period of independence Portal "Bosnia and Herzegovina"
Bosnian Crisis 1908-1909- an international conflict that was caused by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in October 1908. This diplomatic skirmish heated up already tense relations between the Great Powers and during the first weeks of 1909 threatened to escalate into a major European war. Despite the apparent success of Austrian diplomacy, the annexation of new territories under pressure from the ruling circles of the Austrian part of the Habsburg monarchy ultimately turned out to be a Pyrrhic victory. National, political, religious and linguistic contradictions in Austria-Hungary reached a breaking point, leading to the dissolution of the country in 1918, just ten years after the annexation.

Background of the crisis

In the first decade of the 20th century, the Ottoman Empire, inexorably declining, tried to reverse the vector of its development; after the Young Turk Revolution, the ruling circles of the Ottoman Empire began to assert their rights to Bosnia and Herzegovina with renewed vigor. This worried the Austro-Hungarian government, which headed for the annexation of the provinces and was only looking for a convenient excuse to implement their plans. To do this, it was necessary to overcome the opposition not only of the Ottomans, but also of Russia, Great Britain, France, Italy, Serbia and Montenegro.

Politics of Austria-Hungary

Austrian Foreign Minister Alois von Ehrenthal entered into negotiations with representatives of the interested powers. First of all, an agreement was reached with Italy that the Habsburgs would not interfere in the Italo-Turkish War for the possession of Libya. This made it possible to somewhat even out Austrian relations with Italy, which had not developed since the end of the Risorgimento, which deprived the Habsburgs of their vast possessions in the Apennines. It was possible to negotiate with the Sultan by signing an agreement under which Turkey received compensation of 2.5 million pounds sterling for the annexed territories - despite the fact that Austria refused to annex the Novipazar Sanjak. The mediator at the conclusion of this agreement was the main foreign policy ally of the Austrian court - the German Kaiser Wilhelm II, who had unlimited influence on the Sultan.

During the meeting of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs A.P. Izvolsky with his Austrian colleague Alois von Erenthal, held in the castle of Buchlau (Bukhlov), on September 15-16, 1908, a preliminary informal agreement was reached, according to which, in exchange for Russia's recognition of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina , Austria recognized the right of Russia to the unhindered passage of its warships through the Black Sea straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Also, both sides agreed not to object if Bulgaria announced the end of its vassal dependence on the Ottoman Empire. It is worth noting that Izvolsky did not have the authority to conduct such negotiations, and for his Austrian colleague, Erenthal, as it turned out later, it was very important to at least create their appearance. According to Izvolsky's contemporaries, the meaning of his preliminary informal agreement with Erenthal was that at the right moment for the two powers, Austria-Hungary announced the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Russia would simultaneously declare its rejection of the Berlin agreements on the neutral status of the Black Sea straits. It was assumed that concerted action would neutralize the reaction from Russia's allies in the Entente - France and Great Britain, who feared the strengthening of Russian influence in the Mediterranean.

As Count V.N. Kokovtsov, who at that time was the Minister of Finance of Russia, noted in his memoirs, “during hospitable conversations in Bukhlau, Izvolsky played an episode from Krylov’s fable -“ The Crow and the Fox ”.

Bosnian Crisis 1908-1909

The next day (October 6), the governments of Serbia and Montenegro announced mobilization in their countries. The ruling circles and intelligentsia of both states believed that Bosnia-Herzegovina is a historically Serbian province, it should be integrated into the all-Serbian cultural space and divided between them, like Novipazar Sanjak.

On March 10, 1909, Serbia refused to recognize the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On March 17, 1909, the Council of Ministers of Russia at its meeting stated that the Russian Empire was not ready for a war with Germany and Austria-Hungary on two fronts. Because of this, Russia had to keep Serbia from attacking Austria-Hungary; such a rash step could well provoke a pan-European war.

And then Germany said its weighty word. On March 22, the German ambassador to Russia, Count Pourtales, presented his Russian colleague Izvolsky with “proposals for resolving the crisis” (more like an ultimatum), in which Russia was asked to give an immediate, clear, unambiguous answer about agreeing or refusing to recognize the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and made it clear that a negative answer entail an attack by Austria-Hungary on Serbia; in addition, a demand was put forward to end diplomatic support for Serbia. Fearing that Russia would be drawn into the war, Prime Minister P. A. Stolypin spoke out categorically against direct confrontation with Germany and Austria-Hungary, pointing out that "unleashing a war means unleashing the forces of revolution." The next day, Emperor Nicholas II telegraphed German Kaiser Wilhelm II agreeing to accept all German demands. This meant that Russian Balkan policy was a complete fiasco, which contemporaries, mindful of the recently ended unsuccessful Russo-Japanese War, called "diplomatic Tsushima". Under pressure from its ally, Serbia on March 31, 1909 was also forced to recognize the annexation.

Formally, the conflict was settled, but feelings of bitterness from the defeat continued to smolder in both Belgrade and St. Petersburg. In addition, thanks to the efforts of Austrian and German diplomacy, Russia's allies - Serbia and Montenegro, found themselves isolated, and Russia's prestige was dealt another painful blow. The Balkans, for a long time, remained the "powder magazine" of Europe. The explosion occurred in June 1914, when the Serbian terrorist Gavrilo Princip shot dead the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Franz Ferdinand, during an inspection of the newly annexed lands (see Sarajevo assassination).

Bosnian Crisis 1908-1909 led to deepening contradictions between the Entente and the Triple Alliance, being one of the stages on the way to the First World War. The crisis irreversibly spoiled relations between Russia and Serbia on the one hand and Austria-Hungary on the other, and almost led to a major European war. Germany made it clear to Russia and the Entente that it would provide Austria-Hungary with any necessary assistance, up to military. Italy's departure from the Triple Alliance has begun to take shape. Serious contradictions were also revealed within the Entente: the allies did not provide Russia with significant support in the Bosno-Herzegovina issue and were not ready to satisfy Russia's claims in the Eastern Question as a whole, leaving Russia alone with Germany and Austria-Hungary. At the same time, they themselves - "kept the gunpowder dry." According to a number of researchers, at the turn of 1908-1909. Great Britain concentrated more than half of the ships of its fleet in the mother country. Apparently, the British establishment did not see the Bosnian crisis as a timely and convenient pretext for opposing the Triple Alliance.

As for the main "heroes" of the crisis, the crisis affected the political career of Izvolsky: he soon resigned from the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs and was sent as ambassador to France; Russian Foreign Ministry, for a long time which remained a very closed body, directly subordinate to the emperor, finally fell under the complete control of the Government and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers: politics became more public, and decisions more balanced. Ehrenthal received the title of count after the recognition of the annexation by the rest of the Great Powers on April 9, 1909.

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Links

• Astafiev I. I. Russian-German diplomatic relations in 1905-1911. M., 1972;
• Bestuzhev IV Struggle in Russia on foreign policy issues. 1906-1910. M., 1961;
• Vinogradov K. B. The Bosnian crisis of 1908-1909. Prologue of the First World War. L .: Publishing house of the Leningrad University, 1964;
• Zaionchkovsky A. M. Around the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. // Red Archive, 1925, V.3 (10), S. 41-53;
• Ignatiev A.V. Russian-English relations on the eve of the First World War (1908-1914). M., 1962;
• History of diplomacy. Volume II. The author of the volume is V. M. Khvostov. Edited by A. A. Gromyko, I. N. Zemskov, V. A. Zorin, V. S. Semenov, S. D. Skazkin, V. M. Khvostov. M., State publishing house of political literature, 1963;
• Milyukov, P. N. The Balkan crisis and the policy of A. P. Izvolsky. SPb., 1910;
• Pisarev Yu. A. Great powers and the Balkans on the eve of the First World War. M., Nauka Publishing House, 1985;
• Poletika N. P. Sarajevo murder. Research on the history of Austro-Serbian relations and the Balkan policy of Russia in the period 1903-1914. M., Publishing house: Krasnaya gazeta, 1930;
• Fay Sidney Bradshaw. The origins of the world war. Vol. 1-2, New York 1928. / Fey S. B. The origin of the world war. T. 1-2, M., 1934;
• Pribram, A. F. Austrian foreign policy 1908-1918. With a foreword by G. P. Gooch. London, 1923;
• (English)

see also

Great Power Diplomacy 1871-1913 Great powers Treaties and agreements Crises and conflicts Military conflicts Diplomats and politics

An excerpt characterizing the Bosnian crisis

“That would be long,” answered the son.
- Go to your Buonaparte. M lle Bourienne, voila encore un admirateur de votre goujat d "empereur! [here is another admirer of your servile emperor ...] - he shouted in excellent French.
- Vous savez, que je ne suis pas bonapartiste, mon prince. [You know, Prince, that I am not a Bonapartist.]
- “Dieu sait quand revendra” ... [God knows when he will return!] - the prince sang out of tune, laughed even more out of tune and left the table.
The little princess was silent during the whole argument and the rest of the dinner and looked in fright now at Princess Marya, then at her father-in-law. When they left the table, she took her sister-in-law by the hand and called her to another room.
- Comme c "est un homme d" esprit votre pere, she said, - c "est a cause de cela peut etre qu" il me fait peur. [What a smart person your father is. Maybe that's why I'm afraid of him.]
- Oh, he's so kind! - said the princess.

