75 years ago, on January 12, 1943, Soviet troops began a relief operation near Leningrad (Operation Iskra). After powerful artillery preparation, the shock groups of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, the 67th and 2nd shock armies, went on the offensive.
General situation in the Leningrad direction
By the beginning of 1943, the situation in Leningrad, surrounded by German troops, remained extremely difficult. The troops of the Leningrad Front and the Baltic Fleet were isolated from the rest of the Red Army. Attempts to relieve the siege of Leningrad in 1942 - the Lyuban and Sinyavin offensive operations - were unsuccessful. The shortest route between the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts - between the southern coast of Lake Ladoga and the village of Mga (the so-called Shlisselburg-Sinyavinsky ledge, 12-16 km), was still occupied by units of the 18th German Army.
On the streets and squares of the second capital of the Union, shells and bombs continued to explode, people died, buildings collapsed. The city was under constant threat of air raids and artillery shelling. By November–December 1942, the city was severely depopulated. As a result of mass mortality, evacuation and additional conscription into the army, the population of Leningrad decreased by 2 million in one year and amounted to 650 thousand people. The vast majority of the remaining population was employed in various works. The lack of land communications with the territory under the control of Soviet troops caused great difficulties in the supply of fuel and raw materials for factories, and did not allow us to fully satisfy the needs of troops and civilians for food and basic necessities.
However, the situation of Leningrad residents in the winter of 1942-1943. it was still significantly better than the previous winter. Some Leningraders even received increased rate food, compared with the all-Union. Electricity from the Volkhov hydroelectric power station was supplied to the city via an underwater cable laid in the fall, and fuel was supplied to the city via an underwater pipeline. The city was supplied necessary products and goods on the ice of the lake - “Road of Life”, which resumed work in December. In addition, in addition to the highway, a 35-kilometer railway line was built right on the ice of Lake Ladoga. Day and night, multi-meter piles were continuously driven, which were installed every two meters.
Soldiers of the Volkhov Front on the offensive during the breakthrough of the siege of Leningrad
Strengths of the parties
THE USSR. The operation involved troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, part of the forces of the Baltic Fleet and long-range aviation. By the end of 1942, the Leningrad Front under the command of Leonid Govorov included: 67th Army - commander Lieutenant General Mikhail Dukhanov, 55th Army - Lieutenant General Vladimir Sviridov, 23rd Army - Major General Alexander Cherepanov, 42- I Army - Lieutenant General Ivan Nikolaev, Primorsky Operational Group and 13th Air Army - Colonel General of Aviation Stepan Rybalchenko.
The main forces of the LF - the 42nd, 55th and 67th armies, defended themselves at the line Uritsk, Pushkin, south of Kolpino, Porogi, the right bank of the Neva to Lake Ladoga. The 67th Army operated in a 30 km strip along the right bank of the Neva from Porogi to Lake Ladoga, having a small bridgehead on the left bank of the river, in the area of Moscow Dubrovka. The 55th Infantry Brigade of this army defended from the south highway, which passed on the ice of Lake Ladoga. The 23rd Army defended the northern approaches to Leningrad, located on the Karelian Isthmus. It should be noted that the situation on this section of the front was stable long time, even a soldier’s saying appeared: “Three (or “there are three neutral”) armies are not at war in the world - Swedish, Turkish and the 23rd Soviet.” Therefore, units of this army were often transferred to other, more dangerous directions. The 42nd Army defended the Pulkovo line. The Primorsky Operational Group (POG) was located on the Oranienbaum bridgehead.
Lieutenant General of Artillery Leonid Aleksandrovich Govorov at his desk. Leningrad Front
The actions of the LF were supported by the Red Banner Baltic Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral Vladimir Tributs, who was based at the mouth of the Neva River and in Kronstadt. It covered the coastal flanks of the front and supported the ground forces with its aviation and naval artillery fire. In addition, the fleet held a number of islands in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland, thereby covering the western approaches to the city. Leningrad was also supported by the Ladoga military flotilla. The air defense of Leningrad was carried out by the Leningrad Air Defense Army, which interacted with aviation and anti-aircraft artillery of the front and navy. The military highway on the ice of the lake and the transshipment bases on its shores were protected from Luftwaffe attacks by formations of the separate Ladoga air defense region.
The troops of the Leningrad Front were separated from the troops of the Volkhov Front by a 15-kilometer corridor by the Shlisselburg-Sinyavinsky ledge, which closed the ring of the blockade of Leningrad from land. By the beginning of 1943, the Volkhov Front under the command of Army General Kirill Meretsky included: the 2nd Shock Army, the 4th, 8th, 52nd, 54th, 59th Armies and the 14th Air Army. But the following took direct part in the operation: the 2nd Shock Army - under the command of Lieutenant General Vladimir Romanovsky, the 54th Army - Lieutenant General Alexander Sukhomlin, the 8th Army - Lieutenant General Philip Starikov, the 14th Air Army - General - Aviation Lieutenant Ivan Zhuravlev. They operated in a 300 km strip from Lake Ladoga to Lake Ilmen. On the right flank from Lake Ladoga to the Kirov Railway there were units of the 2nd Shock and 8th Armies.
For the offensive, strike groups of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts were formed, which were significantly reinforced by artillery, tank and engineering formations, including from the reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters. In total, the strike groups of the two fronts numbered 302,800 soldiers and officers, about 4,900 guns and mortars (76 mm caliber and above), more than 600 tanks and 809 aircraft.
Germany
The German high command, after the failure of attempts to take the city, was forced to stop the fruitless offensive and order the troops to go on the defensive. All attention was focused on Stalingrad, bleeding, turned into ruins, but not surrendering. In the fall of 1942, the outflow of troops to the Stalingrad direction began from Army Group North. The 8th Air Corps was transferred to the Stalingrad area. Manstein, who was supposed to take Leningrad before, left with his headquarters. The 12th tank, 20th motorized and several infantry divisions were taken from the 18th German Army. In return, the 18th Army received the 69th Infantry, 1st, 9th and 10th Air Field Divisions.
The formation of airfield divisions, due to large losses in the ground forces, began on the initiative of Goering in September 1942. Airfield divisions did not have a regimental level and consisted of 4 rifle battalions and an artillery division, and were staffed by personnel from the ground services of the Air Force and anti-aircraft artillery who had no experience in combined arms combat. They had various weapons, including Soviet captured ones. Thus, the German group near Leningrad decreased not only in quantity, but also deteriorated in terms of quality.
The Red Army was opposed by the German 18th Army under the command of Georg Lindemann (Lindemann), which was part of Army Group North. It consisted of 4 army corps and up to 26 divisions. German troops were supported by the 1st air fleet Colonel General of Aviation Alfred Keller. In addition, on the northwestern approaches to the city opposite the 23rd Soviet army there were 4 Finnish divisions from task force"Karelian Isthmus".
The Germans had the most powerful defense and dense grouping of troops in the most dangerous direction - the Shlisselburg-Sinyavinsky ledge (its depth did not exceed 15 km). Here, between the city of Mga and Lake Ladoga, 5 German divisions were stationed - the main forces of the 26th and part of the divisions of the 54th Army Corps. They consisted of about 60 thousand people, 700 guns and mortars, about 50 tanks and self-propelled guns. There were 4 divisions in the operational reserve.
Tank Pz.Kpfw. III Ausf. N, tactical number 116 from the 1st company of the 502nd separate battalion of heavy tanks of the Wehrmacht, knocked out in the Sinyavin area from January 12 to February 5, 1943
Each village was turned into a strong point, prepared for all-round defense; the positions were covered with minefields, barbed wire barriers and fortified with pillboxes. On the Leningrad side, the defense was held by the 328th Infantry Regiment of the 227th Infantry Division of General von Scotti, the 170th Infantry Division of General Sander in in full force and the 100th Regiment of the 5th Mountain Division, which had up to 30 tanks, about 400 mortars and guns. The German defensive line ran along the left bank of the Neva, the height of which reaches 12 meters. The shore was artificially iced, heavily mined, and had almost no convenient natural outlets. The Germans had two powerful units of resistance. One - structures of the 8th hydroelectric power station, brick houses of the 1st and 2nd towns; the second is the numerous stone buildings of Shlisselburg and its outskirts. For every kilometer of the front there were 10-12 bunkers and up to 30 guns and mortars, and full-profile trenches stretched along the entire bank of the Neva.
The middle defensive line passed through workers' settlements No. 1 and No. 5, Podgornaya and Sinyavino stations, workers' settlement No. 6, and the Mikhailovsky village. There were two lines of trenches, a Sinyavinsky resistance center, cutoff positions, and strongholds. The enemy used destroyed Soviet tanks, turning them into stationary firing points. They bordered the Sinyavinsky heights - the approaches, the base and the western slopes, as well as the Krugloya grove. They were clearly visible from the Sinyavinsky Heights South coast Lake Ladoga, Shlisselburg, 8th hydroelectric power station and workers' village No. 5. This line was the position of divisional reserves (up to one regiment) of the German group. The entire space was under flanking fire from neighboring strong points and resistance centers. As a result, the entire ledge resembled one fortified area.
