Yeltsin's economic reforms and their results. B. Yeltsin's political and economic reforms

1. Beginning of reforms …………………………………… .. ……………………… ...... 2

2. New political regime ……………………………………………… ..4

3. The threat of the disintegration of Russia and the military-political crisis in Chechnya …………… 5

4. Formation of "oligarchic capitalism" in Russia ………………… .6

5. The political crisis of 1998-1999 ……………………………………… ... 9

6. Foreign policy of President B.N. Yeltsin ……………………………… 10

List of used literature ………………………………………… ... 16

1. Beginning of reforms

Autumn - winter 1991-1992 Russia is faced with the most important tasks of state building.

The RSFSR had an insignificant administrative apparatus, and a long and difficult regrouping of personnel and entire structures from the apparatus of the union level began. In a number of cases, new authorities had to be formed.

At the time of the collapse of the USSR, the Russian Federation did not have borders approved by treaties with neighboring states, there was no customs and border services. Only on May 7, 1992 the President of Russia B.N. Yeltsin signed a decree on the creation of the Russian Armed Forces. Until that moment, Russia had no army and navy. A serious dispute arose over the Black Sea Fleet between Russia and Ukraine. Little separated Crimea from the outbreak of hostilities at that moment. It was with great difficulty that politicians managed to avoid such a development of events.

After the collapse of the USSR, there were no guarantees that the Russian Federation would preserve its unity. Autonomous republics of the RSFSR in 1990-1991 proclaimed their state sovereignty, took part in the preparation of the Union Treaty. Separatism was a real threat, which was clearly shown by the events in Chechnya, where on November 1, 1991, J. Dudayev declared the independence of the self-proclaimed Chechen Republic.

However, the attention of Russian society and the Russian leadership was focused not on state building, but on the economy. The collapse of the consumer market was considered the main problem and the most dire threat. Although the best harvest in several years was harvested in 1991, the state's bins were empty - the farms were holding back the grain. The shop counters were also empty. In Moscow in the fall of 1991, many grocery stores sold nothing but hot spices. Winter was coming, and famine had to be feared.

The economic crisis has focused the focus of President Yeltsin and the government on economic issues. In the keynote speech at the V Congress people's deputies RSFSR October 28, 1991 B.N. Yeltsin proclaimed the beginning of radical market reforms in 1992. The President, in particular, made the following forecast: “It will be the worst for everyone for about six months, then - a decrease in prices, filling the consumer market with goods. And by the fall of 1992, as I promised before the elections, stabilization of the economy, a gradual improvement in people's lives ”1.

The government formed by Yeltsin on November 10, 1991 was supposed to carry out the market reform. The economic bloc in the new government was headed by Doctor of Economics, renowned publicist E.T. Gaidar. He believed that indecision in price reform had ruined the government of the Soviet Union and the Union itself. Ironically, it was the decisiveness in price reform that killed the "Gaidar government" a year later. Gaidar identified the priorities of the new Russian government: price liberalization, freedom of trade, privatization of state property. At the end of December 1991, the government's economic program was formalized by a decree of the President of Russia and received official support from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation 2.

The main steps of the reform program were:

Liberalization of prices and trade... One-time introduction of free prices since January 1992. The expected consequences are the establishment of the market value of goods, the elimination of the commodity deficit, the launch of a competition mechanism, the stimulation of business activity, the acceleration of trade, the formation of an infrastructure for the sale of domestic and imported products.

Financial stabilization... The expected results are a decrease in inflation, the establishment of a stable ruble exchange rate.

Widespread privatization of state property... The expected results are the transformation of the population into owners, the formation of economic incentives in people for business activity.

Price liberalization began on January 2, 1992. About 90% of wholesale and retail prices became free. A presidential decree "On Free Trade" was issued, which introduced a revolutionary transition to a new system of economic relations. The decree gave all enterprises, regardless of their form of ownership and all citizens, the right to carry out trade, procurement and intermediary activities without special permits, including setting prices independently. The stock (planned and controlled by the state) distribution of industrial products was canceled. Citizens and enterprises were allowed to trade (including from hands, from stalls and from cars) in any places convenient for them, except for the carriageway of streets and roads, metro stations, etc.

In parallel, measures were taken to stabilize the budget and reduce the budget deficit. The state has actually stopped investing in industry and agriculture. All government spending, especially related to the production of weapons and support for friendly countries, were sharply reduced or stopped altogether. The tax system was changed - a value added tax was introduced at a rate of 28%. This made it possible to support the revenue side of the budget, but accelerated the rise in prices.

In agriculture, the team of reformers embarked on the path of reorganizing collective and state farms into joint-stock companies and partnerships, supporting farms. In most cases, the reorganization was just a formality. The real transformation was freedom of economic activity.

The effect of these measures has been controversial. By the spring of 1992, the consumer market was saturated with goods. Cheese, butter, sausage appeared in stores, queues decreased. Street trading was actively developing. The threat of the collapse of the national economy and the complete collapse of economic ties was eliminated. The shortage of goods was replaced by a shortage of money. As a result, the ruble earned - this is what the reformers at that time considered the main condition for overcoming the economic crisis.

The destruction of old economic schemes and the freeing up of space for market relations was carried out quickly and on a large scale. However, the filling of the counters was not achieved due to the growth of production. On the contrary, in 1992 the gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 14.5%, industrial production by 18%, and investment in fixed assets by 40%. The consumer market was restored by lower consumption and higher imports. Financial stabilization did not take place - inflation amounted to a fantastic 2509%. The fall in production and high inflation caused a breakdown in economic ties, which led to a crisis in production. Inflation has devalued the working capital of enterprises. A crisis of non-payments began - enterprises supplied almost half of their products without receiving payment. In this situation, enterprises switched to natural exchange of products (barter). Barter for all 1990s became a chronic problem of the Russian economy.

The financial situation of citizens has sharply deteriorated. Consumer prices in 1992 increased 26.1 times, in the first months of reforms - 10-12 times. In such a situation, the increase in wages and pensions by 70%, carried out since January 1, 1992, turned out to be scanty and led to the fact that the majority of the population found itself below the poverty line. Savings stored in savings banks were quickly devalued, and inflation rates significantly outstripped the growth of wages. Public sector workers, primarily kindergarten workers, teachers and doctors, were on the brink of survival.

In parallel, privatization was unfolding. Its essence consisted in the transfer of property rights from the state to private individuals. Nomenclature privatization went on spontaneously back in 1989-1991. Gaidar's government and especially headed by A.B. Chubais State Committee Property Management (GKI) began privatization with a struggle against nomenklatura privatization.

2. New political regime

The legal foundations of the new political regime were laid by the new Constitution. According to this Constitution, the legislative power was exercised by the parliament - the Federal Assembly, consisting of two chambers. The lower house - the State Duma - consisted of deputies elected directly by citizens of the Russian Federation. The upper chamber - the Federation Council - included representatives of the legislative and executive authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation. Federal executive power was exercised by the government of the Russian Federation, headed by the chairman of the government. The Prime Minister was appointed by the President with the consent of the State Duma. To obtain consent, the President introduced a candidate for the post of head of government to the chamber. If the Duma rejected the proposed candidates three times, the President dissolved the House and called new elections. The president had the right to dismiss the government. The State Duma had the right to express no confidence in the government. In the event of a repeated expression of no confidence within three months, the President had to either dismiss the government or dissolve the Duma and call new elections. Thus, the new Constitution eliminated the conflict between the legislative and executive powers, similar to that which took place in 1992-1993. At the same time, the President received a significant advantage over parliament.

A key role in the system state power henceforth, the President of the Russian Federation played, who was not part of any of the branches of government. The President was the head of state. He acted as the guarantor of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, human and civil rights and freedoms, determined the main directions of domestic and foreign policy of the state, issued decrees and orders binding on the entire territory of the Russian Federation. As the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armed Forces, the President became the head of all power departments. The only significant limitation established by the Constitution for the President is the rule that it is impossible for one person to hold the presidency for more than two consecutive terms. Political institutions at the turn of the millennium.