Prince Andrei left the next day in the evening. The old prince, without deviating from his order, went to his room after dinner. The little princess was with her sister-in-law. Prince Andrei, dressed in a traveling frock coat without an epaulet, was packing with his valet in the chambers allotted to him. Having inspected the carriage and the packing of the suitcases himself, he ordered to lay it down. Only those things remained in the room that Prince Andrei always took with him: a casket, a large silver cellar, two Turkish pistols and a saber, a gift from his father, brought from near Ochakov. All these travel accessories were in great order with Prince Andrei: everything was new, clean, in cloth cases, carefully tied with ribbons.
In moments of departure and a change in life, people who are able to think about their actions usually find a serious mood of thoughts. In these moments, the past is usually verified and plans for the future are made. The face of Prince Andrei was very thoughtful and tender. With his hands folded back, he paced the room quickly from corner to corner, looking ahead of him, and shaking his head thoughtfully. Was he afraid to go to war, was he sad to leave his wife—perhaps both, but apparently not wanting to be seen in such a position, when he heard footsteps in the passage, he hurriedly freed his hands, stopped at the table, as if he was tying the cover of the box, and assumed his usual, calm and impenetrable expression. These were the heavy steps of Princess Marya.
“They told me that you ordered the mortgage,” she said, out of breath (she must have been running), “but I so wanted to talk to you alone again. God knows how long we'll be apart again. Are you angry that I came? You have changed a lot, Andryusha, - she added, as if in explanation of such a question.
She smiled, pronouncing the word "Andryusha". Apparently, it was strange for her to think that this strict, handsome man was the same Andryusha, a thin, playful boy, a childhood friend.
- Where is Lise? he asked, only answering her question with a smile.
She was so tired that she fell asleep on the couch in my room. Ah, Andre! Que! tresor de femme vous avez,” she said, sitting down on the sofa opposite her brother. She is a perfect child, such a sweet, cheerful child. I loved her so much.
Prince Andrei was silent, but the princess noticed an ironic and contemptuous expression that appeared on his face.
– But one must be indulgent to small weaknesses; who does not have them, Andre! Don't forget that she was brought up and raised in the world. And then her situation is no longer rosy. It is necessary to enter into the position of everyone. Tout comprendre, c "est tout pardonner. [Whoever understands everything will forgive everything.] You think about it, poor thing, after the life to which she is accustomed, to part with her husband and remain alone in the village and in her position? This very hard.
Prince Andrei smiled, looking at his sister, as we smile, listening to people whom we think we can see through.
“You live in the countryside and don't find this life terrible,” he said.
- I'm different. What to say about me! I don't want another life, and I can't, because I don't know any other life. And you think, Andre, for a young and secular woman to be buried in best years life in the village, alone, because papa is always busy, and I ... you know me ... how poor I am in ressources, [interests.] for a woman accustomed to the best society. M lle Bourienne is one…
“I don’t like her very much, your Bourienne,” said Prince Andrei.
- Oh no! She is very sweet and kind, and most importantly, a pathetic girl. She has no one, no one. To tell the truth, I not only do not need it, but it is shy. I, you know, and There has always been a savage, and now even more so. I love being alone… Mon pere [Father] loves her very much. She and Mikhail Ivanovich are two persons to whom he is always affectionate and kind, because they are both favored by him; as Stern says, "We love people not so much for the good they have done us as for the good we have done them." Mon pere took her as an orphan sur le pave, [on the pavement,] and she is very kind. And mon pere loves her manner of reading. She reads aloud to him in the evenings. She reads great.
“Well, to be honest, Marie, I think it’s hard for you sometimes because of your father’s character?” Prince Andrew suddenly asked.
Princess Marya was at first surprised, then frightened by this question.
- ME?... Me?!... Is it hard for me?! - she said.
- He was always cool; but now it’s getting hard, I think, ”said Prince Andrei, apparently on purpose, in order to puzzle or test his sister, speaking so lightly about his father.
“You are good to everyone, Andre, but you have some kind of pride in thought,” said the princess, following her train of thought more than the course of conversation, “and this is a great sin. Is it possible to judge the father? Yes, if it were possible, what other feeling than veneration, [deep respect,] can arouse such a person as mon pere? And I'm so satisfied and happy with it. I only wish you all were as happy as I am.
The brother shook his head in disbelief.
- One thing that is hard for me - I'll tell you the truth, Andre - is my father's way of thinking in religious terms. I do not understand how a person with such a huge mind cannot see what is clear as day, and can be so deluded? This is one of my misfortunes. But even here, lately, I see a shadow of improvement. Lately his taunts are not so caustic, and there is one monk whom he received and spoke to him for a long time.
“Well, my friend, I’m afraid that you and the monk are wasting your gunpowder,” Prince Andrei said mockingly, but affectionately.
- Ah! mon ami. [BUT! My friend.] I just pray to God and hope that He hears me. Andre,” she said timidly after a moment of silence, “I have a big request for you.
- What, my friend?
No, promise me you won't refuse. It will not cost you any work, and there will be nothing unworthy of you in it. Only you can comfort me. Promise, Andryusha, - she said, putting her hand into the purse and holding something in it, but not yet showing, as if what she was holding was the subject of the request and as if before receiving the promise in fulfillment of the request she could not remove it from the purse It is something.
She looked timidly, imploringly at her brother.
“If it would cost me a lot of work ...” Prince Andrei answered, as if guessing what was the matter.
- Whatever you want, think! I know you are the same as mon pere. Think whatever you want, but do it for me. Do it please! My father's father, our grandfather, wore it in all wars ... - She still did not get what she was holding from her purse. "So you promise me?"
"Of course, what's the matter?"
- Andre, I will bless you with the image, and you promise me that you will never take it off. Promise?
“If he doesn’t drag his neck down to two pounds ... To please you ...” said Prince Andrei, but at the same second, noticing the distressed expression that his sister’s face assumed at this joke, he repented. “Very glad, really very glad, my friend,” he added.
“Against your will, He will save and have mercy on you and turn you to Himself, because in Him alone is truth and peace,” she said in a voice trembling with excitement, with a solemn gesture holding in both hands in front of her brother an oval ancient icon of the Savior with a black face in silver chasuble on a silver chain of fine workmanship.
She crossed herself, kissed the icon and handed it to Andrey.
– Please, Andre, for me…
Beams of kind and timid light shone from her large eyes. These eyes illuminated the whole sickly, thin face and made it beautiful. The brother wanted to take the scapular, but she stopped him. Andrei understood, crossed himself and kissed the icon. His face was at the same time gentle (he was touched) and mocking.
- Merci, mon ami. [Thank you my friend.]
She kissed him on the forehead and sat back down on the sofa. They were silent.
- So I told you, Andre, be kind and generous, as you have always been. Don't judge Lise harshly, she began. - She is so sweet, so kind, and her position is very difficult now.
- It seems that I didn’t tell you anything, Masha, so that I reproach my wife for anything or be dissatisfied with her. Why are you telling me all this?
Princess Mary blushed in spots and became silent, as if she felt guilty.
“I didn’t say anything to you, but you were already told. And it makes me sad.
Red spots appeared even more strongly on the forehead, neck and cheeks of Princess Marya. She wanted to say something and could not utter it. The brother guessed right: the little princess cried after dinner, said that she foresaw an unfortunate birth, was afraid of them, and complained about her fate, her father-in-law and her husband. After crying, she fell asleep. Prince Andrei felt sorry for his sister.
- Know one thing, Masha, I cannot reproach, have not reproached and will never reproach my wife, and I myself cannot reproach myself with anything in relation to her; and it will always be so, in whatever circumstances I may be. But if you want to know the truth... you want to know if I'm happy? No. Is she happy? No. Why is this? Don't know…
Saying this, he stood up, went over to his sister, and, bending down, kissed her on the forehead. His beautiful eyes shone with an intelligent and kind, unaccustomed brilliance, but he looked not at his sister, but into the darkness of the open door, through her head.
- Let's go to her, we must say goodbye. Or go alone, wake her up, and I'll come right now. Parsley! he shouted to the valet, “come here, clean it up.” It's in the seat, it's on the right side.
Princess Marya got up and went to the door. She stopped.
Andre, si vous avez. la foi, vous vous seriez adresse a Dieu, pour qu "il vous donne l" amour, que vous ne sentez pas et votre priere aurait ete exaucee. [If you had faith, you would turn to God with a prayer, so that He would give you love that you do not feel, and your prayer would be heard.]
- Yes, is it! - said Prince Andrew. - Go, Masha, I'll come right away.
On the way to his sister's room, in the gallery that connected one house with another, Prince Andrei met a sweetly smiling m lle Bourienne, who for the third time that day came across him with an enthusiastic and naive smile in solitary passages.
- Ah! je vous croyais chez vous, [Ah, I thought you were in your room,] she said, blushing for some reason and lowering her eyes.
Prince Andrei looked sternly at her. Anger suddenly appeared on the face of Prince Andrei. He said nothing to her, but looked at her forehead and hair, without looking into her eyes, so contemptuously that the Frenchwoman blushed and left without saying anything.
When he approached his sister's room, the princess was already awake, and her cheerful voice, hurrying one word after another, was heard from the open door. She spoke as if, after a long period of abstinence, she wanted to make up for lost time.
- Non, mais figurez vous, la vieille comtesse Zouboff avec de fausses boucles et la bouche pleine de fausses dents, comme si elle voulait defier les annees ... [No, imagine, old Countess Zubova, with fake curls, with fake teeth, like as if mocking the years…] Xa, xa, xa, Marieie!
Exactly the same phrase about Countess Zubova and the same laugh had already been heard five times in front of strangers by Prince Andrei from his wife.
He quietly entered the room. The princess, plump, ruddy, with work in her hands, sat on an armchair and talked incessantly, sorting through Petersburg memories and even phrases. Prince Andrei came up, stroked her head and asked if she had rested from the journey. She answered and continued the same conversation.
The stroller stood in six at the entrance. It was a dark autumn night outside. The coachman did not see the drawbar of the carriage. People with lanterns bustled about on the porch. The huge house burned with lights through its large windows. In the hall crowded the courtyards, who wanted to say goodbye to the young prince; all the household were standing in the hall: Mikhail Ivanovich, m lle Bourienne, Princess Mary and the princess.
Prince Andrei was called to his father's office, who wanted to say goodbye to him face to face. Everyone was waiting for them to come out.
When Prince Andrei entered the office, old prince in old man's glasses and in his white coat, in which he received no one except his son, he sat at the table and wrote. He looked back.
– Are you going? And he began to write again.
- I came to say goodbye.
- Kiss here, - he showed his cheek, - thank you, thank you!
- What do you thank me for?
- Because you don’t overstay, you don’t hold on to a woman’s skirt. Service first. Thank you, thank you! And he continued to write, so that the spray flew from the crackling pen. - If you need to say something, say it. These two things I can do together,” he added.
“About my wife… I’m so ashamed that I’m leaving her in your arms…”
- What are you lying? Say what you need.
- When your wife has time to give birth, send to Moscow for an obstetrician ... So that he is here.
The old prince stopped and, as if not understanding, stared with stern eyes at his son.
“I know that no one can help if nature does not help,” said Prince Andrei, apparently embarrassed. “I agree that out of a million cases, one is unfortunate, but this is her fantasy and mine. They told her, she saw it in a dream, and she is afraid.
“Hm ... hm ...” the old prince said to himself, continuing to finish writing. - I will.
He crossed out the signature, suddenly turned quickly to his son and laughed.
- It's bad, isn't it?
- What's wrong, father?
- Wife! said the old prince shortly and significantly.
“I don’t understand,” said Prince Andrei.
“Yes, there’s nothing to do, my friend,” the prince said, “they are all like that, you won’t get married.” Do not be afraid; I won't tell anyone; and you yourself know.
He grabbed his hand with his bony little hand, shook it, looked straight into his son's face with his quick eyes, which seemed to see right through the man, and again laughed his cold laugh.
The son sighed, confessing with this sigh that his father understood him. The old man, continuing to fold and print letters, with his usual speed, grabbed and threw sealing wax, seal and paper.
- What to do? Beautiful! I'll do everything. You be calm,” he said curtly while typing.
Andrey was silent: it was both pleasant and unpleasant for him that his father understood him. The old man got up and handed the letter to his son.
“Listen,” he said, “do not worry about your wife: what can be done will be done.” Now listen: give the letter to Mikhail Ilarionovich. I am writing that he will use you in good places and not keep you as an adjutant for a long time: a bad position! Tell him that I remember him and love him. Yes, write how he will accept you. If it's good, serve. Nikolai Andreich Bolkonsky's son, out of mercy, will not serve anyone. Well, now come here.
He spoke in such a rapid way that he did not finish half of the words, but the son was used to understanding him. He led his son to the bureau, threw back the lid, pulled out a drawer, and took out a notebook covered in his large, long, concise handwriting.
“I must die before you.” Know that here are my notes, to transfer them to the sovereign after my death. Now here - here is a pawn ticket and a letter: this is a prize to the one who writes the history of the Suvorov wars. Submit to the academy. Here are my remarks, after me read for yourself, you will find something useful.

