The choice of religion by a people is always determined by its rulers. True religion it always turns out to be the one that the sovereign professes; the true god is the god whom the sovereign commands to be worshiped; Thus, the will of the clergy, which guides the sovereigns, always turns out to be the will of God himself.
End of the 16th and beginning of the 17th centuries. marked in Russian history by troubles. Having started at the top, it quickly went down, captured all layers of Moscow society and brought the state to the brink of destruction. The Troubles lasted for more than a quarter of a century - from the death of Ian the Terrible until the election of Mikhail Fedorovich to the kingdom (1584-1613). The duration and intensity of the unrest clearly indicate that it did not come from outside and not by chance, that its roots were hidden deep in the state organism. But at the same time, S. time amazes with its obscurity and uncertainty. This is not a political revolution, since it did not begin in the name of a new political ideal and did not lead to it, although the existence of political motives in turmoil; this is not a social revolution, since, again, the turmoil did not arise from a social movement, although in its further development the aspirations of some sections of society for social change were intertwined with it. “Our turmoil is the fermentation of a sick state organism, striving to get out of those contradictions to which the previous course of history led it and which could not be resolved in a peaceful, ordinary way.” All previous hypotheses about the origin of the turmoil, despite the fact that each of them contains some truth, must be abandoned as not completely solving the problem. There were two main contradictions that caused S. time. The first of them was political, which can be defined in the words of Prof. Klyuchevsky: “The Moscow sovereign, whom the course of history led to democratic sovereignty, had to act through a very aristocratic administration”; both of these forces, which grew together thanks to the state unification of Rus' and worked together on it, were imbued with mutual distrust and enmity. The second contradiction can be called social: the Moscow government was forced to strain all its forces to better organize the highest defense of the state and “under the pressure of these higher needs sacrifice the interests of the industrial and agricultural classes, whose labor served as the basis National economy, the interests of service landowners", the consequence of which was the mass exodus of the tax-paying population from the centers to the outskirts, which intensified with the expansion of state territory suitable for agriculture. The first contradiction was the result of the collection of appanages by Moscow. The annexation of appanages did not have the character of a violent, exterminatory war. The Moscow government left the appanage in the management of his former prince and was content with the fact that the latter recognized the power of the Moscow sovereign and became his servant. The power of the Moscow sovereign, as Klyuchevsky put it, did not take the place of the appanage princes, but above them “the new state order was a new layer of relations and institutions, which lay on top of what was acting before, without destroying it, but only assigning new responsibilities to it, showing it new tasks." The new princely boyars, pushing aside the ancient Moscow boyars, took first place in the degree of their pedigree seniority, accepting only very few of the Moscow boyars into their environment on equal terms with themselves. Thus, around the Moscow sovereign there was formed vicious circle prince-boyars, who became the pinnacle of his administration, his main council in governing the country. The authorities previously ruled the state individually and in parts, but now they began to rule the entire earth, occupying positions according to the seniority of their breed. The Moscow government recognized this right for them, even supported it, contributed to its development in the form of localism, and thereby fell into the above contradiction. The power of the Moscow sovereigns arose on the basis of patrimonial rights. Kobrin is a time of troubles, lost opportunities. The Grand Duke of Moscow was the owner of his inheritance; all the inhabitants of his territory were his “slaves.” The entire previous course of history led to the development of this view of territory and population. By recognizing the rights of the boyars, the Grand Duke betrayed his ancient traditions, which in reality could not be replaced by others. Ivan the Terrible was the first to understand this contradiction. The Moscow boyars were strong mainly because of their family land holdings. Ivan the Terrible planned to carry out a complete mobilization of boyar land ownership, taking away from the boyars their ancestral appanage nests, giving them other lands in return in order to break their connection with the land and deprive them of their former significance. The boyars were defeated; it was replaced by the lower court layer. Simple boyar families, like the Godunovs and Zakharyins, seized primacy at court. The surviving remnants of the boyars became embittered and prepared for unrest. On the other hand, the 16th century. was an era of external wars that ended with the acquisition of vast spaces in the east, southeast and west. To conquer them and to consolidate new acquisitions, a huge number of military forces were required, which the government recruited from everywhere, in difficult cases not disdaining the services of slaves. The service class in the Moscow state received, in the form of a salary, land on the estate - and land without workers had no value. The land, which was far from the borders of military defense, also did not matter, since a serving person could not serve with it. Therefore, the government was forced to transfer a huge expanse of land in the central and southern parts of the state into service hands. The palace and black peasant volosts lost their independence and came under the control of service people. The previous division into volosts inevitably had to be destroyed with small changes. The process of "possession" of lands is exacerbated by the above-mentioned mobilization of lands, which was the result of persecution against the boyars. Mass evictions ruined the economy of service people, but even more ruined the tax collectors. The mass relocation of the peasantry to the outskirts begins. At the same time, a huge area of Zaoksk black soil is being opened up for resettlement for the peasantry. The government itself, taking care of strengthening the newly acquired borders, supports resettlement to the outskirts. As a result, by the end of the reign of Ivan the Terrible, the eviction took on the character of a general flight, intensified by shortages, epidemics, and Tatar raids. Most of the service lands remain “empty”; a sharp economic crisis ensues. The peasants lost the right of independent land ownership, with the placement of service people on their lands; the townspeople population found themselves forced out of the southern towns and cities occupied by military force: the former shopping places take on the character of military administrative settlements. The townspeople are running. In this economic crisis there is a struggle for workers. The stronger ones win - the boyars and the church. The suffering elements remain the service class and, even more so, the peasant element, which not only lost the right to free land use, but, with the help of indentured servitude, loans and the newly emerged institution of old-timers (see), begins to lose personal freedom, to approach the serfs. In this struggle, enmity grows between individual classes - between the large owner-boyars and the church, on the one hand, and the service class, on the other. The oppressive population harbors hatred for the classes that oppress them and, irritated by government dispositions, are ready for open rebellion; it runs to the Cossacks, who have long separated their interests from the interests of the state. Only the north, where the land remained in the hands of the black volosts, remains calm during the advancing state “ruin.”
Troubles. In the development of the turmoil in the Moscow state, researchers usually distinguish three periods: dynastic, during which there was a struggle for the Moscow throne between various contenders (until May 19, 1606); social - a time of class struggle in the Moscow state complicated by interference in Russian affairs foreign countries(until July 1610); national - the fight against foreign elements and the choice of a national sovereign (until February 21, 1613).
I period
With the death of Ivan the Terrible (March 18, 1584), the field for unrest immediately opened up. There was no power that could stop or contain the impending disaster. The heir of John IV, Theodore Ioannovich, was incapable of governing affairs; Tsarevich Dmitry was still in his infancy. The government was supposed to fall into the hands of the boyars. The secondary boyars came onto the scene - the Yurievs, the Godunovs - but there were still remnants of prince-boyars (Prince Mstislavsky, Shuisky, Vorotynsky, etc.). Nagy, his maternal relatives, and Belsky gathered around Dmitry Tsarevich. Now, after the accession of Fyodor Ioannovich, Dmitry Tsarevich was sent to Uglich, in all likelihood, fearing the possibility of unrest. The board was headed by N.R. Yuryev, but he soon died. A clash occurred between Godunov and the others. First, the Mstislavsky, Vorotynsky, Golovin, and then the Shuisky suffered. Palace turmoil led Godunov to the regency he aspired to. He had no rivals after the fall of the Shuiskys. When news of the death of Tsarevich Dmitry arrived in Moscow, rumors spread throughout the city that Dmitry had been killed on the orders of Godunov. These rumors were recorded primarily by some foreigners, and then found their way into legends compiled much later than the event. Most historians believed the legends, and the opinion about the murder of Dmitry Godunov became generally accepted. But recently this view has been significantly undermined, and there is hardly any modern historian who would decisively lean towards the side of legends. In any case, the role that fell to Godunov was very difficult: it was necessary to pacify the earth, it was necessary to fight the above-mentioned crisis. It is beyond dispute that Boris managed to alleviate the difficult situation of the country at least temporarily: all modern writers talk about this, pointing out in agreement that “the Moscow people began to be consoled from their former sorrow and live quietly and serenely,” etc. But, of course, Godunov could not resolve the contradictions to which the entire course of previous history had led Russia. He could not and did not want to appear as a pacifier for the nobility in a political crisis: this was not in his interests. Foreign and Russian writers note that in this regard, Godunov was a continuator of Grozny’s policies. In the economic crisis, Godunov took the side of the service class, which, as it turned out during the further development of the turmoil, was one of the most numerous and powerful in the Moscow state. In general, the situation of the drafters and walking people under Godunov was difficult. Godunov wanted to rely on middle class society - service people and townspeople. Indeed, he managed to get up with their help, but failed to hold on. In 1594, Princess Theodosia, daughter of Theodore, died. The king himself was not far from death. There are indications that as early as 1593, Moscow nobles were discussing candidates for the Moscow throne and even nominated the Austrian Archduke Maximilian. This indication is very valuable, as it depicts the mood of the boyars. In 1598, Fedor died without appointing an heir. The entire state recognized the power of his widow Irina, but she renounced the throne and took her hair. An interregnum opened. There were 4 candidates for the throne: F.N. Romanov, Godunov, Prince. F. I. Mstislavsky and B. Ya. Belsky. The Shuiskys occupied a lowly position at this time and could not appear as candidates. Kobrin is a time of troubles, lost opportunities. The most serious contender, according to Sapieha, was Romanov, the most daring was Belsky. There was a lively fight between the contenders. In February 1598, a council was convened. In its composition and character it was no different from others former cathedrals, and no fraud on Godunov’s part can be suspected; on the contrary, in terms of its composition, the cathedral was rather unfavorable for Boris, since Godunov’s main support - simple service nobles - was few in number, and Moscow was best and most fully represented, that is, those layers of the Moscow aristocratic nobility who were not particularly favored to Godunov. At the council, however, Boris was elected king; but soon after the election the boyars started an intrigue. From the report of the Polish ambassador Sapieha it is clear that most of Moscow boyars and princes, with F.N. Romanov and Belsky at their head, planned to place Simeon Bekbulatovich on the throne (see). This explains why in the “cross-record” given by the boyars after Godunov’s crowning, it is said that they should not want Simeon to reign. The first three years of Godunov’s reign passed calmly, but from 1601 there were setbacks. A terrible famine ensued, which lasted until 1604 and during which many people died. A mass of hungry people scattered along the roads and began to plunder. Rumors began to circulate that Tsarevich Dmitry was alive. All historians agree that the main role in the appearance of the impostor belonged to the Moscow boyars. Perhaps, in connection with the emergence of rumors about the impostor, there is a disgrace that befell first Belsky, and then the Romanovs, of whom Fyodor Nikitich enjoyed the most popularity. In 1601, they were all sent into exile, Fyodor Nikitich was tonsured under the name of Philaret. Together with the Romanovs, their relatives were exiled: Prince. Cherkasy, Sitsky, Shestunov, Karpov, Repin. Following the exile of the Romanovs, disgraces and executions began to rage. Godunov, obviously, was looking for threads of the conspiracy, but found nothing. Meanwhile, the anger against him intensified. The old boyars (boyars-princes) gradually recovered from the persecutions of Ivan the Terrible and became hostile to the unborn tsar. When the impostor (see False Dmitry I) crossed the Dnieper, the mood of Seversk Ukraine and the south in general could not have been more favorable to his intentions. The above-mentioned economic crisis drove crowds of fugitives to the borders of the Moscow state; they were caught and forced into the sovereign's service; they had to submit, but remained silently irritated, especially since they were oppressed by service and tithe arable land for the state. There were wandering bands of Cossacks around, which were constantly replenished with people from the center and service fugitives. Finally, a three-year famine, just before the appearance of the impostor within Russian borders, accumulated many “evil bastards” who wandered everywhere and with whom it was necessary to wage a real war. Thus, flammable material was ready. The service people recruited from the fugitives, and partly the boyar children of the Ukrainian strip, recognized the impostor. After the death of Boris, the boyar-princes in Moscow turned against the Godunovs and the latter died. The impostor triumphantly headed towards Moscow. In Tula he was met by the flower of the Moscow boyars - princes Vasily, Dmitry and Ivan Shuisky, Prince. Mstislavsky, book. Vorotynsky. Immediately in Tula, the impostor showed the boyars that they could not live with him: he received them very rudely, “punishing and barking,” and in everything he gave preference to the Cossacks and other small brothers. The impostor did not understand his position, did not understand the role of the boyars, and they immediately began to act against him. On June 20, the impostor arrived in Moscow, and on June 30, the trial of the Shuiskys took place. Thus, not even 10 days had passed before the Shuiskys began to fight against the impostor. This time they hurried, but soon they found allies. The clergy were the first to join the boyars, followed by the merchant class. Preparations for the uprising began at the end of 1605 and lasted six months. On May 17, 1606, up to 200 boyars and nobles burst into the Kremlin, and the impostor was killed. Now the old boyar party found itself at the head of the board, which chose V. Shuisky as king. “The boyar-princely reaction in Moscow” (the expression of S. F. Platonov), having mastered the political position, elevated its most noble leader to the kingdom. The election of V. Shuisky to the throne took place without the advice of the whole earth. The Shuisky brothers, V.V. Golitsyn with his brothers, Iv. S. Kurakin and I.M. Vorotynsky, having agreed among themselves, brought Prince Vasily Shuisky to the execution site and from there they proclaimed him tsar. It was natural to expect that the people would be against the “shouted out” tsar and that the secondary boyars (Romanovs, Nagiye, Belsky, M.G. Saltykov, etc.), which gradually began to recover from Boris’s disgrace, would also turn out to be against him.
II period of unrest
After his election to the throne, Vasily Shuisky considered it necessary to explain to the people why he was elected and not anyone else. He motivates the reason for his election by his origin from Rurik; in other words, it sets forth the principle that the seniority of the “breed” gives the right to seniority of power. This is the principle of the ancient boyars (see Localism). Restoring the old boyar traditions, Shuisky had to formally confirm the rights of the boyars and, if possible, ensure them. He did this in his kissing cross recording, which undoubtedly had the character of a limitation royal power . The Tsar admitted that he was not free to execute his slaves, that is, he abandoned the principle that Ivan the Terrible so sharply put forward and then accepted by Godunov. The entry satisfied the boyar princes, and even then not all of them, but it could not satisfy the minor boyars, minor service people and the mass of the population. The turmoil continued. Vasily Shuisky immediately sent the followers of False Dmitry - Belsky, Saltykov and others - to different cities; he wanted to get along with the [[Romanov]s, Nagis and other representatives of the minor boyars, but several dark events occurred that indicate that he did not succeed. V. Shuisky thought about elevating Filaret, who was elevated to the rank of metropolitan by an impostor, to the patriarchal table, but circumstances showed him that it was impossible to rely on Filaret and the Romanovs. He also failed to unite the oligarchic circle of boyar princes: part of it disintegrated, part of it became hostile to the tsar. Shuisky hurried to be crowned king, without even waiting for the patriarch: he was crowned by Metropolitan Isidore of Novgorod, without the usual pomp. To dispel rumors that Tsarevich Dmitry was alive, Shuisky came up with the idea of a solemn transfer to Moscow of the relics of the Tsarevich, canonized by the church; He also resorted to official journalism. But everything was against him: anonymous letters were scattered around Moscow that Dmitry was alive and would soon return, and Moscow was worried. On May 25, Shuisky had to calm down the mob, which was raised against him, as they said then, by P.N. Sheremetev. A fire was breaking out on the southern outskirts of the state. As soon as the events of May 17 became known there, the Seversk land rose, and behind it the Trans-Oka, Ukrainian and Ryazan places; The movement moved to Vyatka, Perm, and captured Astrakhan. Unrest also broke out in Novgorod, Pskov and Tver. This movement, which embraced such a huge space, had a different character in different places and pursued different goals, but there is no doubt that it was dangerous for V. Shuisky. In the Seversk land the movement was social in nature and was directed against the boyars. Putivl became the center of the movement here, and the prince became the head of the movement. Grieg. Peter. Shakhovskoy and his “big governor” Bolotnikov. The movement raised by Shakhovsky and Bolotnikov was completely different from the previous one: before they fought for the trampled rights of Dmitry, in which they believed, now - for a new social ideal; Dmitry's name was only a pretext. Bolotnikov called the people to him, giving hope for social change. The original text of his appeals has not survived, but their content is indicated in the charter of Patriarch Hermogenes. Bolotnikov’s appeals, says Hermogenes, instill in the mob “all sorts of evil deeds for murder and robbery”, “they order the boyar slaves to beat their boyars and their wives, and estates, and estates they are promised; and they order the thieves and unnamed thieves to beat the guests and all merchants and plunder their bellies; and they call their thieves to themselves, and they want to give them boyarship and voivodeship, and deviousness, and clergy.” In the northern zone of Ukrainian and Ryazan cities, a serving nobility arose who did not want to put up with the boyar government of Shuisky. The Ryazan militia was headed by Grigory Sunbulov and the Lyapunov brothers, Prokopiy and Zakhar, and the Tula militia moved under the command of the boyar’s son Istoma Pashkov. Meanwhile, Bolotnikov defeated the tsarist commanders and moved towards Moscow. On the way, he united with the noble militias, together with them he approached Moscow and stopped in the village of Kolomenskoye. Shuisky's position became extremely dangerous. Almost half of the state rose up against him, rebel forces were besieging Moscow, and he had no troops not only to pacify the rebellion, but even to defend Moscow. In addition, the rebels cut off access to bread, and famine emerged in Moscow. Among the besiegers, however, discord emerged: the nobility, on the one hand, slaves, fugitive peasants, on the other, could live peacefully only until they knew each other’s intentions. Kobrin time of troubles lost opportunities As soon as the nobility became acquainted with the goals of Bolotnikov and his army, they immediately recoiled from them. Sunbulov and Lyapunov, although they hated the established order in Moscow, preferred Shuisky and came to him to confess. Other nobles began to follow them. Then the militia from some cities arrived to help, and Shuisky was saved. Bolotnikov fled first to Serpukhov, then to Kaluga, from which he moved to Tula, where he settled down with the Cossack impostor False Peter. This new impostor appeared among the Terek Cossacks and pretended to be the son of Tsar Fedor, who in reality never existed. Its appearance dates back to the time of the first False Dmitry. Shakhovskoy came to Bolotnikov; they decided to lock themselves here and hide from Shuisky. The number of their troops exceeded 30,000 people. In the spring of 1607, Tsar Vasily decided to act energetically against the rebels; but the spring campaign was unsuccessful. Finally, in the summer, with a huge army, he personally went to Tula and besieged it, pacifying the rebel cities along the way and destroying the rebels: they put “prisoners in the water” in thousands, i.e. that is, they simply drowned. A third of the state territory was given over to the troops for plunder and destruction. The siege of Tula dragged on; They managed to take it only when they came up with the idea of setting it up on the river. Up the dam and flood the city. Shakhovsky was exiled to Lake Kubenskoye, Bolotnikov to Kargopol, where he was drowned, and False Peter was hanged. Shuisky triumphed, but not for long. Instead of going to pacify the northern cities, where the rebellion did not stop, he disbanded the troops and returned to Moscow to celebrate the victory. The social background of Bolotnikov’s movement did not escape Shuisky’s attention. This is proven by the fact that with a series of resolutions he decided to strengthen in place and subject to supervision that social stratum that discovered dissatisfaction with its position and sought to change it. By issuing such decrees, Shuisky recognized the existence of unrest, but, trying to defeat it through repression alone, he revealed a lack of understanding of the actual state of affairs. By August 1607, when V. Shuisky was sitting near Tula, the second False Dmitry appeared in Starodub Seversky, whom the people very aptly dubbed the Thief. The Starodub residents believed in him and began to help him. Soon a team of Poles, Cossacks and all sorts of crooks formed around him. This was not the zemstvo squad that gathered around False Dmitry I: it was just a gang of “thieves” who did not believe in the royal origin of the new impostor and followed him in the hope of loot. The thief defeated the royal army and stopped near Moscow in the village of Tushino, where he founded his fortified camp. People flocked to him from everywhere, thirsting for easy money. The arrival of Lisovsky and Jan Sapieha especially strengthened the Thief. Shuisky's position was difficult. The South could not help him; he had no strength of his own. There remained hope in the north, which was comparatively calmer and suffered little from the turmoil. On the other hand, the Thief could not take Moscow. Both opponents were weak and could not defeat each other. The people became corrupted and forgot about duty and honor, serving alternately one or the other. In 1608, V. Shuisky sent his nephew Mikhail Vasilyevich Skopin-Shuisky (see) for help to the Swedes. The Russians ceded the city of Karel and the province to Sweden, abandoned views of Livonia and pledged an eternal alliance against Poland, for which they received an auxiliary detachment of 6 thousand people. Skopin moved from Novgorod to Moscow, clearing the north-west of the Tushins along the way. Sheremetev came from Astrakhan, suppressing the rebellion along the Volga. In Alexandrovskaya Sloboda they united and went to Moscow. By this time, Tushino ceased to exist. It happened this way: when Sigismund learned about Russia’s alliance with Sweden, he declared war on it and besieged Smolensk. Ambassadors were sent to Tushino to the Polish troops there demanding that they join the king. A split began among the Poles: some obeyed the king's orders, others did not. The Thief’s position had been difficult before: no one treated him on ceremony, they insulted him, almost beat him; now it has become unbearable. The thief decided to leave Tushino and fled to Kaluga. Around the Thief during his stay in Tushino, a court of Moscow people gathered who did not want to serve Shuisky. Among them were representatives of very high strata of the Moscow nobility, but the palace nobility - Metropolitan Filaret (Romanov), Prince. Trubetskoys, Saltykovs, Godunovs, etc.; there were also humble people who sought to curry favor, gain weight and importance in the state - Molchanov, Iv. Gramotin, Fedka Andronov, etc. Sigismund invited them to surrender under the authority of the king. Filaret and the Tushino boyars responded that the election of a tsar was not their job alone, that they could do nothing without the advice of the land. At the same time, they entered into an agreement between themselves and the Poles not to pester V. Shuisky and not to desire a king from “any other Moscow boyars” and began negotiations with Sigismund so that he would send his son Vladislav to the kingdom of Moscow. An embassy was sent from the Russian Tushins, headed by the Saltykovs, Prince. Rubets-Masalsky, Pleshcheevs, Khvorostin, Velyaminov - all great nobles - and several people of low origin. 4 Feb In 1610, they concluded an agreement with Sigismund, clarifying the aspirations of “rather mediocre nobility and well-established businessmen.” Its main points are as follows: 1) Vladislav is crowned king by the Orthodox patriarch; 2) Orthodoxy must continue to be revered: 3) the property and rights of all ranks remain inviolable; 4) the trial is carried out according to the old times; Vladislav shares legislative power with the boyars and the Zemsky Sobor; 5) execution can be carried out only by court and with the knowledge of the boyars; the property of the relatives of the perpetrator should not be subject to confiscation; 6) taxes are collected in the old way; the appointment of new ones is done with the consent of the boyars; 7) peasant migration is prohibited; 8) Vladislav is obliged not to demote people of high ranks innocently, but to promote those of lower rank according to their merits; travel to other countries for research is permitted; 9) the slaves remain in the same position. Analyzing this treaty, we find: 1) that it is national and strictly conservative, 2) that it protects most of all the interests of the service class, and 3) that it undoubtedly introduces some innovations; Particularly characteristic in this regard are paragraphs 5, 6 and 8. Meanwhile, Skopin-Shuisky triumphantly entered liberated Moscow on March 12, 1610. Moscow rejoiced, welcoming the 24-year-old hero with great joy. Shuisky also rejoiced, hoping that the days of testing were over. But during these celebrations, Skopin suddenly died. There was a rumor that he had been poisoned. There is news that Lyapunov suggested that Skopin “unseat” Vasily Shuisky and take the throne himself, but Skopin rejected this proposal. After the king found out about this, he lost interest in his nephew. In any case, Skopin’s death destroyed Shuisky’s connection with the people. The king's brother Dimitri, a completely mediocre person, became the governor of the army. He set out to liberate Smolensk, but near the village of Klushina he was shamefully defeated by the Polish hetman Zholkiewski. Zholkiewski cleverly took advantage of the victory: he quickly went to Moscow, capturing Russian cities along the way and bringing them to the oath to Vladislav. Vor also hurried to Moscow from Kaluga. When Moscow learned about the outcome of the battle of Klushino, “a great rebellion arose among all the people, fighting against the Tsar.” The approach of Zolkiewski and Vor accelerated the disaster. In the overthrow of Shuisky from the throne, the main role fell to the share of the service class, headed by Zakhar Lyapunov. The palace nobility also took a significant part in this, including Filaret Nikitich. After several unsuccessful attempts, Shuisky’s opponents gathered at the Serpukhov Gate, declared themselves the council of the whole earth and “unseated” the king.