During the same period, nostalgia for the modest but safe life of the Soviet era grew in Russian society. Resentment grew that Russia had lost its place in the world. These sentiments ensured the strengthening of the positions of the communists, who had recently been expelled from the political scene of the country, and the loss of the electorate by the liberals. First place in voting under the proportional system in the elections of deputies The State Duma the second convocation in December 1995 was occupied by the Communist Party. An opposition majority has formed in the State Duma.

3. The threat of the disintegration of Russia and the military-political crisis in Chechnya

After the collapse of the USSR, there were no guarantees that the Russian Federation would not suffer the same fate. After all, the autonomous republics of the RSFSR in 1990-1991. proclaimed their state sovereignty, took part in the preparation of the Union Treaty. Interethnic tensions began to be felt inside Russia as well. The destruction of Soviet identity led to an increase in ethnic self-awareness. Characteristic in this regard is the wave of renaming of the republics of Russia: Mari El, Sakha (Yakutia), Khalmg Tangch (Kalmykia), etc. The new names reflected the growth of ethnic identification. In October 1992, an armed conflict broke out between Ossetians and Ingush in the Prigorodny region of North Ossetia. On November 1, 1992, by decree of President B.N. Yeltsin, troops were brought into the conflict zone and by November 4, armed clashes were over, but their consequences have not been overcome to this day.

The military-political crisis in Chechnya

The events in Chechnya became the peak of the Federation's crisis. In September 1991, the executive committee of the National Congress of the Chechen People, headed by J. Dudayev, seized power in Grozny, announcing the creation of the Chechen Republic. On November 1, 1991, J. Dudaev proclaimed the state independence of the Chechen Republic. 1992-1994 trains were plundered from month to month, the non-Chechen population was expelled from Chechnya. In May - July 1994, buses with hostages were seized three times in the region of the Caucasian Mineral Waters; the terrorists demanded a ransom and a helicopter to fly to Chechnya.

The Russian leadership decided to take forceful measures. President Yeltsin issued a decree on holding military operation to restore constitutional order in Chechnya. On December 11, 1994, hostilities began.

Yeltsin's attempt to stop the country's collapse yielded mixed results. In the context of a continuous struggle with the opposition, the collapse of the army, the degradation of the economy, the military campaign only intensified the crisis. It turned out that the country's leadership was unable to solve the Chechen problem either by force or by political means. In fact, Chechnya fell out of Russia. 3

4. Formation of "oligarchic capitalism" in Russia

During the presidency of B.N. Yeltsin, the oligarchs became the system-forming factor of the new social system. In its current meaning, the term "oligarchs" has been used since December 1997. The oligarchs meant an extremely narrow circle, only one and a half to two dozen individuals.

Russian oligarchs were not an economic but rather a political phenomenon. These are the persons who made their business close to the authorities and influenced the adoption of government decisions. They carried out a kind of usurpation of power.

The rise of the oligarchs is closely related to two events - the 1995 mortgage auctions and the 1996-1997 privatization deals.

For all the scandalousness of privatization deals in the mid-1990s. there was an extremely important positive point in them. The strategically important enterprises were acquired by Russian, not foreign businessmen. This was a principled position, deliberately chosen by the state and personally supervising the privatization of A.B. Chubais: when the state is replaced by private capital in the role of owner, control over key sectors of the economy for the country should be retained within Russia.

The mechanism of borrowing, launched in 1996 by the state through the system of state treasury obligations (GKO), by 1998 led to a natural crisis. By purchasing GKOs, the banks provided loans to the state. However, the volume of borrowings grew, confidence in their return was melting, and therefore the state had to agree to more and more interest.

In 1997, on the initiative of A.B. Chubais, who was then first deputy prime minister, was sequestrated - a sharp cut in budget expenditures. In 1997, the decline in production stopped. The economy is showing signs of recovery. But they turned out to be short-term and affected only some processing and raw materials industries. By 1998, Russia's real GDP was 57% of the 1990 level. The decline was higher than during the Great Depression in the United States.

By 1998, the debt of the Russian Federation to international credit organizations and domestic creditors, thanks to the GKO pyramid, grew exponentially. The practice of softening the pungency flourished social problems due to borrowed money, which then were not compensated by anything. The growing budget deficit was considered the norm; in fact, the country lived on debt. As a result, the volume of borrowings became too large. The situation was aggravated by an unfavorable international environment, which was characterized by two tendencies that were painful for Russia. The first is the international financial crisis, which broke out in the fall of 1997. The markets of the Southeast Asian countries were destabilized. Many stocks began to fall in value, and investors began to withdraw money to more reliable markets in Europe and the United States. Russia fell into this wave. Investments began to leave the economy. For the country, this meant that there would be a reduction in tax collections, a decline in production and non-fulfillment of budgetary obligations. The second problem is the sharp drop in oil prices since the beginning of 1998. As a result, they dropped below $ 10 per barrel, which made oil exports from Russia unprofitable 4.

An important factor in the development of the crisis was the fact that a significant part of the attention and efforts of the Russian elite was aimed at resolving political rather than economic problems. In March 1998, President B.N. Yeltsin dismissed the government of V.S. Chernomyrdin. Almost 8 years later, in February 2006, he admitted that his decision was wrong and publicly apologized to Chernomyrdin. The new prime minister was 35-year-old energy minister S.V. Kirienko. It was approved by the State Duma only on the third attempt, that is, under the threat of dissolution, at the end of April, and the government was formed only by mid-May 1998. Due to the change of government, an agreement with Russia's leading external creditor - the International Monetary Fund (IMF ) on the financing of the program in 1998 was concluded only at the end of June, which gave rise to uncertainty and uncertainty in the markets.

The economy needed immediate anti-crisis measures, a package of which was prepared by the Cabinet of Ministers. It included a number of legislative acts that the State Duma was supposed to adopt. The Duma only partially met the government halfway; on the whole, the package was not approved. The time for adequate decisions was lost.

The burden of debt grew rapidly, especially in connection with the rise in interest rates on GKOs. In the summer of 1998, the government had to pay 60 billion dollars in external and internal debt. Pension debts at the end of March 1998 amounted to about 1 billion rubles (at the rate of 6.5 rubles per dollar), the debt on the defense order - 17 billion rubles. Revenues in the same period amounted to just over $ 20 billion.

In addition, the debts of the USSR were on Russia. The sharply deteriorating economic situation made it necessary to ask for a deferred payment of debts, to which Western creditors were forced to agree. The deterioration of relations with Iraq, Cuba, Libya and other traditional allies of the USSR, which began in the years of perestroika, made it problematic for them to recover their old Soviet debts. Nevertheless, in 1997 Russia recognized the indebtedness of the tsarist and Provisional governments to the French holders of Russian valuable papers, but paid, in fact, token compensation.

Ultimately, on August 17, 1998, the RF government and the RF Central Bank issued a joint statement. The ruble was devalued and a default was declared (refusal to pay debts). In addition, a moratorium was introduced on the payment of debts of commercial banks to foreign investors. The Central Bank insisted on this measure, explaining that banks protected by a moratorium from the claims of foreign creditors would be able to ensure the return of funds to individual depositors. In fact, the owners of banks, as a rule, used the moratorium in their own favor, and not in the interests of citizens. An unprecedented scandal broke out. On August 23 B.N. Yeltsin sent the government to S.V. Kiriyenko to resign. The President introduced the candidacy of V.S. Chernomyrdin as head of government. However, parliament rejected this proposal twice. The financial crisis turned into a political one. In the event of a third rejection of Chernomyrdin's candidacy, the dissolution of the Duma was inevitable. In this situation, President B.N. Yeltsin made a compromise with parliament. In September 1998, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Academician E.M. Primakov.

5. The political crisis of 1998 - 1999.

As a result of the default on August 17, 1998, the entire Russian banking system was on the verge of collapse. Several large banks went bankrupt. Household deposits in commercial banks fell by 15% in ruble terms, and in real terms - by 52%. Depositors could not get their money from commercial banks. The prices of consumer goods rose sharply. Many firms went bankrupt. Hundreds of thousands of people belonging to the so-called middle class have lost their jobs and sources of income.