The 227th Infantry Division (minus one regiment), the 1st Infantry Division, the 374th Regiment of the 207th Security Division and the 425th Regiment of the 223rd Infantry were defending against the two armies of the Volkhov Front. The enemy's defensive line ran from the village of Lipka through workers' village No. 8, Kruglaya Grove, Gaitolovo, Mishino, Voronovo and further south. Along the front edge of the defense there was a continuous trench, covered with minefields, gouges and wire fences; in some areas a second trench was dug. Where the swampy terrain did not allow going deeper into the ground, the Germans erected ice and embankments and installed double-row log fences. Lipka, workers' village No. 8, Kruglaya Grove, and the villages of Gaitolovo and Tortolovo were turned into particularly powerful centers of resistance.
The situation for the attacking side was aggravated by the wooded and swampy terrain in the area. Moreover, it was located here large territory Sinyavinsk peat mining, which was cut by deep ditches and additionally reinforced with wood-earth, peat and ice ramparts. The territory was impassable for armored vehicles and heavy artillery, and they were needed to destroy enemy fortifications. To overcome such a defense it was necessary powerful tools suppression and destruction, a huge strain of forces and means of the attacking side.
Soviet officers inspect heavy German guns that shelled Leningrad. These are two 305-mm M16 mortars made by the Czech company Skoda.
A heavy 305mm Czech-made M16 mortar captured by Soviet soldiers. Leningrad area
Operation plan
Back on November 18, 1942, the commander of the Leningrad Fleet, General Govorov, sent a report to the Supreme Command Headquarters, in which it was proposed to carry out two operations east and west of Leningrad - Shlisselburg and Uritskaya in order to “lift the blockade of Leningrad, ensure the construction of a railway along the Ladoga Canal and thereby organize normal communication Leningrad with the country, ensuring freedom of maneuver for the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts. The headquarters, having considered this proposal, demanded that all attention be focused on breaking through the German defense in only one direction - Shlisselburg, which the shortest route led to the achievement of the set goal.
On November 22, the commander of the LF presented a revised operation plan to Headquarters. It provided for counter strikes - Leningradsky from the west, Volkhovsky - from the east in the general direction of Sinyavino. Headquarters approved the presented plan on December 2. The coordination of the actions of both fronts was entrusted to the marshal Soviet Union K.E. Voroshilov. It was planned to prepare the operation by January 1, 1943. Specific tasks for the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts were defined in Directive No. 170703 of the Supreme High Command Headquarters dated December 8, 1942. It demanded, through the joint efforts of the two fronts, to defeat the enemy group in the area of Lipka, Gaitolovo, Moskovskaya Dubrovka, Shlisselburg and , thus, “break the siege of the mountains. Leningrad, complete the operation by the end of January 1943.” After this, moving on to a strong defense at the turn of the river. Moika, village Mikhailovsky, Tortolovo, ensure communications of the Leningrad Front and give the troops a 10-day rest. In the first half of February 1943, it was prescribed to prepare and carry out an operation to defeat the enemy in the Mga area and clear the Kirov railway with access to the Voronovo, Sigolovo, Voitolovo, Voskresenskoye line.
Soviet soldiers in the attack near Leningrad during the beginning of the breaking of the blockade
Preparing the operation
To carry out the operation, two strike groups were formed: on the VF - the 2nd shock army of Lieutenant General V. Z. Romanovsky, on Leningradsky - the 67th army of Major General M. P. Dukhanov. The LF strike group had to cross the Neva across the ice, break through the defenses in the Moskovskaya Dubrovka, Shlisselburg sector, defeat the enemy dug in here, connect with the troops of the VF and restore the connection between Leningrad and the mainland. In the future, it was planned that the formations of the 67th Army would reach the river line. Washing. The VF strike group was supposed to break through the defenses in the Lipka, Gaitolovo sector (12 km wide) and, delivering the main blow to Sinyavino, capture the line of Rabochy Poselok No. 1, Sinyavino, defeat the Sinyavino-Shlisselburg enemy group and join forces with the LF troops. Securing the left flank of the 2nd Shock Army was entrusted to the 8th Army of General F.N. Starikov, which with its right-flank formations was supposed to advance in the direction of Tortolovo, the village. Mikhailovsky. Air support and cover for the troops was provided by the 13th and 14th Air Armies of the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts and the aviation of the Baltic Fleet (about 900 aircraft in total). Long-range aviation, coastal and naval artillery of the fleet (88 guns) were also involved in the operation.
The conduct of the operation of the strike group of the Volkhov Front, by decision of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, was entrusted to the commander of the 2nd Shock Army under the direct supervision of the deputy front commander, Lieutenant General I.I. Fedyuninsky. The operation of the strike group of the Leningrad Front was to be carried out by the commander of the 67th Army under the direct supervision of the front commander, Lieutenant General L.A. Govorova. Representatives of the Supreme Command Headquarters for coordinating the actions of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts were Marshals G.K. Zhukov and K.E. Voroshilov.
The basis of the LF strike group was the 67th Army, built in two echelons before the offensive. The first echelon consisted of the 45th Guards, 268th, 136th, 86th Rifle Divisions, 61st Tank Brigade, 86th and 118th Separate Tank Battalions. The second echelon consisted of the 13th, 123rd rifle divisions, 102nd, 123rd, 142nd rifle brigades, and the army reserve - 152nd and 220th tank brigades, 46th rifle division, 11th , 55th, 138th rifle, 34th and 35th ski brigades. The offensive was supported by artillery of the army, front and Baltic Fleet - a total of about 1,900 guns and mortars and the 13th Air Army with 414 aircraft.
The shock group of the Volkhov Front consisted of the 2nd shock army, part of the forces of the 8th army. The first echelon of the 2nd Shock Army consisted of the 128th, 372nd, 256th, 327th, 314th, 376th Rifle Divisions, 122nd Tank Brigade, 32nd Guards Breakthrough Tank Regiment, 4 separate tank battalions. The second echelon included the 18th, 191st, 71st, 11th, 239th rifle divisions, 16th, 98th and 185th tank brigades. The army reserve consisted of the 147th Infantry Division, 22nd Infantry, 11th, 12th and 13th Ski Brigades. On the left flank of the offensive, part of the forces of the 8th Army operated: the 80th, 364th rifle divisions, 73rd brigade Marine Corps, 25th separate tank regiment and two separate tank battalions. The offensive was supported by the artillery of the front and two armies with about 2,885 guns and mortars and the 14th Air Army with 395 aircraft.
In preparation for the operation, the commanders of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, using their reserves and regroupings of formations from other directions, significantly strengthened the 67th and 2nd shock armies, decisively concentrating forces in the breakthrough areas. Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy here in infantry by 4.5 times, in artillery by 6-7, in tanks by 10, and in aircraft by 2 times. In the 67th Army, 1909 guns and mortars of 76-mm caliber and more were concentrated in the 13-kilometer breakthrough section, which made it possible to increase the artillery density to 146 guns and mortars per 1 km of front. On the Volkhov Front in the direction of the main attack in the breakthrough section 327- 1st Rifle Division (width 1.5 km) the density of guns and mortars per 1 km of the front was 365 units, in the breakthrough area of the 376th Rifle Division (width 2 km) - 183, and in the auxiliary direction - 101 guns and mortars per 1 km front.
Artillery preparation for the attack was planned to last 2 hours 20 minutes, support for the attack was planned using the method of a barrage of fire to a depth of 1 km, and then the method of sequential concentration of fire. In addition, it was planned to place barrage fire 200-250 m from the first enemy position when the attacking troops entered the ice. All tank units (in the LF - 222 tanks and 37 armored vehicles, in the VF - 217 tanks) were planned to be used for direct support of the infantry. For air defense of strike groups, the following were involved: in the Air Force - three anti-aircraft artillery divisions, six separate anti-aircraft divisions and two separate anti-aircraft railway batteries; on the LF - an anti-aircraft artillery division, an air defense regiment, six separate anti-aircraft artillery divisions, two separate anti-aircraft railway batteries, as well as four anti-aircraft artillery and four fighter aviation regiments from the Leningrad Air Defense Army.
The peculiarity of the operation was that almost a month was allocated for preparation. Throughout December, the troops of the 2nd Shock and 67th armies were intensively preparing for the upcoming operation. All formations were supplemented with personnel, military equipment And . The troops accumulated from 2 to 5 rounds of ammunition, depending on the gun and mortar systems. The most labor-intensive work was preparing the starting areas for the front's strike groups. It was necessary to increase the number of trenches and communication passages, shelters for personnel, to open and equip firing positions for artillery, mortars, tanks, and to arrange ammunition depots. The total volume of excavation work on each front amounted to hundreds of thousands of cubic meters. All work was carried out only manually, in dark time days, without violating the normal behavior of the troops occupying the defense, in compliance with camouflage measures. At the same time, sappers built roads and column tracks, roads and log roads through the swamps that abounded in the original areas, cleared minefields, and prepared passages in the barriers. Thus, engineering units built 20 km of column tracks in the military rear, strengthened bridges and built new ones, and made passages in minefields (one per company).
