The political situation in Russia in the XIII century. During the Crimean War (1853ts1856)

Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation

Maikop State Humanitarian and Technical College

abstract

By discipline: History of Adygea

On the topic: Caucasian War

Reasons for activating the policy of tsarism in the North-West Caucasus.

The Eastern question occupied a very important place in the foreign policy of the great European powers throughout the 19th century. “Whenever a revolutionary hurricane subsides for a while, one and the same question will certainly surface again - this is the eternal“ Eastern question, ”wrote K. Marx and F. Engels. An integral part of this international problem was the Circassian issue - the issue of the foreign policy status of the Northwest Caucasus and the historical fate of the Adyghe peoples. Adyghe lands in the 30-60s of the XIX century. remained an arena of intense rivalry between Russia, England and the Ottoman Empire.

The reasons for the intensification of the tsarist policy in Circassia and in the East as a whole were due primarily to the era of decay and crisis of the serf system, which Russia was then going through.

The tsarist government in its foreign policy reflected the interests of the feudal landlords who wanted to expand the sphere of feudal exploitation and the seizure of new lands. This circumstance gave the tsarist foreign policy a sharply expressed character of conquest.

At the same time, the government supported the aspirations of the Russian commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, which in the second quarter of the 19th century. more and more persistently sought to expand sales markets and sources of raw materials. The interests of the ruling classes pushed the expansion of tsarism into underdeveloped countries.

By carrying out external expansion, tsarism wanted to bring down the acuteness of class contradictions within the country and prevent a crisis of the dominant feudal-serf system.

The interest of the tsarist government in the Northwestern Caucasus was due to its economic importance and important strategic position. Circassia possessed a variety of natural resources and raw materials. The Black Sea Adyghe coast played an important role in the development of trade. The Russian government attached even more importance to the military-strategic aspect of the Northwest Caucasus. Petersburg could not consider its dominion in the Transcaucasia to be strong, while the lands of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia were separated from the rest of the empire by the territory inhabited by the "rebellious" North Caucasian highlanders. K. Marx emphasized: “The Caucasus Mountains separate southern Russia from the richest provinces of Georgia, Mingrelia, Imeretia and Guria, recaptured by the Muscovites from the Muslims. Thus, the legs of the gigantic empire are cut off from the body. "

The annexation of the Northwestern Caucasus strengthened the security of Russia's southern borders against encroachments by rival European powers. At the same time, the possession of the Caucasus provided tsarism with a springboard for further conquests in the East. As K. Marx wrote, "... together with the Caucasus, Russia secures for itself domination over Asia ..."

Britain's aggressive ambitions in the Northwest Caucasus .

Great Britain, the largest capitalist country of that time, also pursued aggressive goals in relation to Circassia. The British capitalists were interested in trade with the Circassians and derived considerable income from this business. Export of England to the Black Sea harbors in the 40s of the XIX century. was estimated at 2 million pounds sterling. British publicists compared Circassia with Italy and portrayed it as the richest region. The British were aggressively striving for the eastern markets.

British capital strove to turn the Caucasus into a source of raw materials. The thirst for profit pushed merchant adventurers from the banks of the distant Thames on risky expeditions to the mountain gorges of Circassia. Annually at the beginning of the 30s of the XIX century. up to 200 ships loaded with local products were sent from Circassia to England.

The growing penetration of British capital into the Black Sea region was one of the main reasons for the intensification of British policy in the Northwest Caucasus. The policy of the British government was determined by the interests of the British bourgeoisie. No wonder London refused to recognize the Treaty of Adrianople, which strengthened Russia's position in the Caucasus. British politicians feared the expansion of Russian possessions in the Middle East. Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire D. Ponsonby in 1837 pointedly emphasized in his message to Lord Palmersgon: "None of the people appreciates the importance of Circassia for maintaining political equilibrium in Europe as I do."

Ottoman claims to the lands of the Circassians.

England supported revanchist sentiments in the Ottoman Empire, sought to play the "Turkish card" in the struggle with Russia for domination in the Caucasus. Although the rulers of the Turkish state were forced, as a result of military defeat, to authorize the signing of the Treaty of Adrianople, they could not reconcile themselves to the idea of ​​losing their influence among the Caucasian highlanders. To restore their dominion on the Cote d'Azur of the Caucasus, the Turks launched a vigorous activity in this region. The Sultan's officials and after the end of the Russian-Turkish war of 1828-1829. weaved intrigues in Circassia, sought to restore the shaken authority of the Ottoman ruler in the eyes of the mountaineers. High-ranking representatives from Istanbul, Seyid-Ahmed and Beker-bey, traveled around the Adyghe villages.

Politics Ports in the Caucasus since the late 1830s. in many ways merged with British politics. However, the interests of these states did not coincide in everything. The Ottoman Empire had its own plans for the return of the "Ottoman lands".

The transformation of Circassia into an object of dispute between Russia, on the one hand, England and the Ottoman Empire, on the other, left a very significant imprint on the further development of military and political events in the region.

The invasion of the tsarist troops into the lands of the Circassians.

In the course of the conquest of Circassia, tsarism used a variety of methods. These are punitive expeditions, the creation of fortified lines, military Cossack colonization, the forcible eviction of the Circassian aristocracy from the mountainous zone, as well as the attraction of the Circassian aristocracy to the Russian service, the reception and placement of fugitive mountaineers in Russia, the use of the Russian-Adyghe trade, etc. etc.

Very close attention was paid in the 30s of the XIX century. to consolidate the Black Sea coast of Circassia. The tsarist government sought to deprive the Circassians of economic ties with the outside world through the Black Sea and to starve them out. Karl Marx wrote in this regard: "Russia could hope to realize its still nominal claims to the northwestern regions of the Caucasus only if it succeeded in blocking the eastern coast of the Black Sea and cutting off the supply of weapons and ammunition to these regions."

In 1830, the tsarist troops invaded Circassia from the side of the river. Kuban and the Black Sea coast. Soon Gelendzhik was occupied with them. With the aim of separating the Natukhai and Shapsugs in 1834, a plan was adopted to create a military road from the Olginsky fortification on the river. Kuban to Gelendzhik on the Black Sea coast.

The road to Gelendzhik was laid by the tsarist detachment under the command of General A.A. Velyaminov. This detachment erected the Abinsk fortification in 1834, and the Nikolaev fortification in 1835. In 1836, on the Black Sea coast, the mouth of the river. Doob, the tsarist troops erected the Alexandrian fortification, later called Kabardin.

The campaigns of the tsarist troops were accompanied by the destruction of the Adyghe auls, repressions, the seizure of livestock and other property. For example, a participant in the Caucasian War, M.F. G. X. Zass stood out for his cruel forays. In 1834, he burned the Tamovsky aul in the upper reaches of the Laba, and a significant part of the inhabitants died in the flames, and later perpetrated a savage reprisal against the aul of fugitive Kabardians on the river. Psefir.

The military operations of the tsarist troops on the Black Sea coast acquired a large scale in 1837-1839. At this time, fortifications were built here: the Holy Spirit at Cape Adler, Novotroitskoye at the mouth of the river. Pshada, Mikhailovskoe at the river. Vulan, Velyaminovskoe on the river. Tuapse, Tenginskoe at the river. Shapsuge, Novorossiysk in the Sudzhuk Bay, Navaginskoe at the mouth of the river. Sochi, Golovinskoe near the river. Shakhe and Fort Lazarev at the river. Psezuapse. These fortifications were combined into the Black Sea coastline.

0the Circassian liberation movement and its main stages.

In response to the actions of tsarism in the North-West Caucasus, the liberation movement of the mountain peoples broke out. The struggle of the mountaineers of the Caucasus in the XIX century. K. Marx and F. Engels considered a just and liberation war. F. Engels wrote:

“We have not seen a real war, a war in which the people themselves are participating, in the center of Europe for several generations. We saw her in the Caucasus ... "

The Circassian movement for freedom and independence is divided into 3 stages: 1) 1830-1853; 2) 1853-1856; 3) 1856-1864

Acting in small partisan groups, the Circassians inflicted sensitive blows on the tsarist conquerors. According to General GI Fi-Lipson, a participant in the "Caucasian War," the Circassians used the area very well, were remarkable for their remarkable courage and ease of walking over the mountains.

The best type of troops in Circassia was the cavalry. Tsarist general L. V. Simonov recalled: “the Circassians were above all a worthy defender of the homeland and did not value their lives in actions against its enemies ... During the attack, the Circassians were courageous and quick, they met the enemy everywhere, in the mountains and forests.

This material provides information on the actions of the allied Anglo-French troops in the North Caucasus during the Crimean War of 1853-1856.

The reasons for the ripening of an international conflict, the beginning of the war, the abandonment of the fortifications of the Black Sea coastline by the Russian troops, the arrival of the Sefer-Bey in the Caucasus, the activities of Muhammad-Amin, the expedition of Russian troops to Gelendzhik, the blockade of the harbors of the Black and Azov Seas, the actions of the highlanders and the end of the Crimean War are being investigated. Paris Peace Treaty of 1856 and the results of the war. Figures: L.M. Serebryakov, Davydov, M.S. Vorontsov, Lord G. Palmerston, Mustafa - Pasha.

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Northwest Caucasus during the Crimean War (1853-1856) D / z § 5, p. 36-questions.

The ripening of the international conflict Muhammad - Amin Naib Zakubanya In May 1852. Turkish agents arrived to Muhammad-Amin to persuade the highlanders to join the impending war together with Turkey, England and France against Russia. In July 1853. Naib with 10 thousandth cavalry marched to Karachay, but to no avail. - What was the purpose of this campaign?

The ripening of an international conflict Lord Henry Palmerston British Foreign Secretary “My cherished goal in the war…: to surrender the Aland Islands and Finland to Sweden; to transfer the provinces of Russia near the Baltic Sea to Prussia; restore the independent Kingdom of Poland; Wallachia, Moldavia and the mouth of the Danube should be given to Austria; Crimea, Circassia and Georgia should be given to Turkey. " Were these plans feasible?

The beginning of the war. The abandonment of the fortifications of the Black Sea coastline by the Russian troops Istanbul (Constantinople) - the capital of the Ottoman Empire (Turkey) on October 4, 1853. Turkey has declared war on Russia. The Turks located the main troops in the Caucasus, planning to quickly take Tiflis - the administrative center of the Caucasus. What did the Turks count on when planning the main battles in the Caucasus?

The beginning of the war. The abandonment of the fortifications of the Black Sea coastline by the Russian troops of the Battle of Sinop on November 18, 1853. The defeat of the Turkish fleet in the Sinop Bay hastened the entry into the war of England and France. December 23, 1853 their fleet entered the Black Sea. Why did this complicate Russia's position in the war?

The beginning of the war. The abandonment of the fortifications of the Black Sea coastline by the Russian troops Viceroyalty of the Caucasus, Prince Mikhail Semyonovich Vorontsov "The fleets of the Black Sea coastline will not be able to resist the naval forces of the allied powers ... And the forces assumed for the war with the Turks and mountaineers can no longer correspond to the upcoming struggle." What measures did Prince Vorontsov suggest? March 4 and 5, 1854 Russian garrisons left Novotroitskoye, Tenginskoye, Velyaminovskoye, Lazarevskoye, Golovinskoye and Navaginskoye fortifications. They were transferred to Gelendzhik and Novorossiysk. Then they left Gelendzhik.

Arrival in the Caucasus Sefer - bey Zan (Zanoko) Sefer-bey (1789-1859) leader of the Circassian liberation movement. Descended from a clan of princes. Received a good education. Lived in Istanbul for a long time. I wanted to create the state of "Circassia". In 1854. Sefer Bey arrived in the Caucasus from Turkey. He began to encourage the mountaineers to wage an active struggle against Russia in alliance with Turkey, England and France. But he could not unite all the Adyghe tribes for an active participation in the Crimean War. In addition, he competed with Muhammad-Amin for the right to be the leader of all Circassian tribes. Why were Sefer Bey's efforts unsuccessful?

Expedition of Russian troops to Gelendzhik Detachment of Vice-Admiral L.M. Serebryakov with four mountain guns Storming Gelendzhik In June 1854. from Novorossiysk to Gelendzhik in two small detachments (along the coast and along the sea) an expedition of Russian troops passed. The suddenness of the attack forced the Turks to flee to the mountains, abandoning their ships. Detachments of Vice Admiral L.M. Serebryakov and Lieutenant Davydov returned safely to Novorossiysk. What was the significance of this expedition?

The blockade of the harbors of the Black and Azov Seas In February 1855. the allies announced a blockade of the harbors of the Black and Azov Seas. On February 28, they began shelling Novorossiysk. The city was badly damaged, but the allies did not manage to land troops. The mountaineers also refused to help them in the assault. Thanks to what the assault on Novorossiysk did not take place? But on May 15, 1855. Russian troops left Novorossiysk to cut the line of defense. They retreated to Temryuk and took up defenses there. So they prevented an allied attack there.

Intensification of actions against Russia. In June 1855. The detachments of Sefer Bey occupied the fortress of Anapa abandoned by the Russians. The Turks tried to rouse the Circassians to an active joint struggle against the Russians. But the highlanders did not trust the Europeans. In September 1855. the allies organized the "Fanagoria expedition", the purpose of which was the Black Sea cordon line. September 12, 1855 a squadron of allies of 15 ships appeared near Temryuk. They tried to land troops. But the brave Black Sea scouts prevented them. Nevertheless, the allies were able to occupy Phanagoria. Their next target was Temryuk. After that, they planned to get to Yekaterinodar through the Kuban. How could such a development of events affect the situation in the Caucasian theater of military operations?

Intensification of actions against Russia. ... But the 7-thousandth detachment of Sefer-bey's son Karabatyr could not take the Varenikovsky Fortification. September 20, 1855 Colonel P.D. Babych made a night "sabotage against Phanagoria." With the help of many bonfires, he was able to create the impression that he had significant powers. The maneuver was a success - the allies withdrew from Phanagoria. On the night of December 28-29, 1855. Sefer Bey tried to take Yekaterinodar. But his 3 thousandth detachment was repulsed.

