The reasons why the Cossacks of all Cossack regions for the most part rejected the destructive ideas of Bolshevism and entered into an open struggle against them, and in completely unequal conditions, are still not entirely clear and constitute a mystery for many historians. After all, the Cossacks everyday life there were the same farmers as 75% of the Russian population, bore the same state burdens, if not more, and were under the same administrative control of the state. With the beginning of the revolution that came after the abdication of the sovereign, the Cossacks within the regions and in the front-line units experienced various psychological stages. During the February rebellion in Petrograd, the Cossacks took a neutral position and remained outside spectators of the unfolding events. The Cossacks saw that despite the presence of significant armed forces in Petrograd, the government not only did not use them, but also strictly prohibited their use against the rebels. During the previous rebellion in 1905-1906, Cossack troops were the main armed force, who restored order in the country, as a result, in public opinion they earned the contemptuous title of “whips” and “royal satraps and guardsmen.” Therefore, in the rebellion that arose in the Russian capital, the Cossacks were inert and left the government to decide the issue of restoring order with the help of other troops. After the abdication of the sovereign and the entry into control of the country by the Provisional Government, the Cossacks considered the continuity of power legitimate and were ready to support the new government. But gradually this attitude changed, and, observing the complete inactivity of the authorities and even the encouragement of unbridled revolutionary excesses, the Cossacks began to gradually move away from the destructive power, and the instructions of the Council of Cossack Troops, operating in Petrograd under the chairmanship of the ataman of the Orenburg army Dutov, became authoritative for them.

Inside the Cossack regions, the Cossacks also did not become intoxicated with revolutionary freedoms and, having made some local changes, continued to live as before, without causing any economic, much less social, upheaval. At the front, in military units, the Cossacks accepted the order for the army, which completely changed the foundations of military formations, with bewilderment and, under the new conditions, continued to maintain order and discipline in the units, most often electing their former commanders and superiors. There were no refusals to execute orders and there was no settling of personal scores with the command staff. But the tension gradually increased. The population of the Cossack regions and Cossack units at the front were subjected to active revolutionary propaganda, which involuntarily had to affect their psychology and forced them to listen carefully to the calls and demands of the revolutionary leaders. In the area of ​​the Don Army, one of the important revolutionary acts was the removal of the appointed ataman Count Grabbe, his replacement with an elected ataman of Cossack origin, General Kaledin, and the restoration of the convening of public representatives to the Military Circle, according to the custom that had existed since ancient times, until the reign of Emperor Peter I. After which their lives continued walking without much shock. The issue of relations with the non-Cossack population, which, psychologically, followed the same revolutionary paths as the population of the rest of Russia, became acute. At the front, powerful propaganda was carried out among the Cossack military units, accusing Ataman Kaledin of being counter-revolutionary and having a certain success among the Cossacks. The seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in Petrograd was accompanied by a decree addressed to the Cossacks, in which only the geographical names, and it was promised that the Cossacks would be freed from the yoke of generals and the burden of military service, and equality and democratic freedoms would be established in everything. The Cossacks had nothing against this.

Rice. 1 Region of the Don Army

The Bolsheviks came to power under anti-war slogans and soon began to fulfill their promises. In November 1917, the Council of People's Commissars invited all warring countries to begin peace negotiations, but the Entente countries refused. Then Ulyanov sent a delegation to German-occupied Brest-Litovsk for separate peace negotiations with delegates from Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria. Germany's ultimatum demands shocked the delegates and caused hesitation even among the Bolsheviks, who were not particularly patriotic, but Ulyanov accepted these conditions. The “obscene Peace of Brest-Litovsk” was concluded, according to which Russia lost about 1 million km² of territory, pledged to demobilize the army and navy, transfer ships and infrastructure of the Black Sea Fleet to Germany, pay an indemnity of 6 billion marks, recognize the independence of Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland. The Germans had a free hand to continue the war in the west. At the beginning of March, the German army along the entire front began to advance to occupy the territories given up by the Bolsheviks under the peace treaty. Moreover, Germany, in addition to the agreement, announced to Ulyanov that Ukraine should be considered a province of Germany, to which Ulyanov also agreed. There is a fact in this case that is not widely known. Russia's diplomatic defeat in Brest-Litovsk was caused not only by the corruption, inconsistency and adventurism of the Petrograd negotiators. The “joker” played a key role here. A new partner suddenly appeared in the group of contracting parties - the Ukrainian Central Rada, which, despite all the precariousness of its position, behind the back of the delegation from Petrograd, on February 9 (January 27), 1918, signed a separate peace treaty with Germany in Brest-Litovsk. The next day, the Soviet delegation interrupted the negotiations with the slogan “we will stop the war, but we will not sign peace.” In response, on February 18, German troops launched an offensive along the entire front line. At the same time, the German-Austrian side tightened the peace terms. In view of the complete inability of the Sovietized old army and the beginnings of the Red Army to resist even the limited advance of German troops and the need for a respite to strengthen the Bolshevik regime, on March 3, Russia also signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. After that, the “independent” Ukraine was occupied by the Germans and, as unnecessary, they threw Petliura “from the throne”, placing the puppet Hetman Skoropadsky on him. Thus, shortly before falling into oblivion, the Second Reich, under the leadership of Kaiser Wilhelm II, captured Ukraine and Crimea.

After the Bolsheviks concluded the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, part of the territory of the Russian Empire turned into zones of occupation of the Central countries. Austro-German troops occupied Finland, the Baltic states, Belarus, Ukraine and eliminated the Soviets there. The Allies vigilantly monitored what was happening in Russia and also tried to ensure their interests connecting them with the former Russia. In addition, there were up to two million prisoners in Russia who could, with the consent of the Bolsheviks, be sent to their countries, and for the Entente powers it was important to prevent the return of prisoners of war to Germany and Austria-Hungary. Ports in the north of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, and in the Far East Vladivostok served as a means of communication between Russia and its allies. Large warehouses of property and military equipment, delivered by foreigners on orders from the Russian government, were concentrated in these ports. The accumulated cargo amounted to over a million tons, worth up to 2 and a half billion rubles. Cargoes were shamelessly stolen, including by local revolutionary committees. To ensure the safety of cargo, these ports were gradually occupied by the Allies. Since orders imported from England, France and Italy were sent through northern ports, they were occupied by 12,000 British and 11,000 Allied units. Imports from the USA and Japan went through Vladivostok. On July 6, 1918, the Entente declared Vladivostok an international zone, and the city was occupied by Japanese units of 57,000 and other allied units of 13,000 people. But they did not begin to overthrow the Bolshevik government. Only on July 29, the Bolshevik power in Vladivostok was overthrown by the White Czechs under the leadership of the Russian general M. K. Diterichs.

In domestic politics, the Bolsheviks issued decrees that destroyed all social structures: banks, national industry, private property, land ownership, and under the guise of nationalization, simple robbery was often carried out without any state leadership. The inevitable devastation began in the country, for which the Bolsheviks blamed the bourgeoisie and “rotten intellectuals,” and these classes were subjected to the most severe terror, bordering on destruction. It is still completely impossible to understand how this all-destroying force came to power in Russia, given that power was seized in a country that had a thousand-year-old culture. After all, with the same measures, international destructive forces hoped to produce an internal explosion in worried France, transferring up to 10 million francs to French banks for this purpose. But France, by the beginning of the twentieth century, had already exhausted its limit on revolutions and was tired of them. Unfortunately for the businessmen of the revolution, there were forces in the country that were able to unravel the insidious and far-reaching plans of the leaders of the proletariat and resist them. This was written about in more detail in Military Review in the article “How America saved Western Europe from the specter of world revolution.”

One of the main reasons that allowed the Bolsheviks to carry out a coup d'etat and then quite quickly seize power in many regions and cities of the Russian Empire was the support of numerous reserve and training battalions stationed throughout Russia that did not want to go to the front. It was Lenin’s promise of an immediate end to the war with Germany that predetermined the transition of the Russian army, which had decayed during the “Kerenschina,” to the side of the Bolsheviks, which ensured their victory. In most regions of the country, the establishment of Bolshevik power took place quickly and peacefully: out of 84 provincial and other large cities, only fifteen saw Soviet power established as a result of armed struggle. Having adopted the “Decree on Peace” on the second day of their stay in power, the Bolsheviks ensured the “triumphant march of Soviet power” across Russia from October 1917 to February 1918.

The relations between the Cossacks and the Bolshevik rulers were determined by the decrees of the Union of Cossack Troops and the Soviet government. On November 22, 1917, the Union of Cossack Troops presented a resolution in which it notified the Soviet government that:
- The Cossacks do not seek anything for themselves and do not demand anything for themselves outside the boundaries of their regions. But, guided by the democratic principles of self-determination of nationalities, it will not tolerate on its territories any power other than the people’s, formed by the free agreement of local nationalities without any external or outside influence.
- Sending punitive detachments against the Cossack regions, in particular against the Don, will bring civil war to the outskirts, where energetic work is underway to establish public order. This will cause a disruption in transport, will be an obstacle to the delivery of goods, coal, oil and steel to the cities of Russia and will worsen the food supply, leading to disorder in the breadbasket of Russia.
- The Cossacks oppose any introduction of foreign troops into the Cossack regions without the consent of the military and regional Cossack governments.
In response to the peace declaration of the Union of Cossack Troops, the Bolsheviks issued a decree to open military operations against the south, which read:
- Relying on the Black Sea Fleet, arm and organize the Red Guard to occupy the Donetsk coal region.
- From the north, from the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, move combined detachments to the south to the starting points: Gomel, Bryansk, Kharkov, Voronezh.
- The most active units should move from the Zhmerinka area to the east to occupy Donbass.

This decree created the germ of the fratricidal civil war of Soviet power against the Cossack regions. To survive, the Bolsheviks urgently needed Caucasian oil, Donetsk coal and bread from the southern outskirts. The outbreak of massive famine pushed Soviet Russia towards the rich south. The Don and Kuban governments did not have well-organized and sufficient forces at their disposal to protect the regions. The units returning from the front did not want to fight, they tried to disperse to the villages, and the young Cossack front-line soldiers entered into an open fight with the old men. In many villages this struggle became fierce, reprisals on both sides were brutal. But there were many Cossacks who came from the front, they were well armed and vociferous, had combat experience, and in most villages victory remained with the front-line youth, heavily infected with Bolshevism. It soon became clear that in the Cossack regions, strong units could only be created on the basis of volunteerism. To maintain order in the Don and Kuban, their governments used detachments consisting of volunteers: students, cadets, cadets and youth. Many Cossack officers volunteered to form such volunteer (the Cossacks call them partisan) units, but this matter was poorly organized at the headquarters. Permission to form such detachments was given to almost everyone who asked. Many adventurers appeared, even robbers, who simply robbed the population for profit. However, the main threat to the Cossack regions turned out to be regiments returning from the front, since many of those who returned were infected with Bolshevism. The formation of volunteer Red Cossack units also began immediately after the Bolsheviks came to power. At the end of November 1917, at a meeting of representatives of the Cossack units of the Petrograd Military District, it was decided to create revolutionary detachments from the Cossacks of the 5th Cossack division, 1st, 4th and 14th Don regiments and send them to the Don, Kuban and Terek to defeat the counter-revolution and establish Soviet authorities. In January 1918, a congress of front-line Cossacks gathered in the village of Kamenskaya with the participation of delegates from 46 Cossack regiments. The Congress recognized Soviet power and created the Don Military Revolutionary Committee, which declared war on the ataman of the Don Army, General A.M. Kaledin, who opposed the Bolsheviks. Among the command staff of the Don Cossacks, two staff officers, military foreman Golubov and Mironov, were supporters of Bolshevik ideas, and Golubov’s closest collaborator was the sub-sergeant Podtyolkov. In January 1918, the 32nd Don Cossack Regiment returned to the Don from the Romanian Front. Having elected military sergeant F.K. as his commander. Mironov, the regiment supported the establishment of Soviet power, and decided not to go home until the counter-revolution led by Ataman Kaledin was defeated. But the most tragic role on the Don was played by Golubov, who in February occupied Novocherkassk with two regiments of Cossacks he propagated, dispersed the meeting of the Military Circle, arrested General Nazarov, who took office after the death of General Kaledin, and shot him. After a short time, this “hero” of the revolution was shot by the Cossacks right at the rally, and Podtyolkov, who had large sums of money with him, was captured by the Cossacks and, according to their verdict, hanged. Mironov's fate was also tragic. He managed to captivate significant amount Cossacks, with whom he fought on the side of the Reds, but, not being satisfied with their order, he decided to go over with the Cossacks to the side of the fighting Don. Mironov was arrested by the Reds, sent to Moscow, where he was shot. But that will come later. In the meantime, there was great turmoil on the Don. If the Cossack population still hesitated, and only in some villages did the prudent voice of the old people gain the upper hand, then the non-Cossack population entirely sided with the Bolsheviks. The nonresident population in the Cossack regions always envied the Cossacks, who owned big amount land. Taking the side of the Bolsheviks, nonresidents hoped to take part in the division of the officers' and landowners' Cossack lands.