In addition, the LF also needed to produce means to overcome the high bank of the Neva and areas of damaged ice cover. For this purpose, hundreds of board shields, assault ladders, hooks, ropes with hooks, and “cats” were made. After considering a number of options (including creating a channel in the ice of the Neva with the subsequent construction of a pontoon bridge, or reinforcing the ice by freezing cables into it), they decided to transport tanks and heavy artillery across the Neva on wooden “rails” laid on sleepers.
Special attention was devoted to training troops, commanders and staffs. Under the leadership of the army commanders, training camps and command and staff games were held. For each division in the rear, a terrain similar to that where the defense was to be broken through was selected. Here, training fields and towns were set up similar to enemy strongholds, where units and units learned to storm fortified positions and conduct offensive battles in the forest. Thus, the Leningraders at the Toksovsky training ground created a defense line similar to the one that was to be broken through. Regimental live-fire exercises were held here; the infantry was trained to follow the barrage of fire at a distance of 100 meters. In sections of the Neva within the city limits, they practiced methods of overcoming damaged sections of ice and storming a steep, icy bank fortified with bunkers. Troops on the Volkhov Front underwent similar training. Finally, live-fire exercises took place. The maps were carefully refined using aerial photography. All commanders, including companies and batteries, received photographic diagrams and corrected maps. In the divisions and units allocated for the breakthrough, assault detachments and barrier groups were created to make passages and destroy the most durable defensive structures. The VF formed 83 assault detachments, including sappers, machine gunners, machine gunners, flamethrowers, artillery crews and escort tanks. Particular attention was paid to developing techniques for storming wood-earth barriers, peat, snow and ice ramparts.
Great importance was attached to operational camouflage. The regrouping of troops was carried out exclusively at night or in bad weather. For reconnaissance in force and night searches, only those units and units that were in direct contact with the enemy were involved. To hide preparations for a breakthrough from him, reconnaissance activities were intensified along the entire front, right up to Novgorod. North of Novgorod they imitated vigorous activity, indicating the concentration of a large mass of troops and equipment. A limited number of people participated in the development of the operation plan. All these measures played their role. The enemy only managed to establish shortly before the start of the operation that Soviet troops were preparing for an attack, but he was unable to determine the time and force of the attack. The commander of the 26th Army Corps, General Leiser, taking this into account, proposed to the commander of the 18th Army, General Lindemann, to withdraw troops from Shlisselburg. But this proposal was not accepted.
Soviet soldiers in the attack near Leningrad, during the operation to break the blockade of Leningrad. Photo source: http://waralbum.ru/
On December 27, 1942, the command of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts asked Stalin to postpone the start of the offensive to January 10-12. They explained this proposal by extremely unfavorable weather conditions, which led to a prolonged thaw and, in connection with this, to insufficient stability of the ice cover on the Neva and poor passability of the swamps.
At the beginning of January 1943, a joint meeting of the military councils of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts took place. It clarified the issues of interaction between front troops in the operation, the simultaneity of occupation starting position, the beginning of artillery and aviation training, the time of attack by infantry and tanks, the conditional line of meeting of the troops of the fronts - Workers' settlements No. 2 and 6, etc. It was also agreed that if the troops of one of the fronts, having reached the intended line, do not meet the troops of the other front, then they will continue the offensive until the actual meeting.
Before the start of the operation, on January 10, 1943, Army General G.K. arrived at the headquarters of the VF. Zhukov to see on the spot whether everything has been done for the success of the operation. Zhukov got acquainted with the state of affairs in the 2nd shock and 8th armies. On his instructions, some shortcomings were eliminated. On the night of January 11, the troops took up their starting position.
B. V. Kotik, N. M. Kutuzov, V. I. Seleznev, L. V. Kabachek, Yu. A. Garikov, K. G. Molteninov, F. V. Savostyanov. Diorama of the museum-reserve “Breaking the Siege of Leningrad”, dedicated to the turning point in the history of the defense of Leningrad - Operation Iskra (Kirovsk, Kirovsky district, Leningrad region)
To be continued…
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Know, Soviet people, that you are the descendants of fearless warriors!
Know, Soviet people, that the blood of great heroes flows in you,
Those who gave their lives for their homeland without thinking about the benefits!
Know and honor, Soviet people, the exploits of our grandfathers and fathers!
Documentary film “Ladoga” - 1943. About the battle for Leningrad:
By the beginning of 1943, the situation in Leningrad, surrounded by German troops, remained extremely difficult. The troops of the Leningrad Front and the Baltic Fleet were isolated from the rest of the Red Army. Attempts to relieve the siege of Leningrad in 1942 - the Lyuban and Sinyavin offensive operations - were unsuccessful. The shortest route between the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, between the southern coast of Lake Ladoga and the village of Mga (the so-called Shlisselburg-Sinyavinsky ledge, 12-16 km), was still occupied by units of the 18th German Army.
On the streets and squares of the second capital of the USSR, shells and bombs continued to explode, people died, buildings collapsed. The city was under constant threat of air raids and artillery shelling. The lack of land communications with the territory under the control of Soviet troops caused great difficulties in the supply of fuel and raw materials for factories, and did not allow meeting the needs of troops and civilians for food and basic necessities.
However, the situation of Leningrad residents in the winter of 1942-1943. it was still somewhat better than the previous winter. Electricity was supplied to the city through an underwater cable, and fuel was supplied through an underwater pipeline. The city was supplied with necessary products and goods along the ice of the lake - the Road of Life. In addition, in addition to the highway, an iron line was also built right on the ice of Lake Ladoga.
The commander of the 136th Infantry Division, Major General Nikolai Pavlovich Simonyak, at the observation post. The photo was taken during the first day of the operation to break the blockade of Leningrad (Operation Iskra).
By the end of 1942, the Leningrad Front under the command of Leonid Govorov included: 67th Army - commander Lieutenant General Mikhail Dukhanov, 55th Army - Lieutenant General Vladimir Sviridov, 23rd Army - Major General Alexander Cherepanov, 42- I Army - Lieutenant General Ivan Nikolaev, Primorsky Operational Group and 13th Air Army - Colonel General of Aviation Stepan Rybalchenko. The main forces of the LF - the 42nd, 55th and 67th armies, defended themselves at the line Uritsk, Pushkin, south of Kolpino, Porogi, the right bank of the Neva to Lake Ladoga. The 67th Army operated in a 30 km strip along the right bank of the Neva from Porogi to Lake Ladoga, having a small bridgehead on the left bank of the river, in the area of Moscow Dubrovka. The 55th Rifle Brigade of this army defended from the south the highway that ran along the ice of Lake Ladoga. The 23rd Army defended the northern approaches to Leningrad, located on the Karelian Isthmus.
Units of the 23rd Army were often transferred to other, more dangerous directions. The 42nd Army defended the Pulkovo line. The Primorsky Operational Group (POG) was located on the Oranienbaum bridgehead.
The actions of the LF were supported by the Red Banner Baltic Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral Vladimir Tributs, who was based at the mouth of the Neva River and in Kronstadt. It covered the coastal flanks of the front and supported the ground forces with its aviation and naval artillery fire. In addition, the fleet held a number of islands in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland, thereby covering the western approaches to the city. Leningrad was also supported by the Ladoga military flotilla. The air defense of Leningrad was carried out by the Leningrad Air Defense Army, which interacted with aviation and anti-aircraft artillery of the front and navy. The military highway on the ice of the lake and the transshipment bases on its shores were protected from Luftwaffe attacks by formations of the separate Ladoga air defense region.
By the beginning of 1943, the Volkhov Front under the command of Army General Kirill Meretsky included: the 2nd Shock Army, the 4th, 8th, 52nd, 54th, 59th Armies and the 14th Air Army. But the following took direct part in the operation: the 2nd Shock Army - under the command of Lieutenant General Vladimir Romanovsky, the 54th Army - Lieutenant General Alexander Sukhomlin, the 8th Army - Lieutenant General Philip Starikov, the 14th Air Army - General - Aviation Lieutenant Ivan Zhuravlev. They operated in a 300 km strip from Lake Ladoga to Lake Ilmen. On the right flank from Lake Ladoga to the Kirov Railway there were units of the 2nd Shock and 8th Armies.
The German command, after the failure of attempts to take the city in 1942, was forced to stop the fruitless offensive and order the troops to go on the defensive. The Red Army was opposed by the German 18th Army under the command of Georg Liederman, which was part of Army Group North. It consisted of 4 army corps and up to 26 divisions. The German troops were supported by the 1st Air Fleet of Air Force Colonel General Alfred Keller. In addition, on the northwestern approaches to the city opposite the 23rd Soviet Army there were 4 Finnish divisions from the Karelian Isthmus task force.
The Red Army tank landing force is moving towards a breakthrough!