Nevertheless, the threefold devaluation of the ruble allowed the economy to enter a recovery period. The fall of the ruble made it possible for the products of domestic producers to compete with imported goods. The situation in the economy began to stabilize since the beginning of 1999, when some favorable trends appeared, in particular the growth of production, especially in the field of consumer goods and food. The consequence of this was an increase in tax revenues to the budget.

However, the political crisis continued. Indeed, in the summer of 1998, the second half of the second and last (according to the Constitution) presidential term of B.N. Yeltsin. The search for a successor began, which could not but exacerbate the struggle between the groups.

The 1993 constitution eliminated the post of vice president. The second person of the state, to which power is temporarily transferred in the event of the resignation or death of the President, is the Prime Minister appointed and dismissed by the President himself. This created colossal uncertainty and gave the President virtually unlimited possibilities in choosing a successor.

The crisis continued to grow. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation began the struggle for Yeltsin's early resignation, for which voting was organized in the State Duma and the Federation Council. After B.N. Yeltsin publicly declared: "I will not go anywhere!"

The situation was complicated by the fact that President B.N. For a long time, Yeltsin and his entourage could not find a person about whom they would be convinced that he would protect them from prosecution or any extrajudicial reprisal. The new Russian elite, who feared the coming of the communist opposition to power no less than B.N. Yeltsin, faced the temptation to sacrifice Yeltsin himself for the sake of protecting their interests. The process of self-organization of the elite began in order to determine a successor independently of Yeltsin. Its political expression was the creation of the movements "Fatherland" (leader YM Luzhkov) and "All Russia" (leader of the President of Tatarstan M.Sh. Shaimiev). Luzhkov was more and more clearly preparing to become a presidential candidate. Another likely candidate was the chairman of the government E.M. Primakov.

On May 13-15, 1999, the Duma considered the issue of removing President Yeltsin from office. The charges against the President included five counts: destruction Soviet Union and the weakening of the Russian Federation through the conclusion and implementation of the Belovezhskaya agreements; a coup d'état in September 1993; unleashing and conducting military operations in the Chechen Republic; weakening of the defense and security of the Russian Federation; genocide of the Russian people. 300 votes were required to support the prosecution. The vote was roll-call. From 238 (on the fifth point of accusation) to 283 (on the third) deputies voted for impeachment.

After the failure of the attempt to remove the President as a candidate for prime minister, Yeltsin proposed S.V. Stepashin. The demoralized deputies immediately agreed to his appointment.

However, the crisis did not end there. After his resignation, Primakov joined Luzhkov's movement. The Fatherland - All Russia (OVR) bloc was created. The split in the elite and in the government became obvious.

This moment seemed extremely favorable for the adventurers who did not abandon their plans to change the situation in the North Caucasus. In 1998, the "Congress of the Peoples of Ichkeria and Dagestan" was created in Chechnya, proclaiming the creation of an "Islamic Caliphate in the Caucasus" as its goal. Attacks on the territories and regions of Russia bordering on the territory of the republic sharply intensified.

On May 19, 1999, during a meeting with the Director of the FSB, Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin, President B.N. Yeltsin signed a decree "On additional measures to combat terrorism in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation."

In parallel with the events in the Caucasus, an election campaign was unfolding. The citizens of Russia supported the actions of the federal authorities, despite the calls of a number of politicians and public figures to grant Chechnya independence and cease hostilities. The support of the population was clearly manifested in the growth of trust in Vladimir Putin. In August, after becoming prime minister, his approval rating was 10%. In October, after the ouster of militants from Dagestan and the start of the anti-terrorist campaign in Chechnya, his rating rose to 20%. The successful destruction of terrorists and militants by federal forces, the encirclement of Grozny and the firm determination of the country's leadership to bring the operation to destroy the bandit state to the end led to the growth of V.V. Putin to 45% at the end of November 1999

6. Foreign policy of President B.N. Yeltsin

The final " cold war". Armed conflicts on the territory of the CIS

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR meant a radical change in the global balance of power. The Soviet sphere of influence covered dozens of states, political parties and movements, to which the USSR provided political, economic and military assistance. The main criterion for providing assistance was ideological proximity to Marxism-Leninism. The Russian leadership came to power in the wake of the anti-communist movement and immediately stopped helping friends and allies of the USSR. This opened up space for the struggle for the "Soviet inheritance", in which Russia practically did not participate.

The collapse of the USSR led to an outbreak of hostilities in the regions of interethnic conflicts, which previously, at the very least, were holding back the internal troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict escalated into a full-scale war. New "hot spots" also flared up: in 1992, a civil war broke out in Tajikistan and the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. During 1992-1993. efforts of Russia managed to pay off fighting in South Ossetia, Transnistria and Abkhazia; peacekeeping forces were brought into the conflict zones - Russian in Transnistria and Abkhazia, multilateral (Georgian, Ossetian and Russian) in South Ossetia. In 1993, a collective CIS peacekeeping force was created, and Russian troops in conflict zones began to act under their flag.

The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict has been repeatedly discussed in the UN Security Council; Within the framework of the Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe in 1992, the Minsk Group (9 member countries of the CSCE plus Azerbaijan and Armenia) was created to resolve the conflict. In 1994, a ceasefire agreement was reached.

Thus, the conflicts were frozen. However, the question of the existence of the republics proclaimed during the conflicts remained unresolved: the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, the Republic of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. They are still not recognized by the world community.

In 1993, the collective peacekeeping forces of the CIS were introduced to Tajikistan (they were based on the Russian 201st motorized rifle division stationed near Dushanbe), but the civil war was ended only in 1997.

Creation of national armies in the CIS countries. Nuclear disarmament and arms reduction

The agreement on the creation of the CIS provided for the preservation of a common military-strategic space under a single command. The last Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of Aviation E. Shaposhnikov, became the commander of the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS (OVS CIS). The Russian leadership assumed that the Soviet army would be transformed into the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS. However, in January 1992, the creation of its own army began in Ukraine: the Ministry of Defense was formed, and the personnel of the units of the Soviet armed forces stationed in Ukraine, including the Black Sea Fleet, were asked to take an oath of allegiance to Ukraine. This led to an acute crisis: some units and ships swore allegiance to Ukraine, others refused. The split also ran inside the military units. A number of strategic aviation crews (bombers carrying nuclear weapons) flew to Russia in their air ships.

Following Ukraine, other CIS countries began to create national armies. Under these conditions, on May 7, 1992, President B.N. Yeltsin issued a decree establishing Russian army... On May 15, 1992, in Tashkent, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed the Collective Security Treaty (CST) - a military-political alliance.

Soviet nuclear weapons were located on the territory of not only Russia, but also three other republics of the USSR that became independent states: Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. The United States and Russia have offered these countries to adopt a nuclear-free status and take out nuclear weapons to Russian territory.

The process of reducing strategic arms also continued. US President George W. Bush put forward the idea of ​​signing the Strategic Arms-2 Treaty (START-2). The first concrete discussion of the problems of concluding START II took place at the first Bush-Yeltsin summit in February 1992 and ended with the signing of the document just 11 months later, in January 1993.

In 1995, Russia and the United States extended the moratorium on nuclear testing. In 1996, the 50th jubilee session of the UN General Assembly adopted and opened for signature the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

Russia and CIS countries

The agreement on the creation of the CIS could be interpreted as an act on the establishment of a confederation. The CIS was seen by many as a renewed, softer version of the USSR: in a reduced composition and with a new level of independence of the republics, but with common armed forces, currency, foreign policy, without internal borders or with transparent borders. However, development initiated by Ukraine took a different path: the CIS countries began to create national armies, erect customs barriers, and pursue an independent foreign policy. In the interests of market reforms, Russian reformers sought to distance themselves from the former Soviet republics. The CIS Charter, adopted in January 1993, stated in the first article: "The Commonwealth is not a state and does not have supranational powers." In the same year, the withdrawal of Soviet banknotes from circulation and their replacement with Russian ones started in Russia forced even those CIS countries that expressed an interest in preserving the ruble zone to switch to the introduction of national currencies. In fact, the Commonwealth functioned only as a mechanism for the "divorce" of the former republics of the USSR.