Other armed forces in the south were detachments of the emerging Volunteer Army, located in Rostov. On November 2, 1917, General Alekseev arrived on the Don, got in touch with Ataman Kaledin and asked him for permission to form volunteer detachments on the Don. General Alekseev’s goal was to take advantage of the southeastern base of the armed forces to gather the remaining steadfast officers, cadets, and old soldiers and organize them into the army necessary to restore order in Russia. Despite the complete lack of funds, Alekseev eagerly got down to business. On Barochnaya Street, the premises of one of the infirmaries were turned into an officers' dormitory, which became the cradle of volunteerism. Soon the first donation was received, 400 rubles. This is all that stood out in the month of November Russian society to their defenders. But people simply walked to the Don, without any idea of ​​what awaited them, groping, in the darkness, across the solid Bolshevik sea. They went to where the centuries-old traditions of the Cossack freemen and the names of the leaders whom popular rumor associated with the Don served as a bright beacon. They came exhausted, hungry, ragged, but not discouraged. On December 6 (19), disguised as a peasant, with a false passport, General Kornilov arrived by rail in the Don. He wanted to go further to the Volga, and from there to Siberia. He considered it more correct for General Alekseev to remain in the south of Russia, and he would be given the opportunity to work in Siberia. He argued that in this case they would not interfere with each other and he would be able to organize a big business in Siberia. He was eager for space. But the representatives who came to Novocherkassk from Moscow “ National Center“insisted that Kornilov remain in southern Russia and work together with Kaledin and Alekseev. An agreement was concluded between them, according to which General Alekseev took charge of all financial and political issues, General Kornilov took over the organization and command of the Volunteer Army, General Kaledin continued the formation of the Don Army and the management of the affairs of the Don Army. Kornilov had little faith in the success of work in the south of Russia, where he would have to create a white cause in the territories of the Cossack troops and depend on the military atamans. He said this: “I know Siberia, I believe in Siberia, things can be done there on a broad scale. Here Alekseev alone can easily handle the matter.” Kornilov was eager to go to Siberia with all his soul and heart, he wanted to be released and was not particularly interested in the work of forming the Volunteer Army. Kornilov’s fears that he would have friction and misunderstandings with Alekseev were justified from the first days of their work together. The forced stay of Kornilov in the south of Russia was a big political mistake of the “National Center”. But they believed that if Kornilov left, then many volunteers would follow him and the business started in Novocherkassk could fall apart. The formation of the Good Army progressed slowly, with an average of 75-80 volunteers signing up per day. There were few soldiers; mostly officers, cadets, students, cadets and high school students signed up. there was not enough in the Don warehouses; it had to be taken away from soldiers traveling home, in military echelons passing through Rostov and Novocherkassk, or bought through buyers in the same echelons. Lack of funds made work extremely difficult. The formation of the Don units progressed even worse. Generals Alekseev and Kornilov understood that the Cossacks did not want to go to restore order in Russia, but they were confident that the Cossacks would defend their lands. However, the situation in the Cossack regions of the southeast turned out to be much more difficult. The regiments returning from the front were completely neutral in the events taking place, and even showed a tendency towards Bolshevism, declaring that the Bolsheviks had not done anything bad to them.

In addition, inside the Cossack regions there was a difficult struggle against the non-resident population, and in the Kuban and Terek also against the highlanders. The military atamans had the opportunity to use well-trained teams of young Cossacks who were preparing to be sent to the front, and organize the conscription of successive ages of youth. General Kaledin could have had support in this from the elderly and front-line soldiers, who said: “We have served our duty, now we must call on others.” The formation of Cossack youth from conscription age could have given up to 2-3 divisions, which in those days was enough to maintain order on the Don, but this was not done. At the end of December, representatives of the British and French military missions arrived in Novocherkassk. They asked what had been done, what was planned to be done, after which they stated that they could help, but for now only with money, in the amount of 100 million rubles, in tranches of 10 million per month. The first payment was expected in January, but was never received, and then the situation completely changed. The initial funds for the formation of the Good Army consisted of donations, but they were scanty, mainly due to the unimaginable greed and stinginess of the Russian bourgeoisie and other propertied classes under the given circumstances. It should be said that the stinginess and stinginess of the Russian bourgeoisie is simply legendary. Back in 1909, during a discussion in the State Duma on the issue of the kulaks, P.A. Stolypin spoke prophetic words. He said: “... there is no more greedy and unscrupulous kulak and bourgeois than in Russia. It is no coincidence that in the Russian language the phrases “world-eater kulak and world-eater bourgeois” are used. If they do not change the type of their social behavior, great shocks await us...” He looked as if into water. They did not change social behavior. Almost all the organizers of the white movement point to the low usefulness of their appeals for material assistance to the property classes. However, by mid-January, a small (about 5 thousand people) but very combative and morally strong Volunteer Army had emerged. The Council of People's Commissars demanded the extradition or dispersal of volunteers. Kaledin and Krug answered: “There is no extradition from the Don!” The Bolsheviks, in order to eliminate the counter-revolutionaries, began to pull units loyal to them from the Western and Caucasian fronts to the Don region. They began to threaten the Don from Donbass, Voronezh, Torgovaya and Tikhoretskaya. In addition, the Bolsheviks tightened control on the railways and the influx of volunteers decreased sharply. At the end of January, the Bolsheviks occupied Bataysk and Taganrog, and on January 29, cavalry units moved from Donbass to Novocherkassk. The Don found himself defenseless against the Reds. Ataman Kaledin was confused, did not want bloodshed and decided to transfer his powers to the City Duma and democratic organizations, and then committed life with a shot in the heart. This was a sad but logical result of his activities. The First Don Circle gave pernach to the elected chieftain, but did not give him power.

The region was headed by a Military Government of 14 elders elected from each district. Their meetings had the character of a provincial duma and did not leave any trace in the history of the Don. On November 20, the government addressed the population with a very liberal declaration, convening a congress of the Cossack and peasant population on December 29 to organize the life of the Don region. At the beginning of January, a coalition government was created on a parity basis, 7 seats were given to the Cossacks, 7 to non-residents. The inclusion of demagogues-intellectuals and revolutionary democrats into the government finally led to the paralysis of power. Ataman Kaledin was ruined by his trust in the Don peasants and non-residents, his famous “parity”. He failed to glue the disparate pieces of the population of the Don region together. Under him, the Don split into two camps, Cossacks and Don peasants, along with non-resident workers and artisans. The latter, with few exceptions, were with the Bolsheviks. The Don peasantry, which made up 48% of the region's population, carried away by the broad promises of the Bolsheviks, was not satisfied with the measures of the Don government: the introduction of zemstvos in peasant districts, the attraction of peasants to participate in stanitsa self-government, their widespread admission into the Cossack class and the allocation of three million dessiatines of landowners' land. Under the influence of the incoming socialist element, the Don peasantry demanded a general division of all Cossack land. The numerically smallest working environment (10-11%) was concentrated in the most important centers, was the most restless and did not hide its sympathy for Soviet power. The revolutionary-democratic intelligentsia had not outlived its former psychology and, with amazing blindness, continued its destructive policy, which led to the death of democracy on a nationwide scale. The bloc of Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries reigned in all peasant and non-resident congresses, all kinds of dumas, councils, trade unions and inter-party meetings. There was not a single meeting where resolutions of no confidence in the ataman, the government and the Circle were not passed, or protests against their taking measures against anarchy, criminality and banditry.

They preached neutrality and reconciliation with that force that openly declared: “He who is not with us is against us.” In cities, workers' settlements and peasant settlements, the uprisings against the Cossacks did not subside. Attempts to place units of workers and peasants into Cossack regiments ended in disaster. They betrayed the Cossacks, went to the Bolsheviks and took Cossack officers with them to torture and death. The war took on a character class struggle. The Cossacks defended their Cossack rights from the Don workers and peasants. The death of Ataman Kaledin and the occupation of Novocherkassk by the Bolsheviks ends the period in the south Great War and the transition to civil war.

Rice. 2 Ataman Kaledin

On February 12, Bolshevik troops occupied Novocherkassk and military foreman Golubov, in “gratitude” for the fact that General Nazarov once saved him from prison, shot the new chieftain. Having lost all hope of holding Rostov, on the night of February 9 (22), the Good Army of 2,500 soldiers left the city for Aksai, and then moved to Kuban. After the establishment of Bolshevik power in Novocherkassk, terror began. Cossack units were prudently scattered throughout the city in small groups; domination in the city was in the hands of nonresidents and Bolsheviks. On suspicion of connections with the Good Army, officers were mercilessly executed. The robberies and robberies of the Bolsheviks made the Cossacks wary, even the Cossacks of the Golubovo regiments took a wait-and-see attitude. In the villages where nonresident and Don peasants seized power, the executive committees began dividing the Cossack lands. These outrages soon caused uprisings of the Cossacks in the villages adjacent to Novocherkassk. The leader of the Reds on the Don, Podtyolkov, and the head of the punitive detachment, Antonov, fled to Rostov, then were caught and executed. The occupation of Novocherkassk by the White Cossacks in April coincided with the occupation of Rostov by the Germans, and the return of the Volunteer Army to the Don region. But out of 252 villages of the Donskoy army, only 10 were liberated from the Bolsheviks. The Germans firmly occupied Rostov and Taganrog and the entire western part of the Donetsk district. The outposts of the Bavarian cavalry stood 12 versts from Novocherkassk. Under these conditions, Don was faced with four main tasks:
- immediately convene a new Circle, in which only delegates from the liberated villages could take part
- establish relationships with German authorities, find out their intentions and come to an agreement with them
- recreate the Don Army
- establish relationships with the Volunteer Army.

On April 28, a general meeting of the Don government and delegates from the villages and military units that took part in the expulsion of Soviet troops from the Don region took place. The composition of this Circle could not have any claim to resolving issues for the entire Army, which is why it limited its work to issues of organizing the struggle for the liberation of the Don. The meeting decided to declare itself the Don Rescue Circle. There were 130 people in it. Even on the democratic Don, this was the most popular assembly. The circle was called gray because there were no intelligentsia on it. At this time, the cowardly intelligentsia sat in cellars and basements, trembling for their lives or being mean to the commissars, signing up for service in the Soviets or trying to get a job in innocent institutions for education, food and finance. She had no time for elections this time Time of Troubles, when both voters and deputies risked their heads. The circle was elected without party struggle, there was no time for that. The circle was chosen and elected to it exclusively by Cossacks who passionately wanted to save their native Don and were ready to give their lives for this. And these were not empty words, because after the elections, having sent their delegates, the electors themselves dismantled their weapons and went to save the Don. This Circle did not have a political face and had one goal - to save the Don from the Bolsheviks, at any cost and at any cost. He was truly popular, meek, wise and businesslike. And this gray, from overcoat and coat cloth, that is, truly democratic, the Don saved the people's mind. Already by the time the full military circle was convened on August 15, 1918, the Don land was cleared of the Bolsheviks.

The second urgent task for the Don was to resolve relations with the Germans who occupied Ukraine and the western part of the lands of the Don Army. Ukraine also laid claim to the German-occupied Don lands: Donbass, Taganrog and Rostov. The attitude towards the Germans and towards Ukraine was the most pressing issue, and on April 29 the Circle decided to send a plenipotentiary embassy to the Germans in Kyiv in order to find out the reasons for their appearance on the territory of the Don. The negotiations took place in calm conditions. The Germans stated that they were not going to occupy the region and promised to clear the occupied villages, which they soon did. On the same day, the Circle decided to organize a real army, not from partisans, volunteers or vigilantes, but obeying laws and discipline. What Ataman Kaledin with his government and the Circle, consisting of talkative intellectuals, had been stomping around for almost a year, the gray Circle for saving the Don decided at two meetings. The Don Army was still only a project, and the command of the Volunteer Army already wanted to crush it under itself. But Krug answered clearly and specifically: “The supreme command of all military forces, without exception, operating on the territory of the Don Army must belong to the military ataman...”. This answer did not satisfy Denikin; he wanted to have large reinforcements of people and material in the person of the Don Cossacks, and not to have a “allied” army nearby. The circle worked intensively, meetings were held in the morning and evening. He was in a hurry to restore order and was not afraid of reproaches for his desire to return to the old regime. On May 1, the Circle decided: “Unlike the Bolshevik gangs, which do not wear any external insignia, all units participating in the defense of the Don must immediately take on their military appearance and wear shoulder straps and other insignia.” On May 3, as a result of a closed vote, Major General P.N. was elected military chieftain by 107 votes (13 against, 10 abstained). Krasnov. General Krasnov did not accept this election before the Circle adopted the laws that he considered necessary to introduce into the Donskoy army in order to be able to fulfill the tasks assigned to him by the Circle. Krasnov said at the Circle: “Creativity has never been the lot of the team. Raphael's Madonna was created by Raphael, and not by a committee of artists... You are the owners of the Don land, I am your manager. It's all about trust. If you trust me, you accept the laws I propose; if you do not accept them, it means that you do not trust me, you are afraid that I will use the power given to you to the detriment of the army. Then we have nothing to talk about. I cannot lead the army without your complete trust.” When asked by one of the members of the Circle whether he could suggest changing or altering anything in the laws proposed by the ataman, Krasnov replied: “You can. Articles 48,49,50. You can propose any flag except red, any coat of arms except the Jewish five-pointed star, any anthem except the international..." The very next day the Circle reviewed all the laws proposed by the ataman and adopted them. The circle restored the ancient pre-Petrine title “The Great Don Army”. The laws were an almost complete copy of the basic laws of the Russian Empire, with the difference that the rights and prerogatives of the emperor passed to... the ataman. And there was no time for sentimentality.