The end of the Crimean War and its results. ... March 18, 1856 the Paris Peace Treaty was concluded. Russia agreed to "neutralize" the Black Sea. She could not have military bases and a fleet here. It was forbidden to have fortifications on the eastern coast of the Black Sea. The "neutralization" did not apply to the allies. Why were these conditions difficult and dangerous for Russia?

Thesis

Mashukova, Aminat Petrovna

Academic degree:

Candidate of Historical Sciences

Place of thesis defense:

VAK specialty code:

Speciality:

National history

Number of pages:

Chapter 1. CAUCASIAN FRONT OF THE CRIMEAN WAR

IN THE PLANS OF THE WARRIORS.

1.1. The military plans of the Western powers in relation to the Caucasus in the early 50s. XIX century.

1.2. Northwestern Caucasus on the eve of the Crimean War

Chapter 2. FEATURES OF THE CRIMEAN WAR IN THE CAUCASUS

In 1854-1855.

2.1. Between the Crimea and the Caucasus, the development of a strategy of military operations by the allies.

2.2. Military operations in the Northwestern Caucasus in 1854

2.3. Campaign of 1855 in the Northwestern Caucasus.

Chapter 3. RESULTS OF THE CRIMEAN WAR IN THE CAUCASIAN THEATER

MILITARY ACTION. "

3.1. Diplomatic negotiations on the conditions for ending the war.

3.2. Diplomatic struggle for the Caucasus and the Parisian world 1856

Dissertation introduction (part of the abstract) On the topic "North-Western Caucasus during the Crimean War"

Relevance of the research topic. The integration of the Northwestern Caucasus into Russia took place in a complex foreign policy situation, since the Caucasian problem by the 50s. XIX century. acquired an important role in the system of international relations. The Circassian issue at that time occupied a prominent place in the politics of Russia, Turkey, England and France. The attention of the opposing powers to the Northwestern Caucasus was conditioned by their military-strategic, political and economic interests.

In international relations and politics of the powers in the Middle East and the Black Sea basin " Circassian question", how component Caucasian problem, occupied a significant place, although due to a number of historically specific conditions of that era, it was not formally on the agenda of the so-called "big" diplomacy before the start of the Crimean War. The Circassian issue affected the interests of Russia, whose policy was aimed at strengthening its positions in the Northwestern Caucasus and preventing it from becoming a region of military threat to the Caucasus and southern Russia.

At present, there is a scientific need to rethink the entire complex of issues related to determining the place of the North-West Caucasus in the system of international relations during the Crimean War (1853-1856). This will reveal important patterns. internal political processes in the region during this period and their significance in the course of its final integration into Russia. In theoretical terms, a comprehensive analysis and problematic coverage of Anglo-French-Russian-Turkish relations in the period under study is intended to:

1) determine the place and role of the "Circassian issue" in the struggle between the rival powers;

2) clarify chronological the framework of the so-called Caucasian and Black Sea problems;

3) identify the origins of the formation, the nature and evolution of the Caucasian policy of Russia and Turkey, the forms and methods of its implementation;

4) characterize the attitude of the Circassians and other peoples of the North-West Caucasus to foreign policy and military challenges, their resistance to increased Turkish and Western European intervention and Russian domination.

In addition, a comprehensive study of " Circassian issue”And the events generated by it has not only scientific and practical significance, but is one of the urgent tasks of domestic Caucasian studies for understanding the policy of the opposing powers in the Caucasus, the reaction of the North Caucasian communities to it.

Nowadays, after the IOC adopted a decision on July 4, 2007 to hold the 2014 White Olympics in Sochi, the Circassian issue has acquired a new meaning and is in the center of domestic public attention, and, especially, in national subjects. southern regions RF. Taking into account Georgia's excessive activity in recent years around the Circassian issue, concrete actions of the Russian Federation to resolve this problem will make it possible to successfully resist the unfriendly efforts of the neighboring state and a number of European organizations, and, which is much more important, exclude it as a factor of destabilization in the North Caucasus. The role of historical research in defusing tensions on this issue is extremely important.

The relevance of the work is also determined by the absence of a special monographic work, which would define the role of the North-West Caucasus in the system of international relations during the Crimean War (1853-1856).

Historiography of the problem. In the historiography of the problem, taking into account the use of certain methodological approaches, sources and literature, the following periods are distinguished:

Imperial (until 1917);

Soviet (1917-1991);

Post-Soviet or modern (since 1991).

Domestic pre-revolutionary historians to one degree or another covered various aspects of the confrontation between Russia, England and Turkey in

The Caucasus. The emergence of this problem is a consequence of both the development of science itself and the demands of the foreign policy struggle in the second half.

XIX century, the desire to find a counterbalance to the thesis of British historiography about the just, humane nature of English foreign policy and the aggressive nature of the Russian.

Since the 70s of the XIX century. works began to appear whose authors consider the methods of anti-Russian activity of the British in the Caucasus in the 30s-60s of the 19th century. A separate work by E.D. Felicin.

In the book by A. Jomini, an employee of the Russian Foreign Ministry, devoted to the diplomatic history of the Crimean War, it is emphasized that, unlike France, England showed a special interest in the Caucasus and intended to oust Russia from there, using the Turks and Circassians3.

P.A. Fadeev believed. That the annexation of the Caucasus to Russia in the middle of the XIX century. - the urgent need for the Russian state, forced to take care of strengthening its southern borders4. P. A. Fadeev believed that if for England striving to the East is "a matter of convenience and profit", then for Russia it is a "matter of life" 5.

The next stage in the study of the international aspects of the Caucasian problem was the work of A.I. Petrov and F.F. .Martens 6. A.N. Petrov first attracted diplomatic documents containing information about the course and acuteness of disputes on the Circassian issue at the Paris Congress of 1856 between the delegates of Russia and England.

F.F. Martin, in a multivolume collection of international treaties8, touches upon the problems of Russian-British rivalry in the Caucasus. He emphasizes that the Nesselrode doctrine, which established relations between Russia and the Eastern peoples by her household chores, which did not tolerate interference (even in the form of "good offices") from a third party, was the official position of St. Petersburg and a warning to London 9.

A prominent representative of pre-revolutionary historiography was General M.I. Bogdanovich10, one of the few Russian official military historians who paid attention to highlighting the role of Caucasian national militias and irregular troops in the Crimean War. Scrupulously examining all the factors of Russia's defeat in the Crimean War, he, at the same time, explained its reasons by the inept actions of individual military leaders. Despite its shortcomings, the work of M.I. Bogdanovich, saturated with rich factual material, has not lost its significance in our time.

N.F. Dubrovin enriched the existing stock of information about the military operations of the Allies on the eastern coast of the Black Sea during the Crimean War11.

But he, considering that Russia's fears of losing the Caucasus are justified, in a certain

12 underestimates the role of irregular militias in the victories of the Russian army.

E. Felitsyn, examining the activities of the Circassian prince Sefer-bey Zan, characterizes the internal situation in the region, supplements information about the activities of foreigners in the Western Caucasus in the 30-60s. XIX century. His work contains elements of an analytical approach to facts, but a sound concept, as such, is not traced.

A significant contribution to the study of the problem of the Crimean War and its role in the destinies of Russia and Europe was made by the work of A.M. Zayonch-kovskii14, which until now has not been sufficiently studied and analyzed by historians. On the basis of archival documents, he came to the conclusion that during the Crimean War, the Caucasus was given a prominent place in the strategic. plans of the Western powers. The author, for the first time, cites evidence of the serious intentions of the Allies to transfer European troops to the Caucasus, where the Turks were defeated. However, A.M. Zayonchkovsky does not go deep into the study of the Caucasian plans of England, France and Turkey. But, in his opinion, the 1854 campaign in Transcaucasia could have been more successful for Russia if Russian generals had not believed the misinformation about the size of the Turkish army and the forthcoming landing of allied troops in Trebizond or on the coast of Western Georgia15.

Russian researcher of the history of the Kuban Cossacks F.A. Shcherbina put forward the idea that European emissaries (Poles, French, British) in Circassia, driven by the idealistic motives of people who appreciated courage in the highlanders, who sympathized with them, wanted to save them from their plight. He considers the Turkish policy towards the highlanders the most serious obstacle for Russia in the Caucasus, underestimating the more dangerous, hidden and subtle enemy - England.16 The author views this rivalry as a clash of interests of the "nobility" and free community members, not noticing another conflict - between supporters and opponents rapprochement with Russia, which also prevented the Circassians from supporting their allies17.

Summing up the results of pre-revolutionary historiography, it should be noted that the Caucasus was studied mainly in the context of Russian policy or the military events that took place in this region. The issue of foreign interference in Caucasian affairs was raised along the way, as an addition to other topics. At the same time, at this time, a wealth of factual material was accumulated, on the basis of which Soviet historians began a more thorough study of this problem.

In the Soviet period, the approach of researchers of the foreign policy situation in the Caucasus in the 50-60s. XIX century. was based on the principles of the Marxist-Leninist methodology of the study of history. First of all, this concerned specific provisions on the estate character of the domestic and foreign policy of this or that state, on the relationship and mutual influence of internal and foreign policy spheres of life of a particular society.

At the same time, Soviet historiography significantly expanded the range of problems in the history of the peoples of the Caucasus, the idea of ​​the nature of the annexation of this region to Russia was interpreted in a new way, the periodization of Russian-Caucasian relations was developed, and a way was found to solve the complex issue of the origins and essence of the Caucasian War. In the studies of the Soviet period, in comparison with the pre-revolutionary period, the source base, the method of processing and criticizing historical documents, etc. have expanded.

The problem under consideration is reflected in works that can be divided into the following groups: generalizing and special works on national history and international relations18.

In generalizing works, the main manifestations of Middle Eastern international rivalry in the second third of the 19th century, without which it is difficult to define the role of the Caucasus in the Russian-English and Russian-Turkish contradictions.

M.N. For the first time in Soviet historiography, Pokrovsky touched upon Russian-English contradictions in general, and in the Caucasus, in particular. He believed that the idea of ​​war "was in the air" since the 30s. XIX century. and was not implemented until the early 50s. XIX century. only because England for a long time could not rally the anti-Russian coalition in Europe. And the success of the creation of a triple alliance (England, France, Austria) against Russia during the Eastern crisis of the 50s. M.N. Pokrovsky explains it by purely economic factors: the tough customs policy of St. Petersburg and the weakening of Anglo-French trade rivalry19.

E.V. Tarle, the author of a fundamental study on the Crimean War, considers the Caucasian issue to be one of the reasons for the Crimean War. "In his opinion, Turkey, carried away by revanchist plans to sever the Caucasus, willingly went to unleash a war. The idea of ​​severing the Caucasus from Russia was also given an important place in the British military program , and, was one of the motives for England's entry into the conflict21.

Hence the hesitation of the allies between the projects of the landing of the expeditionary forces in the Crimea and the Caucasus. As Tarle noted, the French marshal A.-J. Saint-Arnault, effectively the sole commander of the combined armies, refused

29 from the deployment of the main hostilities in Circassia and Georgia * ".

I.V. Bestuzhev, exploring the military situation in the Transcaucasus in 1853-1856. , showed the desire of England and France to achieve their goals with the hands of the Turks, but under their own control. Hence - the actual leadership of the Western European officers not only of the Anatolian army, but also of the Om er-Pasha corps. Focusing on the study of poorly studied aspects of the military history of the Crimean War, the author hardly touched upon political problems24.

The views of Soviet scientists about the events in the Northwestern Caucasus during the Crimean War were summarized by A.G. Kolomeytsev 25.

He believed that the bombing of Novorossiysk by the allies and the Kerch-Azov expedition in March-May 1855, initiated by the British government, testified to the preparation for the opening of an independent front in the North-West Caucasus and England's intention to expand the theater of military operations. Disclosing the background of these maneuvers, Kolomeytsev refers to a little-known circumstance: the commander of the British army in the Crimea, Lord Rzglan, proposed a plan for the Kerch-Azov expedition the next day after the visit of the British ambassador to Turkey S. Canning 26.

New data on England's plans for the Caucasian theater of the Crimean War were cited in his study by L.G. Bloodless 27.

The beginning of a special study of the problem was laid by S.K. Bushuev, who identified and published in 1940 a number of diplomatic documents on the incident with the British schooner "Vixen" 28. In the article preceding them, S.K. Bushuev outlined the motives for England's penetration into Circassia in this order: economic, political, strategic, greatly exaggerating the role of the eastern coast of the Black Sea in British foreign trade. Later, S.K.Bushuev develops his ideas in a monograph on between

29 native rivalry in the Caucasus in the 20-70s. XIX century. The author believes that after Adrianople Treaty of 1829 replaced the Russian-Turkish contradictions in the Caucasus with Russian-English ones, although the intrigues of the Gurks in that region did not stop. Describing the plans of the allies in the Caucasus during the Crimean War, Bushuev limited himself to outlining Palmerston's plan for the dismemberment of the Russian Empire and mistakenly argued that Napoleon III supported this idea30.

In the late 1940s - early 1950s. M. Pokrovsky's research on the activities of foreign agents in the Caucasus in the first half of the 19th century has been published. He convincingly shows the influence of British and Turkish politics on the region and innovatively complements this description with the characteristic domestic state of Circassia. Particularly noteworthy is the article by M. Pokrovsky on the course of military operations on the north-eastern coast of the Black Sea during the Crimean War. To this day, it remains the most detailed and well-documented study on the subject.

A.B. Fadeev. He believed that due to the exacerbation in the XIX century. Eastern question, the Caucasus turns into

33 arena of international conflicts. In the genesis of the Caucasian issue, as an international problem of the first half of the 19th century, he identified three periods: I - 20s. XIX century, when the region was the object of Russian-Iranian and Russian-Turkish rivalry; II - 30-40s XIX century. - English-Russian and III - in the 50s. XIX century. it turns into one of the theaters of war with the participation of almost all the main powers of Europe "4.

