Home Perennial flowers Rational egoism. The theory of rational egoism: description, essence and basic concept. The world is built on selfishness

Rational egoism. The theory of rational egoism: description, essence and basic concept. The world is built on selfishness

10. Theories explaining the mechanisms of emotion.

V. K. Vilyunas rightly notes that “much of what is traditionally called the promising word “theory” in the doctrine of emotions is, in essence, rather individual fragments, only together approaching... an ideally comprehensive theory” (1984 ,

With. 6). Each of them emphasizes one aspect of the problem, thereby considering only

a special case of the occurrence of an emotion or some of its components. The trouble is that theories created in different historical eras, do not have continuity. Yes, and can it be in principle? unified theory for, although related to each other, but still such different emotional phenomena as the emotional tone of sensations, emotions and feelings.

Since the time when philosophers and natural scientists began to seriously think about the nature and essence of emotions, two main positions have emerged. Scientists occupying one of them, the intellectualist one, most clearly designated by I.-F. Herbart (1824-1825), argued that organic manifestations of emotions are a consequence of mental phenomena. According to Herbart, emotion is a connection that is established between ideas. Emotion is a mental disorder caused by a mismatch (conflict) between ideas. This affective state involuntarily causes vegetative changes.

Representatives of another position - sensualists - on the contrary, stated that organic reactions influence psychic phenomena. F. Dufour (Dufour, 1883) wrote about this: “Have I not sufficiently proven that the source of our natural inclination to passions does not lie in the soul, but is associated with the vegetative ability nervous system inform the brain about the stimulation it receives that if we cannot voluntarily regulate the functions of blood circulation, digestion, secretion, then it is therefore impossible in this case to explain by our will the violations of these functions that arose under the influence of passions” (p. 388).

These two positions were later developed in cognitive theories of emotions and in the peripheral theory of emotions by W. James - G. Lange.

A) Evolutionary theory emotions of Charles Darwin

Having published the book “The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals” in 1872, Charles Darwin showed the evolutionary path of development of emotions and substantiated their origin physiological manifestations. The essence of his ideas is that emotions are either useful or represent only remnants (rudiments) of various expedient reactions that were developed during the process of evolution in the struggle for existence. An angry person blushes, breathes heavily and clenches his fists because in its primitive history, any anger led people to a fight, and it required energetic muscle contractions and, consequently, increased breathing and blood circulation, ensuring muscle work. He explained the sweating of his hands when he was afraid by saying that he ape-like ancestors In humans, this reaction in case of danger made it easier to grab tree branches.

Thus, Darwin proved that in the development and manifestation of emotions there is no impassable gap between humans and animals. In particular, he showed that anthropoids and children born blind have much in common in the external expression of emotions.

The ideas expressed by Darwin served as an impetus for the creation of other theories of emotions, in particular the “peripheral” theory of W. James - G. Lange.

b) “Associative” theory of W. Wundt

W. Wundt's (1880) ideas about emotions are quite eclectic. On the one hand, he adhered to Herbart’s point of view that to some extent ideas influence feelings, and on the other hand, he believed that emotions are primarily internal changes, characterized by the direct influence of feelings on the flow of ideas.

Wundt considers “bodily” reactions only as a consequence of feelings. According to Wund-
that facial expressions arose initially in connection with elementary sensations, such as
expression of the emotional tone of sensations; higher, more complex feelings (emotional
tions) developed later. However, when some emotion arises in a person’s mind,
then every time it evokes by association something corresponding to it, close in content
niyu lower feeling or sensation. This is what causes those facial movements
which correspond to the emotional tone of sensations. For example, facial expressions
contempt (pushing the lower lip forward) is similar to the movement when a person
the eyelid spits out something unpleasant that has fallen into its mouth.

c) Theory of W. Cannon - P. Bard

Also carried out by physiologists in late XIX centuries, experiments with the destruction of structures that conduct somatosensory and viscerosensory information to the brain gave rise to C. Sherrington (Sherrington, 1900) to conclude that vegetative manifestations of emotions are secondary in relation to its cerebral component, expressed by the mental state. The James-Lange theory was sharply criticized by the physiologist W. Cannon (Cannon, 1927), and he also had reasons for this. Thus, if all physiological manifestations are excluded in the experiment (when nerve pathways are cut between internal organs and cerebral cortex) the subjective experience was still preserved. Physiological changes occur with many emotions as a secondary adaptive phenomenon, for example, for mobilization reserve capabilities the body in case of danger and the fear it generates, or as a form of release of tension that has arisen in the central nervous system.