III period of turmoil
Moscow found itself without a government, and yet it needed it now more than ever: it was pressed by enemies on both sides. Everyone was aware of this, but did not know who to focus on. Lyapunov and the Ryazan servicemen wanted to install Prince Tsar. V. Golitsyna; Filaret, Saltykovs and other Tushins had other intentions; The highest nobility, headed by F.I. Mstislavsky and I.S. Kurakin, decided to wait. The board was transferred to the hands of the boyar duma, which consisted of 7 members. The “seven-numbered boyars” failed to take power into their own hands. They made an attempt to assemble a Zemsky Sobor, but it failed. Fear of the Thief, on whose side the mob was taking their side, forced them to let Zolkiewski into Moscow, but he entered only when Moscow agreed to the election of Vladislav. On August 27, Moscow swore allegiance to Vladislav. If the election of Vladislav was not carried out in the usual way, at a real Zemsky Sobor, then nevertheless the boyars did not decide to take this step alone, but gathered representatives from different layers of the state and formed something like a Zemsky Sobor, which was recognized as the council of the whole earth. After long negotiations, both parties accepted the previous agreement, with some changes: 1) Vladislav had to convert to Orthodoxy; 2) the clause on freedom to travel abroad for science was crossed out and 3) the article on promotion was destroyed smaller people. These changes show the influence of the clergy and boyars. The agreement on the election of Vladislav was sent to Sigismund with a great embassy consisting of almost 1000 persons: this included representatives of almost all classes. It is very likely that the embassy included most of the members of the “council of the whole earth” that elected Vladislav. At the head of the embassy were Metropolitan. Filaret and Prince V. P. Golitsyn. The embassy was not successful: Sigismund himself wanted to sit on the Moscow throne. When Zolkiewski realized that Sigismund's intention was unshakable, he left Moscow, realizing that the Russians would not come to terms with this. Sigismund hesitated, tried to intimidate the ambassadors, but they did not deviate from the agreement. Then he resorted to bribing some members, which he succeeded in: they left from near Smolensk to prepare the ground for the election of Sigismund, but those who remained were unshakable. At the same time, in Moscow, the “seven-numbered boyars” lost all meaning; power passed into the hands of the Poles and the newly formed government circle, which betrayed the Russian cause and betrayed Sigismund. This circle consisted of Iv. Mich. Saltykova, book. Yu. D. Khvorostinina, N. D. Velyaminova, M. A. Molchanova, Gramotina, Fedka Andronova and many others. etc. Thus, the first attempt of the Moscow people to restore power ended in complete failure: instead of an equal union with Poland, Rus' risked falling into complete subordination from it. A failed attempt ended forever political significance boyars and boyar duma. As soon as the Russians realized that they had made a mistake in choosing Vladislav, as soon as they saw that Sigismund was not lifting the siege of Smolensk and was deceiving them, national and religious feelings began to awaken. At the end of October 1610, ambassadors from near Smolensk sent a letter about the threatening turn of affairs; in Moscow itself, patriots revealed the truth to the people in anonymous letters. All eyes turned to Patriarch Hermogenes: he understood his task, but could not immediately take up its implementation. After the storming of Smolensk on November 21, the first serious clash between Hermogenes and Saltykov took place, who tried to persuade the patriarch to side with Sigismund; but Hermogenes still did not dare to call on the people to openly fight the Poles. The death of Vor and the disintegration of the embassy forced him to “command the blood to be bold” - and in the second half of December he began sending letters to the cities. This was discovered, and Hermogenes paid with imprisonment. His call, however, was heard. Prokopiy Lyapunov was the first to rise from the Ryazan land. He began to gather an army against the Poles and in January 1611 moved towards Moscow. Zemstvo squads came to Lyapunov from all sides; even the Tushino Cossacks went to the rescue of Moscow, under the command of Prince. D.T. Trubetskoy and Zarutsky. The Poles, after the battle with the residents of Moscow and the approaching zemstvo squads, locked themselves in the Kremlin and Kitai-Gorod. The position of the Polish detachment (about 3,000 people) was dangerous, especially since it had few supplies. Sigismund could not help him; he himself was unable to put an end to Smolensk. The Zemstvo and Cossack militias united and besieged the Kremlin, but discord immediately broke out between them. However, the army declared itself the council of the earth and began to rule the state, since there was no other government. Due to the increased discord between the zemstvos and the Cossacks, it was decided in June 16 1 1 to draw up a general resolution. The sentence of the representatives of the Cossacks and service people, who formed the main core of the zemstvo army, was very extensive: it had to organize not only the army, but also the state. The highest power should belong to the entire army, which calls itself “the whole earth”; governors - only executive bodies this council, which reserves the right to remove them if they perform poorly. The court belongs to the voivodes, but they can execute only with the approval of the “council of the whole earth”, otherwise they face death. Then local affairs were settled very precisely and in detail. All awards from Vor and Sigismund are declared insignificant. “Old” Cossacks can receive estates and thus join the ranks of service people. Next are the decrees on the return of fugitive slaves, who called themselves Cossacks (new Cossacks), to their former masters; The self-will of the Cossacks was largely embarrassed. Finally, an administrative department was established on the Moscow model. From this verdict it is clear that the army gathered near Moscow considered itself a representative of the entire land and that the main role in the council belonged to the zemstvo service people, and not to the Cossacks. This sentence is also characteristic in that it testifies to the importance that the service class gradually acquired. But the predominance of service people did not last long; the Cossacks could not be in solidarity with them. The matter ended with the murder of Lyapunov and the flight of the zemshchina. The Russians' hopes for the militia were not justified: Moscow remained in the hands of the Poles, Smolensk by this time was taken by Sigismund, Novgorod by the Swedes; Cossacks settled around Moscow, robbed the people, committed outrages and prepared a new unrest, proclaiming the son of Marina, who lived in connection with Zarutsky, Russian Tsar. The state was apparently dying; but a popular movement arose throughout the north and northeast of Rus'. This time it separated from the Cossacks and began to act independently. Hermogenes, with his letters, poured inspiration into the hearts of the Russians. Nizhny became the center of the movement. Minin was placed at the head of the economic organization, and power over the army was given to the prince. Pozharsky. In March 1612, the militia moved to Yaroslavl to occupy this important point, where many roads crossed and where the Cossacks headed, taking an openly hostile attitude towards the new militia. Yaroslavl was busy; the militia stood here for three months, because it was necessary to “build” not only the army, but also the land; Pozharsky wanted to convene a council to elect a king, but the latter failed. Around August 20, 1612, the militia from Yaroslavl moved to Moscow. On October 22, Kitay-Gorod was taken, and a few days later the Kremlin surrendered. After the capture of Moscow, by letter of November 15, Pozharsky convened representatives from the cities, 10 people each, to choose a tsar. Sigismund decided to go to Moscow, but he did not have enough strength to take Volok, and he went back. In January 1613, the electors met. The cathedral was one of the most crowded and most complete: there were even representatives of black volosts, which had never happened before. Four candidates were nominated: V.I. Shuisky, Vorotynsky, Trubetskoy and M.F. Romanov. Contemporaries accused Pozharsky that he, too, strongly campaigned in his favor, but this can hardly be allowed. In any case, the elections were very stormy. A legend has been preserved that Filaret demanded restrictive conditions for the new tsar and pointed to M.F. Romanov as the most suitable candidate. Mikhail Fedorovich was indeed chosen, and undoubtedly, he was offered those restrictive conditions that Filaret wrote about: “Give full justice to justice according to the old laws of the country; do not judge or condemn anyone the highest authority; without a council, do not introduce any new laws, do not burden your subjects with new taxes and do not make the slightest decisions in military and zemstvo affairs." The election took place on February 7, but the official announcement was postponed until the 21st, in order to find out during this time how the people would accept With the election of the tsar, the turmoil ended, since now there was power that everyone recognized and could rely on. But the consequences of the turmoil lasted for a long time: one might say, the entire 17th century was filled with them.
The term “Time of Troubles”, adopted in pre-revolutionary historiography, referred to turbulent events early XVII century, was decisively rejected in Soviet science as “noble-bourgeois” and replaced by a long and even somewhat bureaucratic title: “The Peasant War and Foreign Intervention in Russia.” Today, the term “Time of Troubles” is gradually returning: apparently because it not only corresponds to the word usage of the era, but also quite accurately reflects historical reality.
Among the meanings of the word “turmoil” given by V.I. Dahlem, we encounter “uprising, rebellion... general disobedience, discord between the people and the authorities.” No wonder Pushkin wrote: “Sedition and unrest in bloody days.” However, in modern language, the adjective “vague” has a different meaning - unclear, indistinct. And in fact, the beginning of the 17th century. indeed the Time of Troubles: everything is in motion, everything fluctuates, the contours of people and events are blurred, kings change with incredible speed, often in different parts countries and even in neighboring cities recognize the power of different sovereigns at the same time, people sometimes change their political orientation with lightning speed: then yesterday’s allies disperse into hostile camps, then yesterday’s enemies act together... Time of Troubles is a complex interweaving of various contradictions - class and national , intra-class and inter-class... And although there was foreign intervention, it is impossible to reduce only to it the whole variety of events of this turbulent and truly Troubled Time.
A peasant war? Yes, of course, numerous peasant and Cossack unrest and uprisings, set in motion by the masses of slaves - all this happened. But do we have the right to rage in Russia at the beginning of the 17th century? /163/ reduce the civil war to a peasant war? It is difficult to give an unambiguous answer to this question today, but, in any case, it increasingly arises among historians. Truly, Time of Troubles!
Naturally, such a dynamic period was extremely rich not only in bright events, but also in a variety of development alternatives. In days of national upheaval, accidents can play a significant role in the direction of the course of history. Alas, the Time of Troubles turned out to be a time of lost opportunities, when those alternatives that promised a more favorable course of events for the country did not materialize. Let's look at the facts.
In 1584, Ivan the Terrible died, ending the half-century reign of one of the most disgusting despots in Russian history. As a legacy to his successors, Tsar Ivan left a country devastated by the oprichnina and unbridled exploitation, which also lost the grueling Livonian War that lasted a quarter of a century. With Ivan IV, the dynasty of the descendants of Ivan Kalita actually came to naught. The eldest son of the tsar, similar to his father in both cruelty and erudition, Ivan Ivanovich died from an unsuccessful blow from his father’s staff. The throne passed into the hands of the second son - Fyodor Ivanovich, a weak-minded dwarf with obvious features of degeneration. Court chronicles created a pious legend about a tsar who was not very well versed in earthly affairs, but was highly moral and a prayer book for the Russian land. This legend was brilliantly embodied by A.K. Tolstoy in his magnificent drama “Tsar Fyodor Ioannovich”. Tsar Feodor A.K. Tolstoy says:
What kind of king am I? me in everything
And it is not difficult to confuse and deceive.
There is only one thing I will not be deceived about:
When between what is black and white,
I must choose - I will not be deceived.
But A.K. himself Tolstoy understood perfectly well that the real Tsar Fedor was somewhat different. In his satirical poem “History of the Russian State from Gostomysl to Timashev” he characterized Tsar Fedor as follows:
Was not a vigorous mind,
It’s only too much to ring, -
/164/
which was more in line with the assessment of contemporaries. After all, the Swedish king said that “the Russians in their language call him durak.”
Thus, unlimited autocratic power over a huge country ended up in the hands of a man who was simply not able to rule. Naturally, under Tsar Fedor, a government circle of several boyars was created, a kind of regency council. However, soon real power was concentrated in his hands by one of the participants in this council - boyar Boris Fedorovich Godunov, the tsar's brother-in-law - the brother of his wife Tsarina Irina.
Everyone remembers how in the very first scene of Pushkin’s “Boris Godunov” Prince Vasily Shuisky talks about Boris.
Yesterday's slave, Tatar, Malyuta's son-in-law,
The executioner's son-in-law is an executioner himself at heart,
He will take the crown and barmas of Monomakh...
“Yesterday’s slave”... Yes, chronicle texts hostile to Godunov often call him a “crafty slave,” but what they mean is not Boris’s slave origin, but the fact that he, like all subjects of the Russian tsars, was considered a slave, i.e. .e. slave of the sovereign. From this point of view, both Shuisky himself and Vorotynsky, who was talking with him, were the same “slaves.”
“Tatar”... It seems that in the 16th century. Tatar origin The Russian boyar would hardly have been blamed: the memory that the Horde khans and Murzas ruled in Rus' was still alive, and therefore Tatarness was perceived rather as a virtue. The genealogical legend of the Saburov family, of which the Godunovs were an offshoot, claimed that their ancestor was the Tatar Murza Chet, who was baptized in 1330. If this legend were at least partly true, then, naturally, in 250 years there would have been less Tatar left in Godunov than in Pushkin is Negro, and in Lermontov it is Scottish. But Godunov really was the son-in-law of the oprichnina executioner Malyuta Skuratov. This dubious honor was shared with him by the offspring of the most aristocratic families, princes Dmitry Ivanovich Shuisky and Ivan Mikhailovich Glinsky, who became related to the all-powerful, albeit humble temporary worker.
Godunov's position strengthened quickly. In the summer of 1585, just a little over a year after Fyodor Ivanovich’s accession to the throne, Russian diplomat Luka Novosiltsev got into a conversation with the head of the Polish church, Archbishop Karnkowski of Gniezno. Who knows what they actually talked about? Novosiltsev reported to Moscow, of course, about those words of his that corresponded to the official position. Wanting to say something pleasant to his guest, the archbishop noted that the former sovereign had a wise adviser Alexei Adashev, “and now in Moscow God has given you such a prosperous (smart) man.” VC.)". Novosiltsev considered this compliment to Godunov insufficient: having confirmed that Adashev was reasonable, the Russian envoy said about Godunov that he was “not Alekseev’s mile”: after all, “he is a great man - a boyar and a stablemaster, and here is our sovereign’s brother-in-law, and our sovereign’s dear brother, and with his mind God made him a great sorrower for the earth.”