A unique film about the siege of Leningrad. Chronicle of those years:
Red Army soldiers take position and prepare for battle - breaking the blockade of Leningrad
German defense
The Germans had the most powerful defense and dense grouping of troops in the most dangerous direction - the Shlisselburg-Sinyavinsky ledge (its depth did not exceed 15 km). Here, between the city of Mga and Lake Ladoga, 5 German divisions were stationed - the main forces of the 26th and part of the divisions of the 54th Army Corps. They consisted of about 60 thousand people, 700 guns and mortars, about 50 tanks and self-propelled guns. Each village was turned into a strong point, prepared for all-round defense; the positions were covered with minefields, barbed wire barriers and fortified with pillboxes. There were two lines of defense in total: the first included the structures of the 8th State District Power Plant, the 1st and 2nd Gorodki and the houses of the city of Shlisselburg - from the side of Leningrad, Lipka, Worker settlements No. 4, 8, 7, Gontovaya Lipka - from the side of the Volkhov Front , the second included workers’ settlements No. 1 and No. 5, Podgornaya and Sinyavino stations, workers’ settlement No. 6, and the Mikhailovsky village. The defensive lines were saturated with resistance units and had a developed network of trenches, shelters, dugouts, and fire weapons. As a result, the entire ledge resembled one fortified area.
The situation for the attacking side was aggravated by the wooded and swampy terrain in the area. In addition, there was a large area of Sinyavin peat mining, which was cut by deep ditches. The territory was impassable for armored vehicles and heavy artillery, and they were needed to destroy enemy fortifications. To overcome such a defense, powerful means of suppression and destruction were required, as well as a huge strain of forces and means of the attacking side.
On January 2, 1943, in order to break the siege of Leningrad, the strategic offensive Operation Iskra began.
Girl from the besieged city - People of Legend (USSR 1985):
Plan and preparation of the operation. Shock groups of the Soviet army
Back in November 1942, the LF command presented its proposals to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief for preparing a new offensive near Leningrad. It was planned to carry out two operations in December 1942 - February 1943. During the “Shlisselburg Operation”, it was proposed that the forces of the LF, together with the troops of the Volkhov Front, break through the blockade of the city and build a railway along Lake Ladoga. During the “Uritskaya Operation” they were going to break through a land corridor to the Oranienbaum bridgehead. The headquarters approved the first part of the operation - breaking the blockade of Leningrad (directive No. 170696 of December 2, 1942). The operation was codenamed "Iskra", the troops were supposed to be in full combat readiness by January 1, 1943.
The operation plan was outlined in more detail in Directive No. 170703 of the Supreme Command Headquarters of December 8. The troops of the LF and VF received the task of defeating the German group in the area of Lipka, Gaitolovo, Moskovskaya Dubrovka, Shlisselburg and, thus, lifting the complete blockade of Leningrad. By the end of January 1943, the Red Army was supposed to reach the line Moika River - Mikhailovsky - Tortolovo. The directive also announced the conduct of the “Mginsk operation” in February with the aim of defeating the German group in the Mga area and ensuring a strong railway connection between Leningrad and the country. Coordination of the fronts' actions was entrusted to Marshal Kliment Voroshilov.
Almost a month was allotted to prepare the operation. Much attention was paid to the interaction between the troops of the two fronts. Training fields and special training camps were created in the rear offensive actions formations in wooded and swampy areas and assault on layered enemy defenses. Units of the 67th Army practiced methods of crossing the Neva on ice and establishing a crossing for tanks and artillery. In the LF, at the direction of Govorov, artillery groups were formed: long-range, special purpose, counter-mortar and separate group guards mortar units. By the start of the operation, thanks to reconnaissance efforts, the command was able to get a fairly good idea of the German defenses. In December, a thaw occurred, so the ice on the Neva was weak, and the swampy terrain was difficult to access, therefore, at the suggestion of the commander of the Leningrad Fleet, Headquarters postponed the start of the operation to January 12, 1943. In early January, the State Defense Committee sent Georgy Zhukov to the Volkhov Front to reinforce it.
To carry out the operation, strike groups were formed as part of the LF and VF fronts, which were reinforced with armored, artillery and engineering formations, including from the Headquarters reserve. On the Volkhov Front, the basis of the strike group was Romanovsky’s 2nd Shock Army. It included, including the army reserve, 12 rifle divisions, 4 tank, 1 rifle and 3 ski brigades, a guards breakthrough tank regiment, 4 separate tank battalions: 165 thousand people, 2100-2200 guns and mortars, 225 tanks. The army was supported from the air by about 400 aircraft. The army received the task of breaking through the enemy’s defenses in a 12 km section from the village of Lipki on the shore of Lake Ladoga and to Gaitolovo, reaching the line of Workers’ Villages No. 1 and No. 5, Sinyavino, and then developing the offensive until connecting with the LF units. In addition, the troops of the 8th Army: 2 rifle divisions, a marine brigade, a separate tank regiment and 2 separate tank battalions, launched an auxiliary attack in the direction of Tortolovo, the village of Mikhailovsky. The advance of the 2nd Shock and 8th Army was supported by about 2,885 guns and mortars.
From the LF side main role Dukhanov's 67th Army was supposed to play. It consisted of 7 rifle divisions (one guards), 6 rifle, 3 tank and 2 ski brigades, 2 separate tank battalions. The offensive was supported by the artillery of the army, the front, the Baltic Fleet (88 guns with a caliber of 130-406 mm) - about 1900 guns, the 13th Air Army and naval aviation - about 450 aircraft and about 200 tanks. Units of the 67th Army were supposed to cross the Neva on a 12 km section between the Nevsky Piglet and Shlisselburg, concentrating their main efforts in the direction of Maryino and Sinyavino. The LF troops, having broken through the German defenses in the Moskovskaya Dubrovka, Shlisselburg sector, were supposed to connect with the VF formations at the line of Workers' Villages No. 2, 5 and 6, and then develop an offensive to the southeast and reach the line on the Moika River.
Both strike groups numbered about 300 thousand people, approximately 4,900 guns and mortars, about 600 tanks and more than 800 aircraft.
Sappers of the Volkhov Front, Red Army soldier A.G. Zubakin and Sergeant M.V. Kamensky (right) make passages in a wire fence in the Sinyavino area. The photo was taken during the first day of the operation to break the blockade of Leningrad (Operation Iskra).
Siege Leningrad. Shestakovich's 7th Symphony:
Beginning of the Offensive. January 12, 1943
On the morning of January 12, 1943, troops from two fronts simultaneously launched an offensive. Previously at night, aviation dealt a powerful blow to Wehrmacht positions in the breakthrough zone, as well as to airfields, control posts, communications and railway junctions in the enemy rear. Tons of metal fell on the Germans, destroying their manpower, destroying defensive structures and suppressing morale. At 9:30 in the morning, the artillery of two fronts began artillery preparation: in the offensive zone of the 2nd Shock Army it lasted 1 hour 45 minutes, and in the sector of the 67th Army - 2 hours 20 minutes. 40 minutes before the infantry and armored vehicles began to move, attack aircraft, in groups of 6-8 aircraft, struck pre-reconnaissance artillery and mortar positions, strongholds and communications centers.
At 11:50, under the cover of the “wall of fire” and the fire of the 16th fortified area, the divisions of the first echelon of the 67th Army went on the attack. Each of the four divisions—the 45th Guards, 268th, 136th, and 86th Rifle Divisions—were reinforced by several artillery and mortar regiments, an anti-tank artillery regiment, and one or two engineering battalions. In addition, the offensive was supported by 147 light tanks and armored cars, the weight of which could be supported by the ice. The particular difficulty of the operation was that the Wehrmacht’s defensive positions were along the steep, icy left river bank, which was higher than the right. Fire weapons The Germans were located in tiers and covered all approaches to the shore with multi-layered fire. In order to break through to the other bank, it was necessary to reliably suppress German firing points, especially in the first line. At the same time, we had to be careful not to damage the ice on the left bank.
The assault groups were the first to make their way to the other side of the Neva. Their fighters selflessly made passages in the barriers. Behind them rifle and tank units crossed the river. After a fierce battle, the enemy’s defenses were breached in the area north of the 2nd Gorodok (268th Rifle Division and 86th Separate Tank Battalion) and in the Maryino area (136th Division and formations of the 61st Tank Brigade). By the end of the day, Soviet troops broke the resistance of the 170th German Infantry Division between the 2nd Gorodok and Shlisselburg. The 67th Army captured a bridgehead between the 2nd Gorodok and Shlisselburg, and construction began on a crossing for medium and heavy tanks and heavy artillery (completed on January 14). On the flanks the situation was more difficult: on the right wing, the 45th Guards Rifle Division in the “Neva patch” area was able to capture only the first line of German fortifications; on the left wing, the 86th Rifle Division was unable to cross the Neva at Shlisselburg (it was transferred to a bridgehead in the Maryino area to attack Shlisselburg from the south).