Before the eyes of the Don Rescue Circle stood the bloody ghosts of Ataman Kaledin, who had shot himself, and Ataman Nazarov, who had been shot. The Don lay in rubble, it was not only destroyed, but polluted by the Bolsheviks, and the German horses drank the water of the Quiet Don, a river sacred to the Cossacks. The work of the previous Circles led to this, with the decisions of which Kaledin and Nazarov fought, but could not win because they had no power. But these laws created many enemies for the chieftain. As soon as the Bolsheviks were expelled, the intelligentsia, hiding in cellars and basements, came out and started a liberal howl. These laws did not satisfy Denikin either, who saw in them a desire for independence. On May 5, the Circle dispersed, and the ataman was left alone to rule the army. That same evening, his adjutant Yesaul Kulgavov went to Kyiv with handwritten letters to Hetman Skoropadsky and Emperor Wilhelm. The result of the letter was that on May 8, a German delegation came to the ataman, with a statement that the Germans did not pursue any aggressive goals in relation to the Don and would leave Rostov and Taganrog as soon as they saw that complete order had been restored in the Don region. On May 9, Krasnov met with the Kuban ataman Filimonov and the Georgian delegation, and on May 15 in the village of Manychskaya with Alekseev and Denikin. The meeting revealed deep differences between the Don Ataman and the command of the Don Army in both tactics and strategy in the fight against the Bolsheviks. The goal of the rebel Cossacks was to liberate the land of the Don Army from the Bolsheviks. They had no further intentions of waging war outside their territory.

Rice. 3 Ataman Krasnov P.N.

By the time of the occupation of Novocherkassk and the election of the ataman by the Circle for the Salvation of the Don, all armed forces consisted of six infantry and two cavalry regiments different numbers. The junior officers were from the villages and were good, but there was a shortage of hundred and regimental commanders. Having experienced many insults and humiliations during the revolution, many senior commanders at first had distrust of the Cossack movement. The Cossacks were dressed in their semi-military dress, but boots were missing. Up to 30% were dressed in poles and bast shoes. Most wore shoulder straps, and everyone wore white stripes on their caps and hats to distinguish them from the Red Guard. The discipline was fraternal, the officers ate from the same pot with the Cossacks, because they were most often relatives. The headquarters were small; for economic purposes, the regiments had several public figures from the villages who resolved all logistical issues. The battle was fleeting. No trenches or fortifications were built. There were few entrenching tools, and natural laziness prevented the Cossacks from digging in. The tactics were simple. At dawn they began to attack in liquid chains. At this time, an outflanking column was moving along an intricate route towards the enemy’s flank and rear. If the enemy was ten times stronger, it was considered normal for an offensive. As soon as a bypass column appeared, the Reds began to retreat and then the Cossack cavalry rushed at them with a wild, soul-chilling whoop, knocked them over and took them prisoner. Sometimes the battle began with a feigned retreat of twenty versts (this is an old Cossack venter). The Reds rushed to pursue, and at this time the encircling columns closed behind them and the enemy found themselves in a fire pocket. With such tactics, Colonel Guselshchikov with regiments of 2-3 thousand people smashed and captured entire Red Guard divisions of 10-15 thousand people with convoys and artillery. Cossack custom required that officers go in front, so their losses were very high. For example, the division commander, General Mamantov, was wounded three times and still in chains. In the attack, the Cossacks were merciless, and they were also merciless towards the captured Red Guards. They were especially harsh towards captured Cossacks, who were considered traitors to the Don. Here the father used to sentence his son to death and did not want to say goodbye to him. It also happened the other way around. At this time, echelons of Red troops were still moving across the Don territory, fleeing to the east. But in June the railway line was cleared of the Reds, and in July, after the Bolsheviks were expelled from the Khopyorsky district, the entire territory of the Don was liberated from the Reds by the Cossacks themselves.

In other Cossack regions the situation was no easier than on the Don. The situation was especially difficult among the Caucasian tribes, where the Russian population was scattered. The North Caucasus was raging. The fall of the central government caused a shock more serious here than anywhere else. Reconciled royal power, but not having outlived the centuries-old strife and not having forgotten the old grievances, the mixed-tribal population became agitated. The Russian element that united it, about 40% of the population consisted of two equal groups, Terek Cossacks and non-residents. But these groups were separated social conditions, settled their land scores and could not counter the Bolshevik danger with unity and strength. While Ataman Karaulov was alive, several Terek regiments and some ghost of power remained. On December 13, at the Prokhladnaya station, a crowd of Bolshevik soldiers, on the orders of the Vladikavkaz Soviet of Deputies, unhooked the ataman’s carriage, drove it to a distant dead end and opened fire on the carriage. Karaulov was killed. In fact, on the Terek, power passed to local councils and bands of soldiers of the Caucasian Front, who flowed in a continuous stream from the Transcaucasus and, not being able to penetrate further into their native places, due to the complete blockage of the Caucasian highways, settled like locusts across the Terek-Dagestan region. They terrorized the population, planted new councils or hired themselves into the service of existing ones, bringing fear, blood and destruction everywhere. This flow served as the most powerful conductor of Bolshevism, which swept the nonresident Russian population (due to the thirst for land), touched the Cossack intelligentsia (due to the thirst for power) and greatly confused the Terek Cossacks (due to the fear of “going against the people”). As for the mountaineers, they were extremely conservative in their way of life, which very little reflected social and land inequality. True to their customs and traditions, they were governed by their national councils and were alien to the ideas of Bolshevism. But the mountaineers quickly and willingly accepted the practical aspects of central anarchy and intensified violence and robbery. By disarming the passing troop trains, they had a lot of weapons and ammunition. On the basis of the Caucasian Native Corps, they formed national military formations.

Rice. 4 Cossack regions of Russia

After the death of Ataman Karaulov, an overwhelming struggle with the Bolshevik detachments that filled the region and the aggravation of controversial issues with neighbors - Kabardians, Chechens, Ossetians, Ingush - the Terek Army was turned into a republic, part of the RSFSR. Quantitatively, Terek Cossacks in the Terek region made up 20% of the population, nonresidents - 20%, Ossetians - 17%, Chechens - 16%, Kabardians - 12% and Ingush - 4%. The most active among other peoples were the smallest - the Ingush, who fielded a strong and well-armed detachment. They robbed everyone and kept Vladikavkaz in constant fear, which they captured and plundered in January. When Soviet power was established in Dagestan, as well as on the Terek, on March 9, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars set its first goal to break the Terek Cossacks, destroying their special advantages. Armed expeditions of mountaineers were sent to the villages, robberies, violence and murders were carried out, lands were taken away and handed over to the Ingush and Chechens. In this difficult situation, the Terek Cossacks lost heart. While the mountain peoples created their armed forces through improvisation, the natural Cossack army, which had 12 well-organized regiments, disintegrated, dispersed and disarmed at the request of the Bolsheviks. However, the excesses of the Reds led to the fact that on June 18, 1918, the uprising of the Terek Cossacks began under the leadership of Bicherakhov. The Cossacks defeat the Red troops and blockade their remnants in Grozny and Kizlyar. On July 20, in Mozdok, the Cossacks were convened for a congress, at which they decided on an armed uprising against Soviet power. The Terets established contact with the command of the Volunteer Army, the Terek Cossacks created a combat detachment of up to 12,000 people with 40 guns and resolutely took the path of fighting the Bolsheviks.

The Orenburg Army under the command of Ataman Dutov, the first to declare independence from the power of the Soviets, was the first to be invaded by detachments of workers and red soldiers, who began robbery and repression. Veteran of the fight against the Soviets, Orenburg Cossack General I.G. Akulinin recalled: “The stupid and cruel policy of the Bolsheviks, their undisguised hatred of the Cossacks, the desecration of Cossack shrines and, especially, bloody massacres, requisitions, indemnities and robbery in the villages - all this opened their eyes to the essence of Soviet power and forced them to take up arms. . The Bolsheviks could not lure the Cossacks with anything. The Cossacks had land, and they regained their freedom in the form of the broadest self-government in the first days of the February Revolution.” A turning point gradually occurred in the mood of the ordinary and front-line Cossacks, they began to speak out more and more actively against violence and tyranny new government. If in January 1918, Ataman Dutov, under pressure from Soviet troops, left Orenburg, and he had barely three hundred active fighters left, then on the night of April 4, sleeping Orenburg was raided by more than 1,000 Cossacks, and on July 3, power was restored in Orenburg passed into the hands of the ataman.

Fig.5 Ataman Dutov

In the area of ​​the Ural Cossacks, the resistance was more successful, despite the small number of the Troops. Uralsk was not occupied by the Bolsheviks. Ural Cossacks from the beginning of the birth of Bolshevism, they did not accept its ideology and back in March they easily dispersed the local Bolshevik revolutionary committees. The main reasons were that among the Urals there were no non-residents, there was a lot of land, and the Cossacks were Old Believers who more strictly guarded their religious and moral principles. The Cossack regions of Asian Russia generally occupied a special position. All of them were small in composition, most of them were historically formed in special conditions by state measures, for the purposes of state necessity, and their historical existence was determined by insignificant periods. Despite the fact that these troops did not have firmly established Cossack traditions, foundations and skills for forms of statehood, they all turned out to be hostile to the approaching Bolshevism. In mid-April 1918, the troops of Ataman Semyonov, about 1000 bayonets and sabers, went on the offensive from Manchuria to Transbaikalia, against 5.5 thousand for the Reds. At the same time, the uprising of the Transbaikal Cossacks began. By May, Semenov’s troops approached Chita, but were unable to take it immediately. The battles between Semyonov’s Cossacks and the red detachments, consisting mainly of former political prisoners and captured Hungarians, in Transbaikalia took place with varying degrees of success. However, at the end of July, the Cossacks defeated the Red troops and took Chita on August 28. Soon the Amur Cossacks drove the Bolsheviks out of their capital Blagoveshchensk, and the Ussuri Cossacks took Khabarovsk. Thus, under the command of their atamans: Transbaikal - Semenov, Ussuri - Kalmykov, Semirechensky - Annenkov, Ural - Tolstov, Siberian - Ivanov, Orenburg - Dutov, Astrakhan - Prince Tundutov, they entered into a decisive battle. In the fight against the Bolsheviks, the Cossack regions fought exclusively for their lands and law and order, and their actions, according to historians, were in the nature of a guerrilla war.

Rice. 6 White Cossacks

A huge role along the entire length of the Siberian railway was played by the troops of the Czechoslovak legions, formed by the Russian government from Czech and Slovak prisoners of war, numbering up to 45,000 people. By the beginning of the revolution, the Czech corps stood in the rear of the Southwestern Front in Ukraine. In the eyes of the Austro-Germans, legionnaires, like former prisoners of war, were traitors. When the Germans attacked Ukraine in March 1918, the Czechs offered strong resistance to them, but most Czechs did not see their place in Soviet Russia and wanted to return to the European front. According to the agreement with the Bolsheviks, Czech trains were sent towards Siberia to board ships in Vladivostok and send them to Europe. In addition to the Czechoslovaks, there were many captured Hungarians in Russia, who mostly sympathized with the Reds. The Czechoslovakians had a centuries-old and fierce hostility and enmity with the Hungarians (how can one not recall the immortal works of J. Hasek in this regard). Due to fear of attacks on the way by the Hungarian Red units, the Czechs resolutely refused to obey the Bolshevik order to surrender all weapons, which is why it was decided to disperse the Czech legions. They were divided into four groups with a distance between groups of echelons of 1000 kilometers, so that the echelons with Czechs stretched throughout Siberia from the Volga to Transbaikalia. The Czech legions played a colossal role in the Russian civil war, since after their rebellion the fight against the Soviets sharply intensified.