Bosporus and Dardanelles. Secret provocations on the eve of the First World War (1907–1914) Luneva Yulia Viktorovna

Chapter II The Question of the Black Sea Straits during the Bosnian Crisis of 1908-1909 On the way to the Italo-Turkish war

The Question of the Black Sea Straits during the Bosnian Crisis of 1908–1909 On the way to the Italo-Turkish war

In late 1907 and early 1908, tensions arose between Russia and Turkey. Back in September, immediately after the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian agreement, Russian Foreign Minister A.P. Izvolsky, during a visit to Vienna, in a conversation with A. Erenthal, said that it was in Russia's interests to maintain the status quo in the Balkans. Germany and Austria-Hungary, not objecting to the actions of Russia, continued to develop expansion in the Middle East. Germany negotiated political and military agreements with the Ottoman Empire and secured a continuation of the contract for the construction of the Baghdad Railway. Austria-Hungary signed with Istanbul a secret military convention and a protocol on concessions in Thessaloniki and Kosovo vilayets.

England continued to develop relations with Russia. On May 27–28 (O.S.), 1908, on the roadstead of the Revel (now Tallinn) port, a meeting between Edward VII and Nicholas II took place. The English king spoke in favor of further strengthening the unity between the two governments and expressed satisfaction with the development of events in Russia as a result of the activities of P. A. Stolypin.

Despite the rapprochement with England, Izvolsky believed that relations with Austria-Hungary should also be improved. The Danubian monarchy sought to establish its control in the Balkan Peninsula and firmly establish itself on the Adriatic coast. To do this, she needed to annex the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to Article XXV of the Berlin Treaty of 1878, these South Slavic lands were under the control of Austria-Hungary, but formally remained part of the Ottoman Empire.

To implement this plan, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary A. Ehrental did extensive preparatory work.

In November 1907, Izvolsky, during his trip to Europe, met with him and discussed issues of Balkan politics. Izvolsky told Erenthal that it would be desirable to find out in advance "whether it is possible for Russia and Austria to continue to act in complete unity and harmony, even in the event of such circumstances that, in addition to the will of these two powers, would violate the status quo within Turkish Empire". Izvolsky openly told Erenthal that Russia neither now nor in the future wants any territorial gain either at the expense of Turkey or at the expense of any of the Balkan countries. But if, contrary to this peace-loving and conservative policy, significant changes took place on the Balkan Peninsula, the Russian government, of necessity, “would have to attend to ensuring its most important interest, arising from the history and geographical position of Russia. This interest, in my deep conviction, is entirely concentrated in the question of a free exit from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, in other words, in the question of the Turkish straits. Such a formulation of the matter, it seems to me, should greatly facilitate the establishment of complete agreement between Russia and Austria-Hungary regarding further joint activities in the Eastern question; for the resolution in our favor of the question of the Straits would not violate any Austrian interest ... ".

During April-June 1908, an exchange of notes took place between the Russian and Austro-Hungarian ministries of foreign affairs, in which Russia's support for the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria was confirmed in exchange for Austria-Hungary's support for changing the regime of the Straits in the direction of interest to Russia.

On May 1 (14), 1908, the Government of Austria-Hungary sent a memorandum to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which Erenthal proposed to take a fresh look at the problem of the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina belonging to Turkey, on July 2 (15) Izvolsky sent a memorandum to Erenthal, which contained a proposal to agree in the event of decisive changes in the Balkans on the annexation by Austria-Hungary of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Novopazar Sanjak in exchange for changing the convention on the Straits in favor of Russia. At the same time, Izvolsky mentioned that the revision of the Berlin Treaty is possible only with the consent of the powers that signed it, and for this it would be necessary to hold an international conference.

In terms of time, Izvolsky's statement almost coincided with the coup d'état in Turkey, which began in Thessaloniki, that is, in Macedonia. The government of the Young Turks came to power, which made a bet on Germany. This increased Russia's concern about the fate of the Black Sea straits. The leaders of the Young Turk revolution were going to hold elections in the Ottoman Empire, including Bosnia and Herzegovina. This circumstance prompted the Habsburg Monarchy to formally annex both of the provinces it occupied. A modern historian writes: “Thus the Danube Monarchy caused the second great international crisis of the 20th century, the Bosnian Crisis of 1908-1909. Essentially, it was a consequence of the long impact of the Eastern Question and the events of the Young Turk revolution, but only the German intervention raised the regional crisis to a world level.

On July 21 (August 3), 1908, a special meeting was held in St. Petersburg with the participation of the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, representatives of the Council of State Defense, military and naval ministers, representatives of the General Staffs of the naval and land forces, the Minister of Finance, as well as Russian ambassadors in Paris and Constantinople. At the meeting, the issue of defending the interests of Russia in Turkey was discussed, but it was recognized that now “we are not ready for any independent action, that the armed seizure of the Bosphorus has to be temporarily postponed and for the time being to develop a detailed plan of action for the peaceful occupation of the Bosphorus without declaring war Turkey".

When it came to the possibility of conducting an operation in the Straits, the Minister of Marine announced that two battleships and two cruisers should be sent from Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean for the occupation of the Upper Bosphorus and other actions is possible only in the future.

The meeting was in favor of speeding up the relevant preparations. Izvolsky believed that the general political situation was beneficial for Russia, and believed that England, which hindered Russia's undertakings in the East, would not have opposed it at that moment. The consciousness of their own impotence and friendly relations with England dictated to the Russian ruling circles the need to accept the Turkish revolution, come to terms with it and try to extract possible benefits from it.

The meeting decided "to develop a detailed plan of action for the peaceful occupation of the Bosphorus without declaring war on Turkey, subject to all precautions so that the Turks do not learn prematurely about our intentions."

Three days later, the head of the Main Directorate of the General Staff, F.F. Palitsyn, sent a confidential letter to the commander of the Odessa Military District, stating that "the current political situation may force us to occupy part of the territory of Turkey with troops, in the foreground the Upper Bosphorus." This task was assigned to the Odessa district.

