PEASANT WARS IN RUSSIA XVII-XVIII CENTURIES.
INTRODUCTION ………………………………………………………………………. 3
1. TIME OF TROUBLES.
1.1. Causes of the peasant war in the beginning of the 11th century …………………………. five
1.2. Peasants' War early XVII century ……………………………………… 7
1.3. A look at the events of the early 17th century
like a civil war in Russia ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………12
2. REBELLION LEADED BY S. T. RAZIN.
2.1. The course of the uprising ………………………………………………………………... 16
2.2. V. M. Solovyov about the Razin movement …………………………………….. 17
3. PEASANT WAR LEADED BY EI PUGACHEV.
3.1. Events preceding the start of the war ………………………………….. 24
3.2. The course of the peasant war ……………………………………………………. 25
3.5. Some features of the Pugachev movement …………………………. 28
CONCLUSION …………………………………………………………………... 30
BIBLIOGRAPHY ………………………………………………………………... 31
INTRODUCTION
The 17th century in the history of our country is a remarkable time, a turning point, filled with stormy and heroic events. This is the time when the era of the Middle Ages ends, the era of a new period, late feudalism, begins.
Despite the close interest in the 17th century, its serious study in historical science began rather late. True, the historians of the eighteenth century have already left us their judgments, but very general ones, about the preceding century.
From law school comes known theory enslavement and emancipation of estates in the 16th-19th centuries: the state, with the help of laws, enslaved all estates, forced them to serve their interests. Then it gradually liberated: first the nobles (a decree of 1762 on the freedom of the nobles), then the merchants (a charter to the cities of 1785) and peasants (a decree of 1861 on the abolition of serfdom). This scheme is very far from reality: the feudal lords, as is known, constituted the ruling class from the time of Kievan Rus, and the peasants - the exploited class, while the state acted as a defender of the interests of the feudal lords.
In accordance with the point of view of historians of the state school, the struggle of classes, estates was regarded as a manifestation of the anti-state, anarchist principle. The peasants are not the main driving force of the uprisings, but a passive mass, capable only of escaping from their masters or following the Cossacks during the years of numerous "troubles", when the latter sought to plunder, not obeying the organized principle - the state.
Problem social peace and social conflicts has always been and remains relevant for our country.
Soviet historians as the basis for studying the history of Russia in the 17th-18th centuries. put the idea of the leading importance of two factors: the development of the economy and class struggle. The development of the economy, the evolution of classes and estates, had a significant inhibitory effect on the feudal regime, which reached its climax precisely in these centuries. The tightening of exploitation by the feudal lords and state punitive bodies causes an increase in the protest of the lower ranks of the people. No wonder the 17th century was called “rebellious” by contemporaries.
History of the class struggle in Russia in the 17th-18th centuries. is the subject of close attention, but to which various judgments have been made. There is no unity among historians in assessing the first and second Peasant Wars - their chronological framework, stages, effectiveness, historical role, etc. For example, some researchers reduce the first of them to the uprising of I.I. the movements of the time of the first and second impostors, both militias, and so on, up to the peasant-Cossack uprisings of 1613-1614 and even 1617-1618. The Moscow uprisings of 1682 and 1698, some authors, adhering to the old tradition, call "reactionary riots" directed against Peter's reforms (although the latter had not yet begun). Other historians see these uprisings as complex, controversial, but generally anti-feudal uprisings.
Research on these and other issues is carried out on a broad front: this is the publication of sources (chronicles, discharge, embassy, boyar books, documents on the history of popular uprisings, culture, etc.), their comparative study, the preparation of books on a wide range of problems of socio-economic, political , cultural development of the country in one of the critical eras of national history.
In this work, I will try to consider the history of the Peasant Wars in Russia in the 17th-18th centuries. taking into account different points of view on the basis of scientific monographs and articles of historians of the XIX-XX centuries. The paper also used documents on the history of peasant wars in Russia (11; 19; 25).
1. TIME OF TROUBLES.
1.1. Causes of the peasant war beganXVIIcentury.
At the turn of the XVI-XVII centuries, the Russian state entered a period of deep state-political and socio-economic, structural crisis, the roots of which went back to the era of the reign of Ivan the Terrible. Livonian War, oprichnina terror and the growth of feudal exploitation led to the collapse of the country's economy, which led to an economic crisis, which, in turn, stimulated the strengthening of serfdom. Against this background, inevitably increased social tension at the bottom. On the other hand, the nobility also experienced social dissatisfaction, which claimed to expand their rights and privileges, which would be more in line with their increased role in the state.
The political causes of the unrest were very deep. The autocratic tyrannical model of the relationship between power and society, embodied by Ivan the Terrible, proved to be limited in the conditions of the changed social structure. In a state that has already ceased to be a collection of disparate lands and principalities, but has not yet turned into an organic whole, the agenda is the hardest question- Who and how can influence the adoption of government decisions.
The political crisis also led to a dynastic crisis, which was associated with the suppression of the dynasty of Moscow tsars - descendants of Ivan Kalita after the death of Tsarevich Dmitry in Uglich on May 15, 1591 (many contemporaries blamed Boris Godunov for his death, although the materials of the commission of inquiry spoke of the opposite) and death who had an heir to Tsar Fedor Ivanovich on January 6, 1598. The election to the kingdom in February 1598 of Boris Godunov, who had been the de facto ruler of Russia since 1587, did not solve the problem. On the contrary, contradictions intensified among the groupings of the elite of the Moscow boyars. The situation was complicated by the widespread since the mid-80s. legends about the “tsarevich-deliverer”, which undermined the authority of Tsar Boris, who did not have the advantages of a hereditary monarch.
Achievements of Boris Godunov's policy in the 90s. 16th century were fragile, because they were based on an overstrain of the country's socio-economic potential, which inevitably led to a social explosion. Discontent covered all sectors of society: the nobility and the boyars were outraged by the curtailment of their tribal rights, the service nobility was not satisfied with the policy of the government, which was unable to stop the flight of the peasants, which significantly reduced the profitability of their estates, the townspeople opposed the township building and increased tax oppression, the Orthodox clergy were dissatisfied curtailment of their privileges and rigid submission to autocratic power.
At the beginning of the century, the country was struck by a terrible crop failure. This disaster brought the main draft population of the country to complete ruin. A wave of numerous unrest and uprisings of the starving common people is growing. Government forces had difficulty suppressing such "revolts".
However, Peasant Wars are different from peasant uprisings of this kind. They cover a significant territory of the country, unite the totality of powerful popular movements, often representing heterogeneous forces. In the peasant war, a standing army of rebels operates, the country splits up, as it were, into two parts, in one of which the power of the rebels, and in the other - the power of the king. The slogans of the peasant war are of an all-Russian character.
In the Peasant War of the beginning of the 17th century, three large periods are distinguished: the first period (1603-1605), major event of which there was Cotton's rebellion; the second period (1606-1607) - a peasant uprising led by I. I. Bolotnikov; third period (1608-1615) - the decline of the Peasant War, accompanied by a number of major uprisings of peasants, townspeople, Cossacks, etc. (17.106).
1.2. The Peasant War beganXVIIcentury.
As already mentioned, at the beginning of the century, the situation in the country worsened due to crop failures. In 1601 it rained for more than two months. Then very early, in mid-August, frost hit and snow fell, which led to the death of the crop. The prices have increased several times. Bread speculation began. In the next year, 1602, winter crops again failed to sprout. Again, as in 1601, early cold came. Prices have already risen more than 100 times. The people were starving, mass epidemics began.
Boris Godunov organized state works. He attracted Muscovites and refugees who flooded into the capital for construction, using the already existing experience in building the Ivan the Great Bell Tower, distributed bread from state bins, allowed serfs to leave their masters and look for opportunities to feed themselves. But all these measures were not successful. Rumors spread that the country was punished for violating the order of succession to the throne, for the sins of Godunov.
In the center of the country (1603-1604) an uprising of serfs broke out under the leadership of Khlopko Kosolap. It was brutally suppressed, and Khlopok was executed in Moscow. Many historians consider this uprising the first stage of the Peasants' War of the early 17th century.
In the neighboring Commonwealth, they were only waiting for a reason to intervene in the internal affairs of a weakened Russia. In 1602, a man appeared on the estate of Prince Adam Vishnevetsky, posing as the son of Ivan IV, Tsarevich Dmitry, who miraculously survived, who died in Uglich on May 15, 1591. In reality, it was the Galich nobleman Grigory Otrepiev, a monk of the Chudov Monastery, who belonged to the retinue of Patriarch Job and was closely associated with the Romanovs.
By the beginning of 1605, more than 20 thousand people had gathered under the banner of the "prince". On April 13, 1605, Tsar Boris Godunov suddenly died and his 16-year-old son Fyodor ascended the throne. The boyars did not recognize the new king. On May 7, the tsarist army went over to the side of False Dmitry. Tsar Fedor was overthrown and strangled along with his mother.
However, hopes for the "kind and just" Tsar Dmitry Ivanovich soon collapsed. A Polish protege, an outspoken political adventurer, sat on the Russian throne. On the night of May 17, 1606, an uprising of the townspeople began. The conspirators broke into the Kremlin and brutally killed False Dmitry 1.
Three days later, the well-born boyar Vasily Ivanovich Shuisky, the former organizer and inspirer of the conspiracy, who had previously been convicted of intrigue and poisoned by False Dmitry into exile, was “called out” from the Execution Ground on Red Square as the new tsar.
The man who, by the will of fate, found himself on the throne of Moscow, did not enjoy either authority or folk love. The main quality of Shuisky's character was hypocrisy, his favorite way of fighting was intrigue and lies. Like Godunov, he successfully learned all the lessons of the reign of Ivan the Terrible, was distrustful, cunning, but did not possess either a statesman's mind or the experience of Tsar Boris. This man was not able to stop the collapse of statehood and overcome the social split.
From the very beginning, Shuisky did not enjoy wide support. The banner of the opposition again became the name of Tsar Dmitry Ivanovich, who, according to rumors, escaped from the conspirators this time as well. Shuisky was opposed by the population of border counties, disgraced supporters of False Dmitry, such as the governor of Putivl, Prince G. Shakhovsky and the governor of Chernigov, Prince A. Telyatevsky. Opposition moods swept the noble corporations. In the summer of 1606, the movement began to acquire an organized character. The leader also appeared - Ivan Isaevich Bolotnikov.
The second stage of the Peasants' War began.
Serfdom was a heterogeneous social stratum. The top serfs, close to their owners, occupied a fairly high position. It is no coincidence that many provincial nobles willingly changed their status to serfs. I. Bolotnikov, apparently, belonged to their number. He was a military servant of A. Telyatevsky and, most likely, a nobleman by origin. However, one should not attach too much importance to this: the social orientation of a person's views was determined not only by origin. The “nobility” of Bolotnikov can be explained by his military talents and the qualities of an experienced warrior.
There is news of Bolotnikov's stay in the Crimean and Turkish captivity, as an oarsman in a galley captured by the "Germans". There is an assumption that, returning from captivity through Italy, Germany, the Commonwealth, Bolotnikov managed to fight on the side of the Austrian emperor as the leader of a mercenary Cossack detachment against the Turks. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain why it was he who received the powers of the “big governor” from a man who pretended to be Tsar Dmitry.
The rebels, gathered under the banner of "Tsar Dmitry Ivanovich", were a complex conglomerate of forces. Here were not only people from the lower classes, but also service people in the instrument and the fatherland. They were united in their rejection of the newly elected king, different in their social aspirations. After a successful battle near Kromy in August 1606, the rebels occupied Yelets, Tula, Kaluga, Kashira, and by the end of the year approached Moscow. There were not enough forces for a complete blockade of the capital, and this made it possible for Shuisky to mobilize all his resources. By this time, a split had occurred in the camp of the rebels, and the detachments of Lyapunov (November) and Pashkov (early December) went over to the side of Shuisky.
The battle near Moscow on December 2, 1606 ended in the defeat of Bolotnikov. The latter, after a series of battles, retreated to Tula, under the protection of the stone walls of the city. V. Shuisky himself spoke out against the rebels and in June 1607. approached Tula. For several months, the tsarist troops unsuccessfully tried to take the city, until they blocked the Upa River and flooded the fortress. Shuisky's opponents, relying on his gracious word, opened the gates. However, the king did not miss the opportunity to deal with the leaders of the movement.
It is rather difficult to assess the nature of the Bolotnikov uprising. It seems one-sided view of the movement exclusively as the highest stage of the peasant war. However, this view exists, and the supporters of this view give the following assessments of the first Peasants' War. (17, 108)
Some of them believe that she delayed the legal registration of serfdom for 50 years, others believe that, on the contrary, she accelerated the process of legal registration of serfdom, which ended in 1649.
Some historians express a different view of the events described above. In their opinion, the “program of the movement” remains unknown to us: all the surviving documents that can be used to judge the demands of the rebels belong to the government camp. In the interpretation of Shuisky, the rebels called on the Muscovites to destroy the "nobles and the strong", to divide their property. Patriarch Hermogenes announced that “the Bolotnikovites order the boyar serfs to beat their boyars, and their wives and estates, and promise them estates” (9, 174), promising “to give the boyars, and the voivodship, and the okolnichestvo, and the deacon” (9, 174) . There are cases of the so-called "thieves' dachas", when the estates of the supporters of Tsar Vasily were transferred to the supporters of the "legitimate sovereign Dmitry Ivanovich". Thus, the struggle was aimed not so much at the destruction of the existing social system, but on the change of persons and entire social groups within it. The participants in the speech, former peasants, serfs, sought to be constituted in the new social status of service people, “free Cossacks”. The nobility, dissatisfied with the accession of Shuisky, also sought to improve its status. There was an acute, rather complex and contradictory social struggle, going beyond the framework outlined by the concept of the peasant war. This struggle naturally complemented the struggle for power - after all, only the victory of one of the contenders ensured the consolidation of the rights of his supporters. This confrontation itself turned into an armed struggle, by whole armies.
The lower classes of society also took part in the social confrontation. However, the anti-serfdom fervor found its expression, first of all, in the weakening, and subsequently in the progressive destruction of statehood. In the context of the crisis of all structures of power, it was increasingly difficult to keep the peasants from leaving. In an effort to enlist the support of the nobility, Shuisky March 9, 1607. issued an extensive serf legislation, which provided for a significant increase in the term of the lesson years. The search for fugitives became official duty the local administration, which from now on had to ask each newcomer “firmly, whose he is, where he came from, and when he fled” (9, 174). For the first time, monetary sanctions were introduced for accepting a fugitive. However, the Code of 1607. was more declarative. In the context of the events for the peasantry, the problem became urgent not of an exit restored without prior notice, but of finding an owner and a place of new residence that would ensure the stability of life.
Events in the early 17th century a number of historians are interpreted as a civil war in Russia. However, not all researchers share this point of view. Emphasizing the absence of clear lines of social and political confrontation, they consider all events within the framework outlined by contemporaries themselves - as a time of turmoil - troubled times.
1.3. A look at the events of the beginningXVIIcentury as a civil war
in Russia.
For centuries, scientists have been struggling to unravel the causes and meaning of the Time of Troubles. Progress in the study of unrest was achieved thanks to the works of S.F. Platonov, I.I. Smirnov, A.A. Zimin, V.I. Koretsky and other scientists who considered it as a social phenomenon, prepared by the entire course of the previous development of the country. But already in the course of the discussion that unfolded on the pages of the journal Questions of History in the late 1950s, many vulnerabilities in the existing concepts were also revealed. Both the attempts of a number of Soviet historians to consider the Time of Troubles only from the point of view of the peasant war, and the constructions of S.F. Platonov and I.I. Smirnov, according to which a single complex of events of the Time of Troubles was divided into separate, unrelated stages, were criticized. N.E. Nosov then expressed a judgment about the Time of Troubles as a civil war, which was a complex interweaving of class, intra-class and international struggle. However, until recently, the events of the beginning of the 17th century were considered mainly from the point of view of the class struggle of peasants and serfs, the culmination of which was considered the Bolotnikov uprising. The other classes that participated in the Time of Troubles were not given due attention. A significant contribution to the study of the Time of Troubles belongs to the historian L.L. Stanislavsky (1939-1990): we are talking, first of all, about his research on the history of the Cossacks.
In Soviet science, the Cossack uprisings of the early 17th century were traditionally viewed as an integral part of the peasant war, and the Cossacks themselves as the vanguard of a broad popular anti-serf uprising. Rightly linking the speeches of the Cossacks with the protest of the masses against social oppression, the researchers at the same time essentially identified the goals of the Cossacks and the peasantry, thereby downplaying (contrary to the direct indications of the sources) the independent and active role of the Cossacks in the events of the Time of Troubles.
L.L. Stanislavsky convincingly proves that it was the Cossacks who formed the core of the rebel armies of False Dmitry I, Bolotnikov and the “Tushino thief” and most consistently supported the impostors. As their power increased, the Cossacks more and more clearly manifested their claims to power in the country, to the role of a new ruling class, which seriously threatened the very existence of the nobility. Only the incompleteness of the class (military) organization of the Cossacks, the author notes, did not allow the Cossacks to seize power in the First Militia even at the moment of the greatest weakening of the nobility.
Until 1619. The "free" Cossacks, acting under the banner of impostors, their chosen leaders - Pan Lisovsky and Prince Vladislav, posed a serious threat to the existing social order.
“Who were the Cossacks after all? The vanguard of the revolutionary peasantry or the robber condottieri? Liberators of Russia from foreign invaders or their accomplices? Fighters with feudal exploitation or...?" (23, 5). Stanislavsky gives a clear and precise answer to this question: “They were ... Cossacks and did everything possible to remain Cossacks until they had to retreat before all the might of the Russian state” (23, 242). With the help of facts, he proved that the nucleus Cossack army were former peasants and serfs, for whom leaving for the Cossack villages meant liberation from feudal dependence. Thus, the conclusion of Soviet historiography about the close connection between the Cossack movement of the early 17th century and the protest of the broad masses of the people against social oppression and serfdom is confirmed.
At the same time, the Cossacks are a complex and contradictory phenomenon, which far from fit into the framework of the usual ideas about the Time of Troubles as a peasant war.
An important pattern for understanding the fate of the "free" Cossacks is that as the formation of the class organization of the Cossacks, its interests diverged more and more clearly from the interests of other classes - not only the nobility, but also the bulk of the peasantry.
The termination of the existence of a single class of “free” Cossacks is connected not so much with its internal stratification, but with powerful pressure from the feudal state, the targeted policy of the government of Mikhail Fedorovich, which resulted in the dispersion of the Cossacks over different territories, estates and owners.
The study of the history of the Cossacks, one of the main driving forces of the Time of Troubles, allows us to look at the era of the Time of Troubles from a new angle as a whole. Many historians believe that the social protest of the peasantry at the beginning of the 17th century did not acquire a pronounced class orientation and resulted in special, specific forms - going to the Cossacks and participating in the Cossack movement. But the Cossacks themselves were by no means suitable for the role of the "revolutionary vanguard" of the peasantry and. moreover, the class interests of the Cossacks often came into conflict with the interests of the bulk of the working population. This forces many historians to reconsider the traditional ideas about the Time of Troubles (and the Bolotnikov uprising, in particular) as a peasant war.