Rice. 7 Czech Legion on the way along the Trans-Siberian Railway

Despite the agreements, there were considerable misunderstandings in the relations between the Czechs, Hungarians and local revolutionary committees. As a result, on May 25, 1918, 4.5 thousand Czechs rebelled in Mariinsk, and on May 26, the Hungarians provoked an uprising of 8.8 thousand Czechs in Chelyabinsk. Then, with the support of Czechoslovak troops, the Bolshevik government was overthrown on May 26 in Novonikolaevsk, May 29 in Penza, May 30 in Syzran, May 31 in Tomsk and Kurgan, June 7 in Omsk, June 8 in Samara and June 18 in Krasnoyarsk. The formation of Russian combat units began in the liberated areas. On July 5, Russian and Czechoslovak troops occupy Ufa, and on July 25 they take Yekaterinburg. At the end of 1918, the Czechoslovak legionnaires themselves began a gradual retreat to the Far East. But, having participated in battles in Kolchak’s army, they would finally finish their retreat and leave Vladivostok for France only at the beginning of 1920. In such conditions, the Russian White movement began in the Volga region and Siberia, not counting the independent actions of the Ural and Orenburg Cossack troops, which began the fight against the Bolsheviks immediately after they came to power. On June 8, the Committee of the Constituent Assembly (Komuch) was created in Samara, liberated from the Reds. He declared himself a temporary revolutionary government, which was supposed to spread over the entire territory of Russia and transfer control of the country to a legally elected Constituent Assembly. The rising population of the Volga region began a successful struggle against the Bolsheviks, but in the liberated places control ended up in the hands of the fleeing fragments of the Provisional Government. These heirs and participants in destructive activities, having formed a government, carried out the same destructive work. At the same time, Komuch created his own armed forces - the People's Army. On June 9, Lieutenant Colonel Kappel began commanding a detachment of 350 people in Samara. In mid-June, the replenished detachment took Syzran, Stavropol Volzhsky (now Togliatti), and also inflicted a heavy defeat on the Reds near Melekes. On July 21, Kappel takes Simbirsk, defeating the superior forces of the Soviet commander Guy defending the city. As a result, by the beginning of August 1918, the territory of the Constituent Assembly extended from west to east for 750 versts from Syzran to Zlatoust, from north to south for 500 versts from Simbirsk to Volsk. On August 7, Kappel’s troops, having previously defeated the red river flotilla that came out to meet them at the mouth of the Kama, take Kazan. There they seize part of the gold reserves of the Russian Empire (650 million gold rubles in coins, 100 million rubles in credit notes, gold bars, platinum and other valuables), as well as huge warehouses with weapons, ammunition, medicines, and ammunition. This gave the Samara government a solid financial and material base. With the capture of Kazan into the anti-Bolshevik camp in in full force The Academy of the General Staff, located in the city, headed by General A.I. Andogsky, is transferred.

Rice. 8 Hero of Komuch Lieutenant Colonel Kappel V.O.

A government of industrialists was formed in Yekaterinburg, a Siberian government was formed in Omsk, and the government of Ataman Semyonov, who led the Transbaikal Army, was formed in Chita. The Allies dominated in Vladivostok. Then General Horvath arrived from Harbin, and as many as three authorities were formed: from the proteges of the Allies, General Horvath and from the railway board. Such fragmentation of the anti-Bolshevik front in the east required unification, and a meeting was convened in Ufa to select a single authoritative state power. The situation in the units of the anti-Bolshevik forces was unfavorable. The Czechs did not want to fight in Russia and demanded that they be sent to the European fronts against the Germans. There was no trust in the Siberian government and members of the Komuch among the troops and the people. In addition, the representative of England, General Knox, stated that until a firm government was created, the delivery of supplies from the British would be stopped. Under these conditions, Admiral Kolchak joined the government and in the fall he carried out a coup and was proclaimed head of government and supreme commander with the transfer of full power to him.

In the south of Russia events developed as follows. After the Reds occupied Novocherkassk in early 1918, the Volunteer Army retreated to Kuban. During the campaign to Ekaterinodar, the army, having endured all the difficulties of the winter campaign, later nicknamed the “ice campaign,” fought continuously. After the death of General Kornilov, who was killed near Yekaterinodar on March 31 (April 13), the army again made its way with a large number of prisoners to the territory of the Don, where by that time the Cossacks, who had rebelled against the Bolsheviks, had begun to clear their territory. Only by May the army found itself in conditions that allowed it to rest and replenish itself for the further fight against the Bolsheviks. Although the attitude of the Volunteer Army command towards the German army was irreconcilable, it, having no weapons, tearfully begged Ataman Krasnov to send the Volunteer Army weapons, shells and cartridges that it received from the German army. Ataman Krasnov, in his colorful expression, receiving military equipment from the hostile Germans, washed them in the clean waters of the Don and transferred part of the Volunteer Army. Kuban was still occupied by the Bolsheviks. In Kuban, the break with the center, which occurred on the Don due to the collapse of the Provisional Government, occurred earlier and more acutely. Back on October 5, with a strong protest from the Provisional Government, the regional Cossack Rada adopted a resolution on separating the region into an independent Kuban Republic. At the same time, the right to elect members of the self-government body was granted only to the Cossack, mountain population and old-time peasants, that is, almost half of the region’s population was deprived of voting rights. A military ataman, Colonel Filimonov, was placed at the head of the socialist government. The discord between the Cossack and nonresident populations took on increasingly acute forms. Not only the nonresident population, but also the front-line Cossacks stood up against the Rada and the government. Bolshevism came to this mass. The Kuban units returning from the front did not go to war against the government, did not want to fight the Bolsheviks and did not follow the orders of their elected authorities. An attempt, following the example of Don, to create a government based on “parity” ended in the same way, paralysis of power. Everywhere, in every village and village, the Red Guard from outside the city gathered, and they were joined by a part of the Cossack front-line soldiers, who were poorly subordinate to the center, but followed exactly its policy. These undisciplined, but well-armed and violent gangs began to impose Soviet power, redistribute land, confiscate grain surpluses and socialize, and simply rob wealthy Cossacks and behead the Cossacks - persecute officers, non-Bolshevik intelligentsia, priests, and authoritative old men. And above all, to disarmament. It is worthy of surprise with what complete non-resistance the Cossack villages, regiments and batteries gave up their rifles, machine guns, and guns. When the villages of the Yeisk department rebelled at the end of April, it was a completely unarmed militia. The Cossacks had no more than 10 rifles per hundred; the rest were armed with what they could. Some attached daggers or scythes to long sticks, others took pitchforks, others took spears, and others simply shovels and axes. Punitive detachments with... Cossack weapons came out against defenseless villages. By the beginning of April, all non-resident villages and 85 out of 87 villages were Bolshevik. But the Bolshevism of the villages was purely external. Often only the names changed: the ataman became a commissar, the village assembly became a council, the village board became an iskom.

Where executive committees were captured by non-residents, their decisions were sabotaged, re-elected every week. There was a stubborn, but passive, without inspiration or enthusiasm, struggle between the age-old way of Cossack democracy and life with the new government. There was a desire to preserve Cossack democracy, but there was no courage. All this, in addition, was heavily implicated in the pro-Ukrainian separatism of some Cossacks who had Dnieper roots. The pro-Ukrainian figure Luka Bych, who headed the Rada, declared: “Helping the Volunteer Army means preparing for the reabsorption of Kuban by Russia.” Under these conditions, Ataman Shkuro gathered the first partisan detachment, located in the Stavropol region, where the Council was meeting, intensified the struggle and presented the Council with an ultimatum. The uprising of the Kuban Cossacks quickly gained strength. In June, the 8,000-strong Volunteer Army began its second campaign against Kuban, which had completely rebelled against the Bolsheviks. This time White was lucky. General Denikin successively defeated Kalnin’s 30,000-strong army near Belaya Glina and Tikhoretskaya, then in a fierce battle near Yekaterinodar, Sorokin’s 30,000-strong army. On July 21, the Whites occupied Stavropol, and on August 17, Ekaterinodar. Blocked on the Taman Peninsula, a 30,000-strong group of Reds under the command of Kovtyukh, the so-called “Taman Army,” along the Black Sea coast fought its way across the Kuban River, where the remnants of the defeated armies of Kalnin and Sorokin fled. By the end of August, the territory of the Kuban army is completely cleared of the Bolsheviks, and the strength of the White Army reaches 40 thousand bayonets and sabers. However, having entered the territory of Kuban, Denikin issued a decree addressed to the Kuban ataman and the government, demanding:
- full tension on the part of Kuban for its speedy liberation from the Bolsheviks
- all priority units of the Kuban military forces should henceforth be part of the Volunteer Army to carry out national tasks
- in the future, no separatism should be shown on the part of the liberated Kuban Cossacks.

Such gross interference by the command of the Volunteer Army in the internal affairs of the Kuban Cossacks had a negative impact. General Denikin led an army that had no defined territory, no people under his control, and, even worse, no political ideology. The commander of the Don Army, General Denisov, even called the volunteers “wandering musicians” in his hearts. General Denikin's ideas were oriented towards armed struggle. Not having sufficient means for this, General Denikin demanded the subordination of the Cossack regions of the Don and Kuban to him in order to fight. Don was in better conditions and was not at all bound by Denikin’s instructions. The German army was perceived on the Don as a real force that contributed to getting rid of Bolshevik domination and terror. The Don government entered into contact with German command and established fruitful cooperation. Relations with the Germans resulted in a purely business form. The rate of the German mark was set at 75 kopecks of the Don currency, a price was made for a Russian rifle with 30 rounds of one pound of wheat or rye, and other supply agreements were concluded. From the German army through Kiev in the first month and a half the Don Army received: 11,651 rifles, 88 machine guns, 46 guns, 109 thousand artillery shells, 11.5 million rifle cartridges, of which 35 thousand artillery shells and about 3 million rifle cartridges. At the same time, all the shame of peaceful relations with an irreconcilable enemy fell solely on Ataman Krasnov. As for the Supreme Command, according to the laws of the Don Army, it could only belong to the Military Ataman, and before his election - to the marching Ataman. This discrepancy led to the Don demanding the return of all the Don people from the Dorovol army. The relationship between the Don and the Good Army became not an alliance, but a relationship of fellow travelers.

In addition to tactics, there were also great differences within the white movement in strategy, policy and war goals. The goal of the Cossack masses was to liberate their land from the Bolshevik invasion, establish order in their region and provide the Russian people with the opportunity to arrange their destiny according to their own wishes. Meanwhile, the forms of civil war and the organization of the armed forces returned the art of war to the era of the 19th century. The successes of the troops then depended solely on the qualities of the commander who directly controlled the troops. Good commanders of the 19th century did not scatter the main forces, but directed them towards one main goal: the capture of the enemy’s political center. With the capture of the center, the government of the country is paralyzed and the conduct of the war becomes more complicated. The Council of People's Commissars, sitting in Moscow, was in extremely difficult conditions, reminiscent of the situation in Muscovite Rus' in the 14th-15th centuries, limited by the Oka and Volga rivers. Moscow was cut off from all types of supplies, and the goals of the Soviet rulers were reduced to obtaining basic food supplies and a piece of daily bread. In the pathetic calls of the leaders there were no longer any high motives emanating from the ideas of Marx; they sounded cynical, figurative and simple, as they once sounded in the speeches of the people's leader Pugachev: “Go, take everything and destroy everyone who stands in your way.” . People's Commissar of Military and Marine Bronstein (Trotsky), in his speech on June 9, 1918, indicated simple and clear goals: “Comrades! Among all the questions that trouble our hearts, there is one simple question - the question of our daily bread. All our thoughts, all our ideals are now dominated by one concern, one anxiety: how to survive tomorrow. Everyone involuntarily thinks about himself, about his family... My task is not at all to conduct only one campaign among you. We need to have a serious conversation about the country's food situation. According to our statistics, in 17, there was a surplus of grain in those places that produce and export grain, there were 882,000,000 poods. On the other hand, there are areas in the country where there is not enough of their own bread. If you calculate, it turns out that they are missing 322,000,000 poods. Therefore, in one part of the country there is a surplus of 882,000,000 pounds, and in the other, 322,000,000 pounds are not enough...