Palitsyn noted: "... it is true that the military-political situation in which we will now have to carry out the expedition will differ significantly from the one that was envisaged earlier (meaning before the Russo-Japanese War)." He was sure that Russia would not have to wait for the appearance and breakthrough of the English fleet into the Black Sea. “The main concern of the expedition,” Palitsyn summed up, “will be the capture of advantageous positions on both sides of the Strait, dominating Constantinople, and keeping them in their hands in order to achieve the political goal set, according to the circumstances.” On July 29 (August 11), 1908, F. F. Palitsyn informed I. M. Dikov, Minister of the Navy: “Operational considerations require that in the event of a collision with Turkey, we should be ready to transfer one corps of troops, reinforced by a cavalry brigade and provided with a monthly reserve. In round numbers, this will amount to about 1,100 officer and class ranks, 42,000 lower ranks, 110,000 horses, 3,000 guns and wagons with 300,000 pounds of food supplies. Where the landing will have to be sent - whether to the Bosphorus, or to another point on the coast of Asia Minor - can only be indicated by the situation in which it will be necessary to start a war. Further, Palitsyn referred to the conclusion of the Special Meeting on July 21 (August 3), that for political reasons the government could not enter into an agreement with Bulgaria on joint actions and that the political situation could force part of Turkish territory to be occupied by troops and, in the foreground, the Upper Bosphorus. “Under the current political situation, the task of the expedition,” Palitsyn informed Dikov, “is reduced to capturing positions on both banks of the Bosphorus that dominate Constantinople; and to hold these positions until the concentration of forces necessary for the military task, in accordance with the specified policy. The interests of the first echelon of the ground forces require that the fleet, by providing and facilitating the landing, would contribute to the fall of the Bosphorus batteries and render all possible assistance to the troops in holding the captured positions.

On August 20 (September 1), 2008, Foreign Minister Erenthal informed the Russian Ambassador in Vienna, V.P. meet Izvolsky. Erenthal did not fail to ask whether Izvolsky had already probed the opinion of the British government on this matter. “Having received a negative answer, he agreed in the future to accept the text proposed by Izvolsky. He did not risk anything, being sure that the British would not make concessions in this matter.

The Russian minister intended to use the current situation to secure Russia's right to navigate warships through the Straits. Izvolsky believed that if he managed to conclude a deal with Austria-Hungary, then Germany would not oppose the implementation of his plan. France, as an ally, should not have objected to the Straits either. Great Britain, on the other hand, will have to fulfill its promise given at the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian agreement.

On August 6 (19), the government of Austria-Hungary decided to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina. The annexation plan was supported by the Austrian military party, led by Archduke Franz Ferdinand and Chief of the General Staff Konrad von Götzendorf. By agreement with the Bulgarian prince Ferdinand of Coburg, this event was to coincide with the declaration of independence of Bulgaria. As a result, it turned out that Austria-Hungary was not the only state that violated the Berlin Treaty.

Already on August 20 (September 2), Izvolsky wrote from Carlsbad to his assistant N.V. Izvolsky found it extremely important that the Vienna Cabinet did not refuse to include the issue of the Straits in the discussion. Further, Izvolsky reasoned as follows: “It remains to find a formulation that really provided us with the necessary compensation. The fact is that the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be a material fact; compensation, namely, the consent of Austria-Hungary to one or another resolution of the question of the Straits, in any case, will be of an abstract and secret nature. On August 28, it was clear to Izvolsky that the decision to announce annexation in the near future had already been taken by the Vienna Cabinet.

On September 2–3 (15–16) Izvolsky met with Erenthal in Buchlau. The Russian minister wrote to his assistant that the Austro-Hungarian government had finally decided on annexation and was counting on its recognition by Russia.

As a result of complex negotiations, Erenthal agreed, without waiting for the liquidation of the Ottoman Empire in the distant future, to accept the Russian formula regarding the Straits, when all ships of Russia and other coastal states of the Black Sea could enter and exit through the Straits while maintaining the principle of closing them to warships of other nations. The subjects of the transaction were unequal. The annexation after thirty years of Austro-Hungarian administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina was a logical step, while Russia did not possess the Straits and could not independently resolve the issue settled at the international level. Erental only wanted to introduce some reservation into this formula, which would deprive it of its aggressive character towards Turkey, which seemed quite possible to Izvolsky. Erenthal expressed his readiness to support Russia's demand to Germany.

The Bosphorus mirage clearly arose before the eyes of Izvolsky, who wrote to Charykov that it was necessary to report everything to the tsar and develop before him the idea that we would not achieve anything by protests against annexation and threats, and the path of compensation and guarantees he proposed might even turn out to be profitable. “With a happy and skillful conduct of business, there are chances today, that is, without waiting for the liquidation of the Ottoman Empire, to change the decision on the Straits in our favor. In any case, we get formal consent to such a change from Austria, and maybe Germany, ”wrote Izvolsky.

The results of the meeting between Izvolsky and Erenthal were not officially recorded, which left the freedom to interpret the chances of "a happy and skillful conduct of business." Neither the timing of the annexation, nor Russia's proposal to revise the status of the Straits, nor the procedure for formalizing changes in the Berlin Treaty were specified. The interlocutors then interpreted its meaning differently: Izvolsky claimed that a formal conspiracy had taken place: Erental received Bosnia and Herzegovina, Izvolsky - a revision of the question of the Dardanelles at a European conference that he wanted to organize. Erenthal said that there was no collusion.

On September 10 (23), Izvolsky reminded Erenthal that he “conditioned his consent to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by recognizing the pan-European nature of this issue and the need for compensation.” On September 11, the Russian minister wrote to his assistant that "it is necessary to prepare and at the decisive moment direct our press and public opinion, which can very easily go astray." Izvolsky considered it very important to establish mutual understanding with a number of leading publications, not limited to the friendly New Time, but "enlist the support of A.I. Guchkov (Voice of Moscow) and P.N. Milyukov (Rech)". The main role in contacts with the press was assigned to A. A. Girs, who headed the press department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and assistant minister Charykov.

The ambassador in Istanbul, I. A. Zinoviev, correctly assessed the situation when he wrote that "the present Turkish government is not particularly disposed to resolving the issue of the straits in the sense that is desirable for Russia."

On October 5 (18), 1908, the commander of the troops of the Odessa Military District sent a letter to Palitsyn. "The political events taking place recently in the Balkan Peninsula confirm the need to keep our armed forces and assets on the Black Sea in constant readiness and to accept certain interventions in the fate of the Balkan peoples." He concluded that the question “of the readiness to transfer our armed forces at any moment to one or another point of the Turkish theater is very important and “requiring full and tireless attention and care” is the question of “the readiness to transfer our armed forces at any moment to one or another point of the Turkish theater - in other words, the constant readiness for an attempted landing operation in one or another other sizes and purposes.

The question of the implementation of the landing expedition was divided into a number of component questions about the readiness of the Black Sea Fleet (public and private), military units and various kinds of supplies. “At the present time,” A. V. Kaulbars reported to Palitsyn, “due to the transfer to the reserve, about 40% of the lower ranks are missing on all ships of the Black Sea Fleet. In view of this, for the immediate exit of the combat squadron, it is necessary to remove from all military transports and ships of the reserve fleet most of the crews on them and transfer them to the ships of the combat fleet. To staff up to the regular composition of the teams of military transports and ships of the reserve fleet, it will be necessary to call on spare sailors.

All the difficulties listed by the commander of the Odessa District were the reason that “the ships of the Black Sea Fleet could only be ready to go to sea on the 8th day after the announcement of the expedition. In addition, there was an acute shortage of coal reserves: there were about 20,000 tons; meanwhile, for the purposes of the expedition, a reserve of about 700,000 tons was recognized as necessary. As a result, it turned out that with such unprepared means, there can be no question of speed and, if possible, suddenness of our appearance off the coast of the Bosporus.

It was encouraging that in Peaceful time The banks of the Bosphorus were poorly guarded. The possibility of a sudden seizure of the shores of the Strait in peacetime was also due to certain mutual relations of the European powers, or, as the commander formulated it: "So to speak, the general political situation of the moment." The commander of the troops of the Odessa military district understood that "the Bosphorus expedition, the results of which, if the outcome is favorable, will be of paramount national importance," could lead to significant political difficulties. Therefore, he believed that the adoption of this decision should be preceded by a thorough discussion. “The results expected from the expedition, as well as the results caused by it, in view of the existing conditions, sacrifices and difficulties, will be put on the scales. Both those and others will make a relative assessment, which will serve as the basis for the subsequent decision.

“Until now, the issue of organizing the management of an amphibious expedition, which is a matter of paramount importance, has not been sufficiently developed,” Kaulbars admitted, “and the issue of delimiting the power and responsibility of the military and naval departments in organizing landing operations has not been resolved. It would seem that for the correct use of all the means prepared for the amphibious expedition, for improving and maintaining them in constant readiness, it is necessary, even in peacetime, to designate the person who will become the head of the expedition. Izvolsky, meanwhile, continued his diplomatic tour of Europe. On September 12–13 (25–26) in Berchtesgaden, he met with the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs W. Schön, and on September 16–17 (29–30) in Desio with Italian Foreign Minister T. Tittoni, followed by Paris and London. From a conversation with Schoen, Izvolsky fully understood that Germany would not object to changes in the regime of the Straits, but would demand compensation for itself in this region.

Tittoni was generally sympathetic, but immediately put forward Italy's claims to Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, to which the Russian minister did not object.