It is proved that one of the main springs for the development of the Time of Troubles was the antagonism between the Cossacks and the nobility, who for a decade and a half waged a sharp, uncompromising struggle for power in the country and influence in the army. But the matter was not limited to the clash of these two forces. There is interesting data on the performances during the Time of Troubles by the southern nobility, which, in terms of social status, stood close to instrumental service people and suffered from expansion into their lands by the Moscow nobility.
Important for understanding the balance of power within the nobility on the eve and during the Time of Troubles are early research A.L. Stanislavsky (23) on the history of the sovereign's court, in which he revealed the existence of serious contradictions between the privileged capital and district nobility, as well as between the nobles of the center and the outskirts. The history of the nobility in the Time of Troubles needs further study. However, it is already clear that it was not just a “fellow traveler”, but played an active and independent role in the events of the early 17th century.
The works of A.L. Stanislavsky represent a new direction in the study of the Time of Troubles, which was based not only on the antagonism between the nobility and the peasantry, but also on a deep split within the service class. This split was due to the post-oprichne crisis of land ownership, the fall of the former importance of the noble cavalry, a change in the balance of power between the nobility and the lower strata of the service class, a serious divergence of interests of various bureaucratic and territorial groups service people. Further study of the Time of Troubles in this vein is an urgent task of historical science.
2. REVOLUTION LEADED BY S. T. RAZIN.
2.1. The course of the uprising.
The culmination of social actions in the 17th century was the uprising of the Cossacks and peasants led by S.T. Razin. This movement originated in the villages of the Don Cossacks. The Don freemen have always attracted fugitives from the southern and central regions of the Russian state. Here they were protected by the unwritten law "no extradition from the Don." The government, needing the services of the Cossacks for the defense of the southern borders, paid them a salary and put up with the self-government that existed there.
Stepan Timofeevich Razin, a native of the village of Zimoveyskaya, belonged to the homely Cossacks - he enjoyed great authority. In 1667 he led a detachment of a thousand people, who went on a campaign "for zipuns" (to the Volga, and then to the Yaik River, where he took Yaitsky town).
In the summer of 1668 already almost 20,000 Razin's army successfully operated in the possessions of Persia (Iran) on the Caspian coast. The captured valuables were exchanged by the Razintsy for Russian prisoners who replenished their ranks. The following summer, 1669, the Cossacks defeated the fleet near Pig Island (south of Baku), equipped against them by the Persian Shah. This greatly complicated Russian-Iranian relations and aggravated the government's position towards the Cossacks.
In October 1669 Razin returned to the Don through Astrakhan, where he was greeted with triumph. Inspired by good luck, he set about preparing a new campaign, this time "for the good king" against the "traitors of the boyars." The next campaign of the Cossacks along the Volga to the north turned into a peasant turmoil. The Cossacks remained the military core, and with the influx into the detachment of a huge number of fugitive peasants, the peoples of the Volga region - Mordovians, Tatars, Chuvashs - the social orientation of the movement changed dramatically.
In May 1670, a 7,000-strong detachment of S.T. Razin captured the city of Tsaritsyn, at the same time, detachments of archers sent from Moscow and Astrakhan were defeated. Having approved the Cossack administration in Astrakhan, Razin moved north - Saratov and Samara voluntarily went over to his side. S. Razin addressed the population of the Volga region with “charming” (from the word: seduce, call) letters in which he urged them to join the uprising and harass traitors, that is, boyars, nobles, governors, clerks. The uprising covered a vast territory, on which numerous detachments were operating, led by atamans M. Osipov, M. Kharitonov, V. Fedorov, nun Alena and others.
In September, Razin's army approached Simbirsk, and stubbornly besieged it for a month. The frightened government announced mobilization - in August 1679, a 60,000-strong army headed for the Middle Volga region. In early October, a government detachment led by Y. Baryatinsky defeated the main forces of Razin and joined the Simbirsk garrison under the command of governor I. Miloslavsky. Razin with a small detachment went to the Don, where he hoped to recruit a new army, but was betrayed by the top of the Cossacks and handed over to the government. June 4, 1671 he was taken to Moscow and executed on Red Square two days later. In November 1671 fell Astrakhan - the last stronghold of the rebels. The participants in the uprising were severely repressed.
2.2. V. M. Solovyov about the Razin movement.
The theme of the Razin uprising - the largest popular movement in Russia in the 17th century. has always aroused great interest among researchers of the history of our country in the early Middle Ages. It is not surprising that even now, when national historiography there was a revision of the concepts that dominated in the recent past, historians turn to it. The socio-psychological and many other issues related to the uprising were once reflected in the works of V.I. Buganov and A.N. Sakharov, who still retain priority positions.
V. M. Solovyov (21), who is responsible for a number of interesting studies, is also working very fruitfully in this direction. In this part of the work, I want to present a concentrated analysis of the views of V. M. Solovyov on the Razin movement and its leader.
V. M. Solovyov considered it possible to evaluate the Razin uprising as a “Russian rebellion”. Considering the Razin movement as a "Russian rebellion", he does not refuse to assess the events that took place under Stepan Razin as an uprising, but at a certain stage of their development - as a peasant war.
V. M. Solovyov revealed the complex dialectical essence of the events of 1667 - 1671. In a historical context, they appear as a bizarre fusion of diverse and diverse elemental manifestations, in which the features of meaningless and ruthless rebellion, a blind rebellion, and all the signs of a huge popular uprising, and the characteristics of the so-called peasant war, and much more, from a purely Cossack movement directed against etatism - the dictates of the state, to national liberation, religious uprisings. Finally, in these events, adventurous beginnings (hoax with the false Tsarevich Alexei and the imaginary patriarch Nikon, etc.) and banal robbery, criminality (pogroms, robberies) powerfully make themselves felt. All this is not separated from one another, but coexists, is closely intertwined, and often collides with each other due to deep internal contradictions inherent in the very nature of discord - an extremely motley, confusing and very diverse phenomenon in terms of composition of participants.
Solovyov decided to oppose the historical reality, recreated according to the sources, to the myths about the Razin time, about the Razin uprising and about its leader himself. One of the myths that have taken root in the mass consciousness is the 17th century, when the good old Russian customs, general contentment and prosperity allegedly dominated. On the big factual material V. M. Solovyov showed how difficult was the fate of people from different strata of Russian society and, especially from its lower classes - the poor part of the township, peasants and serfs, how strong was the omnipotence of people close to the tsar and the arbitrariness of the local administration. He pays special attention to the Council Code and the consequences of its adoption for the country. Emphasizing that its adoption was accelerated both by a series of major urban uprisings in Russia and by a revolution in England, which made a great impression on the ruling circles of all European countries, Solovyov saw in the Council Code "essentially a pacifying bridle on the people" and in the establishment of an indefinite investigation of the fugitives - its "center of gravity" and "main social meaning" (21, 25). Analysis of the content of the Code allowed the historian to show why the Razin uprising, started by the Don Cossacks, grew into a mass popular movement of public protest, covering a significant part of the state.
Another myth is about the boundless kindness of the "quietest" Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich. In part, perhaps, he was inspired by the words of V.O. Klyuchevsky, taken out of context, that this tsar is “ kindest person, glorious Russian soul" (10). At the same time, V.O. Klyuchevsky noted, however, the complexity and inconsistency of the nature of the tsar, who was in no way “higher than the rudest of his subjects” (10), a characteristic that is often not taken into account. Solovyov cited several vivid and convincing facts showing this sovereign as a tyrant.
Another myth is about the isolation of the Don Cossacks, among whom the Razin uprising began, from the population of cities and districts of Central Russia, from peasants and townspeople, from small service people. It must be admitted that there are certain grounds for such a myth. They are connected with the essential features that the Cossack community had in comparison with the population of inner Russia in the way of life and in everyday life, in mentality and culture. But with all this, the Don people in the 17th century. had relatives in Russia. They often came to them and lived with them, and at home they received people who came for a while from the center of the country. They took such people with them on military campaigns, gave them at the "duvan" part of the booty due to them, and some of them even defended Azov during the siege of 1641. Solovyov is characterized by an exceptionally balanced approach to resolving the very difficult question of how connected the Don was with internal Russia. He managed to emphasize the originality and isolation of the Cossacks and at the same time their close connection with the population of Central Russia. The historian sees the manifestation of such a connection in the course of the Razin uprising itself.
At present, the view of the largest popular uprisings in Russia in the 17th-18th centuries, including the Razin uprising, as an uprising of the outskirts against the central government, has become widespread. Its supporters, M. M. Sokolsky and G. G. Nolte, point to the presence of serious contradictions between the center and the outskirts. At the same time, according to G.G. Nolte, the desire of their population to ensure greater self-determination of the regions was an important requirement of the new time, since this could contribute to their accelerated development. According to Solovyov, such contradictions are indeed one of the most important reasons for the Razin uprising. So, he notes that the Don Cossacks had "their own reasons for discontent, their own accounts with the government." They were not satisfied that gradually "Don became increasingly dependent on the Russian state." The danger of losing freemen "turned into violent resistance" of the Cossacks, which ultimately resulted in the Razin uprising (21, 81). The historian sees special reasons for the performance of the population of such a peculiar outskirts as Astrakhan, with its developed trade. The Astrakhans hoped to get rid of taxes and extortion with the help of Razin, to establish their own trade and profit from the wealth of others.
At the same time, Solovyov does not share the opinion that the Razin movement is only an uprising of the "common people of the inner Russian outskirts" (15, 36). If we consider the outskirts of the country those territories that were located to the south and east of the notch line, and the inner counties - to the north and west of it, then in the fall of 1670. the uprising spread to the inner counties up to Unzha and Vetluga, the Makariev Zheltovodsky Monastery and Arzamas. Solovyov calculated that the “peasant war zone” included 110 cities (21, 114), and the aspirations and aspirations of its participants, both in the central part of the country and outside it, were largely similar. There are grounds for speaking about the outskirts during the Razin uprising, but it would hardly be true to reduce the uprising only to this (however, just as well as only to the peasant war). Closer to the truth is the view of the Razin uprising and similar popular movements as a “complex and colorful phenomenon” that cannot be limited to “purely class boundaries” (20, 134).
However, popular movements are not only complex, but also deeply contradictory historical phenomena. Solovyov repeatedly emphasized the contradictions of the Razin uprising. Of particular interest is how he highlighted the contradictions between the aspirations of the people who supported Razin, and real results the temporary victory of the Razintsy in certain regions of the country and, first of all, in Astrakhan, where the rebels held out the longest. Instead of the voivodship power, the Astrakhan Posad found itself under the rule of the Razin atamans, and the exactions and arbitrariness of the governors and clerks were replaced by the establishment of forced equality, the introduction of "military administration" and the dictates of the "urban goal" (21, 97).
If we continue the comparative series begun by the historian, then it should be of undoubted interest to compare what the initiators and instigators of the uprising, the Don Cossacks, aspired to, and what they actually received from Razin. The movement, raised in defense of the traditions of the Don free life and Cossack democracy, turned into a violation of liberty. This was also manifested in the organization of the Razintsy into a special army, which was an attempt on the traditional combined arms unity on the Don and the Cossack brotherhood, and in the murder on the circle on April 12, 1670. the royal envoy G. Evdokamov, contrary to the will of the Don army and the norms of military law, and in repeated threats by Stepan Razin and his atamans against the foremen and Cossacks in the Cherkasy town. So instead of freedom and military democracy, the Razin Cossacks established their essentially unlimited omnipotence on the Don. Largely due to this, by the spring of 1671. Razin had many opponents among the Don Cossacks. Apparently, the discrepancy between the aspirations, hopes, aspirations of the participants in popular movements in Russia and the results of these movements is a historical pattern. Of interest is the question posed by Solovyov - what could await the country in the event of a "successful outcome" of the Razin uprising? The historian substantiated the possibility of implementing such a historical alternative, firstly, by the fact that there are cases when peasant wars were won (Norway, China, Ukraine under Bogdan Khmelnitsky), and, secondly, by the fact that Razin could not have stayed at Simbirsk and lead his army "without turning and without delay ... through the agricultural regions with a peasant population to Moscow" (21, 193). However, to the question that naturally arises after this - what would happen next? - Solovyov did not answer. In his opinion, the "lack of clearly defined goals and objectives of the struggle among the rebels and, in general, the extreme contradictory nature of their goals" makes it difficult to give an answer (21, 194). The only thing that is completely clear to the historian is the groundlessness and utopianism of hopes for a “nationwide revolt” as a breakthrough “into the world of enlightened democratic freedom and civilized relations” (21, 194).
Solovyov, of course, is right when he does not try to clarify and concretize the picture of the life of the country in the event of the seizure of power by the Razintsy and is limited only to a general indication of Negative consequences such an outcome of the uprising. At the same time, it is difficult to agree with the historian regarding the possibility of the military success of the Razintsy. Apparently, Solovyov nevertheless underestimated the power of the state and the degree of its superiority over the rebels. Razin could not abandon the fight for Simbirsk and go directly to Moscow. This was due to the peculiarities of the military-strategic thinking of the Don Cossacks, who traditionally attached exceptional importance to the waterway, and to the peculiarities of military tactics in all the largest popular movements in Russia in the 17th-18th centuries, a typical feature of which was the desire to master large fortified cities. And in general, Moscow was too tough a nut to crack for the rebels. Even during the Time of Troubles, when the state was weakened, Ivan Bolotnikov could not take it. Thus, Razin could hardly count on military victory. Nevertheless, the question of an alternative outcome of the uprising is of undoubted interest. The search for an answer to it allows us to better understand the nature of the events that took place under Razin and the very essence of popular uprisings in Russia.
Such a very interesting important problem, as the influence of the Razin uprising on the policy of the Russian government after its suppression. The authorities did a lot for that. to prevent something like this from happening again. However, the very low effectiveness of the measures taken is striking: the riots in Russia up to the Bulavin uprising followed, in essence, a continuous series. Raising and resolving the issue of the reasons for the inability of the leaders of Russian society to find effective mechanisms to counteract the rebellious spirit widespread among the people will not only allow a deeper understanding of the nature and characteristics of the country's development at the end of the 17th - 18th centuries, but, perhaps, shed New World on the historical tragedy of modern Russia.
In general, V. M. Solovyov made a valuable contribution to the study of the history of the Razin movement. He managed to show the uprising led by S. Razin as a very difficult phenomenon, which cannot be given an unambiguous assessment.
3. PEASANT WAR LEADED
E.I.PUGACHEVA.
3.1. Events leading up to the start of the war.
Second half of the 18th century characterized by a sharp increase in social activity working population: owner, monastic and ascribed peasants, working people of manufactories, peoples of the Volga region, Bashkiria, Yaik Cossacks. It reached its apogee in the peasant war under the leadership of E. I. Pugachev.
On Yaik, where in September 1773. an impostor appeared, posing as Peter III, favorable conditions were created for his calls to resonate first with the Cossacks, and then with the peasants, working people, the Bashkirs and the peoples of the Volga region.
The tsarist government on Yaik, as elsewhere, where it ceased to need the services of the Cossacks for the defense of the border territory, began to pursue a policy of limiting its privileges: back in the 40s. the election of military chieftains was canceled, the Cossacks began to be recruited for service away from their native places. The economic interests of the Cossacks were also infringed - at the mouth of the river. Yaik, the government built uchugs (barriers) that prevented the movement of fish from the Caspian Sea to the upper reaches of the river.
The infringement of privileges caused the division of the Cossacks into two camps. The so-called "obedient" side was ready to agree to the loss of former liberties for the sake of preserving part of the privileges. The bulk was the "disobedient side", constantly sending walkers to the Empress with complaints about the oppression of the "obedient" Cossacks, in whose hands were all command posts.
In January 1772, the "naughty" Cossacks went with banners and icons to the tsarist general who arrived in Yaitsky town with a request to remove the military ataman and foremen. The general ordered to shoot at the peaceful procession. The Cossacks responded with an uprising, to suppress which the government sent a corps of troops.
After the events of January 13, the Cossack circle was banned and the military office was liquidated, the Cossacks were controlled by an appointed commandant, who was subordinate to the Orenburg governor. At this time, Pugachev appeared.
None of his impostor predecessors possessed the qualities of a leader capable of leading the masses of the dispossessed. The success of Pugachev, in addition, contributed favorable environment and those people to whom he turned for help to restore his allegedly trampled rights: on Yaik, the excitement from the recent uprising and the government's response did not subside; Cossacks owned weapons and represented the most militarily organized part of the population of Russia.
3.2. The course of the peasant war.
The uprising began on September 17, 1773. Before 80 Cossacks, initiated into the "secret" of the salvation of Peter III, a manifesto was read out, and the detachment set off. The manifesto satisfied the aspirations of the Cossacks: the tsar granted them a river, herbs, lead, gunpowder, provisions, salaries. This manifesto did not yet take into account the peasant interests. But even what was promised was enough that the next day the detachment numbered 200 people, replenishment poured into its composition every hour. The almost three-week triumphal procession of Pugachev began. On October 5, 1773, he approached the provincial city of Orenburg, a well-defended fortress with a garrison of three thousand. The assault on the city was unsuccessful, and a six-month siege began.
Near Orenburg, the government sent an army under the command of Major General Kara. However, the rebel troops utterly defeated the 1.5 thousandth detachment of Kara. The same fate befell the detachment of Colonel Chernyshov. These victories over the regular troops made a huge impression. The uprising - some voluntarily, others under duress, was joined by the Bashkirs, led by Salavat Yulaev, mining workers, peasants assigned to factories. At the same time, the appearance in Kazan of Kara, who shamefully fled from the battlefield, sowed panic among the local nobility. Anxiety gripped the capital of the empire.
In connection with the siege of Orenburg and the long standing at the walls of the fortress of troops, whose number in other months reached 30 thousand people, the leaders of the movement faced tasks that the practice of previous movements did not know: it was necessary to organize the supply of the rebel army with food and weapons, to recruit regiments, counter government propaganda with the popularization of the movement's slogans.
In Berd, the headquarters of "Emperor Peter III", located 5 versts from the besieged Orenburg, his own court etiquette develops, his own guard arises, the emperor acquires a seal with the inscription "Big state seal Peter III, Emperor and Autocrat of All Russia”, the young Cossack woman Ustinya Kuznetsova, whom Pugachev married, had ladies-in-waiting. At the headquarters, a body of military, judicial and administrative authority was created - the Military Collegium, which was in charge of the distribution of property seized from the nobles, officials and clergy, the recruitment of regiments, and the distribution of weapons.
In the usual form, borrowed from government practice. invested otherwise social content. The “king” did not favor noblemen as colonels, but representatives of the people. Former craftsman Afanasy Sokolov, better known by the nickname Khlopusha, became one of the prominent leaders of the insurgent army operating in the region of the factories of the Southern Urals. In the camp of the rebels appeared their own counts. The first of these was Chika-Zarubin, acting under the name of "Count Ivan Nikiforovich Chernyshev."
The proclamation of Pugachev as emperor, the formation of the Military Collegium, the introduction of count dignity, testifies to the inability of the peasantry and the Cossacks to change the old social order new - it was about changing faces.
