them with reserves, send artillery and storm the city rampart. After a 3-hour struggle, the Jerusalem outpost was taken, and at about 10 pm - Volskaya. At night, half of the troops were resting, while the other was under arms, moving forward posts only 50 steps in front of the rampart. The sappers cut openings for the weapons of tomorrow. However, they did not have to fight: at night the commander-in-chief Malazovsky sent a letter to Paskevich that by 5 o'clock in the morning Warsaw would be cleared.

Having cleared Warsaw, the Poles moved towards Modlin. On August 27, the Russian army entered the enemy capital. Russian losses were 10? thousands, Poles - 11 thousand and 132 guns.

It seemed that the struggle with the Poles was over and the defeated Polish army should surrender to the mercy of the victor. However, the Poles had hardly escaped the death that threatened them, when the board members gathered in Zakrochim (near Modlin) declared their unwillingness to unconditionally obey. Paskevich had 60 thousand, but 12 thousand had to be allocated to the Warsaw garrison, and a detachment to support the Brest highway, that is, 45 thousand would remain, which he did not want to risk and go against 30 thousand Poles, albeit defeated and disorganized. He wanted to wait for Rosen and Ridiger to deal with Romarino and Rozhitsky.

Malakhovsky ordered Romarino to come to Modlin, but the latter, pursuing his personal goals and obeying the wishes of the magnates who were with his detachment, did not obey the orders of the commander-in-chief under the pretext of the danger of moving towards Modlin. He decided to retreat to the Upper Vistula, cross at Zavikhost and connect with Rozhitsky. Romarino took up a strong position at Opole, but was overthrown there by Rosen on September 3, who eventually pushed him to the Austrian border. On September 5, at Borov, Romarino with 14 thousand and 42 guns crossed the border and surrendered to the Austrians.

In early September, Ridiger, reinforced from Rosen's detachment, had 9 thousand with 24 guns. Rozhitsky also had 9 thousand, but retreated to Pinchov and, suggesting to hold on to the river here. Nida, detached Kamensky with most of the cavalry, 3 battalions and 2 guns to Stopnitsa. On September 11, Ridiger sent Krasovsky against Kamensky with 2 thousand, and he himself went to Pinchov. On September 12, Krasovsky overtook and defeated Kamensky at Shkalmberzh (some 2 thousand prisoners), and General Plakhovo with Ridiger's vanguard inflicted a strong defeat on Rozhitsky, who was retreating to Mekhov. On September 14, Rozhitsky decided to move to Krakow possessions. Ridiger followed him and drove him to Galicia, where the Austrians disarmed the Poles; however, only 1400 of them remained.

Death of Colonel Kozlinikov in the vicinity of Plock

Seeing the successes against Romarino and Rozhitsky, Paskevich decided to act by force of arms against the main Polish army. It was impossible for the Poles to continue the war in the north; it remained to move the war south to the wooded, mountainous and rugged terrain, where it was possible to rely on Krakow and Galicia, which sympathized with the Poles. However, moving the army south past the Russians required speed, energy and stealth.

The new Polish commander-in-chief Rybinsk, leaving the garrison in Lublin, arrived at Plock on 11 September. The crossing began safely, but Rybinsky returned the troops back, from Paskevich, the conditions of obedience, accepted by the majority at the military council, were returned. But this decision caused outrage, especially among young officers, and therefore the proposal was rejected. Paskevich sent most of his forces after the Poles on both banks of the Vistula.

On September 16, at Wloclawsk, the Poles' crossing began again safely, but Rybinsky, having learned about the fate of Rozhitsky (it was no longer possible to count on a connection with him), again refused the crossing. Immediately Mühlberg, who was negotiating with Paskevich, brought his new proposal, more severe, the words "constitutional" and "fatherland" were excluded from the oath. The offer was rejected and they decided to leave for Prussia.

On September 20, the Polish army (21 thousand, 95 guns and 9 thousand horses) crossed the Prussian border at Sobierzyn, Shutov and Gurzno (east of Thorn). Torn off, in canvas trousers, no greatcoats and many even without shoes, the Poles inspired compassion for the Prussian troops, who were preparing to receive them. While the troops had weapons in their hands, they still seemed calm, but when they had to give up their guns, dismount from their horses, unfasten and fold their sabers, some burst into tears. A few days later, however, the Poles indulged in a carefree and scattered life. Their restless behavior, constant desire for intrigue and gossip, hatred of everything that bore a sign of order, finally, their boast and vanity - all this was the reason that those who crossed the border fell even more in general opinion.

During the uprising, the Kingdom of Poland lost 326 thousand people, of which 25 thousand one Warsaw, and over 600 million zlotys, not counting private losses. But most important of all, the Poles lost those significant privileges that they enjoyed before the uprising.

Notes:

Before the invasion of Napoleon, there were 9257 monasteries, churches, government and private buildings in Moscow; 6496 of them burned down; all the others were more or less plundered. Losses of individuals amounted to 83,372,000 rubles. real estate and 16,585,000 rubles. movable property. This does not include the losses of the palace, spiritual, military and other government and public departments.

These facts, stated in the work of the Earl of York von Wartenburg, are incomprehensible; Napoleon, undoubtedly, had already decided to retreat to Smolensk and echeloned his troops in relation to this; under such conditions, it was impossible to even think about the battle.

It is very difficult to decide to retreat, especially for someone who imagined himself to be a superman and before whom almost the whole world was in awe.

On the same day, October 16, in the rear of Napoleon, Admiral Chichagov moved from the vicinity of Pruzhany to Minsk and to the r. Berezina, leaving Saken against Schwarzenberg and Rainier, driven over the river. Boog.

The Diet is an estate representative institution; a representative assembly in former Poland and later in Finland. - Approx. ed.

Before, oddly enough, Czartoryski was the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Russia.

Warrant officer - the rank in which the lower ranks were promoted, who passed the warrant officer exam after completing the course at the warrant officer school and remained on long-term service. - Approx. ed.

Shlyakhtich is a Polish small-class nobleman. - Approx. ed.

Skirmisher is a soldier in the front line. - Approx. ed.

Tete de pont< tete голова + pont мост) - предмостное укрепление. - Approx. ed.

Here: "four" (from Polish. Cwiartka - four, quarter. - Approx. ed.

Zaseka is an obstacle made of littered trees. - Approx. ed.

Epolements are breastworks of a special device that serve to cover troops where the terrain does not have convenient natural cover. - Approx. ed.

Kosinery - during the uprising, the Polish army, armed with braids, which were attached to poles. - Approx. ed.

It is this attack of the Poles that is depicted in the painting by Kossak, where the patriotic artist completely depicted the triumphant Poles and only in the right corner of a Russian staff officer who was defeated in the dust. Khlopitsky - in a civilian gray coat and top hat, on horseback, behind him in the uniform of the General Staff Prondzinsky. In general, there are many portraits. The Piontek battery is visible on the highway. He used up the shells, but did not want to leave the position, sat down on the cannon, lit his pipe and decided to wait until the shells were delivered. Warsaw is visible in the distance.