On September 19 (October 2), a draft memorandum to the Austro-Hungarian government, which requested compensation to Russia and the Balkan states in the event of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was approved by the tsar. Paragraph 2 of the memorandum dealt with the issue of the Straits and stipulated “the right for Russia and for other Black Sea countries to freely navigate their warships in both directions through the Straits that link the Black and Mediterranean Seas, since the principle of closing these Straits is established by states that are not coastal to this sea." At the end of the memorandum, the Russian government invited Vienna to conduct a friendly exchange of views on the future of Constantinople and its adjacent territories and to establish mutual understanding between Russia and the Danubian Monarchy in the event of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

On the same day, Charykov informed the chairman of the Council of Ministers, the military and naval ministers and the finance minister, as well as the acting chief of the General Staff, about the results of Russian-Austrian negotiations. Stolypin and Kokovtsov expressed their indignation at the fact that the Council of Ministers learned so late "about the case of such a huge historical significance affecting the interests internal state empire." The ministers urgently gathered for a meeting at which Stolypin and Kokovtsov, "with the sympathetic support of others," sharply criticized Izvolsky's actions. They believed that, although Russia could not prevent the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it should act as a defender of the interests of the affected states, "and by no means an accomplice or harborer of Austria." At the meeting, it was decided to tell the king that the government refuses to take responsibility for the consequences of actions taken without his knowledge.

Reporting to Izvolsky about what had happened, Charykov asked him to return to Petersburg. Having received a telegram compiled by Kokovtsov and setting out the opinion of the Council of Ministers, Izvolsky became seriously worried. The minister, through the Russian ambassador to France, A. I. Nelidov, explained to Charykov that he (Izvolsky) had warned Austria about the international consequences of the annexation and was proposing a peaceful and favorable outcome for Russia. He also believed that his return to St. Petersburg, as desired by the meeting, might not be desirable, since the upcoming talks in London, Paris and Berlin promised promising results in the current situation. Despite disagreement on the part of the Council of Ministers, Nicholas II allowed the Minister of Foreign Affairs to continue the journey.

On September 25 (October 8), Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is possible that the thought flashed through the Austrian minister that the unexpected annexation would help to frustrate Izvolsky's plans for the Straits. Two days before this event, on September 23 (October 6), the Russian ambassador in Istanbul, Zinoviev, met with the Grand Vizier and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey. From their responses, the ambassador concluded that they recognized it necessary to protest against the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria to the powers that signed the Treaty of Berlin, but "understand the impossibility of changing the course of events and treat the facts in cold blood."

The annexation in Berlin was treated with caution, although the advance of Austria-Hungary to the southeast was in line with the interests of the Central Powers. The German government, feeling dissatisfied with the independent step of Austria-Hungary, nevertheless unconditionally supported its ally. Reich Chancellor B. Bülow convinced the Kaiser that "only England can benefit from speaking out against Erenthal."

Britain, in turn, sought to prevent the strengthening of Germany's positions either in the Balkans or in Morocco. Gray's harmonious plans were violated by Izvolsky's confused diplomatic game with Austria-Hungary.

Britain took a sharply negative stance on the act of annexation. The British Foreign Minister E. Gray told the Austro-Hungarian government that “violation or modification of the terms of the Berlin Treaty without prior consent with other powers, of which Turkey is affected in this case above all, can never be approved or recognized by His Majesty's Government."

Meanwhile, it was precisely because of the Buhlau deal that the problem of the Straits turned out to be most closely connected with Balkan affairs. In Paris, Izvolsky received no definite assurances. By its non-intervention in the Bosnian crisis, France hoped to get a concession from Germany on the Moroccan issue, which was for her at that time more important than problems Russia and Turkey. Izvolsky's idea of ​​an international conference and compensation in favor of the countries disadvantaged by the annexation was not supported by French Foreign Minister S. Pichon. The French ministers were dissatisfied not only with the unfortunate moment and form chosen by Izvolsky to solve the problem of the Straits, but also with the fact that the Russian minister was negotiating with Erenthal behind their backs. On September 24 (October 7), Russian Ambassador Nelidov telegraphed from Paris that French Foreign Minister S. Pichon asked to inform Russia that "in the opinion of the London Cabinet, until a preliminary agreement on the conference program is reached, it is advisable not to make a proposal convocation. In particular, some time is needed for the preparation of public opinion on the question of the Straits. It is also advisable to agree on compensation in advance. As a result of all this, Gray asked the Paris Cabinet to encourage Russia not to rush with concrete proposals to convene a conference. It also seemed more desirable to Pichon to make a simultaneous declaration at Constantinople and Sofia to the effect that the Berlin Treaty could not be subjected to any modification or violation without the consent of the signatory powers.

In the issue of the Straits, France advocated respect for the sovereignty of Turkey and strongly advised that the issue be agreed with Britain in advance. The situation became even more aggravated due to the fact that just during Izvolsky's stay in Paris, he received a message that Stolypin's point of view had triumphed in St. Petersburg and that the tsarist government had decided to protest against the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This tied Izvolsky's hands. In this extremely complex and confusing situation, affecting the interests of almost all the great powers, a lot depended on the position of Britain.

Russian political circles immediately responded to the annexation. Golos Moskvy considered the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to be a statement of the final liquidation of the Berlin Treaty and supported “the demands made to the government not to miss the moment and take care of Russia's interests. This meant the revision of the regime of the Bosporus and Dardanelles.

The press also drew conclusions about failed attempts Izvolsky. The "Speech" of October 7, 1908 ridiculed the minister who wanted to pursue a policy of "disinterestedness" in the Turkish question and dreamed of coming to the proposed international conference with clean hands. “In no country, it seems, does diplomacy consider it a merit to be especially disinterested. On the contrary, everywhere, it goes without saying that everything undertaken in international politics must be undertaken solely in the interests of the state in question.” In October 1908, Novoye Vremya responded to the failure that had befallen Izvolsky: “We are surprised that A.P. Izvolsky did not come to Buchlau with the simple idea of ​​doing the same thing with the Dardanelles that Baron Erenthal did with Bosnia.”

British newspapers devoted entire pages of their publications to the crisis in the Middle East. Even before the arrival of Izvolsky in London " The Times(The Times) stated, "We can tell right off the bat that demanding new compensation from Turkey is simply unacceptable."

On September 25 (October 8), the day before Izvolsky's arrival in London, the British ambassador in St. Petersburg A. Nicholson informed Gray that Russia could be considered an ally in the issue of supporting Turkey. True, Russia did not agree with the agenda proposed by England for the conference, which was limited to questions of Bosnia, Herzegovina and the independence of Bulgaria. Russia demanded compensation for itself - access to the Straits.

During a week-long stay in the British capital on September 26 - October 3 (October 9-16), Izvolsky held tense negotiations not only with E. Gray and his assistant C. Harding, but also with some other British ministers. These negotiations in England were given such serious importance that they were repeatedly discussed by the cabinet, and their content was systematically reported to Edward VII.

Izvolsky's project provided for the opening of the Straits for military vessels of the Black Sea coastal states. His main proposal was that “the principle of closing the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus remains; an exception is made for military vessels of the coastal states of the Black Sea. At a time when the Port is not in a state of war, the coastal powers of the Black Sea will have the right to freely pass through the straits, in both directions, warships of all sizes and names. “However, in no case can more than three warships of the same coastal power make the transition from the Black to the Aegean Seas at the same time. The Ottoman authorities must be warned at least 24 hours before the passage of every warship." At the same time, Izvolsky assured Gray that “Russia has absolutely no plans of conquest in relation to Constantinople and the zone of the Straits.”

On September 30 (October 13), 1908, Izvolsky's proposal was discussed by the British cabinet. Outlining in detail the course of the negotiations, Gray informed those present that, according to the Russian minister, a negative solution to the issue would lead to very serious consequences: “Izvolsky said that the present moment is the most critical - it can strengthen and strengthen good relations between England and Russia or break them absolutely. His own position is at stake, since he is wholly bound up with the policy of establishing a good agreement with England, which he defends against all adversaries. After a long and very heated discussion of the problem of the Straits, the cabinet was unable to reach a unanimous decision. In Gray's opinion, regardless of the essence of Russian claims, the moment in connection with the events in Turkey was extremely unsuitable for raising the question of the Straits. As a result, Izvolsky's proposal was rejected by a majority of votes. The authority and position of Izvolsky directly depended on London, so the Russian minister was extremely persistent. He managed to ensure that on October 12 Gray received him for the third time. The meeting took place at Gray's house, and the Russian ambassador to London, A. K. Benckendorff, was present during the conversation. Izvolsky somewhat retreated from his original position, proposing the option of passage through the Straits in peacetime of the warships of all the Black Sea states and ensuring that Turkey, in case of war, had equal rights in the use of the Straits by all powers. Gray, not wanting to put Izvolsky in a stalemate, saw in this proposal an element of reciprocity and promised to discuss it at a cabinet meeting.

On October 14, 1908, Gray handed Izvolsky a secret memorandum setting out the British Cabinet's final opinion on the matter. “The British Government agrees to the opening of the Straits, provided that the Straits are open to all equally and without exception. The Russian proposal (to open them "for Russia and the coastal states") runs counter to British public opinion, which would be extremely disappointed if Russia, which was protesting against Austria's actions, took the opportunity to secure an advantage for itself to the detriment of Turkey or in violation of the status quo to the disadvantage of others. A purely unilateral agreement that would give the Black Sea states an advantage in wartime to use the entire Black Sea as an inaccessible harbor, as a refuge for their cruisers and fighters in case of any pursuit by the belligerents, cannot be accepted by the public opinion of England ... The agreement should be, therefore, such that, giving Russia and the coastal states at any time an exit, subject to the restrictions indicated by Mr. Izvolsky, and protecting them from the threat or assertion of foreign naval power in the Black Sea, and in peacetime, it would contain an element of reciprocity and in in the event of a war, it would put the belligerents in the same conditions. Moreover, with regard to the passage of the Straits, His Majesty's Government takes the liberty of remarking that the consent of Turkey must be a necessary preliminary condition for any project.

