There is no doubt that the soldiers who returned from campaigns brought with them new concepts of human dignity and for the first time they had an idea of ​​the duty of a citizen and his rights. But, however, such a development of the personnel of military units can be noted only in the guards and a small number of army units, in the rest of the army the development of both officers and lower ranks, and especially relations between themselves, were completely different. It must be borne in mind that there were still quite a few former "Gatchins" and their ardent followers in the army who continued to profess the Pavlovian Catechism of drill; they understood only the cruel methods of training and it was strange to do without corporal punishment. True, with the accession to the throne of Alexander I, these officers became quiet and temporarily consigned to oblivion their methods of education, but still their attitude differed too sharply from that of the advanced officers, despite the fact that many of these Gatchina offspring had been abroad. Apparently, there were quite a few such officers, as can be seen at least from a special circular of 1810, in which the Minister of War Barclay de Tolly, drawing attention to the increase in sickness and mortality in the troops, pointed out to the generals the deep-rooted habit of “all science, discipline And military order based on corporal and cruel punishment; there were even examples that the officers treated the soldiers inhumanly.” And there were many such "brave captains", unfortunately, in the army.

The influence of Arakcheev on the tightening of army discipline and drill

Strengthening the role of Arakcheev under Alexander I ¦ Reviews of contemporaries on the reforms carried out by Arakcheev in the field of military affairs

After the campaigns abroad, abrupt changes took place in the character of Alexander I: from the first days of his reign, the emperor had to spend a lot of energy on various administrative reforms in Russia. Since 1805, a tense struggle with Napoleon begins; in 1812 the sovereign, by his irreconcilable struggle with Napoleon, showed an amazing firmness of character; foreign campaigns took away from Alexander I a lot of strength to settle all kinds of friction between the allies; in this regard, the campaign of 1814 was especially difficult, when Austria openly already peaced Napoleon, and the successful outcome of the campaign for the coalition was entirely due to Alexander. Modest and always even, who loved his troops, became related to them, the emperor at that time was at the height of his glory and was undoubtedly the first person in Europe. First completely captivated by the idea of ​​overthrowing the European tyrant Napoleon, and then deftly carried away by Metternich with the idea of ​​​​eradicating revolutionary ideas in Europe, Alexander I for a long time takes a great interest in the role of a European arbitrator, forever distracted from his former bright ideals in the matter of restructuring his own state. Under these conditions, the burden of internal government became more and more difficult and unbearable for him. It became necessary to transfer part of this burden to a trusted and closest assistant. Naturally, the heir to the crown prince should have become such an assistant, but at the very beginning of his reign, Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich declared his firm intention never to take the throne, and after 1815 he was so carried away by the arrangement of his Polish army that he left his beloved Warsaw with extreme reluctance .

The question of appointing Grand Duke Nikolai Pavlovich as heir to the throne was resolved only in the 1920s; he needed, moreover, to finish military education; and Grand Duke Mikhail Pavlovich was still too young. The emperor had to place the burden of government on a mere mortal. Count Alexei Andreevich Arakcheev turned out to be such a chosen one, who by the end of the reign of Alexander I became the unlimited, uncontrolled ruler of the entire state, the only speaker on all matters of government, a person so significant that even Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich had to reckon with him.

Undoubtedly, Arakcheev owes his prominent position in the state entirely to Paul I, to whom he entered the service in the Gatchina troops on September 4, 1792, being received rather dryly by the crown prince. At the very first divorce, he showed himself as if he had served in Gatchina for a century, and with his zeal, knowledge of the matter and precise diligence, he soon won the favor of the Grand Duke, who appointed him, with the award of the rank of captain, the commander of his artillery company. Arakcheev devoted himself entirely to his new duties and in a short time brought the Gatchina artillery into exemplary order. Without getting close to anyone, without currying favor with anyone, by no means showing his own character, he achieved high distinctions and appointments that quickly followed each other by his strict attitude to service, zeal and speed in fulfilling the orders of the crown prince.

Count A. A. Arakcheev (from a painting by George Dawe)

The need to constantly maneuver and adapt, to constantly feel as if on the edge of a knife, refined the flexibility of the soul inherent in him by nature. The ability to wear an impenetrable mask on his beautiful face became for him a conscious instrument of self-preservation, but with the accession of Paul I, a whole series of new military posts were assigned to the Grand Duke, forcing him to appear daily to the quick-tempered, changeable emperor. It was here that Arakcheev, who still enjoyed the full confidence of Paul I and who had perfectly studied the character of the emperor by that time, helped the young Grand Duke a lot both with advice and skillful smoothing sharp corners in the relationship of the emperor with his son; this the Grand Duke never forgot.

Being at this time a thunderstorm of the troops, Arakcheev stood guard over the exact, blind execution of the sovereign's instructions and the observance of the law, remaining implacable and strict. Sablukov, in his notes, left us a description of Arakcheev's appearance: “In appearance, Arakcheev looks like a big monkey in a uniform. He was tall, thin and wiry; there was nothing slender in his warehouse; as he was very round-shouldered and had a long, thin neck, on which one could study the anatomy of veins, muscles, etc. Moreover, he somehow convulsively wrinkled his chin. He had large, fleshy ears, a thick, ugly head, always tilted to one side; his complexion was unclean, his cheeks were sunken, his nose was broad and angular, his nostrils swollen, his mouth large, and his forehead hanging down. To finish his portrait - he had sunken grey eyes, and the whole expression of his face was a strange mixture of intelligence and anger.

On July 27, 1807, Arakcheev was promoted to the rank of general from artillery, and on December 12 he was appointed, while maintaining his ranks, still under the sovereign emperor in the artillery unit; finally, on January 13, 1808, Count Arakcheev was placed at the head of the Military Ministry and, in addition, was appointed inspector general of all infantry and artillery; then he was entrusted with the military field office of the sovereign and the courier corps. From the enumeration of all these positions, it is clear that under Alexander I Arakcheev occupied a higher position in the military department than during the time of his favor with Paul I, but his influence grew more and more; now he felt more secure, firstly, thanks to the gentle nature of the emperor and a special, purely friendly gratitude for help in his former service, and secondly, the absence of more capable and dexterous courtiers (Prince Volkonsky was on a long business trip abroad at that time) ruled out competition, and, thirdly, Alexander I saw his fruitful service for the benefit of our artillery.

What is the secret of such an extraordinary rise of the count?

The young emperor was extremely jealous at any encroachments to belittle his power, petty and, to top it off, suspicious. The main object of his care was the army. Passion for reviews and teachings from Paul I passed to him by inheritance. Everything that concerned the army, even the smallest appointment, had to come from the emperor, so that the army knew only him. It was the holy of holies, which no one dared to touch, no interference was tolerated in this area, where everything was decided by order and with the direct participation of the emperor. Knowing Arakcheev as a good worker and connoisseur of military affairs, although not possessing a broad outlook and abilities, but having great experience, the emperor valued in him, first of all, the complete silence and blind fulfillment of the plans from above, which Alexander was repeatedly convinced of even in the reign of his father. Not involved in regicide, Arakcheev, moreover, did not serve as a living reproach and did not disturb the wound that never healed in Alexander's soul. The emperor was sure that the antipathy always inspired by Arakcheev would contribute to his halo.

Endowed with the full confidence of the sovereign, Arakcheev, when he was Minister of War, streamlined the affairs of this department a lot. His activities affected almost all departments of the military administration, but it cannot be said that he attached equal importance to all branches, that he had a certain plan for streamlining and bringing the work of all departments of the ministry into a harmonious whole. Not having a sufficiently deep understanding of military affairs, having been brought up by Paul I in the spirit of ostentatious, petty military service, the new minister drew attention to what was more accessible to him: the combat unit, the timely supply of troops with everything necessary and their arrangement, and even military hospitals were "main occupation" of the Minister of War, as defined by Count Arakcheev.

Why was he assigned to such an important task? The answer to this question can be found in one of the highest decrees of 1808: “The experience of the past military operations assured me of the fair opinion that strict discipline is the soul of military service, that the slightest indulgence of the commander is the first beginning of the disorder as a whole and that parts of it, relaxing little by little from this beginning, they finally entail consequences that neither power nor prudence are strong enough to suddenly stop. These reasons were the reason for the poor obedience of the younger to the elders, rivalries between the elders, and, finally, the revival of marauders who caused such important harm to the entire army. Alexander I, remembering with what zeal Arakcheev followed discipline under Paul I, naturally, had to opt for him, since he considered it necessary to tighten discipline in the army, shaken by the unsuccessful campaigns of 1805, 1806/07.

However, the nationwide reforms initiated by Alexander I during his accession to the throne required fundamental changes in the entire military system, which had to be started immediately; finally, it was clear to the emperor that a serious struggle with Napoleon was soon to come, it was necessary to immediately begin preparations for it; Alexander I was fully aware that Arakcheev was not able to fulfill all these requirements and generally lead the army forward. In view of this, Count Arakcheev had to cede the post of Minister of War to another person who would combine the necessary military administrative abilities and knowledge of military life in peacetime with combat experience, with an understanding of the war and everything that was required to bring the combat training of the army to the point , which is necessary to fight against Napoleon.

In January 1810, General of Infantry M. B. Barclay de Tolly was appointed minister of war, while Count Arakcheev remained with the sovereign with the preservation of other posts. In May 1812, he accompanies Alexander I to Vilna and is with him with the army up to Polotsk. After returning to St. Petersburg, Count Arakcheev, as a member of a special committee under the emperor, was busy organizing district militias, in the first days of August he sat in another committee, led by Count N.I. Saltykov, who elected M.I. troops fighting Napoleon, and in the same month accompanied the sovereign to Abo to meet with the Crown Prince of Sweden. His Majesty's military committee was in his charge, and this alone was sufficient evidence of his importance. “And from that date,” writes Arakcheev in his autobiographical notes, “the whole French war went through my hands, all secret reports and handwritten orders of the sovereign emperor.”

It can be assumed that the actual manager of the military department at that time, due to Barclay de Tolly being at the head of the 1st Western Army, was Arakcheev, however, he was irresponsible as the manager, since he was temporarily put on trial for unrest in supplying the armies with allowances the head of the Military Ministry, Lieutenant General Prince A.P. Gorchakov.

In Paris, on March 31, 1814, the sovereign had already written with his own hand an order to promote Arakcheev to field marshal general, but the count begged to cancel the order and on August 30 only accepted the royal portrait to wear around his neck. He accompanied the sovereign on his second trip abroad, in 1815.

And so, when the entire reserve of strong will of Alexander I was exhausted in the fight against Napoleon, when Alexander began to spend all his time on resolving the political affairs of Europe, the emperor in the last decade of his reign could no longer be the Alexander of former years; he saw that both in Russia itself and in his beloved troops, the new that was generated by progressive aspirations was not settled, and the old was shaken; it would be necessary to rebuild everything anew, but he no longer had the time or energy for this. Now he was looking for assistants not for bold reformers, but for serviceable, accurate clerks. These are the conditions under which the burden of state concerns gradually passed into the "hard hands of a faithful friend", the trust in which has now become unlimited. As Count Rostopchin used to say: "Count Arakcheev is the soul of all affairs." From that time on, the resolution of this or that state business depended on the discretion of the all-powerful count; the importance of the ministers was reduced to a small one; the only direct speaker to the sovereign was Arakcheev, as a member of the committee of ministers; things went so far that Arakcheev made notes and wrote conclusions on the journals of the committee of ministers presented to His Majesty, and this became a custom. According to N.K. Schilder, "the dim figure of Arakcheev has already managed to completely obscure Russia from the eyes of Alexander." A characteristic confirmation of this is the episode told by Baron V.I. Shteingel (Decembrist). General A.P. Tormasov, who in 1815 was commander-in-chief in Moscow, drew up a plan for the restoration of the capital that had suffered from fires and presented it personally to the sovereign in the Winter Palace, having arrived from Moscow for this. The next day, Arakcheev already had a plan. Having demanded Tormasov's adjutant, Baron V. I. Shteingel, Arakcheev told him: “Hello, Mr. Baron; you and Alexander Petrovich came here with projects. The sovereign handed them over to me so that I could examine them with him. So report to your Alexander Petrovich - as he pleases: will I come to him, or will he come to me? It is clear that General Tormasov came to him with a report, and as a result, a few days later, the project and plan received the highest approval.

Without touching on the military settlements, which will be discussed later, it should be recognized that during this period the activities of the count were comprehensive. According to the historian N.K. Schilder, in the last years of Alexander's reign, old ministers (Tatishchev, Lobanov, Lanskoy, Shishkov) dozed at the state helm; they seemed more like ghosts of ministers than real ministers. Only Arakcheev, hated by everyone, was awake; however, the unrestricted manager of the troops was still Alexander I, who provided Arakcheev with only rough work. An era began in the reign of Alexander I, which is called "Arakcheevism", just as in the 18th century the reign of Anna Ioannovna was nicknamed "Bironism".

Naturally, the evolution in the outlook of the guard officers and many lower ranks after returning from foreign campaigns could not hide from Arakcheev either. It is also natural that Arakcheev, brought up by Paul I, was least of all disposed to encourage this. In order to avoid disciplinary violations and to suppress freedom-loving trends among officers and soldiers, Arakcheev decides to expand the scope of front-line studies, in particular by reducing free military service time. It was not difficult for him to inspire this thought to the sovereign.

It was enough for the authorities to learn about the importance attached to front-line occupations by the emperor and Arakcheev, so that they acquired a wide scope. The officers, brought up on the drill of Paul, perked up in spirit; soon the passion crossed all limits; they forgot why these classes were created, but believed that they should serve as the crown of all training of the troops; the emperor himself, and behind him the rest of the top commanders, usually at the review paid attention only to drill training.

It is interesting to trace the correspondence between Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich, who at that time commanded the Polish Army in Warsaw, and General Sipiagin, chief of staff of the Guards Corps.

“In response to the order given in your corps on January 30,” writes the Grand Duke, “that the sovereign emperor deigned to notice that the guards regiments are dressing up officers from other battalions for the guard of the 1st squad, and it is confirmed that all officers should equally know the service, I will tell you that there is nothing to be surprised at that regimental commanders choose and send the same officers to the 1st squad for dressing, for now such a dancing science has started up in the front that it will not give any sense; so involuntarily you send the same officers, just as you usually see at balls: the French quadrille is always jumped by the same persons - four or eight couples, while others are not allowed. I have been serving for more than twenty years and I can tell the truth, even during the time of the late sovereign I was one of the first officers in the front, and now they have been so smart that you won’t find it. ”

To a letter from N.M. Sipyagin regarding the fact that the committee, the highest established to draw up the military regulations, was instructed to equalize both the stance of the training battalion established under the guards, and the step, gun techniques and equipment, and that after the royal review, the soldiers of the battalion would return to their regiments and serve there in everything as a model, Konstantin Pavlovich wrote: “I am not surprised at what kind of new training battalion you have; in my opinion, it seems like a trifle out of hand; it’s good to make a training battalion for such regiments that are in the distance, and collect people from them for uniformity, but from such troops that are under their noses and always in front of you, this is amazing; don't they already know how to teach in the guards regiments? - but it seems to me that they will learn better than a new training battalion: yes, I now have such thoughts about the guards that they teach them so much and even prepare them in ten days with orders how to pass in columns that led the guards to stand on their hands with their feet up, and head down and to march, so they will march; and no wonder: how not to learn everything - you have among the commanders in chief dance masters, fencing masters, perhaps and Franconi wound up, and here we are, sitting in a hole, it remains only to adopt from you and somehow to catch up.

However, not only in the guards, but also in other parts of the Russian army, training and combat training were of the same nature.

Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich in his Polish army achieved even better results in line teaching than in the guards. This is evidenced by an excerpt from the Tsarevich's letter about two divorces in Warsaw in 1816: “The Lithuanian battalion gave a divorce and studied for two battalions. This teaching was so perfect in every respect that it surprised all the spectators, and the marching of the shoulder by whole battalions, the marching in ranks and half a turn by the whole front was so perfect, and such posture was observed, that I with heartfelt pleasure gave them full justice in that this cannot be surpassed. After this, the next day again there was a separation of the Finnish battalion and an exercise for two battalions, and I must admit that I was not only inferior to the Lithuanian ones in anything, but it was absolutely a miracle, extraordinary silence, posture, fidelity and accuracy are unparalleled, marching in a whole front and in rows is amazing , and in the change of front, the platoons kept their feet and walked in parallel so nicely that it should be likened to moving walls, and in general it should be said that they are not marching, but swimming, and, in a word, too well, and, really, nice guys and true children of the Russian life - guards ".