The only exception in this row was in the 1990s. was Belarus. The president of this country, who came to power in 1994, A.G. Lukashenka staked on integration with Russia. In February 1995, the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation was concluded between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus; in April 1996 - the Treaty on the Establishment of the Community of Russia and Belarus; in April 1997 - the Treaty on the Union of Belarus and Russia and, finally, in December 1999, the Treaty on the creation of the Union State was signed. Integration ensured a relatively quick exit of the Belarusian economy from the crisis: since 1996, stable economic growth began in this country. The volume of trade between countries grew rapidly: by the beginning of the XXI century. Belarus has become the second partner of Russia in terms of trade turnover.

The task set by the Russian reformers to switch over to trade with the CIS countries at world prices remained unfulfilled in full. The situation was repeated with the transition to trade at world prices within the CMEA: enterprises of the CIS countries simply did not have the means to purchase raw materials and goods at world prices. Trade turnover within the CIS in the 1990s decreased almost threefold, in the foreign trade of Russia the share of the CIS countries decreased from 54.6% to 20%. The Commonwealth states tried to reorient their foreign economic ties to "third" countries.

However, the supply of electricity and energy carriers from Russia for most of the CIS countries was of critical importance: their termination or transfer to world prices would lead to economic collapse. To avoid large-scale destabilization along the perimeter of its borders, Russia has retained the practice of trading at non-market prices, thereby effectively subsidizing the economy of its neighbors.

Russia and Europe

Russia's foreign trade was gradually reoriented towards European countries. Germany became our main trading partner (about 10% of external trade). Germany, on the other hand, became the leading creditor of Russia (by the end of the 1990s, about a third of the total external debt of the Russian Federation was the debt of the Federal Republic of Germany). Among our ten largest trading partners in the mid-1990s. included five west European countries... The economic rapprochement required political formalization.

In 1992, in the Dutch city of Maastricht, an agreement was signed establishing the European Union (EU), which entered into force in 1993. Russia has a new political and economic partner - a uniting Europe. The usual bilateral ties with European countries had to be supplemented by relations with the EU. In June 1994, the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement was signed, which entered into force in 1997. This is a truly comprehensive document encompassing political dialogue; trade; business and investment; financial and legislative cooperation; science and technology; education and training; cooperation in the field of energy, as well as in nuclear and space technologies; environment, transport; culture; cooperation to prevent illegal activities. The agreement laid the institutional framework for cooperation: the RF-EU summits are held twice a year, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Internal Affairs, Energy, Transport and the Environment regularly meet within the framework of the Permanent Partnership Council, and there is a constant dialogue at the level of senior officials and experts. ...

In 1996, Russia joined the Council of Europe, the oldest pan-European organization dealing primarily with legal and human rights issues.

NATO enlargement and Russia

Until 1996, the West did not hear from Russia "no" on any significant issue of international life. Russian Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev saw the mistake of Soviet diplomacy in the fact that it paid too much attention to the protection of national interests.

In 1998, the so-called Kosovo crisis broke out. The Yugoslav government began to fight against Albanian separatists in the province of Kosovo. The military clashes resulted in the suffering of the civilian population. The international community has demanded an end to human rights violations. In this conflict, NATO countries actually sided with the Kosovar Albanians. The West accused Yugoslavia of genocide. On March 24, 1999, NATO aircraft began bombing Yugoslavia without sanctions from the UN Security Council. US Secretary of State M. Albright announced that the Belgrade government, under pressure from air raids, will agree to conditions leading to the secession of the Yugoslav province of Kosovo in a few days. The Americans underestimated Yugoslavia's resolve. On the 78th day of the bombing, when Belgrade was ready to fight further, President B.N. Yeltsin, his special representative V.S. Chernomyrdin literally forced the President of Yugoslavia, S. Milosevic, to sign his surrender to the West.

Under its terms, peacekeeping forces operating under the UN flag were brought into the province of Kosovo. Russia was a participant in this operation. But the desire of Russia to obtain an independent zone of responsibility (in order to protect the Serbian minority of the Kosovo region from repression) was rejected by Washington in the most energetic way.

Actions in the Balkans are an example of humanitarian intervention, when NATO intervened in the internal affairs of a foreign state under the slogan of protecting human rights. The Russian elite saw in these actions a clear challenge to Russia's national interests.

All these events stimulated the process of NATO enlargement. In 1999 Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary joined NATO, and countries such as Albania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, became new candidates for joining the alliance. In the same year, the alliance adopted a new strategic concept, according to which NATO, in addition to collective defense, was ready to carry out other military-political missions, moreover, outside the territories of the member countries of the bloc.

As a result, in the late 1990s. the Kosovo crisis and the resumption of hostilities in Chechnya, along with other factors, have led to a deterioration in relations between the Russian Federation and the West to such an extent that for the first time in a decade there has been a threat of direct Western intervention in Russian affairs. At the OSCE Istanbul Summit in autumn 1999 B.N. Yeltsin was forced to literally growl at the leaders of European countries: "Nobody has the right to criticize Russia for Chechnya!"

The end of the Cold War, initiated by Russia, saved the West, which had freed itself from the arms race, more than $ 3 trillion. dollars. Russia withdrew its troops from the territory of the countries of the former Warsaw Pact and in fact transferred Eastern Europe to the western zone of influence. Now, instead of fighting through allies against each other in Vietnam and Angola, US and Russian military forces are collaborating on peacekeeping missions.

But if the collapse of communism did not make the United States and Russia friends, then inevitably one has to turn to the second explanation put forward by Western interpreters of Washington's Russian policy: “If Russia regains its economic and political power, it will become a competitor and rival of the United States; it will not be an ideological rivalry, but a rivalry between the great powers. "

List of used literature

1. Volobuev OV, Kuleshov S.V. Russia in the 90s of the XX - the beginning of the XXI century: additional materials to the textbook-workshop for the 11th grade of educational institutions. - M., 2000.

2. Gorbachev - Yeltsin: 1500 days of political confrontation. - M., 1992.

3. Yeltsin B.N. Notes of the President. - M., 1994.

4. Yeltsin B.N. Presidential marathon. - M., 2000.

5. Kostikov V. Romance with the President. - M., 1997.

6. Mlechin L. Formula of power. - M., 2001.

7. Peregudov S.P., Lapina N.Yu., Semenenko I.S. Interest group and the Russian state. - M., 1999.

The reform, supported by President B.N. Yeltsin. In September-October 1993, it began ... was an adviser to the president). Yeltsin: B.N. Yeltsin historically noted as the 1st Chosen ...

Reforms XX century

Abstract >> Historical figures

And his reform... Comparing economic reform Stolypin's economic reform Gaidar, when B.N. Yeltsin, you can ... and the Supreme Council. Presidential decree B.N. Yeltsin"On the phased constitutional reform " As a result of these actions completely ...

Reform Stolypin (2)

Abstract >> History

The first President of Russia B.N. Yeltsin called the three great reformers of Russia ... not proverbs. 3 Agrarian reform Objectives for reform there were several: 1) socially ... 5 Implementation results reforms Stolypina P.A. results reforms characterized by rapid growth ...

August 1991 marked the beginning of a new stage in Russian modernization, no longer socialist, but radically liberal, not evolutionary, but revolutionary. It has already been noted above that although most researchers name socio-economic and political transformations in Russia in the 90s. last century radical reforms, in fact they had a revolutionary character, especially in 1992 - 1994. During this period, both main signs of the revolution were evident - a change in power and forms of ownership. There were also elements of the third, not always obligatory, but always the most terrible component of the revolution - civil war: the shooting of parliament, bloody interethnic conflicts, the Chechen war and all sorts of large-scale criminal showdowns. The fact that a full-scale civil war was avoided is undoubtedly the merit of the then leaders, their ability to compromise.

Unlike the previous period, when the leaders of the USSR, realizing the need to renew society, did not have a clear concept of transformation and, with a noticeable lag in time, reacted to fluctuations in mass sentiments to the left or to the right, the renewed Russian political elite clearly defined the Western model of society as a reference point, mainly in American version. One of the central provisions of the liberal-radical ideology of the 80s. XX century there was an idea of ​​the beneficialness of free, unencumbered by government intervention, market relations. This ideology of a market economy became widespread in the 80s. in the United States during the presidency of R. Reagan and in Great Britain during the rule of Prime Minister M. Thatcher. It was these ideas that were adopted by our liberal radicals, who ignored the fact that these countries had a strong statehood, they did not experience a sharp turn in social development and that they have developed a mature legal culture of the population.