Cannon noted two things. Firstly, the physiological changes that occur during different emotions are very similar to each other and do not reflect their qualitative originality. Secondly, these physiological changes unfold slowly, while emotional experiences arise quickly, that is, they precede the physiological reaction.

He also showed that artificially induced physiological changes characteristic of certain strong emotions do not always produce the expected emotional behavior. From Cannon's point of view, emotions arise as a result of a specific reaction of the central nervous system and in particular the thalamus.

Thus, according to Cannon, the diagram of the stages of the emergence of emotions and the physiological changes accompanying them looks like this:

stimulus -> excitation of the thalamus -> emotion ->

physiological changes.

In later studies by P. Bard (Bard, 1934a, b) it was shown that emotional experiences and the physiological changes that accompany them arise almost simultaneously. Thus, scheme (2) takes on a slightly different form:

Stimulus

Physiological

changes.

d) Psychoanalytic theory of emotions

3. Freud based his understanding of affect on drive theory and essentially identified both affect and drive with motivation. The most concentrated view of psychoanalysts on the mechanisms of the emergence of emotions was given by D. Rapaport (Rapaport, 1960). The essence of these ideas is as follows: a perceptual image perceived from the outside causes an unconscious process, during which an unconscious mobilization of instinctive energy occurs; if it cannot find application in the external activity of a person (in the case when the drive is tabooed by the culture existing in a given society), it looks for other channels of discharge in the form of involuntary activity; different types Such activities are “emotional expression” and “emotional experience”. They can appear simultaneously, alternately, or even independently of each other.

Freud and his followers considered only negative emotions arising as a result of conflicting drives. Therefore, they distinguish three aspects in affect: the energetic component of instinctive drive (“charge” of affect), the process of “discharge” and the perception of the final discharge (sensation, or experience of emotion).

Freud's understanding of the mechanisms of the emergence of emotions as unconscious instinctual drives has been criticized by many scientists (Holt, 1967, etc.)

Conclusion

Consideration of various emotional phenomena noted in the psychological literature gives grounds to say that the emotional sphere of a person has a complex multi-level structure and includes (in ascending order biological and social significance) emotional tone, emotions, emotional properties of a person, feelings, as a result of the combination of which are formed emotional types of people.

Emotional tone is the first and simplest form of emotional response. He has the highest and lower levels manifestations. The lowest corresponds to the emotional tone of sensations, the highest to the emotional tone of impressions from what is perceived and imagined. If the emotional tone of sensations arises only when the stimulus that causes the sensation is directly affected by events that once happened. Both one and the other type of emotional tone are characterized by bipolarity (pleasure-displeasure). Emotional tone can manifest itself either independently or as part of emotions, determining their positive or negative subjective coloring, i.e., the sign of emotion.

Emotion is the next emotional phenomenon occupying a place in evolutionary development emotional sphere a much higher and more important place. This is the reaction of the body and personality to an emotional (meaningful) situation or event for a person, aimed at adapting to them. Moreover, in contrast to the emotional tone, which is the same reaction to various sensations and impressions (either pleasure or displeasure), emotion is a specialized reaction to specific situation. It includes situation assessment and regulation energy flow in accordance with this assessment (its strengthening or weakening). Emotions can be unconditioned reflex and conditioned reflex. It is important that a conditioned reflex emotion is emotional reaction to a foreseeable stimulus, it makes it possible to prepare in advance for the meeting or avoid it. The expression used when an emotion appears performs two functions: signaling one’s condition to another person and discharging existing nervous excitement.

Since the mental, vegetative and psychomotor levels of response are involved in emotion, it is nothing more than a psychophysiological (or emotional) state.

Since emotions are specific reactions to significant stimuli, a person cannot experience them all the time. In fact, not all situations and stimuli that a person encounters throughout the day are regarded by him as significant. And if so, then there is no emotional response to them. The possibility of the absence of emotions is also postulated by P. V. Simonov, when he claims that if the available and necessary information are equal, emotions are equal to zero. V. L. Marishchuk and V. I. Evdokimov (2001) strongly disagree with this, according to whom, “a person does not have such a state, because even a feeling of complete indifference is also an emotion or some kind of emotional disorder. Emotions are equal only the dead person has zero" (p. 78). From my point of view, P. V. Simonov should be criticized not for his view of the possibility of an emotionless state, but for his formula. And in order not to experience an emotion, you don’t have to be dead.

Like emotional tone, emotions are characterized by intensity, duration, and inertia. Affect is the same emotion, but it has the character of a short-term and intense outburst. Mood, like affect, is not a specific (modality) form of emotional response, but characterizes a person’s emotional background for the period of time under consideration. This background may be due to the experienced emotion or a trace of it, the emotional tone of sensations and impressions (memory of something pleasant or unpleasant), and also indicate the absence of this moment emotional response and its traces (neutral background).