HER. Burchuladze devoted several special studies of the role of Georgia in the Crimean War, the study of the goals of Omer Pasha's campaign in Georgia in 1855. This expedition to the rear of the Russian army, according to the author, assumed, in addition to distracting it from Kars, the implementation of British plans to conquer Zakavka

35 zya in 1856 and the political and administrative reorganization of the region.

A.Kh. Kasumov 36. In his opinion, the expedition of Omer Pasha in 1855 was not just a maneuver designed to divert the Russian army from Kars. It was about a larger task - to conquer the Caucasus and force Russia to abandon it37.

In special studies A.Kh. Kasumov and Kh.A. Kasumov on this issue, summarizing the achievements Russian historiography, supplementing them with newly discovered archival documents, and using the methods of historical synthesis, showed the closest relationship of all external and internal aspects of the Circassian issue, including during the Crimean War38.

In a monograph about the Caucasian theater of the Crimean War, H.M. Ibrahimbeyli came to the conclusion that on the eve of the war this region was not politically the most vulnerable part of Russia, as the Bolipinstvo of Russian and foreign statesmen and researchers believed. "However, the work of this author is not devoid of some shortcomings. definition of the role of the military community of the Caucasian irregular militias and the Russian army in victories in the Caucasian theater of military operations - has been resolved quite fully, then for "showing expansionist aspirations of England, France and Turkey ", H.M. Ibrahimbeyli ogra

40 was reduced to downtime by stating the aggressive designs of these powers.

A significant step in the study of the problem was the doctoral dissertation of A.E. Chkheidze on British policy in the Caucasus in the 30-50s. XIX century 41. Sharing the opinion of A.B. Fadeeva, O. P. Markova and Kh.M. Ibrahimbeyli about the Caucasian problem as part of the Eastern question, the author develops the idea that "the contradictions between England and Russia played a certain role in the preparation of the Crimean War" 42. A.E. Chkheidze specifically examines British strategic and political plans for the North-West Caucasus in 1854-1856, and ways to achieve them. He rightly believes that the tactics of England and Turkey of flirting with the Circassians and Shamil showed their futility already in the first two years of the Crimean War43.

In the monograph by G.A. Dzidzaria 44 two chapters are devoted to the analysis of the policy of foreign powers in the Western Caucasus during the period under study. In his opinion, after 1829, Russian-English contradictions became the dominant international contradictions in the Northwestern Caucasus45. Just like A.Kh. Kasumov and Kh.A. Kasumov, G.A. Dzidzaria sees in the eviction of the highlanders to Turkey in 1859-1864. not only the Caucasian, but also the international problem46. However, this author represents the Caucasus during the Crimean War.

Volume 47 of Turkish rather than English plans and aspirations.

D.G. Gulia, analyzing the position of British diplomacy, examines only certain aspects of Britain's policy in the Caucasus at the final stage of the Crimean War. For the first time in Soviet historiography, he uses English archival sources to illuminate this problem48.

Of great interest are the works of Soviet researchers on the history of the Ottoman Empire (A.D. Novichev, V.I.Sheremet, N.A. Dulin, I.L. Fadeev) 49, which highlight internal processes Turkey and its relationship with Russia and Western Europe in the second third of the XIX century.

In particular, V.I. Sheremet in one of his works analyzed the nature of the economic and political ties of the Ottoman Empire with Europe in the second third of the 19th century. and cited information about the plans of Turkey and England in the North Caucasus during the Crimean War50.

To characterize various aspects of socio-economic development and the socio-political system of the Circassians, their relationship with the Russian population, there is a lot of material in the works of Caucasian scholars: T.Kh. Kumy-kova, V.K. Gardanova, B.M. Dzhimova, M.V. Pokrovsky, A.Kh. Bizheva, V.K. Kazharova, K.F. Dzamikhova 51.

Significant importance in the analysis and assessment of the level of development of the Caucasian problem of the ХУШ-ХГХ centuries. played scientific conferences in Makhachkala (June 1989), Kashekhabla (April 1990), Nalchik (October 1990). Thus, Soviet historiography identified the problem of international contradictions in the North Caucasus in the second third of the 19th century. as a subject independent research... New sources were put into circulation, the factual material was significantly expanded.

After the collapse of the USSR and the change in the ideological paradigm, many prohibitions became a thing of the past, and previously inaccessible sources were opened. A number of conferences were held in Grozny (May 1992), Makhachkala (November 1993), Krasnodar (May 1994), devoted to the most diverse aspects of Caucasian studies. Proceedings of conferences and collections of scientific articles of recent years provide an opportunity to rethink and re-evaluate many questions of the history of the North Caucasian peoples.

Some works by V.V. Desheva ". Important information on the problem under study is contained in the work of M. Kandur" ".

Some data on the international position of Western Circassia during the Crimean War are presented in his work by the Russian historian, publicist and writer Y. Gordinet4.

In 2007, a book was prepared by a group of historians and ethnologists from academic centers and universities of the North Caucasus and Moscow, who tried to read the familiar themes of the Caucasian War in a new way.55 It highlighted a special section "The North Caucasus in the Crimean War (1853-1856)", in which considers only the tactics of the Russian command.

At the beginning of the XXI century, a group of Russian Adyghe researchers (A.GO. Chirg, A.K. Cheucheva, S.G. Kudaeva, A.D. Panesh, Khafizova M.G.), interested in a comprehensive and objective study of the problem of foreign policy the status of the Northwestern Caucasus and the historical fate of the Circassians in the 30s and 60s of the 19th century.

A.Yu. Chirg connects the failure of the plans to create the statehood of the Circassians with the constant interference of external forces in their internal affairs. This was most clearly manifested during the Crimean War4 ".

Among modern studies, the works of A.K. Che-ucheva on the peculiarities of the policy of foreign states in the Caucasus in the last quarter of the 18th century. XIX century. We are interested in the sections with an analysis of the international situation of the North-West Caucasus during the Crimean War.3 "In particular, her conclusion that" the consequences of the actions of the Ottoman Empire during the Crimean War turned out to be disastrous for the population of the North-West Caucasus are worthy of attention. unity, and in

58 As a result of the intervention, the Ports were divided into several groups ”.

Certain attention is paid to this problem in his monograph and S.G. Kudaeva 59. Considering the chronology of the Crimean War, the author tries to determine the place of the North-West Caucasus in the system of geopolitical interests of foreign powers. It provides a key to understanding the amplification processes. foreign policy pressure from Western states in this sub-region during the Crimean War. However, the purpose of the work did not allow her to fully investigate the conditions for the formation of foreign policy programs and military plans of the Western powers in the Caucasus in the early 50s. XIX century, and the place of the Circassian issue at the Paris Peace Congress of 1856.

A.D. Panesh in the study of the political history of the Northwestern Caucasus in the 50s. XIX century. is to consider the problem in the context of the intensification of the struggle between Britain, France and Russia for influence in the Middle East60. For obvious reasons, the author is more interested in the peculiarities of the policy of Shamil and Mohammed-Amin in the North-West Caucasus during the Crimean War.

M.G. Khafizova researched the history of the Ubykhs in the 20s and 60s of the 19th century. She sees the drama of the situation in the North-West Caucasus during the Crimean War in the role of the confrontation between Muhammad-Amin and Sefer-bey Zano-ko in the consolidation of the Adyghe sub-ethnic groups. On the other hand, in her opinion, the growth of the anti-Turkish sentiments of the Circassians and their distrust of the Europeans, as well as the inconsistency in the actions of the European powers and Turkey, contributed to the final conquest of the region by Russia and the removal of

61 news of the day of the Circassian issue.

This issue has found a certain reflection in the generalizing works of the modern period. They mainly reflect political history Adygs (Circassians) during the Crimean War (1853-1856).

It should be noted that this problem has also been studied in foreign historiography. The degree of interest of the European powers in Caucasian affairs in general, and in the Northwestern Caucasus, in particular, was different. It depended on the main tasks of the foreign policy of this or that state at a given moment, its internal state, the international situation, etc.

Abroad, the largest number of works on this problem has been published by English and American authors. Of all European countries, England showed the most active interest in the Caucasus, and not only on the eve and during the Crimean War, but also in the future.

Since the 50s. XIX century. in English and American historiography, the topic of the politics of the great powers, and especially England in the Caucasus, was studied mainly within the framework of the history of the Crimean War. E. Yolan, H. Tyrell, A. Kinglake, H. Hozier, A. Slade, D. Brackenbury reported on the events in its Caucasian theater and the strategic calculations of the allies in this area.

English Admiral A. Slade criticized the allied command for indecision in the Caucasian theater of the Crimean War. Speaking for the involvement of the Circassians in cooperation with the allies, he noted the objective difficulties of such a policy associated with the problem of creating a single anti-Russian movement from the peoples living in the Caucasus. A. Slade spoke about the lack of "innate desire" among the mountaineers to become under the rule of Turkey and its pasha64.

In general, these works are based on documentary sources and are descriptive in nature. The Crimean War also presented to some British historians an opportunity for England to oust Russia from the Caucasus and stop its advance in Asia.

The British researcher D. Baddley believed that the consequences of the Crimean War could be more severe for Russia if the Anglo-French command made more active use of the situation in the Caucasus65. “The Crimean War,” Badley said, “could undoubtedly give the Muslim population a chance to prevail over Russia, but in the end the result would have been the same.” 66

Military operations of England on the east coast of the Black Sea in 1854-1855. and Palmerston's plans for the Northwest Caucasus

67 are considered in the works of D. Marschno, S. Wilmot, K. Lorne.

Since the beginning of the XX century. a new stage begins in the Anglo-American historiography of this problem. Expansion in progress chronological framework, depth and content of the research subject. The attention of researchers is gradually shifted from the military to the political plans of the allies, especially England, in the Caucasus during the Crimean War. Two approaches to the problem of British policy in the Caucasus have emerged. They can be conditionally defined as conservative and liberal68.

In the Anglo-American historical literature there is also an alternative to the traditional view of the international aspects of the history of the Northwest Caucasus. Thus, the American historian V. Pyorier, unlike a number of Western scholars, ranks Circassia as an object of Anglo-Russian antagonisms in the Middle East, emphasizing the active attempts of Great Britain during the Crimean War to "radically" solve the problem of the Caucasus69. English historian J. Ridley points to the desire of the London ka

70 binets to separate the Caucasus from Russia in 1854-1856. "

P. Schroeder, based on numerous archival sources, reveals the "imperial designs" of England in the Caucasus during the Crimean War. He directly calls Palmerston's goals "aggressive" and argues that the problem of Georgia and Circassia being ripped off from Russia has become almost a fix idea for him. After the failure of attempts to "solve" the Caucasian issue by military means, the British achieved this diplomatic without stopping preparations for a new campaign in 1856 in the Caucasus. According to Schroeder, the British demands that Russia renounce this region almost led to the disruption of the Paris Congress71.

The active nature of England's policy in the Caucasus in the 50s. XIX century. admits D. Curtiss. He points to the inconsistency in the behavior of the British, who, on the one hand, opposed the slave trade, and on the other, they resented the Russian blockade of the coast of Circassia and greeted "noble freedom fighters" in the mountaineers. According to Curtiss, a policy of conquest was beyond the power of Russia, which was deprived of an "economic basis for imperialism." 72

The English Caucasian scholar W. Allen writes that many Englishmen were seriously convinced of Russia's intention to penetrate deeply into Asia Minor to the shores of the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf (the author himself considers such a danger "problematic"). Opposition to Russian diplomacy, he points out, is becoming a tradition of British ambassadors in the Port: Ponsonby and S. Canning, and the Caucasus is becoming a sharp link in Russian-English contradictions in the Middle East73.

However, Alley does not show the purpose and nature of England's intervention in Caucasian affairs. In his opinion, the question of support for the mountaineers was raised by the British liberals, "who sympathized with the national uprisings in countries with a monarchical regime" 74.

The English historian A. Ramm believed that during the Crimean War Palmerston's idea of ​​the "vital importance" of Circassia and Kars for England was shared by the "angry" British society. Ramm points to the Prime Minister's plans to deploy a large military campaign in the Caucasus in 1856, seeing the ultimate goal of ensuring independence for Circassia from both Russia and Turkey, and creating a protective barrier in the Caucasus against the "Russian onslaught" to the East. According to Ramm, it was difficult for the British delegates to the Paris Congress to defend Palmerston's "Circassian project", because it meant challenging the conditions Andrianopol of the treaty of 1829 7e.

German historiography, in contrast to the Anglo-American, paid less attention to the problem under consideration, but did not completely ignore it. So V. Ryustov, gives valuable information about the course of hostilities in the Caucasian theater, to a lesser extent concerns the local political situation. The author mentions England's intention to turn the Caucasus in the 1856 campaign into the main battlefield, and her position on the Caucasian issue at the Paris Congress76.

Turkish historians see the origins of the Russian-Turkish wars only in Russia's aggressiveness towards the Caucasus and the Ottoman Empire, which were defended by Western European states 7.

It is necessary to highlight the works of historians of the Circassian diaspora: A. Namipotok, R. Trakho, ULM. Khavzhoko, M. Hagondoko "and others. Their works differ in a fairly objective and critical reflection of reality. They criticize the concept of the" voluntary "annexation of the North Caucasian peoples to Russia, and characterize the essence of the Caucasian war as liberating the struggle of the mountaineers against the colonial policy of Russia. However, when considering the Circassian issue, and the Caucasian problem in general, historians of the Circassian diaspora see only Russia's aggressiveness, idealizing Turkey's Caucasian policy and ignoring its colonial character.

Substantive and objectivity of the article was published in due time in the emigre magazines "The ends of the Caucasus" (Paris-Warsaw. 1928-1934), "Caucasus" (Paris, 1934-1939), "North Caucasus" (Warsaw, 193-1939 Surkhai's article "The Caucasus and the Power of the 19th Century" examines the Caucasian problem from the time of Peter I to 1864. The author gives a brief outline of the struggle of Russia, Turkey, Iran and the Western powers over the Caucasian problem79.