From the text of the memorandum, it can be concluded that London does not object in principle to the opening of the Straits, but not only for Russia and the coastal states, but on conditions of complete equality for all countries without exception, and that His Majesty's Government does not consider the time suitable for concluding an agreement, which would give Russia exclusive rights. The proposal of the Russian government to grant this right only to the Black Sea states could cause the British to suspect that Russian diplomacy is trying to use the tense situation caused by Austria's actions in its own interests and to the detriment of Turkey.

The memorandum further proposed to divide the problem of changing the regime of the Straits into two parts - for the period of peacetime and for the period of war. The British government, not objecting to granting the Black Sea states the right to withdraw ships from the Straits at any time (with the restrictions mentioned in Izvolsky's memorandum) and actually agreeing to maintain the principle of closing the Straits for warships of non-Black Sea states in peacetime, insisted on introducing the principle of reciprocity in the use of the Straits by warships of all countries in wartime, especially in the case of participation in hostilities by Great Britain and Russia.

When translating the text of the English memorandum published in A. I. Nelidov's Note on the Straits, a serious error crept in, significantly distorting its content. The word egress has been translated as advantage. Meanwhile, it meant the right of passage. This changed the essence of the British memorandum, which contained the agreement of the British side to grant the Black Sea powers the right of passage through the Straits in peacetime.

The most significant change in the new memorandum was the division of the problem into two parts: the period of peace and war. But after all, Izvolsky and the Russian side, seeking to grant the Russian fleet the right to pass through the Straits, had in mind only peacetime.

Obviously, no treatises and treaties could remain in force in wartime, especially if England and Russia were enemies. Suffice it to recall the statement of R. Salisbury in 1878 that the British government reserves the right to send its fleet to the Black Sea in case of war, regardless of any treatises.

The Gray Memorandum also introduced two new provisions that had not previously figured in the Anglo-Russian negotiations over the Straits. The first has already been mentioned: the British side insisted that the change in the regime of the Straits should not be associated with an international conference that Izvolsky proposed to convene in connection with the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The second position was much more significant.

The Foreign Office document emphasized that the British Government believed that "Turkey's consent must be a necessary prerequisite for any proposal to change the regime of the Straits." For the first time in the course of diplomatic negotiations on this issue, the British side not only remembered the existence of the Turkish government, but even demanded that its consent to any changes in the regime of the Straits be secured.

This condition really changed the whole situation in a significant way and made it almost impossible for the Russian government to achieve a change in the regime of the Straits. In Constantinople, Germany's positions were again strengthened. “Turkey was offended by the scornful attitude of Austria and Bulgaria towards her ... - Gray wrote. “We cannot agree to add more embarrassment to this by imposing on Turkey the embarrassing issue of the Straits.”

Simultaneously with a negative response to Izvolsky, “the British government warned the Porte about the information it allegedly had about Russia’s aggressive projects in relation to the Straits and demanded, on this basis, to strengthen the defensive structures on the Bosphorus, and then, recognizing the measures taken by the Porte as insufficient, sent (despite the protests of the Ports) the British squadron to Turkish waters, to the Straits, to reinforce their views on this issue.

Gray knew from the very beginning that Russia would not agree to the opening of the Straits to the warships of all powers. “The simple opening of the Straits for the warships of all peoples,” he wrote, “would provide an opportunity for foreign fleets to concentrate on the Black Sea at any time. This is unfavorable for Russia and will naturally be unacceptable for her.”

In addition, British diplomacy did not intend to change the regime of the Straits in favor of Russia for nothing, because such a change, in the opinion of the British government, would give Petersburg during the war the opportunity to turn the Black Sea into a harbor from which Russian ships could prevent communications to the Mediterranean Sea and in which they could hide from the persecution of the enemy.

As for the statement about the rejection of the Russian proposal until a favorable change in public opinion for Russia, which was included in the memorandum of the British government, it was dictated only by tactical considerations.

"Careful and prudent was the behavior English minister Foreign Affairs of Edward Grey, - B. Bulow wrote in his memoirs, - he was filled with the desire not to bring things to a break. British diplomacy achieved its goal of preventing Russia from free passage of its warships through the Straits, skillfully using the fact that Izvolsky could not openly admit to his deal with Erenthal at the expense of the Slavic peoples.

In a conversation with Gray on October 1 (14), 1908, Izvolsky stated: “When the question of the Straits is raised, England constantly impedes its solution, and, despite a good relationship with England, no real improvement resulted from these good relations. This may prove disastrous for a good understanding with England." Gray insisted, however, that the moment for resolving the matter raised was unfortunate, and promised at another, more convenient time to use the influence of England in Istanbul to secure the consent of the Turkish government. “Izvolsky only achieved Gray’s assurance,” as A. Taylor correctly noted, “that he would be glad to perform a miracle:“ I positively wish to reach such an agreement that will open the Straits on terms acceptable to Russia ... and at the same time not put in disadvantageous position for Turkey or other powers.”

In fact, as V. M. Khvostov pointed out in The History of Diplomacy, “the change in the position of the British government was explained by the fact that if earlier the influence of Germany prevailed in Turkey, now the Young Turk revolution contributed to the strengthening of the influence of England. It was one thing to support Russia's claims for the free passage of its ships through the Straits in defiance of the hostile Turkey, as well as Germany standing behind her, and it was quite another to support the same claims when there is a chance to become the mistress of the Straits.

In the materials of the St. Petersburg Telegraph Agency, which quoted Izvolsky's interview with Reuters, it was stated that “Izvolsky and Grey have reached agreement on a conference on Balkan affairs, but only a narrow range of issues will be touched upon in it. It is not intended to put the question of the Dardanelles for discussion at the conference, since this question will concern mainly Russia and Turkey. Russia does not want this issue to be resolved in a sense unfavorable for Turkey or to be turned into a question of compensation, since Russia will come to the congress only as a disinterested power.

The Times also confirmed Russia's disinterestedness towards Turkey, but did not go into details of Izvolsky's negotiations with Gray, referring to the fact that they took place behind closed doors. "The Standard" (Standard) credited Great Britain with speaking out in defense of the Port, the issue of opening the Straits was attributed to the two most interested powers - Russia and Turkey, there was concern about Germany and Austria-Hungary's consent to compensation. The issue of the Straits was removed from the agenda. Gray urged Izvolsky to "show such an expression of goodwill towards Turkey that, at the time of the present crisis, while protecting Turkish interests, one would not receive direct benefits for Russia itself - this would make a good impression on the public opinion of England."

Paris and London showed Russian diplomacy "that the road to a peaceful resolution of the issue of the Straits goes from St. Petersburg not through Berlin and Vienna, but through London and Paris, and showed this in the most decisive form, leaving no room for any doubts and hesitation" .

The fact that Gray was not going to help Izvolsky was evidenced by the following remark by Nicholson: “His (Izvolsky. - Auth.) the appeal to the issue of the Straits was so unintelligible from the very beginning - through a fog of inaccuracies (a secret deal with Erenthal in Buchlau. - Auth.). Unfortunately for him, his first steps in this darkness and on a slippery slope brought him face to face with an enemy who presented his own goals with the utmost clarity.

How insignificant the Russian request was for the British government can be seen from Gray's letter to Lowther: “From a strategic point of view, there are no advantages for our ships to enter the Black Sea in wartime. It is an already established principle of our maritime strategy that under no circumstances should warships enter the Black Sea as long as Turkey is not our ally. The terms of reciprocity are therefore nothing more than a shop window.”

Britain decided to postpone the issue of the Black Sea Straits indefinitely. “It is quite possible that it will never be raised,” Zinoviev wrote in his report to the Foreign Ministry. "England will not agree to any proposal before it has been previously accepted by Turkey."

Izvolsky, knowing the cunning of British diplomacy, could have foreseen such an outcome. Even before leaving Paris for London, Izvolsky, not knowing about the new conditions that would be put forward there, had a long conversation with the Turkish ambassador in France, during which he proposed to conclude an alliance treaty between both parties, which included granting Russian warships the right of free passage through the Straits. .

While Izvolsky was touring Europe, Charykov and Stolypin prepared their draft Russian-Turkish agreement, which provided for the support of the Russian government at a future international conference for Turkey's position on the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and, at the same time, Turkey's consent to a change in the regime of the Straits.

On September 23 (October 6), Charykov presented a draft treaty with Turkey, which consisted of four points, for a report to the tsar. He proposed that the two powers at the forthcoming conference on the revision of the Berlin Treaty act jointly in defense of mutual interests. Petersburg was ready to support a number of wishes of the Ottoman Empire, including the abolition of capitulations and the remnants of the indemnity due to Russia. The Turkish government, for its part, had to take an obligation: not to object to the transformation of Bulgaria into an independent kingdom; in the event that the powers agree not to reject the opening of the Straits for the military courts of Russia and other Black Sea countries, subject to the absolute security of Turkish territory and installations in the vicinity of the Straits. Nicholas II approved Charykov's plan.

On September 26 (October 9), the Turkish government decided not to oppose the Russian proposal and asked St. Petersburg to get support for this agreement from England and France at a conference. “Turkey has no objection to our formula about the straits,” Charykov reported to Stolypin. In fact, the Port also did not want to support the Russian proposal, especially with regard to the Straits, therefore, it immediately informed England and Germany about it, counting on their assistance. The ambassador in Istanbul, I. A. Zinoviev, correctly assessed the situation when he wrote: “The present Turkish government is not particularly disposed to resolving the issue of the Straits in the sense that is desirable for Russia.”