Both emotional tone and emotion have a whole set of properties: universality, dynamism, adaptation, partiality, plasticity, retention in memory, irradiation, transference, ambivalence, switchability. At the same time, emotions have a property that the emotional tone is not endowed with: it is contagiousness.

Emotional properties of a person. The stable individual expression of the characteristics of emotions in a particular person (quick or slow onset of emotions, the strength (depth) of emotional experiences, their stability (rigidity) or rapid change, the stability of behavior and activity efficiency to the influence of emotions, the severity of expressiveness) gives grounds to talk about emotional human properties: emotional excitability, emotional depth, emotional rigidity - lability, emotional stability, expressiveness. As for the properties of emotionality identified as an integral emotional characteristic of a person and his temperament, which includes, in addition to expressiveness, the presence of one or another predominant emotional background, then this question remains largely unclear, as does the concept of emotionality itself.

Feelings are the next in the hierarchy and the highest level of a person’s emotional sphere. A feeling is a person’s stable partial attitude towards some animate or abstract object; it is an emotional attitude that determines a person’s readiness to react emotionally to situations in which the object of feeling finds itself. Thus, feeling is attached to an object, and emotion is attached to a situation; feeling is an attitude, and emotion is a reaction.

Emotions and feelings evoke different kinds emotional behavior: amusement, grief, hedonism and asceticism, aggression, showing care, courtship, etc. It's about specifically about behavior, and not about emotional reactions (changes in vegetatives, expression).

Depending on the severity and dominance of emotions and feelings of a particular modality, emotional types can be distinguished: optimists and pessimists, anxious, shy, touchy, vindictive, empathic, sentimental, conscientious, inquisitive.

As for the role of emotion in controlling human behavior and activity, it is very diverse. This is an alarm about a need that has arisen and the sensations experienced from external stimuli (the emotional tone of the sensations plays a role here), and an alarm about the situation existing at the moment of making a decision (dangerous - non-dangerous, etc.), and a reaction to the forecast of need satisfaction and to the very This is satisfaction that helps to extinguish the existing need. Emotional response also contributes to the regulation of energy flow, feeding it into the motivational process and helping to prepare the body for action in a particular significant situation.


List of used literature:

1. Anokhin P.K. The importance of reticulation for various forms highest nervous activity// Physiological Journal of the USSR - 1957 - No. 11 p. 1072-1085.

2. Anokhin P.K Emotions // Big medical encyclopedia v.35 – M., 1964, p.339

3. Anokhin P.K. The problem of decision making in psychology and physiology - M., 1976.

4. Aristotle Works. Metaphysics - M., 1976 - vol. 3, p. 65-369.

5. Wundt V. Essays on psychology. M., 1912.

6. Izard K. Human Emotions - M., 1980

7. Izard K. Psychology of emotions - St. Petersburg 2000

8. Ilyin E.P. Emotions and feelings – St. Petersburg 2002

9. Lazursky A.F. Essay on the science of characters - M., Nauka 1995

10. Lange N.N. Emotions. Psychological study. – M., 1896

11. Leongard K. Accented personalities - M., 1989

12. Leontyev A.N. Needs, motives, emotions: lecture notes - M., 1971

13. Rubinshtein S.L. Basics general psychology– M., 1946

14. Simonov P.V. What is an emotion? – M., 1962


A person is born with a certain set of emotional reactions; moreover, animals also have emotions. These emotions are called primary. These include fear and anxiety as an expression of the need for self-preservation; joy arising from the satisfaction of vital needs, and anger as a consequence of limiting the need for movement.

In more late age As a result of communication with people and as a result of the formation of one’s own “I,” secondary emotions arise. They are not related to vital needs, but this does not make them less significant; on the contrary, they are the ones who bring the greatest suffering and joy.

Emotional phenomena are divided into affects, actual emotions, feelings, moods and stressful conditions.

The most powerful emotional reaction is affect. It captures a person entirely and subjugates his thoughts and movements. Affect is always situational, intense and relatively short-lived. It occurs as a result of some strong shock. In affect, attention changes: switchability decreases, only those phenomena that are relevant to the situation are perceived. As a rule, everything that happened before the event that caused the affective reaction is forgotten. Examples of affective reactions can be a state of euphoria after being freed from danger, stupor when reporting death, anger as a reaction to ridicule and bullying.