Review of the Polish cavalry by Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich in Warsaw on Saxony Square in 1824 (from a painting by Jan Rosen)

By the tone of this admiring letter of the Tsarevich, a great connoisseur and zealous servant in Pavlovian times, one can judge the degree of perfection that was achieved in the linear teaching of the Life Guards of the Finnish Regiment. The question is, how much time, effort and drill had to be spent in order to achieve such automatism from the lower ranks and get a semblance of floating walls? It involuntarily seems that the times of Frederick the Great have risen again and that the glorious year of 1812, when our troops showed so much skill in combat operations, has not yet come.

Unfortunately, the commander-in-chief of the 1st Army, Field Marshal Barclay de Tolly, after 1815, obeying the requirements of Arakcheev, began, according to General Paskevich, “to demand the beauty of the front, reaching the acrobatics, pursued old soldiers and officers who, to they were not capable of this, forgetting that until recently they had shown miracles of courage, saved and glorified Russia. The army did not benefit from the fact that, having lost officers, it was left with only exercimermeisters. In our country, mediocrity took over the leadership, and as it is in the majority, the strong in the state began to emerge from it, and after that no war is able to give intelligence in the training of troops. What to tell us, the generals of the division, when the field marshal bends down his tall figure to the ground to level the grenadier's socks?(Italics mine. - V.N.) And then what kind of stupidity can not be expected from an army major? Frederick II did not. But who knew and thought what Friedrich was doing? And Barclay de Tolly was in front of everyone here. In a year of time, the war was forgotten, as if it had never happened, and military qualities were replaced by exercime master dexterity. These notes of the hero of Smolensk are extremely characteristic. A hero of 1812 and the Swedish War, a former minister of war, an educated person, blindly fulfills Arakcheev's drill requirements, and how else does he fulfill them? In the time of Paul, only Arakcheev fulfilled his requirements in this way. With such serious studies, was there still time to study the deeds of Frederick and other great generals? Of course not.

Things were no better in the 2nd Army. The sovereign and Arakcheev looked at the new commander-in-chief of this army (after Bennigsen), Count Wittgenstein, as a weak and too kind person. In 1818, the future chief of staff, the young and dexterous Major General Kiselev, was sent to the army from St. Petersburg with instructions to prepare the army for the highest review. Believing that the army, stationed far from St. Petersburg, did not sufficiently master the new drill, to which the commander-in-chief was rather skeptical, they decided to send an experienced person who would be able to train and drill the army. One must think that this trip was the work of Prince P. M. Volkonsky, who especially jealously ensured that the sovereign was not upset by the poor preparation of the troops he loved most of all. And that Alexander I at that time attached great importance to parades and understood a lot about this, can be seen at least from the incident that occurred in Warsaw on September 23, 1816. During a large parade of all troops stationed in Warsaw and its environs, when well-trained infantry passed in battalion columns, the sovereign with a pleasant smile said to the crown prince: “This is exactly like the Polish reports graphed in the cells.” From this it can be deduced to what extent the thoughts of Alexander I by this time were related to patterns, which brought him even closer to Arakcheev. The desire to smooth and equalize everything by this time, the emperor was already turning into mania.

In January 1818, Kiselev arrived in Tulchin, taking with him from St. Petersburg a great expert on drill, Colonel Adamov, two non-commissioned officers and one musician. How important Adamov played in the army can be seen at least from the answer of General Zakrevsky, whom Kiselev, after Adamov's death in 1821, asked to send someone to replace him, who knew to the point all the rules and procedures adopted in the guard and welcomed by the emperor: “I don’t know to take the place of Adam’s professor, but rather get in touch with the regimental commanders of the guards, to whom you have a power of attorney.”

But perhaps the most striking characteristic of the methods of training troops at that time will be the following lines of General Kiselev from his correspondence with Zakrevsky. The question of the war with Turkey, in view of the Greek uprising, which was not clarified in 1821, remained unresolved even at the beginning next year, and in the 2nd Army they did not know what to prepare for - for war or for the long-awaited review of the sovereign. “We have nothing from you from St. Petersburg,” wrote General Kiselev, then already chief of staff of the army, to Zakrevsky on January 12, 1822, “and we don’t know what to prepare for; war and a training step are two articles, completely different, and by the spring both will be needed; you probably know things, enlighten us and direct us on the right path. At the end of February, he repeated the same question: “Don't you know anything? You won't believe how difficult it is to prepare for war and peaceful pursuits". (Italics mine. - V.N.) So, even the most prominent figures in the army, extremely gifted people, put up with the fact that the troops in Peaceful time they are preparing not for war, but for parade parades. This shows how serious the viewing requirements of that time were, if you need to prepare for them in advance, persistently and stubbornly. It should be recognized as disastrous the system of Arakcheev, who is not responsible for the army, but influences it more than any military minister, thanks to personal relations with the emperor. The most useful lessons of the wars with Napoleon were forgotten, and this time irrevocably. The lower ranks were mostly illiterate; they stopped thinking about their education - there was no time. The term of service was still 25 years (for residents of the same palace, residents of Little Russia, Novorossia and Sloboda Ukraine - 15 years); punters served indefinitely. In 1818, the term of service for the lower ranks of the guard was reduced to 22 years.

This is not what we see in the Caucasian army, led by the talented Yermolov; in her combat life was in full swing, there was no need to even think about drill and linear exercises - there was no time; they spent little time in the Caucasian troops and on reviews; Petersburg parader, who fell into this army, was first of all struck by the undress appearance of the troops, and sometimes the contemptuous word "ragamuffins" broke from his lips when he shared his impressions after returning to Petersburg. But Russian glory thundered not only in the Caucasus, but throughout Persia and Asia Minor.

Thus, it is necessary to come to the conclusion that by the end of the reign, under the influence of Arakcheev, Alexander I blossomed love for military drill, the beginnings of which were so firmly established by Paul I. war; it was believed that the whole purpose of military affairs was pedantic parading: in studying the rules for stretching socks, aligning ranks and making rifle techniques. The Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd Army, Count Wittgenstein, who with honor commanded a separate corps in 1812 and an army in 1813, before the highest review worries almost exclusively about trifles. So, in his letter to Kiselev, dated the autumn of 1823, he asks: “Pay attention to the fact that etiquettes and other things are whitewashed as best as possible, because the sovereign looks at this a lot.” In one of the orders for the army, after the review of the commander-in-chief, it was indicated that "the pantaloons in the infantry are not white enough." Things got to the point that war was considered the most harmful for the soldiers. Emperor Alexander, in a conversation with Count Kapodistrias, said bluntly: “There were enough wars on the Danube, they demoralize armies". (Italics mine. - V.N.) Not without reason, one of those aware of the harm of such training, General Sabaneev, commander of the 6th Infantry Corps (who was Chichagov’s chief of staff on the Berezina and Barclay’s army chief of staff in the 1814 campaign), wrote to Kiselev: “A training step, a good stance, a quick glance, a bracket against the mouth, the parallelism of the ranks, the immobility of the shoulders, and all the like, objects insignificant for the true purpose, have occupied and worried everyone so much that there is no time to do the most useful. One training step and the shipment of ammunition strangled everyone - from the chief to the lower rank.

What a torment for the unfortunate soldier, and all in order to prepare him for the review! That's where the tyranny is! This is the dignity of Schwartz, Kleinmichel, Zheltukhin and the like! This is what all the abilities, all the cares of the leaders are directed towards! What virtues are now sought in a regimental commander? The dignity of a front-line mechanic, even if he is a real tree. What should be expected? It is impossible without heartfelt contrition to see the terrible despondency of soldiers exhausted by training and alteration of ammunition. No other sound is heard anywhere but rifle techniques and command words, no other conversation is heard except leggings, belts and, in general, a soldier's toilet and training step. It used to be that everywhere there was a song, everywhere there was fun. Now you can't hear them anywhere. Everywhere poof-gauz and a whole army of training teams. What are they teaching? Learning step! Isn’t it shameful for an old man, whose legs went ten thousand miles, whose body is covered with wounds, to teach on a par with a recruit, who, of course, in a short time will become his teacher.

Review of troops by Emperor Alexander I in front of the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg

Who was the cause of such terrible reforms? Yes, all the same Arakcheev, who at that time had the unlimited confidence of Alexander I. Involuntarily, the words of the same Sabaneev from his letter dated November 13, 1819 to Kiselev are recalled: “Is it not sad to see every well-meaning person what influence this rotten pillar has to do state affairs"?

Prince P. M. Volkonsky

Volkonsky's assignment to France in 1807 ¦ The role of Volkonsky as chief of staff under the Russian emperor during the Foreign campaigns ¦ Improvement of the quartermaster part by Volkonsky ¦ Friction between Arakcheev and Volkonsky and their consequences

At the beginning of 1810, the emperor’s main assistant in the matter of transforming the military system, together with M. B. Barclay de Tolly, was Prince Pyotr Mikhailovich Volkonsky, Alexander’s close associate from the day of his accession. The campaigns of 1805 and 1806/07 particularly clearly emphasized the disorganization of our headquarters (quartermaster) service. After the Tilsit meeting, during which Prince Volkonsky was in the retinue of the emperor, Alexander I, having come to the conclusion that it was necessary to reorganize all our headquarters institutions, immediately sent to France Prince Volkonsky, who enjoyed great confidence in him, to whom he set the goal of studying all the French military institutions, respectively, whose merits were judged by costly combat experience.

Prince Volkonsky, having stayed in France for about three years, conscientiously studied the French military system. The organization of the management of the army at the highest command level was a particularly thorough subject of his study. Returning, Volkonsky presented a detailed report to the sovereign. Alexander I was quite satisfied with the information collected by the prince and appointed him in 1810 as manager of the quartermaster's unit, simultaneously with the appointment of Barclay de Tolly as Minister of War. The emperor for major reforms in the army was looking for people with a broad outlook and found such.

Volkonsky ardently set about reforming the staff institutions. It was difficult in two years to train the necessary cadre of officers in the quartermaster service; much remained unfinished, but the combat experience of 1812 confirmed the expediency of Volkonsky's reforms.

Shortly before this war, simultaneously with the “establishment of the War Office” on January 27, 1812, an “institution for the management of a large active army” was announced, which “from the very initial plan of this to the last finishing of each part of it was drawn up, processed and corrected under the direct supervision of and according to the remarks "of the sovereign himself, who personally directed the activities of a commission specially drawn up for this occasion, in which Bakrlai de Tolly sat as chairman, and Volkonsky as a member.

This institution established the unified authority of the commander-in-chief of the armies operating in the same theater of war, provided a coherent system of headquarters and departments for transmitting orders from the commander-in-chief and subsequent commanders, and also provided for the formation of auxiliary bodies of higher military command and control. Our quartermaster unit was at the height of the situation and during the war of 1812 put forward a number of active and capable chiefs (Yermolov, Dibich, Toll, Harding, Dovre, etc.), and in 1813 even took actually first place among the general staffs Allied armies, despite the apparent predominance of foreign high command (Schwarzenberg, Blucher).

At the end of 1812, with the arrival of the emperor in the army, the main apartment was formed and Volkonsky became the head of the main staff of His Majesty. A lot of work fell to his lot, especially during foreign campaigns; in addition to strategic and tactical abilities, diplomatic ones also had to be shown. With a skillful selection of assistants and tireless work, Prince Volkonsky brilliantly justified his appointment; besides, long service at court extremely contributed to the acquisition of the ability to settle all sorts of frictions, which was so useful in 1814, when the coalition was torn apart by disagreements, eliminated solely thanks to the perseverance of Alexander I and the diplomacy of Volkonsky himself and members of his headquarters (Tol, Dibich). Naturally, at the end of the wars, Alexander I wished to preserve the organization that contributed to the success in the fight against Napoleon.

In a personal decree to the Senate of December 12, 1815, it was announced that to manage the entire military department, the General Staff was established under His Imperial Majesty, consisting of: a) Chief of the General Staff, b) Minister of War, c) Inspector of Artillery and d) Inspector of the Engineering Corps . The decree, in particular, prescribed the following: “All matters of military administration are divided into two types: the first includes, so to speak, the front-line part, that is, the number of people in the army, items included in the order, etc.; and to the second - without exception, everything where there is a turnover of monetary amounts, in a word, the economic part. Cases of the first kind are handled by the chief of staff, while cases of the second kind are handled by the minister of war. The latter is subordinate to the chief of the main staff, who was the only reporter to the sovereign on the affairs of the military department; he also informed the minister of war about the orders given by the sovereign regarding the economic part.

Adjutant General Prince P. M. Volkonsky, of course, was appointed to the post of Chief of the General Staff of His Imperial Majesty. In addition to a feeling of close friendship, Alexander I had special respect for him, as for his military associate and great connoisseur of military affairs; and most importantly, Volkonsky was a gentle man, even weak-willed, and did not overshadow the personality of Alexander I.

Adjutant General Konovnitsyn, a hero of 1812, was appointed Minister of War, a clever man, but capable and very active, but he did not sharply show his character.

Prince Volkonsky improved the quartermaster's unit and placed it very highly; it had an excellent organization, enlightened and talented leaders. Our army and the General Staff are indebted to Prince Volkonsky for the fact that in the ranks of this headquarters (then called the quartermaster unit) such figures as Dibich and Tol came to the fore. The army is mainly obliged to him for the creation of military literature and especially the cartographic part.

On December 12, 1816, the salaries of officers, from ensign to colonel inclusive, were increased, and it was ordered to give out even table money to regimental commanders, brigadier generals, divisional and corps chiefs, and chiefs of staff of armies in addition to salaries. The credit for this belongs to the immediate assistant of Prince Volkonsky, the duty general of the General Staff, General Zakrevsky.

But in addition to his service activities, Volkonsky had a very great weight and thanks to his special closeness to the sovereign, since the prince, one might say, was constantly with Alexander I, while also acting as minister of the court. Every morning, at half past nine, he appeared before the sovereign at the end of the toilet; no one, except the prince, at that time had the right to enter the emperor, who usually gave Volkonsky orders regarding the courtyard and the dining table. As soon as the sovereign finished his toilet, Volkonsky was again called to him with a report on the military unit; after him came Count Arakcheev, who made a report on the state of affairs in the empire ("of which he was a real governor," a contemporary notes), and often Arakcheev discussed what Prince Volkonsky had just reported. They spent an hour and a half in the office. After them, diplomats were received for half an hour, then the commander-in-chief or the governor-general of the capital, the commandant, orderlies were called.

Danilevsky-Mikhailovsky noted that in 1819 only Volkonsky and Arakcheev had daily access to the emperor and used his power of attorney; apart from them, no one at the court meant anything. When traveling around Russia, the sovereign always traveled in the same carriage with Volkonsky, but if Arakcheev accompanied him, then, approaching some big city, Alexander took Arakcheev into his carriage, as if emphasizing his paramount importance. And Volkonsky endured this patiently.

In general, Alexander I treated Volkonsky much harsher than with Arakcheev, whose attitude in recent years had the character of surprising courtesy; The sovereign often reprimanded Volkonsky on an insignificant occasion. Prince Volkonsky was selflessly devoted to the emperor; most of all thinking about the peace of Alexander I, he took all measures for this, not at all caring about himself and not having a personal life because of this. Due to his closeness to the sovereign, he received reports from the highest commanders, which usually reported what it was desirable to bring to the attention of the sovereign, but could not be done officially. Volkonsky usually took on such a mission, and sent the opinion or even the resolution of the sovereign to the writer.

Constantly accompanying the emperor on all his trips, he was present at all military reviews, and therefore was well acquainted with the state of the troops. However, thanks to a cautious and gentle nature, and most importantly, exceptional devotion to Alexander I, he did not consider it possible to offer his advice to the emperor, which belittled his importance to a typical courtier; however, it is unlikely that Alexander I would have tolerated so close to him a person who could have a strong influence on him, and even more so who would pass his ideas through him.