In the months when Pugachev was busy with the siege of Orenburg, the government camp was intensively preparing to fight the rebels. Troops were hastily drawn to the area of the uprising, instead of the removed Kara, General Bibikov was appointed commander-in-chief. To inspire the nobles and express her solidarity with them, Catherine declared herself a Kazan landowner.
The first major battle of the Pugachevites with the punitive army took place on March 22, 1774 near the Tatishchev fortress, it lasted six hours and ended in a complete victory for government troops. But the element of the peasant war is such that the losses were quickly replenished.
After this defeat, the second stage of the peasant war began.
Pugachev was forced to lift the siege of Orenburg and, pursued by government troops, move east. From April to June, the main events of the peasant war unfolded on the territory of the mining Urals and Bashkiria. However, the burning of factories, the seizure of livestock and property from bonded peasants and working people, violence against the population of factory settlements, led to the fact that the factory owners managed to arm working people at their own expense, organize detachments from them and send them against Pugachev. This narrowed the base of the movement and broke the unity of the rebels. Near the Trinity fortress, Pugachev suffered another defeat, after which he rushed first to the northwest, and then to the west. The ranks of the rebels were replenished by the peoples of the Volga region: Udmurts, Mari, Chuvashs. When Pugachev approached Kazan on July 12, 1774, there were 20 thousand people in his army. He captured the city, but he did not have time to take control of the Kremlin, where the government troops settled - Michelson arrived in time to help the besieged and inflicted another defeat on the rebels. On July 17, Pugachev, together with the remnants of the defeated army, crossed to the right bank of the Volga - to areas inhabited by serfs and state peasants. The third period of the peasant war began.
Pugachev's manifestoes were of great importance in restoring the number of rebel troops. Already in the manifestos promulgated in November 1773, the peasants were called upon "villains and opponents of my imperial will", which meant the landowners, to take their lives, "and take their houses and all their estate as a reward." The manifesto of July 31, 1774, which proclaimed the liberation of the peasants from serfdom and taxes, most fully reflected the peasant aspirations. The nobles, as "disturbers of the empire and destroyers of the peasants", were to "catch, execute and hang and act in the same way as they, having no Christianity in themselves, repaired with you, the peasants."
On the right bank of the Volga, the peasant war flared up with renewed vigor - rebel detachments were created everywhere, acting disunitedly and out of touch with each other, which facilitated the punitive efforts of the government: Pugachev easily occupied the cities - Kurmysh, Temnikov, Insar, etc., but with the same ease and left them under pressure from superior forces of government troops. He moved to the Lower Volga, where barge haulers, Don, Volga and Ukrainian Cossacks joined him. In August, he approached Tsaritsyn, but did not take the city. With a small detachment, Pugachev crossed to the left bank of the Volga, where the Yaik Cossacks who were with him seized him and on September 12, 1774, handed him over to Mikhelson.
The peasant war ended in defeat.
3.3. Some features of the Pugachev movement.
It was impossible to expect a different outcome of spontaneous protest against the arbitrariness of the authorities and landlords: armed with whatever, the crowds of the rebels could not resist the regiments of a well-armed and trained regular army. Let us note some features of the Pugachev movement.
The main ones consisted in attempts to overcome spontaneity by means borrowed from the government administration: under the newly-appeared emperor Petre III the same order was established as at the royal court in St. Petersburg. In these actions of Pugachev, the purpose of the movement clearly emerges: its leaders were to take the place of the executed nobles and representatives of the tsarist administration.
The call for the wholesale destruction of the nobles, who were indeed put to death without trial or investigation, caused enormous damage to the development national culture because the most educated part of society was exterminated.
Another feature is that the rebels consciously and under the influence of the elements of destruction completely or partially defeated 89 iron and copper smelters, total cost, according to the data of the plant owners, certainly exaggerated, at 2716 thousand rubles. Noble nests were plundered European Russia engulfed by the peasant war.
The victors acted just as mercilessly and cruelly, putting to death thousands of participants in the movement. In one only Nizhny Novgorod province punishers built gallows in more than two hundred settlements. The Yaik Cossacks were renamed into the Ural Cossacks, and the Yaik River - into the Urals. The village of Zimoveyskaya, in which Pugachev was born, and a century before him - Razin, began to be called Potemkinskaya. On January 10, 1775, the leader of the peasant war and his associates were executed on Bolotnaya Square in Moscow. The nobility, headed by the "Kazan landowner" Catherine II, triumphed.
CONCLUSION.
Peasant wars in Russia created and developed traditions of struggle against lawlessness and oppression. They played their role in the history of the political and social development Russia.
Usually, assessing these events, historians note that the peasant wars dealt a blow to the feudal system and hastened the triumph of new capitalist relations. At the same time, it is often forgotten that the wars that engulfed the vast expanses of Russia led to the destruction of the masses of the population (and many peasants, a significant number of nobles), disrupted economic life in many regions and seriously affected the development of productive forces.
Violence and cruelty, fully shown by the opposing sides, could not solve any of the urgent problems of socio-economic development. The whole history of peasant wars and their consequences is the clearest confirmation of Pushkin's brilliant assessment: “The state of the entire region where the fire raged was terrible. God forbid to see a Russian rebellion - senseless and merciless. Those who are plotting impossible revolutions among us are either young and do not know our people, or they are cruelly hard-hearted people, to whom someone else's little head is a penny, and their own neck is a penny ”(7, 87).
What are peasant wars? A fair peasant punishment for the oppressors and feudal lords? Civil War in long-suffering Russia, during which Russians killed Russians? "Russian rebellion, senseless and merciless" (7, 87)? Each time gives its own answers to these questions. Apparently, any violence is capable of giving rise to even more cruel and bloody violence. It is immoral to idealize riots, peasant or Cossack uprisings (which, by the way, were done in our recent past), as well as civil wars, because generated by untruths and extortion, injustice and an irrepressible thirst for wealth, these uprisings, riots and wars themselves bring violence and injustice, grief and ruin, suffering and rivers of blood...
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PEASANT WARS IN RUSSIA XVII-XVIII CENTURIES. PLAN. INTRODUCTION 1. TIME OF TROUBLES. 1. Causes of the peasant war in the beginning of the 11th century. 2. The Peasant War of the early 17th century 3. A look at the events of the early 17th century as a civil war in Russia 2. THE REBELLION UNDER THE LEAD OF ST RAZIN. 2.1. The course of the uprising 16 2.2. VM Solovyov about the Razin movement 3. PEASANT WAR LEADED BY EI PUGACHEV. 1. Events preceding the start of the war 24 3.2. The course of the peasant war. 5. Some features of the Pugach movement. 28 CONCLUSION 30 BIBLIOGRAPHY 31 INTRODUCTION. The 17th century in the history of our country is a remarkable time, a turning point, filled with stormy and heroic events.
This is the time when the era of the Middle Ages ends, the era of a new period, late feudalism, begins.
Despite the keen interest in the 17th century, its serious study in historical science started quite late. True, the historians of the eighteenth century have already left us their judgments, but very general ones, about the preceding century. From the law school comes the well-known theory of enslavement and emancipation of estates in the 16th-19th centuries, the state, with the help of laws, enslaved all estates, forced them to serve their interests. Then, first, the decree of 1762 on the freedom of the nobles gradually liberated the nobles, then the merchants received a letter of commendation to the cities in 1785 and the peasants, the decree of 1861 on the abolition of serfdom.
This scheme is very far from reality, as is known, since the time of Kievan Rus, the feudal lords constituted the ruling class, and the peasants - the exploited class, while the state acted as a defender of the interests of the feudal lords. In accordance with the point of view of historians of the state school, the struggle of classes, estates was regarded as a manifestation of the anti-state, anarchist principle.
The peasants are not the main driving force of the uprisings, but a passive mass, capable only of escaping from their masters or following the Cossacks during the years of numerous troubles, when the latter sought to plunder, not obeying the organized principle - the state. The problem of social peace and social conflicts has always been and remains relevant for our country. Soviet historians as the basis for studying the history of Russia in the 17th-18th centuries. put forward the idea of the leading importance of two factors in the development of the economy and the class struggle.
The development of the economy, the evolution of classes and estates, had a significant inhibitory effect on the feudal regime, which reached its climax precisely in these centuries. The tightening of exploitation by the feudal lords and state punitive bodies causes an increase in the protest of the lower ranks of the people. No wonder contemporaries called the 17th century rebellious. History of the class struggle in Russia in the 17th-18th centuries. is the subject of close attention, but to which various judgments have been made.
There is no unity among historians in assessing the first and second Peasant Wars, their chronological framework, stages, effectiveness, historical role, etc. For example, some researchers reduce the first of them to the uprising of I.I. Bolotnikov of 1606-1607, others include the uprising in it The cotton of 1603, the hunger riots of 1601-1603, the popular movements of the time of the first and second impostors, both militias, and so on, up to the peasant-Cossack uprisings of 1613-1614 and even 1617-1618.
The Moscow uprisings of 1682 and 1698, some authors, adhering to the old tradition, call reactionary riots directed against Peter's reforms, although the latter had not yet begun. Other historians see these uprisings as complex, controversial, but generally anti-feudal uprisings. Studies of these and other issues are being carried out on a broad front: the publication of chronicle sources, discharge, embassy, boyar books, documents on the history of popular uprisings, culture and other comparative studies of them, the preparation of books on a wide range of socio-economic, political, cultural development country in one of the turning points of national history.
In this work, I will try to consider the history of the Peasant Wars in Russia in the 17th-18th centuries. taking into account different points of view on the basis of scientific monographs and articles of historians of the XIX-XX centuries. The paper also used documents on the history of peasant wars in Russia 1. TIME OF TROUBLES. 1. Causes of the peasant war at the beginning of the 17th century. At the turn of the XVI-XVII centuries, the Russian state entered a period of deep state-political and socio-economic, structural crisis, the roots of which went back to the era of the reign of Ivan the Terrible.
The Livonian War, the oprichnina terror and the growth of feudal exploitation led to the collapse of the country's economy, which led to an economic crisis, which, in turn, stimulated the strengthening of serfdom.
Against this background, social tensions inevitably increased among the lower classes. On the other hand, the nobility also experienced social dissatisfaction, which claimed to expand their rights and privileges, which would be more in line with their increased role in the state. The political causes of the unrest were very deep. The autocratic tyrannical model of the relationship between power and society, embodied by Ivan the Terrible, proved to be limited in the conditions of the changed social structure. In a state that has already ceased to be a collection of disparate lands and principalities, but has not yet become an organic whole, the most difficult question arose on the agenda - who and how can influence the adoption of state decisions.
Political crisis also caused a dynastic crisis, which was associated with the suppression of the dynasty of Moscow tsars - descendants of Ivan Kalita after the death of Tsarevich Dmitry in Uglich on May 15, 1591, many contemporaries blamed Boris Godunov for his death, although the materials of the commission of inquiry spoke of the opposite and the death of Tsar Fedor, who had no heir Ivanovich on January 6, 1598. The election to the kingdom in February 1598 of Boris Godunov, who had been the de facto ruler of Russia since 1587, did not solve the problem.
On the contrary, contradictions intensified among the groupings of the elite of the Moscow boyars. The situation was complicated by the widespread since the mid-80s. legends about the deliverer prince, which undermined the authority of Tsar Boris, who did not have the advantages of a hereditary monarch.
Achievements of Boris Godunov's policy in the 90s. 16th century were fragile, because they were based on an overstrain of the country's socio-economic potential, which inevitably led to a social explosion. Discontent embraced all sectors of society, the nobility and the boyars were outraged by the curtailment of their tribal rights, the service nobility did not satisfy the policy of the government, which was unable to stop the flight of the peasants, which significantly reduced the profitability of their estates, the township population opposed the township building and increased tax oppression, Orthodox clergy was dissatisfied with the curtailment of their privileges and strict submission to autocratic power.
At the beginning of the century, the country was struck by a terrible crop failure. This disaster brought the main draft population of the country to complete ruin. A wave of numerous unrest and uprisings of the starving common people is growing. Government forces had difficulty putting down such riots. However, Peasant Wars are different from peasant uprisings of this kind. They cover a significant territory of the country, unite the totality of powerful popular movements, often representing heterogeneous forces. In the peasant war, a standing army of rebels operates, the country splits up, as it were, into two parts, in one of which the power of the rebels, and in the other - the power of the king. The slogans of the peasant war are of an all-Russian character.
In the Peasant War of the beginning of the 17th century, three large periods are distinguished: the first period of 1603-1605, the most important event of which was the uprising of Cotton; the second period of 1606-1607 - a peasant uprising led by I. I. Bolotnikov; the third period of 1608-1615 - the decline of the Peasant War, accompanied by a number of major speeches of peasants, townspeople, Cossacks, etc. 17.106. 1.2.
Peasant War of the early 17th century
The leader also appeared - Ivan Isaevich Bolotnikov. I. However, one should not attach too much of great importance socially ... Forces for a complete blockade of the capital were not enough, and this made it possible for Shuis ... V. Shuisky himself opposed the rebels and in June 1607.
A look at the events of the beginning of the 17th century as a civil war in Russia
A look at the events of the beginning of the 17th century as a civil war in Russia. ... Who, after all, were the Cossacks the Vanguard of the revolutionary peasantry, or ... It is proved that one of the main springs for the development of the Troubles was antagonism ... There are interesting data on the performances during the Troubles of the southern courtyard ... 2.
The course of the uprising
The captured valuables were exchanged by the Razintsy for Russian prisoners, replenishing ... Razin returned to the Don through Astrakhan, where he was met with triumph. The frightened government announced the mobilization - in August 1679, Miloslavsky. Razin with a small detachment went to the Don, where he hoped to gain ... Astrakhan fell - last stronghold rebels.
V. M. Solovyov about the Razin movement
It is not surprising that even now, when in the national historiography ... Solovyov revealed the complex dialectical essence of the events of 1667-1671. They were not satisfied with the fact that the Don gradually fell into more and more dependence ... Instead of the voivodship power, the Astrakhan Posad was under the rule of the Razins ... Solovyov made a valuable contribution to the study of the history of the Razin movement.
PEASANT WAR LEADED BY E.I.PUGACHEV
Pugachev. the election of military chieftains was canceled, the Cossacks began to be involved ... The economic interests of the Cossacks were also infringed - at the mouth of the river. The Cossacks responded with an uprising, to suppress which the government, for example ... After the events of January 13, the Cossack circle was banned and the military was liquidated ...
The course of the peasant war
In connection with the siege of Orenburg and the long standing at the walls of the fortress of the troops ... The first of them was Chika-Zarubin, who acted under the name of Count Ivan N ... After this defeat, the second stage of the peasant war began. 3.3. A different outcome of a spontaneous protest against the arbitrariness of the authorities and landowners about ...
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION. Peasant wars in Russia created and developed traditions of struggle against lawlessness and oppression. They have played their role in the history of Russia's political and social development. Usually, assessing these events, historians note that the peasant wars dealt a blow to the feudal system and hastened the triumph of new capitalist relations. At the same time, it is often forgotten that the wars that engulfed the vast expanses of Russia led to the destruction of the masses of the population and many peasants, a significant number of nobles, disrupted economic life in many regions and seriously affected the development of productive forces. Violence and cruelty, fully shown by the opposing sides, could not solve any of the urgent problems of socio-economic development.
The whole history of peasant wars and their consequences is the clearest confirmation of Pushkin's brilliant assessment. The state of the entire region, where the fire raged, was terrible.
God forbid to see a Russian rebellion - senseless and merciless. Those who are plotting impossible coups in our country are either young and do not know our people, or they are cruel-hearted people, to whom someone else's little head is a penny, and their own neck is a penny 7, 87. What are peasant wars Just peasant punishment for oppressors and feudal lords Civil war in long-suffering Russia, during which Russians killed Russians Russian rebellion, senseless and merciless 7, 87 Each time gives its own answers to these questions. Apparently, any violence is capable of giving rise to even more cruel and bloody violence.
It is immoral to idealize riots, peasant or Cossack uprisings, which, by the way, were done in our recent past, as well as civil wars, because generated by untruths and extortion, injustice and an irrepressible thirst for wealth, these uprisings, riots and wars themselves bring violence and injustice, grief and ruin, suffering and rivers of blood
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Buganov Emelyan Pugachev.
M 1990. 2. The World of History Russia in the 17th century. M 1989. 3. Buganov V.I. Razin and Razintsy. M 1995. 4. Buganov V.I. The detective case of Stepan RazinHistory of the Fatherland. 1994, 1. 5. Busov K. Moscow Chronicle 1584-1613. M 1961. 6. Great statesmen of Russia, ed. Kiseleva A.V. M 1996. 7. Zaichkin I.A. Pochkarev P.P. Russian history from Catherine the Great to Alexander II. M 1994. 8. Zuev M.N. Russian history. M 1998. 9. History of Russia from ancient times to 1861. Ed. Pavlenko N.I. M 1998. 10. Klyuchevsky V.O. Works in 9 volumes, v. 3. M 1988. 11. Peasant war led by Stepan Razin.
Collection of documents. M 1954-1976. T.1-4. 12. Malkov V.V. A manual on the history of the USSR for applicants to universities. M 1985. 13. Moryakov V.I. Russian history. M 1996. 14. Munchaev Sh.M. National history. M 1999. 15. Nolge G.G. Russian Peasant Wars as Outskirts Uprisings Questions of History. 1994, 11. 16. Domestic history.
Textbook, ed. Borisov. M 1996. 17. Manual on the history of the USSR Ed. Orlova A.S. Georgieva V.A. Naumova N.V. Sivokhina G.A. M 1984. 18. Pushkarev S.G. Review of Russian history. Stavropol, 1993. 19. Collection of documents on the history of Russia from ancient times to the second quarter of the 19th century. Yekaterinburg, 1993. 20 Topical issues in the study of popular movements Polemic notes on peasant wars in Russia History of the USSR. 1991, 3. 21. Soloviev V.M. Anatomy of the Russian rebellion. Stepan Razin myths and reality.
M 1994. 22. Soloviev V.M. Razin and his time. M 1990. 23. Stanislavsky A.L. Civil war in Russia in the 17th century. Cossacks at the turning point of history. M 990. 24. Fedorov V.L. Russian history. M 1998. 25. Reader on the history of the USSR from ancient times to the end of the XVIII century. M 1989. 26. Chistyakova E.V. Soloviev V.M. Stepan Razin and his associates. M 1990. 27. Sharova L.N. Mishina I.A. The history of homeland. M 1992.
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Russia at the beginning of the 17th century. Peasant war in the early 17th century
Strengthening the enslavement of peoples. 1584 - the death of Ivan IV and the beginning of the struggle for power in the government elite. The son of Ivan IV, Fedor, was weak-minded and, apparently, the regency council was created by the tsar. The tsar's guardians were Ivan Shuisky, the tsar's maternal uncle Nikita Romanovich Yuryev, the aged Ivan Mstislavsky, and Boris Godunov.
Accession of Boris Godunov. 1598 - Tsar Fedor died and the Zemsky Sobor elected Boris as Tsar.
The beginning of the enslavement of the peasants. Boris saw a way out of the desolation of the country in the enslavement of the peasants. 1592 - 1593 - a decree on the prohibition of the peasant transition throughout the country and forever. In 1597 - a decree on lesson years (a five-year term limitation period litigation for the return of fugitives); increased dependence of serfs; deprivation of the right to be released to bonded serfs by paying the debt. Now only the death of the owner made them free. People who served as freelancers, after six months of service, turned into real serfs.