In the North Caucasus alone there is now a grain surplus of no less than 140,000,000 poods; in order to satisfy hunger, we need 15,000,000 poods per month for the whole country. Just think: 140,000,000 poods of surplus located only in the North Caucasus may be enough for ten months for the entire country. ...Let each of you now promise to provide immediate practical assistance so that we can organize a campaign for bread.” In fact, it was a direct call for robbery. Thanks to the complete absence of glasnost, the paralysis of public life and the complete fragmentation of the country, the Bolsheviks promoted people to leadership positions for whom, under normal conditions, there was only one place - prison. In such conditions, the task of the white command in the fight against the Bolsheviks should have had the shortest goal of capturing Moscow, without being distracted by any other secondary tasks. And to accomplish this main task it was necessary to attract the broadest sections of the people, primarily peasants. In reality, it was the other way around. The volunteer army, instead of marching on Moscow, was firmly stuck in the North Caucasus; the white Ural-Siberian troops could not cross the Volga. All revolutionary changes beneficial to the peasants and people, economic and political, were not recognized by the whites. The first step of their civilian representatives in the liberated territory was a decree that canceled all orders issued by the Provisional Government and the Council of People's Commissars, including those relating to property relations. General Denikin, having absolutely no plan for establishing a new order capable of satisfying the population, consciously or unconsciously, wanted to return Rus' to its original pre-revolutionary position, and the peasants were obliged to pay for the seized lands to their former owners. After this, could the whites count on the peasants supporting their activities? Of course not. The Cossacks refused to go beyond the Donskoy army. And they were right. Voronezh, Saratov and other peasants not only did not fight the Bolsheviks, but also went against the Cossacks. The Cossacks, not without difficulty, were able to cope with their Don peasants and non-residents, but they could not defeat the entire peasantry of central Russia and they understood this perfectly well.

As Russian and non-Russian history shows us, when fundamental changes and decisions are required, we need not just people, but extraordinary individuals, who, unfortunately, were not there during the Russian timelessness. The country needed a government capable of not only issuing decrees, but also having the intelligence and authority to ensure that these decrees were carried out by the people, preferably voluntarily. Such power does not depend on state forms, but is based, as a rule, solely on the abilities and authority of the leader. Bonaparte, having established power, did not look for any forms, but managed to force him to obey his will. He forced both representatives of the royal nobility and people from the sans-culottes to serve France. There were no such consolidating personalities in the white and red movements, and this led to an incredible split and bitterness in the ensuing civil war. But that's a completely different story.

Materials used:
Gordeev A.A. - History of the Cossacks
Mamonov V.F. and others - History of the Cossacks of the Urals. Orenburg-Chelyabinsk 1992
Shibanov N.S. – Orenburg Cossacks of the 20th century
Ryzhkova N.V. - Don Cossacks in the wars of the early twentieth century - 2008
Brusilov A.A. My memories. Voenizdat. M.1983
Krasnov P.N. The Great Don Army. "Patriot" M.1990
Lukomsky A.S. The birth of the Volunteer Army.M.1926
Denikin A.I. How the fight against the Bolsheviks began in the south of Russia. M. 1926

Mass uprising of Cossacks against Soviet power. The first transformations of the new government were directed against the Cossacks. Some Cossack troops, such as the Amur, Astrakhan, Orenburg, Semirechenskoye, Transbaikal, were declared abolished. The local Soviet authorities deprived the Cossacks of the Semirechensky army of their voting rights. Conflicts between the Cossack and non-Cossack populations over Cossack land intensified. Extrajudicial reprisals against Cossack officers began.
The Cossacks begin to gather in detachments and wage partisan warfare. In April 1918, a massive Cossack uprising broke out in the largest army - the Don. At the same time, the struggle flared up in the Urals, and a Cossack uprising broke out in Transbaikalia and Semirechye. The fight is going on with varying degrees of success. But the advance of German troops along the Black Sea and Azov coasts and the uprising of the Czechoslovak Corps on the railway line from the Volga to the Far East distracted the Bolshevik forces.
In the summer of 1918, the Don Cossacks, led by Ataman P.N. Krasnov occupy the entire territory of the Don and, together with the Volunteer Army of General A.I. Denikin helps the rebel Kuban Cossacks. In August 1918, the Astrakhan Cossacks joined the uprising.

In June 1918, the Cossack uprising began on the Terek. By November, the Bolsheviks manage to defeat the rebel forces, but in December the Kuban people and the Volunteer Army come to their aid. Cossack power is established on the Terek, headed by Ataman Vdovenko.
In July 1918, Orenburg Cossacks occupied Orenburg. Atamans Krasilnikov, Annenkov, Ivanov-Rinov, Yarushin take control of the Siberian and Semirechensk troops. Transbaikal residents unite around Ataman Semenov, Ussuri residents around Kalmykov. In September, the Amur Cossacks, together with the Japanese, occupied Blagoveshchensk.
Thus, by the autumn of 1918, most of the Cossack troops liberated their territories and established their military power there.
Cossack state formations. On the territory of the oldest Cossack troops, which have experience of independence and self-government, bodies of the old Cossack power spontaneously arise. The picture is not yet clear future Russia, some Cossack troops announce the creation of their own state entities, state attributes, and standing armies. The largest state formation among all the Cossack troops becomes the “All-Great Don Army,” which deploys a 95,000-strong army to the borders of the Don.

The Kuban people, their Ukrainian-speaking part, go the furthest in their desire for independence. The delegation of the Kuban Rada is trying to achieve recognition by the League of Nations that Kuban is an independent state.
However, the struggle dictates that the Cossack governments need to unite with the White Guard armies fighting for “One, Great and Indivisible Russia.” The Kuban and Tertsy people are fighting as part of the Volunteer Army of General A.I. Denikin. In January 1919, the Don Cossacks recognized Denikin’s supremacy. It is the Cossacks in the South of Russia who give mass strength to the “white” movement. The Bolsheviks call their Southern Front “Cossack.”
At the end of 1918, the power of Admiral A.V. was recognized. Kolchak Orenburg and Ural residents. After some bickering, Ataman Semenov recognizes Kolchak’s power. The Siberians were Kolchak’s reliable support.
Being recognized as the “Supreme Ruler of Russia”, A.V. Kolchak appointed Ataman Dutov as the Supreme Marching Ataman of all Cossack troops.
"Red" Cossacks. In the fight against Soviet power, the Cossacks were not united. Some of the Cossacks, mostly the poor, sided with the Bolsheviks. By the end of 1918, it became obvious that in almost every army, approximately 80% of the combat-ready Cossacks were fighting the Bolsheviks and about 20% were fighting on the side of the Bolsheviks.

The Bolsheviks create Cossack regiments, often on the basis of old regiments of the tsarist army. Thus, on the Don, the majority of the Cossacks of the 1st, 15th and 32nd Don Regiments went to the Red Army.
In battles, the Red Cossacks emerged as the best fighting units of the Bolsheviks. On the Don, the Red Cossack commanders F. Mironov and K. Bulatkin are extremely popular. In Kuban -I. Kochubey, Y. Balakhonov. The Red Orenburg Cossacks are commanded by the Kashirin brothers.
In the east of the country, many Transbaikal and Amur Cossacks are drawn into the partisan war against Kolchak and the Japanese.
The Soviet leadership is trying to further split the Cossacks. To guide the Red Cossacks and for propaganda purposes - to show that not all Cossacks are against Soviet power, a Cossack department is being created under the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.
As the Cossack military governments became more and more dependent on the “white” generals, the Cossacks, individually and in groups, went over to the side of the Bolsheviks. By the beginning of 1920, when Kolchak and Denikin were defeated, the transitions became widespread. Entire divisions of Cossacks are beginning to be created in the Red Army. Especially many Cossacks joined the Red Army when the White Guards evacuated to the Crimea and abandoned tens of thousands of Donetsk and Kuban residents on the Black Sea coast. Most of the abandoned Cossacks are enlisted in the Red Army and sent to the Polish front.

Cossack Don: Five centuries military glory author unknown

Don Cossacks in the Civil War

On April 9, 1918, the Congress of Soviets of Workers, Peasants, Soldiers and Cossacks of the Don Republic met in Rostov, which elected the highest bodies local authorities– CEC chaired by V.S. Kovalev and the Don Council of People's Commissars, chaired by F.G. Podtelkova.

Podtelkov Fedor Grigorievich (1886–1918), Cossack of the village of Ust-Khoperskaya. An active participant in the establishment of Soviet power on the Don at the initial stage of the Civil War. In January 1918 F.G. Podtelkov was elected chairman of the Don Cossack Military Revolutionary Committee, and in April of the same year at the First Congress of Soviets of the Don Region - chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Don Soviet Republic. In May 1918, the detachment of F.G. Podtelkova, who carried out the forced mobilization of the Cossacks of the northern districts of the Don region into the Red Army, was surrounded and captured by the Cossacks who rebelled against Soviet power. F.G. Podtelkov was sentenced to death and hanged.

Both Kovalev and Podtelkov were Cossacks. The Bolsheviks specifically nominated them to show that they were not opposed to the Cossacks. However, real power in Rostov was in the hands of local Bolsheviks, who relied on Red Guard detachments of workers, miners, nonresidents and peasants.

Wholesale searches and requisitions took place in the cities, officers, cadets and all others who were suspected of having connections with the partisans were shot. As spring approached, peasants began to seize and redistribute landowners' and military reserve lands. In some places spare village lands were captured.

The Cossacks could not stand it. With the beginning of spring, still scattered Cossack uprisings broke out in individual villages. Having learned about them, the Marching Ataman Popov led his “Detachment of Free Don Cossacks” from the Salsky steppes to the north, to the Don, to join the rebels.

While the Marching Ataman led his detachment to unite with the Cossacks of the rebel Suvorov village, the Cossacks rebelled near Novocherkassk. The Krivyanskaya village was the first to rise. Its Cossacks, under the command of military foreman Fetisov, broke into Novocherkassk and drove out the Bolsheviks. In Novocherkassk, the Cossacks created the Provisional Don Government, which included ordinary Cossacks with a rank no higher than a constable. But it was not possible to hold Novocherkassk then. Under the blows of Bolshevik detachments from Rostov, the Cossacks retreated to the village of Zaplavskaya and fortified themselves here, taking advantage of the spring flood of the Don. Here, in Zaplavskaya, they began to accumulate forces and form the Don Army.

Having united with the detachment of the Marching Ataman, the Provisional Don Government transferred P.Kh. Popov received all military power and united military forces. With the next assault on May 6, Novocherkassk was taken, and on May 8, the Cossacks, with the support of Colonel Drozdovsky’s detachment, repelled the Bolshevik counter-offensive and defended the city.

F.G. Podtelkov (standing on the right) (ROMK)

By mid-May 1918, only 10 villages were in the hands of the rebels, but the uprising was rapidly expanding. The government of the Don Soviet Republic fled to the village of Velikoknyazheskaya.

On May 11, in Novocherkassk, the rebel Cossacks opened the Don Rescue Circle. The circle elected a new Don Ataman. Pyotr Nikolaevich Krasnov was elected as such. In the pre-war years, Krasnov established himself as a talented writer and an excellent officer. During the First World War P.N. Krasnov emerged as one of the best cavalry generals in the Russian army, and went through the military path from regiment commander to corps commander.

The region of the Don Army was proclaimed a democratic republic under the name “The Great Don Army.” The highest authority on the Don remained the Great Military Circle, elected by all Cossacks, except those on emergency duty. military service. Cossack women received voting rights. In land policy, during the liquidation of landlord and private land ownership, land was first allocated to land-poor Cossack societies.

Sample document of the All-Great Don Army

In total, up to 94 thousand Cossacks were mobilized into the ranks of the troops to fight the Bolsheviks. Krasnov was considered the supreme leader of the Don armed forces. The Don Army was directly commanded by General S.V. Denisov.

The Don Army was divided into the “Young Army”, which began to be formed from young Cossacks who had not previously served and had not been at the front, and into the “Mobilized Army” from Cossacks of all other ages. The “Young Army” was supposed to be deployed from 12 cavalry and 4 foot regiments, trained in the Novocherkassk region and kept in reserve as the last reserve for a future campaign against Moscow. The “mobilized army” was formed in the districts. It was assumed that each village would field one regiment. But the villages on the Don were of different sizes, some could field a regiment or even two, others could field only a few hundred. Nevertheless, the total number of regiments in the Don Army was brought to 100 with great effort.

In order to supply such an army with weapons and ammunition, Krasnov was forced to make contact with the Germans who were stationed in the western regions of the region. Krasnov promised them the neutrality of the Don in the ongoing world war, and for this he offered to establish “correct trade.” The Germans received food on the Don, and in return supplied the Cossacks with Russian weapons and ammunition captured in Ukraine.

Feast of the Knights of St. George in the Officers' Assembly of Novocherkassk, late 1918 (NMIDC)

Krasnov himself did not consider the Germans allies. He openly said that the Germans were not allies of the Cossacks, that neither the Germans, nor the British, nor the French would save Russia, but would only ruin it and drench it in blood. Krasnov considered “volunteers” from the Kuban and Terek Cossacks who rebelled against the Bolsheviks as allies.

Krasnov considered the Bolsheviks to be obvious enemies. He said that as long as they are in power in Russia, the Don will not be part of Russia, but will live according to its own laws.

In August 1918, the Cossacks ousted the Bolsheviks from the territory of the region and began to occupy the borders.

