The history of the problem is well known. Japan accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration and surrendered to the Allies in August 1945. The Declaration limited Japanese sovereignty to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and smaller islands as designated by the Allies. The problem was, based on the new political realities, to carry out state border between Japan and the Soviet Union, and also enshrine it in a peace treaty.
However, the coalition allies had already begun to be drawn into the Cold War, and the first clashes between the United States and the USSR took place in East Asia around Korea and Japan. Thus, the international settlement of the Japanese question was not completed. According to Article 2 of the Peace Treaty concluded on September 8, 1951, Japan renounced all rights, title and claims to Kurile Islands and South Sakhalin, however, the agreement did not indicate in whose favor this refusal was carried out. The Soviet Union took part in the Peace Conference, but refused to sign the treaty. During the conference, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru emphasized that the southern Kuril Islands, Kunashir and Iturup were recognized by the Russian Empire as Japanese territory, while the islands of Shikotan and Habomai were part of Hokkaido and, accordingly, Japan [Sanfuransisuko 1951: 302-303] . More than fifty years have passed since then, but a peace treaty between Russia and Japan has not been concluded.
Naturally, the parties repeatedly made attempts to reach an agreement. Among other things, Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro negotiated with the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Nikita Khrushchev in 1955-1956. However, they were never able to come to an agreement on the issue of the Peace Treaty, limiting themselves to signing a Joint Declaration, according to which two smaller islands, the Habomai and Shikotan ridges, were to pass to Japan along with the signing of the Peace Treaty. In 1960, the Soviet Union unilaterally abandoned the Joint Declaration after Japan signed a new Security Treaty with the United States.
Since then, the Kuril Islands complex has been the subject of a dispute between the two capitals, with the Japanese side insisting that the "Northern Territories" were not part of the ceded Kuril Islands. The PCT is generally perceived in Japan as the “four island problem”, in accordance with the Tokyo Declaration signed by President Boris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro in October 1993.
PST has become the object of serious research by many scientists [see. Kimura 2001; Wada 1999; Iwashita 2005]. However, most of them focused on the consideration of the bilateral relations between Japan and the USSR (since 1991 - the Russian Federation), while at best little attention was paid to the positions of the USA and Great Britain, which were the main initiators of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Thus, the PST is still perceived as a subject of bilateral geopolitical dialogue.
The Cold War, of course, is not discounted and continues to play an important role, but is considered a peripheral factor, which is perceived by most analysts as an ideological and geopolitical confrontation between the United States and the USSR, the center of which was Europe, while Asia occupied a secondary place. The PST did not owe its existence to the Cold War, but was largely influenced by it and was largely shaped by its events. Without understanding the essence of the Cold War in Asia and its consequences for the PST, it is impossible to understand the origin, evolution and possible solution to this problem.
The Cold War in Asia has specific features. Unlike Europe, where a bipolar system emerged after the emergence of NATO in 1949 and the Warsaw Bloc in 1956, Asia went through a series of dramatic transformations, within which national liberation movements, decolonization, civil wars and even revolutions took place, and their apogee was the creation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949 and the invasion of South Korea by communist North Korea in June 1950. The Korean War was the reason why Japan did not sign a Peace Treaty with all interested parties.
The San Francisco Peace Treaty left unresolved territorial disputes between China, the USSR and both Koreas. The end of the Korean War and Khrushchev's new doctrine of "peaceful coexistence" contributed to a softening of the Asian political climate. However, active hostilities were replaced by real cold war, both within states themselves and at the international level. In Japan, the internal Cold War was no less severe than in other countries, and the issue split the new Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In Moscow, as will be shown below, opinions were also divided, although to a lesser extent. As a result, the process of agreeing on a peace treaty with the USSR was interrupted.
Origins of PST in post-war Asia
The PST is generally believed to have its origins in the Yalta Conference of the Allies in January-February 1945 and the subsequent military occupation of the Kuril Islands by the Soviet Union, when Roosevelt and Churchill made concessions to Stalin in exchange for the USSR's entry into the war against Japan. However, careful research shows that this problem is a much more complex and profound issue that came to light even before the US-UK-USSR coalition took shape. It originates from the pre-war geopolitical games of Moscow and Tokyo in 1939-1941, from the period marked by the resignation of the USSR Foreign Minister M. Litvinov and the arrival to this post of V. Molotov, whose geopolitical guidelines are well illustrated by the “Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact”, concluded in August 1939
It was Molotov who raised the issue of the Kuril Islands in 1940, hinting at their possible transfer to the Soviet Union during negotiations with Japan on the Non-Aggression Pact, which were subsequently scrapped [Alexandrov-Agentov 1994: 54]. In his comments to the Japanese version of this document, he tied the conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact to “the return of the previously lost territories of Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands” [Tikhvinsky 2005: 269]. Molotov's remark shows that he did not know or chose to forget that the “Northern Territories” never belonged to Russia. Such a proposal was naturally rejected by Japan, and instead a Neutrality Pact was signed in April 1941. The Kuril Islands have become a latent problem in relations between Tokyo and Moscow.
Soviet foreign policy was based not only on ideology, but also on geopolitical thinking, which was professed by the “inflexible” Molotov, and even by such “pro-Western” diplomats as Deputy Foreign Ministers I. Lozovsky and I. Maisky. In December 1941, immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Lozovsky noted the possibility of revising the entire Soviet border after the victory over the Axis powers. He especially emphasized that the USSR should not allow a situation to arise after the war when “Japanese warships will cut off our access to the Pacific Ocean,” mentioning, in particular, the Kuril Straits. Lozovsky's idea was voiced to Stalin and Molotov before the arrival of British Foreign Secretary Eden. By the beginning of 1942, the Soviet Politburo created two commissions to work on a peace treaty and the configuration of the post-war world order [Documents 1995: 114-115]. In January 1944, Deputy Minister Maisky delivered a report “On a Preferred Future World Order,” which was mainly devoted to Europe, with Asia mentioned only in passing. The report recommended that the Soviet Union refrain from participating in the war with Japan, but it contained persistent calls to “return” South Sakhalin (taken from Russia in 1905) and “hand over to us” the Kuril Islands (ceded to Japan under the Treaty of 1875) [ Documents 1995: 125, 133; Soviet 1999: 20, 35]. Thus, the “Yalta decision” was hatched in Moscow a year before the corresponding conference was held.
The Japanese side was also engaged in geopolitical calculations. Faced with Germany's defeat, the Japanese leadership resorted to the mediation of the Soviet Union. The Neutrality Pact was in force until April 1946, although Molotov warned Japanese Ambassador Sato on April 5, 1945 that the Pact would not be extended [Slavinsky 1995: 304]. The Japanese authorities were ready to cede the “Northern Kuriles”, wanting Stalin to meet them halfway. However, this maneuver was in vain. In accordance with the Yalta Agreement, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan.
Contradictions in views on the occupation of Japan are noticeable already in Directive No. 1 of President Truman of August 15, 1945, according to which the United States was to occupy the main part of Japan, and the Soviet Union - only South Sakhalin; The Kuril Islands were not even mentioned in it. The next day, Stalin wanted to obtain an occupation zone in Northern Hokkaido and was met with a firm refusal. Thus, conflicts began between the former allies over the occupation of Japan, especially the Kuril Islands. A modern Russian historian also believes that conflicts between former allies over Japan and China originate from that period [Essays 2002: 333]. By October 1945, Stalin had taken a hostile stance toward the United States on issues such as control of Japan and Korea. The meeting of the three foreign ministers in Moscow in December 1945 marked a transition from allied relations to confrontation.
Korean War, San Francisco Treaty and PCT
The Peace Treaty with Japan took place in September 1951 in San Francisco amid growing Cold War tensions and fighting in Korea. The Soviet Union sent a delegation to San Francisco, but refused to sign the Treaty mainly due to the fact that representatives of the People's Republic of China were not invited to the Conference [Kapitsa 1996: 125]. In the context of the deteriorating military situation, the Japanese Communist Party also appealed to the Soviet Union with a request not to sign the Treaty [Shimotomai 2004].
Some of its features are also associated with the position of the Eastern Bloc states, which had a negative attitude towards the Treaty. Thus, in Article 2, Japan renounced its rights to six territories, including the Kuril Islands, but it did not indicate in favor of which states the renunciation was carried out. This issue was studied by Professor Hara Kimie and other researchers [Hara 2005]. Some see this as a "trap" set by John Foster Dulles (the main author of the Treaty and the architect of the Conference) to prolong Japan's security dependence on the United States by maintaining its differences with its neighbors, especially the Soviet Union.
Opinion on the Taiwan issue was also divided, with Britain recognizing the Communist government of China and the US supporting the Kuomintang government of Chiang Kai-shek. With the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, Japan quickly transitioned from a defeated enemy to an important regional ally in the eyes of the United States. The agreements reached at the San Francisco Conference, including the Security Treaty, were economically favorable enough for Japan to focus on rebuilding its economy. Meanwhile, Stalin became mired in the Korean War, which continued until his death in March 1953.
Negotiations under bipolar conditions (1955–1972)
During the Cold War, PST became part of an intense rivalry, a zero-sum game. However, a number of attempts have been made to resolve this issue. From a historical point of view, the detente that followed Stalin's death opened up the possibility of a change of position, especially for the Soviet leadership.
The leaders who replaced Stalin, primarily Khrushchev, professed a different approach to to the outside world. It was expected that East Asia would also be influenced by Khrushchev's policy of "peaceful coexistence", which replaced Stalin's belief in the inevitability of war between the communist and capitalist worlds.
Bipolarity also gave rise to internal differences in views on relations with the USSR, which was especially noticeable in Japan, where in December 1955 a faction was formed in the LDP under the leadership of Yoshida, which opposed the new approach of the Hatoyama-Kono faction to resolving relations with the USSR.
In October 1954, Khrushchev visited Beijing to discuss with Mao Zedong a new policy of "peaceful coexistence" in Asia, and they issued a joint declaration in which both demonstrated their intention to normalize relations with Japan.