Economic recovery of the 90s. interrupted by a crop failure. 1601 - Long rains prevented the harvest. Boris tried to fight hunger - he organized the distribution of money to the poor, attracted them to paid construction work, but the rise in bread prices depreciated the money received. Bread was distributed from the state storehouses, but the feudal lords did not follow the state in this.
Exacerbation of the class struggle. 1603 - a major uprising of serfs. The aggravation of the internal political situation also led to a sharp drop in Boris's prestige among the masses among the feudal lords. Under such conditions, False Dmitry I appeared.
False Dmitry I. 1601 - a certain Grigory Otrepyev (a monk from Russia) appeared in the Commonwealth (Poland), posing as Tsarevich Dmitry.
Appearance of an impostor and his promises as the Magnate of Poland. He secretly adopted Catholicism and promised to make this religion the state religion in Russia: a magnate - the land in the west of Russia.
Trip to Moscow. False Dmitry I crossed the Dnieper near Chernigov, as the southwest of Russia was "seething" and the peasants of the Komaritskaya volost (southwest of Orel) were the first to join him. April 13, 1605 sudden death Boris and the accession of his 16-year-old son Fedor. But he could not organize resistance to the enemy, to whose side the boyars began to go over. On June 1, Moscow solemnly received "Tsar Dmitry Ivanovich".
Reasons for the defeat of False Dmitry I. Sitting on the throne, he did not fulfill his promises to Poland, confirmed the 5-year investigation of the fugitives and the decree on bonded servitude. May 17, 1606 - during the wedding with Marina Mnishek, an uprising broke out and False Dmitry I was killed. They convened a Zemsky Sobor, at which Vasily Shuisky was elected tsar, who gave the feudal lords a guarantee of observance of feudal rights - a "cross-kissed record."
Rise of the peasant war. Rebellion of Ivan Bolotnikov. Reasons for the uprising: after the accession of Shuisky, the situation of the peasantry did not improve, especially in the south-west of Russia, where False Dmitry I exempted these territories from paying taxes for 10 years, and Shuisky restored taxation. Supporters of False Dmitry here were governors - Prince Grigory Shakhovskoy in Putivl and Prince Andrey Telyatevsky in Chernigov. There were rumors that Tsar Dmitry escaped.
The course of the uprising. 1606 - the masses received a leader - a serf Telyatevsky, Ivan Isaevich Bolotnikov. Bolotnikov posed as "Tsar Dmitry Ivanovich". July 1606 - campaign from Putivl to Moscow. August 1606 - the battle of Kromy, the capture of Yelets, a campaign against Tula. The Ryazan noble detachment of Grigory Sumbulov and Prokopniy Lipunov joined the rebels. Taking Kaluga and Kashira, Bolotnikov stopped at Kolomenskoye. November 1606 - the noble detachments of Lyapunov, Sumbulov go over to the side of Shuisky. But the movement remained socially heterogeneous. The defeat of Bolotnikov near Moscow and the retreat to Kaluga.
Defeat. May 1607 - the siege of Tula by the tsarist troops. The surrender of the rebels, the execution of Bolotnikov and Goncharov.
Meaning. The Peasant War delayed the complete enslavement of the peasantry for almost 50 years.
PEASANT WARS IN RUSSIA XVII-XVIII CENTURIES. PLAN. INTRODUCTION ………………………………………………………………………. 3 1. TIME OF TROUBLES. 1.1. Causes of the peasant war in the beginning of the 11th century …………………………. 5 1.2. Peasant war of the beginning of the XVII century ………………………………………… 7 1.3. A look at the events of the beginning of the XVII century as a civil war in Russia ............................................................. ... 12 2. Rebellion under the leadership of S. T. Razin. 2.1. The course of the uprising ………………………………………………………………... 16 2.2. VM Solovyov about Razin's movement …………………………………….. 17 3. PEASANT WAR LEADED BY EI PUGACHEV. 3.1. Events preceding the start of the war ………………………………….. 24 3.2. The course of the peasant war ……………………………………………………. 25 3.5. Some features of the Pugachev movement …………………………. 28 CONCLUSION ……………………………………………………………………... 30 BIBLIOGRAPHY ………………………………………………… ………………... 31 INTRODUCTION. The 17th century in the history of our country is a remarkable time, a turning point, filled with stormy and heroic events. This is the time when the era of the Middle Ages ends, the era of a new period, late feudalism, begins. Despite the close interest in the 17th century, its serious study in historical science began rather late. True, the historians of the eighteenth century have already left us their judgments, but very general ones, about the preceding century. The well-known theory of enslavement and emancipation of estates in the 16th-19th centuries comes from the law school: the state, with the help of laws, enslaved all estates, forced them to serve its interests. Then it gradually liberated: first the nobles (a decree of 1762 on the freedom of the nobles), then the merchants (a charter to the cities of 1785) and peasants (a decree of 1861 on the abolition of serfdom). This scheme is very far from reality: the feudal lords, as is known, constituted the ruling class from the time of Kievan Rus, and the peasants - the exploited class, while the state acted as a defender of the interests of the feudal lords. In accordance with the point of view of historians of the state school, the struggle of classes, estates was regarded as a manifestation of the anti-state, anarchist principle. The peasants are not the main driving force of the uprisings, but a passive mass, capable only of escaping from their masters or following the Cossacks during the years of numerous "troubles", when the latter sought to plunder, not obeying the organized principle - the state. The problem of social peace and social conflicts has always been and remains relevant for our country. Soviet historians as the basis for studying the history of Russia in the 17th-18th centuries. put forward the idea of the leading importance of two factors: the development of the economy and the class struggle. The development of the economy, the evolution of classes and estates, had a significant inhibitory effect on the feudal regime, which reached its climax precisely in these centuries. The tightening of exploitation by the feudal lords and state punitive bodies causes an increase in the protest of the lower ranks of the people. No wonder the 17th century was called “rebellious” by contemporaries. History of the class struggle in Russia in the 17th-18th centuries. is the subject of close attention, but to which various judgments have been made. There is no unity among historians in assessing the first and second Peasant Wars - their chronological framework, stages, effectiveness, historical role, etc. For example, some researchers reduce the first of them to the uprising of I.I. Bolotnikov in 1606-1607, others include the Cotton uprising of 1603, the "hunger riots" of 1601-1603, the popular movements of the time of the first and second impostors, both militias, and so on, up to the peasant-Cossack uprisings of 1613-1614 and even 1617-1618. The Moscow uprisings of 1682 and 1698, some authors, adhering to the old tradition, call "reactionary riots" directed against Peter's reforms (although the latter had not yet begun). Other historians see these uprisings as complex, controversial, but generally anti-feudal uprisings. Research on these and other issues is carried out on a broad front: this is the publication of sources (chronicles, discharge, embassy, boyar books, documents on the history of popular uprisings, culture, etc.), their comparative study, the preparation of books on a wide range of problems of socio-economic, political , cultural development of the country in one of the critical eras of national history. In this work, I will try to consider the history of the Peasant Wars in Russia in the 17th-18th centuries. taking into account different points of view on the basis of scientific monographs and articles of historians of the XIX-XX centuries. The paper also used documents on the history of peasant wars in Russia (11; 19; 25). 1. TIME OF TROUBLES. 1.1. Causes of the peasant war in the early 17th century. At the turn of the 16th-17th centuries, the Russian state entered a period of deep state-political and socio-economic structural crisis, the roots of which went back to the reign of Ivan the Terrible. The Livonian War, the oprichnina terror and the growth of feudal exploitation led to the collapse of the country's economy, which led to an economic crisis, which, in turn, stimulated the strengthening of serfdom. Against this background, social tensions inevitably increased among the lower classes. On the other hand, the nobility also experienced social dissatisfaction, which claimed to expand their rights and privileges, which would be more in line with their increased role in the state. The political causes of the unrest were very deep. The autocratic tyrannical model of the relationship between power and society, embodied by Ivan the Terrible, proved to be limited in the conditions of the changed social structure. In a state that has already ceased to be a collection of disparate lands and principalities, but has not yet become an organic whole, the most difficult question arose on the agenda - who and how can influence the adoption of state decisions. The political crisis also led to a dynastic crisis, which was associated with the suppression of the dynasty of Moscow tsars - descendants of Ivan Kalita after the death of Tsarevich Dmitry in Uglich on May 15, 1591 (many contemporaries blamed Boris Godunov for his death, although the materials of the commission of inquiry spoke of the opposite) and death who had an heir to Tsar Fedor Ivanovich on January 6, 1598. The election to the kingdom in February 1598 of Boris Godunov, who had been the de facto ruler of Russia since 1587, did not solve the problem. On the contrary, contradictions intensified among the groupings of the elite of the Moscow boyars. The situation was complicated by the widespread since the mid-80s. legends about the “tsarevich-deliverer”, which undermined the authority of Tsar Boris, who did not have the advantages of a hereditary monarch. Achievements of Boris Godunov's policy in the 90s. 16th century were fragile, because they were based on an overstrain of the country's socio-economic potential, which inevitably led to a social explosion. Discontent covered all sectors of society: the nobility and the boyars were outraged by the curtailment of their tribal rights, the service nobility was not satisfied with the policy of the government, which was unable to stop the flight of the peasants, which significantly reduced the profitability of their estates, the townspeople opposed the township building and increased tax oppression, the Orthodox clergy were dissatisfied curtailment of their privileges and rigid submission to autocratic power. At the beginning of the century, the country was struck by a terrible crop failure. This disaster brought the main draft population of the country to complete ruin. A wave of numerous unrest and uprisings of the starving common people is growing. Government forces had difficulty suppressing such "revolts". However, Peasant Wars are different from peasant uprisings of this kind. They cover a significant territory of the country, unite the totality of powerful popular movements, often representing heterogeneous forces. In the peasant war, a standing army of rebels operates, the country splits up, as it were, into two parts, in one of which the power of the rebels, and in the other - the power of the king. The slogans of the peasant war are of an all-Russian character. In the Peasants' War of the beginning of the 17th century, three large periods stand out: the first period (1603-1605), the most important event of which was the uprising of Cotton; the second period (1606-1607) - a peasant uprising led by I. I. Bolotnikov; third period (1608-1615) - the decline of the Peasant War, accompanied by a number of major uprisings of peasants, townspeople, Cossacks, etc. (17.106). 1.2. Peasant war in the early 17th century. As already mentioned, at the beginning of the century, the situation in the country worsened due to crop failures. In 1601 it rained for more than two months. Then very early, in mid-August, frost hit and snow fell, which led to the death of the crop. The prices have increased several times. Bread speculation began. In the next year, 1602, winter crops again failed to sprout. Again, as in 1601, early cold came. Prices have already risen more than 100 times. The people were starving, mass epidemics began. Boris Godunov organized state works. He attracted Muscovites and refugees who flooded into the capital for construction, using the already existing experience in building the Ivan the Great Bell Tower, distributed bread from state bins, allowed serfs to leave their masters and look for opportunities to feed themselves. But all these measures were not successful. Rumors spread that the country was being punished for violating the order of succession to the throne, for the sins of Godunov. In the center of the country (1603-1604) an uprising of serfs broke out under the leadership of Khlopko Kosolap. It was brutally suppressed, and Khlopok was executed in Moscow. Many historians consider this uprising the first stage of the Peasants' War of the early 17th century. In the neighboring Commonwealth, they were only waiting for a reason to intervene in the internal affairs of a weakened Russia. In 1602, a man appeared on the estate of Prince Adam Vishnevetsky, posing as the son of Ivan IV, Tsarevich Dmitry, who miraculously survived, who died in Uglich on May 15, 1591. In reality, it was the Galich nobleman Grigory Otrepiev, a monk of the Chudov Monastery, who belonged to the retinue of Patriarch Job and was closely associated with the Romanovs. By the beginning of 1605, more than 20 thousand people had gathered under the banner of the "prince". On April 13, 1605, Tsar Boris Godunov suddenly died and his 16-year-old son Fyodor ascended the throne. The boyars did not recognize the new king. On May 7, the tsarist army went over to the side of False Dmitry. Tsar Fedor was overthrown and strangled along with his mother. However, hopes for the "kind and just" Tsar Dmitry Ivanovich soon collapsed. A Polish protege, an outspoken political adventurer, sat on the Russian throne. On the night of May 17, 1606, an uprising of the townspeople began. The conspirators broke into the Kremlin and brutally killed False Dmitry 1. Three days later, the new tsar was “called out” from the Execution Ground on Red Square to the well-born boyar Vasily Ivanovich Shuisky, who was the organizer and inspirer of the conspiracy, previously convicted of intrigue and poisoned by False Dmitry into exile. The man who, by the will of fate, on the Moscow throne, did not enjoy either authority or popular love. The main quality of Shuisky's character was hypocrisy, his favorite way of fighting was intrigue and lies. Like Godunov, he successfully learned all the lessons of the reign of Ivan the Terrible, was distrustful, cunning, but did not possess either a statesman's mind or the experience of Tsar Boris. This man was not able to stop the collapse of statehood and overcome the social split. From the very beginning, Shuisky did not enjoy wide support. The banner of the opposition again became the name of Tsar Dmitry Ivanovich, who, according to rumors, escaped from the conspirators this time as well. Shuisky was opposed by the population of border counties, disgraced supporters of False Dmitry, such as the governor of Putivl, Prince G. Shakhovsky and the governor of Chernigov, Prince A. Telyatevsky. Opposition moods swept the noble corporations. In the summer of 1606, the movement began to acquire an organized character. The leader also appeared - Ivan Isaevich Bolotnikov. The second stage of the Peasants' War began. Serfdom was a heterogeneous social stratum. The top serfs, close to their owners, occupied a fairly high position. It is no coincidence that many provincial nobles willingly changed their status to serfs. I. Bolotnikov, apparently, belonged to their number. He was a military servant of A. Telyatevsky and, most likely, a nobleman by origin. However, one should not attach too much importance to this: the social orientation of a person's views was determined not only by origin. The “nobility” of Bolotnikov can be explained by his military talents and the qualities of an experienced warrior. There is news of Bolotnikov's stay in the Crimean and Turkish captivity, as an oarsman in a galley captured by the "Germans". There is an assumption that, returning from captivity through Italy, Germany, the Commonwealth, Bolotnikov managed to fight on the side of the Austrian emperor as the leader of a mercenary Cossack detachment against the Turks. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain why it was he who received the powers of the “big governor” from a man who pretended to be Tsar Dmitry. The rebels, gathered under the banner of "Tsar Dmitry Ivanovich", were a complex conglomerate of forces. Here were not only people from the lower classes, but also service people in the instrument and the fatherland. They were united in their rejection of the newly elected king, different in their social aspirations. After a successful battle near Kromy in August 1606, the rebels occupied Yelets, Tula, Kaluga, Kashira, and by the end of the year approached Moscow. There were not enough forces for a complete blockade of the capital, and this made it possible for Shuisky to mobilize all his resources. By this time, a split had occurred in the camp of the rebels, and the detachments of Lyapunov (November) and Pashkov (early December) went over to the side of Shuisky. The battle near Moscow on December 2, 1606 ended in the defeat of Bolotnikov. The latter, after a series of battles, retreated to Tula, under the protection of the stone walls of the city. V. Shuisky himself spoke out against the rebels and in June 1607. approached Tula. For several months, the tsarist troops unsuccessfully tried to take the city, until they blocked the Upa River and flooded the fortress. Shuisky's opponents, relying on his gracious word, opened the gates. However, the king did not miss the opportunity to deal with the leaders of the movement. It is rather difficult to assess the nature of the Bolotnikov uprising. It seems one-sided view of the movement exclusively as the highest stage of the peasant war. However, this view exists, and the supporters of this view give the following assessments of the first Peasants' War. (17, 108) Some of them believe that she delayed the legal registration of serfdom for 50 years, others believe that, on the contrary, she accelerated the process of legal registration of serfdom, which ended in 1649. Supporters of the view of peasant wars as an anti-serfdom popular movement also believe that the significance of peasant wars cannot be reduced only to their immediate results. In the course of the peasant wars, the masses learned to fight for land and freedom. Peasant wars were one of the factors that prepared the formation of revolutionary ideology. Ultimately, they prepared the transition to a new mode of production. “We have always taught and continue to teach,” wrote V. I. Lenin, “that the class struggle, the struggle of the exploited part of the people against the exploiting one, underlies political transformations and, ultimately, decides the fate of all such transformations” (17, 108). Some historians express a different view of the events described above. In their opinion, the “program of the movement” remains unknown to us: all the surviving documents that can be used to judge the demands of the rebels belong to the government camp. In the interpretation of Shuisky, the rebels called on the Muscovites to destroy the "nobles and the strong", to divide their property. Patriarch Hermogenes announced that “the Bolotnikovites order the boyar serfs to beat their boyars, and their wives and estates, and promise them estates” (9, 174), promising “to give the boyars, and the voivodship, and the okolnichestvo, and the deacon” (9, 174) . There are cases of the so-called "thieves' dachas", when the estates of the supporters of Tsar Vasily were transferred to the supporters of the "legitimate sovereign Dmitry Ivanovich". Thus, the struggle was aimed not so much at the destruction of the existing social system, but at changing individuals and entire social groups within it. The participants in the speech, former peasants, serfs, sought to be constituted in the new social status of service people, “free Cossacks”. The nobility, dissatisfied with the accession of Shuisky, also sought to improve its status. There was a sharp, rather complex and contradictory social struggle that went beyond the framework outlined by the concept of the peasant war. This struggle naturally complemented the struggle for power - after all, only the victory of one of the contenders ensured the consolidation of the rights of his supporters. This confrontation itself turned into an armed struggle, by whole armies. The lower classes of society also took part in the social confrontation. However, the anti-serfdom fervor found its expression, first of all, in the weakening, and subsequently in the progressive destruction of statehood. In the context of the crisis of all structures of power, it was increasingly difficult to keep the peasants from leaving. In an effort to enlist the support of the nobility, Shuisky March 9, 1607. issued an extensive serf legislation, which provided for a significant increase in the term of the lesson years. The search for fugitives became the official duty of the local administration, which from now on had to ask each newcomer “hard to ask whose he was, where he was from, and when he fled” (9, 174). For the first time, monetary sanctions were introduced for accepting a fugitive. However, the Code of 1607. was more declarative. In the context of the events for the peasantry, the problem became urgent not of an exit restored without prior notice, but of finding an owner and a place of new residence that would ensure the stability of life. Events in the early 17th century a number of historians are interpreted as a civil war in Russia. However, not all researchers share this point of view. Emphasizing the absence of clear lines of social and political confrontation, they consider all events within the framework outlined by contemporaries themselves - as a time of turmoil - troubled times. 