Excellently educated, benevolent, intelligent and developed, prone to progress, able to find and nominate capable assistants, Volkonsky aroused special sympathy for the emperor; however, he was by no means as important as Arakcheev, for he was cautious to the point of timidity.

Count Arakcheev had long looked with envy and discontent at the exceptional closeness of Volkonsky to the sovereign and made every effort to wipe him out. With the sovereign’s growing disillusionment with people over the years, this was not particularly difficult to do, even in relation to Volkonsky, and in 1823, due to misunderstandings that arose about reducing the military estimate (Volkonsky recognized that it was possible to reduce the estimate by only 800 thousand rubles, considering the remaining expenses necessary, and Count Arakcheev reduced these expenses by 18 million rubles), because of the insulting remark made on this occasion by Alexander I, Volkonsky asked the sovereign to dismiss him and stay abroad until the disease was cured. He was quickly granted a vacation abroad, and Adjutant General Dibich was appointed to his position, to whom Alexander I, at his first meeting, gave the following instruction regarding future relations with Count Arakcheev: “You will find in him an uneducated person, but the only one for me in zeal and hard work; try to get along with him and live in harmony: you will often deal with him, and show him the possible power of attorney and respect. Dibich learned this perfectly and always showed Arakcheev emphatic respect.

Prince Volkonsky returned from abroad to St. Petersburg at the beginning of 1824. Alexander I granted him the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called with a gracious rescript, but did not offer his former position, since Arakcheev did not want this. He was offered to become commander-in-chief of the 2nd Army, but Volkonsky preferred to remain the sovereign's adjutant and fulfill the highest orders, mainly court orders (for example, to accompany Empress Elizaveta Alekseevna to Taganrog).

Naturally, Prince Volkonsky in his correspondence called Arakcheev nothing more than a “cursed serpent”, a “villain”, and expressed the conviction that this monster was destroying Russia, and would destroy the sovereign.

If such a cautious person as Prince Volkonsky spoke so harshly about Arakcheev, then one can judge with what hatred the count was treated in the army, whose affairs he was entrusted to manage. By this time, at the head of the troops, in most cases, were persons pleasing or pleasing to the count.

Statutory requirements for the training of troops

Infantry and artillery charters ¦ Causes and consequences of accelerated officer training

Shortly after the Napoleonic wars, new charters came out: the infantry charter in 1816, and the cavalry charter in 1818 (issued in Warsaw, at the location of the august inspector general of the cavalry). The years of publication of the statutes testify to the fact that Arakcheev had a hand in them to a large extent. Indeed, the statutes were overflowing with many petty details; there was almost nothing in them relating to combat training itself. In the "Military Regulations on Infantry Service" there is not a single line about how the attack is carried out; there is not a single word about this in the "Rules of Regimental Teaching for Infantry" (ed. 1818) and in the "Military Regulations on Linear Teaching" (1820).

In the "Military Regulations on Cavalry Military Service" there is a short chapter "On the Attack"; during an attack, it is prescribed to “hold too hot horses”, “never attack more than 80 steps in a quarry”, gallop 80 steps too, and emphasizes several times that the main thing during an attack is alignment. However, the note indicates the importance of training the cavalry to attack; in this charter, the learning process is considered much more widely than in the infantry, which is explained by the personality of the inspector general of the cavalry, under whose editorship this charter came out. Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich, a participant in the last Suvorov campaigns, could not forget about the main essence of Suvorov's teachings - the attack; besides, the Grand Duke could not reckon with the opinion of Arakcheev, unlike the generals.

However, in the same charter there are such instructions as “not to attack infantry ready to meet the cavalry”, “consider it impossible to attack an infantry column”, i.e. very serious attention is paid to the convenience of the cavalry, its safety, but in the war the situation commands everyone, and above all, the goal set must be fulfilled, no matter what the cost of sacrifices.

As time goes by, outdoor demands finally obscure inner essence charter. So, in the “Military Regulations on Cavalry Military Service” (ed. 1823) there are such instructions: “the attacking front must go to the enemy as dignified as possible and try to be completely closed in the ranks, because success in the attack most depends on this”.

Spending a lot of effort on linear exercises preparing for them, the troops did not have time to engage in shooting, although the charter says this quite weightily (“there is no need to prove how important and necessary it is for soldiers to be trained to shoot wholeheartedly. Experiments teach that even the very successes in military operations, much depends on perfection in this art”). The charter states: "every year during training time, all non-commissioned officers and soldiers in the regiment are trained to shoot at a target, using for this the only large part of the gunpowder assigned for training."

Unfortunately, the charter did not provide an exact distribution of the shooting exercises themselves, as a result of which some commanders considered it sufficient to fire five bullets a year for training in shooting, and use the remaining gunpowder at least for fireworks on solemn days.

Finally, there were the "Rules of loose formation, or Instructions on the loose action of infantry" (ed. 1818), which gives very useful information regarding the significance of fire in battle. In the 1st paragraph, it is indicated that this formation is very consistent with the armament of the infantry, for its strength mainly lies in the fire, but not in the multitude, but in the accuracy of the shots; the scattered position of the infantry makes it more convenient to shoot accurately; in loose formation there is another advantage that the unevenness of the terrain almost always provides protection from the enemy's bullet.

These rules once again confirm the importance of marksmanship: “Many still believe today that a bullet harms the enemy only by accident. This opinion is really justified, however, only in those cases where ignoramuses use a gun; when the gun is in the hands of a real shooter, a master of his craft, then the success of shooting will not depend on chance.

The essence of the loose formation in the instruction is stated very clearly: “With this method of fighting, the action of each shooter will be presented in the form of a private or personal fight: for the details of the action, for example, the most profitable means of harming your opponent, choosing a place to close and protect your own, etc. depend completely on the shooter's own will and concepts. It is strange to read, among other purely formalist statutes, such a call for private initiative!

In the 2nd Army, the first shooting review, at the insistence of the young chief of staff, General Kiselev, was held in 1819; this review showed that the shooting business in the army is in a miserable state; the reason should be sought in the fact that the superiors did not attach importance to it, since there was no time for thorough study of it, and most importantly, the higher authorities at reviews usually did not take an interest in it, devoting all their attention to linear teaching. In addition, the troops had a lot of faulty guns.

In general, the whole goal of training the lower ranks can be expressed in the following lines: “having taught each soldier to stand correctly, to wield and operate a gun, to march and turn, and in general all movements, it will be very easy to bring to perfection in the training of the company, on which the perfection of the battalion depends and shelf; for this, it is as diligent as possible for the regimental and battalion commanders to look after the company commanders, so that when training soldiers one by one, everyone clearly, with patience and without punishment, interprets all the rules that belong, showing what and how to fulfill them; use strictness in learning only for the negligent, but even here act with moderation and caution. A caring and skillful boss can instill in his subordinates a desire for service and obedience; also try to bring the soldiers to be revered as shame and self-imposed punishment.

Unfortunately, these good indications of military regulations, in the preparation of which prominent figures of past wars took part, were soon forgotten; the influence of Arakcheev completely swept away the ideological side of training, and the viewing requirements of the higher authorities forced regimental, battalion and company commanders to think exclusively about drill, in which “strictness in teaching” had to be shown not only to the negligent, but to everyone; it is clear that few company commanders at the same time knew how to "act with moderation and caution."

According to the famous partisan D. V. Davydov, “Regarding the alignment of the ranks and the production of pace, our army undoubtedly surpasses all others. But, my God, what is the majority of generals and officers in whom the desire for education has been killed, as a result of which they hate all science! These incompetent ignoramuses, true lovers of elegant belt service, believe in their wisdom that the war, weakening the front-line information acquired by the army in peacetime, is harmful only to him. As if the army is trained not for war, but exclusively for peaceful exercises on the Field of Mars. Having served on more than one campaign, and knowing from experience the usefulness of the military education of soldiers, I will never allow myself to unconditionally reject the useful side of military regulations; from this, however, it does not follow that I recognize the usefulness of a system based only on the burden and dulling of abilities by setting out an incredible number of trifles that do not explain, but extremely obscure the matter. Imposing fetters on gifted individuals and thus making it difficult for them to move out of the midst of ignorant mediocrity is the height of nonsense. In this way, only the following can be achieved: mediocre ignoramuses, distinguished by the most narrow understanding, finally expel capable people from everywhere, who, killed by senseless demands, will not have the opportunity to develop for independent action and will unconditionally submit to the majority.

The fight against Napoleon required a lot of troops, and in connection with this, the officer corps had to be significantly strengthened. True, in 1812, during the formation of the militia, many officials, retired or even nobles were accepted for the position of officers; many of them in 1813 transferred to regular regiments, and then completely remained in the army in active service, but still the loss of officers was great. The military department was greatly concerned about the increase in the officer contingent, seeking to some extent to balance the insufficient knowledge of the officers being graduated. In the most difficult times, military educational institutions produced issues even twice a year. The noble regiment, for example, in 1812 released 1139 officers.

The conditions of service that changed after 1815, in connection with Arakcheev's view of military affairs, forced many officers to leave, and, as Prince Paskevich notes, many "our St. George's crosses retired and turned out to be wine bailiffs." I had to again produce reinforced releases. So, in 1823, by the highest command, 122 pupils of the 1st and 2nd Cadet Corps, pupils of the Noble Regiment, the military orphanage and the Tsarskoye Selo Lyceum were promoted to officers before the end of the course. But such emergency releases could not, of course, radically compensate for the lack of officers.

The popularity of military service among the nobility is decreasing; Napoleon's invasion of Russia ruined many landlords, but it was difficult to live on state salaries alone: ​​after 1812, prices throughout Russia rose sharply. This caused an increase in the content of officer ranks, announced on the sovereign's birthday, December 12, 1816.

Since in the period from 1801 to 1825 only 16 thousand officers were graduated from all military educational institutions, the military department came to the need to establish special elementary schools for ensigns; from 1822 to 1825, such schools were organized in Mogilev, at the headquarters of the 1st Army; cadet school - at the headquarters of the 2nd Army, in the town of Tulchin, and corps schools - at the Grenadier Corps and at the corps of the 1st Army. By establishing all these schools, it was meant to prepare young people for the officer rank, giving them the knowledge necessary for a military officer, educating them morally and instilling in them the rules of military discipline; however, the level of knowledge acquired by future officers in these schools was low, and moral principles were fragile, since the stay of pupils in schools was short, and the composition of teachers was chosen randomly.

Even in military educational institutions, education was not set high; the benefit of foreign teachers is small, and there were few native teachers; programs were striking in their multi-subject, textbooks were either absent or outdated. Service and material support for teachers until 1819 was unenviable. According to one of his contemporaries, the teachers of the lower classes were “kind and knowledgeable people,” but some of them were so poor that they “allowed the cadets to replenish empty teachers’ pockets with pieces of bread, meat, porridge and butter in pieces of paper.” In a military orphanage, a Russian language teacher was entitled to a salary of 300 rubles a year for 18 weekly hours!

Only when the humane Count Pyotr Petrovich Konovnitsyn (1819–1822) became the head of military educational institutions did they finally pay serious attention to improving material conditions, to better accommodation for pupils, and most importantly, to their moral education. Unfortunately, Count Konovnitsyn did not stay long in his post, and his influence was soon leveled. Morals became coarsened, the level of education decreased, since Arakcheev's requirements were diametrically opposed to the views of Count Konovnitsyn.

Suffice it to point out that General Klinger, who had been at the head of the 1st Cadet Corps for almost 20 years (1801–1820), an educator highly valued by the chief head of military educational institutions, Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich, used to say: “Russians should be taught less and beat more!” . And indeed, with the exception of the Konovnitsyn period, corporal punishment flourished in military educational institutions, harsh and rude treatment both between pupils and educators with them. It is clear that when they became officers, they transferred the same treatment to their soldiers, especially if they saw encouragement from their company, battalion, and often even regimental commanders.

General Kiselev, after assuming the post of chief of staff of the 2nd Army, wrote to Zakrevsky on July 13, 1819: “Regarding the appointment of future regimental commanders, I really don’t know any excellent ones here, they get along with battalions, but the regiment is another matter.” At this time, the lack of education and upbringing among the chiefs, starting from the youngest, was already sharply evident. During the service, they did not deal with officers; they only sought to turn both officers and soldiers into machines capable of uniform and simultaneous execution of commands.

For a long time, by analyzing the campaigns of 1812–1814. as if they were no longer interested. Descriptions and plans of the most important battles, however, were drawn up by General Tol, but they were distributed in the most limited circle of specialists. It is interesting to note that during the reign of Alexander I, only two descriptions of the war of 1812 appeared: one - by D. Akhsharumov, and the other - by Buturlin, and even then on French. These works were generally little known among the officers. Some researchers of this era note that Alexander I experienced an unpleasant feeling when reminded of the events of the Patriotic War, and especially of the Battle of Borodino, the glory of which was attributed to Kutuzov, which unwittingly belittled Alexander's personality in the army. It happened that the memorable date of this battle was decidedly not marked by anything even when the emperor spent this day in Moscow.

This attitude of Alexander I was imitated by others, as a result of which the memory of the heroic events of this war began to be smoothed out in our army: neither the days of celebration, nor the study of the course of campaigns, nor, finally, those traditions and methods of training, the vitality of which confirmed glorious battles of this era; on the contrary, everything seemed to resemble Paul's time. As General Paskevich quite rightly wrote in his notes: “In the year of time, the war was forgotten, as if it had never happened, and military qualities were replaced by exercime master’s dexterity.”

In addition, the officers were distinguished by a cruel attitude towards the lower ranks. “During my service, I saw such commanders who fought only because they themselves were fought,” Sabaneev wrote to Kiselev. In a memorandum on corporal punishment, compiled by the same Sabaneev, among other things it is said: “In the regiment, from the corporal to the commander, everyone beats and kills people, and as someone said: in the Russian service, the killer is the one who immediately kills, but who in two, three beat a man for a year, he is not responsible. ”

Rude treatment of officers and cruel treatment of the lower ranks after 1820 began to enter the norm. The Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd Army, Count Wittgenstein, in his order dated July 7, 1822, writes: “I noticed that in some regiments of the 14th Division, the gentlemen of the regimental commanders treat their officers very rudely, forgetting due respect for the title of a noble person, allow themselves the use of expressions that are not characteristic of the treatment that every officer has the right to expect from his superior. Severity and rudeness, punishment and resentment are completely different things, and as much as the first is necessary, so the second is harmful to the service. As for the treatment of the lower ranks, I must note that they should not be physically punished for teaching, and especially in such a cruel manner as it is often done ... "

But Wittgenstein was distinguished by his nobility, and how many other top commanders considered it necessary to notice the unhealthy situation in the army. By at least there is no Arakcheev in their ranks, who successfully resurrected the Pavlovian times in military settlements.

The emergence of secret societies

Union of Prosperity ¦ Northern and Southern secret societies ¦ Suppression of an outbreak of discontent in the Life Guards Semenovsky regiment ¦ Unrest in the troops during the interregnum ¦ Mutiny in the Chernigov regiment

As already mentioned, the great events of the Patriotic War left deep, elevating impressions in the souls of officers and soldiers, and during the period of the Russian troops' stay abroad, many officers became acquainted with progressive political ideas and theories regarding state organization.

The example of the Prussian secret alliance (Tugendbund) seemed to vividly confirm what its members could do for the flourishing of their fatherland. From the very beginning of his reign, Alexander I was favorable to the liberal aspirations of his subordinates, insisted in France on the introduction of a constitution, and soon after the end of the wars with Napoleon gave Poland, which fought so fiercely against us, the most liberal government. Russian society in general and the officers in particular were delighted with this, especially since at the opening of the first Polish Sejm on March 15, 1818, the sovereign indicated in his speech that, introducing administration in Poland on the basis of the rules of legally free institutions, he receives at the same time a means to show the fatherland what it has been preparing for it for a long time, and which it will use when it reaches the proper political maturity.