Let us pay attention to the last word: it meant patron, guardian. It is not for nothing that English observers, translating this expression into English, called Godunov “Lord Protector.” Let us remember that more than 60 years later this very title was used by the all-powerful dictator of England Oliver Cromwell...
Fyodor Ivanovich occupied the royal throne for fourteen years, but for at least 12, and even 13 of them, Boris Godunov was the de facto ruler of the country. Therefore, there is no point in separating the reign of Feodor from the reign of Boris.
However, on the way to the royal throne, Boris Godunov had to overcome one more obstacle. The youngest son of Ivan the Terrible, Tsarevich Dmitry, lived in honorable exile in Uglich as an appanage prince, with his mother Maria Fedorovna from the Nagikh clan and his uncles. If Fyodor had died childless (and this is what happened), then the prince would have been the natural heir. It is a common assertion that Dmitry was not a hindrance to Godunov, since the marriage of Ivan IV to Maria Naga, the sixth or seventh in a row, was not legal from a canonical point of view. And yet, the tsar’s son, although not entirely legitimate, but officially using the title of prince, had much more rights than the tsar’s brother-in-law. When a man who called himself by the name of Dmitry laid claim to the throne, no one wondered whose son he was according to the wife of the formidable king. Yes, Tsarevich Dmitry blocked Godunov’s path to the throne. But at the age of eight and a half, the prince mysteriously /166/ died. According to the official version, contemporary events, it was an accident: the prince “stabbed” himself with a knife during an epileptic seizure. The official version of a later time, the beginning of the 17th century, claims that the holy prince was stabbed to death by assassins sent by the “crafty slave” Boris Godunov. The question of Boris Godunov’s guilt in the death of the prince is difficult to resolve unambiguously. One way or another, this obstacle was removed.
In 1598, after the death of Tsar Feodor, the Zemsky Sobor elected Boris as tsar. It couldn't be otherwise. During the years of his reign, Godunov managed to gather around himself - both in the Boyar Duma and among the court officials - “his people”, those who were indebted to the ruler for their careers and were afraid of the changes that could come with a change of power.
One can have different attitudes to the personal qualities of Boris Godunov, but even his most severe critics cannot deny him his statesmanship, and the most zealous apologists are not able to deny that Boris Fedorovich not only was not guided in his political activity moral standards, but also constantly violated them for his own benefit. And yet he was above all talented politician, an undoubted reformer. And his fate is tragic, like the fate of most reformers.
An amazing paradox: Ivan the Terrible led the country not to the edge of the abyss, but simply into the abyss. And yet in people's memory he remained at times inspiring horror, disgust, but bright and strong man. Boris Godunov tried to pull the country out of the abyss. And since he failed, he found himself eliminated from folklore, and was preserved in the mass consciousness only by his cunning, resourcefulness and insincerity.
The methods of Boris Godunov differed sharply from the methods of Tsar Ivan (although Godunov himself went through the school of the oprichnina). Godunov was shameless and cruel in eliminating his political opponents, but only real, not fictitious opponents. He did not like to organize executions in public squares or solemnly and loudly curse traitors. His opponents were quietly arrested, quietly sent into exile or to a monastery prison, and there they quietly, but usually quickly died, some from poison, some from a noose, and some from unknown causes.
At the same time, Godunov strove for unity, for the consolidation /167/ of the entire ruling class. It was the only thing correct policy in conditions of general ruin of the country.
However, it was during the reign of Boris Godunov that serfdom was established in Russia. The first step was taken under Ivan the Terrible, when the transfer of peasants from one owner to another on St. George’s Day was temporarily prohibited. But during the reign of Fyodor Ivanovich, new serfdom decrees were adopted. According to the hypothesis of V.I. Koretsky, around 1592 - 1593. The government issued a decree banning peasant “exit” throughout the country and forever. This assumption is not shared by all researchers, but, probably, some feudal measures were nevertheless carried out during these years: five years later a decree appeared on “pre-term years” - on a five-year statute of limitations for petitions for the return of fugitive peasants. This decree does not make a difference between those who left on St. George’s Day and not on St. George’s Day, on reserved summers and not on reserved summers, it is based on the provision that the peasant is attached to the land. And the countdown of the limitation period dates back to 1592.
The question of the reasons for the transition to serfdom, of how serious the alternative to another version of the development of feudal relations, without serfdom, was, is one of those not only not yet resolved, but also clearly insufficiently studied. Today we can say with confidence that the “commodity-corvee” concept of B.D., which once dominated science. Grekova collapsed under the pressure of facts. According to B.D. Grekova, development of commodity-money relations in Russia second half XVI V. was so great that the grain trade turned into a profitable source of income. These circumstances pushed the feudal lords to switch to a corvee economy, which was impossible without the enslavement of the peasants.
It is now clear that the development of commodity-money relations was exaggerated, that grain trade was very small: urban population was hardly more than 2 - 3%, and grain exports had not yet begun. Not observed in the 16th century. and a sharp increase in corvée labor, and for the most part it was not peasants who worked the lord’s plowing, but plowed slaves “sufferers”; therefore, the development of corvée was not associated with the emergence of serfdom. /168/
Both the government of Ivan the Terrible and the government of Boris Godunov went to attach peasants to the land, guided by pragmatic, momentary considerations, the desire to eliminate and prevent future desolation of the central districts. But these were in fact only reasons, and not reasons for the transition to serfdom. The economic crisis of the post-oprichnia years was a consequence of more general social processes. At this time, perhaps more clearly than ever before, there is a tendency towards increased exploitation of the peasantry by both individual feudal lords and the state. There were two types of reasons for this. Firstly, the number of feudal lords grew faster than the number of peasants: the point is not in the standard of living, but in the fact that in conditions of a long war the government constantly recruited people from the plebeian strata into the “children of the boyars”, distributing estates with peasants to them for their service. The decrease in the average size of feudal holdings, while the feudal lord maintained the standard of living of previous years, led to the fact that the duties of the peasants steadily increased.
But many feudal lords did not limit themselves to maintaining their standard of living, but sought to increase it. If your neighbor received you, treating you from silver dishes, then it is already awkward for you to put “tin vessels” on the table. A short, although hardy, home-bred horse is becoming unprestigious: a Nogai blood stallion seemed urgently needed. And if a neighbor went on a campaign wearing imported chain mail from Iran or the Caucasus, then his own, dear one, although made by a good craftsman and perfectly protecting from saber strikes, turned into a sign of poverty.
However, the right of peasant transition - albeit with payment of the “elderly” and only once a year - limited the appetites of the feudal lords and served as a natural regulator of the level of exploitation: an overly greedy feudal lord could, like Shchedrin’s wild landowner, be left without peasants. Scribe books mention “severe estates” from which the peasants dispersed, after which the landowners “swept” (abandoned) them.
Godunov's domestic policy was aimed at stabilizing the situation in the country. Under him, new cities are being built, especially in the Volga region. It was then that Samara, Saratov, Tsaritsyn, and Ufa arose. The situation of the townspeople became easier: large feudal lords /169/ no longer had the right to keep artisans and traders in their “white” (tax-free) settlements; everyone who was engaged in crafts and trade had from now on to be part of the township communities and, together with everyone else, pay state taxes - “pull the tax.”
In foreign policy Boris Godunov strived for victories not so much on the battlefield as at the negotiating table. The truce with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was extended several times. Relations with states developed well Central Asia. The defense of the southern borders has been strengthened. The only war launched by Russia during the reign of Boris Godunov was directed against Sweden. As a result Livonian War she got the coast of the Gulf of Finland. After three years of hostilities, the Tyavzin Peace Treaty was signed in 1593, which returned Ivangorod, Yam, Koporye and the Korelu volost to Russia.
Boris Godunov made the first attempt before Peter to eliminate the cultural backwardness of Russia from the countries of Western Europe. Many people come to the country, much more than before, foreign specialists- military and doctors, mineral prospectors (“ore explorers”) and craftsmen. Boris Godunov was even accused (like Peter I a hundred years later) of being excessively partial to the “Germans” (as Western Europeans were called in Russia). For the first time "for science" different languages and letters” several young noblemen were sent to England, France, and Germany. During the Time of Troubles, they did not dare to return to their homeland and “stayed long ago” abroad; one of them in England converted to Anglicanism, became a priest and even a theologian.
Probably, if Godunov had had a few more quiet years at his disposal, Russia would have been more peaceful than under Peter, and would have taken the path of modernization a hundred years earlier. But there were no such quiet years. An improvement in the economic situation was only just beginning, and since the way out of the crisis was going through serfdom, discontent was brewing among the peasantry. So, in 1593 - 1595. The peasants of the Joseph-Volokolamsk monastery fought with the monastic authorities. Who knows, maybe the muted discontent would not have developed into an explosion if the summer of 1601 had not been so rainy. It was not possible to start harvesting. And then, without a break, the early frosts immediately struck, and “the strong scum destroyed all the labor of human affairs in the fields.” The next year was /170/ again a poor harvest, and besides, there was a shortage of seeds, and their quality was low. For three years a terrible famine raged in the country.
Of course, it wasn't just the weather that was causing it. Shattered by heavy taxes and strong feudal exploitation, the peasant economy lost its stability and had no reserves.
But it was not only the weather and the instability of the peasant economy that led to famine. Many boyars and monasteries had reserves of grain. According to a contemporary, they would be enough for the entire population of the country for four years. But the feudal lords hid their reserves, hoping for a further increase in prices. And they grew about a hundred times. People ate hay and grass, and it reached the point of cannibalism.
Let's give Boris Godunov his due: he fought hunger as best he could. They distributed money to the poor and organized paid construction works. But the money received instantly depreciated: after all, this did not increase the amount of grain on the market. Then Boris ordered the distribution of free bread from state storage facilities. He hoped to set a good example for the feudal lords, but the granaries of the boyars, monasteries and even the patriarch remained closed. In the meantime, to free bread from all sides to Moscow and to big cities the hungry rushed in. But there was not enough bread for everyone, especially since the distributors themselves were speculating in bread. They said that some rich people did not hesitate to dress in rags and receive free bread in order to sell it at exorbitant prices. People who dreamed of salvation died in the cities right on the streets. In Moscow alone, 127 thousand people were buried, and not everyone was able to be buried. A contemporary says that in those years dogs and crows were the most well-fed: they ate unburied corpses. While the peasants in the cities died waiting in vain for food, their fields remained uncultivated and unplanted. Thus the foundations were laid for the continuation of the famine.
What are the reasons for the failure of all Boris Godunov’s attempts to overcome hunger, despite his sincere desire to help people? First of all, the king fought the symptoms and did not treat the disease. The causes of the famine were rooted in serfdom, but even the thought of restoring the right of the peasants to move did not occur to the tsar. The only measure he decided to take was permission in 1601 - 1602. temporary limited /171/ transition of certain categories of peasants. These decrees did not bring relief to the peasants.
Hunger killed Boris. Popular unrest covered increasingly large areas. The king was catastrophically losing authority. The opportunities that the reign of this talented statesman opened up for the country were missed. The victory of False Dmitry was ensured, according to Pushkin, by “popular opinion.”
Many false stereotypes have accumulated about False Dmitry I both in literature and in the mass consciousness. He is usually seen as an agent of the Polish king and the lords who, with his help, sought to seize Russia, their puppet. It is quite natural that precisely this interpretation of the personality of False Dmitry was intensively introduced by the government of Vasily Shuisky, who sat on the throne after the overthrow and murder of “Tsar Dmitry.” But today’s historian can be more impartial about the activities of the young man who spent a year on the Russian throne.
Judging by the memoirs of his contemporaries, False Dmitry I was smart and quick-witted. His associates were amazed at how easily and quickly he solved complicated issues. He seemed to believe in his royal origins. Contemporaries unanimously note the amazing courage, reminiscent of Peter the Great, with which the young tsar violated the established etiquette at court. He did not stride sedately through the rooms, supported by the arms of close boyars, but quickly moved from one to another, so that even his personal bodyguards sometimes did not know where to find him. He was not afraid of crowds; more than once, accompanied by one or two people, he rode through the streets of Moscow. He didn't even sleep after lunch. It was fitting for a king to be calm, unhurried and important; this one acted with the temperament of the named father, but without his cruelty. All this is suspicious for a calculating impostor. If False Dmitry had known that he was not the tsar’s son, he would certainly have been able to master the etiquette of the Moscow court in advance, so that everyone could immediately say about him: yes, this is a real tsar. In addition, “Tsar Dmitry” pardoned the most dangerous witness - Prince Vasily Shuisky. Convicted of a conspiracy against the Tsar, Vasily Shuisky led the investigation into the death of the real Tsarevich in Uglich and saw it with his own eyes dead body. Shuisky was sentenced to death by the council, and “Tsar Dmitry” pardoned him. /172/
Wasn’t the unfortunate young man prepared from childhood for the role of a contender for the throne, wasn’t he brought up in the belief that he was the rightful heir to the Moscow crown? It is not without reason that when the first news of the appearance of an impostor in Poland reached Moscow, Boris Godunov, as they say, immediately told the boyars that it was their doing.
Godunov’s most important rivals on the path to power were the Romanov-Yuryev boyars. The eldest of them, Nikita Romanovich, brother of Tsar Feodor's mother, Tsarina Anastasia, was considered an ally of Godunov. It was to him that Nikita Romanovich bequeathed to patronize his children - “Nikitichy”. This “testamental union of friendship” did not last long, and soon after Boris ascended the throne, the five Nikitich brothers were arrested on false charges of trying to poison the Tsar and exiled along with their relatives. The eldest of his brothers, hunter and dandy Fyodor Nikitich, was tonsured a monk under the name of Philaret and sent north to the Anthony-Siysky Monastery. Back in 1602, Philaret’s beloved servant informed the bailiff that his master had come to terms with everything and was thinking only about saving his soul and his poor family. In the summer of 1604, False Dmitry appeared in Poland, and already in February 1605, the reports of the bailiff under “Elder Philaret” changed dramatically. Before us is no longer a humble monk, but a political fighter who has heard the sound of a battle trumpet. According to the bailiff, Elder Philaret does not live according to the monastic rites, he always laughs, no one knows why, and talks about worldly life, about birds of falcon and about dogs, how he lived in the world.” Philaret proudly declared to other monks that “they will see what he will be like in the future.” And in fact, they saw it. Less than six months after the bailiff sent his denunciation, Filaret from an exiled monk became Metropolitan of Rostov: he was elevated to this rank by order of “Tsar Dmitry.” It's all about the impostor's connections with the Romanov family. As soon as False Dmitry appeared in Poland, Godunov’s government declared that he was an impostor Yushka (and in monasticism - Gregory) Bogdanov, the son of Otrepyev, a deacon-defrocked Chudov Monastery, who served under Patriarch Job “for writing.” This was probably the case: the government was interested in revealing the real name of the impostor, and finding out the truth was easier then than it is now, almost four centuries later. Otrepiev, before his tonsure, was a slave of the Romanovs and became a monk, apparently after /173/ their exile. Didn't they prepare the young man for the role of an impostor? In any case, the very appearance of False Dmitry has nothing to do with foreign intrigues. V.O. was right. Klyuchevsky, when he wrote about False Dmitry, that “he was only baked in a Polish oven, but fermented in Moscow.”
Poland not only did not take the initiative in False Dmitry’s adventure, but, on the contrary, King Sigismund III Vasa hesitated for a long time whether to support the applicant. On the one hand, it was tempting to have a person beholden to the king on the Moscow throne. Moreover, the young man did not skimp on promises. He secretly converted to Catholicism and promised the Pope that all of Russia would follow his example. He promised the king Smolensk and the Chernigov-Seversk land, the father of his bride Marina, the Sandomierz governor Yuri Mnishek - Novgorod, Pskov and a million gold coins. But still. The story seemed too incredible miraculous salvation Tsarevich. Doubts about the royal origin of the “Moscow prince” were expressed by almost all the nobles of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, to whom the king turned for advice. And during a discussion in the Sejm, Crown Hetman Jan Zamoyski said that the whole story of the “prince” reminded him of the comedies of Plautus or Terence. “Is it possible,” said Zamoyski, “to order someone to be killed, and then not to see whether the person who was ordered to be killed was killed?” In addition, a bird in the hand - a truce with Russia concluded in 1601 for a period of 20 years on mutually beneficial terms - seemed preferable to a pie in the sky - an ally of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth on the Moscow throne. Sigismund III could not decide on an open military conflict with Russia also because the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth waged a grueling struggle with Sweden for the Baltic states.
That is why the king did not dare to provide full and unconditional support to False Dmitry: he only allowed the Polish nobles, if they wished, to join his army. There were a little more than one and a half thousand of them. They were joined by several hundred Russian emigrant nobles and also Don and Zaporozhye Cossacks, who saw in the campaign of False Dmitry a good opportunity for military booty. The pretender to the throne thus had only a handful of warriors - about four thousand. With them he crossed the Dnieper.
They were already waiting for False Dmitry, but they were waiting near Smolensk: from there a more direct and shorter route to /174/ Moscow opened up. He preferred a more authentic route: he crossed the Dnieper near Chernigov. But the troops of False Dmitry had to go through the Seversk land, where a lot of combustible material had accumulated: small service people dissatisfied with their position, peasants subjected to particularly severe exploitation on small estates, the remnants of the Cossacks defeated by Godunov’s troops, who had risen uprising under the leadership of Ataman Khlopk, and finally, many fugitives gathered here during the hungry years. It was these dissatisfied masses, and not Polish help, that helped False Dmitry reach Moscow and reign there.
In Moscow, False Dmitry also did not turn into a Polish protege. He was in no hurry to fulfill his promises. Orthodoxy remained the state religion; Moreover, the tsar did not allow the construction of Catholic churches in Russia. He did not give up either Smolensk or the Seversk land to the king and only offered to pay a ransom for them. He even came into conflict with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The fact is that in Warsaw they did not recognize the royal title for Russian sovereigns and called them only grand dukes. And False Dmitry even began to call himself Caesar, i.e. emperor. During the solemn audience, False Dmitry for a long time refused to even take from the hands of the Polish ambassador the letter addressed to the Grand Duke. In Poland they were clearly dissatisfied with False Dmitry, who allowed himself to act independently.
Pondering over possible prospect assertion of False Dmitry on the throne, there is no point in taking into account his imposture: monarchical legitimacy cannot be a criterion for determining the essence of the political line. It seems that the personality of False Dmitry was a good chance for the country: brave and decisive, educated in the spirit of Russian medieval culture and at the same time touched by the Western European circle, not succumbing to attempts to subjugate Russia to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. But this opportunity was also not given fruition. The trouble with False Dmitry is that he was an adventurer. We usually have only a negative meaning in this concept. Or maybe in vain? After all, an adventurer is a person who sets goals that exceed the means he has to achieve them. Without a dose of adventurism, it is impossible to achieve success in politics. It’s just that we usually call an adventurer who has achieved success an outstanding politician. /175/
The means that False Dmitry had at his disposal were indeed not adequate to his goals. The hopes that were placed on him different forces, contradicted one another. We have already seen that he did not justify those that were placed on him in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. To gain the support of the nobility, False Dmitry generously distributed land and money. But both are not infinite. False Dmitry borrowed money from monasteries. Together with leaked information about the Tsar's Catholicism, the loans alarmed the clergy and caused their murmurs. The peasants hoped that the good Tsar Dmitry would restore the right to move to St. George’s Day, taken from them by Godunov. But without coming into conflict with the nobility, False Dmitry could not do this. Therefore, serfdom was confirmed and only permission was given to the peasants who left their masters in the years of famine to remain in new places. This meager concession did not satisfy the peasants, but at the same time caused discontent among some of the nobles. In short: not a single social layer within the country, not a single force outside its borders had any reason to support the tsar. That is why he was overthrown from the throne so easily.