1.3. A look at the events of the beginning of the 17th century as a civil war in Russia. For centuries, scientists have been struggling to unravel the causes and meaning of the Time of Troubles. Progress in the study of unrest was achieved thanks to the works of S.F. Platonov, I.I. Smirnov, A.A. Zimin, V.I. Koretsky and other scientists who considered it as a social phenomenon, prepared by the entire course of the previous development of the country. But already in the course of the discussion that unfolded on the pages of the journal Questions of History in the late 1950s, many vulnerabilities in the existing concepts were also revealed. Both the attempts of a number of Soviet historians to consider the Time of Troubles only from the point of view of the peasant war, and the constructions of S.F. Platonov and I.I. Smirnov, according to which a single complex of events of the Time of Troubles was divided into separate, unrelated stages, were criticized. N.E. Nosov then expressed a judgment about the Time of Troubles as a civil war, which was a complex interweaving of class, intra-class and international struggle. However, until recently, the events of the beginning of the 17th century were considered mainly from the point of view of the class struggle of peasants and serfs, the culmination of which was considered the Bolotnikov uprising. The other classes that participated in the Time of Troubles were not given due attention. A significant contribution to the study of the Time of Troubles belongs to the historian L.L. Stanislavsky (1939-1990): we are talking, first of all, about his research on the history of the Cossacks. In Soviet science, the Cossack uprisings of the early 17th century were traditionally viewed as an integral part of the peasant war, and the Cossacks themselves as the vanguard of a broad popular anti-serf uprising. Rightly linking the speeches of the Cossacks with the protest of the masses against social oppression, the researchers at the same time essentially identified the goals of the Cossacks and the peasantry, thereby downplaying (contrary to the direct indications of the sources) the independent and active role of the Cossacks in the events of the Time of Troubles. L.L. Stanislavsky convincingly proves that it was the Cossacks who formed the core of the rebel armies of False Dmitry I, Bolotnikov and the “Tushino thief” and most consistently supported the impostors. As their power increased, the Cossacks more and more clearly manifested their claims to power in the country, to the role of a new ruling class, which seriously threatened the very existence of the nobility. Only the incompleteness of the class (military) organization of the Cossacks, the author notes, did not allow the Cossacks to seize power in the First Militia even at the moment of the greatest weakening of the nobility. Until 1619. The "free" Cossacks, acting under the banner of impostors, their chosen leaders - Pan Lisovsky and Prince Vladislav, posed a serious threat to the existing social order. “Who were the Cossacks after all? The vanguard of the revolutionary peasantry or the robber condottieri? Liberators of Russia from foreign invaders or their accomplices? Fighters against feudal exploitation or...?” (23, 5). Stanislavsky gives a clear and precise answer to this question: “They were ... Cossacks and did everything possible to remain Cossacks until they had to retreat before all the might of the Russian state” (23, 242). With the help of facts, he proved that the core of the Cossack army was made up of former peasants and serfs, for whom leaving for the Cossack villages meant liberation from feudal dependence. Thus, the conclusion of Soviet historiography about the close connection between the Cossack movement of the early 17th century and the protest of the broad masses of the people against social oppression and serfdom is confirmed. At the same time, the Cossacks are a complex and contradictory phenomenon, which far from fit into the framework of the usual ideas about the Time of Troubles as a peasant war. An important pattern for understanding the fate of the "free" Cossacks is that as the formation of the class organization of the Cossacks, its interests diverged more and more clearly from the interests of other classes - not only the nobility, but also the bulk of the peasantry. The termination of the existence of a single class of “free” Cossacks is connected not so much with its internal stratification, but with powerful pressure from the feudal state, the targeted policy of the government of Mikhail Fedorovich, which resulted in the dispersion of the Cossacks over different territories, estates and owners. The study of the history of the Cossacks, one of the main driving forces of the Time of Troubles, allows us to look at the era of the Time of Troubles from a new angle as a whole. Many historians believe that the social protest of the peasantry at the beginning of the 17th century did not acquire a pronounced class orientation and resulted in special, specific forms - going to the Cossacks and participating in the Cossack movement. But the Cossacks themselves were by no means suitable for the role of the "revolutionary vanguard" of the peasantry and. moreover, the class interests of the Cossacks often came into conflict with the interests of the bulk of the working population. This forces many historians to reconsider the traditional ideas about the Time of Troubles (and the Bolotnikov uprising, in particular) as a peasant war. It is proved that one of the main springs for the development of the Time of Troubles was the antagonism between the Cossacks and the nobility, who for a decade and a half waged a sharp, uncompromising struggle for power in the country and influence in the army. But the matter was not limited to the clash of these two forces. There is interesting data on the performances during the Time of Troubles by the southern nobility, which, in terms of social status, stood close to instrumental service people and suffered from expansion into their lands by the Moscow nobility. Important for understanding the balance of power within the nobility on the eve and during the Time of Troubles are the early studies of A.L. Stanislavsky (23) on the history of the sovereign's court, in which he revealed the presence of serious contradictions between the privileged metropolitan and district nobility, as well as between the nobles of the center and outskirts. The history of the nobility in the Time of Troubles needs further study. However, it is already clear that it was not just a “fellow traveler”, but played an active and independent role in the events of the early 17th century. The works of A.L. Stanislavsky represent a new direction in the study of the Time of Troubles, which was based not only on the antagonism between the nobility and the peasantry, but also on a deep split within the service class. This split was due to the post-oprichny crisis of land ownership, the fall of the former importance of the noble cavalry, the change in the balance of power between the nobility and the lower strata of the service class, a serious divergence of interests of various official and territorial groups of service people. Further study of the Time of Troubles in this vein is an urgent task of historical science. 2. REVOLUTION LEADED BY S. T. RAZIN. 2.1. The course of the uprising. The culmination of social actions in the 17th century was the uprising of the Cossacks and peasants led by S.T. Razin. This movement originated in the villages of the Don Cossacks. The Don freemen have always attracted fugitives from the southern and central regions of the Russian state. Here they were protected by the unwritten law "no extradition from the Don." The government, needing the services of the Cossacks for the defense of the southern borders, paid them a salary and put up with the self-government that existed there. Stepan Timofeevich Razin, a native of the village of Zimoveyskaya, belonged to the homely Cossacks - he enjoyed great authority. In 1667 he led a detachment of a thousand people, who went on a campaign "for zipuns" (to the Volga, and then to the river. Yaik, where he occupied the Yaitsky town with a fight). In the summer of 1668 already almost 20,000 Razin's army successfully operated in the possessions of Persia (Iran) on the Caspian coast. The captured valuables were exchanged by the Razintsy for Russian prisoners who replenished their ranks. The following summer, 1669, the Cossacks defeated the fleet near Pig Island (south of Baku), equipped against them by the Persian Shah. This greatly complicated Russian-Iranian relations and aggravated the government's position towards the Cossacks. In October 1669 Razin returned to the Don through Astrakhan, where he was greeted with triumph. Inspired by good luck, he set about preparing a new campaign, this time "for the good king" against the "traitors of the boyars." The next campaign of the Cossacks along the Volga to the north turned into a peasant turmoil. The Cossacks remained the military core, and with the influx into the detachment of a huge number of fugitive peasants, the peoples of the Volga region - Mordovians, Tatars, Chuvashs - the social orientation of the movement changed dramatically. In May 1670, a 7,000-strong detachment of S.T. Razin captured the city of Tsaritsyn, at the same time, detachments of archers sent from Moscow and Astrakhan were defeated. Having approved the Cossack administration in Astrakhan, Razin moved north - Saratov and Samara voluntarily went over to his side. S. Razin addressed the population of the Volga region with “charming” (from the word: seduce, call) letters in which he urged them to join the uprising and harass traitors, that is, boyars, nobles, governors, clerks. The uprising covered a vast territory, on which numerous detachments were operating, led by atamans M. Osipov, M. Kharitonov, V. Fedorov, the nun Alena, and others. In September, Razin's army approached Simbirsk, and stubbornly besieged it for a month. The frightened government announced mobilization - in August 1679, a 60,000-strong army headed for the Middle Volga region. In early October, a government detachment led by Y. Baryatinsky defeated the main forces of Razin and joined the Simbirsk garrison under the command of governor I. Miloslavsky. Razin with a small detachment went to the Don, where he hoped to recruit a new army, but was betrayed by the top of the Cossacks and handed over to the government. June 4, 1671 he was taken to Moscow and executed on Red Square two days later. In November 1671 fell Astrakhan - the last stronghold of the rebels. The participants in the uprising were severely repressed. 2.2. V. M. Solovyov about the Razin movement. The theme of the Razin uprising - the largest popular movement in Russia in the 17th century. has always aroused great interest among researchers of the history of our country of the era early medieval. It is not surprising that even now, when there has been a revision of the concepts that prevailed in the recent past in Russian historiography, historians are turning to it. The socio-psychological and many other issues related to the uprising were once reflected in the works of V.I. Buganov and A.N. Sakharov, who still retain priority positions. V. M. Solovyov (21), who is responsible for a number of interesting studies, is also working very fruitfully in this direction. In this part of the work, I want to present a concentrated analysis of the views of V. M. Solovyov on the Razin movement and its leader. V. M. Solovyov considered it possible to evaluate the Razin uprising as a “Russian rebellion”. Considering the Razin movement as a "Russian rebellion", he does not refuse to assess the events that took place under Stepan Razin as an uprising, but at a certain stage of their development - as a peasant war. V. M. Solovyov revealed the complex dialectical essence of the events of 1667 - 1671. IN historical context they appear as a bizarre fusion of diverse and diverse spontaneous manifestations, in which the features of a senseless and merciless rebellion, a blind rebellion, and all the signs of a huge popular uprising, and the characteristics of the so-called peasant war, and much more, from a purely Cossack movement directed against etatism - the dictate of the state, to national liberation, religious uprisings. Finally, in these events, adventurous beginnings (hoax with the false Tsarevich Alexei and the imaginary patriarch Nikon, etc.) and banal robbery, criminality (pogroms, robberies) powerfully make themselves felt. All this is not separated from one another, but coexists, is closely intertwined, and often collides with each other due to deep internal contradictions inherent in the very nature of discord - an extremely motley, confusing and very diverse phenomenon in terms of composition of participants. Solovyov decided to oppose the historical reality, recreated according to the sources, to the myths about the Razin time, about the Razin uprising and about its leader himself. One of the myths that have taken root in the mass consciousness is the 17th century, when the good old Russian customs, general contentment and prosperity allegedly dominated. On a large amount of factual material, V. M. Solovyov showed how difficult was the fate of people from different strata of Russian society and, especially from its lower classes - the poor part of the township, peasants and serfs, how strong was the omnipotence of people close to the tsar and the arbitrariness of the local administration. He pays special attention to the Council Code and the consequences of its adoption for the country. Emphasizing that its adoption was accelerated both by a series of major urban uprisings in Russia and by a revolution in England, which produced great impression on the ruling circles of all European countries, Solovyov saw in the Council Code "essentially a pacifying bridle on the people" and in the establishment of an indefinite investigation of the fugitives - its "center of gravity" and "main social meaning" (21, 25). Analysis of the content of the Code allowed the historian to show why the Razin uprising, started by the Don Cossacks, grew into a mass popular movement of public protest, covering a significant part of the state. Another myth is about the boundless kindness of the "quietest" Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich. In part, perhaps, it was inspired by the words of V.O. Klyuchevsky, taken out of context, that this tsar is “a kind person, a glorious Russian soul” (10). At the same time, V.O. Klyuchevsky noted, however, the complexity and inconsistency of the nature of the tsar, who was in no way “higher than the rudest of his subjects” (10), a characteristic that is often not taken into account. Solovyov cited several vivid and convincing facts showing this sovereign as a tyrant. Another myth is about the isolation of the Don Cossacks, among whom the Razin uprising began, from the population of cities and districts of Central Russia, from peasants and townspeople, from small service people. It must be admitted that there are certain grounds for such a myth. They are connected with the essential features that the Cossack community had in comparison with the population of inner Russia in the way of life and in everyday life, in mentality and culture. But with all this, the Don people in the 17th century. had relatives in Russia. They often came to them and lived with them, and at home they received people who came for a while from the center of the country. They took such people with them on military campaigns, gave them at the "duvan" part of the booty due to them, and some of them even defended Azov during the siege of 1641. Solovyov is characterized by an exceptionally balanced approach to resolving the very difficult question of how connected the Don was with internal Russia. He managed to emphasize the originality and isolation of the Cossacks and at the same time their close connection with the population of Central Russia. The historian sees the manifestation of such a connection in the course of the Razin uprising itself. At present, the view of the largest popular uprisings in Russia in the 17th-18th centuries, including the Razin uprising, as an uprising of the outskirts against the central government, has become widespread. Its supporters, M. M. Sokolsky and G. G. Nolte, point to the presence of serious contradictions between the center and the outskirts. At the same time, according to G.G. Nolte, the desire of their population to ensure greater self-determination of the regions was an important requirement of the new time, since this could contribute to their accelerated development. According to Solovyov, such contradictions are indeed one of the most important reasons for the Razin uprising. So, he notes that the Don Cossacks had "their own reasons for discontent, their own accounts with the government." They were not satisfied that gradually "Don became increasingly dependent on the Russian state." The danger of losing freemen "turned into violent resistance" of the Cossacks, which ultimately resulted in the Razin uprising (21, 81). The historian sees special reasons for the performance of the population of such a peculiar outskirts as Astrakhan, with its developed trade. The Astrakhans hoped to get rid of taxes and extortion with the help of Razin, to establish their own trade At the same time, Solovyov does not share the opinion that the Razin movement is only an uprising of the “common people of the inner Russian outskirts” (15, 36). lines, and the inner counties - to the north and west of it, then in the fall of 1670. the uprising spread to the inner counties up to about Unzhi and Vetluga, Makariev Zheltovodsky Monastery and Arzamas. Solovyov calculated that the “peasant war zone” included 110 cities (21, 114), and the aspirations and aspirations of its participants, both in the central part of the country and outside it, were largely similar. There are grounds for speaking about the outskirts during the Razin uprising, but it would hardly be true to reduce the uprising only to this (however, just as well as only to the peasant war). Closer to the truth is the view of the Razin uprising and similar popular movements as a “complex and colorful phenomenon” that cannot be limited to “purely class boundaries” (20, 134). However, popular movements are not only complex, but also deeply contradictory historical phenomena. Solovyov repeatedly emphasized the contradictions of the Razin uprising. Special interest represents how he highlighted the contradictions between the aspirations of the people who supported Razin and the real results of the temporary victory of the Razintsy in certain regions of the country and, first of all, in Astrakhan, where the rebels held out the longest. Instead of the voivodship power, the Astrakhan Posad found itself under the rule of the Razin atamans, and the exactions and arbitrariness of the governors and clerks were replaced by the establishment of forced equality, the introduction of "military administration" and the dictates of the "urban goal" (21, 97). If we continue the comparative series begun by the historian, then it should be of undoubted interest to compare what the initiators and instigators of the uprising, the Don Cossacks, aspired to, and what they actually received from Razin. The movement, raised in defense of the traditions of the Don free life and Cossack democracy, turned into a violation of liberty. This was also manifested in the organization of the Razintsy into a special army, which was an attempt on the traditional combined arms unity on the Don and the Cossack brotherhood, and in the murder on the circle on April 12, 1670. the royal envoy G. Evdokamov, contrary to the will of the Don army and the norms of military law, and in repeated threats by Stepan Razin and his atamans against the foremen and Cossacks in the Cherkasy town. So instead of freedom and military democracy, the Razin Cossacks established their essentially unlimited omnipotence on the Don. Largely due to this, by the spring of 1671. Razin had many opponents among the Don Cossacks. Apparently, the discrepancy between the aspirations, hopes, aspirations of the participants in popular movements in Russia and the results of these movements is a historical pattern. Of interest is the question posed by Solovyov - what could await the country in the event of a "successful outcome" of the Razin uprising? The historian substantiated the possibility of implementing such a historical alternative, firstly, by the fact that there are cases when peasant wars were won (Norway, China, Ukraine under Bogdan Khmelnitsky), and, secondly, by the fact that Razin could not have stayed at Simbirsk and lead his army "without turning and without delay ... through the agricultural regions with a peasant population to Moscow" (21, 193). However, to the question that naturally arises after this - what would happen next? - Solovyov did not answer. In his opinion, the "lack of clearly defined goals and objectives of the struggle among the rebels and, in general, the extreme contradictory nature of their goals" makes it difficult to give an answer (21, 194). The only thing that is completely clear to the historian is the groundlessness and utopianism of hopes for a “nationwide revolt” as a breakthrough “into the world of enlightened democratic freedom and civilized relations” (21, 194). Solovyov, of course, is right when he does not try to clarify and concretize the picture of the life of the country in the event of the seizure of power by the Razintsy and is limited only to a general indication of the negative consequences of such an outcome of the uprising. At the same time, it is difficult to agree with the historian regarding the possibility of the military success of the Razintsy. Apparently, Solovyov nevertheless underestimated the power of the state and the degree of its superiority over the rebels. Razin could not abandon the fight for Simbirsk and go directly to Moscow. This was due to the peculiarities of the military-strategic thinking of the Don Cossacks, who traditionally attached exceptional importance to the waterway, and to the peculiarities of military tactics in all the largest popular movements in Russia in the 17th-18th centuries, a typical feature of which was the desire to master large fortified cities. And in general, Moscow was too tough a nut to crack for the rebels. Even during the Time of Troubles, when the state was weakened, Ivan Bolotnikov could not take it. Thus, Razin could hardly count on a military victory. Nevertheless, the question of an alternative outcome of the uprising is of undoubted interest. The search for an answer to it allows us to better understand the nature of the events that took place under Razin and the very essence of the popular uprisings in Russia. Such an important problem as the influence of the Razin uprising on the policy of the Russian government after its suppression is very interesting. The authorities did a lot for that. to prevent something like this from happening again. However, the very low effectiveness of the measures taken is striking: the riots in Russia up to the Bulavin uprising followed, in essence, a continuous series. Raising and resolving the issue of the reasons for the inability of the tops of Russian society to find effective mechanisms to counteract the rebellious spirit widespread among the people will not only allow us to better understand the nature and characteristics of the country's development at the end of the 17th - 18th centuries, but, perhaps, shed new light on the historical tragedy of modern Russia. time. In general, V. M. Solovyov made a valuable contribution to the study of the history of the Razin movement. He managed to show the uprising led by S. Razin as a very difficult phenomenon, which cannot be given an unambiguous assessment. 3. PEASANT WAR LEADED BY EI PUGACHEV. 