In the offensive zone of the 2nd shock (went on the offensive at 11:15) and the 8th army (at 11:30), the offensive developed with great difficulty. Aviation and artillery were unable to suppress the main enemy firing points, and the swamps were impassable even in winter. The most fierce battles took place at the points of Lipka, Workers' Village No. 8 and Gontovaya Lipka; these strong points were located on the flanks of the breaking through forces and even when completely surrounded they continued the battle. On the right flank and in the center - the 128th, 372nd and 256th rifle divisions were able to break through the defenses of the 227th Infantry Division by the end of the day and advance 2-3 km. The strongholds of Lipka and Workers' Village No. 8 could not be taken that day. On the left flank, only the 327th Infantry Division, which occupied most of the fortification in the Kruglaya grove, was able to achieve some success in the offensive. The attacks of the 376th Division and the forces of the 8th Army were unsuccessful.
The German command, already on the first day of the battle, was forced to bring operational reserves into battle: formations of the 96th Infantry Division and the 5th Mountain Division were sent to the aid of the 170th Division, two regiments of the 61st Infantry Division (“Major General Hüner’s group ") were introduced into the center of the Shlisselburg-Sinyavinsky ledge.
Leningrad in the struggle (USSR, 1942):
Leningrad Front- commander: lieutenant general (since January 15, 1943 - colonel general) L.A. Govorov
Volkhov Front- Commander: General of the Army K.A. Meretskov.
Fights January 13 - 17
On the morning of January 13, the offensive continued. The Soviet command, in order to finally turn the situation in its favor, began to introduce the second echelon of the advancing armies into battle. However, the Germans, relying on strongholds and a developed defense system, offered stubborn resistance, and the battles became protracted and fierce.
In the offensive zone of the 67th Army on the left flank, the 86th Infantry Division and a battalion of armored vehicles, supported from the north by the 34th Ski Brigade and the 55th Infantry Brigade (on the ice of the lake), stormed the approaches to Shlisselburg for several days. By the evening of the 15th, the Red Army soldiers reached the outskirts of the city, the German troops in Shlisselburg found themselves in a critical situation, but continued to fight stubbornly.
In the center, the 136th Infantry Division and the 61st Tank Brigade developed an offensive in the direction of Workers' Village No. 5. To secure the left flank of the division, the 123rd Infantry Brigade was brought into the battle; it was supposed to advance in the direction of Workers' Village No. 3. Then, to secure the right flank, the 123rd Infantry Division and a tank brigade were brought into battle; they advanced in the direction of Rabochy Settlement No. 6, Sinyavino. After several days of fighting, the 123rd Infantry Brigade captured Workers' Village No. 3 and reached the outskirts of villages No. 1 and No. 2. The 136th Division made its way to Workers' Village No. 5, but could not immediately take it.
On the right wing of the 67th Army, attacks by the 45th Guards and 268th Rifle Divisions were still unsuccessful. The Air Force and artillery were unable to eliminate the firing points in the 1st, 2nd Gorodoki and 8th State District Power Plant. In addition, German troops received reinforcements - formations of the 96th Infantry and 5th Mountain Rifle Divisions. The Germans even launched fierce counterattacks, using the 502nd Heavy Tank Battalion, which was armed with Tiger I heavy tanks. Soviet troops, despite the introduction of second echelon troops into battle - the 13th Infantry Division, 102nd and 142nd Infantry Brigades, were unable to turn the situation in this sector in their favor.
In the zone of the 2nd Shock Army, the offensive continued to develop more slowly than that of the 67th Army. German troops, relying on strongholds - Workers' settlements No. 7 and No. 8, Lipke, continued to offer stubborn resistance. On January 13, despite the introduction of part of the second echelon forces into the battle, the troops of the 2nd Shock Army did not achieve serious success in any direction. In the following days, the army command tried to expand the breakthrough in the southern sector from the Kruglaya grove to Gaitolovo, but without significant results. The 256th Infantry Division was able to achieve the greatest success in this direction; on January 14, it occupied Workers' Village No. 7, Podgornaya station and reached the approaches to Sinyavino. On the right wing, the 12th Ski Brigade was sent to help the 128th Division; it was supposed to go across the ice of Lake Ladoga to the rear of the Lipka stronghold.
On January 15, in the center of the offensive zone, the 372nd Infantry Division was finally able to take Workers' Villages No. 8 and No. 4, and on the 17th they reached village No. 1. By this day, the 18th Infantry Division and the 98th Tank Brigade of the 2nd UA had already been there for several days fought a stubborn battle on the outskirts of Workers' Village No. 5. It was attacked from the west by units of the 67th Army. The moment of unification of the two armies was close...
As a result of the January battles of 1943, it was possible to clear the southern coast of Lake Ladoga from the enemy. Between Lake Ladoga and the front line a formation was formed corridor 8-11 km wide, through which within 17 days a railway and a road were built.
The blockade was completely lifted January 27, 1944 as a result of the Leningrad-Novgorod strategic offensive operation.
The siege of Leningrad lasted from September 8, 1941 to January 27, 1944. During this time, northern capital 107 thousand aerial bombs were dropped, about 150 thousand shells were fired. According to various sources, during the years of the blockade, from 400 thousand to 1 million people died. In particular, the figure of 632 thousand people appeared at the Nuremberg trials. Only 3% of them died from bombing and shelling, the remaining 97% died from starvation.
The light cruiser "Kirov" salutes in honor of the lifting of the siege of Leningrad!
Leningrad. Firework. Breaking the siege of Leningrad (January 27, 1944):
It was not successful the first time. But the city of millions, stifled by hunger, desperately needed help. More than 30 thousand people gave their lives for breaking the blockade in January 1943. The operation, called “Iskra,” ended on January 30, and already in early February the first train from the mainland arrived in Leningrad.
Break through the bottleneck
During 1942, the Soviet command repeatedly attempted to break the blockade of Leningrad. In January-April, an offensive operation was carried out in the area of the village of Lyubtsy, in August-October - in the direction of the village of Sinyavino and the Mga station. Both campaigns were unsuccessful. The situation in the besieged city remained extremely difficult, and by the beginning of 1943 a new operation was planned, codenamed “Iskra”.
The offensive was to be carried out by the forces of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts with the assistance of the Baltic Fleet, the Ladoga Flotilla and long-range aviation.
Marshal Kliment Voroshilov and Army General Georgy Zhukov were assigned to coordinate the actions.
The essence of the operation boiled down to a counter strike by the forces of the Leningrad Front from the west and the Volkhov Front from the east, in the area of the “Shlisselburg-Sinyavinsky salient”, where the distance between the troops was the shortest.
However, this section of the front was also considered the most likely for an offensive. The enemy understood this and in a year and a half created a powerful defensive system here with long-term defensive structures, strong points, minefields and barbed wire barriers.
In the area of the “Shlisselburg-Sinyavinsky ledge” (the Germans called it “Flaschenhals” - bottleneck) there was the largest group of the 18th Army of Colonel General Georg Lindemann - about five divisions with a total number of up to 70 thousand people. Nazi forces had about 450 guns and 250 mortars of various calibers, up to 50 tanks and about 450 aircraft.
Preparing the offensive
It took about a month to prepare for the operation. The fighters had to be trained in winter offensive tactics and overcome powerful layered enemy defenses in forest and swampy areas. Especially for this purpose, training grounds were built in the rear, simulating areas of the upcoming offensive, and war games were held.
Artillery played a huge role in the operation. On both sectors of the front it was planned to use it in full, starting with artillery preparation of the attack and artillery support for assault units, and ending with escorting the advancing troops.
Aviation was supposed to cover the Soviet offensive from attacks by enemy aircraft.
For the offensive, strike groups of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts were formed, which were significantly reinforced with artillery, tank and engineering formations. Thus, the Leningrad Front received one rifle division, four rifle brigades and an anti-aircraft artillery division, and the Volkhov Front received five rifle divisions, three rifle and ski brigades and one engineer brigade. In total, more than 300 thousand soldiers were preparing for the offensive, and the group included about 4,900 guns and mortars, more than 600 tanks and more than 800 aircraft.
Progress of the operation
Before the offensive, on the night of January 11-12, aviation from the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts launched a massive attack on pre-planned targets - headquarters, airfields and communications centers - in the area of the upcoming breakthrough. At 9.30 am, heavy artillery barrage began, and two hours later, the front assault brigades, accompanied by the fire of hundreds of guns, went on the attack.
The training was not in vain: despite return fire and difficult terrain, Soviet troops literally chewed through the enemy’s defenses meter by meter.
Following the assault brigades, the main units of our army rushed to enemy positions.
The German forces resisted desperately, and the Soviet infantry advanced slowly and unevenly. In two days, the distance between the attackers was reduced to two kilometers, and fighters from two fronts met on January 18 in the area of workers’ villages No. 1 and No. 5. On this day, the land connection between besieged Leningrad and the mainland was finally restored.
Two days later, on January 20, the Soviet army tried to build on the success of the offensive and expand its positions, but to no avail: the Germans brought up reserves to dangerous sectors of the front - manpower and artillery - and the further offensive floundered. In order to hold the conquered lines, our troops went on the defensive.
Results
During the operation, the Soviet army suffered huge losses - about 115 thousand people, of which more than 33 thousand died. German losses amounted to more than 30 thousand people, about eight thousand died.
However, the main goal - breaking the blockade and connecting the city with the mainland by land - was achieved.