Actually emotions- this is a longer reaction that occurs not only to completed events, but mainly to supposed or remembered ones. Emotions reflect an event in the form of a generalized subjective assessment.

Feelings- stable emotional states that have a clearly defined objective character. These are relationships to specific events or people (quite possibly imaginary).

Moods- the most prolonged emotional states. This is the background against which all the others take place. mental processes. Mood reflects a general attitude of acceptance or rejection of the world. Prevailing among this person moods may be related to his temperament.

Stress- a nonspecific reaction of the body to an unexpected and stressful situation. This is a physiological reaction, which is expressed in the mobilization of the body's reserve capabilities. The reaction is called nonspecific, since it occurs in response to any adverse impact - cold, fatigue, pain, humiliation, etc. The author of the theory of stress, Hans Selye, defines it as a set of phylogenetically programmed reactions of the body that prepare it for physical activity by type of resistance, fight or flight. These reactions are expressed in changes in the operating mode of many organs and systems of the body, for example, the heart rate increases, blood clotting, and pulse rate increase. All physiological reactions are triggered by hormones released into the blood. It is known that different people react differently to stress loads. Some have an active reaction - under stress, the efficiency of their activities continues to increase to a certain limit - this is “lion stress”, while others have a passive reaction, the effectiveness of their activities drops immediately - “rabbit stress”.

Psychologist and psychotherapist Yu. M. Orlov tried to explain the nature of some negative emotions that arise in the process of communication and significantly darken the lives of many people. These are the emotions of resentment, guilt and shame.

If a donkey kicks you, you will not be offended by him, although it hurts. If he pushes stranger, then you will be angry, but not offended. But if a friend neglects your interests, a loved one behaves with you differently than you expect, and a relative arrives from a business trip without gifts, then an unpleasant feeling arises, which is usually called resentment.

This feeling arises only in communication with people who are significant to us, from whom we expect special treatment towards us. And when the expected attitude diverges from the real one, resentment arises.

There are three components to any experience of resentment::

  1. My expectations regarding the behavior of a person oriented towards me. How should he behave if he is my friend. Ideas about this are formed in the experience of communication.
  2. Behavior of another that deviates from the expected in an unfavorable direction.
  3. An emotional reaction caused by a discrepancy between expectations and behavior.

These three elements are interconnected by our conviction that the other person is rigidly programmed by our expectations and is deprived of independence. This desire to program the behavior of loved ones comes from childhood. When Small child feels discomfort and feels bad, he is offended and cries, thereby informing his parents that something is wrong. They must change their behavior. The feeling of resentment in the child stimulates the feeling of guilt in the parents. The child raises his parents in this way. In childhood, such behavior is justified - otherwise the little creature would not survive, and parenting skills would not have been formed. The child feels like the center of the world and, naturally, that the world should meet his expectations. In old age, people again become touchy: the weak have their own weapon - creating a sense of guilt in another. When an adult is offended, he begins to feel small and helpless, even his facial expression becomes infantile.

There is a lot of selfishness in resentment. By being offended, a person exploits the love of another, as it creates a feeling of guilt in him. Since resentment is a painful sensation, we often try to hide it or replace it with other emotions. We take revenge, mentally or in reality, on the offender - aggression replaces resentment. Mental aggression is dangerous because it turns on the mechanisms of fighting, but does not use them. The best option for getting rid of resentment is creativity. We can recommend this motto: “ A good life“This is the best revenge.”

Guilt is the opposite of resentment. Outwardly she has no characteristic features, expressions, gestures. We experience guilt through the gift of thinking. There are also three components to the experience of guilt:

  1. My ideas about what I should be in accordance with the expectations of another person. I definitely don’t know the other’s expectations, I only model them. The model is built in accordance with general social attitudes. Our behavior is much to a greater extent determined by the expectations of others than we assume.
  2. Perception and assessment of one’s own behavior “here and now.”
  3. Comparison of the expectation model with own behavior and detection of discrepancy, which is perceived as guilt. This feeling is intensified by the emotion and expression of resentment in the other.

The feeling of guilt is experienced more strongly than resentment. We can cope with resentment by accepting the other for who he is, that is, by changing our expectations or forgiving the offender. In wine, we need to change the expectations of others, and this is no longer realistic.

Guilt is good for immature people. Thus, children can be controlled without punishing them, but by inducing a feeling of guilt. Here it is important not to overdo it, so that the child does not develop a neurosis based on a guilt complex.

Guilt cannot be experienced for too long, since unbearable suffering cannot last long, and it is weakened by feelings of anger or aggression, which draw off the energy of guilt.