If the former Soviet ideology professed a kind of political determinism, which consisted in the belief in the ability of the state and the CPSU to remake human nature and eliminate all the vices of society, then the new liberal-radical faith was based on economic determinism, proving that it is worth eliminating the state from the natural-historical process. how the beneficial mechanisms of the market and economic freedoms, capable of benefiting everyone, will immediately start working. Meanwhile, the capitalist mode of production, functioning under conditions of mature capitalism, cannot do without a strong state that ensures the right of private property, strict rules and laws of a civilized socially-oriented market. The production relations of capitalism receive their necessary legal expression in property relations, the regulation of which is one of the main functions of the state. If the state is destroyed or seriously weakened, as happened in Russia, then there is no need to talk seriously about any normal capitalism.

The social danger of this model of unlimited freedom of market relations was very clearly manifested in the context of the current global financial crisis that erupted in the fall of 2008. Prominent US economists, where this financial crisis began, which became global due to the global nature of the modern economy, admitted that they were wrong, believing that that the market has a "self-preservation instinct." The nature of market relations, unregulated in the interests of society, leads to the fact that their agents, obsessed with the desire to obtain super-profits, are not inclined to reckon with the interests of society. This is why the “invisible hand” of an unregulated market inevitably leads to crises. It is no coincidence that the leaders of the 20 most powerful economies in the world who gathered in Washington on November 15, 2008, trying to overcome the consequences of the global financial crisis and prevent its recurrence, came to the conclusion that it was necessary to change the world financial architecture, organize international control over its functioning, create for this purpose special institutions both at the national and international level.

But our liberal radicals in the early 1990s. were carried away by the idea of ​​free market relations, the maximum elimination of the state from their regulation, which, in their opinion, should have led to the prosperity of the Russian economy. At the same time, they ignored not only the world experience in the development of mature market economies, especially European countries, but also the historically formed special role of the Russian state in public life, her economic sphere, the need for a strong statehood in the face of radical transformations, the paternalistic mentality of the bulk of the population.

A specific program of radical economic reforms was approved by the Russian authorities in the fall of 1991, and its adoption and implementation began to be linked with the name of E.T. Gaidar, who took the place of Deputy Prime Minister for Economics in the new Russian government. The program he proposed was based on the liberal ideas of a market economy, in particular, the concept of shock therapy, used in the process of modernization both in the third world countries and in Eastern Europe. The main thing in it was the one-step transition to a market economy and radical measures to combat inflation and budget deficits, aimed at stabilizing economic development.

Gaidar's version of shock therapy included three major reforms. The first major measure - the one-time introduction of free prices since January 1992 - was to determine the market value of goods, eliminate the commodity deficit, "launch" the mechanism of competition between all industries and enterprises, and force people and organizations to "make money." The second measure - the liberalization of domestic and foreign trade - was to accelerate trade turnover, create an infrastructure for the sale of the maximum possible volumes of domestic and imported products. The third measure - broad and rapid privatization of housing and state-owned enterprises - was supposed to turn the masses of the population into owners, create powerful labor, savings and other economic incentives for them. Basically, these reforms were implemented during one Gaidar year, and in the next period, up to Yeltsin's resignation in 1999, they developed with some, sometimes important, adjustments that did not change the essence of the matter. E. Gaidar suggested relying on the market as an instrument of structural changes in the economy: free prices were supposed to "select" those goods and producers that satisfied the needs of society, and reject those that did not correspond to this. reform Russian statehood liberalization

But already the first radical reform - a vacation from the beginning of January 1992 of prices - led to unexpected dramatic results. Instead of the projected rise in prices threefold, they increased by 10-12 times, so that the planned increase in wages and pensions by 70%, which turned out to be negligible in comparison with the real rise in prices, led to the fact that the majority of the population fell below the poverty line. A sharp gap between the rise in prices and incomes of the population continued in the future, becoming a strong trend in the current stage of modernization in Russia.

In many respects, unforeseen and contrary to the plans of the reformers, the results were yielded by the introduction of economic freedom in industry, most of whose branches had a monopoly character. Since the beginning of price liberalization, they all began to rapidly inflate prices for their products to the maximum, which gave rise to a kind of vicious circle... Each new increase in prices by enterprises turned into a corresponding, or even a large increase in tariffs for the transportation of goods, prices for energy, raw materials, etc. The general gouging of prices, regardless of market conditions and possible economic consequences, gave rise to a widespread crisis in sales. There was a problem of mutual non-payments of enterprises: by June 1, 1992, their amount had reached about 2 trillion. rubles, and, not receiving money for their products, many enterprises faced the threat of collapse. In many industries, the production of essential goods has become unprofitable. Science-intensive industries, in particular, those serving the military-industrial complex, found themselves in the most difficult situation, in fact "unnecessary" for the market. Instead of the expected structural restructuring of industry, the process of de-industrialization began at a rapid pace in Russia.

Voucher privatization did not confirm the forecasts of radical reformers. Formally, the scheme developed by the State Property of Russia headed by A. Chubais and approved the legislature, corresponded to the principles of "people's privatization": all adult Russians received one privatization voucher, and the majority of them had to turn into middle class- owners of enterprises and shareholders. In reality, people's capitalism was not created. The overwhelming majority of Russians, not knowing how to dispose of the vouchers themselves, transferred them to voucher investment funds (CHIFs), which pledged to invest them profitably in the privatized enterprises. However, most of the 2,000 CHIFs that accumulated the bulk of the vouchers disappeared within one or two years, greatly enriching their leadership. Most of the ordinary shareholders in enterprises also quickly parted with state vouchers: as a result of manipulations, machinations and pressure, shares migrated into the hands of the management of enterprises and their entourage. The majority of Russians (about 60%) were left without vouchers and without shares, and most of those who kept shares, as evidenced by sociological surveys, were employees or shareholders of unprofitable enterprises and did not receive dividends.

The "red directors", government officials, first of all, senior officials, domestic and foreign financial corporations, and simply clever financial speculators, criminal shadow structures, became the owners of state property. They were able not only to expropriate stocks and vouchers from ordinary citizens, but also to provide access to the most lucrative industries. The tendency of the first, "voucher" stage of privatization was consolidated in the second, "market" one, which began in 1994 and meant the open sale of enterprises at market value. And at this stage, deals between government officials and the most dexterous financiers played a decisive role.

Very fast main form the sale of state property became loans-for-shares auctions: the state, in dire need of "real" money, transferred a block of shares at a reduced value, as a rule, to a large commercial bank, but in the event that the state did not repay the debt, which became the rule, the bank became the full owner of the shares, taking over and highly profitable enterprises. This was exactly the result of the first loans-for-shares auction, which took place in 1995: ONEXIM Bank acquired a controlling stake in the Norilsk Nickel Combine for $ 170 million, the world leader in the production of nickel, chromium, cobalt, and platinum (according to official data, in 2001. the net profit of this enterprise was about $ 1 billion, and the corporation's capitalization exceeded $ 10 billion). It is significant that the auction rejected the application of the bank "Russian Credit", which offered the state an amount twice as large as ONEXIM bank. In December 1995, at a loans-for-shares auction for the sale state package(51%) of shares of the national company "Sibneft", it was acquired by "Oil financial company", Controlled by B. Berezovsky and R. Abramovich, together with the" Capital Bank of Savings "for $ 100, 3 million. In 2000, Sibneft's net profit amounted to $ 674.8 million. In 2005, Sibneft was bought out from R. Abramovich by the state-controlled Gazprom for $ 13 billion.

Were the distribution of state property and the social structuring of the new Russia “justly” possible, as justified by the radical leaders during the struggle for power? Ideally, in theory, yes, but the ideal model presupposes a number of tough conditions: a rational bureaucracy with strong moral foundations, a strong, impartial state that balances and serves citizens according to the law; a developed civil society that controls the activities of the state and bureaucracy; the availability of approximately equal starting opportunities and entrepreneurial abilities among citizens. Since none of these conditions existed in Russian society, there could be no democratic privatization or democratic capitalism.