At an impromptu Zemsky Sobor (from people who happened to be in Moscow), Prince Vasily Ivanovich Shuisky was elected tsar (“called out,” as they said contemptuously then). Difficult to find good words for this person. A dishonest intriguer, always ready to lie and even support the lie with an oath on the cross - such was the “crafty courtier” (Pushkin), who ascended the throne in 1606. But regardless of the personal qualities of Tsar Vasily, his reign could also be the beginning of good changes in the political system of the Russian state. The point is the obligations that he was forced to give upon accession to the throne.
For the first time in the history of Russia, Shuisky swore allegiance to his subjects: he gave a “record,” the observance of which he secured by kissing the cross. This “kissing record” is sometimes interpreted as a limitation of royal power in favor of the boyars, and on this basis they see Shuisky as a “boyar king.” Let's start with the fact that the contradictions between the “tops” and the “bottoms” of the ruling class were not at all as significant as traditionally seems. There is nothing wrong with limiting autocracy, even in favor of the boyars: after all, it was with the liberties of the English barons that English parliamentarism began. It is unlikely that /176/ unbridled despotism is better than the rule of the king together with the aristocracy. But in the “cross-kissing record” there was no real limitation on the power of the king. Let's get into it.
First of all, Shuisky promised “every person who has not been judged by his boyars in true court will not be put to death.” Thus, legislative guarantees were created against extrajudicial disgraces and executions during the oprichnina. Further, the new tsar swore not to take away property from the heirs and relatives of those convicted if “they are innocent of that guilt,” the same guarantees were given to merchants and all “black people.” In conclusion, Tsar Vasily pledged not to listen to false denunciations (“arguments”) and to resolve cases only after a thorough investigation (“to search thoroughly with all sorts of investigations and put them squarely in front of you”).
The historical significance of Shuisky’s “cross-kissing record” is not only in limiting the arbitrariness of the autocracy, not only in the fact that the principle of punishment only by court was proclaimed for the first time (which, undoubtedly, is also important), but in the fact that it was the first agreement between the tsar and his subjects. Let us remember that for Ivan the Terrible, all his subjects were only slaves, whom he was free to reward and execute. Even the thought that it was not his “slaves” who would swear allegiance to him, but he would swear allegiance to his “slaves” and “kiss the cross” could not have occurred to Ivan IV. IN. Klyuchevsky was right when he wrote that “Vasily Shuisky was turning from a sovereign of slaves into a legitimate king of his subjects, ruling according to the laws.” Shuisky's recording was the first, timid and uncertain, but step towards the rule of law. Of course, to the feudal.
True, in practice Shuisky rarely took into account his record: apparently, he simply did not know what the sanctity of an oath was. But the solemn proclamation in itself of a completely new principle of the administration of power could not pass without a trace: it was not without reason that the main provisions of the “kissing record” were repeated in two agreements concluded by the Russian boyars with Sigismund III on the calling of Prince Vladislav to the Russian throne.
One more circumstance is significant. Until 1598, Russia did not know elected monarchs. Ivan IV, opposing himself to the elected king of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth Stefan Batory, emphasized that he was a king “by God’s will, and not by a multi-rebellious human will.” /177/ Now, one after another, kings appear on the throne, called by the same “rebellious human will”: Boris Godunov, elected by the Zemsky Sobor, False Dmitry, not elected, but who took possession of the throne only by the will of the people, Shuisky... And behind him already the figures of the new elected sovereigns loom - Prince Vladislav, Mikhail Romanov. But the election of a monarch is also a kind of agreement between subjects and the sovereign, and therefore a step towards a rule of law state. That is why the failure of Vasily Shuisky, who was unable to cope with the opposing forces and the beginning of the intervention of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, his overthrow from the throne marked, despite all the antipathy of the personality of Tsar Vasily, another missed opportunity.
The uprising of Ivan Bolotnikov dates back to the reign of Vasily Shuisky. The failure of this movement, which embraced very broad masses, is difficult to attribute to those alternatives that, if realized, could bring good results. Both the personality of the leader of the uprising and the character of the movement itself have been significantly deformed in our popular and educational literature. Let's start with Ivan Isaevich Bolotnikov himself. They write about him that he was the slave of Prince Telyatevsky. This is true, but the inexperienced reader gets the impression that Ivan Isaevich plowed the land or served his master. However, among the slaves there were completely different social groups. One of them consisted of the so-called servants or military serfs. These were professional warriors who went to serve together with their master. In peacetime, they often performed administrative functions in the fiefs and estates of their owners. They were recruited largely from impoverished nobles. Thus, the Nikitichi-Romanovs were arrested following the denunciation of their slave, who came from the ancient (from the 14th century) noble family of the Bortenevs. Grigory Otrepiev, also a scion of a noble family, as noted above, served as a slave for the same Romanovs. Known to become slaves in mid-16th century V. even one of the Belozersk princes. The fact that we know in the 16th - 17th centuries. The noble family of the Bolotnikovs makes one assume that Bolotnikov is a bankrupt nobleman. It is unlikely that Prince Andrei Telyatevsky would have become a governor under the command of his former slave if he had not been a nobleman. /178/
The large number of nobles in the army of the leader of the peasant war, as Bolotnikov was usually portrayed, always required an explanation. In many textbooks you can read that the nobles Pashkov and Lyapunov with their troops, for selfish reasons, first joined Bolotnikov, and then betrayed him when the anti-feudal essence of the movement began to emerge. However, it was kept silent that after Pashkov and Lyapunov left, many other feudal lords remained with Bolotnikov and supported him to the end, including princes Grigory Shakhovskoy and Andrei Telyatevsky.
We do not know Bolotnikov’s program well; we have only heard of its presentation in documents emanating from the government camp. Outlining the calls of the rebels, Patriarch Hermogenes wrote that they “order the boyar serfs to beat their boyars.” It sounds quite anti-feudal. But let’s read the text further: “...and their wives and estates and estates are promised to them” and they promise their supporters “to give boyars and voivodeship and deviousness and clergy.” So we don't find a call for change here feudal system, but only the intention to exterminate the current boyars and take their place ourselves. It is hardly accidental that “in the thieves’ regiments” the Cossacks (as all participants in the uprising were called) were given estates. Some of these Bolotnikov landowners continued to own lands in the first half of the 17th century.
It is hardly accidental that folklore relates to Bolotnikov. How many songs and legends have been written about Stepan Razin! Legends about Pugachev were recorded in the Urals. But folklore is silent about Bolotnikov, although, if you believe modern historical science, it would be him who the people should sing about. But the disobedient people preferred to the “leader of the masses” another hero, alas, not impeccable in class - “the old boyar Nikita Romanovich.”
Of course, under the banners of Bolotnikov, and under the banners of other “thieves’ atamans”, and, finally, in the camp of the “Tushinsky thief”, who declared himself the miraculously saved “Tsar Dmitry”, there were many disadvantaged people who did not accept the cruel feudal system, whose protest sometimes erupted into no less cruel, if not predatory, forms. And yet, it seems, hatred of the oppressors was only one of several components of a broad movement at the beginning of the 17th century.
“Tushinsky thief”, False Dmitry II, who inherited from /179/ his prototype adventurism, but not talents, a pathetic parody of his predecessor, often truly a toy in the hands of representatives of the king of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, did not personify, like Bolotnikov, any serious alternative to that path of development which Russia followed. It may seem unexpected and even annoying, but another missed opportunity was, in my opinion, the failed reign of the son of Sigismund III - Prince Vladislav. To understand the course of reasoning, it is necessary to dwell on the circumstances of his call to the Moscow throne.
In February 1610, having become disillusioned with the “Tushino Tsar,” a group of boyars from his camp went to Sigismund III, who was besieging Smolensk, and invited Vladislav to the throne. A corresponding agreement was concluded. And six months later, in August, after the overthrow of Vasily Shuisky, the Moscow boyars invited Vladislav. Both the Tushino people and the Moscow boyars are traditionally branded as traitors who are ready to give Russia up to foreigners. However, a careful reading of the agreements of 1610 provides no basis for such accusations.
In fact, both documents provide for various guarantees against the absorption of Russia by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth: a ban on appointing immigrants from Poland and Lithuania to administrative positions in Russia, and a refusal to allow the construction of Catholic churches, and the preservation of all orders existing in the state. In particular, serfdom also remained inviolable: “in Rus' there will be no way for Christians to get out among themselves,” “the king does not allow his mercy to leave Russian people among themselves.” In the agreement concluded by the Tushino people in February 1610, one can notice an echo of Godunov’s times: “And for science, it is free for every Moscow people to go to other Christian dominions.”
However, in both agreements one essential point remained uncoordinated - about the religion of the future Tsar Vladislav. Both the Tushino people and the Moscow boyars insisted that he convert to Orthodoxy; a militant Catholic who lost the Swedish throne because of his adherence to the Roman faith, Sigismund III did not agree. Recognizing Vladislav as tsar before resolving this issue is a grave mistake by the Moscow boyars. The point here is not about the comparative advantages and disadvantages of both faiths, but about elementary /180/ political calculation. According to the laws of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the king had to be a Catholic. Orthodox Vladislav was thus deprived of his rights to the Polish throne. This would eliminate the danger of first a personal and then a state union between Russia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which would be fraught in the future with the loss of national independence. The hasty recognition of the power of “the Tsar and Grand Duke Vladislav Zhigimontovich of All Rus'” by the Boyar Duma opened the way to Moscow for the Polish garrison.
It can be assumed that the accession of the Orthodox Vladislav in Rus' would bring good results. The point is not in the personal qualities of the prince: when he later became the Polish king, Vladislav did not show himself to be anything particularly outstanding. Something else is significant: those elements of contractual relations between the monarch and the country that were outlined in the “cross-kissing record” of Vasily Shuisky received their further development. The very accession of Vladislav was conditioned by numerous articles of the agreement. Vladislav himself would have turned into a Russian king of Polish origin, just as his father Sigismund was a Polish king of Swedish origin.
However, this opportunity was missed, although not through Russia’s fault. After the overthrow of Shuisky and the murder of False Dmitry II by his own supporters, real intervention against Russia began. Sweden, whose troops were invited by Shuisky to help in the war against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, took advantage of the opportunity to capture Novgorod and a significant part of the North. The Polish garrison was stationed in Moscow, and Vladislav's governor (the prince was only 15 years old, and his loving father, naturally, did not let him go to distant and dangerous Moscow without him, where quite recently one king was killed and another was dethroned) Alexander Gonsevsky autocratically ruled the country. Near Smolensk, besieged by Sigismund's troops, the Russian embassy, headed by Metropolitan Philaret, negotiated the conditions for Vladislav's accession to the throne. Since the question of the faith of the future tsar could not be resolved, the negotiations failed, and the Russian delegation found itself in the position of prisoners.
Meanwhile, in Moscow, Gonsevsky, on behalf of Tsar Vladislav, distributed lands to supporters of the interventionists, confiscating them from those who did not recognize foreign power. /181/ The order documentation of these months makes a strange impression. It seems that the concepts of fidelity and betrayal have suddenly changed places. Here is a certain Grigory Orlov, who calls himself a “loyal subject” not only of Tsar Vladislav, but also of Sigismund, asking the “great sovereigns” to make him “the treacherous prince Dmitreev Pozharsky’s estate.” On the back of the petition, Gonsevsky is extremely polite and just as firmly, addressing clerk I.T. Gramotin, writes: “Dear Mr. Ivan Tarasevich!.. Prikgozho... give the asudar’s letter of payment.” Not all letters call people like Pozharsky traitors, but there are many such letters.
True, all or almost all of these distributions existed only on paper: Polish troops in Moscow were surrounded first by the first (led by Lyapunov, Trubetskoy and Zarutsky), and then by the second (led by Minin and Pozharsky) militias. It was as if there was no central power. Different cities independently decide who they recognize as rulers. Detachments of Polish nobles roam the country and besiege cities and monasteries, engaged not so much in military operations as in simple robbery. Their own native Cossacks do not lag behind them. This situation could not continue for too long: the desire for order in the country was growing stronger. Let it not be very convenient, not very good, but to order. Whatever we consider the popular unrest of this time to be - a peasant war or a civil war - it is clear that large masses of people took part in the events. But none of these mass movement can't go on for too long. The peasant (and in any case, it was the peasants who made up the bulk of the participants) cannot turn into a free Cossack for the rest of his life; his hands are adapted to the plow, plow and scythe, and not to the saber and flail. For him, a horse is a working animal, and not a living piece of combat equipment. The civil war gradually faded away.
The forces of order that emerged against the backdrop of this general fatigue turned out, as often happens, to be quite conservative. One cannot help but admire the courage, dedication and honesty of Minin and Pozharsky. But pre-revolutionary historians were right, emphasizing the conservative direction of their activities. The public mood was in response to the reproduction of the order that existed before the turmoil. It was not for nothing that the second militia, /182/ having resumed the minting of coins, stamped on it the name of the long-dead Tsar Feodor - the last of the tsars, whose legitimacy was beyond suspicion for everyone.
The expulsion of the interventionists from Moscow made it possible to convene a Zemsky Sobor to elect a new tsar. So it was as if selectivity was getting a new impetus. But this was the last electoral council: Mikhail Fedorovich became tsar as a “relative” of Tsar Fyodor Ivanovich and the heir of “the former great noble and faithful and God-crowned Russian sovereign tsars.”
During the elections, or rather on the sidelines of the cathedral, foreign candidates also surfaced. There had already been a negative experience in choosing a tsar from among the boyars (Godunov and Shuisky): the authority of such a sovereign was not great. Many of the boyars could consider themselves no worse than the sovereign. In this regard, a foreign king, a “natural” sovereign, neutral in relation to clan groups, was preferable. Only one main condition was required - Orthodoxy. Otherwise, as the experience with Vladislav showed, there is a threat to the country’s independence. That is why the proposed candidacy of the Swedish prince was rejected.
So, in the end, the sixteen-year-old son of Metropolitan Filaret Nikitich, Mikhail Fedorovich, became king. One of the boyars wrote to Prince Golitsyn in Poland about this choice: “Misha Romanov is young, his mind has not yet reached him, and he will be favored by us.” It seems that the motives for the election were somewhat deeper. Youth had to pass, and behind the back of Misha, who was “unfinished” in his mind, and who even in his mature years was not distinguished by a particularly deep mind, stood his domineering father- Filaret Nikitich. True, he was still in Polish captivity, but his return was a matter of time.
An intelligent man, with a strong will, but without much brilliance or talent, Filaret Nikitich turned out to be convenient for everyone. In particular, resourcefulness helped him in this. He was supported by those who came forward during the years of the oprichnina: after all, the Romanovs are relatives of the first wife of Tsar Ivan, some of their relatives were oprichniki, and Filaret’s father, Nikita Romanovich, constantly occupied a high position at the court of the formidable king. But those who suffered from the oprichnina could consider Filaret one of their own: among his relatives there were also those executed during the years of oprichnina repression, and Nikita Romanovich had a lasting popularity as an intercessor who knew how to moderate /183/ the tsar’s anger. It must have been a myth: after all, it was possible to survive all the convulsions of the oprichnina and post-oprichnina years by someone who sat quietly and did not stand up for anyone. But myth is sometimes more important than reality for people’s actions.
Filaret was also supported by supporters of False Dmitry: after all, his slave was Grishka Otrepiev, and Falret’s first order of business was the return of Filaret from exile. Supporters of Vasily Shuisky could not be against it either: under this tsar, the same Metropolitan Filaret Nikitich participated in the solemn ceremony of transferring the relics of the innocently murdered Tsarevich Dmitry, an action that should testify that the “Tsar Dmitry” killed in Moscow was in fact “defrocked” , an impostor who took upon himself the name of the holy and faithful prince. S.F. Platonov wrote that in this case Tsar Vasily played with the shrine. Filaret helped him well in the game. But even for Shuisky’s main opponents, the Tushino Cossacks, Filaret was his own man. In 1608, Tushino troops took Rostov, where Filaret was metropolitan. Since then, he ended up in the Tushino camp either as a prisoner or as an honored guest. In Tushino, Filaret was even called the patriarch. It was not for nothing that the vote cast for Mikhail Fedorovich by the Cossack ataman was the last decisive vote in favor of the new tsar. True, the consent of the youngest Mikhail was not received immediately. The mother of the future king, nun Martha, was especially opposed. She can be understood: in those years there was no more dangerous occupation than fulfilling the duties of a king. “People of all ranks of the Moscow state were exhausted by sin,” said nun Martha, “giving their souls to the former sovereigns and not serving directly.” Only when the future king and his mother were threatened that they would be responsible for the “ultimate ruin” of the country did they finally agree.
So, the Romanovs arranged for everyone. This is the nature of mediocrity. Perhaps, in order to consolidate the country and restore social harmony, the country did not need bright personalities, but in people capable of calmly and persistently pursuing conservative policies. The healthy conservatism of the government of the first Romanovs made it possible to gradually restore the economy, state power, with some losses (Smolensk, the coast of the Gulf of Finland, etc.) to restore and state territory. After so many missed opportunities, a conservative /184/ reaction must have been inevitable. Yet another opportunity once again fell through. When electing Michael to the throne, the council did not accompany its act with any agreement. Power acquired an autocratic-legitimate character.
However, unclear information has been preserved about some kind of note that Mikhail Fedorovich gave upon his accession to the throne. Was this a repetition of Shuisky's recording? According to other sources, this was an obligation to rule only with the help of zemstvo councils. Indeed, until 1653, zemstvo councils met regularly, were truly representative and, at least slightly, limited autocratic power.
The costs of appeasement were great. A stable, but purely traditional life ensued. Many of those who had been shaken up by the whirlwind of turbulent events, the dynamism of change, and frequent communication with foreigners now felt stuffy. Their disappointment sometimes took ugly forms. Thus, Prince Ivan Andreevich Khvorostinin, who served under False Dmitry I, drank heavily, did not observe fasts, kept “Latin” (i.e., Catholic) icons and complained that “there are no people in Moscow: all the people are stupid, there is no one to live with.” . They sow the land with rye, but they all live in lies.” The prince was twice exiled to monasteries; his last stay in the northern Kirillo-Belozersky monastery somewhat cooled his ardor, and he wrote a completely orthodox history of the Time of Troubles. How many of these disappointed, drunken talents, forced conformists tediously pulled the burden of service and sadly remembered stormy youth! Only their grandchildren became guards officers and shipbuilders, prosecutors and governors... The modernization of the country was delayed for almost a century. Serfdom was strengthened, finally fixed in the Code of 1649. Only terrible and cruel riots - city uprisings, Razin's campaigns reminded of the high price that the people pay for calm.