From being the guilty one, we become the offender. Irrational feelings of guilt can also find a way out in illness. With his physical suffering, a person seems to pay for something for which he is supposedly to blame, and it becomes easier for him. But this is a heavy price to pay.

If we do not live up to the expectations of a generalized other or society, then a feeling of shame arises. Functional meaning shame is the regulation of human behavior in accordance with the “I-concept”, which is largely a product of culture, and not personal experience. Parents and educators, books and ideology form a person’s idea of ​​what he should be. At the same time, society is guided by considerations of its own safety. Even culture can be seen as a mechanism for protecting the integrity of the community and its weaker members. Culture limits instincts, primarily aggressive and sexual, and develops rules of behavior, for violation of which a person experiences psychological punishment in the form of shame or guilt. The ancients had an expression: “Scourged by shame, they are drawn to virtue.”

The emergence of a feeling of shame can be represented as follows::

  1. How I should be “here and now” in accordance with the “I-concept”.
  2. The way I am “here and now”.
  3. The discrepancy between what should and real behavior and his experience.

Since we receive shame as punishment, behavior dictated by shame is often infantile. But how much trouble it causes! These are suicides in teenagers, suicides out of honor, revenge, jealousy, aggression. Knowing the reasons for your shame reveals the hidden properties of the “I-concept” in the unconscious. If a person is ashamed that he did not answer a letter from a childhood friend whom he has not seen for many years, then we can assume that such a person is obliging and devoted to friends. The shame that arises when sexual prohibitions are violated, even imaginary ones, often indicates the suppression of a person’s sexual desires. That is, what a person is ashamed of says more about him than much else.

Shame is similar to guilt, but in guilt we are expectation-oriented loved one, such an appraiser cannot be ashamed. But there is such a thing as social shame, when one is ashamed of the assessments or opinions of a specific group of people.

We can distinguish attributive shame, the subject of which is individual signs: physical defects, lack of things valued in the group to which a person belongs, and existential shame - holistic, when one is ashamed of all the signs attributed to oneself. This type of shame is sometimes called an inferiority complex. No matter how much they convince a person experiencing this complex, he, despite all his successes, does not believe himself, considers himself unworthy. The basis for the emergence of an inferiority complex is the loss of basic trust in the world and the lack of love in early stages human development. It is difficult to correct the psyche of an unwanted or unloved child, even if he is smart and beautiful, he will still have the stain of a loser on him. At the same time, shame is an important emotion that contributes to a person’s adaptation to life in society. Thanks to shame, self-knowledge deepens, self-esteem, the ability to assess the consequences of one’s actions, and sensitivity to the assessments of others are formed. This emotion is necessary at certain stages of development, but then shame must be able to not only be experienced, but analyzed.

There are other emotions that arise during communication, but they are not culturally justified. This - envy And vanity.In the structure of these emotions, three components can also be distinguished:

  1. The assumption that the other person is the same as me (we rarely envy the unattainable).
  2. Concentrating attention on this person or his individual properties and qualities, comparing these qualities with your own.
  3. The experience of one or another emotion depending on the results of the comparison.
  • Envy: “He’s the same as me, but he’s better.”
  • Vanity: “he’s the same as me, but I’m better.”
  • Schadenfreude: “he’s the same as me, but he’s worse.”

The main component of these emotions is comparison. If a person were to refuse comparison or separate himself from its results, then both envy and gloating would be killed in the bud. But we cannot refuse comparison, because it is the main mental operation in the process of thinking and cognition. All properties of natural objects are comprehended in comparison. If we refused comparison, we would suppress the work of thought.

Comparison is common - from early childhood, a child is compared with other children by parents, educators, and teachers. As a result of this comparison, not only negative emotions arise (envy), but also positive ones - pride, a feeling of exclusivity. The child adopts the habit of comparison. Over the years, we begin to compare everyone: parents, friends, lovers, and also ourselves.

Man's indomitable desire to compare himself and others is constantly supported by the spirit of competition. Society rewards excellence in whatever field it may arise. But in conditions of constant competition, success and failure are equally dangerous. In case of failure, a person will be “undermined” by more successful ones, and success awakens envy and hostility on the part of other people, and they will unite in the fight against the successful one. Refusal to compete in the conditions of our civilization often contributes to the formation of feelings of insecurity and even inferiority.

Proud, envious, gloating, we participate in a process built on comparison. Therefore, knowledge of these emotions always requires an answer to the question: “On what points, signs, properties do I compare myself with others, depriving myself of agreement with myself and involving others in a race that has no end?”

The comparison must be appropriate, otherwise it creates conflict. You should remember the words of the ancients: “As long as I am sane, I do not compare my sweetheart with anyone.”