Berlin followed the developments closely. On October 19 (November 1), the German ambassador in St. Petersburg, A. Pourtales, visited Izvolsky, and they discussed the upcoming conference. The ambassador explained to Izvolsky the motives of German policy, recalling the Russo-Japanese War, when Germany, according to him, was one of all European states, exposing itself to the danger of complications with Japan, supported Russia.

Instead of gratitude, the Russian government joined the ambivalent agreement between France and England, more and more clearly taking the side of a group of powers hostile to Germany. The culminating point of this policy was the Algeciras Conference, where Russia openly spoke out against Germany.

From the book Russia and the Horde author

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international conflict that arose in connection with the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary. According to Art. 25 of the Berlin Treaty (cf. Berlin congress) these two Turkish provinces, inhabited by Serbs and Croats, were under Austrian occupation, but Austria-Hungary sought to completely annex them and use them as a springboard for its expansion south towards Thessaloniki. Opportunity presented itself to Austria-Hungary in connection with the Young Turk coup, the answer to which was "the September counter-revolutionary conspiracy of the powers ... in the name of direct suppression of the revolution in Asia ... in the name of continuing colonial robbery and territorial gains" (Lenin). On 15. IX 1908 a meeting of the Russian and Austrian foreign ministers Izvolsky and Erenthal took place in Buchlau. They agreed to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary and the opening of the Black Sea straits to Russian warships. But while Russia's intention to open the straits met with opposition from England and France, Austria-Hungary, supported by Germany, hastened to take advantage of Izvolsky's consent and on October 7, 1908 announced the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the same time, in order not to appear as the first power to violate the Berlin Treaty, Austria-Hungary resorted to a diplomatic trick: it agreed with Ferdinand Coburg(see) on the proclamation of the independence of Bulgaria, which took place 2 days before the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Turkey, which nominally belonged to Bosnia and Herzegovina, protested against the violation of the Berlin Treaty. A boycott of Austrian goods was declared in Istanbul and other Turkish cities. However, having received no support from any of the great powers, the Porte soon (on February 26, 1909) signed an agreement with Austria, accepting under the guise of buying out the waqf lands (but in essence as a payment for renouncing its sovereignty over the annexed areas) the amount of 2 £500,000 Art. The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina caused a particularly strong indignation in Serbia, where these areas were considered as part of the future large South Slavic state. In response to the annexation, the Serbian government demanded autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the division of the Novobazar Sanjak between Serbia and Montenegro in order to establish a common border between them and prevent further advance of Austria-Hungary to the south. At the same time, Serbia began to prepare for a war against Austria-Hungary and turned to the powers, primarily Russia, for help. Russia, which did not receive its share from the Buchlau deal, was extremely outraged by the actions of Austria, but, not being prepared for war, sought to resolve the conflict through diplomacy. She demanded that the question of annexation be considered by a conference of the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin, and advised Serbia to await the decision of that conference. However, Austria-Hungary, vigorously supported by Germany, did not agree to any concessions. Due to the resistance of these two powers, and also in view of France's refusal to actively support her ally, Russia, the conference of powers was not convened. At the same time, Germany, given Russia's unpreparedness for war, intervened in the conflict in order, as Wilhelm II later declared, to defend its ally "with all the brilliance of its weapons." On March 14, 1909, the German government proposed to Russia the following way of resolving the issue: Austria-Hungary would ask the powers to formally sanction the annexation by exchange of notes, on the condition that Russia promises in advance to give this sanction, and Serbia would renounce all claims to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since Russia hesitated to accept the German proposal, Bülow(see) 21. III 1909 through the German ambassador in St. Petersburg presented Izvolsky with an ultimatum demand for an immediate positive or negative response, and made it clear that a negative response would entail an attack by Austria-Hungary on Serbia. The tsarist government, having come to the conclusion that Russia was not ready for war, accepted the German proposal. The German proposal was then accepted by the other powers, after which the said exchange of notes took place. Left without support, the Serbian government was forced on March 31, 1909 in Vienna to make a humiliating statement that it recognizes the decision of the powers on the question of annexation, renounces its protests and stops all activities within the country directed against Austria-Hungary. This B. to. formally ended, but its consequences continued to affect in the future. It led to the intensification of military preparations in both warring camps of Europe. Relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia not only did not improve, but became more and more aggravated up to the Sarajevo assassination. Thus, B. to., deepening the contradictions between tripartite agreement and tripartite alliance(see), was one of the important stages on the way to the First World War. Literature: Graf Benckendorffs diplomatischer Schriftwechsel. Neue stark vermehrte Auflage der Diplomatischen Aktenstäcke zur Geschichte der Ententepolitik der Vorkriegsjahre. Bd I. 1907-1910. Hrsg. v. B.v. Siebert. Berlin-Leipzig. 1928. S. 11-208. - British documents on the origins of the war. 1898-1914. Ed. by G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley. Vol. 5. London. 1928. P. 356-830.-Die Grosse Politik der europ?ischen Kabinette 1871-1914. Bd 26. Hf. 1-2. Berlin. 1925. - ?sterreicb-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der Bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914. Diplomatische Aktenst?cke d. ?ster.-Ungar. Ministeriums des ?ussern. Ausgew?hlt v. L. Bittner, A. F. Pribram, H. Sbrik u. H. Uebersberger. Bd 1-9. Vienna-Leipzig. 1930. - Zayonchkovsky, A. M. Around the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. "Red Archive". 1925. Vol. 3 (10). pp. 41-53. - Bosnia and Herzegovina in the National Assembly of the Kingdom of Serbia at meetings on September 29, December 20 and 21, 1908. Belgrade. 1909. 86 pp. - Savinsky, A. L entrevue de Buchlau "Le monde slave". 1931. Février. P. 218-227.- Gray of Fallodon. Twenty five years. 1892-1916. Vol. 1. New York. 1925. P. 166-194. - Gershich, G. International right balance in the last Balkan crisis. Beograd. 1909. 138 p. - Zvijir, Jovan. Aneksija Bosne and Herzegovina and Serbia problems. Beograd. 1908. 62 p. -Milyukov, P.N. The Balkan crisis and the policy of A.P. Izvolsky. SPb. 1910. XIV, 404 p. - Nintchitch, M. La crise bosniaque (1908-1909) et les puissances europ?ennes. T. 1-2. Paris. 1937.- Seton-Watson, R. W. The réle of Bosnia in international politics 1875-1914. Oxford. 1932. 36 p.- Pribram, A. F. Austrian foreign policy 1908-1918. With a foreword by G. P. Gooch. London. . 128p. - Zweybräck, F. ?sterreichische essays. Graf Aehrenthal. Berlin. 1916. XL 302 S. - Wedel, O. H. Austro-German diplomacy relations 1908-1914. Stanford University - London. . P. 47-104.-David, W. D. European diplomacy in the Near Eastern question 1906 - 1909. Urbana. 1940.

Bosnian Crisis 1908-1909, its reason was the annexationist policy of Austria-Hungary, which sought to strengthen its position in the Balkan Peninsula. One of the most important strategic tasks is to provide access to the Aegean Sea through the Macedonian port of Thessaloniki.

After the coup d'état of 1903, which brought the Karageorgievich dynasty to power, the new Serbian government set a course for cooperation with Russia and liberation from Austro-Hungarian financial and economic domination. The victory of Serbia ended the customs war with Austria-Hungary, which began in 1906. October 5, 1908 The rescript of Emperor Franz Joseph on the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was published. The Serbian kingdom considered these territories as part of the future South Slavic state and therefore opposed their annexation. Serbia turned to Russia for help, which, in turn, offered to consider this issue at a conference of countries participating in the Berlin Congress. February-March 1909 Austria-Hungary concentrated large army units on the border with Serbia. In support of an ally German Chancellor Bülow sends two messages to St. Petersburg demanding that the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina be sanctioned. Russia, and then other countries that signed the Berlin Treaty, accepted the German proposal.

March-October 1912. formed Balkan Union as part of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Montenegro. The most important goal of the union was liberation from the Ottoman oppression, at the same time the Balkan Union was also directed against A-B. Bulgaria wanted, by annexing Thessaloniki and western Thrace, to gain access to the Aegean Sea, and, together with Serbia, to seize most of Macedonia. Greece claimed territorial acquisitions in South Macedonia and western Thrace, as well as the island of Crete and other island territories in the Aegean Sea. Serbia sought, together with Greece, to carry out the division of Albania and secure access to the Adriatic Sea.

First Balkan War 1912-1913 The reason for the war was the refusal of the Turkish government from its promise to grant autonomy to Macedonia and Thrace. Hostilities began in October 1912. The allied troops launched a decisive offensive: the Bulgarian troops rushed to Constantinople, the Greeks cleared Epirus of the enemy and, together with the Bulgarians, occupied Thessaloniki. Serbian troops liberated most of Macedonia, northern Albania and reached the Adriatic coast. Turkey has requested a truce. On December 16, a conference of representatives of the warring countries opened in London. But in January 1913 hostilities resumed. But the Ottoman Empire was again defeated. In May 1913 in London, Turkey signed a peace treaty, according to which it ceded significant territories to the Balkan states west of the Midia-Enos line.