In January 1955, a little-known Soviet official A. Domnitsky personally met with Hatoyama. Following this event, the Asian socialist states unanimously declared their desire to normalize relations with Japan. Even the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK expressed a similar intention in his statement of February 25, 1955 [Shimotomai 2006: 159].
The negotiation process is well documented by Professor Tanaka Takahiko and other scholars, and is also described in the memoirs of Ambassador Matsumoto Shunichi and journalist Kubota Masaaki [Tanaka 1995]. Khrushchev first hinted at the possibility of returning the smaller islands, Habomai and Shikotan, to Japan in August 1955. At the negotiations that took place in London [Kubota 1983: 32-34], Japan's position was quite flexible. Matsumoto himself was inclined to conclude a peace treaty on the above conditions. What followed, however, was a chain reaction within Japan's elites, and Tokyo began raising the bar in what was a common feature of Cold War domestic politics.
The term PST, which had been in oblivion for several years, suddenly came into use again when Shimoda Takezo, head of the treaty department of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, used it in a speech in parliament on March 10, 1956. Under the leadership of his superior, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and former diplomat Shigemitsu Mamoru, Takezō played perhaps a key role in shaping the term. Against the backdrop of increased domestic political pressure, Shigemitsu sought to take control of the negotiation process and began a new round of discussions in 1956, demanding that Moscow resolve the issue based on the return of all four islands. Faced with stiff resistance from the Soviet authorities, Shigemitsu changed his position and in August 1956 was already inclined to conclude a peace treaty on the terms of the return of only Habomai and Shikotan. However, the Japanese cabinet rejected his proposal.
Here the logic of the Cold War intervened. On September 7, 1956, Dulles informed Shigemitsu that if Japan agrees to sign a peace treaty with the USSR on the terms of returning only two islands, then the United States may not return Okinawa to Japan [Tanaka 1995: 266].
According to a declassified CPSU document concerning policy towards Japan, a week before Prime Minister Hatoyama's visit in October 1956, the USSR Foreign Ministry reported that a group of parliament members led by Ikeda openly resisted attempts at rapprochement with Moscow, despite the fact that that some circles, including the business community of the Kansai region, are favorable to improving relations with the communist bloc [Report 1956]. The Cold War and the zero-sum game had reached their climax, and Hatoyama decided to go to Moscow to sign only the Joint Declaration. This is evidenced by a number of documents published both in Japan and in Russia. Among other things, part of the documents dedicated to the negotiations of October 1956 was published in Moscow in 1996 [Source 1996: 116]. There is a difference between the Russian and Japanese versions: the first omits the phrase "including the territorial issue" after the words "negotiations on a peace treaty", while the second contains the mentioned phrase; the corresponding document was published in March 2005 by Ishikawa, former secretary Kono Ichiro, in the materials of his personal archive [Asahi Shimbun 03/15/2005]. There was a noticeable difference of opinion between Prime Minister N. Bulganin and Foreign Minister A. Gromyko, who included the specified wording in the text, on the one hand, and Khrushchev, who insisted on its exclusion, on the other.
Indeed, the diversity of opinions within the Soviet elite was all too obvious. In his memoirs, Khrushchev criticizes Stalin for his "inability" to conclude a peace treaty. Gromyko also criticized Molotov at the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in 1957 for preventing the rapprochement of positions with Japan [Molotov 1998: 231]. Molotov denies this statement. Representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Central Committee of the CPSU, including the USSR ambassadors to the PRC (Yudin) and the DPRK (Puzanov) stated that “class enemies such as Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov” were against reconciliation with Germany and Japan [Molotov 1998: 595], although Malenkov seemed to be a reformist. Perhaps Khrushchev's reform intentions encountered hidden resistance from the nomenklatura elite. One of the negotiators of those years, academician S. Tikhvinsky, still criticizes Khrushchev’s “voluntarism” [Tikhvinsky 2001: 155]. Tikhvinsky was Matsumoto's counterpart in London. He described Khrushchev's new course at the London negotiations as "voluntarism." However, he changed his point of view somewhat in 2006, when he criticized Khrushchev not for not raising the issue of the two smaller islands, but for the fact that he denounced the 1956 Declaration in 1960. Obviously, the change in position was due to new policy of President Putin.
I tend to attribute the difference of opinion to the fact that in October 1956 Khrushchev was faced - in the form of mass riots in Poland and Hungary - with the consequences of his campaign to debunk Stalin's cult of personality, as well as the North Korean crisis, which arose under the influence of leadership style and the cult of personality Kim Il Sung. V. Kovyzhenko, at that time - head. the Japanese sector of the international department of the CPSU Central Committee was also busy monitoring the situation in North Korea [Shimotomai 2006; Lankov 2002: 154-93].
The absence of the above-mentioned individuals from the signing ceremony of the Joint Declaration on October 19 gave Japan the opportunity to play on the differences of opinion between Khrushchev and Bulganin-Gromyko. Ambassador Matsumoto secured Bulganin’s consent to simultaneously publish the Gromyko-Matsumoto letter, which contained the wording “peace negotiations, including the territorial issue (emphasis added)” [Tanaka 1995: 150].
In 1960, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke set a course for rapprochement with the United States on the basis of a revised Security Treaty. Then the USSR unilaterally abandoned the Joint Declaration, thereby distancing itself even further from Japan.
Under the leadership of the pro-American Ikeda government, a new concept was formulated in 1961, the essence of which was that the disputed islands were not part of the Kuril ridge. In other words, from a diplomatic decision, the PST turned into a propaganda tool for provoking anti-Soviet sentiment among the Japanese people [Wada 1999: 275].
Negotiations on the PTA during the period of "détente"
Only fundamental shifts in the configuration on the world stage could change the balance of power between Tokyo and Moscow. The bipolar system that emerged during the Cold War became increasingly "multilateral" by the 1970s, with the economic rise of Japan and the European Community. In the Asian context, it acquired new dynamism when the US-China détente in 1972 took the Cold War in Asia into a new dimension. This shift left the Soviet elites in a state of shock, and they began to reassess their relations with Japan. China's rise in status and its ensuing rivalry with the USSR opened a new window of opportunity to discuss the PTA.
Moscow sought to counter the US-China rapprochement with its recognition of Japan as a new economic power. Associate Professor S. Vasilyuk believes that Japan and the USSR had common interests - China and oil [Vasilyuk 2005]. In addition, after the "oil shock" Japan was in dire need of the energy resources of Siberia. Moscow and Tokyo held a series of negotiations that began with Gromyko's visit to Tokyo in January 1972, a month before Nixon's trip to China. The culmination of the negotiations was the visit of Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei to Moscow in October 1973.
During his visit, Gromyko not only smiled, but also did not behave in the usual manner of the Soviet leadership, which treated the PST as “an already solved problem.” During talks with Prime Minister Sato Eisaku on January 27, he hinted at a possible return to the “1956 formula.” If you believe Kapitsa’s memoirs, Prime Minister Sato did not answer anything to this, but in turn hinted at the possibility of Japanese assistance in implementing the project to build a pipeline from Irkutsk to Nakhodka.
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai also supported Japan's "just" demand for the return of the Northern Territories, and China continued to follow this line throughout the 1970s. Moscow was unable to prevent the normalization of relations between Japan and China in October 1972, but Soviet diplomats saw that Japan was unwilling to move forward on this issue. Foreign Minister Ohira Masayoshi made it clear during his visit to Moscow in October 1973 that Japan and China were not holding secret negotiations, and their relationship did not influence ties between the USSR and China.
The apogee of “détente” in relations between the USSR and Japan came when General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and Prime Minister Tanaka confirmed that “after the end of the war, unresolved issues remained.” According to Kapitsa, they agreed to continue working to conclude a Peace Treaty in 1974. However, nothing came of this, and subsequently the misunderstanding even intensified: Tanaka insisted that the “unsolved problem” covered four islands, and Brezhnev and his circle were of the opposite opinion .
In 1974, Tanaka was forced to resign due to the Lockheed scandal and was replaced by Miki Takeo. As a dissident from the LDP, Miki also sought to find a solution to the PST, but his government turned out to be weak and divided. In December 1976, Fukuda Takeo became the new prime minister.
Fukuda's new course was called "multilateral", which meant that it was not focused on clearly defined forces. He sought to use economic leverage to achieve foreign policy goals. China and ASEAN, as well as the USSR, were “natural targets” of his efforts. Despite the expansion of economic cooperation, political relations were in stagnation. By 1978, Sino-Soviet relations were so damaged that China insisted on including an anti-hegemony clause (which was aimed at the Soviet Union) in its Treaty with Japan. The USSR, in turn, proposed concluding a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation instead of a Peace Treaty.
Japan was inclined to sign an agreement with dynamic and reformist China, rather than with the gerontocratic and stagnating USSR. Japanese businessmen in to a greater extent They were interested in the Chinese, not the Soviet, market, and their economic successes reduced the need for Soviet energy supplies. Thus, even such a small chance for a settlement was missed, and the cautious optimism of the early 1970s gave way to pessimism by the end of the decade. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 completely damaged Soviet-Japanese relations.
Beginning in 1981, Japan began to celebrate February 7 (the day the Treaty of Shimoda was signed in 1855) as “Northern Territories Day,” reminding the Japanese of the Russian occupation. This delayed the resolution of the issue even further.
Perestroika and the end of the USSR
Perestroika of 1985-1991 gave a new chance for improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations. Its initiator, Mikhail Gorbachev, was more popular among the Japanese than among his own compatriots. Mutual perception has changed radically. Relations with the Soviet Union began to be widely and openly discussed in Japan. However, both sides were unable to agree on a settlement of the “unresolved issue” [Panov 1992].
Until the 1980s, Soviet leaders perceived the territorial issue as part of separate geopolitical games that could only be played by the Secretary General and his advisers. During the Cold War, the "territorial question" could be resolved relatively easily, subject to a decision on the part of the Secretary General, since internal political resistance was unlikely. However, by 1991, it began to seem that even the country's most popular and powerful leader was unable to resolve this issue. On the one hand, perestroika provided an unprecedented chance, but, on the other hand, it limited the possibilities of its implementation.