Behind record time- within just seventeen days - a railway line was built along the shore of Lake Ladoga Shlisselburg-Polyany, which received the name.
Already on February 7, Leningraders at the Finlyandsky Station greeted the first train with food with jubilation.
On January 18, 1943, one of the most significant events in the Great Patriotic War took place - the blockade of Leningrad was broken. This day is a special date for all residents of the city, regardless of age. Despite the fact that Leningrad remained besieged for another whole year after January 1943, with the breaking of the blockade the Leningraders had a real chance to survive.
In addition, the liberation of Leningrad from the blockade in January 1943 became a key moment in the defense of the city: having seized the final strategic initiative in this direction, Soviet troops eliminated the danger of a connection between German and Finnish troops. On January 18 - the day the blockade of Leningrad was broken - the critical period of isolation of the city ended.
It should be noted that for the Wehrmacht command, the capture of the city on the Neva was not only of great military-strategic significance: in addition to the capture of the entire coast of the Gulf of Finland and the destruction of the Baltic Fleet, far-reaching propaganda goals were also pursued. The fall of Leningrad would cause irreparable moral damage to everything to the Soviet people and would significantly undermine the morale of the armed forces. Of course, before the fascist troops isolated the city, the Red Army command had an alternative - to withdraw the troops and surrender Leningrad; but then the fate of its inhabitants would have been even more tragic, because Hitler intended to wipe the city off the face of the earth in the literal sense of the word.
Breaking the blockade of Leningrad became possible as a result of the successful military operation called “Iskra”, which lasted three weeks - from January 12 to January 30, 1943. The strategic offensive operation "Iskra" to break the blockade of Leningrad was carried out by strike forces of the Leningrad (commanded by Lieutenant General L. A. Govorov) and Volkhov (commanded by Army General K. A. Meretskov) fronts.
Preparation for the operation proceeded as follows.
By the end of 1942, the situation near Leningrad was difficult: the troops of the Leningrad Front and the Baltic Fleet were isolated, and there was no land connection between the city and the “Big Land”. During 1942, the Red Army twice attempted to break the blockade. However, both the Lyuban and Sinyavin offensive operations were unsuccessful. The area between the southern coast of Lake Ladoga and the village of Mga (the so-called “bottleneck”), where the distance between the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts was the shortest (12-16 km), was still occupied by units of the German 18th Army.
Under these conditions, the Supreme Command Headquarters developed a plan new operation. The troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts were instructed to “defeat the enemy grouping in the area of Lipka, Gaitolovo, Moskovskaya Dubrovka, Shlisselburg and thus break the siege of Leningrad” and by the end of January 1943, complete the operation and reach the Moika-Mikhailovsky-Tortolovo river line.
Almost a month was allotted for the preparation of the operation, during which the troops began comprehensive preparations for the upcoming offensive. Particular attention was paid to organizing interaction between the strike groups, for which the command and headquarters of the two fronts coordinated their plans, established demarcation lines and worked out interactions, conducting a series of war games based on the real situation.
For the offensive, strike groups of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts were formed, which were significantly reinforced by artillery, tank and engineering formations, including from the reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters. In total, the strike groups of the two fronts numbered 302,800 soldiers and officers, about 4,900 guns and mortars (76 mm caliber and above), more than 600 tanks and 809 aircraft.
The defense of the Shlisselburg-Sinyavinsky ledge was carried out by the main forces of the 26th and part of the divisions of the 54th Army Corps of the 18th Army, numbering approximately 60,000 soldiers and officers, supported by 700 guns and mortars and about 50 tanks and self-propelled guns.
Due to the significant superiority of the Soviet army in manpower and equipment, the German command hoped to hold its position primarily due to the power of its defense: most of the villages were strongholds, the front line and positions in the depths of the defense were fenced with minefields, barbed wire barriers and fortified with bunkers.
Operation "Iskra" by day
At 9:30 a.m., more than 4.5 thousand guns and mortars from two fronts and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet launched their attack on enemy positions. On the Leningrad Front, the firestorm raged for 2 hours and 20 minutes. On the Volkhov Front in the 2nd Shock Army, artillery preparation lasted 1 hour and 45 minutes.
At 11:50 a.m. the last salvo of guards mortars was fired, and rifle chains of divisions of the first echelon of the Leningrad Front entered the Neva ice.
The greatest success on the first day was achieved by the 136th Rifle Division (commanded by Major General N.P. Simonyak) in the area of the village of Maryino. Having quickly crossed the Neva, units of the division broke through the front line of the enemy’s defenses and by the end of January 12 had advanced 3-4 kilometers.
The 268th Infantry Division operated successfully on the first day of the offensive. By the end of the day, the division had advanced up to 3 kilometers and created a threat of encirclement of the Gorodok defense center and the 8th Hydroelectric Power Station.
The situation on the flanks was not so favorable. The 45th Guards Rifle Division, moving from a bridgehead in the Moscow Dubrovka area, came under very heavy enemy artillery, mortar and machine gun fire and was able to advance only 500-600 meters. The 86th Rifle Division, operating on the left flank of the army, crossed the Neva in the area between Maryino and Shlisselburg. Unsuppressed firing points in the semi-basements of the building and on the piers forced its units to lie low on the ice of the Neva.
In the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Front, the greatest successes on the first day were achieved by units of the 327th Infantry Division of Colonel N. A. Polyakov. By the end of the first day of the offensive, the troops of the 2nd Shock Army advanced 3 kilometers.
Scouts of the Leningrad Front during the battle near the wire fences. The photo was taken during the first day of the operation to break the blockade of Leningrad
In the morning the fighting took on a particularly persistent and fierce character. By the end of the second day of the operation, the troops of the 67th Army of the Leningrad Front almost came close to the line of the planned meeting with the troops of the Volkhov Front. The latter had virtually no progress since January 13th.
The commander of the 67th Army, Major General M.P. Dukhanov, brought into battle part of the second echelon forces: the 123rd Infantry Division together with the 152nd Tank Brigade, the 102nd Separate Rifle Brigade and one regiment of the 13th Infantry Division.
Trying to hold the Shlisselburg-Sinyavinsk ledge, the enemy command had strengthened the grouping of its troops here the 96th and 61st the day before infantry divisions and transferred the 5th Mountain Infantry Division to the Sinyavino area. These formations fiercely resisted the advance of the 67th and 2nd Shock Armies and often launched counterattacks.
On the third day of fighting, it was not possible to break the enemy’s resistance. Over the course of the day, the troops of the 67th and 2nd Shock Armies advanced slightly. The distance between the advancing groups of both armies was reduced to 4 kilometers.
On the fourth and fifth days of the offensive, troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts fought for individual strongholds, gradually moving towards each other.
The 2nd Shock Army, fighting stubbornly, slowly advanced towards the Leningraders and expanded the breakthrough. Units of the 128th Rifle Division advanced in cooperation with the 12th Ski Brigade, which made a bold raid across the ice of Lake Ladoga to the rear of the German garrison in the village of Lipka, and captured this village.
On the sixth day of the operation, fierce fighting broke out again in the main direction. They were led by the 136th, 123rd Infantry Divisions, 123rd Infantry Brigade, and 61st Tank Brigade. On the left flank, the 330th Regiment and the 34th Ski Brigade continued to carry out the task of capturing Shlisselburg. The German command feverishly transferred new reserves to the areas of Mgi, Kelkolovo, Mustolovo, and Sinyavino.
By January 17, the troops of the Volkhov Front captured Workers' Villages No. 4 and No. 8, Podgornaya station, and came close to Workers' Villages No. 1 and No. 5. The corridor separating the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts became completely narrow.
On January 18, after fierce fighting, the 136th Infantry Division, pursuing the enemy, broke into Workers' Village No. 5, where at approximately 12 noon it united with units of the 18th Infantry Division of the 2nd Shock Army.
By this time, the advanced units of the 123rd Infantry Brigade of the 67th Army had already met with units of the 372nd Division of the 2nd Shock Army on the eastern outskirts of Workers' Village No. 1.
And at the end of the day, the advanced units of the 34th Ski Brigade established contact with the 128th Infantry Division and the 12th Ski Brigade of the 2nd Shock Army, which finally took Lipki.
Around midnight on January 18, the radio broadcast that the blockade of Leningrad had been broken. There was general rejoicing on the streets and avenues of the city. Early in the morning of January 19, the hero city was decorated with flags. All its residents took to the streets, as they did on major national holidays. At crowded rallies, Leningraders expressed deep gratitude to the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts who broke the blockade.
Having formed a common front and gained a foothold on new lines, the troops of the 67th and 2nd Shock Armies continued their attack on the Sinyavinsky Heights. Fierce fighting continued until the end of January, but, despite the introduction of new units into the battle, it was not possible to break through the enemy’s defenses.