3.1. Events leading up to the start of the war. Second half of the 18th century distinguishes a sharp increase in the social activity of the working population: the owner, monastic and ascribed peasants, working people of manufactories, peoples of the Volga region, Bashkiria, Yaik Cossacks. It reached its apogee in the peasant war under the leadership of E. I. Pugachev. On Yaik, where in September 1773. an impostor appeared, posing as Peter III, favorable conditions were created for his calls to resonate first with the Cossacks, and then with the peasants, working people, the Bashkirs and the peoples of the Volga region. The tsarist government on Yaik, as elsewhere, where it ceased to need the services of the Cossacks for the defense of the border territory, began to pursue a policy of limiting its privileges: back in the 40s. the election of military chieftains was canceled, the Cossacks began to be recruited for service away from their native places. The economic interests of the Cossacks were also infringed - at the mouth of the river. Yaik, the government built uchugs (barriers) that prevented the movement of fish from the Caspian Sea to the upper reaches of the river. The infringement of privileges caused the division of the Cossacks into two camps. The so-called "obedient" side was ready to agree to the loss of former liberties for the sake of preserving part of the privileges. The bulk was the "disobedient side", constantly sending walkers to the Empress with complaints about the oppression of the "obedient" Cossacks, in whose hands were all command posts. In January 1772, the "naughty" Cossacks went with banners and icons to the tsarist general who arrived in Yaitsky town with a request to remove the military ataman and foremen. The general ordered to shoot at the peaceful procession. The Cossacks responded with an uprising, to suppress which the government sent a corps of troops. After the events of January 13, the Cossack circle was banned and the military office was liquidated, the Cossacks were controlled by an appointed commandant, who was subordinate to the Orenburg governor. At this time, Pugachev appeared. None of his impostor predecessors possessed the qualities of a leader capable of leading the masses of the dispossessed. In addition, Pugachev's success was facilitated by the favorable environment and the people to whom he turned for help to restore his supposedly violated rights: on Yaik, the excitement from the recent uprising and the government's response did not subside; Cossacks owned weapons and represented the most militarily organized part of the population of Russia. 3.2. The course of the peasant war. The uprising began on September 17, 1773. Before 80 Cossacks, initiated into the "secret" of the salvation of Peter III, a manifesto was read out, and the detachment set off. The manifesto satisfied the aspirations of the Cossacks: the tsar granted them a river, herbs, lead, gunpowder, provisions, salaries. This manifesto did not yet take into account the peasant interests. But even what was promised was enough that the next day the detachment numbered 200 people, replenishment poured into its composition every hour. The almost three-week triumphal procession of Pugachev began. On October 5, 1773, he approached the provincial city of Orenburg, a well-defended fortress with a garrison of three thousand. The assault on the city was unsuccessful, and a six-month siege began. Near Orenburg, the government sent an army under the command of Major General Kara. However, the rebel troops utterly defeated the 1.5 thousandth detachment of Kara. The same fate befell the detachment of Colonel Chernyshov. These victories over the regular troops made a huge impression. The uprising - some voluntarily, others under duress, was joined by the Bashkirs, led by Salavat Yulaev, mining workers, peasants assigned to factories. At the same time, the appearance in Kazan of Kara, who shamefully fled from the battlefield, sowed panic among the local nobility. Anxiety gripped the capital of the empire. In connection with the siege of Orenburg and the long standing at the walls of the fortress of troops, whose number in other months reached 30 thousand people, the leaders of the movement faced tasks that the practice of previous movements did not know: it was necessary to organize the supply of the rebel army with food and weapons, to recruit regiments, counter government propaganda with the popularization of the movement's slogans. In Berd, the headquarters of "Emperor Peter III", located 5 versts from the besieged Orenburg, his own court etiquette develops, his own guard arises, the emperor acquires a seal with the inscription "The Great State Seal of Peter III, Emperor and Autocrat of All Russia", at the young Cossack woman Ustinya Kuznetsova , whom Pugachev married, maids of honor appeared. At the headquarters, a body of military, judicial and administrative authority was created - the Military Collegium, which was in charge of the distribution of property seized from the nobles, officials and clergy, the recruitment of regiments, and the distribution of weapons. In the usual form, borrowed from government practice. other social content was invested. The “king” did not favor noblemen as colonels, but representatives of the people. Former craftsman Afanasy Sokolov, better known by the nickname Khlopusha, became one of the prominent leaders of the insurgent army operating in the region of the factories of the Southern Urals. In the camp of the rebels appeared their own counts. The first of these was Chika-Zarubin, acting under the name of "Count Ivan Nikiforovich Chernyshev." The proclamation of Pugachev as emperor, the formation of the Military Collegium, the introduction of count dignity, testifies to the inability of the peasantry and the Cossacks to change the old social system with a new one - it was a question of changing faces. In the months when Pugachev was busy with the siege of Orenburg, the government camp was intensively preparing to fight the rebels. Troops were hastily drawn to the area of the uprising, instead of the removed Kara, General Bibikov was appointed commander-in-chief. To inspire the nobles and express her solidarity with them, Catherine declared herself a Kazan landowner. First major battle Pugachevites with a punitive army took place on March 22, 1774 near the Tatishchev fortress, it lasted six hours and ended in a complete victory for government troops. But the element of the peasant war is such that the losses were quickly replenished. After this defeat, the second stage of the peasant war began. Pugachev was forced to lift the siege of Orenburg and, pursued by government troops, move east. From April to June, the main events of the peasant war unfolded on the territory of the mining Urals and Bashkiria. However, the burning of factories, the seizure of livestock and property from bonded peasants and working people, violence against the population of factory settlements, led to the fact that the factory owners managed to arm working people at their own expense, organize detachments from them and send them against Pugachev. This narrowed the base of the movement and broke the unity of the rebels. Near the Trinity fortress, Pugachev suffered another defeat, after which he rushed first to the northwest, and then to the west. The ranks of the rebels were replenished by the peoples of the Volga region: Udmurts, Mari, Chuvashs. When Pugachev approached Kazan on July 12, 1774, there were 20 thousand people in his army. He captured the city, but he did not have time to take control of the Kremlin, where the government troops settled - Michelson arrived in time to help the besieged and inflicted another defeat on the rebels. On July 17, Pugachev, together with the remnants of the defeated army, crossed to the right bank of the Volga - to areas inhabited by serfs and state peasants. The third period of the peasant war began. Pugachev's manifestoes were of great importance in restoring the number of rebel troops. Already in the manifestos promulgated in November 1773, the peasants were called upon "villains and opponents of my imperial will", which meant the landowners, to take their lives, "and take their houses and all their estate as a reward." The manifesto of July 31, 1774, which proclaimed the liberation of the peasants from serfdom and taxes, most fully reflected the peasant aspirations. The nobles, as "disturbers of the empire and destroyers of the peasants", were to "catch, execute and hang and act in the same way as they, having no Christianity in themselves, repaired with you, the peasants." On the right bank of the Volga, the peasant war flared up with renewed vigor - rebel detachments were created everywhere, acting disunitedly and out of touch with each other, which facilitated the punitive efforts of the government: Pugachev easily occupied the cities - Kurmysh, Temnikov, Insar, etc., but with the same ease and left them under pressure from superior forces of government troops. He moved to the Lower Volga, where barge haulers, Don, Volga and Ukrainian Cossacks joined him. In August, he approached Tsaritsyn, but did not take the city. With a small detachment, Pugachev crossed to the left bank of the Volga, where those who were with him Yaik Cossacks they seized him and on September 12, 1774 they handed him over to Michelson. The peasant war ended in defeat. 3.3. Some features of the Pugachev movement. It was impossible to expect a different outcome of spontaneous protest against the arbitrariness of the authorities and landlords: armed with whatever, the crowds of the rebels could not resist the regiments of a well-armed and trained regular army. Let us note some features of the Pugachev movement. The main ones consisted in attempts to overcome spontaneity by means borrowed from the government administration: under the newly-minted Emperor Peter III, the same rules were established as at the royal court in St. Petersburg. In these actions of Pugachev, the purpose of the movement clearly emerges: its leaders were to take the place of the executed nobles and representatives of the tsarist administration. The call for the total destruction of the nobles, who were indeed put to death without trial or investigation, caused enormous damage to the development of national culture, because the most educated part of society was exterminated. Another feature is that the rebels consciously and under the influence of the elements of destruction completely or partially defeated 89 iron and copper smelters, with a total cost, according to the factory owners, which is certainly exaggerated, at 2716 thousand rubles. The noble nests of European Russia, engulfed by the peasant war, turned out to be plundered. The victors acted just as mercilessly and cruelly, putting to death thousands of participants in the movement. In the Nizhny Novgorod province alone, punishers built gallows in more than two hundred settlements. The Yaik Cossacks were renamed into the Ural Cossacks, and the Yaik River - into the Urals. The village of Zimoveyskaya, in which Pugachev was born, and a century before him - Razin, began to be called Potemkinskaya. On January 10, 1775, the leader of the peasant war and his associates were executed on Bolotnaya Square in Moscow. The nobility, headed by the "Kazan landowner" Catherine II, triumphed. The peasant war did not bring relief to the peasants. On the contrary, the landowners continued to increase the duties in their favor and exacted them with greater bitterness than before. Nevertheless, the peasant war left a noticeable mark in the history of Russia, primarily by the fact that it supported the traditions of the fight against lawlessness and oppression. CONCLUSION. Peasant wars in Russia created and developed traditions of struggle against lawlessness and oppression. They have played their role in the history of Russia's political and social development. Usually, assessing these events, historians note that the peasant wars dealt a blow to the feudal system and hastened the triumph of new capitalist relations. At the same time, it is often forgotten that the wars that engulfed the vast expanses of Russia led to the destruction of the masses of the population (and many peasants, a significant number of nobles), disrupted economic life in many regions and seriously affected the development of productive forces. Violence and cruelty, fully shown by the warring parties, could not solve any of the urgent problems of socio-economic development. The whole history of peasant wars and their consequences is the clearest confirmation of Pushkin's brilliant assessment: “The state of the entire region where the fire raged was terrible. God forbid to see a Russian rebellion - senseless and merciless. Those who are plotting impossible revolutions among us are either young and do not know our people, or they are hard-hearted people, to whom someone else's little head is a penny, and their own neck is a penny ”(7, 87). What are peasant wars? A fair peasant punishment for the oppressors and feudal lords? A civil war in long-suffering Russia, during which Russians killed Russians? "Russian rebellion, senseless and merciless" (7, 87)? Each time gives its own answers to these questions. Apparently, any violence is capable of giving rise to even more cruel and bloody violence. It is immoral to idealize riots, peasant or Cossack uprisings (which, by the way, were done in our recent past), as well as civil wars, because generated by untruths and extortion, injustice and an irrepressible thirst for wealth, these uprisings, riots and wars themselves bring violence and injustice, grief and ruin, suffering and rivers of blood... BIBLIOGRAPHY: 1. Buganov Emelyan Pugachev. M., 1990. 2. The World of History (Russia in the 17th century). M., 1989. 3. Buganov V.I. Razin and Razintsy. M., 1995. 4. Buganov V.I. "Search Case" by Stepan Razin / History of the Fatherland. 1994, No. 1. 5. Busov K. Moscow Chronicle 1584-1613. M., 1961. 6. Great statesmen of Russia, ed. Kiseleva A.V. M., 1996. 7. Zaichkin I.A., Pochkarev P.P. Russian history from Catherine the Great to Alexander II. M., 1994. 8. Zuev M.N. Russian history. M., 1998. 9. History of Russia from ancient times to 1861. / Ed. Pavlenko N.I. M., 1998. 10. Klyuchevsky V.O. Works in 9 volumes, vol. 3. M., 1988. 11. Peasant war led by Stepan Razin. Collection of documents. M., 1954-1976. T.1-4. 12. Malkov V. B. A manual on the history of the USSR for applicants to universities. M., 1985. 13. Moryakov V.I. Russian history. M., 1996. 14. Munchaev Sh.M. National history. M., 1999. 15. Nolge G.G. Russian "peasant wars" as uprisings of the outskirts / Questions of history. 1994, No. 11. 16. Domestic history. Textbook, ed. Borisov. M., 1996. 17. A manual on the history of the USSR / Ed. Orlova A.S., Georgieva V.A., Naumova N.V., Sivokhina G.A. M., 1984. 18. Pushkarev S.G. Review of Russian history. Stavropol, 1993. 19. Collection of documents on the history of Russia from ancient times to the second quarter of the 19th century. Yekaterinburg, 1993. 20. Topical issues in the study of popular movements (Polemical notes on peasant wars in Russia) / History of the USSR. 1991, No. 3. 21. Soloviev V.M. Anatomy of the Russian rebellion. Stepan Razin: myths and reality. M., 1994. 22. Soloviev V.M. Razin and his time. M., 1990. 23. Stanislavsky A.L. Civil war in Russia in the 17th century: the Cossacks at the turning point of history. Moscow, 990. 24. Fedorov V.L. Russian history. M., 1998. 25. Reader on the history of the USSR from ancient times to the end of the XVIII century. M., 1989. 26. Chistyakova E.V., Soloviev V.M. Stepan Razin and his associates. M., 1990. 27. Sharova L.N., Mishina I.A. The history of homeland. M., 1992.
PEASANT WARS IN RUSSIA IN THE XVII-XVIII CENTURIES.
PEASANT WARS IN RUSSIA XVII-XVIII CENTURIES.
INTRODUCTION ………………………………………………………………………. 3
1. TIME OF TROUBLES.
1.1. Causes of the peasant war in the beginning of the 11th century …………………………. five
1.2. Peasant war of the beginning of the XVII century ……………………………………… 7
1.3. A look at the events of the early 17th century
like a civil war in Russia ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………12
2. REBELLION LEADED BY S. T. RAZIN.
2.1. The course of the uprising ………………………………………………………………... 16
2.2. V. M. Solovyov about the Razin movement …………………………………….. 17
3. PEASANT WAR LEADED BY EI PUGACHEV.
3.1. Events preceding the start of the war ………………………………….. 24
3.2. The course of the peasant war ……………………………………………………. 25
3.5. Some features of the Pugachev movement …………………………. 28
CONCLUSION …………………………………………………………………... 30
BIBLIOGRAPHY ………………………………………………………………... 31
INTRODUCTION
The 17th century in the history of our country is a remarkable time, a turning point, filled with stormy and heroic events. This is the time when the era of the Middle Ages ends, the era of a new period, late feudalism, begins.
Despite the close interest in the 17th century, its serious study in historical science began rather late. True, the historians of the eighteenth century have already left us their judgments, but very general ones, about the preceding century.
The well-known theory of enslavement and emancipation of estates in the 16th-19th centuries comes from the law school: the state, with the help of laws, enslaved all estates, forced them to serve its interests. Then it gradually liberated: first the nobles (a decree of 1762 on the freedom of the nobles), then the merchants (a charter to the cities of 1785) and peasants (a decree of 1861 on the abolition of serfdom). This scheme is very far from reality: the feudal lords, as is known, constituted the ruling class from the time of Kievan Rus, and the peasants - the exploited class, while the state acted as a defender of the interests of the feudal lords.
In accordance with the point of view of historians of the state school, the struggle of classes, estates was regarded as a manifestation of the anti-state, anarchist principle. The peasants are not the main driving force of the uprisings, but a passive mass, capable only of escaping from their masters or following the Cossacks during the years of numerous "troubles", when the latter sought to plunder, not obeying the organized principle - the state.
The problem of social peace and social conflicts has always been and remains relevant for our country.
Soviet historians as the basis for studying the history of Russia in the 17th-18th centuries. put forward the idea of the leading importance of two factors: the development of the economy and the class struggle. The development of the economy, the evolution of classes and estates, had a significant inhibitory effect on the feudal regime, which reached its climax precisely in these centuries. The tightening of exploitation by the feudal lords and state punitive bodies causes an increase in the protest of the lower ranks of the people. No wonder the 17th century was called “rebellious” by contemporaries.
History of the class struggle in Russia in the 17th-18th centuries. is the subject of close attention, but to which various judgments have been made. There is no unity among historians in assessing the first and second Peasant Wars - their chronological framework, stages, effectiveness, historical role, etc. For example, some researchers reduce the first of them to the uprising of I.I. Bolotnikov in 1606-1607, others include the Cotton uprising of 1603, the "hunger riots" of 1601-1603, the popular movements of the time of the first and second impostors, both militias, and so on, up to the peasant-Cossack uprisings of 1613-1614 and even 1617-1618. The Moscow uprisings of 1682 and 1698, some authors, adhering to the old tradition, call "reactionary riots" directed against Peter's reforms (although the latter had not yet begun). Other historians see these uprisings as complex, controversial, but generally anti-feudal uprisings.
Research on these and other issues is carried out on a broad front: this is the publication of sources (chronicles, discharge, embassy, boyar books, documents on the history of popular uprisings, culture, etc.), their comparative study, the preparation of books on a wide range of problems of socio-economic, political , cultural development of the country in one of the critical eras of national history.
In this work, I will try to consider the history of the Peasant Wars in Russia in the 17th-18th centuries. taking into account different points of view on the basis of scientific monographs and articles of historians of the XIX-XX centuries. The paper also used documents on the history of peasant wars in Russia (11; 19; 25).
1. TIME OF TROUBLES.
1.1. Causes of the peasant war in the early 17th century.
At the turn of the XVI-XVII centuries, the Russian state entered a period of deep state-political and socio-economic, structural crisis, the roots of which went back to the era of the reign of Ivan the Terrible. The Livonian War, the oprichnina terror and the growth of feudal exploitation led to the collapse of the country's economy, which led to an economic crisis, which, in turn, stimulated the strengthening of serfdom. Against this background, social tensions inevitably increased among the lower classes. On the other hand, the nobility also experienced social dissatisfaction, which claimed to expand their rights and privileges, which would be more in line with their increased role in the state.
The political causes of the unrest were very deep. The autocratic tyrannical model of the relationship between power and society, embodied by Ivan the Terrible, proved to be limited in the conditions of the changed social structure. In a state that has already ceased to be a collection of disparate lands and principalities, but has not yet become an organic whole, the most difficult question arose on the agenda - who and how can influence the adoption of state decisions.
The political crisis also led to a dynastic crisis, which was associated with the suppression of the dynasty of Moscow tsars - descendants of Ivan Kalita after the death of Tsarevich Dmitry in Uglich on May 15, 1591 (many contemporaries blamed Boris Godunov for his death, although the materials of the commission of inquiry spoke of the opposite) and death who had an heir to Tsar Fedor Ivanovich on January 6, 1598. The election to the kingdom in February 1598 of Boris Godunov, who had been the de facto ruler of Russia since 1587, did not solve the problem. On the contrary, contradictions intensified among the groupings of the elite of the Moscow boyars. The situation was complicated by the widespread since the mid-80s. legends about the “tsarevich-deliverer”, which undermined the authority of Tsar Boris, who did not have the advantages of a hereditary monarch.
Achievements of Boris Godunov's policy in the 90s. 16th century were fragile, because they were based on an overstrain of the country's socio-economic potential, which inevitably led to a social explosion. Discontent covered all sectors of society: the nobility and the boyars were outraged by the curtailment of their tribal rights, the service nobility was not satisfied with the policy of the government, which was unable to stop the flight of the peasants, which significantly reduced the profitability of their estates, the townspeople opposed the township building and increased tax oppression, the Orthodox clergy were dissatisfied curtailment of their privileges and rigid submission to autocratic power.
At the beginning of the century, the country was struck by a terrible crop failure. This disaster brought the main draft population of the country to complete ruin. A wave of numerous unrest and uprisings of the starving common people is growing. Government forces had difficulty suppressing such "revolts".
However, Peasant Wars are different from peasant uprisings of this kind. They cover a significant territory of the country, unite the totality of powerful popular movements, often representing heterogeneous forces. In the peasant war, a standing army of rebels operates, the country splits up, as it were, into two parts, in one of which the power of the rebels, and in the other - the power of the king. The slogans of the peasant war are of an all-Russian character.