At the first stage, in 1985-1988, the beginning of perestroika greatly influenced Japanese-Soviet relations, but this was followed by silence on both sides. At the second stage, in 1989-1991, both sides had high hopes for the upcoming first official visit of USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev to Japan, but in fact it was too late for Gorbachev to get closely involved in resolving this issue.
The period of “stagnation” in Soviet-Japanese relations left a difficult legacy for both states. After Tanaka's visit in 1973, for almost twenty-five years, not a single leading Japanese leader who could make decisions visited Moscow. Only in 1998 did Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo come to Russia on an official visit. Between 1985 and 1991 the only Japanese Prime Minister who had any understanding or experience of contacts with the Soviet Union was Nakasone Yasuhiro.
Under Uno Sosuke, who served as Foreign Minister in the government of Takeshita Noboru, a new concept of “extended equilibrium” was born in Gaimusho.
Japan's foreign ministers have had little influence on the country's foreign policy due to their generally short tenure in office. All important decisions were actually prepared and made by the Foreign Ministry staff. Abe Shintaro's influence even increased after he left the post of Foreign Minister and remained until illness limited his capabilities.
The initial reaction to Gorbachev as the new Soviet leader was indifference. Prime Minister Nakasone himself, who in March 1985 came to the funeral of Gorbachev's predecessor K. Chernenko, was an exception. During the visit of USSR Foreign Minister E. Shevardnadze to Tokyo in January 1986, some changes emerged. During this period, Gorbachev made several significant adjustments to domestic and foreign policy and delivered his historic speech in Vladivostok in July 1986. Behind the scenes, Shevardnadze boldly proposed “returning to 1956,” thereby acknowledging the existence of the territorial issue and the possibility of the return of Habomai and Shikotan . However, Gromyko criticized Shevardnadze’s position, and Gorbachev also did not support it [Kovalenko 1996: 209].
In 1987, the gulf separating the two states became even wider. Gorbachev's planned visit to Japan was postponed, and even visits by the USSR Foreign Minister became rare events. As a result, the Japanese Foreign Ministry adopted a “wait and see” approach. Former Japanese Foreign Ministry employee Togo Kazuhiko in his recent work refers to the opposition of some forces that resisted the expansion of Japanese-Soviet relations [Togo 2007].
In 1989-1991 A new stage began in both countries. Despite the fact that relations at the highest level reached a dead end, the initiative began to come from scientific circles, which represented a new phenomenon in Soviet politics. In June-July 1988, a number of scientists came forward with fresh ideas and views on bilateral relations. By 1990, their position acquired a more encouraging character; they formulated arithmetic theories from “two plus alpha” (G. Kunadze) to three (V. Zaitsev) and, ultimately, four islands (A. Zagorsky).
What is striking is the growth in the number of researchers in both countries who began to complement the leading role of foreign affairs agencies, although they could not replace it. Concepts and wording have also changed. By the end of 1989, both sides were moving toward a positive outcome. It was a delayed reaction to the radical shift in Western perceptions and the fall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe that marked the beginning of the end of the Cold War.
At the instigation of Shevardnadze, who in January 1989 offered LDP General Secretary Abe contacts at the party level, the ruling party represented by the LDP entered the game on the Japanese side. Abe's new policy was to reduce the role of the "territorial issue" and expand the scope of Soviet-Japanese relations. During his conversation with Gorbachev in January 1990, Abe did not even mention the words “territorial issue” and suggested that “problems that cause headaches be solved with wisdom,” which was praised by Gorbachev.
Such a variety of actors in Japanese politics coincided with the emergence of new political figures in the Soviet Union. Boris Yeltsin, who led the radical opposition in the Supreme Council, visited Japan in January 1990 and proposed a “five-stage solution.” Although this was perceived as a tactical maneuver, in fact it became a manifesto of new political forces that were quickly gaining strength and by the beginning of 1991 began to pose a real threat to Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership.
Despite Abe's unexpected death, his successor Ozawa Ichiro inherited his approach to relations with the Soviet Union. In April 1990, his mentor, Kanemaru Shin, dared to talk about the return of only two islands. Ozawa linked the territorial issue with other points, such as economic cooperation. His idea was not naive, as it was later characterized by critics who called it “an economic way to buy islands” [Gorbachev 1995: 264; Kozyrev 1995: 295]. In general, this plan consisted of “economic cooperation with Japan in response to the political initiatives of the Soviet side.” This approach was directly reflected in Academician Shatalin’s “500 Days” economic reform program, published in the summer of 1990. By the mid-1990s, both sides began to express cautious optimism.
Meanwhile, the Cold War in Asia began to wind down. This was evidenced not only by the warming in relations between Beijing and Moscow, but even more so by the USSR's recognition of South Korea after the 1988 Seoul Olympics, which helped to significantly ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK was dissatisfied with the normalization of relations between South Korea and the USSR. At the same time, Kim Yong Nam, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK, in response to Shevardnadze’s desire to recognize South Korea, hinted at the DPRK’s possible support for Japan in its attempt to regain the “Northern Territories” [Shimotomai 2004: 160].
However, by the fall of 1990, the political climate in Moscow had changed again. Gorbachev has lost his influence. The era of the CPSU ended, and the presidential system that replaced it did not function properly. A similar trend was observed in foreign policy. By the 1990s, the once powerful and monolithic Politburo was replaced by amorphous structures [Ligachev 1992: 4; Klyutikov 1996]. Their interaction and modus operandi varied from case to case and were poorly coordinated. Former Foreign Minister Kozyrev in his memoirs emphasized this phenomenon in connection with the “Japanese problem” in 1990-1993.
As the "sovereign republics" declared their independence, the collapse of the USSR became increasingly possible, and Gorbachev's relationship with Yeltsin became increasingly complex. Gorbachev had to contend with two opposition forces: the growing “Soviet bureaucratic” opposition from his own circle and the “republican democratic” opposition. Although Gorbachev called his policies "centrist", by February 1991 he was in direct conflict with Yeltsin's radical approach. Reactionary-conservative sentiments intensified within Gorbachev’s team. Russian foreign policy experts such as Kozyrev and Kunadze openly opposed Gorbachev's initiatives towards Japan.
The most typical example of an increase in the number of actors on the Japanese side is Ozawa’s visit to Moscow in March 1991. During the trip, Ozawa directly offered “impressive economic assistance in exchange for the islands,” which caused exactly the opposite effect.
Gorbachev's official visit to Japan in April was important, but less significant than expected. Gorbachev really turned to the history of states; he handed over lists of Japanese prisoners of war and other prisoners who died in Siberia, and also promised to introduce a visa-free regime for former residents of the Northern Territories. The parties agreed to continue negotiations on a peace treaty using “positive elements of previous agreements,” and also openly discussed the applicability of the 1956 Declaration and the relationship between the Kuril Islands and the “four islands.” This was the state of affairs before, after a failed coup attempt in August 1991, the presidents of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus unilaterally announced the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991.
This book is about our country's participation in the events in the Congo in 1960–1964, which went down in history as the Congo crisis. Congo became the first Cold War hotspot in sub-Saharan Africa. The battle for a vast territory in the “heart of Africa,” rich in strategic minerals, is filled with events that “shocked the world.” The unrest that engulfed the country a week after the declaration of independence, the secession of the province of Katanga and the entry of UN troops (July 1960). The assassination of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, one of the symbols of independent Africa (1961). A dramatic three-year struggle for the return of Katanga to the Congo (1960–1963), full of unexpected twists, which cost the life of UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld. A powerful uprising of Lumumba's supporters (1964), which was suppressed only with the help of external military intervention, which resulted in the death of dozens of white hostages. Based on documents from the archives of Russia, Great Britain and the United States, the role of the Soviet Union in the Congolese crisis, its motives, intentions and actions in the context of the policies of other players, foreign and Congolese, is explored. The author analyzed the factors that forced the Soviet leadership to refrain from taking steps to escalate the crisis. For historians, teachers and students.
A series: Cold War
* * *
by liters company.
Dedicated to my wife Marina
THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
INSTITUTE OF WORLD HISTORY
CENTER FOR AFRICAN STUDIES
DMITRY POZHARSKY UNIVERSITY
Published by decision of the Academic Council of Dmitry Pozharsky University
Reviewers:
d.i. n Egorova N.I.
d.i. n. Shubin V. G.
Introduction
Marcus suddenly realized that no matter how big the world was, Congo would always be bigger than this world.
Albert Sanchez Piñol. Pandora in the Congo.This book is about our country's participation in the events in the Congo in 1960–1964, which went down in history as the Congo crisis.
During the decolonization of the African continent, the Congo became an arena of rivalry between Cold War opponents and became its first hot spot in sub-Saharan Africa. The Congo attracted many people. It has an enviable geographical position – a huge territory in the center of the continent (“the heart of Africa”), bordered by 9 colonies and states. The subsoil is fabulously rich in strategic raw materials - one of the world's largest deposits of copper, cobalt, uranium, industrial diamonds, significant deposits of tantalum, tin, and zinc.
The United States and its NATO allies feared that if “communist influence” was established in the Congo, the same fate would befall the adjacent territories in a domino effect.
The fears were not unfounded. The prime minister of the Congo was Patrice Lumumba, a left-wing nationalist and admirer of Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah and Guinean President Sekou Touré, who had established relations with the Soviet Union. Soviet leader N. S. Khrushchev was not averse to adding to the list of African friends, with the help of whom he hoped to break into the “soft underbelly of imperialism” on the growing anti-colonial wave. Will the USSR be able to operate in the Congo as successfully as in Guinea, Ghana, Mali? This question was fateful for Africa in 1960.
Following the declaration of Congolese independence on June 30, 1960, the former metropolis of Belgium used the anti-Belgian sentiments of the Congolese to destabilize the situation in its former colony. This was followed by the entry of Belgian troops into the Congo and the separation of the richest province of Katanga. Lumumba and Congolese President Joseph Kasavubu demanded the urgent dispatch of UN troops to “defend the national territory of the Congo against the ongoing external aggression that threatens international peace.”