Also noteworthy is the article by Khavzhoko "Conquest and colonization

Russia of the Northwestern Caucasus. "A common drawback of all the works of historians from the Circassian diaspora is the weakness of the source base of research.

However, despite the achievements modern historiography, the study of the place and role of the Northwestern Caucasus in the political and diplomatic struggle of the Western powers during the Crimean War has not been sufficiently studied. Therefore, at present, there is a need for a comprehensive study of this topic.

The source of the research is the materials of the Russian state archives: the foreign policy of the Russian Empire (AVPRI), the Russian State Military Historical Archive (RGVIA), the Krasnodar Territory (GAKK), the Stavropol Territory (GASK) and the archive of the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic (CTA KBR). The analysis of archival documents made it possible to study the military-political events during the Crimean War in the North-West Caucasus, the attitude of the Russian authorities towards the mountain peoples, the national-colonial policy of Russia in the Caucasus.

In the central archives archives especially attract attention:

AVPRI - Foundations "Relations with Turkey", "Kabardian Affairs", "Turkish Table", "Main Archive", "Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs", "Embassy in Constantinople";

RGVIA - Foundations "Military Scientific Archive", "Main Directorate of the General Staff", "General Staff", "Asian Unit", "Turkey", "Caucasian War".

Documents and materials found in the above-mentioned funds of AVPR.I and RGVIA testify to that acute diplomatic, political and military struggle unfolding around the Circassian issue between Russia and Turkey; make it possible to understand the foreign policy plans of the Russian and Turkish governments, the methods of their implementation, the policy of the Western powers in the Caucasus.

Valuable materials have been extracted from the funds of the SACC:

F. 254 - Military duty of the Black Sea Cossack army;

F. 260 - Office of the head of the Black Sea coastline (18531859;

F. 261. Office of the Chief of the Black Sea Cardon Line of the Black Sea Cossack Host (1794-1861); and GASK:,

F. 79 - General government of the Caucasian region;

F. 87 - Caucasian civil governor.

These documents made it possible to study in detail the peculiarities of the Adyghe-Russian and Adyghe-Turkish relations, to find out the reasons for the split of the princely-noble and elders' elite of the Adyghe society into supporters of the pro-Russian and pro-Turkish orientations, their attitude to foreign policy events, participation in the Crimean War.

A special place in the source base of the study is given to the documents of the SACC. These include all kinds of instructions from the headquarters of the Black Sea Cossack Host, the office of the Chief of the Black Sea Coast Line and the Black Sea Cossack Host, concentrated in the following funds: F. 254 "Military Watch of the Black Sea Cossack Host", F. 260 "Office of the Chief of the Black Sea Coast Line" F. 261 "Chancery Chief of the Black Sea Cordon Line of the Black Sea Cossack Host ".

These funds provide factual material about the most important military events in the North-West Caucasus during the Crimean War, show the attitude of the Adyghe communities in the war, disavow the actions of the allies in the region, plans to use the Adygs in the war against Russia.

Collections of published documents are widely used in the dissertation.

The most valuable among Russian publications of modern times are documents

The first 10 volumes were published under chairmanship A.I. Berger (from 1866 to 1885) and the next 2 - after his death (1885, 1904). Each of the 12 volumes covers the period of administration in the Caucasus by individual commanders and governors. These materials largely reveal the issues of military, diplomatic and international policy of the opposing powers in the Caucasus.

Volumes VIII XI reflect the history of the Crimean War and the peoples of the Caucasus during this period. They contain the correspondence of Russian military commanders and covs, reports and dispatches, information about the actions of the Separate Caucasian Corps during the Crimean War in the Caucasus.

The source base of the research is also the collections of documents on Russian foreign policy and international relations: "Treaties of Russia with the East (political and trade)", "The reign of Emperor Alexander I (1801-1810)" 82. These compilations contain information about political relations rival powers for dominance in the Caucasus, as well as the course of hostilities. In the agreements concluded between Turkey and Russia, there are special articles concerning the North-West Caucasus.

Several documents, significantly supplementing the study on specific issues of Russian policy in the North-West Caucasus, have been published in the "Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire", "Archive of the State

83 Gift Council "," Collection of the Russian Historical Society ".

The sources used were historical and memoir literature published on the pages of the Russian periodicals of that time: in the magazines - "Russian Starina", "Russian Archive", "Military Journal"; in the collections - "Kuban collection", "Caucasian collection", "Collection of information about the Caucasian highlanders"; in newspapers - "Kavkaz", "Terskie vedomosti", "Kubanskie oblastnye vedomosti" and others.

They published not only notes, memoirs, articles by historians and participants in the wars in the Caucasus, but also published documents and materials from archives as attachments. Works II can be distinguished from this list. Kamenev, N.

Karlgof, M.I. Venyukova, F.F. Tornau, A.P. Ermolova, P.P. Korolenko.

An important narrative source is the works of E. Spencer, Logworth86 and J. Bell87. In addition, some information on the problem we are investigating is contained in the work of T. Lapinsky 88. T. Lapinsky gives some information about Sefer-bei Zane89. The value of these materials is emphasized by the fact that T. Lapinsky personally knew Seferbey. Valuable materials on the problem under study are contained in the memoirs of General M.Ya. Olshevsky 90.

Of great importance for this study is the multivolume publication, which began in 1962 by the Commission for the Publishing of Diplomatic Documents under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia - "Foreign Policy

Russia XIX-beginning of the XX century "91. Most of the documents in this collection were published for the first time.

In the Soviet period, due to ideological restrictions in scientific research, archival documents and materials about the events of the Caucasian War were largely not introduced into scientific circulation. And only in the post-Soviet period, after the removal of “ iron curtain»The access to the funds of the Turkish State Archives was opened, which the employees of the Archival Service of the KBR and the Kabardino-Balkarian State Institute for Humanitarian Research did not fail to take advantage of. The result was an exit

92 valuable collections of documents compiled by A.B. Kushkhabiev.

As evidenced by the documents of the collection, the Ottoman claims to the lands of the Circassians did not stop after the military defeat and the signing of the Treaty of Adrianople. To restore their influence in this region, the Turks and after the end of the Russian-Turkish war of 1828 -1829. weaved intrigues in Circassia, sought to restore their shaken authority in the eyes of the mountaineers. Turkey's policy in the Caucasus since the beginning of the 40s of the XIX century. in many ways "equal" to English. But judging by the documents in the collection, their interests did not coincide in everything. Porta had their own plans to return the "Ottoman lands". The transformation of Circassia into an object of dispute between Russia, on the one hand, England and the Ottoman Empire, on the other, left a very significant imprint on the development of military and political events in the region during the Crimean War.

The object of the research is the territory of the North-West Caucasus during the Crimean War.

The subject of study is the international politics of the Russian Empire, Turkey, England, France, etc. in the Northwest Caucasus during the Crimean War.

The purpose of the dissertation is to study the role of the Northwest Caucasus in the system of international relations during the Crimean War (1853-1856).

In accordance with the goal, the dissertation posed the following tasks:

Analyze the historiography of the problem to identify the degree of its study and unused research opportunities;

Introduce new sources into scientific circulation, increase the information impact of traditionally used archival and published documents;

To reveal foreign policy the reasons and factors for the formation of foreign policy programs and military plans of the Western powers in the Caucasus in the early 50s. XIX century;

Explore the role of the Northwest Caucasus (Circassian issue) on the eve of the Crimean War;

To study the peculiarities of the development of the strategy of military operations by the allies;

To study the features of the campaigns of 1854, 1855 in the North-Western Caucasus;

Reveal the features of the diplomatic struggle for the Caucasus and the Paris Peace of 1856;

Analyze the place of the Circassian issue in diplomatic negotiations on the conditions for ending the Crimean War.

The chronological framework of the main part of the dissertation research covers the period of the Crimean War (1853-1856). Lower chronological the border is associated with the outbreak of hostilities in 1853. Upper - with the Paris Conference of 1856, at which the international legal status of the region under study was determined.

In some cases, to determine the specifics of the international policy of Russia, Turkey, England, etc. in relation to the Northwestern Caucasus, the lower chronological line was pushed back to the beginning of the 50s. XIX century, i.e. time of aggravation of the Eastern question.

The geographical scope of the study is limited to the historical territory of the North-West Caucasus during the Crimean War.

The methodological basis of the dissertation was the achievements of modern domestic and foreign historical science using special methods and research principles.

Observance of the principles of modern historical science - historicism and objectivism - is of great importance for us. Following the principles of historicism made it possible to consider the problem in concrete historical conditions in the context of military-political and socio-economic and changes in the North-West Caucasus.

The principle of objectivity in the study was used in connection with the involvement of various sources and taking into account the diversity of points of view on the problem under study.

The problem-chronological method allowed us to analyze the series of events associated with the military-diplomatic struggle of various states in the North-West Caucasus in chronological sequence.

A systematic analysis of historical events made it possible to synthesize information obtained from the processing of documentary sources. They acquired a logical consistency, pivotal orientation in the development of the problem of scientific research.

The study implements a historical-genetic method that allows one to study the dynamics of the confrontation between Russia and Turkey and the European powers in the North-West Caucasus and identify changes in their characteristics in connection with the position of the north-western Circassians.

The historical and typological method allowed us to identify typologically similar events, phenomena and processes in the region during the Crimean War, as well as to reveal the effectiveness of the implementation of diplomatic and military-political strategies of the opposing sides in the North-West Caucasus.

The aggregate method was used when working with documents to collect disparate facts from sources different types and types;

A casual method of detailed consideration of rare, unique, atypical phenomena for the reconstruction of macro- and microevents of various levels of historical reality;

The combined use of all the listed methods and principles provided an integrated approach to research problems, and made it possible to understand that the age-old positive potential of interaction between two neighboring peoples gravitating towards each other was far from being exhausted, but was not fully used in the interests of both sides.

Scientific novelty of the research. The scientific novelty of the dissertation research is that:

This is the first comprehensive study of the process of transformation of the Circassian issue on the eve, during and at the final stage of the Crimean War;

New archival documents have been introduced into scientific circulation, the latest works on Russian history, related to the topic of this dissertation, have been taken into account;

The dissertation research adds new characteristics to the ideas that have developed in Russian historiography about the course of Russia's diplomatic and military struggle, on the one hand, and by the coalition members, on the other, for priority influence in the North-West Caucasus;

For the first time, the problem of the independence of the Western Adyghe ethnopolitical communities, their foreign policy orientation, internal political situation are considered in conjunction with the solution of the Middle East issue;

The military-strategic goals of Russia, Turkey, England and France in the North-West Caucasus and the forms and methods of their implementation by each side have been investigated;

The scientific novelty of the work is also determined by the fact that in it, despite the fact that the tsarist government did not see other methods of achieving its goals in the North-West Caucasus, except for military actions, it shows the military, political, economic and cultural prerequisites for the rapprochement of the Circassians with Russia.

The theoretical and practical significance of the dissertation lies in the fact that its provisions and conclusions, systematized and introduced material into scientific circulation, can be used in the preparation of generalized studies on the history of the peoples of the North Caucasus and international relations of the middle of the 19th century.

The data of this study can be used in the preparation of special courses and special seminars on relevant issues at the history departments of universities.

In addition, the results of the study can be used by school teachers, foreign Adyghe diasporas, everyone who is interested in the history of the peoples of the North Caucasus.

The main provisions for the defense:

1. In the early 50s. XIX century. Turkey, England and France developed a strategy and plans for military operations in the Caucasus. For this, intelligence events, maps of the region and topographic descriptions were drawn up, negotiations were conducted with representatives of the mountain elite on military cooperation.

2. On the eve of the Crimean War (1853-1856), the Circassian issue again acquired international significance in the politics of Turkey and the Western European powers. Circassia was viewed as a significant military-political force in their struggle against the Russian Empire for the redistribution of spheres of influence in the Northwest Caucasus.

3. In the process of forming the strategy of combat operations, the military leadership of the Anglo-French-Turkish alliance assigned a special role to the Caucasian theater of war. The allies planned to deliver a serious blow to Russia in the Caucasus. The most important strategic task of the allies was to establish military contacts with the elite of the Caucasian peoples who continued their struggle for independence.

4. The main task of the allied forces in the Caucasian theater of the Crimean War of 1853-1863. was the destruction of fortifications on the Black Sea coastline. In general, the military actions of 1854 for the allied forces were not as successful (defeat in the storming of Novorossiysk and the refusal of the alliance of the mountain elite), as it was planned at the very beginning of the Crimean War.

5. The efforts of the members of the anti-Russian coalition to use the military forces of the Circassians in their own interests during the Crimean War were not crowned with success. The Adygs refused to fight in the name of the interests of Turkey and the European powers. For the most part, they did not support the operations of Russia's opponents.

6. After the unsuccessful assault on Novorossiysk in 1854, the allied powers did not abandon their attempts to attract the Circassians to the war in the North-West Caucasus. This circumstance introduced a certain split in the Circassian aristocracy. However, the hopes of Russia's rivals for the support of the Circassians influenced the inclusion of the Circassian issue, as one of the main ones, on the agenda of the Paris Peace Congress (1856).

7. The Circassian issue was given special importance in the course of diplomatic negotiations to end the war at the end of 1855-1856. Members of the Anglo-French-Turkish alliance proposed to revise the terms of the Adriano-Polish peace treaty (1829), planning after the war to create a new state "Circassia", controlled by England and France.

8. The Paris Congress of 1856, showed the full depth and complexity of the "Caucasian question" in the relationship between England, France and Turkey, on the one hand, and Russia, on the other. Sharp discussions on this issue clearly laid bare the disagreements among the allies, thanks in large part to whom Russia managed to keep the Caucasus.

Approbation of work. The dissertation was discussed at a meeting of the Department of Russian History of the Kabardino-Balkarian State University named after V.I. HM. Berbekov (protocol no. From). The main findings of the dissertation are published in 7 scientific articles, of which 1 - in the edition recommended by the Higher Attestation Commission of the Russian Federation. The total volume of publications on the topic of the dissertation is more than 2.5 pp.