Since the introduction of drill by Arakcheev into the training of troops, and especially after the establishment of military settlements among the officers, mainly in the guards, dissatisfaction has appeared not only with their position, but also with the position of Russia. Foreign campaigns introduced the officers to the political press developed at that time in Western Europe. Upon their return, many officers, especially guards and from General Staff, began to be read by foreign newspapers and magazines, in which the struggle for a constitutional order in the Western European states was often presented in a dramatic way. Studying bold political theories and systems, many officers dreamed of applying them in their own country. It was this that served as the main topic of the conversations of the officers' circles, which formed in abundance after 1815. In addition, they got acquainted with the statutes of the secret political societies that had multiplied in France and Germany. The emergence of such circles among our officers was facilitated by a certain isolation of Petersburg life, noticed after 1815; whether this was due to a change in the character of the emperor or because of the economic recession, but the officers began to revel much less.

At the end of 1816, several young officers from the Guards and the General Staff formed a secret society. At first, this society limited itself to recruiting new members and familiarizing itself with Western constitutional theory. Propaganda was carried on quite freely, since the police, even the metropolitan, were not very observant, and, in addition, everyone knew the liberal attitude of Alexander I to the cultivation of such ideas; besides, the activity of the society did not affect the existing order, but was purely educational in nature.

At the end of 1817, one of the members of the Russian secret union, Prince Ilya Dolgorukov, during a trip to Germany, entered into relations with the Prussian Tugendbund "th and received its statute. In Moscow, at a meeting of members in 1818, this statute, adapted to to our conditions, was adopted as the statute of the Russian political union, which adopted the name of the Union of Welfare.

Without resorting to any violent measures, the union intended to act on Russian society moral and general educational means, to eradicate as far as possible ignorance and abuse of conviction and good examples, to give a good direction to the education of youth, to take measures to destroy the serfdom of the peasants and zealously assist the government in its good intentions. But the secret task of the union was the introduction of constitutional government in Russia; most of members remained supporters of the monarchy, but there were also adherents of republican rule. These ideas could be put into practice only with a radical breakdown of the existing order, and thus the Welfare Union turned into a purely political one. Inspired by the purest aspirations, they obviously lost sight of the pernicious consequences associated with the interference of troops in the state affairs of their fatherland, and finally, they neglected their official duty, which forbade them to enter into secret alliances. After the Moscow Congress, the number of members of the union increased greatly: not only young people joined it, but also people of a more mature age: several generals (M. Orlov, S. G. Volkonsky), many regiment commanders (Pestel, Fonvizin, Bulatov) and the headquarters -officers, especially from the 2nd Army, as well as landowners and officials. In the period from 1818 to 1823, the union grew significantly, and at the same time others were established. political societies, for example, the military, whose members recognized each other by the inscription carved on the blades of swords or sabers: “For the truth!” Even two Masonic lodges were formed, which for the most part consisted of members of the Welfare Union.

The activities of the members of the union did not extend to the soldiers; campaigning among the lower ranks was not conducted, but the officers - members of the union put out of use the corporal punishment that flourished under the Arakcheev regime, and by their human attitude established the closest connection with the lower ranks, who usually loved these commanders passionately.

The attempt of some historians to connect the outbreak in the Life Guards Semyonovsky Regiment in 1820 with the activities of the Welfare Union has no serious grounds, since the indignation was caused by an extremely sharp change in the regimental regime. At this time, Alexander I himself was already imbued with reactionary aspirations to a sufficient degree. Having sufficiently complete secret information about the widespread dissemination of the ideas of the Welfare Union among the officers and not seeing the benefit of too humane treatment of the lower ranks, in which some commanders even saw a weakening of discipline, Alexander I, under the influence of Arakcheev and Volkonsky, decided to make a full-scale replacement of command personnel. So, the commanders of the guards regiments were appointed: Preobrazhensky - Colonel Pirkh, Izmailovsky - Martynov, Moscow - Frideriks, Grenadier - Stürler and Semenovsky - Colonel Schwartz.

The Life Guards Semyonovsky Regiment had a particularly hard time; as is known, this regiment always enjoyed the special disposition of its august chief - the emperor; the previous commander, General Potemkin, was distinguished by gentleness and delicate treatment both of the officers and the lower ranks, whom he took care of in a fatherly way: beds were made for the lower ranks, and almost everyone had his own samovar. The same good relations were established between officers and soldiers. Semyonovtsy lived richer than others, perhaps also because many of them were excellent shoemakers, sultans and, fulfilling private orders, earned quite a lot of money. The officers of the regiment, shortly after returning from foreign campaigns, formed an artel and laid the foundation for an officer's library; in this artel, some of them dined, which contributed to a closer rapprochement of the officers, enhanced by joint reading and familiarization with political literature.

On the contrary, the new commander, Colonel Schwartz, was a man of little education. He was appointed commander of the regiment on April 11, 1820, in all likelihood, at the direction of Arakcheev (Schwartz served in the Grenadier Count Arakcheev regiment from 1809 to 1815 and earned his favor), who, being extremely disapproving of the Potemkin regime in the Semenovsky regiment, as if I would say this: "We need to beat the crap out of the heads of these thugs."

In an order for the regiment dated May 1, Schwartz expressed disapproval of the old order and drastically changed them; henceforth, the soldiers also ceased to see a friendly address from their regimental commander. With the officers of the regiment, he maintained purely official relations: he gave orders and instructions mainly through sergeants, whom he gathered for this several times a day. It happened that through the sergeant majors he conveyed his comments to the company commanders. By reducing the influence of company commanders, he undermined their authority.

In addition to enhanced general and individual front-line exercises, Schwartz also introduced personal reviews of the lower ranks; for this, he ordered that a dozen lower ranks of the company be sent to him and examined their dressing and uniforms; noticed in the slightest malfunction demanded to himself for a secondary review; preparations were usually made for such reviews since the evening; returning from the review, they immediately went to company exercises; the lower ranks were busy all day. Often Schwartz forced the whole battalion or some platoon to march for three hours in a row that did not please him.

Mundt, appointed orderly to Grand Duke Mikhail Pavlovich, said that before that, as a kind of test, he had to bring Schwartz a full glass of water, placed on a shako, without spilling a drop for two weeks.

IN Sundays in those companies that were assigned to the church attire, Schwartz spent two hours of preliminary teaching, which is why these companies usually kept up only towards the end of mass. From frequent washing, winter trousers were worn out, and the soldiers were forced to buy new ones, of course at their own expense. It is quite natural that the brigade commander, Grand Duke Mikhail Pavlovich, was often amazed at the languid appearance of the Semenovites.

Schwartz significantly increased the penalties. So, from May 1 to October 3, there were 44 corporal punishments (from 100 to 500 rods), which was already extraordinary for the Semenov regiment. Contrary to the law, Schwartz also subjected the Knights of St. George to corporal punishment; during the exercises he often fought, spat in the face. It is clear that such treatment turned the entire regiment against him. Attempts by the soldiers to complain about the oppression of the regimental commander did not lead to favorable results. The hostile officers, apparently, did not hesitate to loudly express their discontent and, in front of the soldiers, to condemn the actions of their commander. Of course, if the relationship between the commander and the officers were normal, they should have warned about the growing anger among the soldiers.

Finally, after an exercise on October 16, when Schwartz punished, as usual, one of the lower ranks of the 2nd Fusilier Company, the guards decided to file a complaint about the harassment of the regimental commander. Gathering without permission at 11 am in the corridor, they called their company commander and asked him to petition for the cancellation of extraordinary reviews, especially on holidays. The company commander went to report the incident to the battalion and regimental commanders. Colonel Schwartz ordered to keep order and wait for orders in the morning, and he himself reported the incident to his brigade commander, Grand Duke Mikhail Pavlovich, and through the chief of staff of the Guards Corps, Benckendorff, to the corps commander, Prince Vasilchikov. The latter, being unwell, sent Benckendorff to investigate. Already during this investigation, it was clear how restless the soldiers of the 1st Battalion were. Benckendorff demanded that the instigators be extradited. As always happens during mass riots, the excitement began to grow, the instigators were not extradited. The authorities decided to punish the soldiers for their resistance, and in the end, considering them guilty of self-will and disobedience, the corps commander ordered the entire company to be arrested, imprisoned in the Peter and Paul Fortress and put on trial. In the evening, the 17th soldier was taken to the fortress under the escort of two companies of the Pavlovsky Life Guards Regiment.

The next day, a city guard was to be appointed from the Semenovsky regiment. When the 1st battalion learned about the fate of the 1st company, indignation flared up; the persuasion of the company and battalion commanders was unsuccessful; people declared that they would go to the guard only with their own head, that is, with the 1st company, since without it there was "nothing to attach to." From the barracks the excitement spread to the regimental yard.

Colonel Schwartz did not dare to come to those who were worried and even spent the night outside the regiment. At night, the military Governor-General Count Miloradovich came to persuade the regiment, but, despite his popularity, to no avail; the attempt of the former commander, General Potemkin, also ended unsuccessfully. Then Prince Vasilchikov announced that at 6 o'clock in the morning he would inspect the regiment himself, and ordered the Jaeger Regiment to occupy the barracks of the Semenovtsy Life Guards, and General Orlov with horse guards to approach the square.

Prince Vasilchikov, who arrived in the morning, announced that he had ordered the arrested 1st company to be brought to trial, now he could no longer release it without the permission of the sovereign, and since the rest of the companies disobeyed the orders of their superiors, he ordered them to immediately go under arrest in the fortress. “Where the head is, there is the tail,” the soldiers said, and calmly, without going into the barracks, they went in a crowd to the fortress. The officers were with them and walked ahead.

Upon arrival, the lower ranks were placed in casemates, and the officers returned to their apartments. Then, on October 19, the 2nd battalion was sent on ships to the fortress of Sveaborg, the 3rd by land to Kexholm, and the 1st, as the most guilty, was left in the fortress.

The Semyonov story excited almost the entire guard. Some commanders said they could not be quite sure of their regiments. However, due to the fact that the outbreak was spontaneous and not accompanied by external agitation, it was easily extinguished. Petersburg society was extremely agitated by this incident; all sympathies were on the side of the Semenovites. The police explained this by the fact that there were many relatives and good acquaintances of the Semenov officers in the city.

The emperor was at that time at a congress in Troppau. Having received this sad news, Alexander I attributed the unrest to outside influence, so to speak, propaganda; none of the top officials tried to clarify the truth. On November 2, the sovereign signed an order deciding the fate of the regiment. All the lower ranks were ordered to be distributed among different regiments of the army. The headquarters and chief officers were recognized as not involved in disobedience, on the contrary, it was noted that they tried hard to restore order, but they failed because of their inability to deal with the soldiers and force them to obey, and therefore they were ordered to be transferred to army regiments. Schwartz was brought to court martial for failing to keep the regiment in due obedience.

For the immediate replenishment of the Semenovsky regiment, one battalion of grenadiers beloved by Arakcheev named after the Emperor of Austria, the King of Prussia and the Crown Prince of the regiments of the military settlement corps was appointed.

The Semyonov story forced the sovereign to pay serious attention to the condition of the soldiers. In January 1821, Prince Volkonsky informed Prince Vasilchikov of the royal desire that the generals, starting with himself, without warning anyone, visit the barracks at various hours of the day and observe what the soldiers are doing, what they are fed, whether they have anything lacking, and, speaking often with them outside the office, would listen to their complaints and try to fulfill their requests, in order to earn their affection and respect.

The lower ranks of the Semenovsky regiment were distributed in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 13th, 15th and 23rd infantry divisions of 200 people each, and about 400 people in the 8th infantry division (in Lubny). Most of the officers ended up in the 2nd Army.

The position of the officers and lower ranks of the Semyonovsky regiment, transferred to the army, was difficult. Officers were forbidden to retire, they were not even allowed temporary vacations, they were removed from command posts, and in general they were looked at as if they were penalized. The distribution of officers and lower ranks almost throughout the army, and in particular the excessive severity towards them, led to the most adverse consequences. According to Vigel, “the dissatisfied officers scattered throughout the army met other dissatisfied ones and, together with them, spreading their opinions, prepared other uprisings, which were more difficult to appease after 5 years.”

The soldiers, of course, were the most malleable element for secret societies, since, hating the government, they aroused the same feelings in their comrades; in terms of their own level of development, the former guardsmen stood out sharply and, of course, easily gained influence over the rest of the soldiers. It would be more expedient to Semyonovsky regiment in in full force sent to the Caucasus, where he could serve in the military field of great service.

After the outbreak of discontent in the Semyonovsky regiment, the government increased the supervision of the secret police; this became known to the Welfare League and caused it to take appropriate precautions. At the beginning of 1822, deputies from St. Petersburg, Tulchin and the Kiev province gathered in Moscow, and they decided to abolish the union; the abolition was fictitious, but by this the main figures of the union wanted, on the one hand, to mislead the government, and on the other, to get rid of some members who inspired distrust.

Meanwhile, the union continued to work and develop; there is no doubt that the outbreak in the Semyonovsky regiment raised among the members of the union the question of revolutionary activity in the troops. By this time, the union consisted, as it were, of two branches: the Northern, in St. Petersburg, and the Southern, in Tulchin. Lieutenant Prince Obolensky, two civilians - Pushchin and Ryleev, two Bestuzhev brothers, and staff captain Kakhovsky were at the head of the Northern. The core of the Southern Society was Colonel Pestel, commander of the Vyatka Infantry Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel of the Chernigov Regiment S.M. Muravyov-Apostol, transferred to the army from the Life Guards Semenovsky Regiment, Colonel Prince Trubetskoy, Major General Prince S. G. Volkonsky and others.

The southern branch was distinguished by a more extreme direction. Pestel drafted a constitution for Russia called "Russian Truth".

Apparently, among the members of the union, the idea now began to grow stronger to use the assistance of the troops to achieve their revolutionary goals; True, some moderate members pointed to the danger of intervention by the troops, but others insisted on the possibility of resorting to the most extreme measures in the fight against the old regime.

Issues at the meetings of the union were discussed so openly that they knew about it in society, and many commanding people knew about it. Known on this occasion, filed to Alexander I by Prince Vasilchikov in the middle of 1812, was a lengthy note by Benckendorff about secret societies in the army. The Emperor did nothing about it.

Undoubtedly, members of the union - some officers in the 2nd Army - talked about revolutionary activities with the lower ranks; at least this can explain the unrest in the Chernigov Infantry Regiment, but these conversations were isolated.

In any case, the leaders of the alliance, having decided to resort to the revolutionary help of the troops, for a long time could not work out a definite plan in what exactly this help should be expressed and when it would be expedient to resort to it; in this respect, the southern branch was ahead of the northern one, the mood of the southerners was much more radical, but they also did not have a ready plan of action.

At the very end of the reign of Alexander I, there were among the military personnel who, believing that the revolutionary tasks of the union violated the duty of the oath, reported this to the highest authorities; such was the cadet of the Bug Lancers Sherwood; about the activities of Pestel, a denunciation was received from the captain of his regiment Mayboroda; there were also reports about the secret societies of the official Boshniak.

All this information, in view of the special importance and the need to keep the case in complete secrecy, were reported only to the emperor, who treated them calmly, the chief of the General Staff, Adjutant General Dibich, and Count Arakchev. It was supposed to capture all the leaders of the Southern Branch, for which, on the orders of Alexander I, Colonel Nikolaev was sent to the Life Guards of the Cossack Regiment, but the emperor’s serious illness and then his death in distant Taganrog, and most importantly, the unauthorized removal of Count Arakcheev from all affairs, was too shocked by the death of Nastasya Minkina, stopped this important event in the most crucial period and made it possible to break out major unrest in the troops in St. Petersburg and in Vasilkov, the headquarters of the 2nd battalion of the Chernigov regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel S. I. Muravyov-Apostol. These riots broke out spontaneously, only as a result of the interregnum, after the death of Alexander I, which lasted 17 days and arose due to the fact that only a few trusted Alexander I knew that in State Council and in the Moscow Cathedral of the Assumption, sealed papers were kept, with which Alexander changed the law on succession to the throne in favor of Grand Duke Nikolai Pavlovich.