But if the modernization of the country did begin at the end of the century, then the elements of the rule of law, the sprouts of which arose in the Time of Troubles, were forgotten for a long time. /185/
Scanning and processing: Luna
COMING TO POWER OF A NEW DYNASTY (6 hours).
1. Impostors on the Russian throne. Vasily Shuisky. I. Bolotnikov.
2. Polish intervention. Swedish military presence in Russia at the beginning of the 17th century.
3. I and II people's militias. Liberation of Moscow. Zemsky Sobor 1613
4. Assessment of the “Troubles” in historiography. Thesis on the Russian Civil War.
SOURCES
- Diary of Marina Mnishek. – St. Petersburg, 1995.
- Legislative acts of the Russian state of the second half of the 16th and first half of the 17th centuries. – L., 1986.
- Konrad Bussow. Moscow Chronicle. – M., 1991.
- About the beginning of wars and “Troubles” in Muscovy. – M., 1997.
- The first peasant war in Russia. Documents // Materials on the history of the USSR for seminars and practical classes. – Vol. 3. / Comp. L.N.Vdovina, V.S.Shulgin; Ed. A.D. Gorsky. – M., 1989. – P.13-97.
- Russian legislation X–XX centuries – T. 3. Acts of Zemsky Sobors. – M., 1985.
- "Troubles" in the Moscow State. Russia at the beginning of the century in the notes of contemporaries. – M., 1989.
- Time of Troubles // Reader on the history of Russia from ancient times to 1618: Textbook. aid for students higher textbook institutions / Ed. A.G. Kuzmina, S.V. Perevezentseva. – M., 2004. – P. 609-655.
- The story of Abraham Palitsyn. – M.; L., 1955.
TEXTBOOKS AND TUTORIALS
1. Valiullin K.B., Zaripova R.K. History of Russia (IX–XX centuries): Textbook. – Ufa, 2003. – 452 p.
2. Gorinov M.M., Lyashenko L.M. Russian history. – Part I. From Ancient Rus' to Imperial Russia (IX–XVIII centuries). – M., 1994. – P. 19-22.
3. Dvornichenko A.Yu., Kashchenko S.G., Florinsky M.F. National history(before 1917): Textbook / Ed. prof. I.Ya.Froyanova. – M., 2002. – 445 p.
4. History of the Fatherland: Textbook for universities / Ed. acad. G.B.Polyak. – M., 2002. – 655 p.
5. History of Russia from ancient times to the end of the 20th century: Textbook. aid for students universities – M., 2001. – 656 p.
6. History of Russia from ancient times to 1861: Textbook for universities / N.I. Pavlenko, I.L. Andreev, V.B. Kobrin. Ed. N.I. Pavlenko. – M., 2000. – 560 p.
7. History of Russia from ancient times to the second half of the 19th century in.: Course of lectures / Ed. prof. B.V.Lichman. – Ekaterinburg, 1994. – 303 p.
8. History of Russia. A course of lectures on the history of Russia from ancient times to the present day / Ed. prof. B.V.Lichman. – Ekaterinburg, 1993. – 333 p.
9. History of Russia (IX–XX centuries). Textbook / Answer. ed. Ya.A.Perekhov. – M., 2002. – 623 p.
10. Kuzmin A.G. History of Russia from ancient times to 1618:
In 2 books. - Book 1. – M., 2003. – P.69-106.
11. Moryakov V.I. History of Russia IX - early XVIII centuries. – M., Rostov n/D., 2004. – 448 p.
12. Munchaev Sh.M., Ustinov V.M. History of Russia: Textbook for universities. – M., 2004. – 768 p.
13. Domestic history: A course of lectures for students. ped. universities, institutes and colleges. – M., 1995. – 288 p.
14. Potaturov V.A., Tugusova G.V., Gurina M.G. Russian history. – M., 2002. – 736 p.
REQUIRED READINGS
- Dunning Ch. Was there a peasant war in Russia at the beginning of the 17th century? // Questions of history. – 1994. – No. 9.
- Kobrin V.B. Time of Troubles - lost opportunities // History of the Fatherland: people, ideas, solutions. Essays on the history of Russia in the 9th – early 20th centuries. – M., 1991.
- Morozova L.E. History of Russia in faces. First half of the 17th century – M., 2000.
- Morozova L.E. Fyodor Ivanovich // Questions of history. – 1997. – No. 2.
- Morozova L.E. Boris Godunov // Questions of history. – 1998. – No. 1.
- Morozova L.E. Vasily Shuisky // Questions of history. – 2000. – No. 10.
- Morozova L.E. Hermogenes, Patriarch of All Rus' // Questions of history. – 1994. – No. 2.
- Troubles in Russia. XVII century // Special issue of the magazine “Rodina”. – 2005. – No. 12.
- Skrynnikov R.G. Civil War in Russia XVII V. – M., 1988.
- Skrynnikov R.G. Boris Godunov. – M., 1986.
- Skrynnikov R.G. Minin and Pozharsky. – M., 1987.
- Skrynnikov R.G. Impostors in Russia at the beginning of the 17th century. – Novosibirsk, 1987.
- Skrynnikov R.G. Controversial issues of the Bolotnikov uprising // History of the USSR. – 1989. – No. 5.
- Stanislavsky A.L. Civil war in Russia in the 17th century. – M., 1991.
- Pavlov A.P. Sovereign's court and political struggle under Boris Godunov (1584–1605). – L., 1992.
- Platonov S.F. Essays on the history of the Time of Troubles in the Moscow State in the 16th–17th centuries. – M., 1995.
- Cherepnin L.V. Zemsky Sobors Russian state in the 16th–17th centuries. – M., 1978.
ADDITIONAL LITERATURE
1. Abramovich G.V. Princes Shuisky and the Russian throne. – L., 1991.
2. Anninsky L. Imposture // Motherland. – 1993. – No. 11.
3. Anpilogov G.N. New documents about Russia at the end of the 16th – beginning of the 17th centuries. – M., 1967.
4. Bovina V.G. Patriarch Filaret (Fedor Nikitich Romanov) // Questions of history. – 1991. – No. 7-8.
5. Gutnov D. Death of Tsarevich Dmitry // Rodina. – 1993. – No. 5-6.
6. Dunning Ch. Was there a peasant war in Russia at the beginning of the 17th century? // Questions of history. – 1994. – No. 9. – P. 21-34.
7. Dumin S. Queen Marina // Motherland. – 1994. – No. 3.
8. Zimin A.A. On the eve of terrible trials. – M., 1986.
9. Kovalenko G.M. Troubles in Russia through the eyes of the English condottiere // Questions of history. – 1999. – No. 1.
10. Kovalenko G.M. The applicant's mistake (the Swedes in troubled times) // Motherland. – 1997. – No. 10.
11. Kostomarov N.I. The Time of Troubles of the Moscow State at the beginning of the 17th century. – M., 1994.
12. Kostomarov N.I. Russian history in the biographies of its main figures. – M., 1993.
13. The creators of the Moscow state. – M., 1997.
14. Solodkin Ya.G. Was Boris Godunov a regent under Fyodor Ivanovich? // Questions of history. – 2001. – No. 10.
15. Tikhomirov M.N. Russian state of the 15th–17th centuries. – M., 1973.
1. The first question involves a story about events related to the adventures of False Dmitry I, False Dmitry II and the policies of V. Shuisky.
V. Kobrin writes that a lot of false stereotypes have accumulated about False Dmitry I in literature and in the mass consciousness. He is usually seen as an agent, a puppet of the Polish king and the lords who sought to seize Russia with his help. This interpretation of the personality of the impostor was introduced by the government of V. Shuisky. V. Kobrin in his works tried to present False Dmitry as a real politician and person, abandoning the previous historiographical cliches.
The historian writes that, judging by the memoirs of his contemporaries, False Dmitry I was smart and quick-witted. His associates were amazed at how easily and quickly he solved complicated issues. Contemporaries unanimously note the amazing courage, reminiscent of Peter the Great, with which the young tsar violated the established etiquette at court.
V. Kobrin considers fair the statement of V.O. Klyuchevsky that False Dmitry “was only baked in a Polish oven, and fermented in Moscow.” He argues that before he was tonsured, Grigory Otrepiev was a slave of the Romanovs, and perhaps it was they who prepared the young man for the role of an impostor. Moreover, it was the Romanovs who were Godunov’s most important rivals on the path to power: the eldest of them, Nikita Romanovich, brother of Tsar Feodor’s mother, Tsarina Anastasia, was considered an ally of Godunov. But after Godunov ascended the throne, the five Romanov brothers were arrested on false charges of trying to poison the Tsar and sent into exile.
V. Kobrin is also trying to debunk the myth that False Dmitry was connected with the intrigues of Poland. He writes that Poland hesitated for a long time whether to support the candidate. The Polish king Sigismund III Vasa only allowed the Polish nobles, if they wished, to join the army of False Dmitry. There were a little more than one and a half thousand of them. They were joined by several hundred Russian emigrant nobles, as well as Don and Zaporozhye Cossacks, who saw the campaign as a good opportunity for military booty. False Dmitry decided to go to Moscow through the Seversk land, where a lot of combustible material had accumulated: small service people dissatisfied with their position, peasants subjected to particularly severe exploitation on small estates, the remnants of the Cossacks defeated by Godunov’s troops, who had risen uprising under the leadership of Ataman Khlopk, many fugitives gathered here in hungry years. It was these dissatisfied masses that helped False Dmitry reach Moscow and take the throne.
Having become king, False Dmitry also did not turn into a Polish protege. He was in no hurry to fulfill his promises. Orthodoxy remained the state religion; the tsar did not allow the construction of Catholic churches in Russia. He did not give up either Smolensk or the Seversk land to the king and only offered to pay a ransom for them.
V. Kobrin’s conclusion is interesting. He believes that the personality of False Dmitry was a good chance for Russia, since he was a person who touched Western Europe and therefore quite capable of directing the country’s development in a different direction. V. Kobrin believes that the main reason for his defeat is that not a single social layer within the country, not a single force abroad had grounds to support him. To gain the support of the nobility, False Dmitry began to distribute land and money. But both are not infinite. False Dmitry borrowed money from monasteries. Together with leaked information about the Tsar's Catholicism, the loans alarmed the clergy and caused their murmurs. The peasants hoped that the good Tsar Dmitry would restore the right to move to St. George’s Day, taken from them by Godunov. But False Dmitry could not do this. Only permission was given to the peasants who left their masters during the famine years to remain in new places. Due to the lack of social support, False Dmitry was easily overthrown from the throne.
After the massacre of False Dmitry, Vasily Shuisky becomes Russian Tsar. Historians note that he was “called out” by the tsar at an impromptu zemsky council (from people who happened to be in Moscow). In historiography, his reputation as an intriguer was firmly established, always ready to lie and even back up the lie with an oath on the cross.
Despite this, according to V. Kobrin, his reign could also be the beginning of good changes in the political system of the Russian state. The fact is that for the first time in the history of Russia he swore allegiance to his subjects: he promised “every person who has not been judged by his boyars in a true court will not be put to death.” Thus, legislative guarantees were created against extrajudicial disgraces and executions during the oprichnina. The new tsar swore not to take away property from the heirs and relatives of those convicted if “they are innocent of that guilt.” The same guarantees were given to merchants and all “black people”. Tsar Vasily also promised not to listen to false denunciations and resolve cases only after a thorough investigation. That. “Shuisky’s recording was the first timid and uncertain step towards the rule of law.”
During the reign of V. Shuisky, the uprising of I.I. Bolotnikov occurred. Students must analyze its reasons, goals, progress, results. It is important to note that I. Bolotnikov was a serf - a servant, i.e. combat serf (a professional military man who served with his master). They were recruited exclusively from among the impoverished nobles. Bolotnikov did not have a special program, except for calls to exterminate the nobles and take their place themselves. Not immediately, but Vasily Shuisky still managed to cope with Bolotnikov.
While V. Shuisky’s troops were besieging Tula, another impostor appeared in the southwest, in Starodub, proclaiming himself Dmitry. False Dmitry II confidently moved towards Moscow. His army included: the troops of Crown Hetman J. Sapieha, Cossacks, and the remnants of Bolotnikov’s army. Thanks to the support of the boyars, False Dmitry II became a camp in the village of Tushino (from here he received his nickname - “Tushino thief”). Students can cite materials from I. Tyumentsev’s article “The Siege,” which tells how for a year and a half the defenders of the Trinity-Sergius Lavra defended themselves from a numerous enemy led by Hetman Y. Sapega. He was assigned a special role in the plans of False Dmitry II to organize the blockade of the capital. J. Sapega had to occupy the Trinity-Sergius Monastery, turn it into the main stronghold of the Tushinites in Zamoskvorechye and cut off the north-eastern roads that were most important for V. Shuisky. The Tushins hoped to use the monastery treasury and treasury to improve their financial affairs and replenish food supplies and equipment. They believed that the authoritative Trinity brethren would help them break the resistance of Shuisky’s adherents and place False Dmitry II on the throne in Moscow.
Tsar V. Shuisky perfectly understood the strategic importance of the Trinity Fortress and promptly sent governors here: the okolnichny Prince Grigory Dolgoruky-Roscha, the Moscow nobleman Alexei Golokhvastov and many others. All military forces of the monastery were also mobilized. The siege of the Trinity-Sergius Monastery lasted a year and a half and ended in complete victory for its defenders.
Students should figure out why the impostor’s authority was constantly growing, many noble people “swapped over” to him, and a dual power actually developed in the country. It is also important to consider: what measures V. Shuisky took to fight the impostor, how relations developed with Poland and Sweden.
2. In Soviet historiography, the term “Polish- Swedish intervention" Modern Russian historiography has abandoned this expression, but has not found a replacement for it. If Poland’s intervention in the events of the Time of Troubles is still interpreted today as an “intervention,” then the actions of the Swedes are increasingly defined as a “military presence.”
The answer to this question should begin with the fact that on June 25, 1608, an agreement was concluded with Poland: Poland should no longer support impostors and not wage wars with Russia. Russia, in turn, had to free all Poles. False Dmitry II captured the train on which the Poles were returning home. Marina Mnishek solemnly entered Tushino and met her miraculously saved “husband.” This raised the authority of the impostor. V. Shuisky decided to turn for help to the enemy of Poland - the Swedish king Charles IX. Skopin-Shuisky went to negotiate with him. Meanwhile, Jan Sapega, unable to defeat the defenders of the Trinity-Sergius Lavra, occupied Suzdal and Pereyaslavl-Zalessky. Pskov, Ivangorod, Vladimir, Uglich, Kostroma, Galich, Vologda, Shuya, Kineshma, Tver, Yaroslavl surrendered to False Dmitry. July 25, 1608 Polish government, having terminated the treaty, declared war on Russia. The invasion of a large army led by Sigismund III occurred in September 1609, his troops besieged Smolensk. In June 1610, Polish troops led by Hetman Zholkiewski moved towards Moscow. July 4, 1610 near the village. Klushino Russians were defeated.
What made Poland intervene in the affairs of the Time of Troubles? There are several opinions on this issue. I. Grala (Director of the Polish cultural center in Moscow) believes that the internal affairs of Poland itself had a certain significance among the reasons. Sigismund III really needed a big success, because... he began his reign with an acute conflict with the main person in the state - the chancellor - and there was a rather acute political crisis in the country. But the most important thing, I. Gralya believes, for Sigismund was the Swedish throne, and not the mirage of the Moscow royal throne. Russia was only a means of taking possession of the coveted Swedish crown. In addition, victory in the east and taking control of a country traditionally characterized by strong authoritarian rule and a hereditary rather than elected monarchy could strengthen the king's position within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and secure the future of the Vasa dynasty. The ruling elites, through the prism of the Troubles, hoped to carry out a reform of monarchical rule, the weakness of which they were well aware of. In addition, I. Gralya argues that the Polish-Lithuanian intervention was only one of the stages of the Time of Troubles, therefore it would be more correct to call it the Polish-Russian war. When Sigismund goes to Simolensk, this is not an intervention. He is advancing on this city as the monarch of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and not as a participant in the civil war on someone else's side. He is trying to recapture his once lost possessions, thereby continuing the long war between Moscow and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. This is the opinion of the Polish historian.
The modern historian B. Florya expressed the opinion that the participation of the Polish-Lithuanian state in the events of the Time of Troubles was quite real, it was in the nature of intervention in internal struggle Russia in order to support some forces in Russian society and suppress their competitors. This situation was different from the numerous wars waged by Russia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The first important impact factor was the presence of Polish-Lithuanian troops in the camp of False Dmitry II. Thereby military contingent the impostor was able to approach Moscow and occupy a significant part of the country's territory. The intervention of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, according to the historian, delayed the end of the Time of Troubles and prolonged the end of the civil war in Russia. In addition, this stage of development of the Polish-Lithuanian state corresponded to the idea of expanding borders to the east. There were several projects for the annexation of the Russian state to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.
In historiography, there are also opinions that the true goals of the war, which consisted in a Catholic “crusade” to the new east, were only covered up by the ancient dispute about Smolensk.
As for the Swedish military presence, historians admit that its nature changed depending on the domestic political situation. The Swedes came to Russia as allies in accordance with the terms of the Vyborg Treaty to assist the government of V. Shuisky. At the end of March 1609, with an army of 10–12 thousand people, which included Swedes, Finns, English, Scots, Germans and French, Delagardie approached Novgorod. Here he met with the Tsar’s nephew M. Skopin-Shuisky. In May, their joint campaign to Moscow began, during which Staraya Russa, Toropets, Torzhok, Porkhov and Ostashkov were liberated. Delagardie took the initiative to reform the Russian army on the model of the Dutch (he trained Russian warriors to maintain battle order on the march and in formation, to properly handle spears, swords and darts, to build and storm field fortifications).
On March 12, 1610, Delagardie, together with Skopin-Shuisky, solemnly entered the capital. However, this did not completely eliminate the Polish threat, so V. Shuisky entered into negotiations with Delagardie about continuing the fight against the Poles. Having been defeated near Klushino, Delagardi with a small detachment approached Novgorod, set up camp at the Khutyn Monastery and began negotiations with representatives of the first militia. After negotiations stalled, he took Novgorod by storm and forced the Novgorod authorities to sign a treaty with him. From that time on, Delagardi actually headed the administration of Novgorod and the Novgorod lands. IN modern research contains sufficient material about Delagardie's activities in Novgorod and about the relationship between the Novgorodians and the Swedes.
After the defeat of the Russian troops near Klushino, a new stage of the Troubles begins. July 17, 1610, after receiving news of the death of the army near the village. Klushino, Tsar Vasily Shuisky was dethroned and tonsured a monk. The Seven Boyars come to power in Russia.
The Seven Boyars received negative assessments in historiography. The boyars are accused of being close to the Polish king and betraying the interests of the country. However, researchers have noticed that so far scientific work no about the Seven Boyars.
The Seven Boyars included: F.I.Mstislavsky, I.M.Vorotynsky, A.V.Trubetskoy, brothers V.V. t A.V. Golitsyn and F.I. Sheremetev. Immediately after the overthrow of Shuisky, letters were sent to different cities to send electors from “all ranks of people” to the capital to elect a new sovereign with the entire land. That. From the very beginning, the boyar commission was a temporary body, operating only until the election of a new sovereign. This was the regency council. However, in the conditions of civil war and intervention, representatives of all lands could not gather quickly, and the legitimacy of many elected officials would be questioned. However, the situation did not tolerate delay. The Poles, led by Hetman S. Zholkevsky, having learned on July 22 about the overthrow of Shuisky, were already 23 at Vyazma, and 26 were in close proximity to Moscow. The Tushino thief and his troops set up camp on the other side of the city.