The structure of the thesis is built in accordance with its goals and objectives. The work consists of an introduction, three chapters, a conclusion, a bibliography and a list of abbreviations.

Conclusion of the thesis on the topic "Domestic history", Mashukova, Aminat Petrovna

CONCLUSION

Based on the study, it should be noted that the Crimean War and the relationship with its participants had the most direct impact on the fate of the peoples of the North-West Caucasus, whose territory became the arena of military operations. The region had a significant impact on the outcome of the war and should not be underestimated.

Problem foreign policy Caucasus, since 1829, i.e. after the conclusion Adrianople peace is turning into a part of Russia's domestic policy, but at the same time, it does not lose its important international significance.

Since the 1830s. The Northwest Caucasus is directly becoming one of the objects of British policy in the East. To achieve it, London sought to take advantage of the Caucasian War, which seemed to increase the chances of success for such a foreign policy line.

The main focus was on the territory of Circassia, accessible from the sea. As an official justification for the policy of England, designed to justify it in the eyes of public opinion, a doctrine was put forward according to which the British government rejected the annexation of Circassia to Russia by Adrianople treaty as an illegal deal and qualified the Circassians as freedom fighters against despotic Russia. This was an indirect recognition of the highlanders by the belligerent side. In addition, British policy was guided by the idea of ​​the need to prevent the establishment of Russia in the Caucasus in order to avoid its further advance through the countries of the Middle East to India.

Throughout the 30s. XIX century. England tried in every way to unite the highlanders in a single state with a single government, in the European sense of these concepts, in order to:

First, formally make Circassia a subject of international relations and give its requests to England for a protectorate, as well as to the English protectorate itself, an appearance of legality;

Second, to significantly simplify the problem of managing this region for London.

The penetration of England into the Caucasus was dictated, first of all, by political and strategic considerations. Along with subversive actions in the Caucasus, England resorted to diplomatic pressure on Russia in order to force it to abandon Circassia.

British Secretary of State G. Palmerston on every occasion expressed an official protest against the strengthening of Russia's position in the Caucasus, suggested to Nicholas I to withdraw Russian troops beyond the Kuban and give the Circassians independence, pledging on his part to keep the highlanders from attacks on Russian territories.

Turkey, forced to abide by the Treaty of Adrianople, tried to operate in the Caucasus secretly, through representatives of the conservative wing of the Polish emigration, who assigned this area an important role in the plans for the revival of Poland.

In the 40s. XIX century. The Russian and Ottoman empires were in dispute over the border line between the two powers in Western Georgia. Petersburg prevented Istanbul from involving European countries in this diplomatic litigation. British aspirations in the Caucasus largely stimulated the outbreak of the Crimean War.

Officially reducing his policy in the eastern crisis of the 50s. XIX century. only to protect the integrity of Turkey, England planned to sever Circassia and Georgia from Russia, establish an English protectorate over them. But erroneous ideas about the political moods of the Caucasian peoples indicated the futility of such plans.

Therefore, the British leadership did not insist on the landing of allied troops in the Caucasus, although it did not abandon this idea without hesitation. Defeats of the Turkish Army in Transcaucasia in 1853-1854, vols. forced London to increase its attention to this area in order to achieve a turning point in the course of the war in conditions when Sevastopol unexpectedly demanded from the allies a maximum and constant build-up of military contingent in Crimea.

Finally, after the fall of Sevastopol and the failure of the Anglo-Turkish expedition led by Omer Pasha in the Caucasus, London began hastily to prepare the transfer of its troops to Georgia and Circassia. These military actions, combined with diplomatic steps, England took with the expectation of meeting its interests in the Caucasus in a future peace treaty with Russia.

During the Crimean War, British agents in the Caucasus carried out military and political missions. The British fleet along the eastern coast of the Black Sea supported and supplied Turkish forces in Western Georgia, conducted military operations on the Taman Peninsula, near Anapa, Novorossiysk, Redug-Kale. British officers actually commanded the Anatolian Turkish army.

The thesis of Western historiography about the passivity of the British in the Caucasus, due to their alleged underestimation of the significance of this theater of war, is unfounded. In fact, for a number of reasons, primarily related to the contradictions among the allies, she was unable to implement them. London tried not to let out of the war, either its ally France or its adversary Russia, without achieving the results it needed.

The international situation of the eastern crisis of the 1950s, unfavorable for Russia. The 19th century, the unfinished Caucasian War, stimulated the revival of Turkey's revanchist claims to the Transcaucasus and the Northwest Caucasus.

The Turks showed a complete inability to "arrange" Circassian affairs, whose unceremonious interference in the inner life of the mountaineers aroused their displeasure. The situation was aggravated by the latent struggle between the British and Turkish emissaries for influence among the Circassians.

The fighting of the mountaineers was not coordinated with the Turkish and Anglo-French command. They were undertaken by Muhammad-Amin independently. The peoples of the Northwestern Caucasus reacted with distrust to the Turks.

Sefer Bey and Mohammed Amin enjoyed power and influence among the people because each of them was a banner that united the Circassians in the fight against the threat of Russian domination. But as soon as they tried to go to the service of the coalition members, they soon lost the support of the population.

The Circassians of the Northwestern Caucasus did not have many true followers of Muridism. That is why the struggle of the Circassians against the rule of tsarism did not take on a purely religious character.

In the case of the British and French claims to Anapa, the people made it clear to Sefer Bey that they would act against them as against their enemies. For the same reason, Omer Pasha's hopes of raising a general uprising against Russian rule in the Caucasus collapsed. The Abkhazians and the Circassians, having got to know the allies and the Turks better, had every reason not to trust them.

Unlike England and Turkey, France was interested in the Caucasus not politically, but strategically, and exactly to the extent that victory in the war over Russia could depend on it. Napoleon III did not seek territorial gains and "material" benefits in the Caucasus at the expense of the enemy. He longed for a winner's laurels that would enable him to play a leading role in Europe.

When the French government, which preferred not to send its army to the Caucasus and become an instrument of British colonial expansion, realized that one should not count on effective assistance Circassians, it firmly spoke in favor of the landing in the Crimea.

In accordance with its tasks in the war, France participated in naval operations off the coast of Circassia, but did not allow them to be brought to an excessive weakening of Russia in the Caucasus.

In developing the preliminary conditions for peace talks with Russia, the Caucasian issue and its Circassian component have become almost the main stumbling block in relations between the Western powers.

England strove to continue the war until Russia unconditionally agrees to discuss "the fate of the peoples inhabiting the eastern coast of the Black Sea."

Napoleon III was looking for a compromise solution, trying, on the one hand, to prevent the British from disrupting the prospect of peace and to drag France into an unwanted military campaign in 1856 in the Caucasus, on the other, to preserve in such an uncertain situation the appearance of loyalty to the allied duty.

The divergence of views of the allies on the Caucasian problem was completely exposed at the Paris Congress of 1856, where a heated dispute ensued between the British and Russian delegates about the future political structure of Circassia and Georgia.

The British defended the idea of ​​creating independent states on these territories as a buffer zone between Russia and Turkey. The Russian side argued that these proposals meant a gross violation of the sovereignty of the Russian state. The tenacity with which each side defended its position nearly called into question the success of the peace talks.

The obvious benevolence of Napoleon III to Russia in this matter, the sluggish support of the British demands by the Turks, who understood their excessiveness and groundlessness, the passivity of Austria, worried only about the resumption of the war and its interests in Europe did not suffer, eventually forced England to moderate their claims.

For Russia, the strategic and political results of the Crimean War in the Caucasus were successful. Neither the fears of the official Petersburg about unreliability the peoples of the region, nor the hopes of the allies for a general anti-Russian uprising there.

At the same time, the Crimean War was an ordeal for Russia. Events 1853-1856 in their content for both belligerents in the Caucasian theater of the Crimean War were conditioned by the victories of the Russian army with the support of the local population over the rising coalition forces.

The outcome of the war on the Caucasian Front was decided by only 30-50 thousand Russian troops, scattered in small detachments over a vast distance from the Black Sea to Ararat, by the population: and by the local militias of the Caucasus.

The country's international prestige was undermined, its economic and military weakness, and an urgent need for major reforms were revealed. Russia faced a long and difficult struggle to get rid of the "Crimean legacy" inherited from the era of Nicholas I in the form of "neutralizing" the Black Sea.

Summing up the general results of studying the problem, the following should be emphasized.

Russian-English contradictions in the Caucasus, which reached already in the 30s of the XIX century. level for an armed conflict, intensified the process of maturation of the causes of the Crimean War.

In the 50s. XIX century. Caucasus remained " stumbling block"In Russian-Turkish relations. The continuing Caucasian war nurtured the hope of the Porto for the restoration of the lost positions in Circassia and Georgia. However, excluding the period of the Crimean War, when Turkey made an open invasion of the region, the Ottoman leadership was forced to act more cautiously than the British.

In the eyes of the Porta, Circassia should have compensated for its weakened dominance in the Balkans and the Mediterranean, and the Circassians should have become a weapon in the fight against the anti-Ottoman national liberation movement.

For France and Austria, the Caucasus did not have an independent significance in their foreign policy, but it was used as an auxiliary lever for pressure on Russia, limiting its influence in the Middle East, realizing French and Austrian aspirations in Europe. This brought additional tension to the state of international relations over the Caucasian issue.

The interest of the Parisian and Vienna cabinets in the Caucasus is a private but symptomatic evidence that the process of transformation of European political life into an integral multicomponent system was under way, in which peripheral problems (the Caucasus) were gradually involved.

Within the framework of this system, simultaneously with the exacerbation of its internal antagonisms, the interdependence and interdependence of phenomena that at first glance seem to be little related to each other intensified. A complex sensitive structure was formed in which it was impossible to disturb a single element so that it would not affect others.

The period of the Crimean War is characteristic of the history of the Caucasus not only by the voluntary participation of military irregular formations on the side of the Russian Empire, but also by the acute struggle of various social and political forces.

Thus, in the course of the war, a very peculiar situation developed in the Caucasian theater, which was sharply different from the events on other fronts. First of all, here it was due to the victory of the Russian army over the superior forces of the coalition. The success of the Russian army on the Caucasian front hastened the end of the entire military campaign and had an effective impact on the course diplomatic negotiations in Paris (1856).

The British demands on the Circassian issue were not reflected in the Paris Peace Treaty, concluded in March 1856. Although the tsarist government as a whole was defeated in the Crimean War, Russia's possessions in the Caucasus were retained by it. Crimean War of 1853-1856 became a very significant milestone in the history of the peoples of the Caucasus.

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The "Caucasian War" is the longest military conflict with the participation of the Russian Empire, which dragged on for almost 100 years and was accompanied by heavy casualties from both the Russian and Caucasian peoples. The reconciliation of the Caucasus did not occur even after the parade of Russian troops in Krasnaya Polyana on May 21, 1864 officially marked the end of the conquest of the Circassian tribes of the Western Caucasus and the end of the Caucasian War. The armed conflict that lasted until the end of the 19th century gave rise to many problems and conflicts, the echoes of which can still be heard at the beginning of the 21st century..

The concept of "Caucasian war", its historical interpretation

The concept of "Caucasian War" was introduced by the pre-revolutionary historian Rostislav Andreevich Fadeev in the book "Sixty Years of the Caucasian War", published in 1860.

Pre-revolutionary and Soviet historians up to the 1940s preferred the term "Caucasian Wars of the Empire"

"Caucasian war" became a common term only in Soviet times.

Historical interpretations of the Caucasian War

In the enormous multilingual historiography of the Caucasian War, there are three main directions that reflect the positions of three main political rivals: the Russian Empire, the great powers of the West, and supporters of the Muslim resistance. These scientific theories determine the interpretation of war in historical science.

Russian imperial tradition

The Russian imperial tradition is presented in the works of pre-revolutionary Russian and some modern historians. It originates from the pre-revolutionary (1917) course of lectures by General Dmitry Ilyich Romanovsky. Supporters of this trend include the author of the famous textbook Nikolai Ryazanovsky "History of Russia" and the authors of the English-language "Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet history"(under the editorship of J.L. Viszhinsky). The above-mentioned work of Rostislav Fadeev can be attributed to the same tradition.

These works often talk about the "pacification of the Caucasus", about Russian "colonization" in the sense of the development of territories, the emphasis is placed on the "predation" of the mountaineers, the religiously militant nature of their movement, the civilizing and reconciling role of Russia is emphasized, even taking into account the mistakes and " kinks ".

In the late 1930s and 1940s, a different point of view prevailed. Imam Shamil and his supporters were declared to be henchmen of the exploiters and agents of foreign intelligence services. Shamil's long-term resistance, according to this version, was allegedly due to the help of Turkey and Britain. From the late 1950s to the first half of the 1980s, the emphasis was placed on the voluntary entry of all peoples and outskirts without exception into the Russian state, the friendship of peoples and the solidarity of workers in all historical epochs.

In 1994, a book by Mark Bliev and Vladimir Degoev "The Caucasian War" was published, in which the imperial scientific tradition combined with an orientalist approach. The overwhelming majority of North Caucasian and Russian historians and ethnographers reacted negatively to the hypothesis expressed in the book about the so-called "raid system" - the special role of raids in mountain society caused by a complex complex of economic, political, social and demographic factors.

Western tradition

It is based on the premise of Russia's inherent desire to expand and "enslave" the annexed territories. In 19th-century Britain (fearing for Russia's approach to the "pearl of the British crown" of India) and the United States of the 20th century (worried about the USSR / Russia approaching the Persian Gulf and the oil regions of the Middle East), the mountaineers were considered a "natural barrier" on the way of the Russian Empire to the south. The key terminology of these works is "Russian colonial expansion" and the "North Caucasian shield" or "barrier" opposing them. The classic work is the work of John Badley, published at the beginning of the last century, "Russia's Conquest of the Caucasus". At present, adherents of this tradition are grouped in the Society for Central Asian Studies and the Central Asian Survey, which it publishes in London.