The difficulties that arise when trying to draw a directly distinguishable line between emotional and non-emotional phenomena force us to look for the distinctive signs of emotions in the broader context of their manifestation, in particular in the external and internal conditions of their occurrence. Existing concepts differ in the importance they attach to this issue: if for some of them it is one of many, then for others it is one of the central issues under consideration. The latter include, for example, the theories of W. James, J.-P. Sartre, P.K. Anokhina, P.V. Simonov, a group of so-called “conflict” theories. Answers to this question usually recognize that emotions arise when something significant to the individual occurs. Discrepancies begin when trying to clarify the nature and degree of significance of an event that can arouse emotion. If for W. Wundt or N. Grot any perceived event is significant, i.e. emotional already due to the fact that at the moment of perception it is part of the individual’s life, which does not know an impartial state and is capable of finding in everything at least a slight shade of interesting, unexpected, unpleasant, etc., then, according to R.S. Lazarus, emotions arise in those exceptional cases when, on the basis of cognitive processes, a conclusion is made about the presence, on the one hand, of some threat, and on the other, the impossibility of avoiding it. However, these apparently so different points of view are not mutually exclusive, they just talk about different things. Lazarus's work provides a scheme for the emergence of only those “obvious” emotional states that, in the terminology adopted in Soviet psychology, should rather be classified as affects. Claparède presents the emergence of emotions-affects in a very similar way, but his concept states that preliminary assessment threats are not produced by intellectual processes, as Lazarus believes, but by a special class of emotional phenomena - feelings.

Thus, the solution to the question of the conditions for the emergence of emotions is determined primarily by what particular class of emotional phenomena is discussed in a particular work. With a broad interpretation of emotions, their occurrence is associated with stable, ordinary conditions of existence, such as reflection of an influence or an object (emotions express their subjective meaning), aggravation of needs (emotions signal this to the subject), etc. With a narrow understanding of emotions, they are considered as a reaction to more specific conditions, such as frustration of needs, impossibility of adequate behavior, conflict situations, unforeseen developments of events, etc. The persuasiveness of examples and experimental data given in support of these various points vision, testifies to the differentiation of emotions in relation to the conditions of their occurrence and, therefore, to the inevitable limitations of attempts to embrace these conditions in some generalized principle or position. These attempts are capable of equipping us with knowledge as abstract as the concept of “emotion in general,” and those brought to full coverage of the entire variety of emotional phenomena can only state (as the generalization shows existing points point of view) double conditioning of emotions: on the one hand, by needs (motivation), on the other - by the characteristics of influences.

One can get an idea of ​​the complexity of the path that must be followed in order to reflect in theory the real complexity of emotional life from the unsurpassed analysis of the conditions for the emergence of emotions in the teachings of B. Spinoza. It shows that the emergence of emotions, along with such conditions analyzed in modern theories as frustration, violation of life constants or reflection of the possibility of achieving goals, is influenced by many other factors: associations of similarity and time, reflection of causal relationships, the “fate” of the objects of our feelings, empathy, an idea of ​​the justice of what is happening, etc. Of course, this material needs to be adapted to modern ideas and terminology, but, on the other hand, it reveals many aspects of the problem that are clearly lacking in these ideas.

The history of psychology has been dominated by the tradition of separating emotional processes into a separate sphere, contrasted with the sphere of cognition in a fundamental distinction, for example, between mind and heart, feelings and cognition, intellect and affect. There is also a fairly pronounced tendency to recognize the primacy and advantage of cognitive processes when comparing these spheres. The extreme position in this regard was called intellectualism, various directions of which considered emotions as a property or type of sensations, as a result of the interaction of ideas, or a special type of cognition. The intellectualistic interpretation of emotions occupies a strong position in modern foreign psychology. Thus, in the works of R.U. Leeper's development of arguments in favor of the motivating function of emotions ends somewhat unexpectedly with the assertion that emotions are perceptions.

It is obvious that views that reduce emotions to cognitive processes and, on the other hand, recognize in one form or another only the secondary nature of emotions, their dependence on cognitive reflection, differ fundamentally. There are also differences in the degree of validity of these two points of view: the first is based mainly on theoretical concepts, while the second is also confirmed by clear phenomenological data, stated in the statements that emotions accompany, “color” the cognitively reflected content, evaluate and express its subjective meaning . Indeed, we are delighted or indignant, saddened or proud of someone or something, our sensations, thoughts, states, adventures, etc. are pleasant or painful. One might think that it is precisely because of its obviousness that the objectivity of emotions is recognized in a number of theories without much emphasis. Meanwhile, there is reason to assert that it is precisely this feature that is central to characterizing the relationship of emotions to the processes of cognition.