Some of those who benefited the most from Russian privatization were the radical politicians who came into power. Immediately after August 1991, facts began to multiply indicating that people who actively fought against the old regime under the slogan of the destruction of all and all privileges, having consolidated in power, began to dispose of state property with amazing cynicism, privatizing for themselves, their relatives, in their interests. The bulk of the new business elite (61%, according to the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences) was made up of the former Soviet nomenklatura, which “staked out” advantageous strategic positions in the economy back in the days of Gorbachev. E. Gaidar, comprehending the nature of privatization after his resignation, had to admit that its main component was "the exchange of nomenklatura power for property," however, the reformer saw in this "the only way to peacefully reform society, the peaceful evolution of the state." Mass privatization, thus carried out in Russia, served as an important mechanism for the formation of capitalism of the nomenklatura-oligarchic type.

The appropriation of state property by the nouveau riche was a fundamental reason for the subsequent deepening of economic inequality. The social strata “lowered” to the social bottom became absolutely and relatively poorer: during the Yeltsin period (1991 - 1999), the real wages of those employed in the economy fell 2.5 times, the pension - 3.3 times, and the income gap 10% the richest and 10% of the poorest Russians increased from 4.5 to 15.5 times. This is according to official figures. And opinion polls give different figures: this income gap is 25-30 times. This indicator in Finland is 4 times, in France - 5 times, in Great Britain - 7. All developed countries follow this indicator, because if it exceeds 7 - 8 times, it is fraught with instability.

Thus, privatization contributed to the redistribution of national wealth in favor of a small stratum wealthy people who have amassed their capital in a rapid transition to the market. According to the data of the Russian Academy of Sciences, by the end of 1993 the wealthy stratum in the country was 3-5%, the middle-income stratum 13-15%, the rest were below the poverty line. In the Address of the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin to the Federal Assembly on March 10, 2006, he celebrated low level the confidence of citizens in big business, he also highlighted the reasons for this: "some representatives of these communities, disregarding the norms of law and morality, went over to personal enrichment unprecedented in the history of our country at the expense of the majority of citizens."

Significant failures and a huge social "cost" of radical economic reforms of the 90s. was explained not only by the erroneously chosen ideology of the market economy, but also by the fact that our reformers did not know much about the features of the Russian economy that had formed during the previous decades of Soviet history, ignored the historically formed mentality of the bulk of the population, in which business, entrepreneurship, and trade were not considered values. In addition, these economic reforms, in particular the privatization of state property, were not accompanied by legal support in the public interest. The main concern of the reformers was to create, as soon as possible, at any cost, a powerful layer of property owners as a guarantee against the restoration of the USSR. All this led to a striking discrepancy between the goals of the reform and its real results, to massive abuse, criminalization of economic relations and a large-scale increase in the corruption of society.

It has already been said above that the attitude towards radical economic reforms and their consequences among researchers is very ambiguous, but the majority gives them negative assessments. At the same time, relying on the principles of objectivity and historicism, it is important to evaluate certain phenomena and processes based on the real possibilities of a given society and real alternatives, and not on what should have been done in accordance with a certain ideal. Based on this, in the radical reforms of the 90s. there are both positive and negative aspects.

The first positive consequence of the radical reforms of 1992 was the creation of a full-blooded market and the reanimation of the Russian economic life... The Russian economy, which in 1991 was in a state of collapse, completely out of control of central planning and subordination, testifying to its state with empty store shelves and the real threat of hunger for the Russian masses, overcame a commodity deficit within one year. In subsequent years, the filling of the rapidly expanding chain of stores with goods led to an abundance of goods, the Russian retail trade in terms of the range of goods practically ceased to differ from the Western one.

The second positive consequence was the overcoming of economic autarchy, an increasingly active entry into the world economic space. The introduction of internal convertibility of the ruble made Russian market attractive to the world economy, foreign goods flowed to Russia, in the blink of an eye filling commodity gaps created by the Soviet economy. Russian producers, for their part, have sharply increased their activity in the world market. True, they were almost exclusively producers and suppliers of oil, gas, metals, timber, which alone were competitive in the global economy. But their successes became an important factor in establishing market relations in Russian economy generally. Russia has practically restored the previous volumes of oil exports and significantly exceeded the volumes of gas exports. Coming back, the income received from this contributed to the development of market mechanisms already in the domestic economy.

The emergence of a stratum of businessmen, the emergence of a new middle class, including representatives of various professions with a characteristic entrepreneurial mentality, can also be attributed to positive changes. Among the structural social changes, the sharp expansion of the service sector was very noticeable, in which at least one third of the employed population was involved.

Among the negative consequences of radical reforms, the first place, as a rule, is given to the collapse of uncompetitive enterprises, as a result, a sharp drop in industrial production, de-industrialization, and Russia's entry into the world economy as its fuel and raw materials sector. A decline in production also occurred in most sectors of the light and food industries and in agriculture. Authoritative sources indicate that from 1991 to 1999. the decline in GDP was at least 45%, and the decline in industrial production was about 55%. The figures are dramatic and even tragic. At the same time, considering these indicators, revealing their real meaning, V.V. Sogrin turned to comparing the nature of the Soviet and post-Soviet economies. The Soviet economy had a pronounced anti-consumer character. The lion's share of Soviet GDP was military production and products of the industries serving it. A significant part was the so-called dead capital (construction in progress, unused equipment, etc.). It was these articles that were reduced primarily in the post-Soviet market economy, focused on the fastest return. That is, the decline in the production of commercial products in the 90s, which are in demand from the population, they are actually purchased, and not stockpiled as unnecessary, as was the case in the Soviet period, was clearly less than the figures quoted.

Important negative aspects of radical economic reforms include the emergence of sharp social contrasts that were absent in the Soviet period, the division of society into a rich and super-rich minority and a poor and poor majority, and the emergence of capitalism of the nomenklatura-oligarchic type.

Boris Yeltsin (born 1931, village of Butka, Sverdlovsk region) statesman, party and public figure, the first President of Russia. In 1955 he graduated from the construction faculty of the Ural Polytechnic Institute. He worked as a builder, having mastered 12 specialties in a year. He was the head of the section, chief engineer, head of the department. In 1961 he joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In 1968, Yeltsin moved to the party, work, heading the construction department of the regional party committee. In 1975 he became secretary, and the next year the first secretary of the Sverdlovsk Regional Committee of the CPSU. In April. 1985 Yeltsin was appointed head. department of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Two months later, he became secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU, and in 1986 and a candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. In 1987 Ye. Disagreed with M. S. Gorbachev on the fundamental issues of the ongoing political and economic reform, which was especially pronounced on Oct. plenum 1987. Retired from his post, E. was appointed to the post of minister - deputy. Chairman of the State Committee for Construction, and headed the democratic opposition, In 1990, at the last, XXVIII Congress of the CPSU, Yeltsin demonstratively left the party.

The confrontation between the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Gorbachev, who sought to maintain a balance between democrats and conservatives, and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Russia E., the leader of supporters of the decisive continuation of reforms, intensified so much that it paralyzed constructive activity in the country. June 12, 1991 Ye. Was elected President of Russia in general elections. The coup of August 19-21, 1991 (GKChP), which tried to restore the crumbling administrative-command system, led to the ban of the CPSU and the collapse of the USSR. Dec. 1991 the presidents of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus proclaimed the formation of the Commonwealth Independent States(CIS). In 1996 E. was re-elected for a second term. E. - the author of the book. "Confessions on a given topic" (M., 1990) and "Notes of the President" (M., 1994). BORIS Nikolaevich appeared in Moscow when the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU of the Brezhnev sourdough was hopelessly old. A certain falling arc of Soviet power "Brezhnev - Andropov - Chernenko" ended with the arrival of the perestroika Mikhail Gorbachev. Mikhail Sergeevich still had material and human resources to renew Soviet socialism. B. Yeltsin no longer had such reserves. It was quite clear that the future of Russia was in pitch darkness with a halt in industry, famine, and regional separatism. Power-loving Boris Nikolaevich was not frightened by this. He started a game of promises - just to survive the dashing years, and then we'll see. Tatarstan was promised sovereignty, youth - a bright future, military - weapons.