The total losses of Soviet troops during Operation Iskra (January 12-30) amounted to 115,082 people (33,940 - irrevocably), while the Leningrad Front lost 41,264 people (12,320 - irrevocably), and the Volkhov Front - 73,818 people (21 620 - irrevocably). According to German data (summary reports of army headquarters on losses) for January 1943, the 18th Army lost 22,619 people. During the first half of the month, the total losses of the army amounted to 6,406 people (of which 1,543 were killed and missing), and in the period from January 16 to 31 - 16,213 people (of which 4,569 were irrecoverable).
For the courage and heroism shown in the January battles, about 19,000 Soviet soldiers were awarded orders and medals, 12 were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Particularly distinguished units were transformed into guards: the 136th (commander N.P. Simonyak) and 327th (commander N.A. Polyakov) rifle divisions were transformed into the 63rd and 64th guards rifle divisions, and the 61st I Tank Brigade (commander V.V. Khrustitsky) - to the 30th Guards Tank Brigade, the 122nd Tank Brigade was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.
As a result of Operation Iskra, troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts broke the blockade of Leningrad on January 18, 1943. Although the military success achieved was quite modest (the width of the corridor connecting the city with the country was only 8-11 kilometers), the political, material, economic and symbolic significance of breaking the blockade cannot be overestimated. IN as soon as possible The Polyany-Shlisselburg railway line, a highway and bridges across the Neva were built. On February 7, the first train with “ Big Earth" Already in mid-February, food supply standards established for other industrial centers of the country began to apply in Leningrad. All this radically improved the situation of the city residents and the troops of the Leningrad Front.
LENINGRAD. 1944 January 18. /TASS/. The breaking of the blockade, which Leningraders had to wait for 16 long months, was a great national holiday for the people. On January 18, 1944, the city celebrated the anniversary military operation, which predetermined the success of Soviet troops in the Battle of Leningrad. The newspaper "On Guard of the Motherland" wrote:
A year ago, the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts won a major victory, which went down as a bright page in the history of the heroic struggle of the great city against Nazi invaders. In intense battles, our units broke the German defenses and broke the blockade. Leningrad received a strong land connection with the country. The opportunity was created to radically improve the supply of the city with everything necessary for its life and struggle, and its military position was strengthened. In the battles on the Neva, the villainous plans of the Nazi invaders to strangle the glorious citadel of the Soviet country were finally buried.
LenTASS described the mood of the residents of the front city on that significant day: “ There is no limit to joy. People hug, kiss, shake hands, congratulate each other on breaking the blockade”.
The news of the connection of troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts in the area of Workers' Village No. 1 came to the besieged city only in the evening of January 18, 1943, and the night shift workers were the first to hear it. Despite the late hour, immediately after the Sovinformburo’s extraordinary message about breaking the blockade was broadcast on the radio, rallies took place at Leningrad factories.
On the morning of January 19, 1943, the streets of Leningrad were decorated with flags, even strangers in the streets they hugged and congratulated each other on an important victory. By morning, the artists had finished working on a series of new posters dedicated to breaking the blockade - two days later they could be seen on the streets of the city.
On the same day, the Leningrad City Executive Committee decided to prepare a plan of priority work to restore the city economy.
However, the Red Army failed to build on its success and push back German troops from Leningrad in January 1943. The Germans constantly transferred fresh reserves to this area, and in the period from January 19 to 30, a large number of artillery, tanks and five divisions transferred from other sectors of the front, including parts of the 4th SS Polizei Division. Their actions were actively supported by German aviation. Historians note that German reserves were most actively used against the 67th Lenfront Army - the fascist command believed that the troops advancing from the besieged city were more weakened. As a result, in order to prevent the enemy from reaching Ladoga and again closing the blockade ring, Soviet troops went on the defensive.
The first attempts to relieve the siege of Leningrad
Attempts to break through the blockade ring around Leningrad were made several times. For the first time, such a task was assigned to units of the Red Army in September 1941, but the lack of forces and the difficult situation in other sectors of the Soviet-German front did not allow it to be solved either in 1941 or in 1942.
Operation Iskra in 1943, which restored the besieged city’s connection with the country, was preceded by four offensive operations undertaken by troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts with the aim of unblocking the city and liberating the occupied areas of the Leningrad region:
- September-October 1941: two Sinyavinsk operations
The first was undertaken immediately after the formations of the 18th German Army reached Lake Ladoga and the blockade of Leningrad was established. The Soviet command intended to quickly restore the city’s connection with the country. On September 10-26, the 54th Separate Army, the 115th Rifle Division and the 4th Lenfront Marine Brigade launched counter attacks on Sinyavino and Mgu. But the troops were unable to complete the assigned task due to lack of strength: the 54th Army advanced only 6-10 km in the Sinyavinsk direction, and the Lenfront formations, having crossed the Neva on the night of September 20, captured only small bridgehead.
The second Sinyavin operation on October 20-28, 1941 began at the moment of the unfolding offensive of German troops near Tikhvin and was stopped due to the aggravated situation in this direction.
- Tikhvin offensive operation of 1941 - the first victory near Leningrad
Conducted from November 10 to December 30, 1941 by the forces of the 54th Lenfront Army, the 4th and 52nd separate armies with the assistance of troops of the North-Western Front. Her main goal There was a defeat of the Tikhvin group of fascist German troops, the restoration of railway communication in the Tikhvin-Volkhov section, as well as an improvement in the position of the Lenfront and Baltic Fleet troops. The strategic objective of the operation was to prevent the transfer of enemy forces to the Moscow direction.
Thanks to the reinforcements, the 4th, 52nd and 54th armies had superiority over the enemy in men and artillery, but they were inferior in tanks and aircraft. The offensive developed slowly, and the troops' actions lacked synchronization. However, the Soviet units were successful and on December 9 liberated Tikhvin, by the end of December they reached the Volkhov and captured several bridgeheads on its left bank, throwing the Germans back to their original lines.
Units of the Red Army advanced 100-120 km, ensuring through traffic along railway to Voybokalo station and disrupting the plan to create a second ring of encirclement of Leningrad. They inflicted damage on ten enemy divisions and forced the Germans to transfer five divisions to the Tikhvin direction, thereby creating favorable conditions for a counter-offensive of Soviet troops near Moscow.
- January 7 - April 30, 1942: Lyuban offensive operation
A strike by the troops of the Volkhov Front from the Volkhov line and the 54th Army from the Pogost region in the general direction of Lyuban was supposed to encircle and destroy the enemy’s Lyuban group, going to the rear of the German troops blockading Leningrad from the south. Advancing in a wooded and swampy area, in off-road conditions, in deep snow, with a lack of automatic weapons, transport, communications, food and fodder, the troops advanced slowly, encountering stubborn enemy resistance. In addition, there was a lack of organization of the offensive. The Germans managed to regroup eleven divisions and one brigade into the 18th Army zone, dramatically changing the balance of forces.
- August-October 1942: third Sinyavinsk operation
In September 1942, the German command planned Operation Nordlicht (Northern Lights) to capture Leningrad. To carry it out, the 18th Army was reinforced by formations of the 11th Army transferred from Crimea and several divisions from Western Europe, as well as large forces of artillery and aviation.
The Soviet command forestalled the enemy by launching an offensive in the Sinyavinsk direction in August. With counter strikes from the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, it was planned to defeat the enemy’s heavily fortified Mginsk-Sinyavin grouping, restoring Leningrad’s land connection with the country. On August 19, Lenfront troops suddenly went on the offensive, striking at Sinyavino and Tosno. On August 27, troops from the strike group of the Volkhov Front began an offensive from the east. Having broken through the German defenses in the Gontovaya Lipka, Tortolovo sector and repelling counterattacks, by the end of August they reached the approaches to Sinyavino.
The Nazis hastily transferred six fresh divisions, including one tank, to the breakthrough area, which allowed them to stop the advance of Soviet troops and launch strong flank counterattacks. During September, Lenfront troops sought to overcome the enemy’s defenses on the left bank of the Neva and develop an offensive towards Sinyavino, towards the troops of the Volkhov Front.
On September 26, units of the Nevsky Operational Group captured a bridgehead in the Moscow Dubrovka area, where stubborn fighting took place. But Lenfront troops were unable to expand the captured bridgeheads or break through the enemy’s defenses to the full depth and connect with the Volkhov Front. By order of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, the troops retreated to their original lines, maintaining a small bridgehead on the left bank in the Moscow Dubrovka area.
The Sinyavinsk operation of 1942 did not solve the problem of releasing the siege of Leningrad. However, as a result active actions troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, the enemy’s plan to storm the city was thwarted.
Operation Spark
Preparations for the offensive operation in the area of Lake Ladoga were carried out throughout December 1942, and were completed by the deadline set by Headquarters - January 1, 1943.
Through the joint efforts of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts, defeat the enemy group in the Lipka-Gaitolovo-Moskovskaya Dubrovka-Shlisselburg area and thus break the siege of the mountains. Leningrad. By the end of January 1943, the operation would be completed.