The USSR and the USA agreed on the need for a UN operation in the Congo. The Congolese crisis has become international. US President Dwight Eisenhower, Khrushchev and Lumumba hoped to turn the internationalization of the crisis to their advantage. Eisenhower's goal was to turn UN troops into a "shield" against communist penetration, to prevent direct Soviet intervention in the Congo, to protect Western interests through the hands of the UN, saving his own funds and resources. Khrushchev believed that the UN operation would expand the USSR's ability to influence events in the Congo and support Lumumba's government. And the Congolese prime minister hoped, with the help of UN troops, to restore the territorial integrity of the country. The Soviet and Congolese leaders quickly became convinced that the American scenario was being implemented through the UN operation in the Congo. Lumumba turned to the USSR for help, bypassing the UN, to carry out military action against the breakaway Katanga. And he received vehicles (trucks and civilian aircraft) to transport federal government troops to the borders of the rebel province.
The outbreak of hostilities against the Katangese separatists at the end of August 1960 led to an escalation of the crisis. With the help of UN troops and pro-Western forces inside the Congo, Lumumba was removed from power, and the Soviet embassy was expelled from the Congo. Khrushchev backed down. His Congolese policy began to be determined by the need to overcome the crisis, preserving the sovereign “face” of the USSR and his own international reputation as a consistent fighter against colonialism and imperialism. Subsequently, the Soviet leadership avoided steps that could cause an escalation of confrontation with Western powers in the Congo.
The battle for the Congo is rich in events that “shocked the world.” Unrest that engulfed the country a week after independence, the secession of Katanga and the entry of UN troops (July 1960). The assassination of Patrice Lumumba (January 17, 1961), one of the symbols of independent Africa. A dramatic struggle for the return of Katanga to the Congo (1960–1963), full of unexpected turns, which cost the life of UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld. The powerful Lumumbist uprising (1964), which was suppressed only with the help of external military intervention, which resulted in the death of dozens of white hostages.
To find ways out of the crisis, all UN institutions and mechanisms were involved - the General Assembly, the Security Council, the specially created Advisory Committee on Congo Affairs, the situation in the Congo was the subject of numerous negotiations and conversations. The UN peacekeeping operation in the Congo has become one of the largest and most complex for the Blue Helmets.
The documentary basis of the book is made up of archival materials. The author found the most valuable documents in the Archive of Russian Foreign Policy (AFP RF). These are informational messages analytical reports and notes, recordings of conversations, other “products” of the Soviet embassy in the Congo and the African departments of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Khrushchev’s correspondence with foreign politicians about the situation in the Congo. This body of documentation unevenly covers the different stages and episodes of the Congolese crisis. Sometimes due to objective reasons: employees of the Soviet embassy in the Congo twice, in September 1960 and in November 1963, had to destroy documents when citizens of the USSR were ordered to leave the country within 48 hours. Mainly due to the fact that many information has not been declassified. The author was unable to obtain a single document from the Soviet diplomatic mission operating in Stanleyville in 1961, when the eastern part of the Congo was controlled by the government led by Lumumba's successor, Antoine Gizenga. Materials about the 1964 uprising were also unavailable.
The Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI) contains materials about the main directions of USSR policy in Africa. There are only a few declassified documents on the Congo. The rest are kept in the fund of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, closed to researchers.
In the State Archives of the Russian Federation (GA RF), documents on the stay of Congolese politicians who came through public organizations in the USSR turned out to be useful.
After several days of work in the National Archives of the United Kingdom, the author found important documents about the situation in the Congo. Of particular value are materials on the Congolese policy of Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah.
The author did not have the opportunity to work on Congolese topics in US archives. Policy documents on US policy in Africa and analytical materials from the State Department and CIA on the activities of the Eastern Bloc countries on the continent, discovered in the National Archives while studying another topic, were a good help for the study of the Congo crisis.
Some “compensation” for the paucity of documents from American archives was a collection prepared for a conference held by staff of the Cold War History Project at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington on September 23–24, 2004. The collection included, in particular, an “Analytical Chronology” of events in the Congo , prepared by the CIA. Many documents published in the series “International Relations of the United States” prepared by the State Department are interesting as an “enemy’s view” of the actions of the USSR in the Congo.
A lot of useful information about the situation in the Congo and the Soviet position at different stages of the crisis is contained in UN materials - documents of the Security Council, the General Assembly, reports of the representatives of the Secretary General in the Congo.
A valuable source is the oral testimony of direct participants in the events, those who literally “made history.”
The memoir genre is represented by the memoirs of diplomats, intelligence officers who worked in the Congo under diplomatic cover, politicians, UN employees, and foreign mercenaries who fought in the Congo.
The Congo crisis is a tasty dish for researchers. American journalist and historian Madeleine Kalb believes that the Battle of the Congo “is worthy of a first-class adventure novel - an exotic setting, a dramatic plot, colorful and influential characters at a significant moment in their lives against the backdrop of a collapsing empire, great power rivalry and an unexpected surge of nationalism throughout continent." The historiography of the Congolese “thriller” is extensive: hundreds of monographs, thousands of articles.
The works of Soviet historians constitute it a small part. They contain useful factual material, but were written not for the purpose of an objective analysis of the Congolese policy of the USSR, but to justify it.
The discovery, albeit very limited, of domestic archival documents has made it possible to reconsider the stereotypes that developed during the Cold War. Works have appeared that objectively examine real Soviet motives and actions at various stages of the Congolese crisis. However complete picture The participation of the Soviet Union in the battle for the “heart of Africa” has not yet been recreated.
The role of the USSR in the Congolese events of 1960–1964. has not been the subject of special research by foreign authors. In the 1960s, most Western historians described the behavior of the Soviet Union as component the Kremlin’s sophisticated “plan” to take over Africa and spread communist ideology there. Often the “Red threat” was exaggerated to make the policy of Western powers, especially the United States, seem logical and justified. An objectivist approach was rare.
In the 1970s and 80s, works were published where the actions of the Soviet Union in the Congo were analyzed not to illustrate its expansionist aspirations, but as one of the main participants in the Cold War in the “heart of Africa,” where it opposed the West, defending its national interests. We find a textbook assessment of Soviet policy in M. Kalb. Khrushchev's decision to "send planes, weapons and military advisers to assist Lumumba in suppressing Katangese separatism" was "a typical display of adventurism" by the Soviet leader. The adventure resulted in the removal of Lumumba from power, the expulsion of the Soviet embassy from the Congo, the murder of Lumumba and the “personal defeat” of Khrushchev. He was forced to “reconsider his optimistic assumptions and take a serious look at African realities.” By 1962, “after a series of disappointments and defeats in the Congo and other countries of the African continent, Khrushchev was ready to abandon adventurous dreams and pursue a more cautious, realistic policy.” And here a new disappointment awaited him: “He looked in vain for an effective radical politician who could replace Lumumba, and in the end decided to establish full-fledged diplomatic relations with a moderate government led by an openly pro-American prime minister.”
Some researchers regard Khrushchev’s “realism” as not at all a healthy pragmatism. The Belgian journalist and sociologist Lude de Witte believes that the USSR imitated confrontation with the West in the Congo, “fought with one hand,” was indifferent to the fate of the left-wing Congolese nationalists and was guided solely by its own interests: “ The Kremlin lacked the political will, means and resources to create real threat Western hegemony in the Congo<…>It is obvious that the Kremlin did not want to support Lumumba unconditionally during the Congo crisis. He was more interested in winning the propaganda war, and Khrushchev denounced Western intervention to strengthen the Soviet Union's diplomatic position in the Afro-Asian world. The defeat of the Congolese national liberation movement was a crushing blow for all African freedom fighters, but not for the historically blind, conservative Kremlin bureaucrats who treated Lumumba and African nationalism as junk." In the Congo, the author concludes, there was no Cold War: “The Congo crisis was not really a war between East and West for hegemony in Central Africa.”
Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs George McGee, who oversaw U.S. Congolese policy from July 1962 to May 1963, considers the Congo a very dangerous front in the Cold War. In a 1990 interview, he stated that President Kennedy "had every reason to view the Soviets as the 'enemy' in the Congo." The Congolese crisis, the American politician believes, could well lead to war between the USSR and the United States.
The research on the Congo crisis by American historian Lisa Namikas has become innovative. The author managed to truly recreate international history crisis, presenting it as the result of a complex interaction of five main players: USA - USSR - Belgium - UN - Congo. This became possible thanks to an extensive archival database - documents from the archives of the USA, Belgium, Russia, and the GDR. In the GDR, Namikas found materials that shed light on the Soviet position on the 1964 uprising. Documents on this topic in domestic archives have not been declassified. She believes that Soviet policy in the Congo was the result of a situational combination of pragmatic and ideological imperatives. Khrushchev, Namikas argues, “took calculated, reasonable risks” to “establish Soviet influence in the Congo.” The Soviet leader was not “the lumbering behemoth that he was portrayed in Cold War history, but was a much more sophisticated being and well aware of his weaknesses.” It is logical that he “did not make any extra efforts to gain dominance” in Central Africa, “a region of third importance for the USSR.” Namikas considers Khrushchev’s main mistake during the crisis to be his refusal to provide massive assistance to Lumumba and attempts to save the Congolese prime minister when he was removed from power. And he immediately admits that this was impossible for a politician who really assessed his capabilities: “Khrushchev’s inaction can be explained by the fact that the USSR was already overly involved in a conflict at a distance of 12 thousand miles from its territory.” Such caution resulted in the fact that the Soviet Union in the Congo “did not have a consistent and firm policy”, “there was no loyal strong man in power or a leader who was at least internally ready to wage a cold war in Africa, as was the case in Asia and Latin America.”