The objectivity of emotions excludes an interpretation that places them alongside the processes of cognition, and requires the idea of ​​the emotional sphere as a separate layer of the psyche, as if built on top of the cognitive image and occupying a position between it and internal mental formations (needs, experience, etc.). With such “localization,” emotions easily fit into the structure of the image as a carrier of a subjective attitude towards what is reflected in it ( this characteristic emotions are quite common). It also makes it easier to understand both the aforementioned double conditionality of emotions (needs and situation) and their complex relationships with cognitive processes.

According to a number of concepts, some directly emotional event can cause the formation of new emotional relationships to various circumstances associated with this event, and it is the cognitive image that serves as the basis for such development of the emotional process. Thus, strong emotions can give emotional coloring almost everything that is in one way or another connected with the situation of their occurrence (A.R. Luria, Y.M. Kalashnik). In more common cases, the subject of new emotional relationships are the conditions and signals of directly emotiogenic influences. According to one of the central definitions of B. Spinoza, the object of love-hate becomes everything that is cognized by the subject as the cause of pleasure-displeasure. In all such cases, the emotional process seems to follow the paths laid out by the processes of cognition, subordinating in its development to those connections that are perceived by the subject in objective reality. However, it is important to emphasize that the processes of cognition here control only the development of the emotional process, in the initial generation of which it is no longer cognition itself that is of decisive importance, but the correspondence of what is cognized to the needs of the individual.

But in relation to cognitive processes emotions appear not only in passive role"slave" process. There is compelling evidence that emotions, in turn, are the most important factor regulation of cognitive processes. Thus, emotional coloring is one of the conditions that determines involuntary attention and memorization; the same factor can significantly facilitate or complicate the voluntary regulation of these processes; the influence of emotions on the processes of imagination and fantasy is well known; with uncertain stimulus material or with pronounced intensity, emotions can distort even the processes of perception; A number of characteristics of speech depend on emotions, and data are accumulating on their subtle regulating influence on thought processes. It should be noted that these diverse and very important manifestations of emotions are studied mainly in experimental psychology, while less attention is paid to them in theoretical works.

Thus, directing emotions towards reasons, signals, etc. significant events, the processes of cognition thereby determine their own destiny, subsequently being directed by emotions towards these reasons, etc. to better familiarize yourself with them and find out the optimal way to behave. Only such complementary influence of the spheres of intellect and affect, which are respectively responsible for reflecting the objective conditions of activity and the subjective significance of these conditions, ensures the achievement ultimate goal activities - meeting needs.

This question seems to continue the previous one along the line of localization of emotions in the mental system, however, it no longer highlights the topological, but the functional characteristics of the emotional sphere, in other words, it considers the localization of emotions not so much in the system of psychological formations, but in the system of forces that bring these formations into movement. We can immediately say that the solution to this question is most directly related to the initial postulate about the scope of the class of phenomena classified as emotional, and depends on whether specific experiences of a motivating nature are added to it - desires, drives, aspirations, etc.

Obviously, the problem of the nature of the processes that motivate activity is not just one of the internal problems of the psychology of emotions. From its solution follow far-reaching conceptual conclusions concerning the fundamental understanding of the psyche. Thus, it is this problem that is key to distinguishing in the history of psychology dichotomous (intelligence - affect) and trichotomous (cognition - feeling - will) mental schemes. IN modern psychology it is not so urgent, but its importance continues to be defended by the so-called motivational theories of emotions.

We must not forget that the problem of determining behavior has always attracted the attention of researchers, although the section of motivation within which this problem is currently being studied is relatively new for psychology. If we overcome the barrier created by the introduction of new terminology into psychology, the history of the development of ideas about the relationship between emotions and motivation will turn out to be very long and rich. For example, the teachings of B. Spinoza undoubtedly belong to motivational (in the modern sense) theories. In the concepts of W. Wundt and N. Groth, separating stimulating experiences from emotional ones, latest topics no less remain an inevitable link in the development of motivation processes.

The isolation of the motivation section in psychology is associated with a shift in the interests of researchers from the immediate, immediate causes of behavior to more and more distant and indirect ones. Indeed, to fully explain a certain act, it is clearly not enough to say that it was committed because of a desire. A specific action always corresponds to some more general life attitude, determined by the needs and values ​​of the subject, his habits, past experiences, etc., which in turn are determined even more general patterns biological and social development, and only in this context can it receive its true causal explanation. The problem with motivation is in a broad sense the way she stands in psychological science in general, involves elucidating all the factors and determinants that motivate, guide and support the behavior of a living being.