Continuation
However, the weather interfered with the fighting. At the end of December, the commanders of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, Colonel General Leonid Govorov and Army General Kirill Meretskov, appealed to the Supreme High Command with a request to postpone the start of the offensive until January 10-12 due to extremely unfavorable conditions. weather conditions. The military leaders explained the need for a delay by the fact that the thaw was prolonged near Leningrad, the ice cover on the Neva was not stable enough, and the swamps were impassable - the soil in them was frozen only 15-20 cm, which was not enough for the movement of tanks. In addition, serious fluctuations in air temperature - from 0 to minus 15 degrees - created fogs that complicated observation of the enemy. In such conditions, launching an offensive was risky. This request was granted by the Headquarters, and the start of Operation Iskra was scheduled for January 12, 1943.
Our troops had to carry out Operation Iskra in extreme difficult conditions, Hitler’s troops turned the positions they occupied into powerful fortified areas with an extensive system of concrete field structures, with big amount anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles. The enemy's defense also relied on very advantageous heights and other natural boundaries. The enemy defenses on the left bank of the Neva were especially powerful. Having fortified themselves here, the Nazis had open water up to 800 meters wide in front of them. Even a frozen river presented an extremely strong barrier, since there were no shelters on the ice. It was visible and shot through from a steep, steep bank occupied by the enemy, the height of which in the breakthrough area ranged from 5 to 12 meters. Hitler's troops reinforced this natural obstacle with a dense network of barbed wire and minefields."
Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov
From the book "Memories and Reflections"
In the breakthrough area, for every kilometer of the front, the 18th Army of the German Army Group North, under the command of Colonel General G. Lindemann, had over 20 strong firing points, each sector was defended by large forces of infantry, 12 mounted and 20 manual ones were concentrated on each square meter machine guns. Such serious enemy positions forced the command of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts to be especially careful in planning the offensive. At the same time, the Soviet military leaders, remembering the previous failures in the Leningrad direction, did not experience excessive optimism.
It was planned to break the blockade on the Mginsk-Shlisselburg ledge, in the Shlisselburg-Sinyavino area on south coast Lake Ladoga. This 15 km wide section of German defense was called the “bottleneck”. The reinforced 67th Army of the Lenfront and the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Front were ordered to deliver decisive blows. To ensure their actions, the forces of the 13th and 14th Air Armies, part of the artillery of the Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga Military Flotilla were allocated.
Planned surprise
The order to begin the offensive was read to the troops on the evening of January 11, 1943. At night to preparatory work The sappers started. The offensive began on the morning of January 12. The air temperature that day dropped to 23 degrees below zero. The weather made its own adjustments to the offensive scenario, forcing us to abandon the massive use of aviation, however combat missions carried out by small groups of attack aircraft.
Georgy Zhukov wrote in his memoirs about the beginning of the operation:
“The blow of the Soviet troops, which the Nazis had been expecting for a whole year, was still unexpected for them that day, especially in strength and skill. In this battle we managed to achieve tactical surprise, although the enemy knew that we were preparing to break the blockade. He may , even foresaw where exactly the attacks of the Soviet troops would be delivered: the very configuration of the front spoke of this. Day after day, on the proposed breakthrough site, the Germans erected more and more new defensive structures, pulled together their selected units here, and again and again supplied resistance nodes with fire weapons, created over more than sixteen months of blockade. But exactly when, on what day and hour, with what forces we would begin the operation - the German command did not know...
At 9:30 am the frosty morning silence was broken by the first salvo of artillery preparation. On the western and eastern sides of the Shlisselburg-Mginsky corridor, the enemy simultaneously fired thousands of guns and mortars from both fronts. For two hours a firestorm raged over enemy positions in the directions of the main and auxiliary attacks of the Soviet troops. The artillery cannonade of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts merged into a single powerful roar, and it was difficult to make out who was firing and from where. Ahead, black fountains of explosions rose, trees swayed and fell, and logs of enemy dugouts flew upward. Above the ground, here and there, gray ones appeared, quickly settling on severe frost clouds - evaporation from swamps opened by fire. For each square meter two or three artillery and mortar shells fell in the breakthrough area".
The artillery density in the breakthrough sector of the Leningrad Front troops was about 144 guns and mortars per 1 km of front, in the offensive sector of the Volkhov Front - 180 guns and mortars per 1 km. In total, more than 4.5 thousand guns fired at German positions, the actions of which were reinforced by twelve separate Katyusha divisions. The 45th Rifle Division advanced from the famous Nevsky Patch - a tiny piece of land in the Nevskaya Dubrovka area, which Soviet troops held for about 400 days.
Nevsky Piglet - a symbol of courage
The bridgehead on the left bank of the Neva was created by order of the Soviet command in September 1941. In the area of Moscow Dubrovka, significant forces were concentrated in order to destroy the Shlisselburg-Sinyavin group of the German 18th Army with a blow towards the 54th Army. For almost a year and a half, Soviet troops repeatedly tried to launch an attack on Mga and Sinyavino from here to break the blockade of Leningrad. By April 1942, the size of the bridgehead reached 4 km along the front and 500-800 meters in depth.
Despite the fact that none of the attempts to develop the offensive or expand the bridgehead was successful, the Nevsky patch pinned down significant German forces. Only on February 17, 1943 did the Germans leave their positions in front of the bridgehead. The Nevsky Piglet entered the history of the Great Patriotic War as a symbol of courage, heroism and self-sacrifice Soviet soldiers, and also as one of the bloodiest battle sites. Every day its defenders repelled 12-16 attacks, about 50 thousand mines, shells and aerial bombs fell on them. Soviet troops suffered huge losses here, and due to difficulties in evacuating the wounded, the percentage of irretrievable losses was very high. Exact numbers Historians still cannot name Soviet losses on this section of the front; There are figures ranging from 50 to 250 thousand people, but none of them is final today.
Continuation
By noon, 11 Soviet divisions went on the offensive in the sector from Moscow Dubrovka to Shlisselburg. At the offensive site of the 136th Infantry Division, a brass band played "Internationale" (at that time former anthem THE USSR). The first to move were assault groups consisting of sappers and infantrymen. They had to climb the high icy banks of the Neva with the help of hooks, ladders and so-called “cats” - metal climbing devices. The Germans met the advancing Soviet units with hurricane fire, but were unable to stop the attackers. By the end of the first day of the offensive, the distance between the 67th Army of the Lenfront and the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Front advancing towards each other was 8 km.
The long-awaited connection of troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts occurred after six days of the offensive on the eastern outskirts of Workers' Village No. 1. Here at 9:30 a.m. on January 18, soldiers of the 1st battalion of the 123rd rifle brigade of the Leningrad Front and soldiers of the 1st battalion of the 1240th met regiment of the 372nd Infantry Division of the Volkhov Front.
At 11:45, another meeting of the regiments took place - units of the 269th Regiment of the 136th Infantry Division of the Leningrad Front and the 424th Regiment of the 18th Infantry Division of the Volkhov Front met to the north-west of Workers' Village No. 5. At exactly noon, the soldiers of these divisions also met south of this Workers' Village.
At two in the afternoon a red flag was raised over Shlisselburg. The entire southern coast of Lake Ladoga was cleared of enemy troops. A corridor 8-11 km wide was broken through the German defense. In the evening, a message about breaking the blockade was read out in Leningrad.
Losses of the parties in the battles to break the siege of Leningrad
In the January battles of 1943, Soviet troops inflicted enormous losses on the Nazis in manpower and equipment: repelling the advance of the Red Army, the Wehrmacht lost over 70 thousand troops killed and wounded, and more than 2 thousand were captured. 344 enemy aircraft, 110 tanks and armored vehicles were destroyed, the Germans lost more than 300 guns and mortars, more than 800 machine guns, a large number of cars, tractors, railway cars and carts. Soviet troops captured large trophies. Also, the artillery and mortars of the Red Army destroyed 470 fortified units and dugouts, 25 well-equipped observation posts, and defeated and suppressed 172 enemy artillery and mortar batteries.
Historians estimate the total losses of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts in Operation Iskra in January 1943 at 115 thousand people. Of these, Lenfront's losses: more than 12 thousand people killed, over 28.9 thousand wounded. Losses of the Volkhov Front: more than 21.6 thousand killed, about 52 thousand wounded.
Significance of the 1943 operation
For the besieged city, breaking the blockade primarily meant restoring communications with the mainland. Already on the evening of January 18, 1943, the State Defense Committee approved new plan the construction of a railway line, which, through the Volkhovstroy station, was supposed to connect Leningrad directly with the east of the country. On the same day, railway engineers arrived in Shlisselburg, just liberated from the Germans, who by February 8, 1943 were to build more than 30 km of road and two bridges across the Neva and Nazia. Within 17 days, a road was built through the breakthrough area.
Breaking the blockade improved the economic situation of the city, the supply of troops and the population. A continuous flow of food, fuel and raw materials entered Leningrad, which made it possible to develop additional production capacities and begin a larger-scale restoration of the urban economy.
The military significance of breaking the blockade was that it finally destroyed the plans of the Nazi command to take Leningrad by storm, and in this sense, historians and military personnel see Operation Iskra as crucial moment throughout the Battle of Leningrad 1941-44. From the moment the blockade was broken, the initiative in this section of the Soviet-German front passed to the Red Army.