Grand Duke Nikolai Pavlovich himself and, on his orders, the entire army swore allegiance to Konstantin immediately after receiving the news of the death of Alexander I. In order to avoid unrest, an act should have changed the main decrees on the imperial family of Paul I, according to which the throne after the death of Alexander I was to pass to the elder brother Konstantin, announce in advance publicly.

Such a long interregnum gave the idea to the hottest heads in the northern branch of the union to try, if not to wrest power from the new sovereign, then at least to limit it. The most effective way was to lure the soldiers onto the revolutionary path, but the troops were completely unprepared for this. It was decided to knock them down with false rumors that Constantine was being removed from the throne by force, and not voluntarily; These rumors were spread among the lower ranks by their most beloved officers (Mikhail and Alexander Bestuzhev in the Life Guards of the Moscow Regiment, lieutenants A.N. Sutgof, N. Popov and Lieutenant Kozhevnikov in the Life Guards Grenadier Regiment); the absence of Tsarevich Konstantin Pavlovich, who was in Warsaw during these troubled days, despite the request of Nicholas I to return, finally knocked down the soldiers and increased the reliability of the spread rumors.

The plan of action hastily worked out in the Northern branch of the union was based on the stubbornness of the soldiers to remain loyal to Konstantin when they were ordered to swear allegiance to Nicholas I. They expected, on the basis of unverified information, that the regiments would not give a new oath: Izmailovsky, Jaegersky, Life Grenadiers, Moscow, Finland, Guards crew and part of the guards horse artillery. As soon as the regiments are assembled for a new oath, and the soldiers resist and do not want to give it, the revolutionary officers will lead them out of the regimental yards and gather them on Petrovsky Square, which will force the Senate to immediately issue a manifesto on changing the form of government in Russia.

In fact, on the day of the new oath, December 14, 1825, only two battalions (and even then not completely) of the Moscow and Grenadier regiments and part of the Guards crew were carried away; these units, supported by a fairly large crowd of mob, gathered at the monument to Peter I with shouts of: “Hurrah! Konstantin!" There were no more than 3,000 soldiers on the side of the rebels. After lengthy negotiations, which did not lead to favorable results, but entailed vain sacrifices - Count Miloradovich and Colonel Styurler were mortally wounded, - Nicholas I, having concentrated the rest of the troops who swore allegiance to him to the same square, scattered the rebels with grapeshot, and the rebellion was stopped by evening of the same day.

The unrest in the 2nd Army was expressed only by indignation in the Chernigov regiment as a result of the arrest on December 25, 1825 of Lieutenant Colonel S. I. Muravyov-Apostol. The officers of the regiment, who adored Muravyov, recaptured him, seriously injuring their commander, Colonel Gebel; then the liberated Muraviev with his like-minded officers moved with two companies to the regimental headquarters, adding four more companies along the way. Muravyov-Apostol issued an appeal stating: "The Russian army is coming to restore the government of the people, based on holy law."

The news of the rebellion in the Chernigov regiment spread very quickly and confused the neighboring troops. On the night of December 30-31, the corps commander, General Roth, left for the town of Belaya Tserkov, ordering nine squadrons of the 3rd Hussars Division, the 5th Cavalry Artillery Company and the 17th Jaeger Regiment to concentrate. Seeing that it would be difficult for the infantry to overtake the rebels, on January 3 he surrounded Muravyov with cavalry from three sides and, after several artillery shots, forced all the rebels to surrender.

There were no other outbreaks in the army. It is difficult, judging by these facts, to believe that serious attempts were made in the army at that time to interfere in the political life of their fatherland. Our army, as always, remained true to its oath and duty at this difficult moment, and, despite the efforts of the members of the secret alliance, was not drawn into politics. Despite the replacement of Constantine on the throne by Nikolai, incomprehensible to the masses, despite the revolutionary agitation of their immediate and beloved commanders, the troops remained steadfast and firm in protecting the peace of their homeland. And it cannot be assumed that the political Union of Welfare had such a large number of members among the officers and lower ranks.

From the case of the uprising on December 14, 1825, it can be seen that the Consolidated Regiment, formed from the rebellious soldiers of the guard and speaking on February 27, 1826 on the Caucasian line, was in total: two headquarters officers, 31 chief officers, 70 non-commissioned officers , 28 musicians, 1107 combatants and 49 non-combatants, a total of 1287 people, and from the register of the commandant of the Peter and Paul Fortress, Adjutant General Sukin, it follows that there were less than 100 officers planted in the fortress in the cause of the Welfare Union.

military settlements

Goals and objectives of the creation of military settlements ¦ Reviews of contemporaries on the state of affairs in the settlements ¦ Cholera riots ¦ Elimination of military settlements by Nicholas I

The name of Arakcheev became especially hated due to the creation of military settlements. M. A. Fonvizin in his “Notes” notes that “nothing so much aroused the indignation of public opinion against Alexander, not just liberals, but the whole of Russia, as the forcible establishment of military settlements.”

The idea of ​​this institution did not belong to Count Arakcheev; according to the historian N.K. Schilder, the idea of ​​the expediency of military settlements in Russia came to the sovereign after reading the article of General Servan: “Sur les forces frontieres des etats”. The article was translated by Prince Volkonsky into Russian (for Arakcheev, who did not know French), and white margins were left against the text for the sovereign's own handwritten notes. Alexander I, seeing how the treasury was suffering due to the constant increase in our armed forces caused by the first wars with Napoleon, decided to reduce the cost of maintaining the troops by transferring part of the army, namely the infantry and cavalry, to the maintenance of the peasants. The troops settled among them were supposed to help them in their free time, work in the field and at home, and in turn accustom the peasants to military life, discipline and combat order. Thus, the military settlements were based on the idea of ​​making it easier for Russia to maintain her numerous troops and at the same time to introduce military training for the male population (like the Krumper-Sistem in Prussia), so that in case of war it would be possible to recruit recruits directly into the active troops without spending time and effort for preliminary and initial training. The regulation on military settlements, published in 1825, directly indicates the purpose of their creation: “gradual reduction, and then perfect abolition of recruiting kits". Undoubtedly, the idea is tempting, but only partially feasible, and even then if the settled troops are not too busy with the little things of military service and really help the peasant in his field work. Here, the distinctive feature of Alexander I was especially clearly manifested - his speculative way of thinking; it would be nice to turn both the peasants and the soldiers into mechanical figures and rearrange one in place of the other. From this it is clear why Alexander I did not want to abandon his idea for anything, despite the rather formidable warnings of complete failure and the obvious disapproval expressed at first by all his closest employees.

Undoubtedly, the result of the implementation of this idea depended entirely on the person at the head of the matter; it required a man with a state mind, an extremely broad outlook, extensive experience in military affairs, knowledge of the internal life of the state, and, moreover, unconditionally benevolent. Let's just say that if M.I. Golenishchev-Kutuzov, one could fully count on a more favorable outcome, but, however, not on complete success, since due to the complexity of mutual relations and the heterogeneity of the duties of soldiers and peasants, it was impossible to have a good military peasant and an outstanding settled soldier. Of course, if we take into account the primitiveness of the then military equipment, the ease of handling firearms, and most importantly, the possibility of extremely simplifying the training and education of the lower ranks during 25 years of service, then the idea of ​​​​military settlements had some basis.

Who does the emperor put in charge of this matter? Count Arakcheev! It was difficult to find a more unsuccessful leader, and, moreover, with completely unlimited and uncontrolled powers of authority. Insufficiently educated in the broad state sense, resurrecting the beginnings of Pavlovian drill and paradomania, cruel, vicious with subordinates, not tolerating any objections, and most importantly, not allowing any changes in the plans he adopted, Arakcheev was an omnipotent tyrant with whom every talented and educated person avoided not only to serve, but even to meet.

The question is why Alexander I, having in front of him outstanding statesmen, for this big business chose Arakcheev?

Undoubtedly, in addition to complete confidence in him and confidence in the exact fulfillment of his instructions, the emperor admired Arakcheev as a diligent owner of his own estate, where he also started a purely military order. Indeed, roads smooth as parquet, excellent river crossings, a comfortable village adjacent to the count's estate, made an amazing impression: the huts, painted pink, stand in a row, at the same distance from each other; all buildings were erected according to a single plan; all the peasants are uniformly and cleanly dressed, stand and respond in a military manner. From the belvedere of the count's palace, twenty-two villages belonging to the count are visible; through a telescope, you can even see what the peasants are doing in each of them. According to the count, his peasants have achieved great material well-being, and his patrimony brings an excellent income.

In a letter to his sister, Grand Duchess Ekaterina Pavlovna, dated June 7, 1810, the emperor does not hide his delight at the excellent arrangement of the Arakcheevsky estate: “When I write to you, it’s the same as I write to George, and therefore show him these lines . I earnestly ask him, when he passes here, to go, accompanied by General Arakcheev, in a droshky through all the villages through which he drove me, and pay attention: 1) to the order that reigns everywhere; 2) cleanliness; 3) for the construction of roads and tree planting; 4) for special symmetry and grace, which are observed everywhere. The streets of the local villages have with that special purity which I so desire for the cities: the best proof that my demand is feasible is that it is observed even here in the countryside. The streets of Novgorod, Valdai, Vyshny Volochok, Torzhok and Kresttsov should have been kept in the same form! And what a dramatic difference! I repeat: the local villages serve as proof that this is possible ... "

By the end of 1809, the emperor had finally matured the idea of ​​​​military settlements. Arakcheev, they say, at first did not approve of this idea and even opposed its implementation, but then, wanting to please the sovereign and realizing that this could serve to further strengthen his position, he was its most ardent supporter. The emperor ordered Arakcheev to proceed with the settlement of the reserve battalion of the Yelets Infantry Regiment in the Klimovichi district (later renamed the Mogilev province), the Babyletsky eldership, whose inhabitants were resettled in Novorossiysk region.

The Patriotic War and foreign campaigns suspended the development of settlements for several years. Returning from abroad in 1815 with a broken mental strength, Alexander I, with tremendous energy, however, took up the military settlements, as if considering them his and Arakcheev's personal business.

The main goal was forgotten - to make it easier for the state to maintain military forces: unlimited credit was opened to Arakcheev, and millions flowed to him in a wide wave without any control, only so that in less than 20 years there would be almost no memory of them left.

The emperor, cautious in solving most serious state affairs, did not consider it necessary to bring the issue of military settlements for preliminary discussion either in the State Council or in the Committee of Ministers. There was no regulation, or regulation, on military settlements, which gave Arakcheev complete freedom of action. This time the Novgorod province was chosen for the settlement of the infantry; this was done solely for the convenience of Arakcheev; living in Georgia, he, as an unlimited ruler, was in the center of his main possessions - military settlements.

On August 5, 1815, a decree was issued addressed to the Novgorod governor on the deployment of the 2nd battalion of the Grenadier Regiment named after Count Arakcheev in the Vysotsky volost of the Novgorod province, on the river. Volkhov, next to the village. Georgian. Observation of order in the Vysotsky volost, previously entrusted to the Zemstvo police, was transferred to the jurisdiction of the battalion commandant. On August 29, the battalion already set out from St. Petersburg, and five days later it was in place and began to deploy. When settling this and subsequent grenadier battalions, the experience of quartering the Yelets regiment was taken into account.

Residents of the volosts appointed to complete this regiment were left in place and forever enrolled in military settlers with subordination to the military authorities. Male children were enrolled as cantonists, and then served to replenish the settled troops. The connection of all the settlements of one regiment (three volosts) was called the district of such and such a regiment. So, each district included the settlements of one regiment, which was divided into three battalions, and these latter were divided into companies, corporals and platoons.

Following the Arakcheev regiment, other grenadier regiments followed, led by the regiment of the Emperor of Austria, the King of Prussia and the Crown Prince; all these regiments settled in the neighborhood of the Arakcheev estate, along the river. Volkhov. Here, in the Novgorod and Starorussky districts, 14 regiments were soon placed. In the district itself, each company lived separately: it had its own company area, mainly for classes, a guardhouse, a common threshing floor and barns; officers lived right there, in special houses. All chores were carried out under the supervision and orders of officers, who, as it were, were also assistants. The center of the settlement of each regiment was its headquarters, where the regimental commander's apartment, hospitals, a large arena, shops, etc. were located; usually it was a well-organized whole town. Arakcheev's passion for construction here was completely satisfied.

The settled troops received detailed instructions from Arakcheev regulating the conditions of life and service in the settlements; the chiefs were instructed "to try, by the good behavior of all ranks in general, not only to prevent all sorts of complaints and displeasures of their masters, but to gain their love and power of attorney." The peasants of the settlements were granted many benefits and benefits, among them: the cancellation of many state arrears, the alleviation and even the abolition of certain monetary and in-kind duties, the free use of medicines, the establishment of schools for children, the appointment of specialists in various sectors of the economy to raise its culture.

With regard to the performance of military service, they were also granted important benefits, namely: they were exempted from the general recruitment kits, no matter how urgent the need for them was. According to the length of service of the indicated years, each military settler, continuing to live in his native village, was exempted from military service in any form. The government took care of children and prepared them for military service, food and uniforms were state-owned.

It turns out, in fact, a tempting picture. Nevertheless, the peasants went to the military settlements extremely reluctantly, because by their nature they could not put up with the regime created by Arakcheev.

Following the infantry military settlements, they began to arrange the same settlements for the cavalry, for this the provinces of Kherson (Kherson, Elizavetgrad, Alexandria and Olviopol districts), Yekaterinoslavskaya (Verkhnedneprovsky district) and Sloboda-Ukrainian (Volchansky, Zmievsky, Kupyansky, Starobelsky and Izyum districts). Arakcheev was also the main and plenipotentiary commander in these settlements, but, constantly living away from them and not considering it convenient for himself to go into all the details of their lives due to insufficient knowledge of the cavalry service, Arakcheev put Lieutenant General Count Witt at the head of these settlements, whose headquarters was in the city of Elizavetgrad. A lot of work fell to Arakcheev's share in placing the troops in place and delimiting the activities of them and the peasants; this work was further complicated by the fact that Arakcheev, not trusting anyone, entered into everything himself; it must be taken into account that at the same time Arakcheev did not miss the most important state cases, which were still submitted to him for consideration.

Thanks to the enormous energy shown by both the emperor and Arakcheev in the creation of military settlements, they quickly and widely developed.

On February 3, 1821, they were given the name of a separate corps of military settlements, and, of course, Count Arakcheev was appointed chief of the corps; its headquarters was in Novgorod; the chief of staff was General Kleinmichel, an extremely dexterous and intelligent man. The composition of the headquarters was diverse: it included engineers, auditors, even officers of the quartermaster service (Bradke was the chief quartermaster of the military settlement corps).

What was this type of settled army and at the same time an armed people?

According to N.K. Schilder, a separate corps of military settlements, which constituted, as it were, a special military state under the control of Count Arakcheev, at the end of 1825 consisted of 90 battalions of the Novgorod settlement, 36 battalions and 249 squadrons of the Sloboda-Ukrainian, Yekaterinoslav and Kherson settlements, which already included a whole third of the Russian army.

The main occupation of the settled troops was still the front and linear exercises; resurrected in this respect the Pavlovian times, which left a deep imprint in the soul of Arakcheev; in addition, the crafty Arakcheev, seeing Alexander I's passion for divorces, also belonged to this unit in the settled troops; it was necessary to prove to the emperor with his own eyes that the settled troops were in no way inferior to the active ones in front-line occupations, and in terms of housekeeping, accommodation and low cost of maintenance, they were significantly superior to them. Many hours of marching in order to achieve proper bearing and stance, and then linear exercises, occupied the whole day of the settled soldier; classes were carried out not only with severity, but even with cruelty; often the count himself was present at them and, if he noticed negligence, he prescribed punishment with gauntlets, and in addition, the commanders themselves, fearing to fall under the wrath of Arakcheev or wanting to please him, did not spare the soldiers. In this regard, the commander of the grenadier regiment named after Count Arakcheev, Colonel von Fricken, who enjoyed the special love of his boss and was nicknamed Fyodor Kulakov in the settlements for his ferocious scuffle, was especially distinguished.