Only a person has the opportunity to know the true reasons for his behavior, but the mistakes that he usually makes indicate that this knowledge is based on indirect reflection and guesses. On the other hand, the subject clearly experiences the emotional impulses that arise in him, and it is by them that he is actually guided in life, unless other motives interfere with this (for example, the desire not to cause harm to others, to be faithful to the sense of duty, etc.). This simple fact underlies concepts that argue that emotions (including desires) motivate behavior.

Naturally, this situation is completely unacceptable for authors who see between emotions and motivating experiences fundamental difference, attributing the latter to will or motivation, or ignoring them altogether (which is very characteristic of modern psychology). The paradigm of such concepts is as follows: behavior is determined by needs and motives; emotions arise in specific situations (for example, frustration, conflict, success-failure) and perform their specific functions in them (for example, activation, mobilization, consolidation).

During the formation of psychology as an independent science at the turn of the 20th century, this second point of view practically supplanted the tradition of a unified interpretation of emotional and motivational processes, characteristic of the entire previous period of development of ideas about emotions, and the modern academic scheme for presenting psychology treats motivation and emotions as two relatively separate problems , the connections between which are comparable, for example, with the connections between perception and attention, or memory and thinking. However, as often happens, strengthening the positions of one of the warring parties activates the actions of the other. It seems that it was precisely this mechanism that led to the appearance in the psychology of emotions of a number of works defending the functional unity of emotional and need-motivational processes. Old ideas began to be defended most energetically in Russian literature - L.I. Petrazhitsky, in foreign, several decades later - R.U. Leeper.

Summarizing the discussion of the motivating function of emotions in foreign psychological literature, M. Arnold states: “The relationship between emotions and motivation, depicted in the theoretical literature, remains completely unclear. Although it has been argued time and time again that emotions motivate, hardly anyone has come forward to explain unequivocally how exactly this happens.” There is no exaggeration in these words. Thus, E. Duffy, defending in one of his works the need for a unified interpretation of motivational and emotional processes, at the same time argues that both terms - motivation and emotion - are simply unnecessary in the psychological dictionary.

The disappointing nature of the current picture should not come as a surprise at least for two reasons. Firstly, the positions of parallelism and positivism, within which modern motivational theories of emotions are formulated, do not allow the isolation of the world of subjective experiences as a separate link in regulatory processes, whereas it is precisely this condition that allows not only to formally combine, but also to distinguish between motivational and emotional processes in a single interpretation. Secondly, by actually calling for a return to old forgotten ideas, motivational theories do not use the experience accumulated in their development in the past. Meanwhile, this experience is quite rich, and accusations of failure to provide an explanation of “how exactly emotions motivate” would be unfair to him.

A true functional interpretation of emotions can only be obtained in the context of the position defended by Soviet psychology about the necessary and active participation of subjective experiences in the regulation of activity. The solution that, under these conditions, the question of the relationship between emotion and motivation receives is conveyed in the most concentrated form by the formulation of S.L. Rubinstein, who argues that emotions are a subjective form of the existence of needs. This means that motivation is revealed to the subject in the form of emotional phenomena that signal to him about the need-based significance of objects and encourage him to direct activity towards them. Emotions and motivational processes are not identified:

being a subjective form of existence of motivation, emotional experiences represent only the final, effective form of its existence, which does not reflect all those processes that prepare and determine the appearance emotional assessments and motives.

Like many others, the question of the universality of the motivational interpretation of emotions depends on the postulated scope of phenomena classified as emotional. So, according to the theory of R.U. Leeper, emotions are only one form of motivation, responsible for driving behavior along with such “physiologically determined” motives as hunger or physical pain. Obviously, even if the experiences of hunger and pain are not considered emotional, this does not prevent the recognition that they represent the subject’s needs (food and self-preservation), representing a concrete subjective form of their existence. Therefore, the solution to the question of whether all motivation is revealed to the subject in the form of emotions depends solely on how the boundary is drawn that separates experiences of an emotional and non-emotional nature.

emotion motivation universality interpretation

Bibliography

1. Arkhipkina O.S. Reconstruction of the subjective semantic space signifying emotional states. - News. Moscow un-ta. Ser. Psychology. 2008, No. 2.

2. Buhler K. Spiritual development child. M., 2009.

3. Vasiliev I.A., Popluzhny V.L., Tikhomirov O.K. Emotions and thinking. M., 2010.

4. Vilyunas V.K. Psychology of emotional phenomena. M., 2009.

5. Woodworth R. Experimental psychology. M., 2008

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