The trouble was that the Don was not united in the fight against the Bolsheviks. Approximately 18% of combat-ready Don Cossacks supported the Bolsheviks. The Cossacks of the 1st, 4th, 5th, 15th, and 32nd Don regiments of the old army almost completely went over to their side. In total, the Don Cossacks made up approximately 20 regiments in the ranks of the Red Army. Prominent red military leaders emerged from among the Cossacks - F.K. Mironov, M.F. Blinov, K.F. Bulatkin.

Almost all of the Bolsheviks were supported by nonresident Don people, and Don peasants began to create their own units in the Red Army. It was from them that the famous red cavalry B.M. was created. Dumenko and S.M. Budyonny.

In general, the split on the Don was characterized by class. The overwhelming majority of Cossacks were against the Bolsheviks, and the overwhelming majority of non-Cossacks supported the Bolsheviks.

In November 1918, a revolution occurred in Germany. The First World War is over. The Germans began to return to their homeland. The supply of weapons and ammunition to the Don ceased.

In winter, the Bolsheviks, having mobilized a million-strong Red Army throughout the country, began an offensive to the west in order to break through to Europe and unleash a world revolution there, and to the south to finally suppress the Cossacks and “volunteers” who were preventing them from finally establishing themselves in Russia.

The Cossack regiments began to retreat. Many Cossacks, having passed their village, fell behind the regiment and remained at home. By the end of February, the Don Army rolled back from the north to the Donets and Manych. There were only 15 thousand fighters left in its ranks, and the same number of Cossacks were “hanging out” in the rear of the army. Krasnov, whom many saw as a German ally, resigned.

Confident in the invincibility of the Red Army, the Bolsheviks decided to crush the Cossacks once and for all and transfer the methods of “Red Terror” to the Don.

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IV. Don Cossacks at the beginning of the 20th century

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The Don Army at the beginning of the 20th century. Administrative structure, population, management, economy, land ownership. The region of the Don Army occupied a vast territory of about 3 thousand square miles. Administratively, it was divided into 9 districts:

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Don Cossacks and the Revolution of 1905–1907 Cossack units in the fight against revolutionary uprisings. The tragic events of January 9, 1905 in St. Petersburg became the prologue to the first Russian revolution. The Don Cossacks were practically involved in violent revolutionary cataclysms to one degree or another during the period between the February and October revolutions. The formation of the highest bodies of Cossack government on the Don. Already in March 1917, the Provisional Government, taking into account the prevailing sentiments among the Cossacks, began to consider the issue of

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Cossacks and the October Revolution Don army Cossacks and the Bolshevik uprising in Petrograd. By the time of the Bolshevik uprising in Petrograd in October 1917, the capital’s garrison included the 1st, 4th and 14th Don Cossack regiments with a total number of 3,200

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O.V. Ratushnyak

POLITICAL SEEKINGS OF THE DON AND KUBAN COSSACKS DURING THE YEARS OF THE CIVIL WAR IN RUSSIA (1918-1920)

Almanac " White Guard", No. 8. Cossacks of Russia in the White movement. M., “Posev”, 2005, pp. 17-23.

The civil war in Russia is one of the complex, multi-valued, internally contradictory topics of Russian historiography. Despite the fact that many researchers have repeatedly addressed it, there are still many debatable problems within its framework. Problems of this kind include identifying the reasons for the defeat of the White movement. Apparently, one of them is the contradictions within the anti-Bolshevik camp. To a large extent, this was facilitated by the desire of the Cossacks (at least a certain politically active part of them) to find their special way development. Consideration of various aspects of the political quest of the Don and Kuban Cossacks during the Civil War in Russia is the purpose of this article. The determining factors of this process include: the internal situation of the Cossack territories and regions, their relationships among themselves and with other participants in the anti-Bolshevik movement.

The Cossacks, once a symbol of freedom and liberty, eventually became one of the classes of the Russian Empire. The revolutionary events of 1917 did not spare the Cossack regions either. Like Russia as a whole, the Cossacks found themselves at a crossroads. The main issue in political life was the question of choosing a further path of development, which ultimately led to a fratricidal massacre. At the same time, the revolution and the Civil War did not so much split the country (as some researchers believe), but rather emphasized and revealed the contradictions that existed within Russian society as a whole and the Cossack regions as its component.

Factors that had an important influence on the course and results of the Civil War include, in particular, the stratification within the Cossacks and their relationship with the nonresident population of Cossack regions. One of the main reasons for the participation of the majority of Cossacks in the war on the side of the anti-Bolshevik forces was the desire to maintain their privileges. However, the duality of their position lay in the fact that, while defending their class privileges, the Cossacks fought against such remnants of feudalism as class duties. Apparently, this was one of the factors that initially the bulk of the Cossacks took a neutral attitude towards the Bolshevik government.

The Bolsheviks' promise to end the difficult, devastating world war, which weighed heavily on the Cossacks, who bore the brunt of it, had a particularly great influence on the Cossacks. Therefore, the Cossack units that came from the front and supported the Bolshevik slogan of peace did not interfere with the establishment of Soviet power in the Cossack regions. The Bolsheviks enjoyed the greatest sympathy among the poorest strata of the Cossacks. The favorable attitude of the Cossacks towards Soviet power was also facilitated by the fact that the long separation from the economic situation as a result of being at the front to some extent declassed part of the Cossacks, dulling the instinct of a small owner. 1 However, having initially relied on the nonresident population, the Bolshevik government prompted them to actively advocate for the redistribution of land. And here the Cossacks, who did not want to part with their class privileges, could not stand aside. Even the Don Revolutionary Committee, elected on January 23, 1918 in the village of Kamenskaya, and actually supported the Soviet government in its struggle against Ataman A.M. Kaledin, did not want to hear about the redistribution of land in favor of nonresidents. The members of the Committee “were very unfriendly to the claims of non-residents for a common division of the Don land and did not at all intend to end the general Cossack privileges.” 2

The same attitude towards the land issue was in Kuban. Here the regional government, trying not to aggravate relations with non-residents and the poorest part of the Cossacks, in every possible way delayed the solution to the agrarian problem. At first, the nonresident part of the population put up with this situation. Thus, at the congress of representatives from the settlements of the Kuban region, the faction of non-residents adopted an appeal to the Kuban Rada and military units, in which it was brought to their attention that “it does not intend to make any claims to the Cossack shared lands and to the Cossack military property, being convinced that the Constituent the meeting will find an opportunity to satisfy the urgent needs of the non-resident population of the region without violating the interests of the working Cossacks.” 3 However, the propaganda activities of the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, Socialist Revolutionaries and the October events of 1917 contributed to the activation of the nonresident population. In December 1917, the 2nd regional congress of representatives of Cossacks, non-residents and highlanders of the Kuban decided to abolish the planted payment. In February 1918, under pressure from the poorest Cossacks and part of the nonresident population, the Kuban Regional Rada was forced to publish the “Draft Rules for the Regulation of Land and Agricultural Relations in the Kuban Region.” But this could no longer prevent performances by out-of-towners. Unauthorized seizures and redistribution of land began throughout the region. The Executive Committee of the Soviets of the Kuban Region declared the Kuban Regional Rada and the Kuban government outlawed. Units of the 39th Infantry Division and detachments of local revolutionary forces launched an offensive aimed at overthrowing the Kuban government. Despite the unfolding events, the majority of the Cossacks took a wait-and-see attitude. This is confirmed by the facts that it allowed the dispersal of the small Military Circle in Novocherkassk, the expulsion of the Kuban Regional Rada and the government from Yekaterinodar, as well as the occupation of its territories by Soviet troops, which were resisted mainly by units of the nascent Volunteer Army.

The origins of the neutrality of the Cossacks are quite accurately revealed in his memoirs by A.I. Denikin: “The mood of the Don Cossacks has become clearer. They completely understand neither Bolshevism nor the Kornilovism. They agree with our explanations, but seem to have little faith. Well-fed, rich and, apparently, would like to benefit from both the “white” and “red” movements. Both ideologies are now still alien to the Cossacks, and most of all they are afraid of getting involved in internecine strife.” 4 This statement is also true of the Kuban Cossacks.

The attitude of the Cossacks towards Soviet power at the end of 1917 - beginning of 1918 is recorded in the memoirs of many eyewitnesses of those events, in particular A.P. Bogaevsky: “Poisoned by propaganda at the front, the combatant Cossacks calmly waited for Soviet power, sincerely or not believing that this was the real people’s power, which they, ordinary people, won't do anything bad. And if she destroys the former authorities - the ataman, generals, officers and, by the way, the landowners, so to hell with them... In general, the mood of the entire Cossacks en masse was not much different from the general mood of the Russian peasantry: the Cossacks had not yet experienced the whole charms Soviet control... The rest “kept neutral.” 5

Despite the fiery speeches of General L.G. Kornilov, the Cossacks did not join the ranks of the Volunteer Army. It was no less indifferent to calls to join the Kuban army, which was created by the Kuban regional government.

The policy of neutrality, characteristic of the bulk of the Cossacks in the first years of the civil war, appeared, according to A.A. Zaitsev, an expression of a certain psychology of the front-line Cossacks. The front-line Cossacks did not want to take up arms either against “their” wealthy villagers, or against non-residents with whom they were bound by ties of front-line brotherhood. 6

The Cossacks, tired of the war, and partly imbued with the spirit of Social Democratic and Socialist Revolutionary ideas, did not support the Volunteer Army. During the “Ice” campaign, the Cossacks, for the most part, greeted the volunteers “either with indifference or hostility.” 7

During the period from spring to autumn 1918 in the Don and Kuban there was a transition from the support of Soviet power by the poorest Cossacks, including front-line Cossacks, with the neutrality of the bulk of the middle peasants, to the opposition of the Bolsheviks by the majority of the Cossack population. A number of factors contributed to this change in the mood of the Don and Kuban Cossacks.

Firstly, in the Cossack the instinct of the owner prevailed over the instinct of the worker, which was greatly facilitated by land policy Soviet authorities authorities in Cossack regions. At the first stage of agrarian reforms (spring 1918), the Soviets allocated plots of land to poor peasant and Cossack farms through the confiscation of church, monastery, and large privately owned lands. This confiscation was also used by the kulaks, who sought to appropriate the landowners' lands, equipment and livestock. However, when the question arose about the fate of military lands, the restructuring of the class land use of the Cossacks and their equalization with the rest of the rural population, the kulak part of the Cossacks openly opposed Soviet power. Subsequently, she was supported by the middle peasants and part of the Cossack poor. As noted by S.M. Budyonny, “some Cossacks, as soon as the conversation came up about allocating land to non-residents, said: “We are not against the Soviets, but don’t touch our land, it wasn’t given to you.” 8

Secondly, the class policy pursued by the Bolsheviks at the first stage of the civil war contributed to inciting class hatred. Nonresidents, enjoying the approval and support of the Soviet government, sought to solve their problems (primarily the land issue) at the expense of the Cossacks, and at the same time settle scores with the latter. This led to an increase in pogroms of Cossacks, executions and robberies by non-resident populations. According to A.I. Denikin, “the majority of nonresidents took one or another, at least indirect, part in the deprivation of the Cossacks.” 9

Thirdly, among the Ukrainian partisans who retreated under German pressure into Cossack areas, robberies of Cossack villages under the slogan of fighting counter-revolution became widespread. Looting was also common among some Red Army detachments consisting of nonresidents. All this, as well as acts of “decossackization”, which in 1918 had a spontaneous nature of requisitions in the form of confiscation of weapons, horses, harnesses and equipment, carried out in a form offensive to the Cossacks, led to the fact that the middle peasant part of the Cossacks succumbed to the agitation of the Cossack elites and openly opposed Soviet power. “Humiliated morally, ruined materially, but also exterminated physically, the Kuban Cossacks (and not only the Kuban Cossacks - O.R.) soon shook off any touch of Bolshevism and began to rise.” 10

All of the above reasons for the change in the mood of the Cossacks were noticed and subsequently taken into account by the Bolsheviks. So, G.K. Ordzhonikidze noted that “at the very first attempts to carry out land reform, the Cossacks took a hostile position towards Soviet power... On the other hand, the retreating Ukrainian troops continued their atrocities and robberies in the Kuban region. There were many inept, extremely tactless actions on the part of individual local workers who were in power.” eleven

However, despite the change in attitude towards the Bolsheviks, the relationship between the Cossacks and the command of the Volunteer Army was still complex and contradictory. The main point of contradiction was, on the one hand, the desire of some of the Cossacks to maintain independence from Russia (both from the Bolshevik and anti-Bolshevik), on the other hand, the desire of the leadership of the Volunteer Army to subjugate the Cossack forces, both military and socially. economic and political issues. What added fuel to the fire was that the Cossacks saw the volunteers, first of all, as representatives and defenders of an outdated Russian monarchy. At the same time, in the Volunteer Army, “if not a hostile, then at least an unfriendly attitude was created towards the multi-level Kuban government, which was too reminiscent of the “Soviet Dep” hated by the officers and too sharply dissociated itself from the all-Russian idea.” 12

Already at the first meeting between the volunteers and the commander of the troops of the Kuban region, General V.L. Pokrovsky in the village of Shendzhiy in mid-March 1918 there was a skirmish. The first clearly showed their desire to subjugate the Kuban people. The union of the Volunteer Army with the Cossacks, in the opinion of the leadership of the volunteers, could only happen on two main conditions: the abolition of the Kuban government and the Rada (this manifested the reluctance of the white generals to recognize the right of Kuban to state independence) and the subordination of the ataman of the Kuban Cossack army to the commander of the Volunteer Army.