V. Ananiev writes that the candidacy of the future tsar was a serious problem. None of the Moscow aristocratic families stood so high as to lay claim to the throne and avoid constant conspiracies and intrigues. In his opinion, in such conditions it was natural to return to the idea of placing a foreigner on the Russian throne, which arose several years ago. The first among the applicants was the name of the Polish prince, the fifteen-year-old son of Sigismund III, Vladislav Vaz.
On August 27, 1610, the treaty was signed. It assumed the election of a Polish prince to the Russian throne, but at the same time protected the independence of the Moscow state from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and did not contain any conditions that could be associated with the idea of “traitor boyars” established in Russian science. Vladislav had to convert to Orthodoxy and not “divert” the Orthodox to any other faith. It was forbidden to build Catholic churches in the country. Poles and Lithuanians could not hold government positions in the Russian state. The entire system of relations between the king and society had to remain the same.
On September 11, the Grand Embassy departed from Moscow for Smolensk, which was supposed to negotiate with the Polish king. It was headed by Metropolitan Philaret.
B. Florya also believes that the election of Prince Vladislav to the Russian throne was not the decision of some narrow group of conspiratorial boyars. Representatives of different classes of Russian society who were in Moscow spoke out in support of Vladislav. They tried in this way to achieve an end to the Time of Troubles, the withdrawal of Polish-Lithuanian troops from Russian territory and the restoration of the Russian state within its former borders. But, according to B. Flor, these boyars are responsible for the fact that after the conclusion of the treaty, they did not ensure that the Polish-Lithuanian side fulfilled its terms, allowed the entry of the Polish garrison into Moscow and illegal, ever-increasing interference in the internal affairs of Russia. In that the most important moment The boyar government turned out to be unable to protect the state interests of Russia.
In addition, according to B. Florya, neither King Sigismund III nor his advisers near Smolensk did anything to convince Russian society to accept Vladislav as their sovereign. They did not offer the future subjects of the prince any rights, advantages or privileges. The 1610 treaty was never implemented, possible conditions, in which Vladislav could rule Russia were not discussed, and the Polish-Lithuanian side, with the help of various behind-the-scenes machinations, sought the transfer of power to Sigismund III himself. According to B. Flor, from the moment when Russian society, united in a militia, opposed the accession of Vladislav and for breaking the unfulfilled agreements with the Polish-Lithuanian state, we can talk about the betrayal of the boyars from the ruling elite. The boyars sided with the Polish garrison in Moscow against their people.
Historians are still arguing: who was the initiator and what was the reason that on October 9 or 11, 1610, Polish troops quietly entered the capital. The archers, who represented for the Poles, were removed from the capital real threat. Hetman Zolkiewski feared that in urban conditions the cavalry would lose its military advantage and become prey for the Muscovites if they wanted to rebel. Hetman Gosevsky began to attend meetings of the Boyar Duma and grant estates of his own free will. He was a supporter of decisive action and considered it necessary to transform the country into a colony of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.
Soon the boyar government demonstrated its powerlessness. Poles and Lithuanians ruled Moscow. Muscovites' dissatisfaction with the actions of the occupiers grew steadily and threatened to break through.
The first major clash in the capital occurred on January 25, 1611, when the assembled people began to complain about oppression by Polish soldiers and their insult to the religious feelings of the Orthodox. On March 19–20, the clashes took on the character of a real urban war, and in addition to them, Moscow was engulfed in fire. The country was brought to the brink of a national catastrophe.
3. In the works of modern historians, in contrast to pre-revolutionary researchers of the Time of Troubles, the concepts of “First” and “Second” militias were firmly established. The first militia refers to the joint actions in 1611 of detachments from Ryazan, Zaraysk and other cities, united with Cossack detachments of former Tushino residents. The Second Militia refers to the detachments of Nizhny Novgorod residents and those who joined them as they moved towards Yaroslavl, and then towards Moscow.
The first to use the term " civil uprising"by the period 1610–1612, there was N.M. Karamzin. S.M. Soloviev and V.O. Klyuchevsky used the terms “militia of northern cities” and “First and Second militias”. S.F. Platonov and I.E. Zabelin abandoned these terms. S.F. Platonov wrote about the second zemstvo government, Zabelin called it “Nizhny Novgorod”, and the First - “Moscow Region”.
In 1912, P.M. Kataev’s work “The Troubles of the Moscow State and its Reflection in Nizhny Novgorod” was published. The author gives his gradation of popular liberation movements: the zemstvo movement against the Tushins in the northern and Volga cities; the first zemstvo militia; Nizhny Novgorod militia.
Some historians (Kargalov, Skrynnikov, Tyumentsev) use the term “militia” in relation to the time of Skopin-Shuisky’s actions, considering it another militia.
Let us move on to the analysis of the specific historical situation of the creation of militias. Since the entry of Polish troops into Moscow, opposition to the policies of the Moscow boyars has arisen in the capital. Even those who in August 1610 supported the agreement with the Poles, hoping for the preservation of the traditional state and social structure promised by Zolkiewski on behalf of the Polish king, were disappointed. The king himself and his inner circle did not intend to limit their power in the Russian lands with any conditions or obligations.
V. Volkov notes that the disintegration of the central apparatus of power, which from the end of September 1610 fell under the complete control of Polish henchmen, contributed to the activation of local zemstvo and provincial administration, which played an increasingly important role important role in organizing military resistance to the interventionists. Back in 1606, during the Bolotnikov uprising, all-class local government bodies began to take shape - city and district councils.
It is important to note that the formation of the liberation movement went through several stages. Initially, the zemstvo liberation movement arose and spread in the north of the country in 1608–1609. It manifested itself in the rebuff of the troops of one of the impostors, False Dmitry II, that flooded the country and in the mass support of the population for M. Skopin-Shuisky, who was moving towards Moscow. At the same time, zemstvo people rose up in the Middle Volga region: in Balakhna, Yuryevets Volzhsky, etc. These formations were headed not by sovereign governors, but by elected zemstvo “chiefs.”
At the second stage, the center of the liberation struggle moves from the north of the country to the Ryazan lands. Zemstvo armies began to form there, and in February 1611 they moved towards Moscow. At the beginning of March 1611, the main forces of local militias gathered in three assembly points: Ryazan, Serpukhov and Kolomna. The most organized was the Ryazan militia - a real army, with numerous artillery and a “walk-the-city”. It was headed by the Duma nobleman Prokopiy Lyapunov. He entered into an alliance with the “boyars” from the disintegrated camp of False Dmitry II - Dmitry Trubetskoy and Ivan Zarutsky. In addition to the Ryazan militia, zemstvo troops marched to Moscow from Vladimir, Nizhny Novgorod, Murom, Yaroslavl, Pereslavl-Zalessky, Uglich, Suzdal, Vologda, Galich, Kostroma.
Lyapunov sought to prepare an uprising in Moscow itself. The gathering of forces near Moscow ended on April 1, 1611. The siege of the city began. April 7 after class White City the “Council of the Whole Land” is created - the highest authority in the territory liberated from the invaders. At the same time, the leaders of the zemstvo army were elected - Lyapunov, Trubetskoy, Zarutsky. However, there was no orderly interaction between zemstvo chiefs and the administrative administration in individual camps. On June 30, 1611, a Verdict was drawn up, which confirmed and formalized the estate-representative organization of power in the country. The power of Lyapunov, Trubetskoy, Zarutsky was further approved, but significantly limited. They were under the control of the governor. However, even after the adoption of the Verdict, contradictions continued to persist in the liberation camp near Moscow.
According to researcher V. Volkov, the persistence of serious contradictions in the liberation camp was facilitated by the anti-Cossack sentiments of P. Lyapunov and the orientation of the militia government towards Sweden, with which negotiations were held about the possible election of one of the Swedish princes - Gustav Adolf or Karl Philip - to the Russian throne. The aggravation of the conflict was facilitated by the fact that the head of the besieged Polish garrison A. Gosevsky sent fabricated letters to the Cossacks, in which on behalf of the main zemstvo governor local authorities called for the extermination of the Cossacks. On July 22, Lyapunov was summoned to the Cossack circle and hacked to death by Ataman S. Karamyshev. After this, the role and meaning of the “Council of All the Earth” changes. The futility of the siege of Moscow and the split in the militia led to the disappointment of the zemstvo people. They blamed the militia leaders for everything.
S. Platonov wrote that after the collapse of the first militia, “the zemshchina realized that it was necessary to fight not only Poland, but also everyone who did not realize this, i.e. with the Cossacks too. The settled zemstvo community now separated the Cossacks from itself and finally realized that they were an enemy, not a helper.” S. Platonov believes that the main role in organizing the second militia belongs to Patriarch Hermogenes, a man with extraordinary moral strength and enormous political influence as an activist. He realized before anyone else that a foreign king was impossible in Moscow. Therefore, he began to bless the people for the uprising against the Poles. Of decisive importance, according to Platonov, was the sending of a letter to Nizhny Novgorod, directed against the Cossacks.
Many historians have written about the controversial and in many ways decisive position of the Cossacks. So, A.L. Stanislavsky argued that the position of the Cossacks was repeatedly decisive and determined in which direction the scales would swing during the Time of Troubles. However, the Cossacks themselves had enormous ambitions and a habit of moving from one warring camp to another, which ultimately turned against them.
Next, students should consider the circumstances of the formation of the second militia, the role of K. Minin, D. Pozharsky, and the collection of the “third money”. Kolomna was the first to respond to the call of Nizhny Novgorod, then other cities. In March 1612, the militia set out from Nizhny and headed towards Yaroslavl. It is important to note that the army had a zemsky council, which, together with Prince D. Pozharsky, ruled not only the army itself, but the entire land. On August 20, 1612, the militia from Yaroslavl moved to Moscow. On October 22, 1612, Kitay-gorod was taken, and then the Kremlin surrendered. King Sigismund launched a campaign against Moscow. He reached Volokolamsk, approached Volok three times, but was repulsed three times. These events ended the period of intervention.
Already in November 1612, the leaders of the zemstvo militia announced the convocation of a zemstvo council, at which the issue of the future political structure of the state should be resolved. The restoration of state power was envisioned by the government of Trubetskoy, Pozharsky, and Minin in the manner familiar to people in the 17th century. form of monarchical government.
Students should assess the social composition of the Zemsky Sobor of 1613 and the composition of contenders for the Russian throne. Among them were: the Polish prince Vladislav, the Swedish prince Karl Philip, the “raven” (Ivan Dmitrievich - the son of False Dmitry II and Marina Mnishek) and a number of other princes and boyars. Different sources name different candidates.
Due to irreconcilable contradictions between rival factions, the electoral activities of the cathedral reached a dead end. Under these conditions, a movement arose among service people and Cossacks directed against the cathedral leadership. Its center was the Moscow courtyard of the Trinity-Sergius Monastery, and its active inspirer was the influential cellarer of this monastery, Abraham Palitsyn. This movement decided to proclaim 16-year-old M. Romanov tsar. Many boyars and official businessmen joined the “Romanov party”: Prince I.V. Golitsyn, I.N. Romanov, Prince B.M. Lykov, I.B. Cherkassky and others. “Against” were: Trubetskoy, Pozharsky, Prince Mstislavsky. The Cossacks, whose role increased many times after the victories, the Moscow people, and the participants of the Zemsky Sobor who supported them, insisted on the election of one of the Russian princes or boyars as tsar. On February 21, 1613, the Zemsky Sobor, yielding to energetic pressure from below, proclaimed Mikhail Romanov tsar.
4. The Period of Troubles entered historical science as a period of virtual anarchy, chaos and unprecedented social upheaval.
Contemporaries assessed the Troubles as a punishment that befell people for their sins.
N.M. Karamzin called the Troubles “the most terrible phenomenon in history.” He believed that it had been prepared for a long time: “the frantic tyranny of the twenty-four years of John’s reign, the hellish game of Boris’s lust for power, the disasters of fierce famine and widespread robbery, the hardness of hearts, the depravity of the people - everything that precedes the overthrow of states condemned by providence to destruction or torment.” rebirth..." N.M. Karamzin was also sure that although “internal barbarians” were rampant in Russia, they were directed by the Poles.
Big role Poland was also recognized in organizing the Troubles in Russia by N.I. Kostomarov (Time of Troubles of the Moscow State. - M., 1990) and D.I. Ilovaisky. N.I. Kostomarov wrote that the intrigues of the Catholic Church played an important role.
S.M. Soloviev defined the Troubles as “general moral decay.” As a representative of the state school of historiography, Solovyov saw in the Troubles a struggle between state and anti-state forces. Troubles are the struggle of landowners with landless wandering people. Their interests ran counter to the public. In addition, S.M. Soloviev saw a struggle between classes in the Troubles. This was a new moment in historiography.
V.O. Klyuchevsky believed main reason Troubles are the end of a legitimate dynasty and the rise to power of an illegal dynasty. According to the historian, during the Time of Troubles there was an uprising of the people against the patrimonial state. Considering the history of Russia through the prism of the continuous process of colonization, V.O. Klyuchevsky came to the conclusion that on the eve of the Time of Troubles, the balance between the center and the localities was disrupted, and tensions grew between them. In addition, other circumstances contributed to the Troubles: the actions of the rulers after Fedor, the constitutional aspirations of the boyars, the low level of public morality, boyar disgrace, famine, pestilence during the reign of Boris, and the intervention of the Cossacks.
I.E. Zabelin viewed the Troubles as a struggle between herd and national principles. Representatives of the herd principle were the boyars who sacrificed national interests for the sake of their own privileges.
S.F. Platonov is one of the leading experts on the history of the Time of Troubles. For the first time in historiography, he began to consider the Troubles as a powerful social conflict, in which he distinguished several levels: between the boyars and the nobility; between landowners and peasants. The Troubles developed due to the formation of serfdom and the strengthening of feudal oppression.
S.F. Platonov gives his periodization of the Troubles. The first period is the struggle for the Moscow throne; the second is destruction public order; the third is an attempt to restore order. The results of the Troubles, according to Platonov, were: the defeat of the old boyars, the Cossacks; The victory was won by the middle, conservative layers of the population.
Thus, pre-revolutionary historiography focused on the analysis of the political, moral, ethical and social aspects of the Time of Troubles.
Soviet historical science mainly considered social factors Troubles and often absolutized them. In the 30s XX century the term “Troubles” was excluded from the use of historians, recognized as counter-revolutionary and containing a negative assessment of the revolutionary movement. Instead of this term, another was used - “peasant war” under the leadership of I. Bolotnikov. This approach is reflected in the works of M.N. Pokrovsky, I. Smirnov, B.D. Grekov, A. Sakharov, V. Koretsky and others.
Thus, I.I. Smirnov argued that the uprising of I. Bolotnikov became the first peasant war in Russia, during which serfs and peasants fought to destroy “feudal oppression.” A.A. Zimin came to the conclusion that the uprising of I. Bolotnikov was the culmination of the first peasant war. It began with the Cotton uprising.
V.I. Koretsky dated the first peasant war to 1603–1614. and assessed it as the first mass movement against actual enslavement.
R.G. Skrynnikov again began to use the concept of “Troubles”. The historian did not share the opinion that the Khlopk uprising was the beginning of the first peasant war. He convincingly proved that impoverished nobles, landowners of southern Russia, Cossacks, and serfs took part in the Troubles. R.G. Skrynnikov also showed that the popular protests did not have an anti-feudal orientation.
V.B. Kobrin views the Troubles as a complex interweaving of national, intra-class, and inter-class contradictions. He was the first to assess the events of the early 17th century. not as a peasant war, but as a civil war. V.B. Kobrin re-evaluated the personality and activities of B. Godunov and False Dmitry I, considering that they have some reform potential.
The concept of civil war was worked out in more detail by A.L. Stanislavsky. believed that the Troubles gave birth to another subject of political struggle, namely, the free Cossacks. Born from almost all classes of Russian society, it painfully sought its own place in the social and state structure of the country. The position of the Cossacks was repeatedly decisive and determined in which direction the scales would swing during the Time of Troubles. It was the Cossacks who determined the success of the decisive battles of the Time of Troubles.
Most modern historians share the assessment of the Time of Troubles as the first civil war in Russia. Thus, V. Nazarov writes that the Troubles or civil war became the apogee of a political crisis, which was resolved by military force. It was a period of alternatives. He also notes that the uniqueness of the Troubles lies in the fact that not only the army and detachments, not only class groups, but regions and regions fought among themselves. Therefore, Bolotnikov’s uprising became a movement of the southern borderlands and southern provinces against the center and capital. None of the classes of Russian society that participated in the events of the Time of Troubles achieved a politically significant result on their own. Any successful version of events presupposed a broad coalition of forces under political slogans that were meaningful to all participants.
In his latest research, B. Florya proves that the Troubles were largely a rebellion of the nobility of the outskirts against the privileged center, which led to the creation of two hostile centers of power in the country.
Foreign historiography also contains several assessments of the Troubles. American historian D. Billington regards the Troubles as religious war between Orthodoxy and Catholic Church. Another American historian, C. Dunning, believes that it is impossible to talk about a peasant war in Russia at the beginning of the 17th century, because popular uprisings were not anti-feudal in nature and were not an uprising of the “lower classes” against oppression. Polish historians came to the conclusion that the Time of Troubles arose in Russia as a result of certain patterns of development. I. Gralya supports the opinion of V.O. Klyuchevsky that the impostor was only baked in a Polish oven and fermented in Moscow. At the beginning of the 17th century, in his opinion, the following events took place in Russia simultaneously: the Polish-Lithuanian intervention, the Swedish intervention, and a real civil war. The first was, after all, the civil war.
Thus, a complex and contradictory event Russian history– Troubles of the early 17th century. – continues to attract the attention of domestic and foreign historians. They find new aspects and problems of this large and complex issue.
TOPIC 25. SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIA IN THE 20-70s OF THE 17th century (4 hours)
1. New features in economic life countries (crafts, manufactures, their nature, conditions for the formation of the all-Russian market).
2. Agriculture. Characteristics of local and patrimonial land ownership.
3. Social structure of society according to the Council Code of 1649. Changes in the position of peasants and townspeople.
REQUIRED READINGS
- Vorobyov V.M., Degtyarev A.Ya. Russian feudal land ownership from the “Time of Troubles” to the eve of Peter’s reforms. – L., 1986.
- Government agencies Russia in the XVI-XVII centuries. – M., 1991.
- Demidova N.F. Service bureaucracy of the 17th century. and its role in the formation of absolutism. – M., 1987.
- History of the peasantry in Europe. – M., 1986. – T.2.
- Koretsky V.I. The formation of serfdom and the first peasant war in Russia. – M., 1975.
- Milov L.V. On the reasons for the emergence of serfdom in Russia // History of the USSR. – 1985. - No. 3.
- Cherepnin L.V. Zemsky Sobors of the Russian State in the 16th-17th centuries. – M., 1978.