In the Peasants' War of the beginning of the 17th century, three large periods stand out: the first period (1603-1605), the most important event of which was the uprising of Cotton; the second period (1606-1607) - a peasant uprising led by I. I. Bolotnikov; third period (1608-1615) - the decline of the Peasant War, accompanied by a number of major uprisings of peasants, townspeople, Cossacks, etc. (17.106).
1.2. Peasant war in the early 17th century.
As already mentioned, at the beginning of the century, the situation in the country worsened due to crop failures. In 1601 it rained for more than two months. Then very early, in mid-August, frost hit and snow fell, which led to the death of the crop. The prices have increased several times. Bread speculation began. In the next year, 1602, winter crops again failed to sprout. Again, as in 1601, early cold came. Prices have already risen more than 100 times. The people were starving, mass epidemics began.
Boris Godunov organized state works. He attracted Muscovites and refugees who flooded into the capital for construction, using the already existing experience in building the Ivan the Great Bell Tower, distributed bread from state bins, allowed serfs to leave their masters and look for opportunities to feed themselves. But all these measures were not successful. Rumors spread that the country was punished for violating the order of succession to the throne, for the sins of Godunov.
In the center of the country (1603-1604) an uprising of serfs broke out under the leadership of Khlopko Kosolap. It was brutally suppressed, and Khlopok was executed in Moscow. Many historians consider this uprising the first stage of the Peasants' War of the early 17th century.
In the neighboring Commonwealth, they were only waiting for a reason to intervene in the internal affairs of a weakened Russia. In 1602, a man appeared on the estate of Prince Adam Vishnevetsky, posing as the son of Ivan IV, Tsarevich Dmitry, who miraculously survived, who died in Uglich on May 15, 1591. In reality, it was the Galich nobleman Grigory Otrepiev, a monk of the Chudov Monastery, who belonged to the retinue of Patriarch Job and was closely associated with the Romanovs.
By the beginning of 1605, more than 20 thousand people had gathered under the banner of the "prince". On April 13, 1605, Tsar Boris Godunov suddenly died and his 16-year-old son Fyodor ascended the throne. The boyars did not recognize the new king. On May 7, the tsarist army went over to the side of False Dmitry. Tsar Fedor was overthrown and strangled along with his mother.
However, hopes for the "kind and just" Tsar Dmitry Ivanovich soon collapsed. A Polish protege, an outspoken political adventurer, sat on the Russian throne. On the night of May 17, 1606, an uprising of the townspeople began. The conspirators broke into the Kremlin and brutally killed False Dmitry 1.
Three days later, the well-born boyar Vasily Ivanovich Shuisky, the former organizer and inspirer of the conspiracy, who had previously been convicted of intrigue and poisoned by False Dmitry into exile, was “called out” from the Execution Ground on Red Square as the new tsar.
The man who, by the will of fate, on the Moscow throne, did not enjoy either authority or popular love. The main quality of Shuisky's character was hypocrisy, his favorite way of fighting was intrigue and lies. Like Godunov, he successfully learned all the lessons of the reign of Ivan the Terrible, was distrustful, cunning, but did not possess either a statesman's mind or the experience of Tsar Boris. This man was not able to stop the collapse of statehood and overcome the social split.
From the very beginning, Shuisky did not enjoy wide support. The banner of the opposition again became the name of Tsar Dmitry Ivanovich, who, according to rumors, escaped from the conspirators this time as well. Shuisky was opposed by the population of border counties, disgraced supporters of False Dmitry, such as the governor of Putivl, Prince G. Shakhovsky and the governor of Chernigov, Prince A. Telyatevsky. Opposition moods swept the noble corporations. In the summer of 1606, the movement began to acquire an organized character. The leader also appeared - Ivan Isaevich Bolotnikov.
The second stage of the Peasants' War began.
Serfdom was a heterogeneous social stratum. The top serfs, close to their owners, occupied a fairly high position. It is no coincidence that many provincial nobles willingly changed their status to serfs. I. Bolotnikov, apparently, belonged to their number. He was a military servant of A. Telyatevsky and, most likely, a nobleman by origin. However, one should not attach too much importance to this: the social orientation of a person's views was determined not only by origin. The “nobility” of Bolotnikov can be explained by his military talents and the qualities of an experienced warrior.
There is news of Bolotnikov's stay in the Crimean and Turkish captivity, as an oarsman in a galley captured by the "Germans". There is an assumption that, returning from captivity through Italy, Germany, the Commonwealth, Bolotnikov managed to fight on the side of the Austrian emperor as the leader of a mercenary Cossack detachment against the Turks. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain why it was he who received the powers of the “big governor” from a man who pretended to be Tsar Dmitry.
The rebels, gathered under the banner of "Tsar Dmitry Ivanovich", were a complex conglomerate of forces. Here were not only people from the lower classes, but also service people in the instrument and the fatherland. They were united in their rejection of the newly elected king, different in their social aspirations. After a successful battle near Kromy in August 1606, the rebels occupied Yelets, Tula, Kaluga, Kashira, and by the end of the year approached Moscow. There were not enough forces for a complete blockade of the capital, and this made it possible for Shuisky to mobilize all his resources. By this time, a split had occurred in the camp of the rebels, and the detachments of Lyapunov (November) and Pashkov (early December) went over to the side of Shuisky.
The battle near Moscow on December 2, 1606 ended in the defeat of Bolotnikov. The latter, after a series of battles, retreated to Tula, under the protection of the stone walls of the city. V. Shuisky himself spoke out against the rebels and in June 1607. approached Tula. For several months, the tsarist troops unsuccessfully tried to take the city, until they blocked the Upa River and flooded the fortress. Shuisky's opponents, relying on his gracious word, opened the gates. However, the king did not miss the opportunity to deal with the leaders of the movement.
It is rather difficult to assess the nature of the Bolotnikov uprising. It seems one-sided view of the movement exclusively as the highest stage of the peasant war. However, this view exists, and the supporters of this view give the following assessments of the first Peasants' War. (17, 108)
Some of them believe that she delayed the legal registration of serfdom for 50 years, others believe that, on the contrary, she accelerated the process of legal registration of serfdom, which ended in 1649.
Supporters of the view of peasant wars as an anti-serfdom popular movement also believe that the significance of peasant wars cannot be reduced only to their immediate results. In the course of the peasant wars, the masses learned to fight for land and freedom. Peasant wars were one of the factors that prepared the formation of revolutionary ideology. Ultimately, they prepared the transition to a new mode of production. “We have always taught and continue to teach,” wrote V. I. Lenin, “that the class struggle, the struggle of the exploited part of the people against the exploiting one, underlies political transformations and, ultimately, decides the fate of all such transformations” (17, 108).
Some historians express a different view of the events described above. In their opinion, the “program of the movement” remains unknown to us: all the surviving documents that can be used to judge the demands of the rebels belong to the government camp. In the interpretation of Shuisky, the rebels called on the Muscovites to destroy the "nobles and the strong", to divide their property. Patriarch Hermogenes announced that “the Bolotnikovites order the boyar serfs to beat their boyars, and their wives and estates, and promise them estates” (9, 174), promising “to give the boyars, and the voivodship, and the okolnichestvo, and the deacon” (9, 174) . There are cases of the so-called "thieves' dachas", when the estates of the supporters of Tsar Vasily were transferred to the supporters of the "legitimate sovereign Dmitry Ivanovich". Thus, the struggle was aimed not so much at the destruction of the existing social system, but at changing individuals and entire social groups within it. The participants in the speech, former peasants, serfs, sought to be constituted in the new social status of service people, “free Cossacks”. The nobility, dissatisfied with the accession of Shuisky, also sought to improve its status. There was a sharp, rather complex and contradictory social struggle that went beyond the framework outlined by the concept of the peasant war. This struggle naturally complemented the struggle for power - after all, only the victory of one of the contenders ensured the consolidation of the rights of his supporters. This confrontation itself turned into an armed struggle, by whole armies.
The lower classes of society also took part in the social confrontation. However, the anti-serfdom fervor found its expression, first of all, in the weakening, and subsequently in the progressive destruction of statehood. In the context of the crisis of all structures of power, it was increasingly difficult to keep the peasants from leaving. In an effort to enlist the support of the nobility, Shuisky March 9, 1607. issued an extensive serf legislation, which provided for a significant increase in the term of the lesson years. The search for fugitives became the official duty of the local administration, which from now on had to ask each newcomer “hard to ask whose he was, where he was from, and when he fled” (9, 174). For the first time, monetary sanctions were introduced for accepting a fugitive. However, the Code of 1607. was more declarative. In the context of the events for the peasantry, the problem became urgent not of an exit restored without prior notice, but of finding an owner and a place of new residence that would ensure the stability of life.
Events in the early 17th century a number of historians are interpreted as a civil war in Russia. However, not all researchers share this point of view. Emphasizing the absence of clear lines of social and political confrontation, they consider all events within the framework outlined by contemporaries themselves - as a time of turmoil - troubled times.
1.3. A look at the events of the beginning of the 17th century as a civil war
in Russia.
For centuries, scientists have been struggling to unravel the causes and meaning of the Time of Troubles. Progress in the study of unrest was achieved thanks to the works of S.F. Platonov, I.I. Smirnov, A.A. Zimin, V.I. Koretsky and other scientists who considered it as a social phenomenon, prepared by the entire course of the previous development of the country. But already in the course of the discussion that unfolded on the pages of the journal Questions of History in the late 1950s, many vulnerabilities in the existing concepts were also revealed. Both the attempts of a number of Soviet historians to consider the Time of Troubles only from the point of view of the peasant war, and the constructions of S.F. Platonov and I.I. Smirnov, according to which a single complex of events of the Time of Troubles was divided into separate, unrelated stages, were criticized. N.E. Nosov then expressed a judgment about the Time of Troubles as a civil war, which was a complex interweaving of class, intra-class and international struggle. However, until recently, the events of the beginning of the 17th century were considered mainly from the point of view of the class struggle of peasants and serfs, the culmination of which was considered the Bolotnikov uprising. The other classes that participated in the Time of Troubles were not given due attention. A significant contribution to the study of the Time of Troubles belongs to the historian L.L. Stanislavsky (1939-1990): we are talking, first of all, about his research on the history of the Cossacks.
In Soviet science, the Cossack uprisings of the early 17th century were traditionally viewed as an integral part of the peasant war, and the Cossacks themselves as the vanguard of a broad popular anti-serf uprising. Rightly linking the speeches of the Cossacks with the protest of the masses against social oppression, the researchers at the same time essentially identified the goals of the Cossacks and the peasantry, thereby downplaying (contrary to the direct indications of the sources) the independent and active role of the Cossacks in the events of the Time of Troubles.
L.L. Stanislavsky convincingly proves that it was the Cossacks who formed the core of the rebel armies of False Dmitry I, Bolotnikov and the “Tushino thief” and most consistently supported the impostors. As their power increased, the Cossacks more and more clearly manifested their claims to power in the country, to the role of a new ruling class, which seriously threatened the very existence of the nobility. Only the incompleteness of the class (military) organization of the Cossacks, the author notes, did not allow the Cossacks to seize power in the First Militia even at the moment of the greatest weakening of the nobility.
Until 1619. The "free" Cossacks, acting under the banner of impostors, their chosen leaders - Pan Lisovsky and Prince Vladislav, posed a serious threat to the existing social order.
“Who were the Cossacks after all? The vanguard of the revolutionary peasantry or the robber condottieri? Liberators of Russia from foreign invaders or their accomplices? Fighters against feudal exploitation or...?” (23, 5). Stanislavsky gives a clear and precise answer to this question: “They were ... Cossacks and did everything possible to remain Cossacks until they had to retreat before all the might of the Russian state” (23, 242). With the help of facts, he proved that the core of the Cossack army was made up of former peasants and serfs, for whom leaving for the Cossack villages meant liberation from feudal dependence. Thus, the conclusion of Soviet historiography about the close connection between the Cossack movement of the early 17th century and the protest of the broad masses of the people against social oppression and serfdom is confirmed.
At the same time, the Cossacks are a complex and contradictory phenomenon, which far from fit into the framework of the usual ideas about the Time of Troubles as a peasant war.
An important pattern for understanding the fate of the "free" Cossacks is that as the formation of the class organization of the Cossacks, its interests diverged more and more clearly from the interests of other classes - not only the nobility, but also the bulk of the peasantry.
The termination of the existence of a single class of “free” Cossacks is connected not so much with its internal stratification, but with powerful pressure from the feudal state, the targeted policy of the government of Mikhail Fedorovich, which resulted in the dispersion of the Cossacks over different territories, estates and owners.
The study of the history of the Cossacks, one of the main driving forces of the Time of Troubles, allows us to look at the era of the Time of Troubles from a new angle as a whole. Many historians believe that the social protest of the peasantry at the beginning of the 17th century did not acquire a pronounced class orientation and resulted in special, specific forms - going to the Cossacks and participating in the Cossack movement. But the Cossacks themselves were by no means suitable for the role of the "revolutionary vanguard" of the peasantry and. moreover, the class interests of the Cossacks often came into conflict with the interests of the bulk of the working population. This forces many historians to reconsider the traditional ideas about the Time of Troubles (and the Bolotnikov uprising, in particular) as a peasant war.
It is proved that one of the main springs for the development of the Time of Troubles was the antagonism between the Cossacks and the nobility, who for a decade and a half waged a sharp, uncompromising struggle for power in the country and influence in the army. But the matter was not limited to the clash of these two forces. There is interesting data on the performances during the Time of Troubles by the southern nobility, which, in terms of social status, stood close to instrumental service people and suffered from expansion into their lands by the Moscow nobility.
Important for understanding the balance of power within the nobility on the eve and during the Time of Troubles are the early studies of A.L. Stanislavsky (23) on the history of the sovereign's court, in which he revealed the presence of serious contradictions between the privileged metropolitan and district nobility, as well as between the nobles of the center and outskirts. The history of the nobility in the Time of Troubles needs further study. However, it is already clear that it was not just a “fellow traveler”, but played an active and independent role in the events of the early 17th century.
The works of A.L. Stanislavsky represent a new direction in the study of the Time of Troubles, which was based not only on the antagonism between the nobility and the peasantry, but also on a deep split within the service class. This split was due to the post-oprichny crisis of land ownership, the fall of the former importance of the noble cavalry, the change in the balance of power between the nobility and the lower strata of the service class, a serious divergence of interests of various official and territorial groups of service people. Further study of the Time of Troubles in this vein is an urgent task of historical science.
2. REVOLUTION LEADED BY S. T. RAZIN.
2.1. The course of the uprising.
The culmination of social actions in the 17th century was the uprising of the Cossacks and peasants led by S.T. Razin. This movement originated in the villages of the Don Cossacks. The Don freemen have always attracted fugitives from the southern and central regions of the Russian state. Here they were protected by the unwritten law "no extradition from the Don." The government, needing the services of the Cossacks for the defense of the southern borders, paid them a salary and put up with the self-government that existed there.
Stepan Timofeevich Razin, a native of the village of Zimoveyskaya, belonged to the homely Cossacks - he enjoyed great authority. In 1667 he led a detachment of a thousand people, who went on a campaign "for zipuns" (to the Volga, and then to the Yaik River, where the Yaitsky town was occupied with a fight).
In the summer of 1668 already almost 20,000 Razin's army successfully operated in the possessions of Persia (Iran) on the Caspian coast. The captured valuables were exchanged by the Razintsy for Russian prisoners who replenished their ranks. The following summer, 1669, the Cossacks defeated the fleet near Pig Island (south of Baku), equipped against them by the Persian Shah. This greatly complicated Russian-Iranian relations and aggravated the government's position towards the Cossacks.
In October 1669 Razin returned to the Don through Astrakhan, where he was greeted with triumph. Inspired by good luck, he set about preparing a new campaign, this time "for the good king" against the "traitors of the boyars." The next campaign of the Cossacks along the Volga to the north turned into a peasant turmoil. The Cossacks remained the military core, and with the influx into the detachment of a huge number of fugitive peasants, the peoples of the Volga region - Mordovians, Tatars, Chuvashs - the social orientation of the movement changed dramatically.
In May 1670, a 7,000-strong detachment of S.T. Razin captured the city of Tsaritsyn, at the same time, detachments of archers sent from Moscow and Astrakhan were defeated. Having approved the Cossack administration in Astrakhan, Razin moved north - Saratov and Samara voluntarily went over to his side. S. Razin addressed the population of the Volga region with “charming” (from the word: seduce, call) letters in which he urged them to join the uprising and harass traitors, that is, boyars, nobles, governors, clerks. The uprising covered a vast territory, on which numerous detachments were operating, led by atamans M. Osipov, M. Kharitonov, V. Fedorov, nun Alena and others.
In September, Razin's army approached Simbirsk, and stubbornly besieged it for a month. The frightened government announced mobilization - in August 1679, a 60,000-strong army headed for the Middle Volga region. In early October, a government detachment led by Y. Baryatinsky defeated the main forces of Razin and joined the Simbirsk garrison under the command of governor I. Miloslavsky. Razin with a small detachment went to the Don, where he hoped to recruit a new army, but was betrayed by the top of the Cossacks and handed over to the government. June 4, 1671 he was taken to Moscow and executed on Red Square two days later. In November 1671 fell Astrakhan - the last stronghold of the rebels. The participants in the uprising were severely repressed.
2.2. V. M. Solovyov about the Razin movement.
The theme of the Razin uprising - the largest popular movement in Russia in the 17th century. has always aroused great interest among researchers of the history of our country in the early Middle Ages. It is not surprising that even now, when there has been a revision of the concepts that prevailed in the recent past in Russian historiography, historians are turning to it. The socio-psychological and many other issues related to the uprising were once reflected in the works of V.I. Buganov and A.N. Sakharov, who still retain priority positions.
V. M. Solovyov (21), who is responsible for a number of interesting studies, is also working very fruitfully in this direction. In this part of the work, I want to present a concentrated analysis of the views of V. M. Solovyov on the Razin movement and its leader.
V. M. Solovyov considered it possible to evaluate the Razin uprising as a “Russian rebellion”. Considering the Razin movement as a "Russian rebellion", he does not refuse to assess the events that took place under Stepan Razin as an uprising, but at a certain stage of their development - as a peasant war.
V. M. Solovyov revealed the complex dialectical essence of the events of 1667 - 1671. In a historical context, they appear as a bizarre fusion of diverse and diverse spontaneous manifestations, in which the features of a senseless and merciless rebellion, a blind rebellion, and all the signs of a huge popular uprising, and the characteristics of the so-called peasant war, and much more, are distinguishable from a purely Cossack movement directed against etatism - the dictate of the state, to national liberation, religious uprisings. Finally, in these events, adventurous beginnings (hoax with the false Tsarevich Alexei and the imaginary patriarch Nikon, etc.) and banal robbery, criminality (pogroms, robberies) powerfully make themselves felt. All this is not separated from one another, but coexists, is closely intertwined, and often collides with each other due to deep internal contradictions inherent in the very nature of discord - an extremely motley, confusing and very diverse phenomenon in terms of composition of participants.