At the end of classes or on specially appointed days (alternately), the soldiers were driven to construction work: to build headquarters, houses for housing, to build roads. Deforestation, clearing fields, laying roads, making bricks and similar work was assigned to army personnel battalions. According to A.K. Gribbe, these battalions - the unfortunate victims of that time - up to 50-60 in number, came to the settlements in April, and left for winter quarters in more or less remote counties of Novgorod and adjacent provinces - in September; but sometimes those battalions that did not have time to complete the work lessons determined by him were left as a punishment for October.

Finally, completely exhausted by these works, the soldier also had to teach his peasant, or his cantonist son. If we add to this the time for cleaning and putting in order his ammunition, and also for guard duty at the headquarters, then the picture of his employment is quite clear. Life was no better for the peasant. The military peasant, exhausted by field work, was charged with front-line occupations and marching; returning home from work, he did not find peace even here: he was forced to wash and clean his hut and sweep the street. He had to inform the authorities about almost every egg that his hen would bring. Women did not dare to give birth at home: feeling the approach of childbirth, they had to appear at the headquarters.

The "caring" of the count extended to the point that he issued the "Short Rules for Peasant Mothers of the Georgian Estate", concerning the care of newborns.

Improving the morality of the rural population was also very concerned about Arakcheev, as evidenced by his "Rules on Weddings".

In the huge estate of Arakcheev, the number of grooms and brides was constantly growing; they were usually reported to the count by the steward. By order of the count, boys and girls came to his house in a whole crowd and became couples - the groom with the bride he had chosen: Ivan - with Matryona, and Sidor - with Pelageya. When everything is distributed in this way, the count orders Pelageya to go to Ivan, and give Matryona to Sidor and so he will order them to be married. From here, strife, quarrels went on in the families, and debauchery flourished. To top it all, the peasant was never left alone with his family - there were always settled soldiers in the yard or hut, which created a considerable temptation for women.

What Arakcheev did in his estate, he began to do in all military settlements, considering the regime he created in Georgia to be ideal.

If we take into account the enormous work on the organization of military settlements, carried out in a relatively short period of time, then one involuntarily marvels at the hard work and energy of Arakcheev.

However, from the memoirs of Arakcheev's employees, it is clearly seen what was the secret of the speed with which Arakcheev carried out the wishes of the sovereign. This secret is quite simple. Arakcheev did not at all consider it necessary to look for the most trained people to perform this or that work. He firmly believed in the omnipotence of subordination and preached the rule that in the service no one can ever excuse himself with ignorance and inability. It is enough to order and collect - and any deed will be done.

Impartial and restrained in his judgments, Bradke in his “Notes” says bluntly: “There is a lot of noise, a lot of torment, running around and fuss in the classes in military settlements, but there is no real benefit.” In the arrangement of the settlements themselves, according to the review of the same author, “there was brilliance on the surface, but despondency and disaster inside.” At every step there was evidence of senseless, unproductive expenditures and a lack of concern for the real benefit of the cause. The blind faith of the leaders in the omnipotence of the order was constantly refuted by reality, but they stubbornly refused to recognize the validity of life lessons.

The very choice of localities for the arrangement of settlements, according to Bradke, was "fatal." In the Novgorod province, the places for settlements were almost entirely occupied by an old, rotten forest with vast and deep swamps. They built magnificent buildings for headquarters, built highways everywhere, put up smart houses for soldiers, but meadows and pastures turned out to be located far beyond the fields, and the cattle came to pasture completely exhausted.

Expensive foreign cattle was released when the meadows had not yet been cut, and the cattle began to die from hunger and unsuitability for fodder marsh grasses. And to all such grave blunders were added the burdensomeness of pedantic formalism and aimless cruelty in the methods of administration. Such is the reverse side of the ostentatious "businesslike" Arakcheev administration of military settlements. This is evidenced by the memoirs of Martos, Mayevsky and Europeus.

And here is what General Mayevsky, one of Arakcheev’s prominent assistants, writes: “Everything that makes up the appearance captivates the eye to admiration; everything that makes up the interior speaks of disorder. Cleanliness and neatness is the first virtue in this settlement. But imagine a huge house with a mezzanine in which people and food freeze; imagine a compressed room, a mixture of sexes without separation; imagine that a cow is kept like a gun, and fodder in the field is obtained for 12 miles; imagine that capital forests are burned, and new buildings are bought from Porkhov with burdensome delivery, that in order to save one tree they use a sazhen of firewood to furnish it with a cage, and then you will get an idea of ​​\u200b\u200bthis state economy.

During the detours of military settlements by Alexander I, everything shone with contentment and prosperity. Entering different houses at lunchtime, the sovereign found a roast pig and a goose on the table of each settler. Eyewitnesses say, however, that these goose and piglets were quickly carried around the backyards from house to house, as the sovereign moved from one settler to another. Of course, the eyewitness adds to this story, neither empty cabbage soup nor battered backs were shown to the sovereign.

From all these unspeakable blessings, the people came to "fear" and "numbness." Such a recognition breaks through even in Arakcheev himself in his reports to the sovereign.

It is no wonder that under such conditions riots often broke out among the peasants; so, at the very beginning, riots arose in the Vysotsky volost. Arakcheev did not attach any serious importance to them and usually informed the sovereign that brawlers, naughty people and people of bad behavior were revolting.

Then, when Arakcheev dressed the children of military settlers, aged from 6 to 18, in military uniforms, women's riots began. All these disturbances were initially liquidated quite quickly and easily, since there were an abundance of troops in the settlement areas, they were still far from getting along with the population, and Arakcheev disposed of them unlimitedly and decisively. Little by little, Arakcheev began to introduce the reforms he recognized as necessary: ​​the peasants began to go to work in the field in uniforms; began to shave their beards. True, they were still trying to get rid of the Arakcheev blessings and sent deputations to the sovereign, but Alexander I, accepting the deputation affectionately, first of all instructed them to obey their superiors. Petitions to the Empress Mother, to Tsarevich Konstantin Pavlovich and Grand Duke Nikolai Pavlovich did not lead to anything.

According to Martos, the peasants said: “Add us a tribute, demand a son from each house for service, take everything from us and take us to the steppe: we will more readily agree, we have hands, we will start working there and we will live happily there.” , but do not touch our clothes, the customs of our fathers, do not make us all soldiers ... Meanwhile, - continues Martos, - all the inhabitants were dressed in soldier's uniforms, they were given summer and winter pantaloons, gray overcoats, caps, painted in companies; in every village they took a threshing floor, began to teach them to toss and turn left and right, walk in step, trample with their heels, straighten up, carry a cleaver; they even cared to such an extent that they were not too lazy to build stoves in those threshing floors, so that the villagers would visit the arena even in winter days, march in it and listen to the command of the loud-mouthed corporal, for their such special happiness.

After all these unsuccessful attempts, the peasants had no choice but to submit to their sad fate. On March 25, 1818, Count Arakcheev informed the sovereign that everything was going well in the military settlements, peacefully and calmly. But in reality it was not so: the settler could never come to terms with the restriction of life's freedom and the restriction of property rights; a dull feeling of hatred for those who put him in these conditions began to lurk in him. Who was the culprit? The settlers constantly saw an officer in front of them: he lived among them, conducted front-line exercises; he was, as it were, their landowner. All their hatred was concentrated against him; besides, among the officers of the military settlements there were many supporters of the drill; the senior settled chiefs very much disliked everyone who did not share their views on military service, they got rid of such in every possible way, and the most zealous non-commissioned officers were put forward in their place. bloody events, erupted in July 1831 on the banks of the Volkhov and known as the cholera riots, were, as it were, an expiatory victim of a huge state mistake made in 1815 by the establishment of military settlements.

Taking advantage of the fact that two battalions from each settled regiment went on a campaign against the rebellious Poles, finding fault with the fact that doctors and commanders allegedly poured poison into the wells, the peasant settlers inhumanly tortured several officers. With this, the military settlements themselves signed the verdict, and soon Emperor Nicholas I was forced to proceed with the liquidation of the brainchild of Alexander I.

However, one cannot but admit that Arakcheev was concerned about improving the material support of military settlements: public bread shops were opened, horse factories were founded; special cantonist schools were established for children; sawmills and other factories were built and, finally, a special fund of military settlements was formed, which in 1826 reached 32 million rubles. However, it was not heard that when he was the chief commander of a separate corps of military settlements, he distributed benefits from this fund; he was preparing a monument for himself for posterity, but he only earned the popular rumor that "it is necessary to write about him not with ink, but with blood."

Notes:

Napoleon was aware of the danger of Murat's advanced position and suggested that he retreat to Voronov, 30 miles closer to Moscow, but Murat did not take advantage of this.

On October 9, he informs Mara: “It is very possible that by November His Majesty will be in winter quarters between the Dnieper and Dvina in order to be closer to his reinforcements, to give the army a rest and to deal with many other issues with less difficulty.”

Everything that later was told by Napoleon and his admirers about the harsh autumn and terrible frosts that ruined the army is completely wrong. On the contrary, frosts in 1812 began later than usual and lasted less time than in other years in this area. “The first frosts began on October 15 (27), with a clear, sunny sky, and only on October 20 (November 1) did the temperature drop to -8 degrees, and on October 23 (November 4) the first snow fell” (Von Guretzky-Cornitz). “Until November 6 (October 25), that is, for 16-17 days, the weather was excellent, and the cold was much less than in some months of the campaign in Prussia and Poland, and even in Spain” (Gourgaud). In his famous Bulletin No. 29, Napoleon even himself says: “Until November 6, the weather was excellent” (Molodechno, December 3).

Napoleon, being in Fominsky, 50 miles from Moscow, heard the explosions with joyful anger and the next day announced to Europe that “the Kremlin, the arsenal, the shops - everything is destroyed; the ancient citadel, the same age as the beginning of the monarchy, the ancient palace of the tsars, like all of Moscow, has been turned into piles of rubble, into a dirty, disgusting cesspool and henceforth has neither political nor military significance. Thank God nothing like this happened. The mines were badly arranged, and only a small part of the Kremlin walls collapsed; everything else survived.

F.v. D. Napoleon a Dresde. T.II. P. 68.

On the same day, Moscow was occupied by the Wintsengerode detachment, under the command of Ilovaisky 4th, since Wintzengerode was captured by the French during the negotiations.

Schilder N.K. Emperor Alexander I. T. IV. S. 115.

100th anniversary of the War Ministry. Ch.H.S. 109.

That was the name given to these officers in the Military Journal.

A. A. Arakcheev was born on September 23, 1769, died on April 21, 1834; came from an old but poor noble family, immigrants from the Novgorod province (his father was a lieutenant of the Life Guards of the Preobrazhensky Regiment).

The years of his childhood passed in the family estate (20 souls) in the Bezhetsk district. From his mother, he learned her code of pedantic requirements, based mainly on the desire for constant work, strict order, extraordinary accuracy and thrift. These traits remained forever in his character.

On July 20, 1785, Arakcheev entered the Shlyakhetsky Artillery and Engineering Cadet Corps, from which he graduated brilliantly on September 27, 1787, after which he was left at the corps as a tutor and teacher of mathematics and artillery. (Russian biographical dictionary. 1900. Vol. II.)

Since August 5, 1793 - major of artillery; from 1796 - Gatchina governor (second person in Gatchina after the Tsarevich); from June 28, 1796 - lieutenant colonel of artillery and colonel of the troops of the heir.

Russian biographical dictionary. 1900. Vol. II.

The favors of the emperor continued to shower on him; On November 7, he was appointed St. Petersburg city commandant and "headquarters" (headquarters officer for the economic part) of the Life Guards of the Preobrazhensky Regiment; Promoted to major general on the 8th; On the 13th he was granted the Anninsky Ribbon; On December 12, he received a rich Georgian estate in the Novgorod province (the only valuable gift he accepted during his entire service); On April 5, 1797, he was granted the title of baron and the Alexander Ribbon; since August 10 he has been commander of the Life Guards Preobrazhensky Regiment.

Kiesewetter A. Arakcheev // Russian Thought. 1910. No. 11.

On February 18, 1798, the baron was dismissed without a request for a clean resignation with promotion to lieutenant general.

While the artillery battalion of his brother Andrei was on guard at the arsenal, there was a theft of gold tassels and galloon from an old artillery chariot. The count reported that the guard was kept from the regiment of General Vilde; the sovereign expelled him from the service, but at that time Kutaisov revealed the whole truth.

Schilder N.K. Emperor Alexander I. T. I. S. 186.

There. T.II. pp. 138–139.

Kartsov Yu., Voensky K. Causes of the War of 1812. S. 9.

As early as the end of 1807, the military collegium was ordered: “The highest orders announced by the artillery general Count Arakcheev should be considered Our personal decrees” (100th anniversary of the Military Ministry. T. IV. Part I. C. 198).

Epanchin N. E. Tactical preparation of the Russian army before the campaign of 1828-1829. S. 19.

Epanchin N. E. Tactical training of the Russian army. S. 24.

Schilder N.K. Emperor Alexander I. T. IV. S. 8.

Epanchin N. E. Tactical training of the Russian army. S. 17.

Prince P. M. Volkonsky was born in 1776. In 1793 he was promoted to warrant officer of the Semyonovsky Life Guards Regiment; in 1796, being a regimental adjutant, he was promoted to lieutenant. Zealous service attracted the attention of Paul I and in his reign he passed all the ranks, up to and including the colonel of the guard. For zeal, he was noticed by the chief of the regiment, Grand Duke Alexander Pavlovich. On the day of the coronation of Alexander I, he was promoted to major general and appointed adjutant general (25 years old). Soon after, he was appointed assistant chief of the military field office of His Majesty. In 1805, he was a general on duty, first at Buxgevden, and then at Kutuzov. For distinction in the battle of Austerlitz, he received the Order of St. George 3rd degree. In the future, he was already with the person of the emperor.

Correspondence of Emperor Alexander I with his sister Grand Duchess Ekaterina Pavlovna. 1910. S. 32.

Spouse Grand Duchess- Prince Georgy of Oldenburg, Tver, Yaroslavl and Novgorod Governor-General and Chief of Communications.

The regulation on military settlements, published in 1825, states that “the entire settlement of each regimental district is divided into two main parts: fixed and mobile.

motionless part of the population is made up of all those persons who do not participate in military campaigns and always remain in the places of settlement.

mobile part of the population is made up of all those persons who participate in military campaigns.

The fixed part includes: 1) hosts, 2) cantonists, 3) disabled people, 4) all old-timers over 45 years old, 5) families of people going on a campaign.

People who make up the mobile part of the regiment, when they are in the field, are distributed on farms with their families, participate in their rural work and use the product of their common labors. The masters in each regiment are united in one battalion, in several companies or squadrons, and this part of the regiment, while the others are moving on a campaign, remaining in their places, motionless prepares for the service of people who will come to her in time to replace the loss that is in the mobile parts during the campaign may follow.

Vigil's Notes. M., 1892. T. V. S. 59.

The fourth volume of the series "Russian military costume" for the first time covers in detail the evolution of the uniform of foot units of the Russian guards and the army, including artillery and engineering troops, during the reign of Emperor Alexander I (1801-1825). The main emphasis in the text is on the period of the Napoleonic wars of 1805-1815.

For the first time since the publication of the fundamental work "Historical Description of Clothing and Weapons of the Russian Troops", a revision of the history of the development of the Russian military uniform in the first quarter of the 19th century was carried out.

The illustrative series of the book is based on iconography from the collections of the Russian State Military Historical Archive, the State Hermitage and the State Historical Museum, as well as drawings and reconstructions made by famous artists and graphic artists: N. Zubkov, S. Popov, A. Yezhov and V. Malyshev. The volume widely presents previously unpublished drawings and paintings of that time, photographs of firearms and edged weapons and individual items of uniforms.