ADDITIONAL LITERATURE
1. Babich M.V. State institutions of Russia in the 17th century: A reference guide. – M., 1999. – Issue. 1.
2. Christensen S.O. History of Russia in the 17th century. Review of studies and sources. – M., 1989.
3. Klyuchevsky V.O. Historical portraits. – M., 1990.
4. Kostomarov N.I. Russian history in the biographies of its most important figures. – M., 1991.
5. Sedov P.A. Offerings in Moscow orders XVII century// Domestic History. - 1996. - No. 1.
6. Helly R. Serfdom in Russia. 1450-1725.- M., 1998.
1. The shocks of the Time of Troubles were remembered for a long time by the Russian people. Ruined, plundered cities and villages, their depopulation (death of some, flight to the outskirts of others), desolation of arable lands, decline of crafts and trade - these were the sad results of the “Great Lithuanian Devastation” for the economy of the country, especially its central and southern counties. Sources of that time, documentary and literary (chronicles, stories, legends), are filled with descriptions of the plight of the Russians. The government, very concerned about all this, sent “watchmen” around the country, and they revealed the scale of the devastation, identified “empty” and “lived”, thereby determining the solvency of the remaining residents, the prospects for restoring the viability of all sectors of the economy.
Unlike Agriculture, industrial production has moved forward more noticeably. The most widespread industry is the home industry; throughout the country, peasants produced canvas and homespun cloth, ropes and ropes, felted and leather shoes, a variety of clothes and dishes, embroidery and towels, bast shoes and washcloth, tar and resin, sleighs and matting, rendered lard and bristles, and much more. Through buyers, these products, especially canvases, reached the market. Gradually, for the peasants, this industry outgrows the domestic framework and turns into small commodity production. Masters of Yaroslavl canvases, Vazh cloths, Reshma matting, Belozersk spoons, Vyazma sleighs, etc. follow this path.
Among the artisans, the most numerous group were tax workers - artisans of urban suburbs and black-mown volosts. They carried out private orders or worked for the market. Palace artisans served the needs of the royal court; state and registered employees worked on orders from the treasury (construction work, procurement of materials, etc.); privately owned - from peasants, peasants and slaves they produced everything necessary for landowners and patrimonial owners. Craft on a fairly large scale developed, primarily among draft traders, into commodity production. But in different industries this proceeded differently.
Ox metalworking, which has long existed in the country, is based on the extraction of bog ores. Metallurgy centers invested in the districts south of Moscow: Serpukhovsky, Kashir-|kom, Tula, Dedilovsky, Aleksinsky. Another center of ores are the counties to the north-west of Moscow: Ustyuzhna Zheleznopolskaya, Tikhvin, Zaonezhye.
The authorities have repeatedly summoned qualified blacksmiths to Moscow; They also fulfilled orders from the capital on the spot. When a new Stone Bridge was built on the Moscow River in 11689, the blacksmith Dmitry Molodoy was called from Nizhny “to work on the bridge with iron cutters.”
Moscow was a major metalworking center. Back in the early 40s, there were more than one and a half hundred forges here.
The best gold and marble craftsmen in Russia worked in the capital. The centers of silver production were also Ustyug Veliky, Nizhny Novgorod, Veliky Novgorod, Tikhvin and others. Copper and other non-ferrous metals were processed in Moscow and Pomorie (manufacturing cauldrons, bells, dishes with painted enamel, embossing, etc.).
Metalworking is to a large extent transformed into commodity production, not only in urban suburbs, but also in the countryside, black sowing and privately owned.
Blacksmithing shows trends towards consolidation of production and the use of hired labor. This is especially typical for Tula, Ustyuzhna, Tikhvin, and Ustyug Veliky. The largest metal manufacturers of the 17th century emerged from the Ural blacksmiths. Demidovs and Batashovs, Mosolovs and Luginins. The blacksmiths, who became rich and had several forges, exploited hired hammers and others, and were engaged in trading in iron and other goods.
Similar phenomena, although to a lesser extent, are observed in woodworking. All over the country, carpenters worked to order - they built houses, river and sea vessels. Carpenters from Pomerania were distinguished by their skill. made of wood, bast, matting, resin, even houses and small ones were sold on the market.
In many districts of the north-west of European Russia, the sowing and processing of flax and hemp became the specialty of the local population. In addition, they made ropes and other ship gear and dyeing.
The largest center of the leather industry was Yaroslavl, where raw materials for the manufacture of leather products arrived from many districts of the country. Worked here big number small “factories” - craft workshops. Good tanned leather was produced in Vologda, leather and morocco leather was produced in Kazan. Leather processing was carried out by craftsmen from Kaluga and Nizhny Novgorod. Yaroslavl tanners used hired labor; some “factories” grew into manufacturing-type enterprises with a significant division of labor (wood crushers, ironers, shoemakers, rollers and other narrow specialists).
Furriers who processed expensive furs (sable, beaver, marten, squirrel, arctic fox, etc.) usually fulfilled orders, while those who worked with cheap raw materials (sheepskins, etc.) went to the market. The largest number of furriers worked in Moscow (the center of the trade was Pankratyevskaya Sloboda). Hired labor also began to be used in the furrier business, and entrepreneurs began to emerge.
Quite a few products made from wool came onto the market! homespun cloth and felted shoes, caps and raincoats (epanchi). They were produced both in the city and in the countryside and spread throughout the country. Uglich was a major center for felted products.
Vologda was famous for tallow candles, Kostroma and Yaroslavl were famous for soap.
Palace artisans lived almost exclusively in Moscow. Weapons, gold, silver, and linen production grew from a craft into a manufactory.
The master, as an independent manufacturer-craftsman, had students. According to the “life record”, the latter were assigned to study and work with a master for five to eight years. The student lived with the owner, ate and drank with him, received clothes, and did all kinds of work. Upon completion of training, the KL student worked for a period of time with the master, sometimes “for hire.” Students who acquired the necessary and significant experience or were tested by specialists themselves became<Л мастерами.
The corps of artisans was also replenished by calling townspeople from other cities to Moscow for permanent or temporary work. For the needs of the treasury and the court, gunsmiths and icon painters, silversmiths, masons and carpenters were sent to the capital from other cities.
The Order of Stone Affairs was in charge of state-owned bricklayers and garters. They lived in special settlements in Moscow and the cities of Zamoskovye. Among them there were “master apprentices” - manufacturers, work managers, and craftsmen; ordinary masons and yaryzhnye (laborers). Among the apprentices, essentially architects of the 17th century, Antip Konstantinov, the builder of the Golden, Treasury and Passage Chambers of the Patriarchal Court in the capital's Kremlin, gained fame; O.M. Startsev, who erected the metropolitan chambers (including the Krutitsky Teremok) at the Krutitsky courtyard.
The number of manufactories - large enterprises based on the division of labor, which remains predominantly manual, and the use of mechanisms driven by water - has increased. This indicates the beginning of the transition to early capitalist industrial production (still heavily entangled in serf relations).
At this time, old manufactories were expanded, for example, the Cannon Yard - a “forge mill” was built to forge stone buildings with water (instead of the old wooden ones). Two state-owned gunpowder mills appeared in Moscow. The workshops of the Armory, Gold and Silver Chambers continued to operate, and the sewing manufactories - the Tsarskaya and Tsaritsyna workshops of the Chamber - continued to operate. A weaving factory appeared - Khamovny Dvor in Kadashevskaya Sloboda (Zamoskvorechye), a silk factory - Velvet Dvor (it died out quite quickly). These manufactories were state-owned or Dvrtsova. Forced labor was used on them. They had no connections with the market.
Another group of manufactories are merchant ones: rope yards in Vologda, Kholmogory (emerged in the 16th century), in Arkhangelsk (in the 17th century). These were relatively large enterprises; about 400 Russian hired workers worked at Vologda alone. The Kholmogory yard produced so many ropes that they could equip a quarter of the ships of the English fleet, at that time one of the largest in the world. The Dukhaninsky glass factory appeared near Moscow. His dishes went to the palace and for sale. The most important areas of manufacturing production are in the Urals, in the Tula-Kashira region, and the Olonets region.
Already in the 20s, the treasury tried to build small factories for metal processing in the Urals, in the Tomsk region. But the lack of cheap labor prevented this.
In the next decade, after the discovery of copper ores in the Solikamsk region, the Pyskorsky copper smelter, the first in Russia, was built. Bellows were installed in the smelter, which were driven by the mill's water stakes. The plant produced several hundred pounds of copper per year. At the end of the 40s it was closed - ore reserves were depleted. In the mid-60s, the copper smelter in Kazan stopped operating for the same reason. The first copper smelters built by the treasury in the Onega region were commissioned by foreign merchants. However, instead of copper smelting, which could not be established, they, using the experience of local craftsmen, organized 30 water-powered ironworks.
Near Tula, three similar factories were built in 1637 by A.D. Vinius, Dutch merchant. He planned to establish capitalist-type factories in Russia. Cast iron and iron were smelted at the Tula sites, their processing took place at the Kashira sites, and the manufactured products were used to meet the needs of the domestic market.
In the 60s, 56 foreigners and 63 Russian masters and apprentices worked at all Tula-Kashira factories; They, with a single exception, worked for hire. The other menial jobs - mining ore, preparing coal and delivering them to factories - were performed by the peasants of the SolomenskL palace volost, which were simply assigned to Tula enterprises, i.e. forced peasants and slaves to work in factories as part of their duties. A volost with peasants was also assigned to the Kashirschi factories.
Thus, at these plants, and at the end of the century at the metallurgical plants of A. Butenant in Olonets crane, both civilian and forced labor were used. The appearance of such factories is a significant step forward in the history of Russian industry: both in terms of increasing production (several tens of thousands of pounds of cast iron and iron were smelted at the factories of Tula and Kashira per year), and a wide division of labor (manufacturing, for example , carbine or musket went through a number of production processes by craftsmen of various specialties), and the use of mechanical arts that used the power of falling water.
Following the example of the Vinius-Akema factories, Russian boyars (I.D. Miloslavsky, B.I. Morozov in Obolensky, Zvenigorod, Nizhny Novgorod districts) began to open similar enterprises, using the labor of serfs. Other factories arose, iron smelting and ironworking, owned by merchants and wealthy craftsmen (for example, Nikita Demidov in Tula, etc.). They used hired labor.
Manufactories played a leading role in the production of weapons. In the manufacture of agricultural implements and household items, small peasant crafts and urban artisans successfully competed with them. The Cannon Yard was engaged in meeting the needs of the state in strengthening its defense capability - casting cannons).
Firearms and bladed weapons were made in the Moscow Armory - a dispersed type manufactory (craftsmen worked in the chamber premises and at home), in contrast to the Cannon Yard - a centralized type manufactory only in the courtyard premises).
Mints were a type of centralized manufactory. At the new Mint, up to 500 people were employed in the production of honey-I Noah coins.
The organizer of textile manufactories was also the Sovereign’s “palace” - the management of the royal palace economy. Thus, the Kadashevskaya Palace Settlement produced linen fabrics for the sovereign's use. The linen was supplied by the palace Tverskaya Konstantinovskaya Sloboda in Khamovniki near Moscow, the palace villages of Breytovo and Cherkasovo in Yaroslavl [county]. Certain types of fabrics were produced at home.
In the 17th century up to six dozen different manufactories arose; not all of them turned out to be viable - almost half survived until Peter’s time. It is not surprising that serf labor was used here. More indicative is the gradual expansion of civilian labor both in manufactories and in water transport (Volzhsky, Sukhon-Dvinsky and other routes), the salt mines of the Vychegda Salt and the Kama Salt (in the latter, by the end of the century, there were more than 200 quarries that produced annually up to 7 million poods of salt), in the fishing and salt fields of the Lower Volga (at the end of the century, several tens of thousands of hired workers worked in Astrakhan and its environs only in the summer).
Thus, the initial stage of textile production, the initial accumulation of the formation of the pre-proletariat and pre-bourgeoisie: “kaL of merchant merchants,” dates back to the 17th century. Large merchants grow into entrepreneurs involved, for example, in salt making: N.A. Sveteshnikov, V.G. Shorin and Ya.S. PatokL O.I. Filatyev and D.G. Pankratiev, Shustov brothers and others. Since the 19th century. The Stroganovs gained strength from the end of the 17th century - the Demidops
Trade. The 17th century is the most important stage in the development of night market trade relations, the beginning of the formation of an all-Russian national market. In the grain trade, Vologda, Vyatka, Veliky Ustyug, and Kungur district acted as your centers in the north; southern cities - Orel and Voronezh Ostrogozhsk and Korotoyak, Yelets and Belgorod; in the center - Nimniy Novgorod. By the end of the century, a grain market appeared in Siberia. Salt markets were Vologda, Salt Kama Lower Volga; Nizhny Novgorod served as a transshipment point.
In the fur trade, a large role was played by Salt Vychego and yokaya, which lay on the road from Siberia, Moscow, Arkhangelsk, Svensk Fair near Bryansk, Astrakhan; in the last third of the century - Nizhny Novgorod and the Makaryevskaya Fair, Irbit (Irbit Fair) on the border with Siberia.
Flax and hemp were sold through Pskov and Novgorod, Tikhvin and Smolensk; the same goods and canvases - through the Arkhangelsk port. Leathers, lard, and meat were traded in large quantities in Kazan and Vologda, Yaroslavl and Kungur, and iron products in Ustyuzhna Zheleznopolskaya and Tikhvin. A number of cities, primarily Moscow, had trade relations with all or many regions of the country. Quite a few townspeople formed a special “merchant rank”, engaged exclusively in trade. The merchant class - the pre-bourgeoisie - was emerging.
The dominant position in trade was occupied by the townspeople, primarily guests and members of the living room and cloth hundreds. Large traders came from wealthy artisans and peasants. In the trading world, an outstanding role was played by guests from Yaroslavl - Grigory Nikitnikov, Nadya Sveteshnikov, Mikhailo Guryev, Muscovites Vasily Shorin and Evstafiy Filatiev, Dedinovo brothers Vasily and Grigory Shustov (from the village of Dedinova, Kolomensky district), Ustyug residents Vasily Fedotov-Guselnikov, Usov-Grudtsyn, The Barefoot, Revyakins and others traded in various goods and in many places; trade specialization was poorly developed, capital circulated slowly, free funds and credit were absent, and usury had not yet become a professional occupation. The scattered nature of trade required many agents and intermediaries. Only towards the end of the century specialized trade appeared. For example, the Novgorod Koshkins exported hemp to Sweden, and from there they imported metals.
Retail trade took on a larger scale in cities (in shopping arcades and huts, from trays, benches and peddling). Posad small traders walked around the districts with a body filled with various goods (peddlers); Having sold them, they bought canvas, cloth, furs, etc. from the peasants. Buyers emerged from among the peddlers. They connected the peasants with the market.
Foreign trade operations with Western countries were carried out through Arkhangelsk, Novgorod, Pskov, Smolensk, Putivl, and the Vienna Fair. They exported leather and grain, lard and potash, Venka and furs, meat and caviar, linen and bristles, resin and tar, wax and matting, etc. They imported cloth and metals, gunpowder and weapons, pearls and precious stones, spices and incense, wine and lemons, paints and chemicals (vitriol, alum, ammonia, arsenic, etc.), silk and cotton fabrics, writing paper and lace, etc. Thus, they exported raw materials and semi-finished products, imported products of Western European manufacturing industry and colonial goods. 75% of foreign trade turnover came from Arkhangelsk - the only and also inconvenient port connecting Russia with Western Europe. Astrakhan played a leading role in Eastern trade. Private traders conducted transactions with the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Persia and the Mughal Empire in India. Since the end of the 17th century, especially after the conclusion of the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689), trade relations with China have been developing.
The competition of foreign merchants in the domestic market caused collective protests from less wealthy Russian merchants. In the 20s - 40s, they filed petitions, complaining that they “left their trades and therefore became impoverished and incurred great debts.” They demanded that the operations of foreigners be limited, and those who, despite the prohibitions of the Russian authorities, conducted retail trade, be expelled from the country.
Finally, in 1649, English merchants were prohibited from trading within the country, and then they were all expelled. The reason for Ngy's decree was explained simply and ingenuously: the British “killed their sovereign King Charles to death.” The Revolution took place in England, and its participants, led by Oliver Cromwell, executed their monarch, which in the eyes of the Russian court was clearly reprehensible and unforgivable
According to the Customs Charter of 1653, many small customs duties remaining from the time of feudal fragmentation were eliminated in the country. Instead, a single ruble duty was introduced - 10 money per ruble, i.e. 5% from the purchase price of goods (1 ruble = 200 money). They took more from foreigners than from Russian merchants. The New Trade Charter of 1667 further strengthened protectionist tendencies in the interests of the Russian commercial and industrial class.
2. Agriculture. From the end of the 10s to the beginning of the 20s, after the Peace of Stolbovo and the Deulin Truce, the expulsion of gangs of marauding interventionists, the end of the actions of rebel groups, the Russian people began to re-establish a normal economic life. The Zamoskovny region, the center of European Russia, came to life, the districts around the Russian capital, in the west and northwest, northeast and east. The Russian peasant is moving to the outskirts - south of the Oka River, in the Volga region and the Urals, in Western Siberia. New settlements are springing up here. Peasants who fled here from the center from their owners - landowners and patrimonial owners, monasteries and palace departments, or were transferred to these places, are developing new land masses, entering into economic, marriage, and everyday contacts with the local population. A mutual exchange of management experience is being established: local residents adopt from the Russians the steam system of agriculture, haymaking, apiary beekeeping, plows and other devices; Russians, in turn, learn from local residents about the method of long-term storage (Unthreshed bread and much more.
Agriculture did not recover quickly; the reasons for this were the low capacity of small peasant farms, low yields, natural disasters, and crop shortages. “The development of this branch of the economy was strongly and long hampered by the consequences of the “Lithuanian ruin.” This is evidenced by scribe books - land inventories of that time. Thus, in 1622, in three districts south of the Oka - Belevsky, Mtsensky and Yeletsk - local nobles owned on the lands of 1187 peasants and 2563 peasants, i.e. landless or very weak peasants were twice as many peasants themselves. Agriculture, which experienced extreme decline at the beginning of the century, returned to its previous state very slowly.
This was reflected in the economic situation of the nobles and their suitability for service. In a number of southern counties, many of them did not have land and peasants (odnodvovortsy), or even estates. Some, due to poverty, became Cossacks, slaves of rich boyars, monastery servants, or, according to the documents of that time, lay around taverns. I By the middle of the century, in the Zamoskovny region, about half of the land, in some places more than half, was classified by scribes as “living” rather than empty arable land.
The main way of development of agriculture of this time was extensive: farmers included an increasing number of new territories into economic turnover. Popular colonization of the outskirts is proceeding at a rapid pace.
Since the late 50s - 60s, immigrants in large numbers have gone to the Volga region, Bashkiria, and Siberia. With their arrival, agriculture began to be practiced in places where it had not existed before, for example, in Siberia.
In European Russia, the dominant farming system was three-field farming. But in the forest areas of Zamoskovny, Pomorye, and even in the northern regions of the southern outskirts, cutting, fallowing, two-field, three-field felling began. In Siberia, in the second half of the century fallow land is gradually being replaced by three-field farming.
Rye and oats were sown most of all. Next came barley and wheat, spring rye (egg) and millet, buckwheat and spelt, peas and hemp. The same is true in Siberia. More wheat was sown in the south than in the north. In the gardens they grew turnips and cucumbers, cabbage and carrots, radishes and beets, onions and garlic, even watermelons and pumpkins. In the gardens there are cherries, red currants, gooseberries (kryzh-bersen), raspberries, strawberries, apple trees, pears, plums. Productivity was low. Crop failures, shortages, and famines recurred frequently.