Anti-imperialist tradition

Early Soviet historiography of the 1920s - first half of the 1930s. (the school of Mikhail Pokrovsky) viewed Shamil and other leaders of the resistance of the highlanders as leaders of the national liberation movement and spokesmen for the interests of the broad working people and the exploited masses. The mountaineers' raids on their neighbors were justified by the geographical factor, the lack of resources in an almost beggarly urban life, and the robbers of the abreks (19-20 centuries) - the struggle for liberation from the colonial yoke of tsarism.

During the Cold War, Leslie Blanch emerged from among Sovietologists who creatively reworked the ideas of early Soviet historiography with his popular work The Sabers of Paradise (1960), translated into Russian in 1991. A more academic work - the study by Robert Bauman "Unusual Russian and Soviet wars in the Caucasus, in Central Asia and Afghanistan "- speaks of the" intervention "of the Russians in the Caucasus and of the" war against the highlanders "in general. Recently, there has been a Russian translation of the work of the Israeli historian Moshe Hammer" Muslim Resistance to Tsarism. Shamil and the conquest of Chechnya and Dagestan. ”A feature of all these works is the absence of Russian archival sources in them.

Periodization

Background of the Caucasian War

At the beginning of the 19th century, the Kartli-Kakhetian kingdom (1801-1810), as well as the Transcaucasian Khanates - Ganja, Sheki, Kuba, Talyshinsky (1805-1813) became part of the Russian Empire.

Bucharest Peace Treaty (1812), who ended the Russian-Turkish war of 1806-1812, recognized Western Georgia and the Russian protectorate over Abkhazia as Russia's sphere of influence. In the same year, the transition to Russian citizenship of Ingush societies, enshrined in the Vladikavkaz Act, was officially confirmed.

By Gulistan Peace Treaty of 1813 that ended the Russo-Persian War, Iran renounced sovereignty over Dagestan, Kartli-Kakheti, Karabakh, Shirvan, Baku and Derbent khanates in favor of Russia.

The southwestern part of the North Caucasus remained in the sphere of influence of the Ottoman Empire. Hard-to-reach mountainous regions of Northern and Central Dagestan and Southern Chechnya, mountain valleys of Zakuban Circassia remained outside Russian control.

At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the power of Persia and Turkey in these regions was limited and the mere fact of recognizing these regions as Russia's sphere of influence did not mean the immediate subordination of the local rulers to St. Petersburg.

Between the newly acquired lands and Russia lay the lands of those who had sworn allegiance to Russia, but de facto independent mountain peoples, mainly professing Islam. The economy of these regions to a certain extent depended on raids on neighboring regions, which for this very reason could not be stopped, despite the agreements reached by the Russian authorities.

Thus, from the point of view of the Russian authorities in the Caucasus at the beginning of the 19th century, there were two main tasks:

• The need for the annexation of the North Caucasus to Russia for territorial unification with the Transcaucasia.
• The desire to stop the constant raids of the mountain peoples in the territory of the Caucasus and Russian settlements in the North Caucasus.

It was they who became the main causes of the Caucasian War.

Brief description of the theater of military operations

The main centers of war were concentrated in the remote mountainous and foothill regions in the North-East and North-West Caucasus. The region where the war was going on can be divided into two main theaters of war.

Firstly, this is the North-Eastern Caucasus, which mainly includes the territory of modern Chechnya and Dagestan. The main enemy of Russia here was the Imamat, as well as various Chechen and Dagestan state and tribal formations. During the hostilities, the mountaineers managed to create a powerful centralized state organization and achieve noticeable progress in armament - in particular, the troops of Imam Shamil not only used artillery, but also organized the production of artillery pieces.

Secondly, this is the North-Western Caucasus, which includes, first of all, the territories located south of the Kuban River and which were part of the historical Circassia. These territories were inhabited by a large people of Adygs (Circassians), divided into a significant number of sub-ethnic groups. The level of centralization of military efforts throughout the war remained extremely low here, each tribe fought or made peace with the Russians on its own, only occasionally forming fragile alliances with other tribes. Often during the war there were clashes between the Circassian tribes themselves. Economically, Circassia was poorly developed, almost all iron products and weapons were purchased on foreign markets, the main and most valuable export product was the slaves captured during the raids and sold to Turkey. The level of organization of the armed forces corresponded approximately to European feudalism, the main force of the army was the heavily armed cavalry, consisting of representatives of the tribal nobility.

Periodically armed clashes between the highlanders and Russian troops took place in the Transcaucasus, Kabarda and Karachay.

Situation in the Caucasus in 1816

At the beginning of the 19th century, the actions of Russian troops in the Caucasus were in the nature of random expeditions, not connected by a common idea and a specific plan. Often conquered areas and sworn-in nationalities immediately fell away and became enemies again as soon as Russian troops left the country. This was due, first of all, to the fact that practically all organizational, managerial and military resources were diverted to the conduct of the war against Napoleonic France, and then to the organization of post-war Europe. By 1816, the situation in Europe had stabilized, and the return of the occupying forces from France and European states gave the government the necessary military strength to launch a full-scale campaign in the Caucasus.

The situation on the Caucasian line was as follows: the Trans-Kuban Circassians opposed the right flank of the line, the Kabardian Circassians opposed the center, and the Chechens, who enjoyed a high reputation and authority among the mountain tribes, lived opposite the left flank across the Sunzha River. At the same time, the Circassians were weakened by internal strife, and a plague epidemic raged in Kabarda. The main threat came primarily from the Chechens.

General Yermolov's policy and the uprising in Chechnya (1817 - 1827)

In May 1816, Emperor Alexander I appointed General Alexei Ermolov as commander of the Separate Georgian (later Caucasian) corps.

Ermolov believed that it was impossible to establish a lasting peace with the inhabitants of the Caucasus due to their historically established psychology, tribal fragmentation and established relations with the Russians. He developed a consistent and systematic plan of offensive actions, which envisaged at the first stage the creation of a base and the organization of bridgeheads and only then the beginning of phased, but decisive offensive operations.

Ermolov himself described the situation in the Caucasus as follows: "The Caucasus is a huge fortress, defended by a half-million garrison. It is necessary either to storm it, or to seize the trenches. The assault will cost dearly. So let us lead the siege!" .

At the first stage, Yermolov moved the left flank of the Caucasian line from Terek to Sunzha in order to get closer to Chechnya and Dagestan. In 1818, the Nizhne-Sunzhenskaya line was strengthened, the Nazranovsky redoubt (modern Nazran) in Ingushetia was fortified, and the Groznaya fortress (modern Grozny) was built in Chechnya. Having strengthened the rear and created a solid operational base, the Russian troops began to advance deep into the foothills of the Greater Caucasus Range.

Ermolov's strategy consisted in a systematic advance deep into Chechnya and Mountainous Dagestan by encircling mountainous areas with a continuous ring of fortifications, cutting openings in rugged forests, laying roads and destroying recalcitrant auls. The territories liberated from the local population were inhabited by Cossacks and Russian and friendly Russian settlers, who formed "strata" between the tribes hostile to Russia. Ermolov responded to the resistance and raids of the mountaineers with repressions and punitive expeditions.

In Northern Dagestan, in 1819, the Vnezapnaya fortress was laid (near the modern village of Endirey, Khasavyurt district), and in 1821, the Burnaya fortress (near the village of Tarki). In 1819 - 1821, the possessions of a number of Dagestan princes were transferred to the vassals of Russia or annexed.

In 1822, the Sharia courts (mehkeme) that had been operating in Kabarda since 1806 were dissolved. Instead, a Provisional Civil Court was established in Nalchik under the full control of Russian officials. Together with Kabarda, the Balkars and Karachais dependent on the Kabardian princes fell under the rule of Russia. In the area between the Sulak and Terek rivers, the lands of the Kumyks were conquered.

In order to destroy the traditional military-political ties between the Muslims of the North Caucasus hostile to Russia, by order of Ermolov, Russian fortresses were built at the foot of the mountains on the rivers Malka, Baksanka, Chegem, Nalchik and Terek, which formed the Kabardin line. As a result, the population of Kabarda was locked up in a small area and cut off from the Trans-Kuban region, Chechnya and mountain gorges.

Ermolov's policy was to severely punish not only the "robbers", but also those who do not fight them. Ermolov's cruelty against the rebellious highlanders will be remembered for a long time. Back in the 1940s, Avar and Chechen residents could say to Russian generals: "You have always ravaged our property, burned villages and intercepted our people!"

In 1825-1826, the brutal and bloody actions of General Yermolov caused a general uprising of the Chechen highlanders under the leadership of Bey-Bulat Taymiev (Taymazov) and Abdul-Kadyr. The rebels were supported by some Dagestani mullahs from among the supporters of the Sharia movement. They urged the highlanders to rise to jihad. But Bey-Bulat was defeated by the regular army, the uprising was suppressed in 1826.

In 1827, General Alexei Ermolov was recalled by Nicholas I and dismissed due to suspicion of links with the Decembrists.

In 1817 - 1827 there were no active hostilities in the North-West Caucasus, although numerous raids by Circassian detachments and punitive expeditions of Russian troops took place. The main goal of the Russian command in this region was to isolate the local population from the Muslim environment hostile to Russia in the Ottoman Empire.

The Caucasian line along the Kuban and Terek was shifted into the depths of the Adyghe territory and by the beginning of the 1830s it reached the Labe River. Adygs resisted, using the help of the Turks. In October 1821, the Circassians invaded the lands of the Black Sea army, but were driven back.

In 1823 - 1824 a number of punitive expeditions were carried out against the Circassians.

In 1824, the uprising of the Abkhazians was suppressed, forced to recognize the power of Prince Mikhail Shervashidze.

In the second half of the 1820s, the coastal areas of the Kuban were again subjected to raids by the Shapsug and Abadzekh detachments.

Formation of the Imamate of Nagorno Dagestan and Chechnya (1828 - 1840)

Operations in the North-East Caucasus

In the 1820s in Dagestan there was a movement of muridism (murid - in Sufism: a student, the first stage of initiation and spiritual self-improvement. It can mean a Sufi in general and even just an ordinary Muslim). Its main preachers, Mulla-Mohammed, then Kazi-Mulla, propagated in Dagestan and Chechnya a holy war against the infidels, primarily the Russians. The rise and growth of this movement was largely due to the brutal actions of Alexei Yermolov, as a reaction to the harsh and often indiscriminate repression of the Russian authorities.

In March 1827, Adjutant General Ivan Paskevich (1827-1831) was appointed commander-in-chief of the Caucasian corps. The general Russian strategy in the Caucasus was revised, the Russian command abandoned systematic advancement with the consolidation of occupied territories and returned mainly to the tactics of individual punitive expeditions.

At first, this was due to the wars with Iran (1826-1828) and with Turkey (1828-1829). These wars had significant consequences for the Russian Empire, establishing and expanding the Russian presence in the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia.

In 1828 or 1829, the communities of a number of Avar villages elected as their imam an Avar from the village of Gimry, Gazi-Muhammad (Gazi-Magomed, Kazi-Mulla, Mulla-Magomed), a disciple of the Naqshbandi sheikhs of Muhammad Yaragsky and Jamaluddin, influential in the North-Eastern Caucasus. This event is considered to be the beginning of the formation of a single imamate of Dagestan and Chechnya, which became the main focus of resistance to Russian colonization.

Imam Gazi-Muhammad developed a vigorous activity, calling for jihad against the Russians. From the communities that joined him, he took an oath to follow the Sharia, abandon local adats and break off relations with the Russians. During the reign of this imam (1828-1832), he destroyed 30 influential beks, since the first imam saw them as accomplices of Russians and hypocritical enemies of Islam (munafiks).

In the 1830s, the Russian positions in Dagestan were fortified by the Lezgin cordon line, and in 1832 the Temir-Khan-Shura fortress (modern Buinaksk) was built.

Peasant uprisings took place from time to time in the Central Ciscaucasia. In the summer of 1830, as a result of the punitive expedition of General Abkhazov against the Ingush and Tagaurians, Ossetia was included in the administrative system of the empire. In 1831, the Russian military administration was finally established in Ossetia.

In the winter of 1830, the Imamate launched an active war under the banner of defending the faith. Gazi-Muhammad's tactics were to organize rapid, unexpected raids. In 1830, he captured a number of Avar and Kumyk villages subject to the Avar Khanate and Tarkov Shamkhalstate. Untsukul and Gumbet voluntarily joined the imamat, the Andians were conquered. Gazi-Muhammad tried to seize the village of Khunzakh (1830), the capital of the Avar khans who had taken Russian citizenship, but was repulsed.

In 1831, Gazi-Muhammad plundered Kizlyar, and the next year he laid siege to Derbent.

In March 1832, the imam approached Vladikavkaz and laid siege to Nazran, but was defeated by the regular army.

In 1831, Adjutant General Baron Grigory Rosen was appointed head of the Caucasian Corps. He defeated the troops of Gazi-Muhammad, and on October 29, 1832, he stormed the village of Gimry, the imam's capital. Gazi-Muhammad died in battle.

In April 1831, Count Ivan Paskevich-Erivansky was recalled to suppress the uprising in Poland. In his place were temporarily appointed in the Transcaucasia - General Nikita Pankratyev, on the Caucasian line - General Alexei Velyaminov.

Gamzat-bey was elected as the new imam in 1833. He stormed the capital of the Avar khans, Khunzakh, destroyed almost the entire family of the Avar khans and was killed for this in 1834 by the right of blood feud.

Shamil became the third imam. He pursued the same reform policy as his predecessors, but on a regional scale. It was under him that the state structure of the Imamate was completed. The Imam concentrated in his hands not only religious, but also military, executive, legislative and judicial powers. Shamil continued the reprisal against the feudal rulers of Dagestan, but at the same time tried to ensure the neutrality of the Russians.

Russian troops led an active campaign against the Imamat, in 1837 and 1839 they ravaged Shamil's residence on Mount Akhulgo, and in the latter case, the victory seemed so complete that the Russian command hastened to report to St. Petersburg about the complete pacification of Dagestan. Shamil with a detachment of seven associates retreated to Chechnya.