Solovyov decided to oppose the historical reality, recreated according to the sources, to the myths about the Razin time, about the Razin uprising and about its leader himself. One of the myths that have taken root in the mass consciousness is the 17th century, when the good old Russian customs, general contentment and prosperity allegedly dominated. On a large amount of factual material, V. M. Solovyov showed how difficult was the fate of people from different strata of Russian society and, especially from its lower classes - the poor part of the township, peasants and serfs, how strong was the omnipotence of people close to the tsar and the arbitrariness of the local administration. He pays special attention to the Council Code and the consequences of its adoption for the country. Emphasizing that its adoption was accelerated both by a series of major urban uprisings in Russia and by a revolution in England, which made a great impression on the ruling circles of all European countries, Solovyov saw in the Council Code "essentially a pacifying bridle on the people" and in the establishment of an indefinite search for fugitives - its "center of gravity" and "main social meaning" (21, 25). Analysis of the content of the Code allowed the historian to show why the Razin uprising, started by the Don Cossacks, grew into a mass popular movement of public protest, covering a significant part of the state.
Another myth is about the boundless kindness of the "quietest" Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich. In part, perhaps, it was inspired by the words of V.O. Klyuchevsky, taken out of context, that this tsar is “a kind person, a glorious Russian soul” (10). At the same time, V.O. Klyuchevsky noted, however, the complexity and inconsistency of the nature of the tsar, who was in no way “higher than the rudest of his subjects” (10), a characteristic that is often not taken into account. Solovyov cited several vivid and convincing facts showing this sovereign as a tyrant.
Another myth is about the isolation of the Don Cossacks, among whom the Razin uprising began, from the population of cities and districts of Central Russia, from peasants and townspeople, from small service people. It must be admitted that there are certain grounds for such a myth. They are connected with the essential features that the Cossack community had in comparison with the population of inner Russia in the way of life and in everyday life, in mentality and culture. But with all this, the Don people in the 17th century. had relatives in Russia. They often came to them and lived with them, and at home they received people who came for a while from the center of the country. They took such people with them on military campaigns, gave them at the "duvan" part of the booty due to them, and some of them even defended Azov during the siege of 1641. Solovyov is characterized by an exceptionally balanced approach to resolving the very difficult question of how connected the Don was with internal Russia. He managed to emphasize the originality and isolation of the Cossacks and at the same time their close connection with the population of Central Russia. The historian sees the manifestation of such a connection in the course of the Razin uprising itself.
At present, the view of the largest popular uprisings in Russia in the 17th-18th centuries, including the Razin uprising, as an uprising of the outskirts against the central government, has become widespread. Its supporters, M. M. Sokolsky and G. G. Nolte, point to the presence of serious contradictions between the center and the outskirts. At the same time, according to G.G. Nolte, the desire of their population to ensure greater self-determination of the regions was an important requirement of the new time, since this could contribute to their accelerated development. According to Solovyov, such contradictions are indeed one of the most important reasons for the Razin uprising. So, he notes that the Don Cossacks had "their own reasons for discontent, their own accounts with the government." They were not satisfied that gradually "Don became increasingly dependent on the Russian state." The danger of losing freemen "turned into violent resistance" of the Cossacks, which ultimately resulted in the Razin uprising (21, 81). The historian sees special reasons for the performance of the population of such a peculiar outskirts as Astrakhan, with its developed trade. The Astrakhans hoped to get rid of taxes and extortion with the help of Razin, to establish their own trade and profit from the wealth of others.
At the same time, Solovyov does not share the opinion that the Razin movement is only an uprising of the "common people of the inner Russian outskirts" (15, 36). If we consider the outskirts of the country those territories that were located to the south and east of the notch line, and the inner counties - to the north and west of it, then in the fall of 1670. the uprising spread to the inner counties up to Unzha and Vetluga, the Makariev Zheltovodsky Monastery and Arzamas. Solovyov calculated that the “peasant war zone” included 110 cities (21, 114), and the aspirations and aspirations of its participants, both in the central part of the country and outside it, were largely similar. There are grounds for speaking about the outskirts during the Razin uprising, but it would hardly be true to reduce the uprising only to this (however, just as well as only to the peasant war). Closer to the truth is the view of the Razin uprising and similar popular movements as a “complex and colorful phenomenon” that cannot be limited to “purely class boundaries” (20, 134).
However, popular movements are not only complex, but also deeply contradictory historical phenomena. Solovyov repeatedly emphasized the contradictions of the Razin uprising. Of particular interest is the way he highlighted the contradictions between the aspirations of the people who supported Razin and the real results of the temporary victory of the Razintsy in certain regions of the country, and primarily in Astrakhan, where the rebels held out the longest. Instead of the voivodship power, the Astrakhan Posad found itself under the rule of the Razin atamans, and the exactions and arbitrariness of the governors and clerks were replaced by the establishment of forced equality, the introduction of "military administration" and the dictates of the "urban goal" (21, 97).
If we continue the comparative series begun by the historian, then it should be of undoubted interest to compare what the initiators and instigators of the uprising, the Don Cossacks, aspired to, and what they actually received from Razin. The movement, raised in defense of the traditions of the Don free life and Cossack democracy, turned into a violation of liberty. This was also manifested in the organization of the Razintsy into a special army, which was an attempt on the traditional combined arms unity on the Don and the Cossack brotherhood, and in the murder on the circle on April 12, 1670. the royal envoy G. Evdokamov, contrary to the will of the Don army and the norms of military law, and in repeated threats by Stepan Razin and his atamans against the foremen and Cossacks in the Cherkasy town. So instead of freedom and military democracy, the Razin Cossacks established their essentially unlimited omnipotence on the Don. Largely due to this, by the spring of 1671. Razin had many opponents among the Don Cossacks. Apparently, the discrepancy between the aspirations, hopes, aspirations of the participants in popular movements in Russia and the results of these movements is a historical pattern. Of interest is the question posed by Solovyov - what could await the country in the event of a "successful outcome" of the Razin uprising? The historian substantiated the possibility of implementing such a historical alternative, firstly, by the fact that there are cases when peasant wars were won (Norway, China, Ukraine under Bogdan Khmelnitsky), and, secondly, by the fact that Razin could not have stayed at Simbirsk and lead his army "without turning and without delay ... through the agricultural regions with a peasant population to Moscow" (21, 193). However, to the question that naturally arises after this - what would happen next? - Solovyov did not answer. In his opinion, the "lack of clearly defined goals and objectives of the struggle among the rebels and, in general, the extreme contradictory nature of their goals" makes it difficult to give an answer (21, 194). The only thing that is completely clear to the historian is the groundlessness and utopianism of hopes for a “nationwide revolt” as a breakthrough “into the world of enlightened democratic freedom and civilized relations” (21, 194).
Solovyov, of course, is right when he does not try to clarify and concretize the picture of the life of the country in the event of the seizure of power by the Razintsy and is limited only to a general indication of the negative consequences of such an outcome of the uprising. At the same time, it is difficult to agree with the historian regarding the possibility of the military success of the Razintsy. Apparently, Solovyov nevertheless underestimated the power of the state and the degree of its superiority over the rebels. Razin could not abandon the fight for Simbirsk and go directly to Moscow. This was due to the peculiarities of the military-strategic thinking of the Don Cossacks, who traditionally attached exceptional importance to the waterway, and to the peculiarities of military tactics in all the largest popular movements in Russia in the 17th-18th centuries, a typical feature of which was the desire to master large fortified cities. And in general, Moscow was too tough a nut to crack for the rebels. Even during the Time of Troubles, when the state was weakened, Ivan Bolotnikov could not take it. Thus, Razin could hardly count on a military victory. Nevertheless, the question of an alternative outcome of the uprising is of undoubted interest. The search for an answer to it allows us to better understand the nature of the events that took place under Razin and the very essence of the popular uprisings in Russia.
Such an important problem as the influence of the Razin uprising on the policy of the Russian government after its suppression is very interesting. The authorities did a lot for that. to prevent something like this from happening again. However, the very low effectiveness of the measures taken is striking: the riots in Russia up to the Bulavin uprising followed, in essence, a continuous series. Raising and resolving the issue of the reasons for the inability of the tops of Russian society to find effective mechanisms to counteract the rebellious spirit widespread among the people will not only allow us to better understand the nature and characteristics of the country's development at the end of the 17th - 18th centuries, but, perhaps, shed new light on the historical tragedy of modern Russia. time.
In general, V. M. Solovyov made a valuable contribution to the study of the history of the Razin movement. He managed to show the uprising led by S. Razin as a very difficult phenomenon, which cannot be given an unambiguous assessment.
3. PEASANT WAR LEADED
E.I.PUGACHEVA.
3.1. Events leading up to the start of the war.
Second half of the 18th century distinguishes a sharp increase in the social activity of the working population: the owner, monastic and ascribed peasants, working people of manufactories, peoples of the Volga region, Bashkiria, Yaik Cossacks. It reached its apogee in the peasant war under the leadership of E. I. Pugachev.
On Yaik, where in September 1773. an impostor appeared, posing as Peter III, favorable conditions were created for his calls to resonate first with the Cossacks, and then with the peasants, working people, the Bashkirs and the peoples of the Volga region.
The tsarist government on Yaik, as elsewhere, where it ceased to need the services of the Cossacks for the defense of the border territory, began to pursue a policy of limiting its privileges: back in the 40s. the election of military chieftains was canceled, the Cossacks began to be recruited for service away from their native places. The economic interests of the Cossacks were also infringed - at the mouth of the river. Yaik, the government built uchugs (barriers) that prevented the movement of fish from the Caspian Sea to the upper reaches of the river.
The infringement of privileges caused the division of the Cossacks into two camps. The so-called "obedient" side was ready to agree to the loss of former liberties for the sake of preserving part of the privileges. The bulk was the "disobedient side", constantly sending walkers to the Empress with complaints about the oppression of the "obedient" Cossacks, in whose hands were all command posts.
In January 1772, the "naughty" Cossacks went with banners and icons to the tsarist general who arrived in Yaitsky town with a request to remove the military ataman and foremen. The general ordered to shoot at the peaceful procession. The Cossacks responded with an uprising, to suppress which the government sent a corps of troops.
After the events of January 13, the Cossack circle was banned and the military office was liquidated, the Cossacks were controlled by an appointed commandant, who was subordinate to the Orenburg governor. At this time, Pugachev appeared.
None of his impostor predecessors possessed the qualities of a leader capable of leading the masses of the dispossessed. In addition, Pugachev's success was facilitated by the favorable environment and the people to whom he turned for help to restore his supposedly violated rights: on Yaik, the excitement from the recent uprising and the government's response did not subside; Cossacks owned weapons and represented the most militarily organized part of the population of Russia.
3.2. The course of the peasant war.
The uprising began on September 17, 1773. Before 80 Cossacks, initiated into the "secret" of the salvation of Peter III, a manifesto was read out, and the detachment set off. The manifesto satisfied the aspirations of the Cossacks: the tsar granted them a river, herbs, lead, gunpowder, provisions, salaries. This manifesto did not yet take into account the peasant interests. But even what was promised was enough that the next day the detachment numbered 200 people, replenishment poured into its composition every hour. The almost three-week triumphal procession of Pugachev began. On October 5, 1773, he approached the provincial city of Orenburg, a well-defended fortress with a garrison of three thousand. The assault on the city was unsuccessful, and a six-month siege began.
Near Orenburg, the government sent an army under the command of Major General Kara. However, the rebel troops utterly defeated the 1.5 thousandth detachment of Kara. The same fate befell the detachment of Colonel Chernyshov. These victories over the regular troops made a huge impression. The uprising - some voluntarily, others under duress, was joined by the Bashkirs, led by Salavat Yulaev, mining workers, peasants assigned to factories. At the same time, the appearance in Kazan of Kara, who shamefully fled from the battlefield, sowed panic among the local nobility. Anxiety gripped the capital of the empire.
In connection with the siege of Orenburg and the long standing at the walls of the fortress of troops, whose number in other months reached 30 thousand people, the leaders of the movement faced tasks that the practice of previous movements did not know: it was necessary to organize the supply of the rebel army with food and weapons, to recruit regiments, counter government propaganda with the popularization of the movement's slogans.
In Berd, the headquarters of "Emperor Peter III", located 5 versts from the besieged Orenburg, his own court etiquette develops, his own guard arises, the emperor acquires a seal with the inscription "The Great State Seal of Peter III, Emperor and Autocrat of All Russia", at the young Cossack woman Ustinya Kuznetsova , whom Pugachev married, maids of honor appeared. At the headquarters, a body of military, judicial and administrative authority was created - the Military Collegium, which was in charge of the distribution of property seized from the nobles, officials and clergy, the recruitment of regiments, and the distribution of weapons.
In the usual form, borrowed from government practice. other social content was invested. The “king” did not favor noblemen as colonels, but representatives of the people. Former craftsman Afanasy Sokolov, better known by the nickname Khlopusha, became one of the prominent leaders of the insurgent army operating in the region of the factories of the Southern Urals. In the camp of the rebels appeared their own counts. The first of these was Chika-Zarubin, acting under the name of "Count Ivan Nikiforovich Chernyshev."
The proclamation of Pugachev as emperor, the formation of the Military Collegium, the introduction of count dignity, testifies to the inability of the peasantry and the Cossacks to change the old social system with a new one - it was a question of changing faces.
In the months when Pugachev was busy with the siege of Orenburg, the government camp was intensively preparing to fight the rebels. Troops were hastily drawn to the area of the uprising, instead of the removed Kara, General Bibikov was appointed commander-in-chief. To inspire the nobles and express her solidarity with them, Catherine declared herself a Kazan landowner.
The first major battle of the Pugachevites with the punitive army took place on March 22, 1774 near the Tatishchev fortress, it lasted six hours and ended in a complete victory for government troops. But the element of the peasant war is such that the losses were quickly replenished.
After this defeat, the second stage of the peasant war began.
Pugachev was forced to lift the siege of Orenburg and, pursued by government troops, move east. From April to June, the main events of the peasant war unfolded on the territory of the mining Urals and Bashkiria. However, the burning of factories, the seizure of livestock and property from bonded peasants and working people, violence against the population of factory settlements, led to the fact that the factory owners managed to arm working people at their own expense, organize detachments from them and send them against Pugachev. This narrowed the base of the movement and broke the unity of the rebels. Near the Trinity fortress, Pugachev suffered another defeat, after which he rushed first to the northwest, and then to the west. The ranks of the rebels were replenished by the peoples of the Volga region: Udmurts, Mari, Chuvashs. When Pugachev approached Kazan on July 12, 1774, there were 20 thousand people in his army. He captured the city, but he did not have time to take control of the Kremlin, where the government troops settled - Michelson arrived in time to help the besieged and inflicted another defeat on the rebels. On July 17, Pugachev, together with the remnants of the defeated army, crossed to the right bank of the Volga - to areas inhabited by serfs and state peasants. The third period of the peasant war began.
Pugachev's manifestoes were of great importance in restoring the number of rebel troops. Already in the manifestos promulgated in November 1773, the peasants were called upon "villains and opponents of my imperial will", which meant the landowners, to take their lives, "and take their houses and all their estate as a reward." The manifesto of July 31, 1774, which proclaimed the liberation of the peasants from serfdom and taxes, most fully reflected the peasant aspirations. The nobles, as "disturbers of the empire and destroyers of the peasants", were to "catch, execute and hang and act in the same way as they, having no Christianity in themselves, repaired with you, the peasants."
On the right bank of the Volga, the peasant war flared up with renewed vigor - rebel detachments were created everywhere, acting disunitedly and out of touch with each other, which facilitated the punitive efforts of the government: Pugachev easily occupied the cities - Kurmysh, Temnikov, Insar, etc., but with the same ease and left them under pressure from superior forces of government troops. He moved to the Lower Volga, where barge haulers, Don, Volga and Ukrainian Cossacks joined him. In August, he approached Tsaritsyn, but did not take the city. With a small detachment, Pugachev crossed to the left bank of the Volga, where the Yaik Cossacks who were with him seized him and on September 12, 1774, handed him over to Mikhelson.
The peasant war ended in defeat.
3.3. Some features of the Pugachev movement.
It was impossible to expect a different outcome of spontaneous protest against the arbitrariness of the authorities and landlords: armed with whatever, the crowds of the rebels could not resist the regiments of a well-armed and trained regular army. Let us note some features of the Pugachev movement.
The main ones consisted in attempts to overcome spontaneity by means borrowed from the government administration: under the newly-minted Emperor Peter III, the same rules were established as at the royal court in St. Petersburg. In these actions of Pugachev, the purpose of the movement clearly emerges: its leaders were to take the place of the executed nobles and representatives of the tsarist administration.
The call for the total destruction of the nobles, who were indeed put to death without trial or investigation, caused enormous damage to the development of national culture, because the most educated part of society was exterminated.
Another feature is that the rebels consciously and under the influence of the elements of destruction completely or partially defeated 89 iron and copper smelters, with a total cost, according to the factory owners, which is certainly exaggerated, at 2716 thousand rubles. The noble nests of European Russia, engulfed by the peasant war, turned out to be plundered.
The victors acted just as mercilessly and cruelly, putting to death thousands of participants in the movement. In the Nizhny Novgorod province alone, punishers built gallows in more than two hundred settlements. The Yaik Cossacks were renamed into the Ural Cossacks, and the Yaik River - into the Urals. The village of Zimoveyskaya, in which Pugachev was born, and a century before him - Razin, began to be called Potemkinskaya. On January 10, 1775, the leader of the peasant war and his associates were executed on Bolotnaya Square in Moscow. The nobility, headed by the "Kazan landowner" Catherine II, triumphed.
The peasant war did not bring relief to the peasants. On the contrary, the landowners continued to increase the duties in their favor and exacted them with greater bitterness than before. Nevertheless, the peasant war left a noticeable mark in the history of Russia, primarily by the fact that it supported the traditions of the fight against lawlessness and oppression.
CONCLUSION.
Peasant wars in Russia created and developed traditions of struggle against lawlessness and oppression. They have played their role in the history of Russia's political and social development.
Usually, assessing these events, historians note that the peasant wars dealt a blow to the feudal system and hastened the triumph of new capitalist relations. At the same time, it is often forgotten that the wars that engulfed the vast expanses of Russia led to the destruction of the masses of the population (and many peasants, a significant number of nobles), disrupted economic life in many regions and seriously affected the development of productive forces.
Violence and cruelty, fully shown by the opposing sides, could not solve any of the urgent problems of socio-economic development. The whole history of peasant wars and their consequences is the clearest confirmation of Pushkin's brilliant assessment: “The state of the entire region where the fire raged was terrible. God forbid to see a Russian rebellion - senseless and merciless. Those who are plotting impossible revolutions among us are either young and do not know our people, or they are cruelly hard-hearted people, to whom someone else's little head is a penny, and their own neck is a penny ”(7, 87).
What are peasant wars? A fair peasant punishment for the oppressors and feudal lords? A civil war in long-suffering Russia, during which Russians killed Russians? "Russian rebellion, senseless and merciless" (7, 87)? Each time gives its own answers to these questions. Apparently, any violence is capable of giving rise to even more cruel and bloody violence. It is immoral to idealize riots, peasant or Cossack uprisings (which, by the way, were done in our recent past), as well as civil wars, because generated by untruths and extortion, injustice and an irrepressible thirst for wealth, these uprisings, riots and wars themselves bring violence and injustice, grief and ruin, suffering and rivers of blood...
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