On March 17, 1918, at a meeting of representatives of the Kuban with the command of the Volunteer Army in the village of Novodmitrievskaya, an agreement was signed according to which the Kuban government detachment became fully subordinate to General L.G. Kornilov, and the commander of the troops of the Kuban region with his chief of staff were recalled to the Kuban government to form the Kuban army. According to this agreement, the Legislative Rada, the Military Government and the Ataman were to continue their activities, promoting the military activities of the commander of the Volunteer Army. As General A.P. recalled Bogaevsky “there was no mutual trust and sincerity in this union. Only severe necessity forced both sides to come together.” 13 Subsequent events fully confirmed this. The lines concerning the formation of the Kuban Army “were introduced at the insistence of the Kuban representatives,” according to A.I. Denikin, “mainly, allegedly only for the moral satisfaction of the displaced commander of the troops, subsequently created great complications in the relationship between the main command and Kuban.” 14

The desire to ignore the Kuban government and establish one’s own was also evident in the appointment of General Denikin on the eve of the first April assault on Yekaterinodar as governor-general of the Kuban region.

Subsequently, with the occupation of most of the territory of the Kuban by volunteer units, the policy of the Volunteer Army command towards the Kuban people became more and more adamant and harsh. This also left an imprint on the relationship between the Kuban Cossacks and volunteers. Thus, one of the documents of that period says that the view of the Volunteer Army as a liberation army “begins to fade under the influence of the illegal actions of many units and individuals of the army who behave in the republic as in a conquered country.” 15 The replacement of the red terror with white and the monarchist slogans bursting out from the ranks of the volunteers, as well as the slogans of “one and indivisible,” gradually pushed some of the Cossacks away from Denikin’s army. Local independence activists contributed a lot to this with their propaganda. However, during the Second Kuban Campaign, disagreements between the Kuban authorities and A.I. Denikin has not yet touched the ordinary Cossacks. According to D.V. Lekhovich: “It followed its officers. And the Kuban officers - students of Russian military schools - looked at events through the eyes of a Russian officer. They were distrustful of the activities of their government, and many of them were ready to deal with independent leaders without ceremony. And they knew this very well.” 16

One of the reasons for the disagreements between the Volunteer Army and the Cossacks (especially the Don Cossacks) was the latter’s orientation toward Germany as a possible ally in the fight against the Bolsheviks. The command of the Volunteer Army adhered to its previous orientation towards its Entente allies. In addition to the task of liberating Russia from the Bolsheviks, the leaders of the White movement pursued the goal of preserving the integrity of Russian territory. From these positions, General Denikin and his entourage believed that in addition to the fight against the Bolsheviks, it was necessary to fight Germany and suppress any independent attempts to secede from Russia. At the same time, the Don people, represented by the government and the ataman, considered their main task to be the liberation of the Don territory from the Bolsheviks, and in this fight they were ready to accept any support. Not bound by direct obligations to England and France, they perceived Germany as a force that contributed to their goals and objectives. Here we can quite agree with A.A. Gordeev, who noted that the appearance of German armed forces within the borders of the Don Army Region was perceived by the Cossacks and the ataman as a certain support for the allies in the fight against the Bolsheviks. 17 Although, of course, Germany was perceived by the Don people as a forced ally, chosen on the principle of the least evil. We find confirmation of this in the order of the Don Ataman P.N. Krasnov, given on May 4, 1918: “The Don takes into account the fact that part of the territory is occupied by German troops, looks at them not as enemies, but as allies in the fight against the Bolsheviks and tries to use them to arm and supply all the means of fighting for his army.” . 18

The Entente orientation of General Denikin and his entourage and the Germanophile views of P.N. Krasnov left their mark not only on the relationship between them, but also on strategic plans during the Civil War. One of the reasons for the June campaign to Kuban of the Volunteer Army was the reluctance to act together with the Don Cossacks, who by this time had openly adopted a German orientation.

At the same time, the leadership of the Volunteer Army understood the need for an alliance with the Cossacks. On the opening day of the Kuban Rada in Yekaterinodar on November 1, 1918, General Denikin, calling for unity, stated that “the volunteer army recognizes the need, now and in the future, for the broadest autonomy of the constituent parts of the Russian state and an extremely careful attitude to the age-old way of life of the Cossacks.” everyday life." 19 Despite this statement, many opponents of A.I. Denikin was considered his slogan about “non-predecision”, i.e. about not deciding the forms of government in Russia and about the place of the Cossack regions within Russia, a common political ploy. In their eyes, Denikin always remained a supporter of a “united and indivisible” Russia and a defender of the monarchical system. According to P.N. Krasnov, “General Denikin had nothing on his banner except the slogan of a united and indivisible Russia.” 20

However, despite acute disagreements, at the end of December 1918, General A.I. was officially recognized. Denikin as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in the South of Russia (AFSR) and the subordination of the Don Army to him. Among the reasons for making such a decision, one can highlight, in particular, the revolution in Germany, which entailed the withdrawal of occupying German troops from the territory of the Cossack regions, which caused the weakening of the Don and Kuban independentists by the approach of the Bolshevik front to the borders of the Don and the strengthening of the positions of England and France, and, consequently, Denikin .

Of no small importance in the relationship between volunteers and Cossacks was the fact that the Volunteer Army was formed on Cossack territory. Its main bases were also located here. It is no coincidence that after the liberation of the Cossack regions from Bolshevik rule, relations between the leadership of the Volunteer Army and the Cossack political leaders worsened even more. A number of Cossack political figures wanted to play an even more important role in resolving both military and political issues. However, their views, reflecting primarily local interests, very often ran counter to the opinion of the high command. In particular, the latter considered the liberation of Cossack territories from Bolshevik rule to be only part of a strategic plan for the liberation of the entire territory of Russia. Representatives of the Don and Kuban Cossacks for the most part believed that with the liberation of the Cossack regions, the fight against Soviet power could be considered basically over. As R. Medvedev correctly noted in his book “October Revolution”: “... having overthrown Soviet power at home, the Cossacks had no desire to go further and conquer Russia for the white generals.” 21 This caused sharp dissatisfaction on the part of the volunteers. The relationship was also quite aggravated by the fact that, encountering opposition from the Don and, especially, Kuban authorities, A.I. Denikin constantly had to interfere in the internal affairs of the Cossack regions, which, in turn, caused discontent among the Cossack authorities. All this created a tense atmosphere of mutual hostility, which could not but affect the morale and condition of the anti-Bolshevik troops.

Based on the fact that independent tendencies had more weight in the Kuban than on the Don, the relationship here with the command of the All-Soviet Union of Socialist Republics was more acute and tense. It is no coincidence that A.I. Denikin did not want the creation of a Kuban army, although the Kuban people constantly and persistently sought this, citing precedents such as the Don Army and promises of volunteer command during the First Kuban Campaign. He understood that the creation of such an army would only give an extra trump card in the hands of local independents, and, given the attraction of some of them to Ukraine, would turn them into a dangerous enemy in the rear of the volunteers.

In May 1919, in connection with the change of the Kuban government, relations between Kuban and the command of the AFSR worsened. At this time, the pro-Denikin government of F.S. Sushkov was replaced by the office of P.I. Kurgansky, who expressed the interests of the Black Sea part of the Cossacks.

Relations between the Kuban residents and Denikinites became especially strained in connection with the sending of a delegation of Kuban representatives to the Paris Peace Conference. The main task of the delegation was to achieve recognition, if not of state independence, then at least of the autonomy of Kuban.

On February 5, 1919, the Kuban and Don delegations, together with representatives of Ukraine and Belarus, addressed a memorandum to the Supreme Command of the Entente Powers in Odessa. It proposed a project for the creation of Russia on a federal basis through “a voluntary agreement, as equals with equals, of those state entities that crystallized from the ruins old Russia" These “state entities” meant, first of all, the territories of the Don, Kuban, Ukraine and Belarus. In an effort to get rid of the tutelage of the main command of the AFSR, representatives of the Don and Kuban asked the Supreme Command of the Entente Powers to provide them with material and, above all, military assistance directly. For the same purpose, the memorandum suggested the need to create independent armies in the Cossack territories and form a common operational headquarters with the powers of the Concord “without its interference in the political and internal affairs of the named state entities.” 22

In Paris, the Kuban people pursued the same idea, but with a clear demand to recognize the Kuban as an “independent state entity.” At the same time, it was emphasized that “the Kuban Cossacks do not want to be part of Soviet Russia, just as they do not want to be tsarist and generally monarchic in Russia.” 23

In fact, the activities of the Kuban delegation in Paris were reduced mainly to two memoranda and private conversations (for example, with American President William Wilson). Despite the fact that the Kuban delegation was not allowed to attend the peace conference, the speeches of its members and the submitted memorandums left their mark on the subsequent relationship between the commander-in-chief of the AFSR and some of the members of the Kuban Rada. These relations were especially aggravated by the agreement concluded in July 1919 by the Kuban Parisian delegation with representatives of the Majlis of the Mountain Republic. According to this agreement, units of the Kuban Army, if located on the territory of the republic, were to be operationally subordinate to its military command. As we will see later, the fact of concluding an agreement between the Kuban people and the highlanders, which was actually directed against the command of the AFSR, later turned out to be in the hands of the latter.

After the murder of the chairman of the Rada M.S. Ryabovol on June 27, 1919, who delivered an anti-Denikin speech on the first day of the South Russian Conference, the Rada openly proclaimed the need to fight not only the Red Army, but also the monarchism that flourished in the army of General Denikin. “By the beginning of the autumn of 1919, many deputies of the Rada were vigorously promoting the separation of their region from Russia and did not hesitate to scold the Denikin government. They in every possible way undermined the authority of the Kuban Ataman, calling him Denikin’s protege, and removed from the highest administration of the region all Cossacks who sympathized with the ideas of the Volunteer Army. And already in the form of an open challenge to the white command, they negotiated with Georgia and Petlyura... The situation became extremely tense, as propaganda directed against the army and its command gradually began to penetrate the ranks of the Kuban Cossacks at the front.” 24

The most ardent independentists were the Black Sea part of the Kuban Cossacks, among whom pro-Ukrainian sentiments were especially strongly developed. According to General Denikin, the word “Chernomorets” has become synonymous with Ukrainophile and separatist. Linear Cossacks, fearing the national discrimination that awaited them in the event of the Ukrainization of Kuban, opposed the Ukrainophile tendency of the Black Sea residents. This confrontation within the Kuban institutions of power prevented the leadership of the AFSR from pursuing its line, both military and political relations. The aggravated situation at the front, as well as intensified anti-Denikin propaganda from the Black Sea part of the Rada, forced General Denikin to take drastic measures regarding relations with the Kuban people. And here, the agreement concluded by the Kuban Parisian delegation with representatives of the Mountain Republic came in handy. The latter was in a state of war with the Terek Cossack army, which was patronized by the command of the All-Soviet Union of Socialist Republics. Thus, the agreement concluded between Kuban and the Mountain Republic could be considered as directed against the main command of the AFSR. On this basis, on November 7, 1919, General Denikin gave the order for the immediate trial of all persons who signed this treaty. 25 One of the participants in the Paris delegation F.I. Kulabukhov was hanged. The remaining members of the delegation, fearing reprisals, did not return to Kuban. Taking advantage of the discontent of the Kuban Rada, several of its members (almost all Black Sea residents) were court-martialed by order of General Wrangel. The military ataman and the government did not dare, and most likely did not want, to speak out in defense of the Kuban parliament, which, yielding to force, was forced to make some changes to the Kuban constitution. The essence of the constitutional changes was the abolition of the Legislative Rada, whose functions were transferred to the Regional Rada, as well as the strengthening of the power of the Military Ataman and the government, ready to make concessions to the command of the AFSR. It was also stated that “The Kuban region sees itself as inextricably linked with the United, Great, Free Russia.” 26

However, the struggle for power between the leadership of the Kuban and the AFSR proceeded with varying degrees of success. Less than two months have passed since the Regional Rada restored the legislative Rada and canceled virtually all the concessions wrested from it. One of the results of this struggle was the abandonment of the front by the Kuban Cossacks. So, if at the end of 1918 the Kuban people made up 68.75% of all the AFSR, then by the beginning of 1920 there were no more than 10% of them, 27 which, naturally, could not but affect the combat effectiveness of Denikin’s army. Thus, the confrontation between the Cossacks (and primarily the Kuban independentists) and the volunteers became one of the reasons for the failure of the anti-Bolshevik movement in the Don and Kuban.