Second Balkan War 1913 The royal government of Serbia was the first to express its dissatisfaction with the results of the war. Having not received Northern Albania and access to the Adriatic Sea, it demanded the transfer of Vardar Macedonia. Greece laid claim to Thessaloniki and the Aegean coast. Romania counted on the annexation of Southern Dobruja and the Silistria fortress. But Bulgaria refused them all. As a result, Serbia, Greece, Romania and Turkey entered into an anti-Bulgarian alliance. Hostilities lasted from June to August 10, 1913 and ended with the signing of the Bucharest peace and the signing of a separate peace treaty between Bulgaria and Turkey - the Constantinople peace treaty on September 29. Bulgaria lost all acquisitions in Macedonia. Serbia received Vardar Macedonia, Greece-Aegean Macedonia with Thessaloniki, Epirus and the islands of the Aegean Sea. Romania acquired Southern Dobruja and Silistria. Turkey regained most of Eastern Thrace with Adrianople.

Preparing for war, both blocks were engaged in strengthening their positions in the Balkans and the Middle East.

Plans of Germany and Austria-Hungary in the Balkans:

1. Germany hatched plans to subjugate Turkey to its influence, especially after it managed to get a concession for the construction of the Baghdad railway.

2. Austria-Hungary wanted to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina; sought to subjugate Serbia and Bulgaria to its influence and oust Russia from there; go to the shores of the Aegean Sea.

England could not reconcile with these plans, which has always considered the countries of the Middle East as a bridge from Europe to India. Russia could not allow this either, the subordination of Turkey and the Balkans to the influence of Germany and Austria would mean a threat to the security of the entire Russian south from the Black Sea coast to the Transcaucasian border.

In 1908-1909. the Bosnian crisis erupted. Austria-Hungary, relying on the support of Germany, using the weakening of the Ottoman Empire caused by the Turkish Revolution and the rising freedom movement in the Balkans, in 1908 annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. The failure of the attempt of Russian diplomacy to achieve a revision of the status of the Black Sea straits for agreeing to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina led to the conclusion Russian agreements With Italy on maintaining the status quo in the Balkans and on joint action against any violation of the status quo. It was signed in Racconigi(near Turin) October 24, 1909 This actually meant union of Russia and Italy directed against Turkey and Austria. The agreement hastened the start Italian-Turkish War 1911–1912 gg. for Libya and, oddly enough, the beginning of the Balkan wars. After all, watching the defeat of Turkey in the Italo-Turkish war, the Balkan countries hastened to formalize Balkan Union and start a war against the Porte.

October 6, 1908 governments Serbia and Montenegro announced in their countries mobilization. Russia, under pressure from Germany, was forced to recognize this action of the Austrian government, as it was not ready to interfere with it by military means. Under the pressure of his ally, Serbia March 31, 1909 also was forced to recognize the annexation, April 9, 1909, the rest of the great powers agreed with this.

Consequences of the Balkan Crisis of 1908–1909:

1. Relations between Russia and Serbia on the one hand and Austria-Hungary on the other deteriorated.

2. In contrast to the Entente, Germany became even closer to Austria-Hungary.

3. There has been a departure of Italy from tripartite alliance.

4. Within the framework of the Entente, serious contradictions were revealed: the allies did not provide Russia with significant support in the Bosnian-Herzegovina issue (“they kept the gunpowder dry”) and were not ready to satisfy Russia’s claims in the Eastern Question, in general, leaving Russia alone with Germany and Austria-Hungary .

First Balkan War (1912–1913).August 6(19), 1911 a Russian-German treaty was signed, which concerned only the policy of both countries in relation to Persia and Turkey, as well as problems related to the construction of the Baghdad road.

Terms of the Russo-German Potsdam Agreement:

1. Russia pledged not to interfere with the construction of the railway Berlin – Baghdad, and also committed itself to obtaining a concession from Iran for the construction of a railway Tehran - Khanekin on the Iranian-Turkish border.

2. Germany acknowledged the presence of "special interests" of Russia in northern Iran and pledged not to seek concessions there, and also gave an assurance that it would not build branches of the Baghdad railway north of Khanekin.

Despite all efforts, the German side failed to tear Russia away from the Entente. In the end September 1911, sending Turkey ultimatum, Italy started a war to conquer Tripoli and Cyrenaica. The situation in the Balkans, the aggressive actions of Austria-Hungary, the Italo-Turkish war pushed the Balkan states to an alliance against Turkey. Russia supported the unification of their forces, but against Austria-Hungary and Germany.

The goals of the Balkan countries in the war with Turkey:

1. Serbia advocated the division of Macedonia, Albania, as Serbia sought to gain access to the Adriatic Sea.

2. Bulgaria demanded the annexation of the entire Macedonian territory, she sought to gain access to Aegean Sea, annexing Thessaloniki and Western Thrace. First Bulgarian king Ferdinand I dreamed of creating Whole Bulgaria- an empire that was supposed to cover the entire eastern part of the Balkans.

3. Greece also claimed Thrace, Macedonia and Albania.

4. Montenegrins sought to occupy the major Turkish ports on the Adriatic and the Novopazar Sanjak.

Negotiations dragged on. The main difficulty in creating a Balkan Union was how to reach an agreement on the division of Macedonia between Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece, and Thrace between Greece and Bulgaria. Bulgarian-Serbian treaty on a defensive alliance was signed only March 13, 1912 May 12, 1912, Bulgaria and Serbia signed military convention in case of war against Turkey or Austria. May 29 joined the Union of Slavic States Greece, who did not want to be left without territorial gains at the expense of Turkey. Later alliance treaty signed Montenegro and Bulgaria.Petersburg wanted to keep the Balkan countries from attacking Turkey, but failed to do so.

September 26 (October 9), 1912 Montenegro, having opened hostilities, marked the beginning of the First Balkan War. On October 5 (18), 1912, Serbia and Bulgaria declared war on Turkey, and the next day, Greece. Balkan countries quickly defeated the Turkish troops and occupied most of the territory that belonged to Turkey in Europe. On December 16, 1912, at a conference in London, negotiations began between representatives of the warring countries of Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, Montenegro and Turkey on the development of peace conditions. . On May 30, 1913, a peace treaty between Turkey, where the Young Turks came to power, on the one hand, and Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria and Montenegro, on the other, was signed. Even at the very beginning of the work of the London Conference, the ambassadors of the six countries decided to create an autonomous Albania. The supreme power in the country was left to the Turkish sultan, however, under the control of six European powers, and in fact a protectorate of Austria-Hungary and Italy was established. This was done in order to deprive Serbia of access to the Adriatic. Russia could not prevent this. After the war, a dispute arose between the allies about the ownership of Macedonia, Thrace, northern Albania. Montenegro did not occupy Shkoder, Greece did not annex Thrace. Bulgaria was unhappy with the claims of the Serbs to Macedonia. None of the founding states of the Balkan Union was fully satisfied with the London Treaty and the outcome of the war.

Second Balkan War (June 29– July 29, 1913). First Balkan War despite the opposition of Austria-Hungary and Germany, strengthened the position of Serbia and influenced its position in the Balkan region, important in the event of a war in Europe. That's why Austrian diplomacy and Germany was intended to, if not eliminate Balkan block, then at least significantly weaken b. Influenced by German and Austrian diplomacy Greece and Serbia began to agree on a joint struggle against Bulgaria and June 1, 1913 signed the corresponding treaty.

In the hope that it will be supported by Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria June 29, 1913 without declaring war, opened hostilities against the Serbs and Greeks. started Second Balkan War.

The goals of the powers in the Second Balkan War:

1. Serbs, not having received access to the Adriatic Sea as a result of the First Balkan War, they wanted to annex to their country Macedonia and Thessaloniki thus gaining access to the Aegean Sea.

2. Greeks it was necessary to expand the borders of their country as much as possible. Later, after the First World War, there was The great idea of ​​Venizelos- recreation Byzantine Empire with its capital in Constantinople (Istanbul).

3. Romania, which was not part of the union, also had territorial claims to Bulgaria dreaming about Dobruja.

The Bulgarian command and Tsar Ferdinand, starting the war, did not take into account the fact that the situation in Europe had changed. Germany held back Austria-Hungary, since decisive measures were taken in Germany to strengthen the army, which should have been completed only by the beginning of 1914. In addition, Germany did not want Romania to go over to the Entente.

The Bulgarian troops were defeated, which prompted them to oppose it. July 12 Turkey, a the 14 th of July– Romania.July 30 in Bucharest opened conference, on which August 10, 1913 was signed peace treaty.

Terms of the Bucharest Peace Treaty:

1. Greece received South Macedonia, Thessaloniki, part western Thrace, island Crete and islands in the Aegean.

2. Serbia got most of Macedonia previously owned by Bulgaria.

3. Romania found Southern Dobruja.

4. Turkey got back a part Thrace and Adrianople(currently city Edirne).

5. Bulgaria lost not only recent conquests, but also part of its old territory. Despite significant territorial losses, the central part of Thrace, conquered from the Ottoman Empire, remained part of Bulgaria.

Consequences of the Balkan Wars:

1. The Balkan wars led to the liberation of the Slavic peoples from the Turkish yoke.

2. The Balkan bloc ceased to exist, which was in the hands of Germany and Austria-Hungary.

3. Germany and Austria-Hungary lost Romania, which, together with Serbia and Greece, was now under the influence of the Entente.

4. Serbia has lost the support of Russia, but has grown significantly. Serbia, having again failed to gain access to the Adriatic Sea during the war, wanted to annex the north of Albania, which went against the policy of Austria-Hungary and Italy. The Balkans became the "powder magazine" of Europe.