Operations in the Northwest Caucasus

On January 11, 1827, a delegation of Balkar princes, General Georgy Emmanuel, submitted a petition to accept Balkaria into Russian citizenship, and in 1828 the Karachay region was annexed.

According to the Peace of Adrianople (1829), which ended the Russian-Turkish war of 1828 - 1829, the sphere of interests of Russia was recognized as a large part of the eastern coast of the Black Sea, including the cities of Anapa, Sudzhuk-kale (in the area of ​​modern Novorossiysk), Sukhum.

In 1830, the new "proconsul of the Caucasus" Ivan Paskevich developed a plan for the development of this region, practically unknown to the Russians, by creating a land communication along the Black Sea coast. But the dependence of the Circassian tribes inhabiting this territory on Turkey was largely nominal, and the fact that Turkey recognized the North-Western Caucasus as a Russian sphere of influence did not oblige the Circassians to anything. The invasion of the Russians on the territory of the Circassians was perceived by the latter as an attempt on their independence and traditional foundations, and met with resistance.

In the summer of 1834, General Velyaminov made an expedition to the Trans-Kuban region, where a cordon line to Gelendzhik was organized, the Abinskoye and Nikolaevskoye fortifications were erected.

In the mid-1830s, the establishment of a blockade by the forces of the Russian Black Sea Fleet of the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus began. In 1837 - 1839, the Black Sea coastline was created - 17 forts were created for 500 kilometers from the mouth of the Kuban to Abkhazia under the cover of the Black Sea Fleet. These measures practically paralyzed coastal trade with Turkey, which immediately put the Circassians in an extremely difficult position.

At the beginning of 1840, the Circassians launched an offensive, attacking the Black Sea line of fortresses. On February 7, 1840, Fort Lazarev (Lazarevskoye) fell, on February 29 the Velyaminovskoye fortification was taken, on March 23, after a fierce battle, the Circassians broke into the Mikhailovskoye fortification, which was blown up by a soldier Arkhip Osipov due to his inevitable fall. On April 1, the Circassians captured the Nikolaev Fort, but their actions against the Navaginsky Fort and the Abinsky fortifications were repelled. The coastal fortifications were restored by November 1840.

The very fact of the defeat of the coastline showed how powerful the potential of resistance was possessed by the Circassians of the Trans-Kuban region.

The heyday of the Imamate before the Crimean War (1840 - 1853)

Operations in the North-East Caucasus

In the early 1840s, the Russian administration attempted to disarm the Chechens. Norms were introduced for the surrender of weapons by the population, and hostages were taken to ensure their implementation. These measures provoked a general uprising at the end of February 1840 under the leadership of Shoip-mulla Tsentoroevsky, Javatkhan Dargoevsky, Tashu-khadzhi Sayasanovsky and Isa Gendergenoevsky, which, upon arrival in Chechnya, was led by Shamil.

On March 7, 1840, Shamil was proclaimed the Imam of Chechnya, and Dargo became the capital of the Imamat. By the fall of 1840, Shamil controlled all of Chechnya.

In 1841, riots broke out in Avaria, initiated by Hadji Murad. The Chechens raided the Georgian Military Road, and Shamil himself attacked a Russian detachment located near Nazran, but was unsuccessful. In May, Russian troops attacked and took the position of the imam near the aul Chirkei and occupied the aul.

In May 1842, Russian troops, taking advantage of the fact that the main forces of Shamil set out on a campaign in Dagestan, launched an attack on the capital of Imamat Dargo, but were defeated during the Ichkerin battle with the Chechens under the command of Shoip Mullah and were thrown back with heavy losses. Impressed by this catastrophe, Emperor Nicholas I signed a decree prohibiting any expeditions for 1843 and ordering them to limit themselves to defense.

The Imamat's troops seized the initiative. On August 31, 1843, Imam Shamil captured the fort near the village of Untsukul and defeated the detachment that was going to the rescue of the besieged. In the days that followed, several more fortifications fell, and on September 11, Gotsatl was taken and communication with Temir Khan Shura was interrupted. On November 8, Shamil took the Gergebil fortification. The highlanders' detachments practically interrupted communication with Derbent, Kizlyar and the left flank of the line.
In mid-April 1844, Shamil's Dagestani detachments under the command of Hadji Murad and Naib Kibit-Magoma launched an attack on Kumykh, but were defeated by Prince Argutinsky. Russian troops captured the Darginsky district in Dagestan and began to build the forward Chechen line.

At the end of 1844, a new commander-in-chief, Count Mikhail Vorontsov, was appointed to the Caucasus, who, unlike his predecessors, possessed not only military, but also civilian power in the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia. Under Vorontsov, military operations in the mountainous regions controlled by the imamate intensified.

In May 1845, the Russian army invaded the Imamat in several large detachments. Without encountering serious resistance, the troops passed the mountainous Dagestan and in June invaded Andia and attacked the village of Dargo. The battle of Dargin lasted from 8 to 20 July. During the battle, Russian troops suffered heavy losses. Although Dargo was taken, the victory was essentially Pyrrhic. Due to the losses incurred, the Russian troops were forced to curtail active operations, so the battle at Dargo can be considered a strategic victory for the Imamat.

Since 1846, several military fortifications and Cossack villages arose on the left flank of the Caucasian line. In 1847, the regular army laid siege to the Avar village of Gergebil, but retreated due to a cholera epidemic. This important stronghold of the Imamate was taken in July 1848 by the adjutant general, Prince Moses of Argutinsky. Despite such a loss, Shamil's detachments resumed their actions in the south of the Lezgin line and in 1848 attacked the Russian fortifications in the Lezgin village of Akhty.

In the 1840s and 1850s, systematic deforestation in Chechnya continued, accompanied by periodic clashes.

In 1852, the new head of the Left Flank, Adjutant General Prince Alexander Baryatinsky, knocked the warlike highlanders out of a number of strategically important villages in Chechnya.

Operations in the Northwest Caucasus

The Russian and Cossack offensive against the Circassians began in 1841 with the creation of the Labinsk line, proposed by General Grigory von Sass. Colonization of the new line began in 1841 and ended in 1860. During these twenty years, 32 villages were founded. They were inhabited mainly by the Cossacks of the Caucasian line of the line and a number of nonresidents.

In the 1840s - the first half of the 1850s, Imam Shamil tried to establish contacts with Muslim rebels in the Northwest Caucasus. In the spring of 1846, Shamil undertook a dive into Western Circassia. 9 thousand soldiers crossed to the left bank of the Terek and settled in the villages of the Kabardian ruler Mohammed-Mirza Anzorov. The Imam counted on the support of the Western Circassians led by Suleiman-Efendi. But neither the Circassians, nor the Kabardians went to join the troops of Shamil. The imam was forced to retreat to Chechnya. On the Black Sea coastline in the summer and autumn of 1845, the Circassians tried to seize forts Raevsky and Golovinsky, but were repulsed.

At the end of 1848, another attempt was made to unite the efforts of the Imamat and the Circassians - Shamil's naib, Mohammed-Amin, appeared in Circassia. He managed to create a unified administrative management system in Abadzekhia. The territory of the Abadzekh societies was divided into 4 districts (mekhkeme), from which the troops of the horsemen of the regular army of Shamil (murtaziks) were kept.

In 1849, the Russians launched an offensive to the Belaya River in order to transfer the front line there and take away from the Abadzekhs fertile land between this river and the Laba, as well as to oppose Muhammad-Amin.

From the beginning of 1850 to May 1851, the Bzhedugs, Shapsugs, Natukhai, Ubykhs and several smaller societies obeyed Mohamed-Amin. Three more mekhkeme were created - two in Natukhai and one in Shapsugia. Under the rule of the naib was a huge territory between the Kuban, Laba and the Black Sea.

Crimean War and the end of the Caucasian War in the North-Eastern Caucasus (1853 - 1859)

Crimean War (1853 - 1856)

In 1853, rumors of an impending war with Turkey caused a rise in the resistance of the mountaineers, who counted on the arrival of Turkish troops in Georgia and Kabarda and on the weakening of the Russian troops by transferring part of the units to the Balkans. However, these calculations did not come true - the morale of the mountain population fell noticeably as a result of the many years of war, and the actions of the Turkish troops in the Transcaucasus were unsuccessful and the mountaineers did not succeed in establishing interaction with them.

The Russian command chose a purely defensive strategy, but the clearing of forests and the destruction of food supplies from the mountaineers continued, albeit on a more limited scale.

In 1854, the commander of the Turkish Anatolian army entered into relations with Shamil, inviting him to move to join him from the side of Dagestan. Shamil invaded Kakheti, but, having learned about the approach of Russian troops, retreated to Dagestan. The Turks were defeated and were driven back from the Caucasus.

On the Black Sea coast, the positions of the Russian command were seriously weakened in connection with the entry of the fleets of England and France into the Black Sea and the loss of dominance at sea by the Russian fleet. It was impossible to defend the forts of the coastline without the support of the fleet, in connection with which the fortifications between Anapa, Novorossiysk and the mouths of the Kuban were destroyed, the garrisons of the Black Sea coastline were withdrawn to the Crimea. During the war, trade between the Circassians and Turkey was temporarily restored, which allowed them to continue to resist.

But the abandonment of the Black Sea fortifications did not have more serious consequences, and the allied command practically did not show activity in the Caucasus, limiting itself to supplying weapons and military materials to the Circassians at war with Russia, as well as the transfer of volunteers. The landing of the Turks in Abkhazia, despite its support from the Abkhazian prince Shervashidze, did not have a serious impact on the course of hostilities.

The turning point in the course of hostilities came after the accession to the throne of Emperor Alexander II (1855-1881) and the end of the Crimean War. In 1856, Prince Baryatinsky was appointed commander of the Caucasian corps, and the corps itself was reinforced by troops returning from Anatolia.

The Paris Peace Treaty (March 1856) recognized for Russia its rights to all conquests in the Caucasus. The only clause limiting Russian rule in the region was the prohibition to maintain a navy in the Black Sea and build coastal fortifications there.

End of the Caucasian War in the North-Eastern Caucasus

Already at the end of the 1840s, the fatigue of the mountain peoples from the many years of war began to manifest itself, it was reflected in the fact that the mountain population no longer believed in the attainability of victory. Social tension grew in the Imamat - many highlanders saw that Shamil's "state of justice" was based on repression, and the naibs were gradually turning into a new nobility interested only in personal enrichment and fame. Dissatisfaction with the rigid centralization of power in the Imamat grew - Chechen societies, accustomed to freedom, did not want to put up with a rigid hierarchy and unquestioning submission to Shamil's power. After the end of the Crimean War, the activity of the mountaineers of Dagestan and Chechnya began to decline.

Prince Alexander Baryatinsky took advantage of these sentiments. He abandoned punitive expeditions to the mountains and continued systematic work on the construction of fortresses, cutting openings and resettlement of the Cossacks for the development of the territories taken under control. To attract the highlanders, including the "new nobility" of the Imamat, to his side, Baryatinsky received considerable sums from his personal friend, Emperor Alexander II. Peace, order, preservation of the customs and religion of the mountaineers on the territory subject to Baryatinsky allowed the highlanders to make comparisons not in favor of Shamil.

In 1856-1857, a detachment of General Nikolai Evdokimov knocked Shamil out of Chechnya. In April 1859, the new residence of the imam, the village of Vedeno, was taken by storm.

On September 6, 1859, Shamil surrendered to Prince Baryatinsky and was exiled to Kaluga. He died in 1871 during a pilgrimage (hajj) to Mecca and is buried in Medina (Saudi Arabia). The war ended in the North-East Caucasus.

Operations in the Northwest Caucasus

Russian troops launched a massive concentric offensive from the east, from the Maikop fortification founded in 1857, and from the north, from Novorossiysk. The military operations were very brutal: the auls that resisted were destroyed, the population was expelled or resettled to the plains.

Former opponents of Russia in the Crimean War - primarily Turkey and partly Great Britain - continued to maintain ties with the Circassians, promising them military and diplomatic assistance. In February 1857, 374 foreign volunteers, mainly Poles, landed in Circassia, led by the Pole Teofil Lapinsky.

However, the defenses of the Circassians were weakened by traditional inter-tribal conflicts, as well as disagreements between the two main leaders of the resistance - the Shamilian naib Mohammed-Amin and the Circassian leader Zan Sefer-bey.

End of the war in the Northwest Caucasus (1859 - 1864)

In the Northwest, fighting continued until May 1864. At the final stage, hostilities were particularly brutal. The regular army was opposed by scattered detachments of the Circassians who fought in the remote mountainous regions of the North-Western Caucasus. Circassian auls were massively burned, their inhabitants were exterminated or expelled abroad (primarily to Turkey), partly moved to the plain. On the way, they died in thousands of hunger and disease.

In November 1859, Imam Mohammed-Amin admitted defeat and swore allegiance to Russia. In December of the same year, Sefer Bey suddenly died, and by the beginning of 1860 a detachment of European volunteers had left Circassia.

In 1860 the Natukhai stopped their resistance. The struggle for independence was continued by the Abadzekhs, Shapsugs and Ubykhs.

In June 1861, representatives of these peoples gathered for general meeting in the valley of the Sasha river (in the area of ​​modern Sochi). They established the supreme body of power - the Mejlis of Circassia. The government of Circassia tried to achieve recognition of its independence and negotiate with the Russian command about the conditions for ending the war. For help and diplomatic recognition, the Mejlis turned to Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire. But it was already too late, given the existing balance of forces, the outcome of the war did not raise any doubts and no help from foreign powers was received.

In 1862, Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich, the younger brother of Alexander II, replaced Prince Baryatinsky as commander of the Caucasian army.

Until 1864, the highlanders slowly retreated further and further to the southwest: from the plains to the foothills, from the foothills to the mountains, from the mountains to the Black Sea coast.

The Russian military command, using the "scorched earth" strategy, hoped to generally cleanse the entire Black Sea coast of the recalcitrant Circassians, either by exterminating them or expelling them from the territory. The emigration of the Circassians was accompanied by the mass death of the exiles from hunger, cold and disease. Many historians and public figures interpret the events of the last stage of the Caucasian War as genocide of the Circassians.