L. Namikas's monograph introduced the Congo crisis into the context of debates in the historiography of the Cold War between neo-orthodox and post-revisionists. The first place responsibility for the Cold War on the USSR with all the ensuing assessments of its genesis, essence and evolution. They prove that Soviet foreign policy was determined decisively by ideological imperatives, and the United States was only reacting to the propaganda and political offensive of the Eastern bloc. The latter believe that the Cold War was the product of mutual misunderstanding and recognize the presence of a powerful ideological component in American politics.
Namikas firmly takes the side of the post-revisionists: “The new evidence clearly shows that none of the Cold War adversaries adequately understood the goals of the other side or the extent to which it would (or would not) defend its positions in the Congo. Upholding ideological principles that defined goals more important than material and mundane ones increased the significance of the crisis. Both superpowers wanted to avoid a direct clash, but also wanted to avoid appearing weak in front of the newly independent states.”
The work of Elizabeth Schmidt was also written from a post-revisionist position, where the events in the Congo in 1960–1965. a separate chapter is devoted.
My goal was to clarify the role of the Soviet Union in the Congolese crisis, to explore its motives, intentions and actions based on archival materials and in the context of the behavior of other players, foreign and Congolese.
The Congo crisis for the USSR is one of the lost battles of the Cold War. N.S. Khrushchev did not write a word about him in his memoirs. Today it is necessary to comprehend the reasons for the defeat and draw the right conclusions. For the future. Russian historian A.I. Fursov justified this need precisely and clearly: “We need mercilessly honest knowledge about ourselves, about the reasons for our historical defeat at the end of the 20th century. This is a necessary, although not sufficient, condition not only for victories, but also for survival in the 21st century in the trials that it brings and that are just around the corner.”
I express my deep gratitude and appreciation to the following people and organizations: the Directorate of the Institute of General History of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Director, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences A. O. Chubaryan) for the opportunity to implement this project; staff of the Center for African Studies of the Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences (headed by Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences A. B. Davidson) for valuable comments, suggestions and advice; American historian Lisa Namikas for fruitful cooperation in the field of studying the Congo crisis and unique information about US policy in the Congo; reviewers, Doctor of Historical Sciences N.I. Egorova and Doctor of Historical Sciences V.G Shubin, for their careful reading of the manuscript and constructive comments; A. V. Dmitriev for his work on the maps; employees of the Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation, the State Archive of the Russian Federation, the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History, the Russian State Archive of Film and Photo Documents, the National Archives of the United Kingdom, the National Archives of the United States for their professional assistance and favorable attitude towards the author.
* * *
The given introductory fragment of the book Cold War in the "Heart of Africa". USSR and the Congo crisis, 1960–1964 (S. V. Mazov, 2015) provided by our book partner -
Recently, American Secretary of State John Kerry visited Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. The US press noted that the main purpose of Kerry's trip was to strengthen relations with the five named states. The means of strengthening is economic partnership. However, Western analysts representing the so-called alternative press believe that Washington is developing a confrontation with Russia in the region.
Let us remind you that John Kerry’s visit to Central Asia ended two weeks ago. The US Secretary of State visited five countries: Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. This visit was literally historic. The coverage is impressive: five countries in a row. This was a clear demonstration of the build-up of American influence in the region. And the demonstration was, of course, addressed to Moscow.
Yandex.Direct
Looking for property in Cyprus?
Real estate agency in Cyprus. Current objects. Big choice. Come in
houseage.comAddress and phone number
The American media wrote that main goal D. Kerry's visit was to strengthen relations with the states of Central Asia through economic partnership. As for Russia, our analysts treated the American press reports with distrust. What kind of “partnership” is this? Especially with Turkmenistan, where not only is there no democracy, but there is even an example of its direct opposite! However, these analysts can look towards Saudi Arabia or Qatar, where from time to time they cut off the heads of pederasts and where there is also no (and no plans for) democracy. The United States cooperates quite successfully with these monarchies, and even jointly invented the petrodollar.
One of the strongest states in the region, Kazakhstan (a member of the EAEU, SCO and CSTO), cordially received the overseas envoy. “Recently in New York I met with US President Barack Obama, we discussed issues of bilateral cooperation. Since the first days of independence of our republic, which will turn 24 in December, we have been cooperating with your country, and the Kazakh people are grateful for the constant support of our sovereignty and economic development. Today there are about 500 companies with American capital in our country. We are aimed at continuing this work,” Tengrinews.kz quotes Nursultan Nazarbayev as saying to John Kerry.
Kazakhstan is one example. The biggest. Of course, the United States will also carry out “bilateral interaction” with other countries.
Analysts of the South Front portal believe that the recent visit of US Secretary of State John Kerry to the countries of Central Asia demonstrates the importance of the states of the region for Washington, including in the context of negative trends in US foreign policy in Afghanistan, where the local government is seated in chairs by White House specialists , is weakening, while the Taliban and its allies are strengthening.
Kerry and the foreign ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan at a meeting in Samarkand openly discussed areas of cooperation affecting the most different areas: economy, water security, education.
American analysts believe that this list of areas is rather formal. This is just a cover, but in reality there was a discussion of “additional issues” in “individual countries.” It is easy to predict, the authors of the article write, that the purpose of Kerry’s visit and American policy in general is issues related to Afghanistan and Russia.
Afghanistan and the activities of IS.
The borders between the states of Central Asia and Afghanistan are attracting the attention of politicians due to the increased activity of militants of all types and calibers. Here are the Taliban, who tried to seize the city of Kunduz, and ISIS, whose formations are beginning to densely concentrate there. IS militants generally consider this area a springboard for further expansion into Central Asia.
The threat is also growing in the south. Previously, the number of IS militants increased on the borders of Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.
Along with this, analysts note “serious internal problems” in the countries of Central Asia.
All this greatly worries not only the Central Asian states themselves, but also the leadership of those countries that have influence in the region: first of all, Russia, the USA and China (the latter is conducting economic expansion here).
As for Russia, at the recent CSTO Collective Security Summit it announced plans to create a joint border security initiative. Several Central Asian states were invited to participate in the initiative. As American analysts write, additional Russian and Kazakh armed forces have already been deployed in the region within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (since June 2015). Chinese intelligence specialists cooperate with them.
The overall structure of the deployed joint armed forces in Tajikistan includes border protection units (troops from Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, as well as Russian and Kazakh military advisers) and separate military formations from Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus (the latter's contribution is small) stationed in the territory 201st Russian military base, in the vicinity of Dushanbe, Kulyab and Kurgan-Tube. In addition, there are units of the CSTO and the regional anti-terrorism structure (RATS) of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which includes Russian, Kazakh and Chinese intelligence forces.
However, not all countries support the CSTO's efforts. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, for example, are discussing their own joint operations to strengthen and protect their borders. These countries have previously preferred to “avoid close cooperation with the CSTO,” analysts recall.
According to experts, the reason for this attitude towards the CSTO is the ambitions of state leaders. Currently, Ashgabat and Tashkent are trying to establish a bilateral security partnership.
Of course, the United States paid attention to this.
Washington, like Moscow, is concerned about the rise in aggression in Afghanistan and is also interested in strengthening security cooperation with Central Asian states in order to challenge Moscow as the dominant military security power in the region.
Analysts say Washington's motives in Central Asia are clear. However, the devil is in the details: the details of how the United States intends to “strengthen security cooperation” in the region are obscured.
However, experts believe that something can be assumed.
Turkmenistan could grant the United States permanent rights to use the Mary-2 base (located near the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan border).
Another possible plan is US support for a joint Uzbek-Turkmen border security initiative.
Another “topic” could be an increase in the US presence in Tajikistan. Tajikistan is considered one of Russia's closest allies in Central Asia, and therefore Washington would like to increase its influence here.
Of course, none of these forms of cooperation have been fully confirmed yet. Nevertheless, analysts believe that the Kremlin may pay attention to these “attempts.” The “division of efforts” will create holes in Russia’s regional security system. Recent events in Afghanistan have made it clear that US military efforts are unlikely to strengthen regional security. As a matter of fact, American forces are simply not enough for this.
Experts believe that only the joint forces of Russia and Kazakhstan will be able to “quickly and effectively” counter the IS threat. The military of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan do not have appropriate military equipment; the armed forces of these countries are not able to act effectively. Well, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, as noted above, are trying to avoid participating in joint CSTO events.
Analysts, however, undertake to assert that, in general, Russia, China, Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states assess the existing threats correctly.
However, the unstable situation on the borders of the countries of Central Asia and Afghanistan leads to the fact that the confrontation between the United States and Russia is unfolding “throughout the entire former Soviet periphery.”
You can’t argue with this, let’s add from ourselves. Otherwise, it would not be a cold war, but a warm friendship of peoples. So in Syria, too, there are two coalitions against “IS”: one with the Russians, and the second - you know who.
1. Features of political development
The post-war world included not only two hostile blocs, there was also a “third world”, which included states formed as a result of the collapse of colonial empires. They differed in their level of economic development, lifestyle, and worldview. The liberated countries were faced with the question: which device should they prefer? Quite often they adopted political systems inherited from previous imperial masters. A minority of the former colonies leaned toward the Soviet model. However, the declared affiliation with one camp or another did not correspond much to reality, since in most cases in these countries there were not enough material and political conditions to live in accordance with the proclaimed models.
The Cold War became an important factor in the formation of the post-colonial structure of the world. In most cases, its influence on the development of former colonies was negative, since in the conditions of ideological confrontation between the West and the East, politicians had a huge advantage, having the opportunity to speculate on colonialism as the main reason for the lag in development of the Third World countries. Colonialism created imbalances in the economies of dependent countries, thus making them vulnerable, but it also formed some of the preconditions for modernization in politics and economics. These preconditions could be exploited, but the Cold War atmosphere virtually eliminated continuity of development with the previous colonial administration, even where there were clearly achievements that needed to be preserved and increased.
Despite the absurdity of uniting countries such as Egypt and Gabon, India and New Guinea, such a union still had a certain meaning. The governments of these states did not believe that the world capitalist market and spontaneous private enterprise would succeed in their countries. In the minds of politicians in the Third World, the West was the “First World” with its greedy capitalism; the “second” included socialist countries with their harsh totalitarian regimes - both of these worlds had arsenals of weapons mass destruction. The "Third World" was supposed to become a new world - free, peace-loving, independent. This concept was implemented at the First Conference of African and Asian States, held April 18-24, 1955 in Bandung, in which 28 countries took part. At the conference, the basic principles of peaceful coexistence were formulated: 1) mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; 2) non-aggression; 3) non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; 4) equality and mutual benefit.