Analyzing the processes that took place in the anti-Bolshevik camp, one can agree with Kh.M. Ibragimbeyli, who cites the following reasons for the weakening, and ultimately the defeat of the AFSR: “predatory methods of supplying the army, forced mobilization of the population, corruption in the rear authorities, squabbling between the senior command staff and caste division of the army into volunteers, Donets, Kubans.” 28

The result of the Civil War in the North Caucasus (Don and Kuban) was the Novorossiysk evacuation and surrender of Cossack units on the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus to the Red Army. Both of these events, on the one hand, were a consequence of contradictions between the Cossack authorities and the command of the AFSR, and on the other, one of the reasons for the deepening of these contradictions in Crimea.

Contradictions between the command of the Don Army and the volunteers led to the fact that when the question of evacuation arose, the latter, taking control of it, seized most of the ships and actually abandoned the Don people to their fate. Almost all the rear institutions of the Denikin army and the Volunteer Corps in full force with weapons and ammunition were removed from Novorossiysk. At the same time, most of the Don Army, which made up the overwhelming majority (after the departure of the Kuban troops) of the AFSR, was left on the shore. It must be remembered that the civilian population of the Don also retreated to Kuban along with the combatant Cossacks. Only a few of them managed to travel to Crimea. Terrible in their savagery, the tragic scenes of the Novorossiysk evacuation are captured in many of the memories of its participants. Total in the Novorossiysk area Soviet troops About 22 thousand people were captured. 29 Of these, at least 8 thousand combatants from the Don and about 10 thousand civilian refugees from the Don.

The IV Donskoy (formerly Mamontovsky) Corps (about 18,000 combat troops from the Don), with two brigades of the II Don Corps joining it, was cut off from the Novorossiysk direction and forced to move together with the corps of the Kuban Army on Tuapse, and then to the Georgian border. 30 The position of the Kuban and Donets, retreating to Tuapse and further to the Georgian border, was as follows. A small part of the Donets evacuated to Crimea from Tuapse on March 19. On May 1, 1920, about 5 thousand Donets and 1.5-2 thousand Kuban people (“wolves” by A.G. Shkuro) were taken from the Adler region to the Crimean Peninsula. 31 Two days later, in the area of ​​​​the New Town, virtually all the Cossacks of the IV Don Corps were taken out on English destroyers, with the exception of the 14th and 9th Don brigades, which were unable to get through to the loading site due to the flow of surrendering units of the Kuban Army. 32 Thus, from the strip from Tuapse to Gagra, at least 10,000 combat troops were taken to the Crimea.

Despite Georgia’s refusal to allow White Guard units and refugees into its territory, a small part of the Donets, together with the Kuban, crossed the Georgian border. Considering that a certain number of Donets were scattered in the Kuban mountains and villages, the data of the Kuban Military Government, which noted the surrender of about 15,000 Donets into captivity to the Bolsheviks, should be considered correct. 33 Apparently, most of the Don people (about 8-9000 people) who were captured were from the Don corps convoy or civilian refugees.

Of the 40-45 thousand Kuban army, at least 25-30,000 people surrendered. Most of the Cossacks were disarmed on May 1-2, 1920 in the Sochi region. About one and a half thousand Kuban residents moved to Georgia. Considering that about 2,000 Kuban Cossacks were transported from the Black Sea coast to Crimea (not counting a small part in the combined detachment of the Volunteer Corps), we can conclude that more than 10,000 Kuban went to the mountains: either to the “greens” for further fight against Bolsheviks, or to their native villages.

Thus, by the summer of 1920, there were more than 20,000 Donets and about 3-4,000 Kubans on the Crimean Peninsula. Subsequently, most of the Kuban and Donets, who surrendered on the Black Sea coast and escaped reprisals from the Bolsheviks, were sent to the Polish front to “atone their guilt with blood.” During the war with Poland, many of them went over to the side of the Poles and, subsequently, were either transported to the Crimea to P.N. Wrangel, or were interned in Poland and Germany. Some of the Kuban residents fell to Wrangel as a result of the defeat of the “Army of the Renaissance” of General M.A. Kostikova in Kuban. After the unsuccessful landing of General S.G. Ulagaya from the territory of Kuban crossed 12,000 Kuban residents to Crimea. In total, by November 1920, there were about 30 thousand Donets and at least 20 thousand Kuban people on the Crimean peninsula.

As for the relationship between the Cossacks and the white command, in Crimea they acquired a completely different shade, becoming tougher and uncompromising (not counting a number of tactical concessions) on the part of General Wrangel. First of all, this was due to the fact that the Crimean Peninsula was not Cossack territory, and, therefore, one of the factors that strengthened the influence of the Cossacks disappeared.

At the same time, we cannot agree with A.A. Gordeev, who argued that “the command of the Volunteer Army was spared the need to reckon with the governments of the Don, Kuban and Terek.” 34 Finding themselves outside the Cossack territory, the leadership of the AFSR, of course, felt more free. This was expressed, in particular, in the reorganization of the Military Council. If earlier it was dominated by Don people, now out of 20 people in the Military Council, only 3 were Don generals. Further, “Wrangel continues the work begun by Alekseev, Kornilov and Denikin - subjugating all counter-revolutionary movements in the south of Russia, but not by subordinating the political leaders of these movements, but, on the contrary, by eliminating these leaders.” 35 In particular, the commander of the Don Army, General V.I., was dismissed from service and exiled abroad. Sidorin. An interesting fact is that he was fired “by agreement with the Don Ataman.” 36

In turn, the Cossacks finally lost faith in the possibility of liberating Russia from the power of the Bolsheviks, and the leaders of the Cossacks could not help but feel the precariousness of their position in isolation from the Cossack regions. All this ultimately led to the atamans of the Don and Kuban turning to the governments of England and France with a request for mediation in resolving the military conflict between Soviet Russia and the white governments of the Cossack territories and recognizing the independence of the latter. True, as the ataman of the All-Great Don Army A.P. assured. Bogaevsky, he did not have any thoughts of a separate (from the Don) peace with the Bolsheviks. However, Wrangel, alarmed by the possibility of being left alone with the Red Army, forced the Cossack elite to sign an agreement on April 15, 1920, and on July 22 of the same year to conclude an agreement on the Cossack union under his leadership. It recognized the complete military leadership of Wrangel, including the Cossack troops. In addition, the Cossack atamans pledged to conduct all foreign relations only with the permission and through the mediation of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army. In exchange for the subjugation of the Cossack elite, Wrangel promised the atamans complete autonomy and independence in relation to internal civil structure.

Wrangel's agreement with the Cossack atamans was used by opposition forces, who subjected it to sharp criticism. At the same time, the Presidium of the Kuban Regional Rada declared the agreement invalid. At the same time, members of the presidium referred to the fact that the agreement did not have the signature of the chairman of the regional Rada. However, this demarche on the part of the Kuban people did not prevent Wrangel from announcing on August 4, 1920 the alliance he had concluded with the Cossacks “for the common struggle against the Bolsheviks.” 37

In general, the promise of independence of the Cossack lands helped Wrangel, on the one hand, to achieve submission from the Cossack elite, and on the other, to retain the trust of the Cossacks. The subordination of the Cossacks is also evidenced by the fact that neither the Don nor the Kuban armies existed in Crimea. The first was reorganized into the Don Cossack Corps, the commander of which was appointed Wrangel supporter General F.F. Abramov. The Kuban Brigade was formed from the Kuban residents. All these units were part of one army, which was emphatically called “Russian”.

By November 1920, the Cossacks who were on the Crimean Peninsula, together with the entire Russian army, were faced with a choice: surrender to the mercy of the Bolsheviks or leave the inhospitable island and go to a foreign land with the hope of a quick return to their native land.

We must give Wrangel his due: the withdrawal of the 150,000-strong mass of refugees from Crimea under the pressure of Red Army units was more organized than the Novorossiysk evacuation. Objective reasons also contributed to this. Firstly, there were more ports in Crimea than on the Black Sea coast, which made it possible to reduce the crowds and, consequently, relieve tension and panic. Secondly, ships were prepared in advance with a supply of fuel and food. Thirdly, long before the Crimean disaster, an evacuation plan had already been drawn up, which made it possible to organize loading without unnecessary fuss. Fourthly, the merging of parts of the Russian army into a single fighting organism, the removal of tension in relations between the leaders of the Cossacks and the leadership of the All-Soviet Union of Socialist Republics, which was characteristic of the Denikin period of struggle, made it possible to avoid the excitement and hostility that accompanied the Novorossiysk evacuation. The even distribution of loading ports between the Don, Kuban and other parts of the army also contributed to a relatively calm situation during the evacuation.

However, one should not idealize the evacuation, as some Wrangel supporters did in their memoirs. There was everything in Crimea: robberies, fires, vanity, and panic. But all this manifested itself in much to a lesser extent, than in Novorossiysk and did not stop everyone who wanted to leave from immersing themselves. Most Donetsk and Kuban residents were forced to bear the heavy burden of emigrants. The situation was no less difficult for a significant part of the Cossacks who remained in their native lands. As for the further political quests of the Don and Kuban Cossacks, they continued in emigration (as well as the confrontation with Wrangel). However, this is a topic for a separate study.

1 Ladokha G. Essays on the civil struggle in Kuban. Krasnodar, 1923. P. 23.

2 Kakurin N.E. How the revolution was fought. M., 1990. T. 1. P. 164.

3 Pokrovsky G. Denikinism. Year of politics and economics in Kuban (1918-1919). Kharkov, 1926. P. 15.

4 Denikin A.I. The campaign and death of General Kornilov // Gul R.B. Ice trek. Denikin A.I. The campaign and death of General Kornilov. Budberg A. Diary 1918-1919. M., 1990. P. 108.

5 Bogaevsky A.P. 1918 // White Case: Ice Campaign. M., 1993. S. 27, 39.

6 Zaitsev A.A. Memoir literature as a source for studying the social psychology of the Cossacks during the Civil War // Cossacks in revolutions and civil war. Cherkesok, 1988. P. 82.

7 Kakurin N.E. Decree. op. T. 1. P. 183.

8 Budyonny S.M. Distance traveled. M., 1958. Book. 1. pp. 43-44.

9 Denikin A.I. White movement and the struggle of the Volunteer Army // White Cause: Don and the Volunteer Army. M., 1992. P. 255.

10 Ibid. P. 256.

11 Ordzhonikidze G.K. Articles and speeches. M., 1956. t. 1. P. 71.

12 Denikin A.G. The campaign and death of General Kornilov... P. 142.

13 Bogaevsky A.P. Decree. op. P. 75.

14 Denikin A.I. The struggle of General Kornilov... P. 164.

15 State Archive of the Krasnodar Territory (SAKK). F. R-106. Op. 1. D. 37. L. 141-142.

16 Lekhovich D.V. Whites against reds. The fate of General Anton Denikin. M., 1992. P. 202.

17 Gordeev A.A. History of the Cossacks. M., 1993. P. 225.

18 Krasnov P.N. The All-Great Don Army // White Cause: Don and the Volunteer Army. M., 1992. P. 32.

19 Lekhovich D.V. Decree. op. P. 211.

20 Krasnov P.n. Decree. op. P. 142.

21 Quoted. by: Ibragimbeyli H.M. Criticism of modern bourgeois historiography of the Cossacks in the revolution and civil war // Cossacks in revolutions and civil war. Cherkesok, 1988. P. 66.

22 GAKK F. 6473 Op. 1 D. 196 L. 84-85

23 GAKK F. R-411. Op. 2. D. 263. L. 2, 4.

24 Lekhovich D.V. Decree. op. P. 252.

25 GACC. F. R-6. Op. 1. D. 126. L. 233.

26 Skobtsov D.E. Drama of Kuban // Denikin. Yudenich. Wrangel: memoirs. M.-L., 1927. P. 137-138.

27 Dispersal I. Kuban action // Struggle of classes. 1936. No. 1. P. 75.

28 Ibragimbeyli H.M. Decree. op. P. 64.

29 Kakurin N.E. Decree op. T. 2. P. 329.

30 State Archive Russian Federation(GA RF). F. 6473. Op. 1. D. 40. L. 1.

31 The tragedy of the Cossacks. Paris, 1938. Part IV. pp. 432, 497.

32 GA RF F. 5881. Op. 2. D. 806. L. 24.

33 The tragedy of the Cossacks... P. 403.

34 Gordeev A.A. Decree. op. P. 334.

35 Venkov A.V. Wrangel and the Cossacks // Revival of the Cossacks: history and modernity. Novocherkassk, 1994. P. 89.

36 Free Cossacks. Paris, 1937. No. 235. P. 12.

37 Latest news. Paris, 1920. 18.08.