Chapter I. 1801-1807

I.I. Uniform reforms 1801-1807
I.II. Generals, retinue, individual ranks and services
I.III. Guard:
Preobrazhensky, Semenovsky and Izmailovsky regiments
Life Guard Jaeger Battalion
Life Guards Garrison Battalion
Life Guards Artillery Battalion
I.IV. Army:
Army heavy infantry: grenadier and musketeer regiments
Chasseur regiments
Garrison regiments and battalions. Disabled companies
Field and garrison artillery
Pioneer regiments
pontoon companies

Chapter II. 1807-1814

II.I. Uniform reforms 1807-1814
II.II. Generals, retinue, individual ranks and services
II.III. Guard:
Life Guards Preobrazhensky, Semenovsky and Izmailovsky regiments
Life Guard Jaeger Regiment
Life Guards Finnish Battalion (Regiment)
Life Guards Lithuanian Regiment Officer uniforms of the regiments of the Old Guard in 1807-1814.
Life Guards Garrison Battalion and Companies of Guards Disabled
Guards crew
Life Guards Grenadier and Pavlovsk Regiments
Life Guards Artillery Battalion (Brigade)
II.IV. Army:
Grenadier and musketeer (infantry) regiments
Chasseur regiments
Garrison regiments and battalions. Disabled people.
inner guard
army artillery
Garrison artillery
Pioneer and Sapper regiments

Chapter III. 1814-1825

III.I. Uniform reform 1814-1818
III. II. Generals, retinue, individual ranks and services
III.III. Guard:
Guards Heavy Infantry: Life Guards
Preobrazhensky, Semenovsky, Izmailovsky, Moscow, Grenadier and Pavlovsky regiments
Guards Light Infantry: Life Guards Jaeger and Finnish Regiments
Guards crew
Guards of the Separate Lithuanian Corps: Life Guards Lithuanian and Volyn regiments
Life Guards Garrison Battalion and Guards Disabled Companies
Guards foot and horse artillery
Life Guards Sapper Battalion
Life Guard Horse Pioneer Squadron
III.IV. Army:
Grenadier, infantry and naval regiments
Carabinieri and chasseur regiments
Garrison regiments and battalions. Inner Guard. Disabled companies and teams
Army field artillery
Garrison artillery
Sapper and pioneer battalions
Army equestrian pioneers
Military-working companies of the Engineering Corps
Army units of the Separate Lithuanian Corps

The state of the Russian army at the end of the reign of Alexander I

Vladimir Pavlovich Nikolsky, Colonel of the General Staff

Influence of foreign campaigns

The growth of political self-awareness in the Russian army? Establishment of schools and Lancaster schools for soldiers

The Patriotic War and the foreign campaigns that followed it extremely raised the military status, making it the most honorable and popular in Russia. The well-known Decembrist, a prominent participant in these campaigns, M. A. Fonvizin, in his Notes, notes: “Two unsuccessful wars with Napoleon and the third, which threatened the independence of Russia in 1812, forced young Russian patriots to devote themselves exclusively to military rank to defend the fatherland. The nobility, patriotically sympathizing with the decline of our military glory in the wars with France in 1805 and 1807. and foreseeing a quick break with her, he hurried to join the ranks of the army, ready to meet Napoleon. All decent and educated young people (nobles), despising the civil service, went to the same military; before 1812, young privy and actual state councilors happily joined the army as lieutenant colonels and majors. and the capture of Paris, in which our army took an active (and glorious) part, all this unusually elevated the spirit of our troops and especially the young officers.

In the course of their two years of anxious combat life, amid incessant dangers, they have become accustomed to strong sensations, which for the brave become almost a necessity.

In such a mood of spirit, with a sense of dignity and sublime love for the fatherland, most of the officers of the guard and the General Staff returned in 1815 to St. Petersburg.

In the same mood, many officers returned, who became part of the 1st and 2nd armies, whose headquarters were located in Mogilev and Tulchin. Many guard officers who were on foreign campaigns at that time already commanded regiments and brigades in the armies (M. A. Fonvizin, Prince S. G. Volkonsky, M. F. Orlov). All of them, on campaigns in Germany and France, got acquainted with European civilization, which made a strong impression on them. These impressions sunk deep into the souls of the officers, for, having acquired during the long and difficult wars of 1812-1814. great experience in military art, they were fully aware that they were not only not inferior to their Western European counterparts, but also surpassed them (for example, our artillery in 1814 was considered the best of all European ones; Russian arrows outnumbered foreign ones). They could not fail to realize that only the Russians were, in fact, the crushers of Napoleon's power.

Returning home, they found, as before, great disturbances in the life of their people. The long absence of the emperor, who exerted all his strength in the fight against Napoleon, involuntarily paying less attention to internal affairs, and the terrible upheavals that befell Russia in 1812, further upset internal state our homeland, the imperfection of which sharply declared itself by the existing serfdom of the peasants.

The officers of the army, during their stay abroad, got used to being interested in the political side of life and transferred this habit to their homeland. It is clear that here the soil turned out to be even more receptive and fertile.

No wonder the emperor, in a conversation with the Prussian Bishop Eilert, during a visit to Berlin in 1818, said: “The campaign of the Russians through Germany to Paris will benefit all of Russia. Thus, a new one will come for us historical era and I still have a lot of work to do.” From this it is clear that the emperor also recognized the great political significance of the presence of our troops in Germany. Many of our officers during the campaign became acquainted with German officers, members of the Prussian secret alliance (Tugendbund), which so beneficially contributed to the liberation and exaltation of Prussia. In open conversations with them, our young officers imperceptibly adopted their free way of thinking and striving.

“Not only the officers, but also the lower ranks of the guard gained an overseas spirit,” testifies N. I. Grech in his notes. In 1816 he was present at a dinner given by a Masonic lodge (in France) to guards sergeants and non-commissioned officers. They behaved with dignity, some inserted French phrases into their speech.

That the stay there had a strong developing influence on the soldiers who had been abroad, is evident from the conversation of the Minister of Internal Affairs V.P. Kochubey with the famous writer V.I. Karazin on October 27, 1820. Karazin told the minister: abroad, and most of all, those who served in the corps, located in France, returned with completely new thoughts and disseminated them during their transition or in the places where they lodged. People started talking more. They judge that it is difficult to serve, that there are large penalties, that they receive little salary, that they are punished severely, and so on. To a further question from Kochubey, Karazin added: “There are very smart people among the soldiers who know how to read and write. There are many soldiers among the brisk seminarians who have been sent to military service for bad behavior. There is<…>and among the courtyards there are very sharp and knowledgeable people, there are stewards, solicitors and other master's people who are recruited for bad behavior or for abuse. They, like everyone else, read magazines and newspapers. Find out how many copies of Invalid and other magazines are now sold in comparison with the elapsed time.

This interesting conversation confirms that in the ranks of the lower ranks of the army there were then quite a few developed people, though not with a particularly high moral level.

In the Russian corps, temporarily left in France under the command of Prince M. S. Vorontsov after 1814, apparently, humane treatment was introduced, and serious attention was paid to teaching the lower ranks to read and write. In addition to the ordinary schools, four Lancastrian schools, or schools of mutual instruction, were established. In June 1818, Grand Duke Mikhail Pavlovich inspected such a school in Maubeuge, in which 300 soldiers studied, and was very pleased with it, having learned that many soldiers learned to read and write very well in three months. At first, Alexander I was interested in these schools and supported the idea of ​​their establishment; in 1817, by the highest command, even a special committee was established in St. Petersburg to introduce mutual education in the schools of soldiers' children, a school was formed for the guards regiments, but already in the 20s the idea of ​​spreading such schools in the troops was completely abandoned, because on these schools began to look as a means of spreading freethinking and rebellion.

There is no doubt that the soldiers who returned from campaigns brought with them new concepts of human dignity and for the first time they had an idea of ​​the duty of a citizen and his rights. But, however, such a development of the personnel of military units can be noted only in the guards and a small number of army units, in the rest of the army the development of both officers and lower ranks, and especially relations between themselves, were completely different. It must be borne in mind that there were still quite a few former "Gatchins" and their ardent followers in the army who continued to profess the Pavlovian Catechism of drill; they understood only the cruel methods of training and it was strange to do without corporal punishment. True, with the accession to the throne of Alexander I, these officers became quiet and temporarily consigned to oblivion their methods of education, but still their attitude differed too sharply from that of the advanced officers, despite the fact that many of these Gatchina offspring had been abroad. Apparently, there were quite a few such officers, as can be seen at least from a special circular of 1810, in which the Minister of War Barclay de Tolly, drawing attention to the increase in sickness and mortality in the troops, pointed out to the generals the deep-rooted habit of “all science, discipline and base the military order on corporal and cruel punishment; there were even examples that the officers treated the soldiers inhumanly.” And there were many such "brave captains", unfortunately, in the army.

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“The sanitary condition of the army We will touch on this issue only because it clearly reveals the difference in the methods of struggle between regular, whether bourgeois or proletarian, and partisan, peasant armies. One of the basic principles of organizing any

At the same time there were unrest in the army. The chiefs, whom the soldiers loved, were removed and replaced by Arakcheev proteges. Arakcheev rebuilt the system of training in the army, planting a senseless and cruel military drill.

The main discontent grew among the soldiers. The signs of fermentation reflected the mood of the peasantry, since the army in its mass consisted of peasants recruited through recruitment kits.

The long-standing struggle of the peasants against serf oppression and hatred of the landlords were also manifested in the army. The Patriotic War of 1812 played a huge role in the growth of the consciousness of the soldier serfs. Foreign campaigns made it possible for the mass of soldiers to get acquainted with the life of states where serfdom no longer existed. The army, which returned home after victories over Napoleon, was a hotbed of discontent against serf oppression. The militias who returned from the front hoped that military exploits would bring them freedom, meanwhile, in their homeland, the former serf oppression awaited them. “We shed blood,” they said, “and we are again forced to sweat on corvée, we delivered our homeland from a tyrant, and the lords again tyrannize us.”

The soldier's service at that time lasted 25 years. In the presence of at least one penalty, the soldier was doomed to indefinite, lifelong service. The soldiery was worse than hard labor; brutal corporal punishment raged in the army. “I am the defense of the fatherland, and my back is always beaten,” was sung in a soldier's song composed at the beginning of the 19th century. According to V. Fedorov, during 1816-1825. at least happened in the army

15 open performances. One of the biggest unrest in the army was the indignation of the Semyonovsky regiment, which began

October 16, 1820 in St. Petersburg. The chief of this oldest guards regiment was Emperor Alexander I. The regiment became famous for its heroic deeds in the Patriotic War of 1812. and during overseas trips. Upon returning from abroad, the officers, among whom there were many future Decembrists, destroyed corporal punishment in the regiment, began to address the soldiers as “you”.

The new commander of the Semyonovsky regiment, the Arakcheev Schwartz, dramatically changed the regimental order: reprisal with a stick was reintroduced, the senseless drill for parades filled the soldiers all the time. In a short time, from May 1 to October 3, 1820, on the orders of Schwartz, 44 soldiers were punished, who received a total of 14,250 blows. On October 16, in the evening, the head "sovereign company" arbitrarily gathered for roll call, called the authorities and brought a complaint against the regimental commander. This was an unheard of event in the tsarist army. The frightened command fraudulently sent the company to the arena, arrested it and escorted it to prison - to the casemates of the Peter and Paul Fortress. Meanwhile, the excitement spread to the rest of the companies, which supported the demands of the first. The entire regiment was arrested and imprisoned in the Peter and Paul Fortress. In the speeches of the Semyonovites, the protest of the soldiers' masses against feudal oppression was manifested.

The indignation of the Semyonovsky regiment plunged the government into the strongest alarm. The adjutants of the St. Petersburg governor-general Miloradovich hardly went to bed for two weeks; one of them, F. Glinka, later said: “Then we lived exactly in bivouacs, all measures for the security of the city were taken. Every half an hour (throughout the night) quarter officers appeared, every hour private bailiffs brought verbal and written reports ... sent couriers, constantly sent out gendarmes, and the alarm was terrible.

During the indignation of the Semyonovites, revolutionary proclamations were scattered in the neighboring barracks, calling on soldiers to fight the tsar and the nobles, declaring that the tsar was “nothing but a strong robber” who would always stand for the nobles. The regiments were called upon to overthrow their noble superiors and to choose commanders "from their brother soldier." In one of the proclamations, found in the courtyard of the Preobrazhensky barracks in October 1820 after the uprising of the Semyonovsky regiment, it was said: “The farmers are oppressed in a manner. Many noblemen drive their peasants to corvée six days a week. Tell me, is it possible to turn off such peasants from the ranks of hard labor? Thus, the slogans of the rebel soldiers echoed the slogans of the peasant movement.

Semyonovtsy amazed everyone with their solidarity and stamina. With great difficulty, through the provocateur, it was possible to snatch out several names of the "instigators" during the investigation. They were subjected to the most severe punishment - driven through the ranks; survivors of the execution were exiled to hard labor in mining factories. The penal Semyonovsky regiment was disbanded. Later, the exiled Semyonovites took part in the unrest of the Ural workers.

Army of Alexander I "IN THE FRENCH MANNER"

It is traditionally believed that the starting point of French influence on the uniform of the Russian army was the meeting of the emperors Alexander and Napoleon in Tilsit on June 25, 1807. In fact, French borrowings penetrated the Russian army a year earlier with the start of the organization of the battalion of the Imperial Militia, formally part of the Zemstvo militia, but in its structure, organization, uniforms and equipment, it was a full-fledged regular unit, which later became part of the imperial guard.

On November 6, 1806, the highest manifesto was published on Russia's entry into another campaign against France as part of the Russian-Prussian coalition. On November 30, Alexander I decides to convene the Zemstvo Host or Internal Temporary Militia to maintain the regular army. The emperor sets an example for the Russian nobility and orders the creation at his own expense of the peasants of the estates belonging to the imperial family, a militia battalion, which was formed on December 12, 1806 under the name "Imperial Militia Battalion" consisting of one grenadier, three chasseur companies and one artillery half-company.

On February 18, 1807, the inspector of naval regiments, Major General P.S. Shirkov received gratitude from Tsarevich Konstantin Pavlovich for participating in the formation of the battalion and, in particular, for the fact that "especially in the speedy uniform of the Imperial battalion of the lower ranks you performed"".

Without a doubt, the formation and uniforming of the battalion of the Imperial Militia took place under the noticeable influence of the campaign against the French that took place in 1805. The ranks of the battalion were the first among the units of the guard and the army to receive uniforms with lapels. In addition, the cuff valves on them were cut according to the common French curly pattern with three “toes”. On the contrary, when choosing a model of cloth pantaloons, they returned to an earlier domestic tradition - Potemkin trousers with leather leggings on copper buttons. It is this option winter clothes in December 1807 it was approved for the lower ranks of the army infantry regiments 2, and in 1808 for the regiments of the guard. In the equipment, they abandoned the belt belts traditional for the Russian army. The lower ranks received not traditional swords with hewn blades, but half-sabers with flat hilts, similar in shape to the model used by the French. Shoulder belts were introduced, again with an eye to the French model, for carrying these half-sabers and bayonets in sheaths. Instead of cylindrical satchels on one shoulder strap, rectangular ones were introduced, with two shoulder and one transverse strap. Without a doubt, it was the packs of the battalion of the Imperial Militia that served as a model for the development of new packs for the guards and army infantry 3 . The rolled overcoat was attached to the top cover of the knapsack with the help of two belts with iron buckles. Instead of cloth hats, which showed their impracticality during the hostilities of 1805, the battalion introduced a shako with a leather bottom and side trim. Judging by the drawings made at that time by A.I. Orlovsky, the shakos from the policemen were also borrowed from the French.

For the first time, it was in this battalion that the grenadier company began to be divided into grenadier and rifle platoons. The division of grenadier companies according to this principle in the rest of the regiments of the guard and the army took place only in October 1810. The officers of the battalion received epaulettes similar in form to the French counterparts of that period. It was this type of epaulette that served as the basis for the development of officer epaulettes, introduced in the Foot Guards by the highest decree of September 9, 1807. 4

In the campaign of 1807 the battalion distinguished itself at Gutstadt, Heilsberg and Friedland. The valor shown by the ranks of the battalion became one of the reasons for the decision

about reckoning the battalion of the Imperial militia to the guard. The status of the guards unit was finally assigned to the battalion after the promulgation of the highest decree of January 22, 1808: "Recruit him(battalion. - O.L.) to the corps of troops of the Life Guards" 6 . At the same time, a separate 4th paragraph in the decree specifically noted that: "The uniform, ammunition, weapons, convoys, etc.: leave the current form, but in terms the same as the infantry regiments of the Life Guards" 7 . The artillery team was assigned to the Life Guards Artillery Battalion over the staff, and formally it was considered temporarily seconded from the battalion.