The inspirers of the Bandung movement were the leaders of India, Indonesia, Egypt and Yugoslavia - Jawaharlal Nehru, Ahmed Sukarno, Gamal Abdel Nasser and Josip Broz Tito. The principles of non-alignment, in the development of which mainly representatives of former colony countries participated, were to become the basis of a new life. In reality, however, they were often not implemented: long wars took place in Pakistan, India, Somalia, Ethiopia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Uganda, and Tanzania. In particular, the leaders of this movement found themselves helpless during the bloody war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.
The non-aligned movement was formalized at the Belgrade Conference in September 1961.
2. The establishment of a communist regime in the largest Asian country
Even on the eve of the First World War, Western competition for spheres of influence in China provoked national movements in Asia, and World War II dealt a crushing blow to Western dominance in Asia.
Determine from the map which states gained independence in Asia in 1945-1955.
The most radical changes took place in China. In 1949, the communists came to power here and, under the leadership of Mao Zedong, established the independence of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The example of China breaking free from Western control was a cautionary tale, and US and Western policy during the Cold War was dominated by the desire to stop the advance of communism in Asia.
For four thousand years, China was distinguished not only by its large and homogeneous population, but also by its political integrity. Most Chinese believed that their country was the center of the world and a model for all mankind. China rightfully considered its classical culture (painting, calligraphy, public institutions) a model for universal imitation. China and the Chinese certainly did not have a sense of cultural or intellectual backwardness. Technological weakness, which became fully apparent only in the 19th century. due to the obvious lag in the military sphere, was due not so much to the low level of technology or education, but rather to the self-sufficiency and self-confidence that distinguished Chinese civilization. Renewal became possible only after the fall of the ancient Chinese Empire, guardians of traditional culture, and only through social revolution.
The communists led the massive resistance to the Japanese invaders in the occupied territory. Therefore, when the Communists won a short civil war in 1949, they were perceived as the legitimate rulers of China after 40 years of anarchic anarchy. In addition, the communists, relying on their ideology, were able to create a nationwide effective power structure. This is exactly what the Chinese expected from politicians.
For most Chinese, the communist revolution meant the restoration of peace, order, prosperity, administrative continuity, the greatness of a vast empire and an ancient civilization.
Mao Zedong
Behind the forced collectivization of agriculture in 1955-1957. followed by the “Great Leap Forward” policy in industry, which began in 1959 and led to the terrible famine of 1959-1961. Mao Zedong’s new experiment, the “cultural revolution,” which took place in 1966-1976, was aimed at suppressing any opposition in the country. The "revolution" was accompanied mass repressions, instilling an atmosphere of general fear. Its result was the pre-crisis state of the Chinese economy. After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, the group led by Deng Xiaoping won the power struggle. The country's new leadership carried out a number of socio-economic reforms that transformed the country. However, the previous political structures remained unchanged.
Explain why, despite social and economic changes in China, the country's political structures have remained unchanged.
3. Korean War
Korean War (1950-1953) along with the Berlin blockade in 1948-1949. became another peak of the Cold War.
Occupied by the Japanese in 1905, Korea, according to the Anglo-American-Chinese agreement of 1943, was supposed to gain independence after World War II. On final stage war, the USSR and the USA decided to consider the 38th parallel on the Korean Peninsula as the demarcation line of allied military actions against Japan. Soviet troops accepted the Japanese surrender to the north, and American troops to the south of the 38th parallel.
Immediately after the entry of Soviet troops into Korea, a government of a unified Korea sympathetic to the Soviet Union was created. The Americans opposed this government to the provisional Korean government, which had previously been in exile. These two governments vied for power in the country, although the division of the country along the 38th parallel was expected to be temporary. Nevertheless, on August 15, 1948, the Republic of Korea was proclaimed with its capital in Seoul, and on September 9 of the same year, the Korean People's Republic was proclaimed.
Democratic Republic (DPRK) with its capital in Pyongyang. In fact, residents of both parts of the country were never given the opportunity to decide their own fate, and Korea still remains divided: temporary military borders turned into permanent ones.
After the communist victory in China, Mao Zedong was given the opportunity to help the North Korean communists in their quest to create a unified state. It was with the support of Mao Zedong and with the knowledge of Stalin that the North Korean troops attacked the south. In 1950, the leader of the Korean communists, Kim Il Sung, informed Stalin that as soon as the communists crossed the 38th parallel, a popular uprising would begin in the south and the whole thing would be limited to a short civil war.
The corrupt regime in South Korea was not popular with the people; about 100 thousand people died during various uprisings against it. In addition, Stalin apparently believed that the United States did not attach much strategic importance to South Korea and would not interfere in the conflict. However, the American leadership, frightened by the events in Berlin, believed that communism was on the march and must be stopped at all costs.
In 1950, the USSR withdrew from the United Nations for some time. The US leadership did not fail to take advantage of this situation and was able to involve the UN in solving the Korean problem. American and UN troops were sent to Korea.
The Americans hoped for a quick resolution of the conflict, but they were faced with a three-year bloody war, which was the result of the participation of the Chinese army in it. The Chinese victory, which cost a large number of casualties but forced the Americans to retreat, caused a state of shock in Western world. Military successes in the fight against American and UN troops, as well as pursuing a policy independent of Moscow, have increased China's international prestige. The Korean War showed that with China international affairs can no longer be ignored.
During the Korean War
Chinese troops in Korea
It is interesting to note that during the Korean War (in which the United States officially participated, but the USSR did not), Washington knew for certain that at least 150 Chinese aircraft were actually Soviet and flown by Soviet pilots. The Americans kept this information secret because they reasonably believed that Moscow did not at all want to be drawn into the war. In other words, the main concern of both sides was to prevent actions that could be regarded as steps towards starting a war between the powers.
On July 9, 1951, the USSR proposed a truce. Negotiations proceeded extremely sluggishly, and meanwhile the front line stabilized in the same positions where hostilities began - along the 38th parallel. On July 26, 1953, a truce was concluded. The war killed 4 million Koreans, 1 million Chinese, 54,246 Americans, 120 Soviet pilots 4th Fighter Aviation Corps.
Who do you think is primarily responsible for starting the Korean War?
The Korean War was a global event. It contributed to the development of the arms race. After the Korean War, the size of the army in the United States sharply increased from 1.5 million in 1948 to 3.2 million in 1951 (in the USSR, respectively, from 2.9 million to 3.1 million people). Under the influence of the Korean War, a decision was made to permanently dislocate American troops in Europe. Since the end of 1953, the United States began to deploy tactical nuclear weapons on the European continent.
During the war, the United States was able to win over the UN, tripled military spending, created NATO, and the opportunity arose to arm Germany, which happened in 1955.
4. Beginning of the confrontation in Indochina
The main metropolis in Indochina was France. The French appeared in South-East Asia relatively late, having conquered Indochina in mid-19th V. They subjugated the Vietnamese, who had ancient culture and a highly developed sense of national unity. The French united Vietnam with Laos and Cambodia, forming their colony of Indochina. The local elite willingly cooperated with the French administration. The French education system educated the local intelligentsia, a significant part of which fell under the influence of Marxism and took the path of fighting colonialism.
The French built roads, including railways, founded the University of Hanoi, schools, and hospitals. They fought illiteracy and epidemics, resulting in a reduction in the death rate among the Vietnamese. Unlike the British, they did not boast too much of their racial “superiority” and did a lot to develop the education system. Contacts with France were encouraged, resulting in the 1930s. A small Vietnamese elite visited there, including the future communist leader Ho Chi Minh, who created the party in 1929. The negative side of French domination was that the economic development of the country was dictated by the interests of the metropolis. Industrialization proceeded slowly. Overpopulation was a constant problem; the vast majority of Vietnam's 16 million peasants were poor, forced to pay high rents and taxes. Depression of the 1930s led to a fall in prices for rice and sugar; There were riots, which the French ruthlessly suppressed.
As a result of the military defeat of France by the Germans in the summer of 1940, its dominance in Indochina was greatly shaken; the colonial authorities began to cooperate with the Japanese, helping them hunt down local partisans. In the south of the country, communist units were destroyed, but in the north, communists led by Ho Chi Minh began to enjoy support. This had far-reaching consequences, since it was there that the Vietnamese Independence Struggle League (Viet Minh) arose.
During his lifetime, Ho Chi Minh became a legend, similar to the one associated with the names of Che Guevara, Castro, and Mao. After his death, Ho Chi Minh's embalmed body was placed in a glass coffin in a mausoleum in Hanoi. Despite the appeal to Marxism, the core of his worldview was nationalism. Ho Chi Minh had outstanding intellectual abilities, remaining an incorruptible and modest person in everyday life.
After the surrender of the Japanese, Ho Chi Minh, with the help of small detachments of General Nguyen Giap, who later became a famous military leader, established control over the main cities of the country and announced the creation of the independent Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). By the spring of 1946, French troops had established control in the south of the country. In December 1946, hostilities began, which continued sluggishly until 1950. The situation changed radically after the communist victory in China. Nguyen Giap now had heavy weapons provided by the Chinese authorities. After Mao's victory and the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States provided a $3 billion loan to the French to fight the Vietnam War. But despite the initial successes, the French were never able to defeat Ho Chi Minh and were defeated. The war increasingly changed its character and became part of the confrontation between two world military blocs.
Ho Chi Minh
French troops in Indochina (war 1946-1954)
At the Geneva International Conference on April 26, 1955, an agreement was reached on the delimitation of North and South Vietnam. In the summer of 1956 they were appointed general elections, the results of which were expected to unite the country. After the conference, the United States assumed responsibility for the fate of Vietnam. The Americans installed in power Ngo Dinh Diem, a tough nationalist, a representative of one of the most influential Vietnamese families, who refused to recognize the Geneva Accords. Meanwhile, Ho Chi Minh was preparing to resume the war for a unified communist Vietnam.