The basis for the development of livestock farming was peasant farming. From it the feudal lords received draft horses for working in their fields and table supplies: meat, live and killed poultry, eggs, butter, etc. Among the peasants there were, on the one hand, those with many horses and many cows; on the other hand, deprived of any livestock. Cattle breeding especially developed in Pomerania, the Yaroslavl region, and the southern districts.
Fish were caught everywhere, but especially in Pomerania. In the northern regions, the White and Barents Seas, cod and halibut, herring and salmon were caught; hunted seals, walruses, and whales. On the Volga and Yaik, red fish and caviar were of particular value.
In natural rural
The Time of Troubles in the Moscow state was a consequence of tyrannical rule, which undermined the state and social system of the country. Captures the end of the 16th century. and the beginning of the 17th century, which began with the end of the Rurik dynasty with the struggle for the throne, led to ferment among all layers of the Russian population, and exposed the country to extreme danger of being captured by foreigners. In October 1612, the Nizhny Novgorod militia (Lyapunov, Minin, Pozharsky) liberated Moscow from the Poles and convened elected representatives of the entire land to elect a tsar.
Small encyclopedic dictionary of Brockhaus and Efron. St. Petersburg, 1907-09
THE END OF KALITA'S COURSE
Despite all the unsatisfactory evidence contained in the investigative file, Patriarch Job was satisfied with them and announced at the council: “Before the sovereign of Mikhail and Gregory Nagi and the Uglitsky townspeople, there was an obvious betrayal: Tsarevich Dimitri was killed by God’s court; and Mikhail Nagoy ordered the sovereign’s officials, clerk Mikhail Bityagovsky and his son, Nikita Kachalov and other nobles, residents and townspeople who stood for the truth, to be beaten in vain, because Mikhail Bityagovsky and Mikhail Nagiy often scolded for the sovereign, why did he, Naked, he kept a sorcerer, Andryusha Mochalov, and many other sorcerers. For such a great treacherous deed, Mikhail Naga and his brothers and the men of Uglich, through their own faults, came to all kinds of punishment. But this is a zemstvo, city matter, then God and the sovereign know, everything is in his royal hand, and execution, and disgrace, and mercy, about which God will notify the sovereign; and our duty is to pray to God for the sovereign, the empress, for their long-term health and for the silence of internecine warfare.”
The Council accused the Naked; but the people blamed Boris, and the people are memorable and love to connect all other important events with the event that especially struck them. It is easy to understand the impression that the death of Demetrius should have made: before, appanages died in prison, but they were accused of sedition, they were punished by the sovereign; now an innocent child died, he died not in strife, not for the fault of his father, not by order of the sovereign, he died from a subject. Soon, in June, there was a terrible fire in Moscow, the entire White City burned out. Godunov lavished favors and benefits on those who were burned: but rumors spread that he deliberately ordered Moscow to be set on fire in order to bind its inhabitants to himself with favors and make them forget about Demetrius or, as others said, in order to force the king, who was at Trinity, to return to Moscow, and do not go to Uglich to search; the people thought that the king would not leave such a great matter without personal research, the people were waiting for the truth. The rumor was so strong that Godunov considered it necessary to refute it in Lithuania through the envoy Islenyev, who received the order: “If they ask about the Moscow fires, they will say: I did not happen to be in Moscow at that time; the thieves, the people of Nagikh, Afanasy and his brothers stole: this was found in Moscow. If anyone says that there are rumors that the Godunovs’ people lit the fire, then answer: it was some kind of idle thief who said it; a dashing man has the will to start. Godunov’s boyars are eminent, great.” Khan Kazy-Girey came near Moscow, and rumors spread throughout Ukraine that Boris Godunov had let him down, fearing the earth for the murder of Tsarevich Dimitri; this rumor circulated among ordinary people; Aleksin's boyar son denounced his peasant; a peasant was captured and tortured in Moscow; he slandered a lot of people; They sent to search through the cities, many people were intercepted and tortured, innocent blood was shed, many people died from torture, some were executed and their tongues were cut, others were put to death in prison, and many places became desolate as a result.
A year after the Uglitsky incident, the king’s daughter Theodosius was born, but the next year the child died; Theodore was sad for a long time, and there was great mourning in Moscow; Patriarch Job wrote a consoling message to Irina, saying that she could help her grief not with tears, not with useless exhaustion of the body, but with prayer, hope, by faith, God will give birth to children, and cited St. Anna. In Moscow they cried and said that Boris had killed the Tsar’s daughter.
Five years after the death of his daughter, at the very end of 1597, Tsar Theodore fell ill with a fatal illness and died on January 7, 1598, at one in the morning. Kalita's male tribe was cut short; there was only one woman left, the daughter of Ioannov’s unfortunate cousin, Vladimir Andreevich, the widow of the titular Livonian king Magnus, Marfa (Marya) Vladimirovna, who returned to Russia after the death of her husband, but she was also dead to the world, she was a nun; Her tonsure, they say, was involuntary; she had a daughter, Evdokia; but she also died in childhood, they say, also an unnatural death. There remained a man who not only bore the title of Tsar and Grand Duke, but also actually reigned at one time in Moscow by the will of the Terrible, the baptized Kasimov Khan, Simeon Bekbulatovich. At the beginning of Theodore's reign, he is still mentioned in the ranks under the name of the Tsar of Tver and takes precedence over the boyars; but then the chronicle says that he was taken to the village of Kushalino, he did not have many servants, he lived in poverty; finally he went blind, and the chronicle directly blames Godunov for this misfortune. Godunov was not spared from being accused of the death of Tsar Theodore himself.
THE HORRORS OF HUNGER
Let's give Boris Godunov his due: he fought hunger as best he could. They distributed money to the poor and organized paid construction work for them. But the money received instantly depreciated: after all, this did not increase the amount of grain on the market. Then Boris ordered the distribution of free bread from state storage facilities. He hoped to set a good example for the feudal lords, but the granaries of the boyars, monasteries and even the patriarch remained closed. Meanwhile, starving people rushed to Moscow and large cities from all sides to get free bread. But there was not enough bread for everyone, especially since the distributors themselves were speculating in bread. They said that some rich people did not hesitate to dress in rags and receive free bread in order to sell it at exorbitant prices. People who dreamed of salvation died in the cities right on the streets. In Moscow alone, 127 thousand people were buried, and not everyone was able to be buried. A contemporary says that in those years dogs and crows were the most well-fed: they ate unburied corpses. While the peasants in the cities died waiting in vain for food, their fields remained uncultivated and unplanted. Thus the foundations were laid for the continuation of the famine.
POPULAR UPRISINGS IN THE TIMES OF TROUBLES
The rise of popular movements at the beginning of the 17th century was absolutely inevitable in conditions of total famine. The famous Cotton Rebellion in 1603 was instigated by the serf owners themselves. In conditions of famine, the owners expelled the slaves, because it was not profitable for them to keep the slaves. The very fact of the death of governor I.F. Basmanova, in the bloody battle of the end of 1603 with serfs, speaks of the very significant military organization of the rebels (many serfs, obviously, also belonged to the category of “servants”). The authority of the tsarist government and Boris Godunov personally declined sharply. Service people, especially in southern cities, were waiting for a change of power and the elimination of a monarch of a non-royal family, which they began to remind of more and more often. The true “Troubles” began, which immediately included those who had recently been forced to leave Central Russia and seek happiness in its border, mainly southern borders, as well as outside Russia.
MOSCOW AFTER THE MURDER OF FALSE DMITRY
Meanwhile, Moscow was littered with corpses, which were taken out of the city for several days and buried there. The body of the impostor lay in the square for three days, attracting curious people who wanted to curse at least the corpse. Then he was buried behind the Serpukhov Gate. But the persecution of the murdered man did not end there. The week from May 18 to 25 there were severe frosts (not so rare in May-June in our time), causing great damage to gardens and fields. The impostor has been followed by whispers about his sorcery before. In conditions of extreme instability of existence, superstitions flowed like a river: something terrible was seen over the grave of False Dmitry, and the natural disasters that arose were associated with it. The grave was dug up, the body was burned, and the ashes, mixed with gunpowder, were fired from a cannon, pointing it in the direction from which Rasstriga came. This cannon shot, however, created unexpected problems for Shuisky and his entourage. Rumors spread in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Germany that it was not “Dmitry” who was executed, but some of his servants, while “Dmitry” escaped and fled to Putivl or somewhere in the Polish-Lithuanian lands.
CONFRONTATION WITH THE Rzeczpospolita
The Time of Troubles did not end overnight after the liberation of Moscow by the forces of the Second Militia. In addition to the struggle against internal “thieves”, until the conclusion of the Deulin Truce in 1618, hostilities continued between Russia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The situation in these years can be characterized as a large-scale border war, which was waged by local governors, relying mainly only on local forces. A characteristic feature of military operations on the border during this period were deep, devastating raids on enemy territory. These attacks were aimed, as a rule, at certain fortified cities, the destruction of which led to the enemy losing control over the territory adjacent to them. The task of the leaders of such raids was to destroy enemy strongholds, ravage villages, and steal as many prisoners as possible.
In a crisis, with the support of the Poles and all those dissatisfied with Godunov’s government, after his death the throne was seized by False Dmitry I. The interests of various layers of society that supported False Dmitry contradicted each other. Therefore, having satisfied the desires of some, the new king inevitably aroused the discontent of others.
E.A. Shaskolskaya identified the following reasons for dissatisfaction in various strata of society with the policies of False Dmitry I:
“-to enlist the support of the nobility, False Dmitry generously distributed land and money. Soon money had to be borrowed from the monasteries. This worried the clergy. In addition, a rumor spread that False Dmitry had secretly converted to Catholicism;
Land and monetary grants to the nobles irritated the boyars. Discontent was also caused by the fact that False Dmitry violated the old customs that were familiar to the order of court life;
The peasants hoped that the new tsar would restore their right to transfer from one landowner to another on St. George's Day. But, having given in to them, False Dmitry would inevitably have caused discontent among the nobles. This happened when in 1606 the peasants who had left their masters during the famine years were allowed to stay in their new places.” E.A. Shaskolskaya “History of Russia, IX - XX” p. 143
Many false stereotypes have accumulated about False Dmitry I both in literature and in the mass consciousness. He is usually seen as an agent of the Polish king and the lords who, with his help, sought to seize Russia, their puppet. It is natural that exactly this interpretation of the personality of False Dmitry was intensively introduced by the government of Vasily Shuisky, who sat on the throne after the overthrow and murder of Tsar Dmitry. But today’s historian can be more impartial about the activities of the young man who spent a year on the Russian throne.
Judging by the memoirs of his contemporaries, False Dmitry I was smart and quick-witted. His associates were amazed at how easily and quickly he solved complicated issues. He seemed to believe in his royal origins. Contemporaries unanimously note the amazing courage, reminiscent of Peter the Great, with which the young tsar violated the established etiquette at court. He did not stride sedately through the rooms, supported by the arms of close boyars, but quickly moved from one to another, so that even his personal bodyguards sometimes did not know where to find him. He was not afraid of crowds; more than once, accompanied by one or two people, he rode through the streets of Moscow. He didn't even sleep after lunch. It was fitting for a king to be calm, unhurried and important; this one acted with the temperament of the named father, but without his cruelty. All this is suspicious for a calculating impostor. If False Dmitry had known that he was not the tsar’s son, he would certainly have been able to master the etiquette of the Moscow court in advance, so that everyone could immediately say about him: yes, this is a real tsar. In addition, Tsar Dmitry pardoned the most dangerous witness - Prince Vasily Shuisky. Convicted of a conspiracy against the Tsar, Vasily Shuisky led the investigation into the death of the real Tsarevich in Uglich and saw his dead body with his own eyes. Shuisky was sentenced to death by the council, and Tsar Dmitry pardoned him.
Wasn’t the unfortunate young man prepared from childhood for the role of a contender for the throne, wasn’t he brought up in the belief that he was the rightful heir to the Moscow crown? It is not without reason that when the first news of the appearance of an impostor in Poland reached Moscow, Boris Godunov, as they say, immediately told the boyars that it was their doing.
Godunov’s most important rivals on the path to power were the Romanov-Yuryev boyars. The eldest of them, Nikita Romanovich, brother of Tsar Feodor's mother, Tsarina Anastasia, was considered an ally of Godunov. It was to him that Nikita Romanovich bequeathed to patronize his children - the Nikitichs. This testamentary union of friendship did not last long, and soon after Boris ascended the throne, the five Nikitich brothers were arrested on false charges of trying to poison the Tsar and exiled along with their relatives. The eldest of his brothers, hunter and dandy Fyodor Nikitich, was tonsured a monk under the name of Philaret and sent north to the Anthony-Siysky Monastery. Back in 1602, Philaret’s beloved servant informed the bailiff that his master had come to terms with everything and was thinking only about saving his soul and his poor family. In the summer of 1604, False Dmitry appeared in Poland, and already in February 1605, the reports of the bailiff under Elder Philaret changed dramatically. Before us is no longer a humble monk, but a political fighter who has heard the sound of a battle trumpet. According to the bailiff, Elder Philaret does not live according to the monastic rites, he always laughs, no one knows why, and talks about worldly life, about birds of falcon and about dogs, how he lived in the world” V.N. Tatishchev “Russian History” p. 257. To the other monks, Filaret proudly declared that they would see what he would be like in the future. And in fact, they saw it. Less than six months after the bailiff sent his denunciation, Filaret from an exiled monk became Metropolitan of Rostov: he was elevated to this rank by order of Tsar Dmitry. It's all about the impostor's connections with the Romanov family. As soon as False Dmitry appeared in Poland, Godunov’s government declared that he was an impostor Yushka Bogdanov, the son of Otrepyev, a deacon-defrocked Chudov Monastery, who was under Patriarch Job for writing. This was probably the case: the government was interested in revealing the real name of the impostor, and finding out the truth was easier then than it is now, almost four centuries later. Otrepyev, before his tonsure, was a slave of the Romanovs and became a monk, apparently after their exile. Didn't they prepare the young man for the role of an impostor? In any case, the very appearance of False Dmitry has nothing to do with foreign intrigues. V.O. was right. Klyuchevsky, when he wrote about False Dmitry that “he was only baked in a Polish oven, and fermented in Moscow” V.O Klyuchevsky “Russian History” p. 123.
Poland not only did not take the initiative in False Dmitry’s adventure, but, on the contrary, King Sigismund III Vasa hesitated for a long time whether to support the applicant. On the one hand, it was tempting to have a person beholden to the king on the Moscow throne. Moreover, the young man did not skimp on promises. He secretly converted to Catholicism and promised the Pope that all of Russia would follow his example. He promised the king Smolensk and the Chernigov-Seversk land, the father of his bride Marina, the Sandomierz governor Yuri Mnishek - Novgorod, Pskov and a million gold coins. But still. The story of the prince’s miraculous rescue seemed too incredible. Doubts about the royal origin of the Moscow prince were expressed by almost all the nobles of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, to whom the king turned for advice. And during a discussion in the Sejm, crown hetman Jan Zamoyski said that the whole story of the prince reminded him of the comedies of Plautus or Terence. Is it possible, - said Zamoyski, - to order someone to be killed, and then not to see whether the person ordered to be killed was killed? In addition, a bird in the hand - a truce with Russia concluded in 1601 for a period of 20 years on mutually beneficial terms - seemed preferable to a pie in the sky - an ally of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth on the Moscow throne. Sigismund III could not decide on an open military conflict with Russia also because the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth waged a grueling struggle with Sweden for the Baltic states.
That is why the king did not dare to provide full and unconditional support to False Dmitry: he only allowed the Polish nobles, if they wished, to join his army. There were a little more than one and a half thousand of them. They were joined by several hundred Russian emigrant nobles and also Don and Zaporozhye Cossacks, who saw in the campaign of False Dmitry a good opportunity for military booty. The pretender to the throne thus had only a handful of warriors, about four thousand. With them he crossed the Dnieper.
They were already waiting for False Dmitry, but they were waiting near Smolensk: from there a more direct and shorter route to Moscow opened up. He preferred a more authentic route: he crossed the Dnieper near Chernigov. But the troops of False Dmitry had to go through the Seversk land, where a lot of combustible material had accumulated: small service people dissatisfied with their position, peasants subjected to particularly severe exploitation on small estates, the remnants of the Cossacks defeated by Godunov’s troops, who had risen uprising under the leadership of Ataman Khlopk, and finally, many fugitives gathered here during the hungry years. It was these dissatisfied masses, and not Polish help, that helped False Dmitry reach Moscow and reign there.
In Moscow, False Dmitry also did not turn into a Polish protege. He was in no hurry to fulfill his promises. Orthodoxy remained the state religion; Moreover, the tsar did not allow the construction of Catholic churches in Russia. He did not give up either Smolensk or the Seversk land to the king and only offered to pay a ransom for them. He even came into conflict with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The fact is that in Warsaw they did not recognize the royal title for Russian sovereigns and called them only grand dukes. And False Dmitry even began to call himself Caesar, i.e. emperor. During the solemn audience, False Dmitry for a long time refused to even take from the hands of the Polish ambassador the letter addressed to the Grand Duke. In Poland they were clearly dissatisfied with False Dmitry, who allowed himself to act independently.
When pondering the possible prospect of False Dmitry’s establishment on the throne, there is no point in taking into account his imposture: monarchical legitimacy cannot be a criterion for determining the essence of a political line. It seems that the personality of False Dmitry was a good chance for the country: brave and decisive, educated in the spirit of Russian medieval culture and at the same time touched by the Western European circle, not succumbing to attempts to subjugate Russia to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. But this opportunity was also not given fruition. The trouble with False Dmitry is that he was an adventurer. We usually have only a negative meaning in this concept. Or maybe in vain? After all, an adventurer is a person who sets goals that exceed the means he has to achieve them. Without a dose of adventurism, it is impossible to achieve success in politics. It’s just that we usually call an adventurer who has achieved success an outstanding politician.
The means that False Dmitry had at his disposal were indeed not adequate to his goals. The hopes that different forces placed on him contradicted one another. We have already seen that he did not justify those that were placed on him in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. To gain the support of the nobility, False Dmitry generously distributed land and money. But both are not infinite. False Dmitry borrowed money from monasteries. Together with leaked information about the Tsar's Catholicism, the loans alarmed the clergy and caused their murmurs. The peasants hoped that the good Tsar Dmitry would restore the right to move to St. George’s Day, taken from them by Godunov. But without coming into conflict with the nobility, False Dmitry could not do this. Therefore, serfdom was confirmed and only permission was given to the peasants who left their masters in the years of famine to remain in new places. This meager concession did not satisfy the peasants, but at the same time caused discontent among some of the nobles. Not a single social layer within the country, not a single force outside its borders had any reason to support the tsar. That is why he was overthrown from the throne so easily.
My opinion is that False Dmitry I, unlike Boris Godunov, was not so active in state affairs. Of course, he also came to power thanks to his cunning. But still, during his reign, many segments of the population were dissatisfied with his policies. And besides, he secretly converted to Catholicism, which was not acceptable for the ruler of Russia.