On May 21, 1864, in the town of Kbaada (modern Krasnaya Polyana) in the upper reaches of the Mzymta River, a solemn prayer service and a parade of troops celebrated the end of the Caucasian War and the establishment of Russian rule in the Western Caucasus.

Consequences of the Caucasian War

In 1864, the Caucasian War was formally recognized as over, but individual centers of resistance to the Russian authorities persisted until 1884.

For the period from 1801 to 1864, the total losses of the Russian army in the Caucasus were:

• 804 officers and 24,143 lower ranks killed,
• 3,154 officers and 61,971 lower ranks wounded,
• 92 officers and 5915 lower ranks prisoners.

At the same time, the number of irrecoverable losses does not include servicemen who died of wounds or died in captivity. In addition, the death toll from disease in places with an unfavorable climate for Europeans is three times the number of deaths on the battlefield. It is also necessary to take into account that the civilian population also suffered losses, and they can reach several thousand killed and wounded.

According to modern estimates, during the Caucasian Wars, the irrecoverable losses of the military and civilian population of the Russian Empire, incurred during hostilities, as a result of illness and death in captivity, amount to at least 77 thousand people.

At the same time, from 1801 to 1830, the combat losses of the Russian army in the Caucasus did not exceed several hundred people a year.

The data on the losses of the mountaineers are purely estimated. Thus, the estimated population of Circassians at the beginning of the 19th century ranges from 307,478 people (K.F. Stahl) to 1,700,000 people (I.F. Paskevich) and even 2,375,487 (G.Yu. Klaprot). The total number of Adygs who remained in the Kuban region after the war is about 60 thousand people, the total number of muhajirs - immigrants to Turkey, the Balkans and Syria - is estimated at 500 - 600 thousand people. But, in addition to purely military losses and the death of the civilian population during the war years, the devastating plague epidemics at the beginning of the 19th century, as well as losses during the resettlement, influenced the population decline.

Russia, at the cost of significant bloodshed, was able to suppress the armed resistance of the Caucasian peoples and annex their territories. As a result of the war, the local population of many thousands, who did not accept Russian power, were forced to leave their homes and move to Turkey and the Middle East.

As a result of the Caucasian War in the Northwest Caucasus, the ethnic composition of the population was almost completely changed. Most of the Circassians were forced to settle in more than 40 countries around the world; according to various estimates, from 5 to 10% of the pre-war population remained in their homeland. To a large extent, although not so catastrophically, the ethnographic map of the Northeastern Caucasus has changed, where ethnic Russians settled in large areas, cleared of the local population.

Huge mutual grievances and hatred gave rise to interethnic tensions, which then turned into interethnic conflicts during Civil war leading to the deportations of the 1940s, from which the roots of modern armed conflicts are largely rooted.

In the 1990s and 2000s, the Caucasian War was used by radical Islamists as an ideological argument against Russia.

XXI century: echoes of the Caucasian war

The issue of the genocide of the Circassians

In the early 1990s, after the collapse of the USSR, due to the intensification of search processes national identity, the question arose about the legal qualification of the events of the Caucasian War.

On February 7, 1992, the Supreme Soviet of the Kabardino-Balkarian SSR adopted a resolution "On condemning the genocide of the Circassians (Circassians) during the Russian-Caucasian war." In 1994, the Parliament of the KBR addressed the State Duma of the Russian Federation with the issue of recognizing the genocide of the Circassians. In 1996, the State Council - Khase of the Republic of Adygea and the President of the Republic of Adygea addressed a similar question. Representatives of Circassian public organizations have repeatedly addressed requests for recognition of the Circassian genocide by Russia.

On May 20, 2011, the Georgian parliament adopted a resolution recognizing the genocide of the Circassians by the Russian Empire during the Caucasian War.

There is also an opposite tendency. So, the Charter of the Krasnodar Territory says: "The Krasnodar Territory is the historical territory of the formation of the Kuban Cossacks, the original place of residence of the Russian people, which constitutes the majority of the population of the region"... This completely ignores the fact that before the Caucasian War the main population of the territory of the region were the Circassian peoples.

Olympic Games - 2014 in Sochi

An additional aggravation of the Circassian issue was associated with the holding of the Winter Olympics in Sochi in 2014.

Details about the connection between the Olympics and the Caucasian War, the position of the Circassian society and official bodies are set out in the reference prepared by the "Caucasian Knot" "The Circassian question in Sochi: the capital of the Olympics or the land of genocide?"

Monuments to the heroes of the Caucasian War

The installation of monuments to various military and political leaders during the Caucasian War causes an ambiguous assessment.

In 2003, in the city of Armavir, Krasnodar Territory, a monument to General Zass was unveiled, who in the Adygeyan space is usually called the "collector of Circassian heads". Decembrist Nikolai Lorer wrote about Sass: "In support of the idea of ​​fear preached by Zass, Circassian heads were constantly sticking out on the peaks on the piled mound near the Strong Trench near Zass, and their beards were developing in the wind."... The installation of the monument caused a negative reaction from the Circassian society.

In October 2008 in Mineralnye Vody A monument to General Ermolov was erected in the Stavropol Territory. He caused an ambiguous reaction among representatives of various nationalities of the Stavropol Territory and the entire North Caucasus. On October 22, 2011, unknown persons desecrated the monument.

In January 2014, the Vladikavkaz mayor's office announced plans to restore a previously existing monument to the Russian soldier Arkhip Osipov. A number of Circassian activists spoke out categorically against this intention, calling it militaristic propaganda, and the monument itself - a symbol of empire and colonialism.

Notes (edit)

The "Caucasian War" is the longest military conflict with the participation of the Russian Empire, which dragged on for almost 100 years and was accompanied by heavy casualties from both the Russian and Caucasian peoples. The reconciliation of the Caucasus did not occur even after the parade of Russian troops in Krasnaya Polyana on May 21, 1864 officially marked the end of the conquest of the Circassian tribes of the Western Caucasus and the end of the Caucasian War. The armed conflict that lasted until the end of the 19th century gave rise to many problems and conflicts, the echoes of which can still be heard at the beginning of the 21st century.

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Campaign of 1853

Actions on the Caucasian-Turkish border opened unexpectedly for the Caucasian governor, Prince Vorontsov. The secrets of the cabinets were hidden so deeply that he did not believe in the possibility of a break; therefore, in the spring, from the large Caucasian army beyond the Caucasus, in the garrisons of Akhaltsikh, Akhalkalaki, Alexandropol and Erivan, there were only 19½ battalions, a division of Nizhny Novgorod dragoons and a little irregular cavalry; the Turks managed at the end of August to assemble a strong army of 100,000 under the command of Abdi Pasha and to warn us by opening hostilities; in addition, they supported the entire hostile population of the Caucasus, agitated by foreign emissaries.

In the fall, when a break with the Ottoman Empire was inevitable, reinforcements were sent from the North Caucasus, and in mid-October the 13th Infantry Division (16 thousand) was transported by sea to Georgia and a 10,000-strong Armenian-Georgian militia was formed, which made it possible to concentrate 30 thousand troops under the command of Lieutenant General Prince Bebutov. However, war had not yet been declared, and the situation was very uncertain.

On the night of October 16 (28), a large horde of Turks attacked the post of St. Nicholas (closing the road from Batum, along the Black Sea coast), where there were only 300 people with two guns, and took possession of their fort, while suffering heavy losses.

At this time, the main forces of the Turkish Anatolian army (up to 40 thousand) under the command of Abdi Pasha were concentrated at Kars. At the end of October, they approached the village of Bash-Shuragel, 15 versts from Alexandropol.

From the Russian side, under the command of Prince Orbeliani, a detachment of 6 thousand people was sent for reconnaissance, which on November 2 (14) at Bayandur got involved in a battle with the Turkish army (30 thousand) and avoided complete defeat only thanks to the quick arrival of Prince Bebutov with 3 battalions , 6 squadrons and 12 guns. This battle, in which the Russian army lost up to 800 people, made an unfavorable impression for Russia among the border inhabitants.

The war actually began, and meanwhile Russia was far from ready. Only on November 6 (18) was the Imperial Manifesto on the break with Turkey received, and soon after that the troops prepared for an offensive, which was scheduled for November 14 (26) and was to be conducted along the right bank of the Arpachai, so that, threatening the communication of the Turks with Kars, force them to fight.

On November 14 (26), a battle followed near Akhaltsikh, where 7000 Russian troops, under the command of Prince Andronikov, defeated the 18,000-strong Turkish corps of Ali Pasha, who was trying to break through the Borjomi gorge to Tiflis; and on November 19 (December 1), Prince Bebutov utterly defeated the main Turkish army near Bashkadyklar, despite the fact that he was more than three times weaker than the enemy, who also occupied an excellent position. The Turks suffered more than 6 thousand losses here, and the consequences of this victory, in terms of their moral influence, were enormous. Now the Russians could calmly spend winter period, especially since the harsh season and lack of food finally upset the Anatolian army.

Campaign of 1854

After the brilliant victories of the previous year, Emperor Nicholas considered it appropriate to go immediately to an energetic offensive and capture Batum, Ardahan, Kars and Bayazet; but Prince Vorontsov (whose opinion was also supported by Prince Paskevich) pointed to the comparative small number of our troops, the lack of officers, ammunition, the harsh season, and found it necessary to postpone actions until spring.

Turkish troops, meanwhile, also settled down and received reinforcements. Military operations began on their part at the end of May, with the movement of the 12-thousandth detachment of Gassan-bey to Guria. Met and utterly defeated by a small detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Prince Eristov, the Turks, having lost their leader, fled to Ozurgeti, and then, having increased to 34 thousand, took a strong position across the Chorokh River. Here they were attacked on June 4 (16) by the commander of the Russian troops in Guria, Prince Andronikov, and again suffered a complete defeat.

No less successful were the actions of our so-called Erivan detachment, led by Lieutenant General Baron Wrangel, against the Turkish corps of Selim Pasha, which was stationed near Bayazet. On July 17 (29), Baron Wrangel completely dispersed the enemy troops that had taken up a position on the Chingil Heights, and then entered Bayazet. This victory greatly influenced the savage Kurdish tribes.

The Alexandropol corps, which was still commanded by Prince Bebutov, did not undertake offensive actions for a long time, mainly due to lack of funds to begin the siege of the Kars fortress, which had recently been significantly strengthened. Only by June 20 (July 2) did Prince Bebutov approach the village of Kuryuk-dara, waiting for the enemy to leave Kars and take battle in the open field. Here he had to stay for about a month, until the Turks themselves decided to attack him. On July 24 (August 5), a stubborn battle took place at Kuryuk-dara, where 18 thousand Russians defeated a 60-thousand Turkish army. However, taking into account that the Anatolian army still extended up to 40 thousand and could give a strong rebuff under the walls of Kars, Prince Bebutov did not consider it possible to go to this fortress, but remained in an observation position, especially since he received news about the landing at Batum of significant enemy forces that could be sent to his messages. As a result, on August 4 (16), he went to the Kars-chai River, and at the end of November, with the onset of a cold, to Alexandropol.

By this time, all the other Russian detachments operating on the Caucasian-Turkish border had retreated to their own borders and settled in apartments.

Campaign of 1855

The assault on Kars in 1855

Despite the victories won in, the position of the Russians in the Caucasus was difficult; the Turks, prompted by the allies, made significant preparations for a new campaign, and Shamil, the head of the rebellious highlanders, threatened to invade Georgia, and thus forced to keep part of the troops ready to repel it. Nevertheless, Adjutant General HH Muravyov, appointed at the end to the place of Prince Vorontsov, reinforcing the troops entrusted to him, at the end of May moved to Kars, sending a special detachment of Major General Suslov against the Turkish corps of Veli Pasha located at Surn- Hovhannes.

Approaching Kars (where at that time the Englishman Williams was in charge of everything), Muravyov, through patrols of cavalry detachments with artillery, stopped communication between the fortress and the outside world and made it impossible to deliver supplies to it. Despite the Tsar's demand that "offensive actions should be aimed at the earliest possible achievement of decisive successes," the commander-in-chief decided to storm the fortress only when news was received of the landing of Omer Pasha's corps (35-40 thousand) in Batum, in order to go to the rescue Kars.

The assault on September 17 (29) was repulsed, despite the heroic efforts of the Russian troops, who lost up to 6½ thousand people. Meanwhile, Omer Pasha, having moved forward only two transitions, suddenly returned to Batum, and on September 21 (October 3) landed in Sukhum-kala, in Abkhazia, whose ruler, Prince Mikhail Shervashidze, betrayed Russia. With the help of the Abkhazians, Omer Pasha hoped to invade Guria through Mingrelia and thereby distract Muravyov from Kars.

On October 25 (November 6), the Turks, taking advantage of the significant superiority of their forces, attacked the detachment of Prince Bagration-Mukhransky located on the Inguri River, which was supposed to retreat beyond the Tskhenistskali River, where they stopped, waiting for reinforcements. Meanwhile, Omer Pasha did not take advantage of the success he had won, and hesitated; and at this time, due to prolonged rains, the damp and low-lying country nearingur turned into a swamp, so that a further offensive became difficult.

On November 25 (December 7), the news of the capture of Kars came, forcing the Turkish commander-in-chief to suspend his actions. The onset of winter finally stopped them, and at the end of February Omer Pasha with his troops sailed to Trebizond. After repelling the assault, Muravyov did not lift the blockade, as the defenders of Kars had hoped for, but, on the contrary, began to make all the preparations for the winter camp at the fortress, where, due to lack of food, the position of the Turks was becoming unbearable. On November 16 (28), Kars surrendered, and with its fall the Turkish Anatolian army also disappeared.

Outcome

Neither Russia nor Turkey suffered territorial losses in the Caucasus. Russia returned Kars to Turkey in exchange for Sevastopol captured by the allies during the Crimean War. Russia was unable to gain a foothold in the Caucasus. However, Russia was able to win the Caucasian War (1817-1864).