After the Communist victory in China, Vietnam began to seem to the West as a sphere of vital interest. US President Eisenhower proceeded from the “domino theory” and believed that if Vietnam fell into the hands of the Communists, the rest of Asia would follow. The United States prevented the unification of Vietnam and supported the puppet regime in the south of the country. On the other hand, Ho Chi Minh acted no less harshly, feeling the support of the USSR. With that regime on the brink of defeat, the United States entered the Vietnam War in 1965, which lasted until 1975. The Americans were defeated and withdrew from the country, dropping more bombs on it than were dropped in the entire Second World War.
5. Main problems of development of Hindustan
After World War II, the anti-colonial movement began to rise in India, Britain's richest colony. To weaken it, in 1946 a decision was made to hold elections to the Central Legislative Assembly. The victory of the secular Indian National Congress (INC), which did not express the interests of certain religious groups, aroused the displeasure of Muslims, who refused to trust the Hindus and demanded their representation in power. The INC, unwilling to meet the demands of Muslims, emphasized its desire to become the only national party representing the interests of both Hindus and Muslims. This is what prompted the Muslim League under the leadership of Muhammad Ali Jinnah to break with the INC and embark on the path of separatism, which led to the emergence of the state of Pakistan. In August 1947, the independence law was passed, providing for the creation of two states. Former colony was divided along religious lines into India, in which the majority of the population professed Hinduism, and Pakistan, in which the Muslim population predominated. Independence Day was celebrated for the first time on August 14 in India and August 15, 1947 in Pakistan. But before the holidays ended, tragedy began. During August and September 1947, up to 500 thousand Muslims were killed who were leaving the Indian half of eastern Punjab (Pyatirechye). Militant Sikhs (representatives of a religious doctrine different from Islam and Hinduism) did not spare even women and children, stopped trains crowded with refugees, and killed everyone in cold blood. Killings of Hindus also took place in Pakistan, but on a much smaller scale. The Muslim League tried to survive the Sikhs and Hindus who found themselves in Pakistan. Millions of refugees crossed the border in both directions in search of salvation, driven mad by the horror of intercommunal war. 9-10 million Muslims fled from India; There were very few Hindus left in West Pakistan, but there were about 30 million in East Pakistan. Communal clashes and killings occurred later, but never reached the horrific proportions of 1947.
The transfer of power in India from the British to the national government turned into a catastrophic massacre. Among the victims was the founder of the Indian National Congress, M. Gandhi, who was killed in January 1948 by a Hindu extremist. A certain share of the blame for this bloodshed lies with the previous colonial administration, which did not have a clear concept of a multinational state, and the new authorities, which contributed to the tension through irresponsible statements or inaction.
J. Nehru
After gaining independence in political life India adopted a parliamentary system. The first Indian government and the INC was headed by Gandhi's ally Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964), the founder of the largest political dynasty: after his death, he was Prime Minister in 1966-1977 and 1980-1984. was his daughter I. Gandhi, and then in 1984-1991. The government was headed by his grandson, R. Gandhi. Having become one of the leaders of the movement of non-aligned countries, India has gained high prestige in the international arena. Great assistance in the construction of modern industrial India was provided by the Soviet Union, under whose strong ideological influence J. Nehru was.
During the years of independence in India, economic reforms. The largest measure to modernize the country was the agrarian reform, which limited large-scale landownership. But the problem of peasant landlessness remained unresolved.
In the 1960-1980s. There is an expansion of public sector activities. 14 large banks were nationalized, the activities of monopolies were limited, and a “green revolution” was carried out, which solved the country’s food problems. The growth and strengthening of the bureaucracy, the insufficient efficiency of a number of enterprises became one of the reasons for the change in India's economic course in the 1990s, during which some public sector organizations were nationalized, a number of state-owned enterprises were corporatized, and the Indian market was opened to freer imports.
India is coping with food difficulties. Despite the fact that India is among the top ten countries in the world in terms of industrial production, acute domestic political problems still remain unresolved. These include national-religious strife, which resulted in clashes between Hindus and Muslims, the Sikh movement for autonomy, and the uprising of Tamil separatists (a people in South India) in the south of the country. I. Gandhi died at the hands of the Sikhs in 1984, and in 1991, during the election campaign, R. Gandhi was killed by a Tamil terrorist.
Unlike India, Pakistan declared an Islamic republic with a strong presidency. Pakistan's disagreement with the terms of territorial delimitation, which believed that a number of Muslim regions mistakenly became part of India, became the reason for repeated armed conflicts between countries. In Pakistan, like in India, economic reforms were carried out, but less radical. It was these reforms that caused sharp contradictions between West Pakistan and East Bengal, whose opposition parties advocated secession from Pakistan. In 1971, a bloody civil war began, as a result of which a new state appeared on the world map - the People's Republic of Bangladesh.
After the surrender of Japan in August 1945, Indonesian independence was declared. Its owners, the militarily weak Dutch, refused to voluntarily leave this country. Relying on the British, they restored their power, but they were unable to establish complete control over the fifth largest country in the world. In December 1949, Holland recognized the limited sovereignty of Indonesia, and in August 1950, having evacuated its troops (85 thousand people) and the colonial administration, granted it full independence.
The victorious national liberation movement was led by Ahmed Sukarno. His ideology was a mixture of Islamic, Marxist, liberal slogans, decorated with sonorous phraseology. In 1959, he established an authoritarian regime of “guided democracy” and was proclaimed president for life. Majority political parties, including the Indonesian Communist Party (CPI), supported his actions. The slogan “Nationalization, religion, communism” was proclaimed in the country, which meant the cooperation of three ideological directions.
Another of Sukarno's slogans was: "A nation always needs an enemy." This is where the idea of “Greater Indonesia” arose, which presupposed external expansion and the search for internal enemies. The persecution of the Chinese (“enemy within”) and their flight led to the breakdown of the internal trade system in Indonesia, as Chinese population engaged primarily in intermediary operations. The country's economy was collapsing due to gross government intervention. Political tension grew, which was not least caused by the actions of the Communist Party of Ukraine, which was the third largest communist party in the world (3.5 million people) after the Soviet and Chinese. KPI during agrarian reform advocated the self-seizure by peasants of land that belonged to large owners. Not knowing what to do with the opposition of the military (dissatisfied with the collapse of the country), and wanting to get rid of it, Sukarno approved the conspiracy of the communists, who on October 1, 1965 launched a putsch and began the massacre. But the commander of the reserve forces, General Suharto, seized power into his own hands. A terrible retribution followed: according to local custom, the massacre was massive - everyone involved in the conspiracy was declared guilty, and entire families had to atone for their guilt. The number of victims, according to some estimates, reached 1 million people.
The failure of the coup attempt led to the defeat of the Indonesian Communist Party, the physical destruction of its supporters and the subsequent removal of Sukarno from power, which occurred on February 22, 1967. Subsequently, he was under house arrest in his country palace. Since Sukarno was a symbol of national independence for Indonesians, his grave became a place of pilgrimage and annual mass memorial gatherings on the day of his death.
Name the reasons for the fall of the Sukarno regime. Do you agree that the failure of his policies was natural?
In 1968-1998. The country's president was General Suharto. This period was characterized by the predominant influence of the military in all spheres of society, providing ample opportunities for foreign capital. In the political life of the country, Muslim parties have come to the fore (90% of the country's population are Muslims). The growing influence of Islamic fundamentalists led to open clashes with the authorities, as a result of which the Suharto regime fell.
In modern Indonesia, many unresolved problems remain, such as the fight against separatism, corruption and terrorism. There are still religious clashes here. But the problem of extreme poverty among the poorest segments of the population remains the most acute.
7. Confrontation in the Arab world and the problem of Israel during the Cold War
After the end of the First World War, the Arab world had the chance to create a unified Arab state in which the Arabic language and Muslim culture would become the cementing foundation. However, these plans were not destined to come true, since a secret agreement in 1916 between Great Britain and France divided Turkey's Arab inheritance.
After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the three nations inhabiting it - the Kurds, Armenians and Palestinians - were denied their own state. Arab lands became mandate territories of Great Britain and France (Syria and Lebanon). In 1920, colonial administration of Palestine was established. The British allowed Jews to emigrate to Palestine, but did not allow them to found their own state. This was less than the Zionists wanted, but more than the Arabs were willing to concede. Another British mandate was on the opposite bank of the Jordan River. England's policy in Palestine was characterized by inconsistency and uncertainty, but on the whole the British administration tended to side with the Arabs.
After Hitler came to power, Jewish immigration increased sharply. By 1935, their number in Palestine reached 60 thousand people. Arab resistance increased accordingly, as the Arabs feared that their faith and way of life would be threatened by the increasing number of Jews. The Arabs believed that the claims of the Jews were exorbitant - according to the tradition of ownership ancient Israel included most of modern Syria and Jordan, as well as the territory of the Egyptian Sinai and modern Israel.
Since the beginning of the 20th century. Jews, under the influence of Zionist propaganda, arrived in Palestine, bought land there, and created kibbutzim (communes with an almost complete absence of private property). The majority of the Arab population viewed the arrival of the Zionists as a blessing, since the Jews, with their tenacity and hard work, turned the barren land of Palestine into fertile plantations. This attitude towards the Zionists offended representatives of the local Arab elite, who were proud of their ancient culture and were indignant at the epithet “backward.” With the growing flow of emigrants Jewish community became more and more Europeanized, democratic and socialist, while the Arab community remained traditional, patriarchal.
During the period between the world wars, the leader of Arab nationalists was the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Muhammad Amin al-Husseini, head of the largest landowning clan in Palestine. Al-Husseini took an active part in anti-Jewish pogroms in 1929. He organized the systematic extermination of moderate Arabs, of whom there were quite a few in Palestine.