1. Economic reforms of E. Gaidar (beginning - January 2, 1992) The main provisions of this reform were:

Liberalization (vacation) of prices, freedom of trade.

The prices for most goods and services were "released to the market will." On the one hand, it was a bold move that promoted rapid "market learning". On the other hand, it was a very careless measure. After all, the Soviet economy was rigidly monopolized. As a result, monopolies gained market price freedom, which, by definition, can set prices, in contrast to firms operating in a competitive environment, and are only able to adapt to existing prices. The result was not slow to show itself. Prices have jumped 2000 times during the year. A new enemy number 1 has appeared in Russia - inflation, which has grown by about 20% per month.

Privatization (transfer of state property into private hands) Voucher privatization was called by its ideologue and implementer, A. B. Chubais, “people's privatization”. However, the people from the very beginning were rather skeptical about the idea of ​​privatization. Already during the privatization operation itself, the press published that the people correctly perceived the idea and practice of privatization, and therefore it passes without social excesses. But it seems that the majority of citizens reacted to the operation simply indifferently, knowingly knowing that in a market economy the people cannot be the owner. Indeed, the “people's private property”, on the basis of which the country moved towards the market, would look too strange. As a result, what should have happened: state property ended up in the hands of those who had money or were able to “convert” managerial power into property. V Soviet times money was either in the hands of big managers, directors of enterprises or government officials who disposed of state financial resources, or, finally, criminal structures, often blocking them with both.

2. Land reform

It was also doomed to fail. The transfer of land to private hands led to the fact that people who worked on the land, but did not have the initial capital, were simply ruined.

3. Reforming the political system of Russia. Formation of a new political system.

December 1992 - March 1998 - V.S. Chernomyrdin at the head of the government of the Russian Federation.

September 21, 1993 - termination of the powers of the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Council. Decree of President Boris N. Yeltsin "On the phased constitutional reform"

As a result of these actions, the organs of Soviet power completely ceased to exist.

April-August 1998 - Sergei Kirienko at the head of the government of the Russian Federation. August 17, 1998 - default, fall of the dollar.

May-August 1999- Sergei Stepashin becomes Prime Minister.

August 1999-December 1999 - V.V. Putin becomes prime minister December 31, 1999 - BN Yeltsin's departure from the post of President of the Russian Federation.

Much of what Yeltsin did, he did for the first time in more than 70 years. I believe that it is impossible to underestimate the role of the person who initiated these democratic reforms, who dedicated his life to the struggle for democracy in Russia. Yeltsin was able to concentrate considerable power in his hands and was also able (which is even more important and more difficult) to dispose of it. With the coming of Yeltsin to power, in Russia began new era; he managed to lead the country, which is in an extremely difficult and dangerous situation, along the path of the least possible losses. Of course, the times of his tenure as president cannot be called the "golden age", but nevertheless, his enormous role in the development and restoration of Russia as a strong and powerful state cannot be denied.



"Shock therapy". Boris Yeltsin, like Mikhail Gorbachev, hesitated with unpopular reforms. By the end of 1991. food stocks ran out, a real threat of hunger loomed. In October 1991, the President of the Russian Federation proposed a program of radical economic reforms based on the so-called "Shock therapy". The main ideologist of these reforms was the famous economist and politician Yegor Timurovich Gaidar. He proposed to Yeltsin to introduce free prices for goods and services in the country according to the Western model, to refuse state control for domestic and foreign trade, to test in Russia the mechanism of market competition between enterprises and industries. At the same time, it was proposed to carry out privatization and corporatization of state property on an all-Russian scale. Gaidar's theory was based on the Polish model of "shock therapy". It was assumed that under the conditions of this economic reform, the least protected segments of the population: pensioners, doctors, teachers, other state employees, as well as disabled people, children, students will receive support from the state. The program of a gradual transition from socialism to capitalism of Shatalin and Yavlinsky, which supposed to do without shock therapy in 500 days, was rejected by Yeltsin.

By Yeltsin's decision, retail prices were released on January 1, 1992. Almost instantly, they increased 10-15 times, and by the end of the year - up to 150 times. Unfortunately, no real positive changes in the economy have been achieved. The population of Russia felt in its financial condition a sharp decline standard of living. Inflation was gaining momentum. By January 1993, 4 times more paper money, not provided with a commodity mass, was printed than in the middle of 1992. The decline in production in 1992, when the liberalization of prices was announced, was 35 percent... Mutual debts of enterprises by this time amounted to almost 2 trillion rubles and, in fact, deprived most of them of working capital. It was clear that Gaidar's program had failed.

Voucher privatization. The most important direction reforms under the leadership of B.N. Yeltsin was privatization. At the first stage of privatization, which took place in Russia from 1991 to 1994, all citizens were handed over privatization checks - vouchers. In accordance with the law of July 3, 1991 "On personalized privatization checks and deposits" vouchers gave the right to purchase shares in industrial and other enterprises. The issuance of privatization checks was carried out in accordance with the decree of the President of the Russian Federation of August 14, 1992 "On the introduction of a system of privatization checks in Russian Federation". Each citizen received one voucher with a nominal value of 10,000 rubles. At that time, this money could buy one mirror from a Volga car. But the authors of the privatization instilled in the population that the cost of the voucher was equal to the cost of two Volga cars. Of course, due to total poverty, the population, not having the necessary information, simply sold privatization checks on the cheap to those who were privy to the possibility of acquiring fat pieces of former public property.

By July 1, 1994, over 20 thousand former state enterprises were corporatized. About 60% of enterprises went into private hands. * However, the voucher privatization of state property did not lead to the formation of a middle class, but to the creation of a detachment of oligarchs. Vouchers collected during the privatization period in the hands of one capitalist in the amount of several thousand or tens of thousands, in the early 1990s made it possible to acquire solid factories and factories that generate billions of dollars in profits, such as Norilsk Nickel. The annual income of this enterprise exceeds one billion US dollars. Capitalist Vladimir Potanin owns Norilsk Nickel.

Thanks to Chubais's privatization, the overwhelming majority of factories and plants are now again in the hands of the capitalists, as if the October Revolution had never happened. This was another robbery of the Russians who, with the help of A.B. Chubais, the author of the privatization for vouchers, lost a huge share of the former public property. Thanks to the 1993 Constitution, mineral resources and natural resources are also not public property. The privatization process solved the main tasks set by its authors: the private sector of the economy, the securities market was formed, and the economic reforms were made irreversible. Thus, the rapid redistribution of property pursued not only economic, but also political and goals. Therefore, following the voucher stage of the privatization of state property, in July 1994 the stage of so-called loans-for-shares auctions for the sale of enterprises began. With the help of loans-for-shares auctions, which gave the appearance of legality and fairness of privatization, industrial oil production facilities, oil refineries, steel and aluminum plants, and other "tasty morsels" of the former public property were acquired for a pittance.

The implemented model of privatization was one of the main reasons for the destruction of our economy. In the process of its implementation, two fundamental mistakes were made. The first- Simultaneously with the privatization of the main assets of enterprises, their new owners were given the opportunity to privatize and appropriate rental income. That is, simultaneously with the acquisition of an oil well or a mine, the owner received as a gift from the state subsoil, natural resources located under the well or on the territory of the mine. (This policy is reminiscent of the Charter of Charity to the nobles, according to which they received the right to develop mineral resources on their lands). The second- a new class of executive directors, top managers and managers of the largest city-forming enterprises of the country was essentially removed from public control and legal responsibility for the efficiency of using the assets of their enterprises. This was largely facilitated by the fact that the state was removed from the management of the property belonging to it.

The rejection of the regulatory role of the state, miscalculations in the privatization policy led to an acute crisis in the domestic industry and the economy as a whole.

The main reason for this situation was the idea that the transfer of state property to private hands is the cornerstone on which the civilized market is built. At the time, it was argued that the most important thing was to create a "sense of master" that was so necessary for a market economy. A.B. Chubais, one of the initiators of the privatization of state-owned enterprises, argued: only a private owner can provide a significant increase in production efficiency, create genuine incentives to increase the competitiveness of production, to constantly update the range of products, expand the scale of scientific and technological progress. The Chinese experience was not taken into account.