After the battalion was granted the privileges of the Imperial Guard, a series of changes in its appearance began. On March 15, 1808, a command came to the commissariat expedition "To have the Life Guards Militia Battalion overcoats instead of dark green gray cloth" Earlier, on February 20, 1808, the commissariat received an order from the Minister of War on the procurement of overcoats for the guards units according to new terms. The list also included 340 overcoats for the guards battalion of the Militia. It was prescribed “to sew these overcoats and so that they are completely ready by April 1st, buttons and canvas will be sent together, on threads the money will be released" 9 . Judging by the document, it can be assumed that only a third of the battalion was dressed in a new overcoat. The rest of the ranks wore dark green overcoats before the end of the due date (January 1810), which was a common practice in the guards regiments at that time.

On April 8, 1808, a decree was issued to rename "battalion of the Life Guards of the Militia" or "Life Guards of the Imperial Militia Battalion" in Finnish Guard Battalion or "Life Guards Finnish Battalion" "0 .

both officers and lower ranks should have coats of arms on shakos and buttonholes on uniforms, following the model of other Guards regiments. Later, this decree, published in the PSZ 12 states book, was mistakenly attributed to all infantry regiments of the guard by the compilers of the Historical Description ... In fact, the guards infantry received a shako at the very beginning of 1808. At the same time, sultans of a wide pyramidal shape were introduced into the guards, modeled on a battalion of the Imperial Militia. In particular, on February 28, 1808, the commander of the Life Guards Semenovsky Regiment

ordered "in the mouths of the old form of the shako(meaning cloth hats. - O.L.) and hand over the sultans to the regimental storeroom” 13 . A little earlier, February 16, “The Sovereign Emperor, the Highest Command, deigned so that all the lower ranks of the infantry regiments had cloth earmuffs always in shakos(Earphones were originally sewn on in cloth hats. - O.L.) and were sewn to them and lined with canvas, so that it was possible to tie them up at any time of the year in case of bad weather, which the regimental chiefs could observe when examining the part of the shako "".

Several Guards shakos arr. 1808, distinguished by special

detail - concave side walls, sewn-in leather back pads and cloth earmuffs 15 . The battalion of the guards militia continued to wear the old "militia" shakos with even walls throughout the whole of 1808.

On May 22, 1808, the commissariat expedition received a message that the emperor verbally wished that “all combatant and non-combatant ranks in the battalion on caftans and frock coats, instead of the former dark green shoulder straps, have scarlet ones, in pursuance of which the Highest Command, the indicated shoulder straps by the battalion were immediately built” 16.

On September 30, 1808, Tsarevich Konstantin Pavlovich in a letter to the Minister of War emphasized: “As the Imperial Militia Battalion should be, by the Highest Command, in the Guards position, then your Excellency will deign to order the terms of all uniform and ammunition things to be considered similar to the terms for these regiments” 7. On October 5, 1808, new terms were approved for the uniform allowance of the imperial battalion. From January 1809, uniform items (caftans, winter and summer trousers) were supposed to be built every year.

Throughout 1808, the battalion retained the old militia uniforms and ammunition, but with the addition of guards distinctions (coats of arms on shakos and buttonholes from the guards bason). In November 1808, the Finns received an additional 138 people: cartridge bags with black bandages, black belts, black leather satchels with shoulder straps, paired straps for tying overcoats on satchels and iron buckles for them. Also for 669 people were accepted "straps for headphones koi at shakos" 1 ". Then, in November, the battalion demanded the missing from the commissariat: scarlet and black cloth, 313 pairs of leather leggings "with straps

under the heel, bayonet scabbards, cleavers, manners and 138 pairs "suede mittens with varigs" 19 . At the same time, in return for the 50 missing cleavers, the battalion asked "for uniformity, let go of sabers, exactly the same ones that were released before in this battalion." The commissariat went to meet the requirements of the battalion and allocated the required number of sabers, and for mittens with "varigami" released the money.

Judging by the list of ammunition received in 1808, the battalion continued to wear overcoats rolled into tubes over knapsacks, and this despite the fact that on October 8, 1808, all infantry units of the guard received a new regulatory document: "Description of what a way for a soldier to dress on a campaign” 20 . According to the new rules, the overcoat was supposed to be rolled into a long ring, pulled together at the ends with a belt on an iron buckle, and worn over the left shoulder under the shoulder backpack straps. In addition, the Finnish continued to stand out with a transverse belt with a buckle on a knapsack harness. The rest of the regiments of the guards and the army received transverse straps for knapsacks only at the beginning of April 1809. 40 kopecks per piece 22 . In January 1809, after approval

uniform report card of the Finnish battalion, the cost of materials supplied for the manufacture of one guards shako was sharply reduced to 2 rubles. 39 1 A copy. (including the cost of the etiquette and repack) 23 . In subsequent years, the list and quantity of consumables required for the manufacture of one shako for other guards units exactly repeated the data of the Finnish table and remained unchanged until 1814. 24

On December 29, 1808, badges were delivered for the officers of the battalion on the model of the Life Guards of the Izmailovsky Regiment. With the introduction of new guards officer badges in 1808, the tradition was preserved: the chief officers of Preobrazhensky and Semyonovtsy continued to wear numbers and letters on their badges indicating the date of the Battle of Narva in 1700, located below state emblem and military fittings. Headquarters officers and all Izmailovites relied on signs without a date.

After a series of, albeit small, but varied changes in the uniform allowance of the battalion, the question arose of developing states and uniform tables for the new guard unit. From November 1808 to the beginning of January 1809, with the direct participation of the Minister of War A.A. Arakcheev and Tsarevich Konstantin Pavlovich, the development of the mentioned documents took place. When compiling the norms of clothing allowance, judging by the surviving correspondence, the commissariat proceeded from the situation that existed at that time for the Life Guards of the Jaeger battalion. In particular, the number of buttons on the overcoat was planned to be released "as in the Life Guards Jaeger [regiment]" 25 . The proposal to replace the backpacks available in the battalion did not pass. Question “The knapsacks are put in the same position, should they be left like that, or should they be put in calf ones?” Arakcheev determined that "should be black" 26 . The Finnish began to differ from the rest of the guards infantry

the number of accessories on the knapsacks. In the work of the commission, it was noted about the number of supposed iron knapsack buckles: “At first, the guards put 5 to the knapsacks, but according to the current position, 3 each, in the same state they put 6 each” 2 - 7. In the approved reports, the norm of six iron buckles was retained: three on the lid of the satchel, one on the shoulder strap and two on the back of the pack for fastening the ends of the shoulder straps. In three regiments of the guards heavy infantry, knapsack buckles were distributed as follows: three iron ones on the lid of the knapsack and, from April 1809, an additional copper one on the transverse shoulder strap 28 .

In the army regiments of heavy and light infantry, from January 1810, iron buckles were released through the commissariat depots for the transverse shoulder belt. The fact that in the army infantry regiments, in contrast to the guards, it was supposed to wear an iron buckle on the transverse knapsack belt, was once again confirmed in 1817 when developing new uniform regulations 29 .

The emperor's initial verbal wish for the introduction of red shoulder straps in the battalion was reflected first in the draft table, and then in its finally approved version. Non-commissioned officer galloons were originally supposed to be released "at the price of Guards" 1 rub. 22 kop. "in kind". According to the approved report card, they began to release the Guards wide woolen lace for buttonholes on collars and sleeve valves at the rate of 1 arshin per person (71.12 cm) - 20 kopecks each. for arshin. The norms for the issue of cloth for winter trousers remained the same: 1 arshin 5 inches (0.93 m) per person.

On January 21, 1809, the final version of the uniform table of the Life Guards of the Finnish Battalion 30 was approved by the highest. Despite the careful study of expenditure items in the uniform report card, it was not possible to avoid errors and contradictions in the already approved document. Cloth for caftans was planned to be released according to the standards of the Life Guards of the Jaeger Regiment. At the same time, the compilers managed to forget the consumption of cloth for lapels. The consumption rate of scarlet cloth was also determined without taking into account the edging along the edges of the lapels. Of the metal fittings on the caftan, according to the report card, it was supposed to release only 24 copper buttons, although with the existing style, one caftan required a set of 26 buttons and 17 pairs of hooks and loops.

The allowances for the leave of the guards bass for lining the caftans of drummers and flutists were as follows: 19 arshins for a battalion drummer (non-commissioned officer rank) and 15 arshins for everyone else. The order of embroidering the caftans of drummers and flutists was not determined by the time sheet. The variant of the embroidery of the caftan of the battalion drummer, most likely, coincided with the embroidery of the trumpeters in the Life Guards Ulansky Regiment. In the table of the guards lancers, the procedure for embroidering a caftan with lapels with 19 arshins of the guards bason was clearly prescribed: “along the two side seams of the back, along and across the sleeves, along the floors, along the folds, along the collar and along the shoulders of the shells” 11. Company drummers and flutists among the Finns differed, most likely, in the absence of embroidery on the back, floors and coattails.

For the drummers of the Finnish battalion, for the first time in the guards infantry, they approved for baldrics "copper plaques according to the model" with sockets for attaching drum sticks. Most likely, it was after the Finns that copper plaques on drum bands appeared in the entire guards infantry. Moreover, by the end of 1811, in heavy infantry they wore a badge in combination with three copper single-fire grenades, and in light infantry - only a badge 32.

By the highest decree of December 16, 1809, copper scales were granted to the guards infantry for chin straps 33 . The Finns received scales only at the end of 1811 when the battalion was reorganized into a regiment.

Leather leggings on cloth pantaloons actually differed from the standard sample. According to the report card for leggings, it was supposed to release money at the rate of 80 kopecks. for a couple, whereas earlier, on November 8, 1808, for the next year, 1809, money for the manufacture of leggings for the Life Guards Semyonovsky and Jaeger regiments and the Finnish battalion was planned at the rate of 1 rub. 30 kop. for a couple of 34 . This means that the leather blanks were larger than the standard size and the leggings themselves, during manufacture, came out higher than the approved ones, which is confirmed by a number of decrees issued in 1809, regardless of the Finnish timesheet.

On October 10, 1808, samples of leggings for winter pantaloons for guards regiments of two sizes were approved "for big and small growth" 35 . On May 31, 1809, the height of leather leggings on winter trousers was increased. Wherein “It was pleasing to the Sovereign Emperor to approve again a sample of such skins for a large growth and that the former one, which was relied on for this growth, was already a smaller one” 36 .

On August 31, 1809, the emperor decided to introduce new models of high leggings of four heights (instead of the previous two) only for the Life Guards of the Preobrazhensky, Semenovsky and Izmailovsky regiments 37 . At the same time, it was ordered "Leave the old samples in their force for the Guards Jaeger Regiment, Artillery, Finnish and Garrison battalions, release them in half against each sample" 3 *.

The Finnish in the report card retained high patent leather boots at a price of 2 rubles. for a pair, and despite the fact that, according to the order of the Minister of War, since 1809, all parts of the guards infantry were determined to release two pairs "soft boots"(1 ruble 30 kopecks per pair) of the new model 39 . Boots "lacquered round-nosed" at the price of 2 rubles. for a couple, they were also kept in the uniform report card of the Life Guards of the Garrison Battalion, approved on September 1, 1809.

On October 13, 1809, for the Life Guards of the Jaeger Regiment and the Finnish Battalion, the drawings and sizes of the letters on the covers of cartridge bags were approved: “GE.” and "F.G." 40 On February 8, 1811, the production of letters for the guards rangers was ordered in St. Petersburg in the Arsenal of the artillery expedition 41 . It is possible that letters for the Finnish were also made there.

At the beginning of 1810, in all guard units where the wearing of sultans was supposed to be, their uniforms were changed. Wide hair pyramidal sultans were replaced with narrow cone-shaped ones made of the same material. A year later, the sultans of the new Guards model were introduced into the army.

On October 11, 1811, the highest decree was issued on the deployment of the Life Guards of the Finnish battalion into a regiment of three battalions 42. On October 31, 1811, the commissariat expedition received an order to supply four new guards battalions (two Life Guards of the Lithuanian Regiment and two Life Guards of the Finnish Regiment) with guns and hatchets on October 31, 1811. The weapons were supposed to be delivered from the St. Petersburg arsenal. Moreover, if you follow the statistics, then, in addition to rifles, infantry cleavers were issued to all combat ranks of the two new battalions of the Finnish Regiment 43. It turned out that one old battalion of the regiment was fully equipped with sabers, and infantry cleavers were released for two new ones. Such a picture contradicted the provisions adopted at that time, according to which the Jaeger companies of the light infantry regiments did not have blade cold weapons, with the exception of non-commissioned officers and musicians. Perhaps the contradiction that arose was corrected after the royal decree of November 11, 1811, according to which the new regiment began to be officially considered "among the light infantry" 44 .

According to a statement dated November 13, 1811, the Finnish in the new states additionally required the following accessories and ammunition: 2233 pairs of shako scales (for all three battalions); 1210 copper belt buckles; 1307 flasks with straps and iron buckles; 2310 iron buckles for ammo bags (2 per bag); 1294 backpacks with straps; to knapsacks of iron buckles 7764 (at the rate of 6 buckles per knapsack); 1307 "raincoat" belts with iron buckles and 1257 shako coats of arms (for two battalions) 45 .

In August 1811, the guards changed the pattern of woolen lace on collars and sleeve flaps. Now it was released in two types: wide - for longitudinal buttonholes of the collar and sleeve valves (1 arshin 4 inches - 88.9 cm) and narrow - for transverse calculations on the same buttonholes (the same 1 arshin 4 inches). Additionally, the bast loops were sheathed around the perimeter with yellow woolen cord (1 arshin 12 inches - 1.245 m) 46 .

Neither the shape of the caftan itself, nor the collar at the end of 1811 - the beginning of 1812 did not change. Statement "Historical description..." about the introduction in the guards and the army in January 1812 of uniforms with blind collars fastened with hooks - an unfortunate mistake based on an incorrect interpretation of documentary and iconographic sources. Deaf collars, as a fashionable trend, but not as an established element of the uniform, appear among the guards officers in the spring of 1814, and officially only in 1815 among the rank and file. to assume that with the introduction of new uniform buttonholes, only the cut of the sleeve flaps changed: instead of figured ones, they began to be made rectangular.

In 1813, Russian troops, including the guards, faced almost catastrophic problems in supplying uniforms. To make up for the acute shortage in uniforms, trophy French stocks were used. After the unsuccessful summer campaign of 1813, the Finnish, according to the lower rank of the Nazarov regiment, after the capture of the French wagon train received boots and shoes 47 . According to regimental history, the Finnish Life Guards Regiment intended to make for the winter of 1813-1814. cloth trousers and boots due to the inconvenience of service trousers with leather leggings 48.

Wearing in 1814 of cloth boots and shoes to them by two regiments of the guard (Finland and Lithuanian) is confirmed by official documents. When organizing the supply of the battalions of the Life Guards of the Lithuanian and Finnish regiments, allocated to a separate guards detachment in Warsaw, the head of the Military Ministry, Prince A.I. Gorchakov, in a letter dated July 16, 1814, pointed out: “Leather for pantaloons in both battalions will not be released, but instead of them they will be released in kind or in money as the battalions wish, and as the best, black cloth and buttstock for boots in the required quantity will be recognized, because both of these battalions have shoes” 49.

4 September 1814, after the return of the 2nd Guards Division to St. Petersburg, it was decided that in the Life Guards Finnish Regiment, belts and baldrics should be made according to the model of the guards rangers 50 . What were the differences in the design of ammunition in the two regiments of the guards infantry at that time, it is impossible to say for sure.

The ammunition of the Finnish Regiment began to be varnished only after the decree of October 10, 1814. 50 Black ammunition was varnished for the guards chasseurs from the end of 1804. with collapse.

On November 13, 1814, the emperor ordered that the hilts on cleavers in all guards infantry should be made of red copper and a new uniform pattern 53 .

The changes at the end of 1814 became the beginning of the next, already post-war, uniform reform, which ended in 1817-1818.