For the purposes of self-defense, the Jewish Agency, with the permission of Churchill, created an independent Jewish Brigade within the British Army, which became the core of the Haganah, the defensive force of the Jewish Agency in 1920-1948. (with the formation of the Jewish state, the Haganah became the basis of the Israel Defense Forces).
In counterbalance to Arab terrorism, the most radical Zionists formed their own terrorist organization, the Irgun.
On November 29, 1947, the UN General Assembly voted by a majority vote for the abolition of the British Mandate regime in Palestine and the creation of two states on its territory - Arab and Jewish. On May 14, 1948, Israel's independence was declared, while the Palestinian Arabs did not follow the example of the Jews in anticipation of Israel's short life. Soon, four Arab states (Egypt, Libya, Jordan and Syria) began war against Israel.
It was assumed that the Jews would be defeated, since the army of Egypt consisted of 10 thousand soldiers, Jordan - 4.5 thousand, Syria - 7 thousand, Iraq - 3 thousand; several thousand people were part of the Arab Liberation Army, made up of Palestinians. According to the UN decision, the Arab state was allocated 43% of the territory of Palestine with a population of about 800 thousand Arabs and 95 thousand Jews, and the Jewish state - 56% of the territory with a population of about 499 thousand Jews and about 510 thousand Arabs.
Of great importance at the time of the proclamation of the state of Israel was the position of Stalin, who wanted to undermine British positions in the Middle East by recognizing the Jewish state. To increase chaos, he ordered the sale of weapons to Israel through Czechoslovakia.
The Haganah, which numbered 21 thousand soldiers, initially did not have heavy weapons; it even lacked rifles. It was the Czechoslovak communists, on the orders of the Soviet leader, who made the defense of Israel possible by allocating an air base for the transfer of weapons to Tel Aviv. The Israelis launched a warning strike in April 1948, which was carried out using Czechoslovak weapons. By December, thanks to foreign arms supplies, Israel already had a well-armed army of 100,000 and established military superiority over the Arabs.
The creation of the State of Israel caused a problem with Arab refugees (650 thousand people). In response to this, in 1947-1957. 567 thousand Jews left Arab countries. All of them, unlike the Palestinians, were well-appointed before 1960. Arab countries chose to keep refugees in camps, where they remained as hostages, to justify subsequent wars.
Israeli tanks on the approaches to the Golan Heights in the Six-Day War of 1967.
Life from war to war, surrounded by hostile Arab countries - this is a feature of the history of the Jewish people after the proclamation of the State of Israel.
Chronicle of events
1956 - a combined contingent of troops from Great Britain, France and Israel occupied the Sinai Peninsula, but under pressure from the USSR and the USA, the troops were withdrawn from the occupied territories.
1967 - large-scale Israeli offensive. The result of the war, which lasted six days, was the annexation by Israel of the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza, the Golan Heights, the West Bank of the Jordan River, and the establishment of control over Jerusalem.
1973 - Egyptian army invades the Sinai Peninsula; Syrian army occupied the Golan Heights. During the three-week war, Israel managed to stop the advance of Arab troops and go on the offensive.
1978 - signing of the Camp David Accords, which became the basis for the conclusion of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979.
In the Israeli-Arab conflict, the countries that opposed the Cold War took different sides. So, if in Germany the victory of the Jews was welcomed, then in the GDR, on the contrary, they sympathized with the Arabs who were subjected to “brazen imperialist provocation.”
During the Cold War, neither the USSR nor the USA managed to win the Middle Eastern countries to their side. The leaders of the Middle Eastern states were more concerned with their internal and regional problems and used the antagonism between the USSR and the USA to their own advantage. The Soviet Union played an important role in supplying weapons to Israel's main opponents - Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. This, in turn, gave incentive to the United States and other Western countries to support Israel in their quest to oust the USSR from the global and Middle Eastern arms market. As a result of this competition, the rival Middle Eastern nations were abundantly supplied with the most modern weapons. The natural consequence of this policy was to turn the Middle East into one of the most dangerous places in the world.
Questions and tasks
1. Why so different countries Can Asia and Africa be united under the concept of “third world”? 2. Do you agree that the Chinese model of socialism had a clearly national character? Give reasons for your position. 3. Why is the Korean War considered one of the high points of the Cold War? 4. What was common in the historical destinies of Vietnam and Korea after independence? How were they different? How did the Cold War affect the development of these countries? 5. Why did the confrontation arise in the Middle East? 6. What was Israel's problem during the Cold War? 7. Why do you think that during the Cold War, neither the USSR nor the USA managed to completely win over the Middle Eastern countries to their side?
Studying the source
From the statement of the Soviet government about armed aggression against Egypt: “Egypt has become a victim of aggression. Israeli troops invaded its territory and the threat of landing of British and French troops loomed.<...>The actions of the Israeli government constitute an act of armed aggression and are an open violation of the Charter of the United Nations. The facts show that the Israeli invasion was clearly designed to be used as a pretext for the Western powers, primarily England and France, to send their troops into the territory of the Arab states, in particular the Suez Canal zone. The Western powers cover up their aggressive actions with references to the colonialist declaration of the United States of America, England and France in 1950, which was unanimously rejected by all Arab states.<...>The Soviet government believes that the UN Security Council, in the name of preserving peace and tranquility in the Near and Middle East, must take immediate measures to stop the aggressive actions of England, France and Israel against Egypt and to immediately withdraw intervention troops from Egyptian territory.”
Name the year in which this document appeared. Why did the USSR Government support Egypt in this conflict? Using the text of the document and additional sources of information, explain how the Cold War affected the course of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Point of view
K. Weathersby, American historian
Despite the unanswered questions about Soviet policy in Korea in 1945-1950, the evidence at our disposal indicates that North Korea's attack on South Korea in June 1950 was not the result of the USSR's determination to expand its territory, much less an initial step in broader plans for Soviet intervention in the American sphere of influence. In reality, Stalin's goals in Korea were limited. He sought to establish a buffer state in North Korea in order to protect the Soviet Union from a possible attack from the peninsula. Stalin also wanted to get certain things from Korea material resources and strengthen the political position of the Soviet Union by creating another "people's democracy" in the territory occupied by Soviet army at the end of the war.
As you remember, the site decided to start a series of articles that we devoted to quite deep and serious topics. Last time we looked at the question of why the USSR collapsed, this time we want to consider an equally serious, and from a historical and analytical point of view, a very interesting episode called the “Cold War”. Many representatives of the younger generation have heard about this, and some even witnessed these events and remember all the tense moments of this conflict. Now many people use this concept as a common noun, in a situation of a “bad world”, but, nevertheless, today in the political aspect the Cold War is relevant again, but this is a topic for a separate article. Today we will briefly look at the Cold War during the period of relations between the USSR and the USA.
What is the Cold War
The Cold War is a period of time when there was confrontation between two superpowers, and as you understand, it was between the USSR and the USA. This concept was used because the two countries were not engaged in a weapons war. And in all other, mostly peaceful ways. It seems that diplomatic relations were maintained between the countries, and sometimes the peaks of confrontation subsided, meanwhile, a quiet struggle was constantly going on in all areas and directions.The years of the Cold War are counted from 1946 to 1991. The Cold War began with the end of World War II, and ended with the collapse of the USSR. The essence of the Cold War was to establish world dominance by one country and defeat the other.
Causes of the Cold War
After the end of World War II, when both superpowers considered themselves victors in this war, they wanted to build the world situation at their own discretion. Each of them wanted to dominate the world, while both countries had diametrically opposed systems of government and ideology. Subsequently, such a confrontation would become part of the ideology of the two countries; the Soviet Union wanted to destroy America and establish communism throughout the world, and the United States wanted to “save” the world from the USSR.
If we analyze everything that happened, we can say with confidence that this is an artificial conflict, since any ideology must have its enemy, and both the USA for the USSR and the USSR for America were ideal options as an enemy. Moreover, the Soviet people hated the mythical enemies of the Americans, although they perceived the inhabitants of America as normal, just like the Americans - they were afraid of the mythical “Russians” who do not sleep, but think about how to conquer and attack America, although they had nothing against the inhabitants of the union themselves . Therefore, it is safe to say that the Cold War was a conflict of leaders and ideologies, inflated due to their own ambitions.
Cold War politics
First of all, both countries tried to enlist the support of other countries in their course. The USA supported all the countries of Western Europe, when the USSR was supported by the countries of Asia and Latin America. Essentially, during the Cold War, the world was divided into two confrontational camps. Moreover, there were only a few neutral countries.
Most of all, the aggravation of the political situation was caused by the Cold War conflicts, in particular, we will highlight only two of them: the Berlin and Cuban missile crises. It was they who became the catalyst for the deterioration of the situation, and the world was really on the brink of a nuclear war, which, fortunately, was prevented and the situation was defused.
The constant race, in everything, was also part of the Cold War. First of all, there was an arms race, both countries were developing various types of weapons: new military equipment, weapons (mostly mass destruction), missiles, spy equipment, etc. There was also a propaganda race on television and in other sources; fierce propaganda was constantly carried out against the enemy. The race was not only in the military sphere, but also in science, culture and sports. Each country sought to overtake the other.
Both countries constantly monitored each other, and there were spies and intelligence agents on both sides.
But, probably, to a greater extent, the Cold War took place on foreign territory. As the situation accumulated, both countries installed long-range missiles in countries neighboring the enemy; for the USA it was Turkey and the countries of Western Europe, while for the USSR it was the countries of Latin America.
Results of the Cold War
Many people often wonder who won the Cold War? Maybe. America won the Cold War, since this war ended with the fall of its enemy, and the main reason for the end of the Cold War was the collapse of the USSR, not the fact that it was not the work of the American intelligence services.
If we talk about the results, then none of the countries (the USA and Russia) learned any useful lessons, except that the enemy does not sleep and is always ready.
If there had been no Cold War, then all the enormous potential of the two countries could have been used for peaceful purposes: space exploration, new technologies, etc. It is possible that mobile phones, the Internet, etc. If scientists had appeared 20 years earlier, instead of developing weapons, they would have been engaged in solving various world mysteries, of which there are a huge number.