In the course of mass privatization, income from state-owned enterprises, and at the same time natural resources, main pipelines, the monopoly position of producers of important types of products that are in high demand in the market, began to receive new owners, and not the state. It is not surprising that as a result of the increased cash flows from former state-owned enterprises, including oil-producing ones, people with billions of dollars appeared in Russia, influencing the authorities - oligarchs. They received and receive today, bypassing the state treasury, the lion's share of rental income. Let us emphasize that the oligarchs receive not only profit from the operation of enterprises acquired at an inexpensive price, but also income from the natural resources themselves, which are contained in our bowels: oil, gold, diamonds, etc. But the subsoil previously belonged to the entire people, and not to a group of oligarchs.

The former national property is exported in huge volumes by new owners abroad. And at present, a significant part of the rental income passes by the state treasury, is appropriated by oil workers, gas workers, fishermen, metalworkers, foresters, new owners of the country's subsoil and natural resources.

Such a rapid enrichment of the “new Russians”, social stratification, and the growing poverty of the overwhelming majority of the population could not but cause a socio-psychological shock among the citizens of Russia.

The State Duma of the first convocation, a significant part of which represented the "left wing", opposed "shock therapy", for a softening of the course of market reforms. Under pressure from the State Duma, B.N. Yeltsin was forced to replace E.T. Gaidar. And about. V.S. Chernomyrdin, who had previously headed Gazprom, one of the richest departments in modern Russia, was appointed Prime Minister of the Russian Federation.

The crisis in Russia. In the summer of 1994, the government of V.S. Chernomyrdina proclaimed a course towards the formation of a "highly efficient, socially oriented market economy." However, the crisis in Russia was so deep that it was not possible to form a highly efficient economy, in the words of V.S. Chernomyrdin, "they wanted the best, but it turned out as always."

Industrial enterprises not related to the extraction of energy resources were in a deplorable state. They had no working capital to replace their outdated equipment. Old economic ties, which were previously with enterprises of the former Soviet republics, were severed, new partnerships adjusted with difficulty. Many industrial, transport, construction enterprises did not pay wages to workers and employees for months; payments of pensions and benefits were delayed. The standard of living of Russians, already rather modest, has declined even more. The death rate increased by 20%, while the birth rate, on the contrary, decreased by 14%. * There were about 2 million unemployed people in the country, who were superfluous for the economy. Population with lower incomes living wage, that is, practically poor people, exceeded 40 million people. These and other figures and facts testified to the fact that the consequences of economic reforms had an extremely negative impact on the social status of the population of Russia. Shock therapy has done significant damage budgetary sphere- education, science, medicine, culture.

This position of the working masses was taken advantage of by the communists and their allies in the elections to the State Duma of the second convocation in December 1995. On the wave of protest, deputies from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation received the most votes on party lists. Whereas Chernomyrdin's party "Our Home is Russia" won only about 10% of the votes, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation is twice as many - 22%. In addition, in the elections in single-mandate constituencies, the communists received an additional 58 deputy seats. The election results allowed the Communist Party of the Russian Federation to elect its representative Gennady Nikolaevich Seleznev as Chairman of the State Duma. Egor Semenovich Stroyev, a former member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, was elected chairman of the Federation Council. Simultaneously with the duties of the speaker of the upper chamber, E.S. Stroyev performed the functions of the head of the administration of the Oryol region.

End of work -

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Lecture notes Old Russian state and law

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History of domestic state and law"
The Russian state and law are over a thousand years old. Their history includes the names of Yaroslav the Wise, Vladimir Monomakh, Ivan the Terrible, Peter I, Catherine II, M.M. Speransky, S.Yu. Witte, P.A. Stolypin,

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The formation of ancient Russian law
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Basic norms of law enshrined in the "Russian Pravda"
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Old Russian state
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State and legal reforms of Peter 1
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Changes in the government of Paul 1
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Strengthening the social base of autocracy
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Civil law
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Family and marriage law
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State system on the eve of reforms
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Preparation of the abolition of serfdom
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Criminal law
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The first Soviet Constitution of 1918
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Formation of the USSR and changes in legislation
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Justice and law enforcement reform
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In the USSR in the 1930s
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Mass repressions in the USSR
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Changes in criminal, military and procedural law
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Changes in criminal law in the 30s
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Types of punishment
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Changes in military law
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Features of the functioning of the state and legal system during the Great Patriotic War
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In the post-war period. N.S. Khrushchev's reforms
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N.S. Khrushchev's reforms
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State and legal changes in the "Brezhnev era"
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Agrarian reform
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Industrial reforms
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Changes in the legal system
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Features of the Constitution of the USSR of 1977
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Management and law. Collapse of the Soviet Union
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Statehood. Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993
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Powers of the President of the Russian Federation
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State administration reforms of V.V. Putin
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Conclusion
The experience of world civilization shows that the state and society are forced to carry out transformations, modernization, reforms in order to meet new requirements. Historical experience

B.N. Yeltsin

Boris Yeltsin is a state, party and public figure, the first President of Russia. In April. 1985 Yeltsin was appointed head. department of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Two months later, he became secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU, and in 1986 and a candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. In 1987, E. parted ways with M.S. Gorbachev on the fundamental issues of the ongoing political and economic reform, which was especially pronounced on Oct. plenum 1987. Resigned from his post, Yeltsin was appointed to the post of minister - deputy. Chairman of the State Committee for Construction, and headed the democratic opposition, In 1990, at the last, XXVIII Congress of the CPSU, E. demonstratively left the party. The confrontation between the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Gorbachev, who sought to maintain a balance between democrats and conservatives, and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Russia Yeltsin, the leader of supporters of a decisive continuation of reforms, intensified so much that it paralyzed constructive activity in the country. June 12, 1991 Ye. Was elected President of Russia in general elections. The coup of August 19-21, 1991 (GKChP), which tried to restore the crumbling administrative-command system, led to the ban of the CPSU and the collapse of the USSR. Dec. 1991 the presidents of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus proclaimed the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In 1996 E. was re-elected for a second term. Yeltsin appeared in Moscow when the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU of Brezhnev's leaven was hopelessly old. A kind of falling arc of Soviet power "Brezhnev - Andropov - Chernenko" ended with the arrival of the perestroika Mikhail Gorbachev. Mikhail Sergeevich still had material and human resources to renew Soviet socialism. B. Yeltsin no longer had such reserves. It was quite clear that the future of Russia was in pitch darkness with a halt in industry, famine, and regional separatism. Power-loving Boris Nikolaevich was not frightened by this. He started a game of promises - just to survive the dashing years, and then we'll see. Tatarstan was promised sovereignty, youth - a bright future, military - weapons.

E. Gaidar's economic reforms (beginning - January 2, 1992)

The main provisions of this reform were:

Liberalization (vacation) of prices, freedom of trade.

The prices for most goods and services were "released to the market will." On the one hand, it was a bold move that promoted rapid "market learning". On the other hand, it was a very careless measure. After all, the Soviet economy was rigidly monopolized. As a result, monopolies gained market price freedom, which, by definition, can set prices, in contrast to firms operating in a competitive environment, and are only able to adapt to existing prices. The result was not slow to show itself. Prices have jumped 2000 times during the year. In Russia appeared new enemy number 1 is inflation, which grew by about 20% per month.

Privatization (transfer of state property to private hands). Voucher privatization was named by its ideologist and implementer, A.B. Chubais by "people's privatization". However, the people from the very beginning were rather skeptical about the idea of ​​privatization. Already during the privatization operation itself, the press published that the people correctly perceived the idea and practice of privatization, and therefore it passes without social excesses. But it seems that the majority of citizens reacted to the operation simply indifferently, knowingly knowing that in a market economy the people cannot be the owner. Indeed, the “people's private property”, on the basis of which the country moved towards the market, would look too strange. As a result, what should have happened: state property ended up in the hands of those who had money or were able to “convert” managerial power into property. In Soviet times, money was either in the hands of big managers, directors of enterprises or government officials who controlled state financial resources, or, finally, criminal structures, often blocking them with both. Land reform was also doomed to failure. The transfer of land to private hands led to the fact that people who worked on the land, but did not have the initial capital, were simply ruined.